

Tactical *Negrificación* and White Femininity

Race, Gender, and Internationalism in Cuba's Angolan Mission

Lorraine Bayard de Volo

At the ideological heart of the Cuban Revolution is the commitment to liberation from oppressive systems at home and abroad. From early on, as it supported anti-imperialist struggles, revolutionary Cuba also officially condemned racism and sexism. However, the state's attention to racism and sexism has fluctuated—it has been full-throated at times, silent at others. In considering Cuba's legacy, this essay examines gender and race in its international liberatory efforts while also considering the human costs of armed internationalism. Why did women feature prominently in some instances and not others? As a “post-racial” society where “race doesn't matter,” how are we to understand those occasions in which race officially *did* matter?

I focus on Cuba's Angola mission (1975–91) to explore the revolution's uneven attention to gender and race.¹ Rather than consistently battling inequities, the state approached gender and racial liberation separately and tactically, as means to military, political, and diplomatic ends. Through *negrificación* (blackening) of national identity, Cuba highlighted race to internationally legitimize and domestically mobilize support for its Angola mission.² In contrast, despite their high profile in the Cuban insurrection of the 1950s and 1980s defense, women were a relatively minor theme in the Angolan mission.

Several prominent studies note the international factors behind Cuba's racial politics, but they have a domestic focus, leaving international dynamics relatively

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unexplored.³ Here, I examine the international dynamics of race and gender in the Angola mission. While the state highlighted African ancestry internationally, women were a minor and primarily domestic theme. Few military women served in Angola, though many went as civilian internationalists. I suggest that military women's femininity was furthermore racialized, as idealized feminine combatants were typically represented as white and light-skinned women despite a diverse racial composition. Finally, regarding (in)visibility and Cuba's internationalism, I explore evidence of ambivalence and trauma among veterans that conflicts with the glowing testimonials of state media. Though these are predictable outcomes of armed conflict, military and civilian *internacionalistas* have no state-sanctioned public channel for critically assessing the mission in Angola or acknowledging psychological distress.

Racial and Gender Equality as Goals and Tools

Revolutionary Cuba adopted a single-issue framework, focusing on either race or gender, rather than an intersectional framework attending to the multiply oppressed. It outlawed discrimination, channeled Afro-Cubans and women into the public sphere of work, education, the military, and the Communist Party, and trusted economic redistribution to solve inequalities.⁴ Problematically, Cuba "sought to use advances in the areas of race and gender to legitimize its activities and consolidate state power."⁵ In doing so, it defaulted to representing Black soldiers as men and women soldiers as white. In sum, gender and racial equality, official revolutionary goals, were also tools to advance the state, yet Afro-Cuban women at the intersection of racial and gender oppression were largely absent from representations of internationalist New Men and Women.

From early on, Cuba represented its revolutionary promise and accomplishments to a global audience by embracing internationalism as well as racial and gender liberation. Addressing Latin American leaders in 1961, Che Guevara declared Cuba's solidarity with the world's oppressed peoples while also confirming Cuba's commitment to liberation from racial and gender discrimination. Cuba, he explained, "took many steps to affirm human dignity, one of the first having been the abolition of racial discrimination."⁶ Che also remarked on advances in women's liberation, yet as scholars note, gender equality was relegated to a secondary status.⁷ Fidel Castro declared, "The liberation of women is dependent upon the Revolution's success in attaining its primary objectives: to establish a wholly socialist economy and society."⁸ Nonetheless, the state often touted women's advances as evidence of the revolution's success, and women's military participation was an early measure.⁹ In celebrating the rebel triumph in 1959, Castro characterized women's participation as a rebel accomplishment: "We have proven that in Cuba it is not only men who fight. Women also fight."¹⁰

While women's equality was a secondary if unfinished goal, Cuba declared the race problem solved while shutting down independent Black organizing, which it viewed as divisive.¹¹ Despite claims of a raceless society, racism remains and racial politics follow "patterns of opening and retrenchment" according to state needs.¹² The literature indicates that in Cuba, international factors are key drivers of racial politics.¹³ Cuba emphasized race to embarrass the United States for its lack of progress on racial equality and to promote socialism in the Global South.¹⁴ With its Angola mission, Cuba departed from its previous claims of being a raceless society to selectively claim a Latin African identity.¹⁵ In what follows, I explore how and why Cuba raised the issues of race and gender separately and tactically, depending upon the degree to which those issues supported its Angolan mission.

Tactical Negricación: *Internacionalismo* and the Mission in Angola

In the name of *internacionalismo* (international solidarity), Cuba initiated Operation Carlota, entering the Angolan conflict in late 1975 as three Angolan rebel armies clashed when the Portuguese colonial power departed. It secretly sent 1,100 troops to support the leftist People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and thwart South African military incursions.¹⁶ Cuba ultimately sent tens of thousands of additional soldiers and support personnel. Over the course of sixteen years (1975–90), 377,033 Cuban combatants and over 50,000 Cuban civilian workers served in Angola, with 2,077 deaths.¹⁷

Operation Carlota significantly shaped African politics. It was pivotal in establishing MPLA control in Angola, ending South Africa's grip on neighboring Namibia, and toppling Apartheid itself.¹⁸ Nelson Mandela thanked Cuba in 1991: "In Africa we are used to being victims of countries that want to take from us our territory or overthrow our sovereignty. In African history there is not another instance where another people has stood up for one of ours."¹⁹ According to Piero Gleijeses, "Victory in Angola boosted Cuba's prestige in the Third World," with Cubans now "regarded as heroes in the Black world."²⁰

Soon after the mission began, Castro proclaimed Cubans to be a "Latin-African people," an unprecedented acknowledgment of racial identity that linked it to solidarity with African peoples.²¹ He explained, "Many are the things that unite us to Angola: our cause, our common interests, politics, ideology. But we are also united by blood . . . in the two senses of the word, blood of our ancestors and blood we shed together on the battlefields."²² Jorge Risquet, the highest-ranking Cuban official in Angola, had declared in 1959 that the "revolution does not have a color, except the olive green color of the revolutionary army."²³ Yet in 1985, addressing the MPLA Congress, he too embraced the racial shared-origin story: "The Cuban and Angolan peoples have been together for a long time [and] African slaves, many of them from the territory that is now Angola, were part of the Cuban liberation army in the wars against Spanish colonialism."²⁴ Similarly, Cubans were

said to be “returning” to Africa to aid Angola’s independence and repel the mercenary and racist armies of the United States and Apartheid South Africa.

This was an instance of tactical *negrificación*, by which the state positioned Cuba as Black relative to other white-dominated nations, especially the United States and South Africa.²⁵ In contemporary Cuba, Kaifa Roland finds that the post-Soviet rise of tourism has racialized Cubans and Cuba itself as Black, in contrast to the racialized white Europe and North America. However, unlike this contemporary *negrificación*, in which Cubans experience themselves as “onerously black,” the tactical *negrificación* of Cuba in its Angola mission aimed at racial pride.²⁶

In part, tactical *negrificación* responded to symbolic dimensions of global Cold War politics. Cuba’s Angolan mission came as the United States was reeling from defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. Leading into the 1976 elections, the Ford administration faced conservative criticism of US-Soviet *détente* plus fears that the United States was perceived as weak, as the early “victory of Soviet-backed forces in Angola [became] a symbol of United States helplessness.”²⁷ The US press and policymakers obsessed about the USSR’s role in Angola, with Cuba only occasionally and obliquely mentioned as a Soviet-backed force.

But Cuba did not escape blame, and President Gerald Ford vilified Castro as an “international outlaw” for sending troops to Angola.²⁸ Aiming at the heart of Cuban *internacionalismo*, the United States condemned Cuba for perpetuating the wrongs the revolution claimed to fight against, labeling Cuba and its Soviet allies as racist, imperialist aggressors. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger accused Cuba of having “never had any historic interests” in Angola.²⁹ Taking up the attack, the *New York Times* called Cuba’s Angola mission “a blatant military intervention by white powers from distant continents in the internal affairs of a black African country.”³⁰ Similarly, an opinion editorial framed Cuban troops as “mercenaries” doing the bidding of their Soviet “paymaster.”³¹ Angolan rebels fighting against the MPLA denounced Cuban troops as a foreign army of occupation.³²

In response, Cuba insisted it acted out of solidarity, with no desire to control Angola or exploit its resources, and that it had made its decision autonomously, without Soviet direction. In a 1976 article in *Verde Olivo*, the Cuban military magazine, an officer argued that unlike the United States, Cuba would never invade a country to subjugate it, as doing so is “antithetical to revolutionary principles.”³³ Fifteen years later, Raúl Castro claimed: “All [*internacionalistas* who served in Angola] were moved by a single interest: to save and consolidate the fraternal Republic of Angola. . . . We have brought nothing back but the satisfaction of having done our duty and the remains of our comrades who fell.”³⁴

As reassurance particularly to African nations that its Angola mission was not an occupation, Cuba claimed to answer the call of its African “brothers”—brothers in the familial sense of shared blood, in the ideological sense of shared ideals, and as

“brothers in arms.”³⁵ As Fidel Castro put it in 1975, “We do not fold our arms when we see an African people, our brother that the imperialists want devoured, suddenly and brutally attacked by South Africa.”³⁶ This was a fraternal, bilateral relationship, then, and not a Cuban occupation.³⁷ The image of Cuban Latin-Africans fighting alongside Black African brothers against imperialism and Apartheid combined *internacionalismo* with race-based liberation to produce a radical inversion of global racial power relations. In addition to bolstering criticism of the US government, it also helped Cuba frame the predominately white and vehemently anti-Castro Cuban exile community as “passionately racist.”³⁸ Notably, this image of racial brotherhood was gendered masculine, thus challenging racial but not gender hierarchies.³⁹

Domestic Legacies of Racial Politics and Internationalism

The Angolan mission’s domestic legacy on race relations is less clear. Initially, Cuba selectively deployed dark-skinned Afro-Cuban soldiers, with the idea that they could blend in with local allies.⁴⁰ While this tactic was meant to evade the CIA, it also had the domestic effect of highlighting the courage and internationalist spirit of Afro-Cuban soldiers. In addition, Cuba named the mission Operation Carlota after an Afro-Cuban woman who died leading a 1844 slave uprising.⁴¹ Aisha Finch finds that Carlota’s actions and identity as a Black woman became “an intriguing metonym through which to read individual eruptions of black rage and the collective desires of black militancy.”⁴² Indeed, over 130 years later, on the anniversary of Carlota’s slave uprising, the revolutionary state took up her memory, hailing Black identity while also tapping into the revolution’s faith in women’s abilities. Internationalists “returned” to Africa “to extend the legend of Carlota, the Cuban-African heroine,” a framing emblematic of Cuba’s tactical *negrificación* in which Cuban-ness evoked African ancestry.⁴³ Named after a woman rebel slave, Cuba’s mission began with a recognition of the revolutionary potential of Afro-Cuban women; however, during the course of the mission, the gendered aspect of the reference receded.

Roughly half the Cuban population has African ancestry, and Afro-Cuban men were overrepresented in the rank-and-file of the military.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the Angolan struggle began as one against the white Portuguese colonial power followed by the intervention of Apartheid South Africa. The literature suggests, accordingly, that Cuba’s aid to the independence struggles of Black Africans played well to the global subaltern. As Frank Taylor asserts, “Operation Carlota established beyond the shadow of doubt Fidel’s credentials as ‘one of the blackest men in the Americas.’”⁴⁵

There is evidence that it encouraged Afro-Cuban support for the Angola mission.⁴⁶ For example, Reverend Abbuno González of the Cuban Pentecostal Church stated, “My grandfather came from Angola. So it’s my duty to go and help Angola. I owe it to my ancestors.”⁴⁷ Merida Rodrigues, a Black woman who had served as a

civilian internacionalista in Angola, mentioned the “African heritage of slavery” in explaining her sense of obligation to help Angola. She was further motivated because “[Angola] had so many needs,” which reminded her of her own poor and predominately Black community before the revolution.⁴⁸ However, as I discuss below, internationalists interviewed over a decade later did not highlight race as a motivator.

(In)Visible Gender

Normatively and numerically, Cuban soldiers were overwhelmingly men, but the form of masculinity adopted by the Cuban state was remarkably low-key. Fidel Castro’s comments at the burial of internacionalistas illustrate the state’s position throughout the mission: “It is not our intention at this solemn time to boast of our successes or to humiliate anyone, not even those who were our adversaries. Our country was not looking for military glory or prestige. . . . Even though we always acted with all the necessary firmness, at no time during the negotiating process did we utter an arrogant, dominating, or boastful word.”⁴⁹ Indeed, only rarely were



Figure 1. *Verde Olivo* cartoon (March 21, 1976, by René de la Nuez), featuring Angola as a Black combatant and Cuba unnamed but represented as the inanimate globe “Solidarity.” The two confront their Angolan enemies, the racially indistinct rats, as well as white imperialists: the United States (as Uncle Sam) and South Africa.

victories announced, and those were often described in terms of tactics more than heroics. Consistently, the state portrayed the military as disciplined soldiers doing their duty, motivated exclusively by solidarity, in marked contrast to greedy, racist, neoimperialist adversaries. Both sides performed a version of masculine strength that rendered them formidable adversaries, but in this rendering, Cuba claimed an honorable masculinity that it contrasted to its corrupt and dishonorable masculine adversary.

As the cartoon by René de la Nuez illustrates (fig. 1), Cuba also took pains not to outshine its Angolan ally and consistently portrayed its soldiers as playing in a supporting role alongside Black Angolans rather than leading in battle.⁵⁰ One Cuban leader explained, “We thought it would be much more dignified if the people we had helped talked about [our aid].”⁵¹ This sensitivity arose in part because some African states viewed Cuba as an occupier on the continent.⁵² Accordingly, this position of Cuban humility avoided offending African governments.

Given Cuba’s 1960s baby boom and male draft, the Angolan mission did not need new sources of recruits, namely women, unlike in the 1980s War of All the People, in which women were the central focus and hundreds of thousands were mobilized into militias. Though a small number of Cuban military women served in Angola, gender was not central to the state propaganda, which focused instead on Afro-Cuban identity and *internacionalismo*.⁵³ The exceptions tended to involve Angolan women, mothers of male combatants or, after 1984, women of the anti-aircraft artillery units.

Early Cuban media references to women and Angola often focused on Angolan women, celebrating combatant motherhood in particular. A 1976 *Verde Olivo* article praised Angolan women in combat: “She wants to . . . demonstrate once again that she is capable of being just like you . . . to defeat the enemy of humanity. . . . She is going to defend the child of her womb. And take the rifle and shoot, just like you, for the child to live. So that all the children live.”⁵⁴ Mariana Grajales, Cuba’s mixed-race mother figure of the wars of independence, was also a common reference. In 1978, *Verde Olivo* celebrated International Women’s Day by honoring mothers of military sons and daughters: “Dignified inheritors of Mariana Grajales’ example, [who have] given to the country their precious children who made today’s freedom possible . . . [and] who endure the absence of loved ones with legitimate revolutionary pride.”⁵⁵ With such stirring references to maternal strength and suffering, Cuba adhered to traditional gendered divisions of war.

The Cuban media also hailed women in ways that more directly challenged gender norms, though these depictions were inevitably accompanied by references that confirmed military women’s femininity was intact. Women were regularly described as “also there,” offering unique feminine contributions: “The Cuban woman was also there [in Angola], an example of heroism, dedication, and bravery. In Angola, . . . women were the vital and decisive companions to men, contributing

to the resurgence of peace and love.”⁵⁶ The Women’s Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment in Angola, established on International Women’s Day in 1984, received Cuban media attention far out of proportion to its size. *Verde Olivo* featured artillery women stationed at the border of the US base in Guantanamo. These “brave and enthusiastic girls [*muchachas*]” hope to serve in Angola: “It still is not known who will [go to Angola], but there were tears of protest among those who feared they would not be selected.”⁵⁷ As these examples illustrate, references to women’s courage and revolutionary commitment were habitually balanced with feminine attributes—peace, love, and “tears of protest.”

Articles covering *internacionalistas* such as the artillery women, especially articles oriented more toward mobilizing support than conveying news, were typically accompanied by photos of a few white and lighter-skinned women. This racialized representation was so common that I was surprised, upon seeing a group photo of the entire women’s artillery regiment stationed in Angola, to find that its members were predominately mixed-race or darker-skinned Afro-Cuban women. The link between idealized femininity and whiteness most likely was not state policy so much as a manifestation of subconscious bias. Regardless, it demonstrates Afro-Cuban women’s invisibility even as the state represented internationalism as a means of women’s liberation.

Some articles indirectly addressed the question of women’s virtue among so many men. Milagros Karina Soto, a political officer attached to a tank brigade, maintained that as the only woman in her unit, she has “received some of the most interesting and agreeable compliments” of her life: “I have never felt better about being a woman, because I sense, from the soldier to the highest officer, their respect and admiration for the *compañeras*. At times they care for us too much; they are afraid that we may be risking too much. . . . But we want to be with them anywhere they need us.”⁵⁸

Military women were unfailingly framed as eager, having earned their right to fight. Discussing artillery women, Fidel Castro rhetorically asked, “Could we deny women the opportunity of also participating?”⁵⁹ Their participation confirmed the revolution’s support for women’s equality. As Vilma Espín, head of the Federation of Cuban Women, explained, “women went to fight in Angola, fulfilling an internationalist duty. And they did not do it because there were not enough men to send there, but because our party believes that is also the right of women.”⁶⁰

Most Cuban women in Angola were civilian *internacionalistas*: medical personnel, teachers, journalists, entertainers, and construction workers. Victoria Britain described “young women with pink earrings and ponytails,” many of whom “had left a child at home with a grandmother for their two years in Angola.”⁶¹ However, each completed basic military training, and some were attacked and returned fire.⁶² This militarized aspect of civilian work in Angola, which entailed stress and trauma as well as physical danger, was not part of official Cuban discourse.

In sum, Cuban coverage of women's participation in the Angola mission was a consistent but not prominent theme. While *negrificación* was primarily oriented to an international audience, representations of women addressed a domestic one, sometimes hewing to traditional gender relations, sometimes challenging them, but often tapping into a femininity racialized as white or lighter-skinned.

Internacionalista Ambivalence and Trauma

When it comes to memory, Angola now evokes ambivalence or even trauma for many Cubans. In her research with predominately civilian internacionalistas, Christine Hatzky found that most “were fundamentally persuaded not only of the success of the internationalist concept, but also that what they themselves were doing was right”; nonetheless, “In the memories of many Cubans . . . Angola remains a difficult phase in their history.”⁶³ Most critically, among interviewees she found trauma, anxiety, stress, and despair to be common experiences.⁶⁴ Although the state legitimized the Angolan mission through claims to an African ancestry and the “return” to Africa to fight alongside their “brothers,” Hatzky found little evidence of a special affinity for Africa in general or Angola in particular, and only a few of those interviewed mentioned searching for their African roots as a reason for volunteering.⁶⁵ It is not clear whether the importance of the Cuban connection to Africa had become diluted over time or if state sources during the mission did not accurately reflect public sentiment.

During my fieldwork, Cubans who readily spoke on a range of other topics were typically reluctant to speak about Angola in a formal interview setting. This hesitancy was likely influenced by the state secrecy that had surrounded the mission—a hesitancy compounded by my identity as a US citizen. But in more spontaneous moments, many Cubans raised Angola on their own, asserting that it was a mistake and waste of resources, a view often influenced by a perception of abandonment by their Angolan ally once the conflict was over.

Critical perspectives are also evident in artistic expressions.⁶⁶ For example, several Cubans who were reluctant to detail their own Angolan experience instead referred me to Frank Delgado's 1995 song “Veterano,” which Robert Nasatir describes as “a bitter evocation of the personal cost of the Angolan conflict.”⁶⁷ Delgado sings of having been ignorant of Angola until his unit was loaded onto a plane “without many explanations” and, “confused and with camouflage clothing . . . , we landed in a city called Luanda.” He describes his mother as “truly alone, looking for me on a map written in Portuguese.” He also recalls Angolans' fickle reception:

One day we were received with joy
another day that we expected the same
They insulted us and cursed us.

His lyrics also touch on the intentions of Cuban troops, which ranged from admirable to questionable. In acknowledging concerns for his abandoned mother, the dubious honor of some of his “brothers-in-arms,” and even his own confusion over the mission, this song challenges the often-gendered tropes that bolstered Cuba’s mission in Angola. The ambivalent and even bitter reflection resonates with Hatzky’s findings but contrasts sharply with the official framing of the mission. Though the revolution’s limited and selective representation of the individual internacionalista experience does not prepare us for evidence of ambivalence and trauma, such emotional and psychological costs are consistent with the literature on war. These sobering findings shine new light on Cuba’s internationalism, underscoring its human costs.

Conclusion

In its mission in Angola, Cuba’s overwhelmingly male military had sufficient numbers such that the state was not pressured to recruit women or otherwise challenge the gendered division of war. Yet race was a prominent theme, and through *negrificación*, Cuba legitimized its Angolan mission to a global audience. Though a racially mixed group of military women served, they were small in number, and the public face of the internacionalista woman was white or light-skinned. The Cuban military in Angola remained normatively and numerically masculine, and the racial pride generated from the *negrificación* of its international mission was predominately gendered masculine. Cuba’s 1980s War of All the People defense mobilization helps contextualize these findings. In that case, men alone could not meet its recruitment goals, so the state actively courted women, often linking participation to women’s liberation. In sum, Afro-Cuban men gained some recognition and status and white women were the feminine face of the Cuban internacionalistas. But Afro-Cuban women, doubly disadvantaged, remained largely invisible despite their representation in Cuba’s female artillery units.

This research supports the argument that revolutionary Cuba’s gender- and race-based liberatory efforts were secondary goals that ebbed and flowed according to their utility for realizing international and domestic military campaigns. It also sheds light on Black and mixed-race women’s double disadvantage and invisibility in the internationalist project. Finally, it underscores the lingering damage of armed conflict and calls for an expanded understanding of the costs of armed internationalism.

Lorraine Bayard de Volo is a political scientist in the Department of Women and Gender Studies at the University of Colorado Boulder. Her areas of interest include gender, sexuality, and race as they relate to war and revolution in Latin America. She recently published *Women and the Cuban Insurrection: How Gender Shaped Castro’s Victory* (2018). She is currently working on a book that takes a postcolonial, feminist approach to Cold War Cuba.

Notes

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1. Primary sources for this article include Cuban and US state reports, speeches, videos, archived interviews, and print media 1975–1991: *Verde Olivo* (the weekly military magazine), *Mujeres* (the monthly women’s magazine), and *Granma* (the national daily newspaper). Seventeen years of print media was searched for gender or race references, yielding over 2,600 entries, which were then coded. This study also draws from fieldwork interviews and observations and from documents collected from several Cuban archives, including those of the Cuban Women’s Federation.
2. Roland, “Tourism and the *Negrificación*.”
3. Sawyer, “Unlocking the Official Story”; de la Fuente, *A Nation for All*.
4. Sawyer, *Racial Politics*, xviii; Smith and Padula, *Sex and Revolution*, 4.
5. Sawyer, “Unlocking the Official Story,” 407.
6. Guevara, “Economics Cannot Be Separated.”
7. Smith and Padula, *Sex and Revolution*; Chase, *Revolution within the Revolution*.
8. Lewis, Lewis, and Rigdon, *Four Women Living the Revolution*, xvii.
9. Bayard de Volo, *Women and the Cuban Insurrection*.
10. Smith and Padula, *Sex and Revolution*, 22.
11. Sawyer, “Unlocking the Official Story,” 406–7; de la Fuente, *A Nation for All*.
12. Sawyer, *Racial Politics*, xix.
13. Sawyer, *Racial Politics*, xix; “Unlocking the Official Story,” 408; de la Fuente, *A Nation for All*.
14. Sawyer, “Unlocking the Official Story,” 405.
15. Roland, “Tourism and the *Negrificación*”; Sawyer, *Racial Politics*; Moore, *Castro, the Blacks, and Africa*.
16. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, 131; Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*.
17. R. Castro, “Raul Castro Welcomes Internationalists.” See also Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, 152.
18. Saney, “African Stalingrad,” 82.
19. Mandela, “Castro Opens National Moncada Barracks Ceremony.”
20. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 380.
21. Moore, *Castro, the Blacks, and Africa*, 3.
22. F. Castro, “16th Anniversary of the Committees for the Defense.”
23. Benson, *Antiracism in Cuba*, 132.
24. Risquet Valdes, “Seguiremos cumpliendo en Angola.”
25. Roland, “Tourism and the *Negrificación*.”
26. Roland, “Tourism and the *Negrificación*,” 152.
27. Gelb, “U.S., Stung in Angola.”
28. *New York Times*, “Castro Resumes.”
29. Marcum, “Lessons of Angola,” 407.
30. *New York Times*, “‘Big Lie’”; Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 321.
31. Safire, “Who Lost Africa?”
32. Hatzky, “‘Latin-African’ Solidarity,” 162.
33. Ramírez Castillo, “Apoyo resuelto.”
34. R. Castro, “Raul Castro Welcomes Internationalists.”
35. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*; Bayard de Volo, “Revolution in the Binary?”
36. F. Castro, quoted in Saney, “African Stalingrad,” 91.

37. See Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 199.
38. de la Fuente, *A Nation for All*, 306.
39. Bayard de Volo, "Revolution in the Binary?"
40. This practice began in the 1960s at the request of leaders in Zaire and Guinea-Bissau (Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 88–89, 188). The State Department reported that 480 Black Cuban soldiers landed in Congo for transfer to Angola (Kissinger, "Cuban Clandestine Military Support").
41. Saney, "African Stalingrad," 95.
42. Finch, *Rethinking Slave Rebellion in Cuba*, 148.
43. R. Castro, "Raul Castro Welcomes Internationalists."
44. Moore, *Castro, the Blacks, and Africa*; Domínguez, "Racial and Ethnic Relations," 284.
45. Taylor, "Revolution, Race," 36.
46. Moore, *Castro, the Blacks, and Africa*, 331–32; Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*.
47. Saney, "African Stalingrad," 95.
48. Rodrigues, "Interview by Lyn Smith."
49. F. Castro, "Castro Honors Internationalists."
50. See Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 392.
51. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 393.
52. Alao, *Brothers at War*.
53. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*; Moore, *Castro, the Blacks, and Africa*.
54. de Arturo, "En este Día Internacional de la Mujer,"
55. Milián Castro, "La revolución ha dado posibilidades," 61.
56. *Mujeres*, "Entrevista con Rosario Fernández Pereda," 11.
57. Blaquier, "Días de sol radiante," 55.
58. *Juventud Rebelde*, 231.
59. Martín, *Respuesta a la escalada Sudafricana*.
60. Espín, "Vilma Espín Responds," 52.
61. Brittain, *Death of Dignity*, 7–8.
62. Hatzky, "'Latin-African' Solidarity," 162.
63. Hatzky, "'Latin-African' Solidarity," 163–64.
64. Hatzky, *Cubans in Angola*, 261.
65. Hatzky, *Cubans in Angola*; "'Latin-African' Solidarity," 163.
66. See also Alberto, *Caracol Beach*.
67. Nasatir, "El Hijo de Guillermo Tell," 58n5. Hatzky also mentions Delgado's *Veterano* as a key example of "the neglect and silence that accompanies the official success story of engagement in Angola" and the "(subversive) discursive strategies [that] have developed in the communicative memory of the Cuban population" that "call the official version of events [in Angola] into question." Hatzky, *Cubans in Angola*, 267.

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