**PSCI 7111: Seminar on American Political Institutions**

Fall 2020

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This course is an examination of the study of institutions in American government – Congress, the presidency, agencies, the courts, etc. – but our approach to the subject is somewhat different than a traditional graduate seminar. First, rather than traipsing through a broad survey of the literature on each institution (something you have a chance to do in various graduate seminars on Congress, bureaucracy, etc.) we will concentrate on concepts, theoretical approaches, and empirical analyses that cut across the institutions. In doing so we will touch on all the various institutions, but focus on how the research relates to larger theoretical concerns. We will explore the trends in political science research on governing institutions in the United States (and to some extent elsewhere), and try to get a feel for where the literature stands today.

The objective of the course from this perspective is to familiarize students with different research styles on American political institutions but to also heighten your interest in theoretical questions that are common across many different phenomena and areas of study in Political Science.

A second difference in this seminar’s design is the focus on project-based learning. The goal of graduate school is to both familiarize you with the knowledge and findings of advanced research, and to prepare you for a successful career in the academy. While there is utility in assigning large research projects to graduate students in their coursework and send you off to do it, this can often be “trial by fire.” There is nothing inherently wrong with that approach – to wit, most of your career will involve independent research – there is still much to be gained when we pool our knowledge, resources, abilities, and experience in doing original research and analysis. Social science research is an interactive process (collaboration, assistance with methodology, providing data, critiquing work, etc.), and it can be instructive for students to learn from one-another in an active process of doing, not just discussing. Therefore, a sizable portion of the course – including classroom time! – is devoted to actively engaging in your research process. This does not just mean doing your own research, but actively being involved in the projects of others. This will be done by assigning specific class periods for collective work on each student’s project.

**Course Requirements**

(1) ***Participation*** (30% of course grade): It is expected that students will complete the required reading and participate fully in class discussion. Participation in detailed and informed discussion of research is what makes seminars a useful learning experience and is part of being a political scientist. Occasionally I will choose a number of readings for the coming week that are of particular importance. Class discussion will assess the value of each theory or study, the appropriateness of the methods, the adequacy of evidence and the contributions of each reading to our understanding of American politics. The recommended readings are offered as further literature that may be used (or added to) for your in-class presentations (see below).

The participation grade will also hinge on the contributions each of you make to the projects of other students. Students are often timid about critiquing and engaging in each other’s work, particularly in class. However, this project-based course will not function if we do not have the full engagement of one-another in everyone’s research. Therefore, I will expect that everyone prepare for each “project day,” including completion of any required reading or assigned duties.

(2) ***Discussion Leader*** (15% of course grade): Students will be required to lead discussion on a portion of the readings for two class periods. To do this, students will choose one or two of the week’s readings and prepare a presentation to the class that explains the theoretical, empirical and analytical aspects of the research. You will teach the reading, therefore you need to fully comprehend it! An additional, though not the sole component of the presentation, is to offer a critique, new analysis or extension of the work presented. If you feel that a supplementary reading is necessary to help illuminate a particular argument or perspective, please recommend it to the class.

(3) ***Research Paper*** (55% of course grade): Students may choose any topic concerning political institutions in the U.S. to produce a paper that will be a precursor (in some way) to a publishable paper. Students will discuss a rough topic idea with me in the first few weeks of the semester. A written prospectus (2-3 pages) will be provided to the class on September 22, and presented for comments on September 24. While continuing work on the project students will prepare readings and a research agenda for their “project day.” All or most of a class period will be devoted to each student’s project.

At the end of the semester, every student will give a 10-15 minute in-class presentation of his or her theory and research, complete with slide show in the last few weeks of the course. All papers will be presented in class using a conference panel format. Your career will turn on the ability to be an effective communicator of complicated and original material.

**University Policies**

If you qualify for accommodations because of a disability, please submit to your professor a letter from Disability Services in a timely manner (for exam accommodations provide your letter at least one week prior to the exam) so that your needs can be addressed. Disability Services determines accommodations based on documented disabilities. Contact Disability Services at 303-492-8671 or by e-mail at [dsinfo@colorado.edu](mailto:dsinfo@colorado.edu). If you have a temporary medical condition or injury, see [Temporary Injuries](http://click.communications.cu.edu/?qs=20c8e07ba7f437245d1a704213e859f736f4cfa0fff8843033a6dee6bdc07d7155d11c8894b91b63) guidelines under the Quick Links at the [Disability Services website](http://click.communications.cu.edu/?qs=20c8e07ba7f43724790bbc18f391221312290b75a0ecbb74c7af95ad22dd569a69fe78acac989748) and discuss your needs with your professor.

Campus policy regarding religious observances requires that faculty make every effort to deal reasonably and fairly with all students who, because of religious obligations, have conflicts with scheduled exams, assignments or required attendance. See the [campus policy regarding religious observances](http://click.communications.cu.edu/?qs=19e4f7fecccb0a10202ec138f0222d1041c84170cf1e69c25e0a2fbc22a686877400077b0ca43a0f) for full details.

Students and faculty each have responsibility for maintaining an appropriate learning environment. Those who fail to adhere to such behavioral standards may be subject to discipline. Professional courtesy and sensitivity are especially important with respect to individuals and topics dealing with differences of race, color, culture, religion, creed, politics, veteran’s status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity and gender expression, age, disability, and nationalities. Class rosters are provided to the instructor with the student's legal name. I will gladly honor your request to address you by an alternate name or gender pronoun. Please advise me of this preference early in the semester so that I may make appropriate changes to my records. For more information, see the policies on [classroom behavior](http://click.communications.cu.edu/?qs=19e4f7fecccb0a103cd9dd510a5119787ef135ddcd5e055a21048caf0bcf20010894bfedd1dc59ac) and [the student code.](http://click.communications.cu.edu/?qs=19e4f7fecccb0a107fabf798e0028bf548a48ede625356cfbef04500ae232418ca04d4013e0b03f6)

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All students enrolled in a University of Colorado Boulder course are responsible for knowing and adhering to the [academic integrity policy](http://click.communications.cu.edu/?qs=19e4f7fecccb0a10dfeee473f2789bd60440cc5e2d17a2d9ba750adc1ad946deeff26a22cc5bc1f6) of the institution. Violations of the policy may include: plagiarism, cheating, fabrication, lying, bribery, threat, unauthorized access, clicker fraud, resubmission, and aiding academic dishonesty. All incidents of academic misconduct will be reported to the Honor Code Council ([honor@colorado.edu](mailto:honor@colorado.edu); 303-735-2273). Students who are found responsible for violating the academic integrity policy will be subject to nonacademic sanctions from the Honor Code Council as well as academic sanctions from the faculty member. Additional information regarding the academic integrity policy can be found at [honorcode.colorado.edu](http://click.communications.cu.edu/?qs=19e4f7fecccb0a10b4a8a56ce33b22833ab8952c2143029535a307647bb1447e317337a04237567d).

Several books (marked with “**\*\***”) should be purchased…any which way you can.

**Week 1: What is the study of political institutions? (Aug. 27) (class visit by Prof. Josh Strayhorn)**

What is a political institution? Why should we study them? How can we study them? What is the role of formal (and informal) theory?

* Diermeier, Daniel, and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. “Institutionalism as a Methodology.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15:123-144.
* Adam Przeworski. 2004. “Institutions Matter?” *Government and Opposition* 39(4): 527-540. (why study institutions?)
* Hall, Peter, and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.” *Political Studies* :936-957.
* Calvert, Randall. 1995. “The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication.” In Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions, edited by J. Banks and E. Hanushek. New York: Cambridge University Press. (definition of political institutions)

*Recommended*

* Koelble, Thomas A. 1995. “The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology.” *Comparative Politics* 27, 2 (January): 231-243.
* Kato, Junko. 1996. “Institutions and Rationality in Politics: Three Varieties of Neo-Institutionalists.” *British Journal of Political Science* 26, (4):553-582.
* Katznelson, Ira, and Barry R. Weingast, eds. 2005. Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
* Aldrich, John, and Kenneth Shepsle. 2000. Explaining Institutional Change: Soaking, Poking, and Modeling in the U.S. Congress. In *Congress on Display, Congress at Work*, edited by W. Bianco. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
* Besley, Timothy and Anne Case. 2003. “Policy Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States.” *Journal of Economic Literature* 41(1): 7-73. (why study inst)

**Week 2: Continuation of Week 1 (Sept. 3)**

**Week 3: The Evolution of Rational Choice Institutionalism (Sept. 10)**

From Preference-Induced Equilibrium to Structure-Induced Equilibrium to Nash Equilibrium.  Preferences over institutions.

* Weingast, Barry. 2002. “Rational Choice Institutionalism,” in Political Science: State of the Discipline, Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds. New York: W.W. Norton.
* Shepsle, Kenneth. 1989. “Study Institutions: Some Lessons From the Rational Choice Approach.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1:131-47.
* Cameron, Charles. 2000. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chp. 3.
* Riker, William. 1980. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” *American Political Science Review*, 74, pp. 432-46.
* Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2006. Old Questions and New Answers About Institutions: The Riker Objection Revisited,” in *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman, pp. 1031-1049 (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
* Levi, Margaret. 1981. “The Predatory Theory of Rule.” *Politics & Society* 10(4): 431–65.

*Recommended*

* Shepsle, Kenneth, and Mark Bonchek. 1997. Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. New York: W. W. Norton. Chps. 2, 3 & 4. This book will lay the ground work for rational choice approaches to institutions.
* Shepsle, Kenneth. 1986. “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions.” In Political Science: The Science of Politics, edited by H. Weisberg. New York: Agathon Press.

**Week 4: Institutional Emergence, Design, and Change (Sept. 17)**

* Goodin, Robert E. 1996. Institutions and Their Design. In The Theory of Institutional Design, edited by Robert E. Goodin, 1-53. New York: Cambridge University Press
* Moe, Terry M. 2005. Power and Political Institutions. *Perspectives on Politics* 3, 2 (June): 215-233
* David Lewis, 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. Stanford University Press. Intro chapter-ch3.
* Riker, William. 1984. “The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice.” *American Political Science Review* 78:1-16.
* Niskanen, William. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton. Chps 3-5. Still a classic.
* Greif, Avner, and David D. Laitin. 2004. "A theory of endogenous institutional change." *American Political Science Review* 633-52.

***Institutional Design, Part 2***

* Polsby, Nelson. 1968. “The Institutionalization of the House of Representatives.” *American Political Science Review* 63:144-68. One of the first works to systematically study the changing rules and structure of Congress.
* Ragsdale, Lyn, and John Theis. 1997. “The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924-92.” *American Journal of Political Science* 41:1280-1318.
* Kevin McGuire “The Institutionalization of the U.S. Supreme Court” *Political Analysis* 2004

*Recommended*

* Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Chps 3, 5-7. .
* Shepsle, Kenneth and Barry Weingast. 1994. “Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19: 149-80. A summary of the state of the debate from their perspective – the empire strikes back – progress has been made since.
* Weingast, Barry, and William Marshall. 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.” *Journal of Political Economy* 96:132-63. (relational contracts)
* Hammond, T.H. and Gary J. Miller.  1987.  “The Core of the Constitution.”  *American Political Science Review*.  81:  1155-1174.
* Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. University of Michigan Press. Read Parts 1 & 2.
* Rudalevige, Andrew. 2002. Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chaps 1-5.
* Krehbiel, Keith. 2004. “Legislative Organization.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18:113-128.

**Week 5: Political Institutions, Hierarchies and Collective Action Problems (Sept. 24)**

* Hardin, Russell. 1982. *Collective Action*. Resources for the Future. (pp. 16-66)
* \*\*Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Chapters 1-3, and 6)
* Miller, Gary J.  1992.  Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy*.*  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.  (Chapters 4, 8-11)
* Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan:  Party Government in the House.  Berkeley:  University of California Press.  Chapters 4-5 (pp. 85-135).
* Deitz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern. 2003. “The Struggle to Govern the Commons.” *Science* 302: 1907-1912.

*Recommended*

* Todd Sandler, *Collective Action: Theory and Application.* Chapter 1, pages 1-18. (1992)
* Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press. (collective action)
* Moe, Terry M. 1990.  "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*.  7: 213-53.
* Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. (1990)

**Week 6: Presentation of Project Prospectus (Oct. 1)**

* 2-3 page prospectus provided to class (Sept. 29)

**Week 7: Institutions, Ideas, Rules and Governance (Oct. 8)**

Institutional interaction. Institutional dominance. Institutional effectiveness.

* Calvert, Randall, Mark Moran, and Barry Weingast. 1987. “Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of the FTC.” in Congress: Structure and Policy, edited by Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Power)
* John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan, “Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy,” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6:1-20 (1990)
* Robert C. Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change,” *American Political Science Review* 96:4 (December 2002): 697-712.
* Berry, Christopher R., Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell. 2010. “After Enactment: The Lives and Deaths of Federal Programs.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 1-17.
* Beland, Daniel, and Jacob Hacker. 2004. Ideas, Private Institutions, and American Welfare State 'Exceptionalism'. *International Journal of Social Welfare* 13:42-54.

*Recommended*

* Huntington, Samuel P. 1982. “American Ideals versus American Institutions.” *Political Science* *Quarterly*, 97 (Spring): 1-37.
* Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

**Week 8: Bargaining, Cooperation, and Coordination (Oct. 15) (see Cameron)**

* Romer and Rosenthal (add citation)
* Muthoo, Abhinay. 2000. “A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory.” *World Economics* 1: 145-166.
* **\*\*** Cameron, Charles. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
* Groseclose,T. and N. McCarty. 2001. “The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience,” *American Journal of Political Science*.
* Coordination reading - TBD

*Recommended*

* Tullock, Gordon. 1981. “Why So Much Stability?” *Public Choice* 37: 189-202.
* Baron, David, and John Ferejohn. 1989. Bargaining In Legislatures. *American Political Science Review* 83:1181-1206.
* Baron, David. 1994. A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19:267-296.
* Rogers, James. 2005. Empirical Determinants of Bicameral Sequence in State Legislatures. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30:29-42.
* Banks, Jeffrey, and John Duggan. 2006. A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1:49-85.
* Cameron, Charles, and Jee-Kwang Park. 2007. “A Primer of the President’s Program.” In Bert Rockman and Richard Waterman, eds. *Presidential Leadership: The Vortex of Power*, New York City: Oxford University Press, p. 46–79.

**Week 9: Commitment Problems (Oct. 22)**

**TBD**

**Week 10: Project Day (Oct. 29)**

Students provide readings, proposed data, and potential tasks a week prior to their project day. Goal of session is to present “work in progress” for feedback from instructors and students. May have a “reader” for each project.

**Week 11: Project Day (Nov. 5)**

**Week 12: Project Day (Nov. 12)**

**Week 13: Principal-Agent Relationships In and Between Institutions (Nov. 19)**

Agent selection. Compliance. Competence. Accountability.

* Moe, Terry. 1984. The New Economics of Organization. *American Journal of Political Science* 28:739-77.
* Miller, Gary J., 2005. “The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models,” v. 8: 203-225. *Annual Review of Political Science.*
* Lane, Jan‐Erik. "Political Representation from the Principal–Agent Perspective." *Representation* 45.4 (2009): 369-378.
* D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press), chapter 2 & 4.
* Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. “Asymmetric Information, Delegation, and the Structure of Policy-making.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11:37-56.
* Songer, Donald, Jeffrey Segal, and Charles Cameron. 1994. “The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Theory of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interaction.” *American Journal of Political Science* 38::673-96.
* Whitford, Andrew. 2005. “The Pursuit of Political Control by Multiple Principals.” *Journal of Politics* 67:29-49.

*Recommended*

* McCubbins, Mathew, and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms.” *American Journal of Political Science* 2:165-79.
* Gailmard, “Accountability and Principal-Agent Models”, Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.361.2652&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
* Huber and Shipan Chapters 2 and 4

**November 26: Thanksgiving Holiday**

**Week 14: Institutional Agenda-setting: Internal & External Determinants (Dec. 3)**

Who sets the agenda? How does agenda setting influence institutional action, performance, outcomes?

* Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. “Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo.” *Public Choice* 33, 4 (1978): 27-43.
* Caldeira, Gregory A., John R. Wright, and Christopher J.W. Zorn. 1999. “Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court.” 15 *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 549-572.
* Baird, Vanessa A. 2004. “The Effect of Politically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda,” *Journal of Politics* 66 (August): 755-72.
* **\*\*** Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chps 1-3, 9 & 10.

*Recommended*

* Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chps 1-3, 6 & 8.
* Binder, Sarah. 2003. *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Chps 1, 2 & 5.
* Epp, Charles. 1998 “External Pressure and the Supreme Court’s Agenda” in Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman (eds), *Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
* Kingdon, John. 1995. *Agendas, Alternative, and Public Policies*. 2nd Edition ed. New York: HarperCollins. Chps 1, 3, 4, & 8.

**Week 15: Presentation of Projects (Dec. 10)**

10-15 minute presentations of projects (w/ slides)

**ADDITIONAL READINGS** (Not to be covered in class, but important for the comprehensive exam in American Politics.)

**Institutional evolution: commitment and change**

* North, Douglas. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press. Chps. 1-4 & 9-11.
* North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” *The Journal of Economic History* 49(04): 803–32. (commitment)
* Adler, E. Scott. 2002. Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chps 1, 2, 5-7.
* Eric Schickler. 2000. “Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1998: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models.” *American Political Science Review* 94: 269-288.
* Higgs, Robert. 1987. Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government. Chps 1-4.
* Skowronek, Steven. 1982. Building A New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capabilities, 1877-1920. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chps 1-3 & 6.

*Recommended*

* Light, Paul. 1997. *The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work, 1945-1995*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
* Goldberg, Victor P. 1974. Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand. *Journal of Law and Economics* 17, 2 (October): 461-492

**Sociological and Behavioral Approaches**

* March, James, and Johan Olsen. 1984. “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.” *American Political Science Review* 78:734-749.
* Dowding, Keith. 1994. The Compatibility of Behaviouralism, Rational Choice and 'New Institutionalism'. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6:105-17.
* Dahl, Robert. 1961. “The Behavioral Approach to Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest.” *American Political Science Review* 55:763-72.

*Recommended*

* Easton, David. 1965. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Chp 1. A nice explanation of where the behavioral approach comes from.
* Powell, Walter W., and Paul J. Dimaggio, eds. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Introductory chapter.
* Meyer, John, and Brian Rowan. 1977. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” *American Journal of Sociology* 83:340-363.
* Kingdon, John. 1989. Congressmen’s Voting Decisions, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (Third Edition). Introduction, Chps. 9 & 10. Optimizes the Michigan Model of behavioralism applied to the institution of Congress.

**Historical Institutionalism**

* + Pierson, Paul and Theda Skocpol. 2002. “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” in Political Science: State of the Discipline, Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds. New York: W.W. Norton.
  + Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” *American Political Science Review* 94: 251-67.
  + Page, Scott. 2006. “Path Dependence.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1:87-115.

*Recommended*

* Peters, B. Guy, Jon Pierre, and Desmond King. 2005. The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism. *Journal of Politics* 67:1275-1300.
* Rockman, Bert. 1994. “The New Institutionalism and the Old Institutions.” In New Perspectives on American Politics, edited by Dodd and Jillson. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
* Brady, David and Elaine Swift. 1994. “Common Ground: History and Theories of American Politics.” In The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations, edited by Dodd and Jillson. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
* Elizabeth Sanders, “Historical Institutionalism” in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, Bert A. Rockman, ed’s., The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
* Steinmo, Sven, and Kathleen Thelen. 1992. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, edited by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. New York: Cambridge University Press.
* Weir, Margaret. 1992. “Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation.” in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, edited by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. New York: Cambridge University Press.
* Steinmo, Sven, and Jon Watts. 1995. “It's the Institutions, Stupid! Why Comprehensive National Health Insurance Always Fails in America.” *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 20:329--72.
* Skocpol, Theda. 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.