China's Nuclear Belt & Road program

Socio-technical perspectives on China’s export nuclear infrastructures

In-person, April 22-23, 2022, Boulder, CO

This will be the second of three workshops organized for the project A Tale of Two Asias: Living In and Beyond the Nuclear Age, hosted by the Center for Asian Studies. Funding for the project is being provided by the Albert Smith Nuclear Age Fund at the University of Colorado Boulder. 

About the project

The Center for Asian Studies is hosting three focused workshops exploring the similarities and differences in Japanese and Chinese experiences of nuclear energy development. Already engaged in a broader examination of Asian infrastructure development through the China Made project, we explore Japanese and Chinese modes of living in the nuclear age through a socio-technical lens, including considerations of the impacts of energy infrastructures on everyday life, social movements and cultural engagements with nuclear energy development, and the political implications of infrastructural risk and vulnerability. Collectively, these workshops ask: What are the socio-technical dimensions of efforts to both survive in and move beyond the nuclear age in Asia? What do we learn from paying particular attention to the Japanese and Chinese contexts of these efforts?

In March 2021, we hosted “A Decade of Fukushima: socio-technical perspectives on surviving the nuclear age in Japan.” This first workshop in the project featured an international gathering of 10 scholars, with 5 papers presented. Workshop papers and discussion comments can be found on the project website. With this workshop, attention focused on the case of Japan which experienced a decade ago the triple disaster earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear reactor meltdown in the northern Tohoku region. Presentations explored socio-technical perspectives on how people in Japan have lived with the aftermath of the March 11, 2011 events. Our approach for the workshop was meant to recognize that nuclear power enrolls people, as individuals and as social collectivities, into a particular and peculiar set of relationships with technology. Those relationships blur the boundaries between science and society, and between technology and culture, in unique and compelling ways. The workshop focused on questions such as: How do people – in their everyday lives – understand and practice their relationship to radiation? How do they calculate different kinds of risk? How do they come to be involved in the measurement of radiation and the science of predicting health-related effects of radiation?

About the second workshop: China’s Nuclear Belt & Road

Three years after the Fukushima disaster, China’s President Xi Jinping announced his signature foreign policy initiative: the ‘Belt & Road’ (一带一路). Designed in large part to address China’s chronic oversupply of domestic infrastructural construction capacity, much of the BRI focuses on developing energy infrastructure connectivities across Asia and beyond, with nuclear power being a significant part of this infrastructure development. With 47 existing reactors which already account for 1/5 of global nuclear power generating capacity, China proposes to build at least 30 new reactors across Asia, as part of the BRI, by 2030. This in addition to the 43 new reactors already planned for construction withinChina. In contrast to Japan, then, China’s future reliance on nuclear power is guaranteed. Indeed, China increasingly presents itself as a model of how to live in the nuclear age, while in Japan there has been much greater emphasis on living beyond the nuclear age.

This second workshop will explore the prospects for, and possible consequences of, China’s efforts to position itself, and Asia more broadly, as the global leader in nuclear power production. What have been the social, economic, cultural, and/or political effects and implications of China’s nuclear energy infrastructure development both within China and in other Asian countries where China is currently investing in nuclear energy development projects? In keeping with the broader project’s socio-technical lens, we hope to emphasize in our discussions the relationships between local communities and nuclear technology within the broader context of China’s growing influence throughout the Asian continent and beyond.

Participants are asked to consider the general questions raised in the project and workshop descriptions above. These can be summarized as follows:

• For the project overall: What are the technopolitical dimensions of efforts to both survive in and move beyond the nuclear age in Asia? What do we learn from paying particular attention to the Japanese and Chinese contexts of these efforts?
• For this workshop more specifically: What is the current state of China’s export nuclear energy infrastructure efforts? What connections can be drawn between those exports and China’s domestic nuclear industries? To what extent is China promoting itself as a model for a new generation of nuclear power developments? What have been the on-the-ground effects of China’s nuclear energy infrastructure investment and development? How has China addressed potential and/or actual nuclear accidents? How have the risks of nuclear energy been addressed at local levels within China and/or in Belt & Road partner countries? What sorts of local political issues have emerged around Chinese nuclear infrastructures outside of China? How have non-Chinese civil society and media institutions engaged with China’s nuclear investments?

These questions are merely meant to generate thoughts and ideas. Participants should feel free to consider other issues in their responses. Participants are also encouraged to be provocative, experimental, and not constrained by normal academic conventions when writing their papers.

Preliminary Program

Format: Each 45 minute session will involve a presentation (20-30 minutes), followed by discussant comments (5 minutes), followed by general Q&A.

Friday April 22^nd

Venue: Center for British & Irish Studies, Norlin Library, CU Boulder Campus

Morning Program

9:30 – 9:45       Welcome and Introductory session

9:45 – 10:30     China’s Nuclear Cooperation and Global Security (Lynn Lee, Princeton University)

10:30 – 11:00    Break

11:00 – 11:45    China’s Pledge on Overseas Coal and the Nuclear Belt and Road (Lami Kim, US Army War College)

Afternoon Program

1:00 – 2:30       Title TBA (Jessica Lovering, Good Energy Collective)

2:30 – 3:15       Exporting Reactors? Nuclear Energy and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (MV Ramana, University of British Columbia)

3:15 – 3:45       Break

3:45 – 4:15       The Weight of China’s Nuclear Projects May Lead to Global Spondylosis(Ipshita Bhattacharya (Jagran LakeCity University)

4:15 – 4:45       Nuclear Innovation: China’s Strategy (Yi-chong Xu, Griffith University)

Saturday April 23^rd

Venue: Flatirons Room, Center for Community, CU Boulder Campus

10:00-11:30      Roundtable Discussion: What’s next for China’s Nuclear Belt & Road and for nuclear power globally?

Abstracts

“The Weight of China’s Nuclear Projects May Lead to Global Spondylosis”

Ipshita Bhattacharya, Jagran LakeCity University, Bhopal

China launched its most ambitious plan in 2013 in form of Belt and Road Initiative. In another decade China is planning to establish and finance thirty nuclear reactor projects in BRI countries, which will have regional as well as global political implications. Since China is investing in nuclear projects it will have more dominance and interference in the global nuclear market, and in international nuclear governance. Eventually this will lead to the dependence of the BRI host countries of nuclear projects on China.

Since these host countries often don’t have rigorous regulations and necessary institutions to follow the rule of law, the limitation to adhere to the application of international standards, the technological advancements, infrastructure and the knowledge to deal with the radioactive material, they will have to depend largely on China that might lead to compromised negotiations on the part of local stakeholder’s interests. In this situation the application of laissez-faire method by Beijing for the infrastructural developmental support will easily procure the Chinese actors the project deals completely exempting them from the environmental, social and legal consequences and independently and dominantly allowing them to make profits by cutting corners. This study will majorly explain the socio-political impact assessment, along with technological and legal bottlenecks on part of BRI host countries for these nuclear projects and critically weigh the prospective potential benefits of China in comparison to BRI countries hosting the nuclear projects. Second part will deal with the potential global threat posed by the Chinese strategy of bringing down gravity of nuclear trade to a level of easy open retail commerce. The dichotomy of nuclear power enablement lies in the fact that whereas the knowhow and the technology enable and ensure national development: the grave ramifications loom large globally on its misuse or abuse.

“China’s Pledge on Overseas Coal and the Nuclear Belt and Road”

Lami Kim, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA

In September 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China will not build new coal power plants abroad.  How will this decision affect the Nuclear Belt and Road, China’s ambition to export nuclear power plants to the Belt and Road countries?  The Nuclear Belt and Road could be a boon from the environmental perspective.  Powering China’s massive development and infrastructure building projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with coal would be a disaster for the environment. While renewables are not yet reliable and affordable, nuclear energy is a clean alternative to fossil fuels. However, China’s problematic industrial safety track record, in addition to its rampant corruption problem, generate concerns about nuclear accidents.  In addition, many BRI countries mostly lack rigorous regulations and the necessary technology, know-how and personnel to handle the atoms safely.  This paper will examine the impact of China’s pledge to stop building coal power plants abroad on its ambitions for the Nuclear Belt and Road, as well as implications from the environmental/nuclear safety perspective.

Lami Kim is an Assistant Professor in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, a US-Korea NextGen Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an Adjunct Fellow at Pacific Forum. Her research interests are all things nuclear, emerging technologies and international security, and security issues in East Asia. Her work has appeared or is forthcoming in The Washington Quarterly, Global Governance, War on the Rocks, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the National Bureau of Asian Research, Routledge, and The Diplomat, among others. She has been interviewed by Time magazine, Al-Jazeera and the LA Times, among others. She has served as a research fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center, the Wilson Center, Pacific Forum, and the Stimson Center; as a Nuclear Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; as a Visiting Fellow at Seoul National University; and also as a South Korean diplomat.  She has taught at Harvard University, Boston College, and the University of Hong Kong. She holds a PhD degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a Master’s degree from Harvard University.

“China’s Nuclear Cooperation and Global Security”

Lynn Lee, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

How would the expansion of China’s civil nuclear cooperation through the BRI affect the global nuclear security and safety culture? On the one hand, the impact may be marginal because China has been abiding by the rules and norms of the global nuclear regime. Not only has China safely operated its nuclear power reactors for decades, it has adapted to this regime through extensive bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Institutionally, the structure of this regime and China’s position in it may constrain the degree of China’s influence on the culture. On the other hand, the impact may be significant because China is exporting nuclear energy to new comer states, which renews concerns in nuclear proliferation, accident and terrorism. Also, the addition of these states that are not signatories of the 123 Agreement may weaken the U.S. control of the security and safety culture. In this paper, I first conceptualize the global nuclear regime, the current nuclear security and safety culture, and the extent of China’s civil nuclear cooperation. Then, I analyze China’s potential impact on the culture from the above mentioned angles. In terms of the methodology, I examine China’s intention and policy through analyzing Chinese official documents, academic publications and other open source material. Second, I intend to conduct semi-structured interviews with nuclear energy experts from China and its partner states including the U.S., South Korea and the UK to examine China’s actual practices in nuclear security and safety.

Lynn Lee is a PhD candidate in Security Studies in the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Her academic interests lies in nuclear issues in Northeast Asia, such as China’s nuclear strategy and military modernization, and North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. In her dissertation, she examines China’s influence strategy through critical infrastructure construction projects (ex. nuclear energy exports) and dual use technology transfer, and intends to contribute to the development of a counter-hegemonic theory. At Princeton, she is student director of the Center for International Security Studies. She holds a MA in China Studies from the Yenching Academy at Peking University and a BS in Foreign Service from Georgetown University. She is fluent in Korean and Mandarin, and proficient in French.

“Exporting Reactors? Nuclear Energy and China’s Belt and Road Initiative”

M.V. Ramana, University of British Columbia

Nuclear power features prominently in China’s plans for exports of energy technologies under the Belt and Road Initiative. One Chinese official has even suggested that China build “an energy community with a shared future for mankind with nuclear power as a bond”. In February 2022, China National Nuclear Corporation signed an agreement to build a nuclear plant in Argentina. This marks China’s first export of a nuclear reactor to a country other than Pakistan. At the same time, prospects for nuclear energy around the world have been quite dismal, with the technology’s market share in continuous decline since the mid 1990s. This talk will examine the trends in nuclear power around the world and the causes for these trends. It will then go on to examining the recent history of nuclear power export targets set by Chinese officials and agreements with various countries, as well as the specific case of the high temperature gas cooled reactor, before offering a brief prognosis of future reactor exports from China.

M.V. Ramana is the Simons Chair in Disarmament, Global and Human Security and Director of the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. He is the author of The Power of Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy in India (Penguin Books, 2012) and co-editor of Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream (Orient Longman, 2003). Ramana is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, the Canadian Pugwash Group, the International Nuclear Risk Assessment Group, and the team that produces the annual World Nuclear Industry Status Report. He is the recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship and a Leo Szilard Award from the American Physical Society.

“Nuclear Innovation: China’s Strategy”

Yi-chong Xu, Griffith University

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle – Sun Tzu. 

The United States and France have the world’s largest nuclear power fleets and Russia sells more power stations globally. China is catching up quickly, having the most nuclear power plants (NPP) built in the past three decades and the most NPPs under construction in the world. Most significantly it is developing advanced nuclear technologies, specifically closed fuel cycle nuclear reactors and small modular reactors, to compete in the global transition to low-carbon energy. This takes place in a near absence of global competition in these areas. Its impact will be strategic and broad, affecting not only the nuclear industry, but also industrial capacity, energy transition, international trade, and, most importantly, standard setting through international institutions such as the IAEA. In a globalised economy, who controls the standards, controls the market. With economic power and influence flowing away from fossil fuels, new sources of influence are emerging that will be anchored in a raft of technologies, among which is advanced nuclear technology. 

This paper examines the development of these two technologies – closed fuel cycle nuclear reactors and small modular reactors – to explain how China is engaging in global competition and to identify its potential impact. It concludes that China is not seeking to compete for global market shares with the known technologies developed more than half century ago. Rather, it is aiming for new technologies, new standards, and new markets, as it has been doing in many other sectors. This analysis provides just one example of the way in which China is reshaping the geostrategic landscape through technological innovation.