Matthias Steup (Ph.D. Brown, 1985) joined the Philosophy Department in July 2016. Previously, he was Department Head at Purdue University (2008-2016). He also taught at Grinnell College, the University of Wyoming, and St. Cloud State University in Minnesota. He works primarily in epistemology, particular on skepticism, perceptual justification, and the question of whether we have control over our beliefs. For more information see Professor Steup's personal website and CV.
- "Destructive Defeat and Justificational Force: The Dialectic of Dogmatism, Conservatism, and Meta-Evidentialism." Synthese, forthcoming.
- "Believing Intentionally," Synthese, forthcoming.
- "Foundational Justification, Meta-Justification, and Fumertonian Acquaintance," in Michael Bergmann and Brett Copenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance. Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism: 61-82. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- "Is Epistemic Circularity Bad?" Res Philosophica 90 (2013): 215-235.
- "Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism's Dilemma?" in Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism: 135-153. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- "Belief Control and Intentionality," Synthese 188 (2012): 145-163.
- "Evidentialist Anti-Skepticism," in Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and Its Discontents: 105-122. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- "Empiricism, Metaphysics, and Voluntarism," Synthese 178 (2011): 19-26. (Special issue on the work of Bas Van Fraassen, edited by Otávio Bueno and Darrell Rowbottom).
- "Are Mental States Luminous?" In William Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge: 217-236. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- "Doxastic Freedom," Synthese 161 (2008): 375-392. (Special Issue on Epistemic Deontology, edited by Nicholaj Nottelman.)
- "Internalist Reliabilism," Philosophical Issues 14, 2004, pp. 404-425.