Tuesday 1:00-3:00, and by appointment
Teaching in Spring 20: PHIL 1200 Honors. See the course website at https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/1200hSP20/
Chris Heathwood (PhD, UMass, 2005) joined the Department in 2005 and works mainly in theoretical ethics. He also has interests in the philosophy of mind (in particular, the nature of pleasure and pain) and metaphysics. Most of his research has been on the topic of well-being, or of what things are of ultimate benefit and harm to us, and on various topics in metaethics.
Current Research: Prof. Heathwood’s main research project is a book manuscript defending a desire-satisfaction theory of well-being. In a related side-project, he is investigating whether a desire-based theory of happiness is defensible. He is also working on a very short introductory book, Happiness and Well-Being, for Cambridge University Press and an invited paper for a forthcoming volume on Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons.
When he's not thinking about these topics or teaching about others, he is often hanging out with his two sons, Henry and Charlie, and wife, Nicki. When he's not doing that, he likes to listen to radio stories (which nowadays usually means podcasts), do Bikram yoga, play golf, watch baseball (Little League as much as MLB), or play guitar.
- "Which Desires Are Relevant to Well-Being?" Noûs 53 (2019): 664-688
- "Irreducibly Normative Properties," Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10 (2015): 216-244.
- “Subjective Theories of Well-Being," in B. Eggleston and D. Miller (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 199–219.
- "Could Morality Have a Source," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2012): 1-19.
- "Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare," Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6 (2011): 79-106.
- "The Relevance of Kant's Objection to Anselm's Ontological Argument," Religious Studies 47 (2011): 345-57.
- "Preferentism and Self-Sacrifice," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011): 18-38.
- "Moral and Epistemic Open-Question Arguments," Philosophical Books 50 (2009): 83-98
- “Fitting Attitudes and Welfare,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3 (2008): 47-73.
- “The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire,” Philosophical Studies 133 (2007): 23-44.
- “Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism,” Philosophical Studies 128 (2006): 539-563.
- “The Problem of Defective Desires,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 487-504.