The History of Philosophy Group meets regularly to hear and discuss work in progress by various faculty members and graduate students working in the history of philosophy at CU-Boulder, including ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, and early modern philosophy. 
Mark Boespflug presenting “Descartes’ Epistemological Naturalism”, October 22, 2018
Mark Boespflug presenting “Descartes’ Epistemological Naturalism”, October 22, 2018

Fall 2018

Daniel Coren, "Aristotle on External Resting Points"
Monday October 8th, 2-3:30pm, Hellems 269

Mark Boespflug
Monday October 22nd, 2-3:30pm, Hellems 269

Philip Choi, "First Things First in Medieval Epistemology"
Monday November 12, 1:30 pm, Hellems 269

Spring 2018

Daniel Coren, "Aristotle on Motion in Incomplete Animals"
April 23, 4:00-6:00pm, Hellems 269

Fall 2017

Mark Boespflug, "Locke on Doxastic Voluntarism"
October 19, 2:30-4:00pm, Hellems 269


Spring 2017

Robert Pasnau, “Plato’s Protagoras on Akrasia”
January 23
Philip Choi, “Is John Burden an Epistemic Fallibilist?”
February 20
Gagan Sapkota, “The Role of the Myth of Cronus in Plato’s Statesman
February 27

Joseph Stenberg, "John Buridan on Happiness"
March 3, 3:30-5:00pm Hellems 269

Bob Pasnau, “Moments of Decision: A First Try at Medieval Voluntarism” (joint talk with CMEMS)
April 10

Dan Wolt (Sao Paolo), “Two conceptions of voluntary action in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
April 26, 3:30-5pm Hellems 269
It is nearly universally agreed among commentators that according to Aristotle’s account of voluntary action in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), for an action to be blameworthy it must be voluntary. I argue for a qualified rejection of this assumption: some blameworthy actions do not meet the criteria for voluntariness set out in NE 3.1. However, I argue that elsewhere in the NE one finds a broader conception of voluntary action, and it is true that an action must count as voluntary on the broader conception in order to be blameworthy. While according to the narrow conception found in 3.1 voluntary actions must be under the agent’s direct control, according to the broader conception an action may count as voluntary by being under the agent’s indirect control. An example is an action done in culpable ignorance of the particulars. These blameworthy actions are not voluntary in the narrow sense, but they are voluntary in the broader sense. I suggest, moreover, that the com presence of these two conceptions in the NE is not simply a matter of sloppiness on Aristotle’s part. Rather, he has good philosophical reasons for employing both. 

Fall 2016

Mitzi Lee, "Aristotle on Evil.”
Tuesday Sept. 1, 3:30-5pm Hellems 220.
Garret Bredeson, "How Does Kantian Virtue Differ from Aristotelian Continence—and Aristotelian Virtue?”
Tuesday Sept. 27, 3:30 - 5:00, Hellems 269.
Daniel Coren, "Everything moved must be moved by something: Aristotle's Physics VII.1 & VIII.4”
Tuesday Oct. 18, 3:30-5:00, Hellems 269
Caleb Cohoe (Metropolitan State University of Denver), “Everyone Wills to Live Forever: Augustine vs. the Stoics on Self-Preservation” 
Thursday Nov. 3,  5:00pm, HUMN 135
sponsored by the Center for Medieval and Early Modern Studies 
Mark Boespflug, "The Nature and Status of Voluntary Belief in Aquinas”
Tuesday Nov. 15, 3:30-5:00pm, Hellems 269

Tyler Huismann, "The art or the artisan? A causal puzzle in Aristotle"
Tuesday Nov. 29 3:30-5:00pm, Hellems 269

Daniel Coren presenting at a History of Philosophy workshop

Daniel Coren presenting to the History of Philosophy Group workshop, April 23, 2018