I was raised in Toronto. As a proud Canadian I frequently apologize for that. I did my BA and MA in Philosophy at McMaster University. I wrote my Master’s thesis on the liar paradox. My research is mostly in ancient Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle’s physics. Last summer I was invited to present a paper at a workshop on infinity in ancient philosophy. I’ve had papers accepted to professional conferences in pre-Socratic philosophy, philosophy of science, logic, methodology, epistemology, ancient science, and other areas. I also have research interests in ethics and metaphysics (in both of which I've had papers published), and medieval philosophy.
My dissertation advisor is Professor Mitzi Lee. I am writing my dissertation on Aristotle’s account of things that can move by themselves. Humans seem to be such things. Dogs and cats do too. Aristotle agrees. But he also thinks that nothing other than animals can move itself. So why aren’t fire, water, and air considered self-movers? And he thinks that other things must always move even self-movers. Then why are dogs considered self-movers?
Besides teaching and studying philosophy, I enjoy spending time with my wife, Tess, listening to music, and playing chess. For any future student in any of my classes: if you’d like to play me at chess in my office hour, let me know. If you win or draw, I will concede said loss or draw at the start of the next class.
For more information, see Daniel's web site: danielcoren.wordpress.com.
“Aristotle against (unqualified) self-motion: Physics VII 1 a241b35-242a49 / ß241b25-242a15” Accepted for publication in Ancient Philosophy 05/14/2018 (9,941 words)
“Making Sense of the Sentence: Aristotle’s EN 1094a18-22” Accepted for publication in the Journal of Philosophical Research 04/16/2018 (9,996 words)
“Always Choose to Live or Choose to Always Live” Accepted for publication in the Southwest Philosophy Review 01/27/2018 (7,153 words)
2018. “Why Does Aristotle Defend the Principle of Non-Contradiction Against its Contrary?” The Philosophical Forum 49: 39-59.
2018. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry.” Acta Analytica 33: 145-159.
2017. “On Young’s Version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.” Philosophia: The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 45: 585-594.
Response by G. Young, “A response to Coren’s objections to the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for moral responsibility.” Philosophia: The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 45: 1365-1380.
2015. “Anthropocentric Biocentrism in a Hybrid.” Ethics and the Environment, 20 (2): 48-60.