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Letter from the Chair



Dear Students, Colleagues, Friends, and Alumni,

In this year's Letter from the Chair, I'd like to begin with noteworthy accomplishments of our amazing faculty members. David Boonin, Director of the Department's Center for Values and Social Policy, has accepted an invitation to be the new Editor of the excellent journal *Public Affairs Quarterly*. Carol Cleland continues as the Director of CU Boulder's *Center for the Study of Origins*. Michael Huemer has finished yet another book, *Paradox Lost*, forthcoming with Palgrave Macmillan. Alison Jaggar has been elected to the *American Academy of Sciences*, one of the oldest learned

societies in the US. Finally, Robert Pasnau's book *After Certainty: A History of Our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions* appeared in print with Oxford University Press.

I'd like to continue by highlighting the extraordinary range of philosophical activities going on in our department, providing our students and faculty members with a rich and extremely stimulating intellectual environment. New faculty member Heather Demarest is off to a great start as the Chair of the Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science (CHPS). She did a terrific job organizing last year's *conference* on Metaphysics and the Laws of Nature. Our Center for the Values and Social Policy (CVSP) continues to offer talks pretty much every single week and sponsors once again our unique and tremendously successful Rocky Mountains Ethics Congress (RoME), which will convene for the 11th time in August. In March, Graham Oddie's *Formal Values Workshop* will commence for the third time; in April, we will host the *Morris Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy*, organized by Robert

Pasnau. Yet another Morris Colloquium, this time on the Philosophy of Mind (*The Self and its Realizations*) and organized by Robert Rupert, will take place in June.

Last year saw the departure of two valued faculty members: *Adam Hosein* moved to Northeastern University, and *Michael Tooley* retired. At the same time, it gives me particular pleasure to announce the *hire* of two new faculty members, both from Washington University: *Julia Staffel* and *Brian Talbot*.

In conclusion, I'd like to thank our *donors* for helping us support our students and keeping our programs competitive, and graduate students Christopher Dengler, Sam Director, and Lorenzo Nericcio for their editorial work putting together this newsletter.

Cheers,

Matthew Staff

Margot Crowe Gift

The Philosophy Department is extremely grateful to Mrs. Margot Crowe for a generous legacy gift she made in 2017 in the name of her late husband, Prof. Charles Lawson Crowe (1928-2013), who was a professor in the Philosophy Department from 1967-1993. He received a BA from Duke University (Trinity College) in 1950, and served with the United States Army in

Germany from 1951-1953. Upon his return, he was accepted for a combined degree from Union Seminary and Columbia University where he received his PhD in Philosophy of Religion.

From 1955-56, he was Assistant Director of Graduate Admissions at Columbia University, and later taught philosophy and ethics at Sweet Briar

College from 1956 -1964. While at Sweet Briar, he initiated the integration of Sweet Briar College. Civil Rights, ethics and values became a central part of his professional life. He finished his Ph.D. in 1961. From 1964-1967, he became National Representative and Director, Dissertation Fellowship Program, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, Princeton, NJ. While

Margot Crowe Gift, *cont.*



From the left:
James White, Margot
Crowe, Robert Shay,
Timothy Orr, Deb
Coffin

speaking at a Graduate Dean's conference in 1967, he was invited to come to the University of Colorado, Boulder as Associate Dean of the Graduate School. From there he became Dean of the Graduate School, the first to hold the position of Provost, Vice President for Research. In 1974 he was appointed the first Chancellor of the Boulder Campus, University

of Colorado from 1974 - 1976. During those years, Dr. Crowe had an appointment in the Philosophy Department as Associate Professor 1967-1971 and Professor of Philosophy 1971-1993. He was survived by his two sons from his first marriage, Thad and Glenn, as well as his wife Mrs. Margot Crowe.

Mrs. Crowe is herself an alumna of CU Boulder (1963-1967), and has given years of service to the University through an extensive list of volunteer roles. Notable among these is her service as President of the CU Retired Faculty and Staff Association; her membership on the Colorado Shakespeare Festival Advisory Board and on the College of Music Adopt-A-Student Committee; and her service to the Colorado Shakespeare Festival Gardens.

Dr. Lawson Crowe dedicated many years of his life and service to the

Philosophy Department and to the University of Colorado, and it was in acknowledgement of his commitment to philosophy and to the welfare of philosophy graduate students that Mrs. Crowe made this gift to us.

Mrs. Crowe is a strong and passionate supporter not only of philosophy, but also classics, music, and the performing arts on campus, and we are enormously grateful to her for her gift and for her continuing support of the arts, humanities, and higher education. Her gift will be used to support Philosophy graduate student education and research, by supporting a host of crucial graduate student professional development activities, including dissertation writing, research support, and travel to conferences.

Faculty Activities — Chris Heathwood

For the 2017-18 academic year, Chris Heathwood is a Faculty Fellow at the Center for Ethics & Public Affairs at Tulane University's Murphy Institute. His main project there is a book manuscript defending a desire-satisfaction theory of well-being.



Chris Heathwood

Theories of well-being attempt to identify which things ultimately make a person better or worse off. Desire satisfactionists hold that the answer is simple: people are better off just when their desires are satisfied; but Heathwood's version of this theory is distinctive in several ways.

Because a person's desire for something might be based on a mistaken impression of what it would be like to get, most desire theories appeal not to one's actual desires, which are often in this way mistaken, but to one's fully informed desires. Heathwood argues, however, that an actual-desire theory is in fact more plausible. Another feature of Heathwood's theory that is unusual for desire satisfactionists is that the theory obeys what is called the experience requirement, which says, in a nutshell, "what you don't know

can't hurt you." The book will also argue that the natures of both pleasure and happiness, which are perhaps the most intuitively plausible examples of things that make our lives better, can be explained in terms of desire satisfaction. Heathwood thus sees his theory as reconciling the two major subjectivist traditions in the theory of well-being: desire satisfactionism and hedonism.

Heathwood presented a version of the chapter on happiness, "Happiness and Desire," at Syracuse University this fall. He will comment on a symposium paper on the nature of pleasure at the Eastern APA this winter. And he will present either on idealization or on the experience requirement at the Canadian Philosophical Association in the spring.

Alison Jaggar—AAAS Inductee

Feature on Alison Jaggar

By Lorenzo Nericcio

Dr. Alison Jaggar, Arts and Sciences Professor of Distinction in the CU Boulder Departments of Philosophy and Women and Gender Studies, has had a long, pioneering, and influential career. Fascinated from a young age by the questions central to philosophy and with a particular interest in the problem of free will, she did her undergraduate work at the University of London, where she encountered Oxford ordinary language philosophy. Frustrated by what she perceived as its narrow focus on analyzing how terms were used in common speech—for instance, considering not the metaphysical issue of free will but rather how the term ‘free will’ is used—Jaggar became inspired to think critically about the kinds of methods that are employed when philosophy is done, and, importantly, *who* decides which methods are the right ones. This cluster of questions regarding philosophical methodology would continue throughout her career. Moving into graduate education, Jaggar pursued an MLitt at the University of Edinburgh, where her thesis was titled, *Philosophy as Description: An Examination of a Trend in Recent Philosophy*. The thesis discussed critically the methodology used by some of the leading philosophers she had studied as an undergraduate: Ryle, Austin, and the later Wittgenstein.

Jaggar attended the State University of New York at Buffalo for her PhD. Her doctoral dissertation pursued her interest in philosophical methodology but the global events occurring at that time, especially the Vietnam War and the Women’s Liberation Movement, sparked new interests in normative moral and political philosophy. These interests were central in much of her subsequent work.

While Jaggar was at Buffalo, the university was shut down due to the intensity of anti-war demonstrations and teams of junior faculty and graduate students taught so-called Free University classes off campus. Jaggar joined a team that taught classes on women’s liberation and when the

university re-opened she and another graduate student team-taught a for-credit course for the Philosophy Department. When Jaggar was hired for her first job at Miami University of Ohio, she built on this course to develop a course on the Philosophy of Women’s Rights, which she believes to have been the first ever course on feminist philosophy.

A few years later, Jaggar became a founder of the discipline of Women’s and Gender Studies and she has written many books and articles at the intersection of this discipline and philosophy. They include: *Feminist Frameworks*, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, *Living with Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Ethics*, *Just Methods: an Interdisciplinary Feminist Reader*, and *Gender and Global Justice*.

More recently, Jaggar worked with a multidisciplinary and international team in developing a new metric measuring global poverty. The metric is methodologically innovative because it takes the perspectives of poor people directly into account, with special attention to revealing the gendered aspects of global poverty. In addition Jaggar has an ongoing book project with former graduate student Theresa Tobin of Marquette University, which considers how moral claims may be justified in real-world circumstances of diversity and inequality. Jaggar & Tobin’s work proposes a new mission and a new method for moral epistemology. In both of these projects, Jaggar works against the grain of “top down” methodological approaches in moral and political theory.

Instead of appealing exclusively to the a priori intuitions of professional philosophers, Jaggar and her colleagues take their questions into the field, seeking for their work to be richly informed with multiple perspectives



Alison Jaggar

and empirical considerations.

Dr. Jaggar has recently been inducted into the American Academy of Arts & Sciences for a career of outstanding achievements. The AAAS is a nearly two hundred and fifty year old learned society, devoted to the advancement of social, political, and other intellectual pursuits. As a Fellow of the AAAS, Jaggar will contribute to their publications, and be involved in their other scholarly activities.



Dr. Jaggar’s Induction into the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Interview — Michael Tooley



Michael Tooley

"I want to set out a new approach, starting with an attempt to show that, contrary to Hume's claim, induction can be justified, and then, if that argument is successful, I hope to go to show that one can use that conclusion as the basis of an argument for the existence of a mind-independent, external world."

Michael Tooley, renowned professor emeritus at University of Colorado Boulder's philosophy department, has recently retired. However, this has not stopped his pursuit of rigorous philosophical inquiry. I caught up with him at his home near the Main Campus to find out what new research he is presently embarked upon.

Lorenzo Nericcio: It's an honor to sit down with you, Dr. Tooley. Thanks for having me.

Michael Tooley: The idea of being interviewed came as a surprise, Lorenzo, but I am delighted to talk with you about my current work and future research projects.

LN: Let's start with some biographical background information. How did you get your start in philosophy? What areas have you contributed most to during your career?

MT: When I graduated from high school, I knew virtually nothing about philosophy. As a Canadian living near Toronto, it was natural to go to the University of Toronto, and there one had to choose one's major when one entered. The subjects that I loved were mathematics and physics, and so I chose that as my major.

I quickly became interested in part of philosophy, however, when I had conversations with a friend who was also at the University of Toronto, but who was attending St. Michael's College, where, in

one's first year, students studied St. Thomas Aquinas's proofs of the existence of God. So we talked about those arguments, which, though I was myself a Christian, struck me as quite unconvincing. However, the failure of those arguments did not give me any reason for abandoning my Christian beliefs.

Later that year, however, I talked with a friend, Jim Mackenzie, from my elementary school days, about some concerns that I had, and Jim suggested that I read a book by Bertrand Russell – *Marriage and Morals*. As I read Russell's book, I found myself asking what reasons I had for my religious beliefs, and I realized that I did not really have any, that I had the beliefs in question only because they were the beliefs accepted by my family, and by almost everyone I knew.

I therefore decided to set those beliefs aside, and to see whether there were good reasons for them, so I began reading relevant writings in philosophy of religion and ethics, and this quickly led me to the conclusion that Christianity was both implausible, and also morally unappealing – in view of doctrines such as that of eternal torment in hell.

I was, however, still very much in love with mathematics and physics, and it was only as I was entering my junior year that I decided to switch to philosophy.

You also asked about the main areas in which I've worked. The answer is that I've always viewed philosophy as having two sides. On the one hand, there is the side that goes back to Socrates, and his view, first, that the unexamined life, even if it is an exaggeration to say that it is not worth living, is certainly morally very problematic, and then his view, second, that most people do not really have good reasons that they can offer in support of their most important beliefs. So, on this side of philosophy, I have been especially interested, first of all, in applied ethics, where I have written about the moral status of abortion, and

voluntary euthanasia, and cloning – three areas that I think are very important, and where I believe that people have very passionate opinions, but ones for which they are only rarely capable of offering a plausible defense. Then, secondly, philosophy of religion has also been a major interest.

Then there is the technical side of philosophy, where one finds – in areas such as metaphysics and epistemology – that there are questions that often have no connection at all with how one should live one's life, but which are extremely basic, utterly fascinating, and challenging in the extreme.

Up to the present, my work in this area has been mainly in metaphysics, where I have been especially interested in competing accounts that philosophers have offered of laws of nature, causation, and the nature of time, and I am still continuing some work in those areas. My main focus in the future, however, will be primarily on epistemology, and, in particular, on the question of whether skepticism can be refuted. A number of philosophers have claimed that it can be, but the arguments offered have never struck me as convincing. So, I want to set out a new approach, starting with an attempt to show that, contrary to Hume's claim, induction can be justified, and then, if that argument is successful, I hope to show that one can use that conclusion as the basis of an argument for the existence of a mind-independent, external world.

LN: That's a really helpful way to organize philosophical issues. Which areas of the field are you primarily focusing on these days?

MT: At the moment, I'm working in three areas. First of all, I have submitted a couple of papers in philosophy of time, the one dealing with whether the fundamental laws of physics are temporally symmetric or temporally asymmetric, and the

other dealing with an objection to what is called the growing block view of the nature of time – a view that I defended in *Time, Tense, and Causation*.

Secondly, I have a draft of a book on the nature of causation, which I am shortly going to be revising to take into account some recent work in the area. Finally, I have been threatening for about 40 years to write an article on sexual morality and human irrationality, which I am finally about to do!

LN: On the topic of causation, you reject the view that causation is ontologically reducible. What flaws do you see in that view? Additionally, could you say a bit more on the relations between your view of causation and universal laws? Specifically, there seems to be the problem that most formulations of physical laws do not include a directional time arrow.

MT: Different attempts to analyze causation in terms of non-causal states of affairs are open to different objections. For example, in the case of David Lewis's attempt to analyze causation in terms of counterfactuals, where the latter are analyzed as Stalnaker and Lewis did in terms of closeness relations between possible worlds, one can show that such an account cannot handle the case of possible worlds that involve some causal processes that are linear, rather than branching, or worlds where some causal processes peter out after a certain interval of time. Or consider reductionist accounts of causation in terms of probability, where a key idea is that at least basic causes raise the probability of their effects. There the objection is that if a weaker probabilistic cause is present that precludes the presence of a stronger probabilistic cause, the probability of the effect given the weaker probabilistic cause may be lower than the overall probability of the effect.

There are also, however, general objections that apply to all reductionist analyses, one of which is this. Any reductionist analysis of causation must provide an account of the fact that causation is an asymmetric relation. There are two ways in which this might be done. One is to appeal to some asymmetric patterns in events, such as

that involving increase in entropy. Here the problem involves the idea of 'temporally-flipped-over' universes. For concreteness, consider any universe that both obeys the laws of Newtonian physics and where entropy is increasing. There could surely be what might be called a 'second-level' universe that contained both that universe, and another Newtonian universe in which the initial conditions were precisely like those in the first universe at some future time, except that all of the velocities were reversed. It then follows, by virtue of Newton's laws, that entropy would be constantly decreasing in the second universe. So, analyzing the direction of causation in terms of the direction of increase in entropy will generate the wrong result for the 'flipped-over' universe.

The only other alternative open to a reductionist is to view the earlier than relation as a basic relation, and so not a relation capable of being analyzed in terms of temporal patterns in events, and then to analyze the direction of causation in terms of the earlier than relation – as David Hume and others have done. The problem then is that it immediately follows that backward causation is logically impossible, and while that may be so, given, first of all, that many people have thought that time travel was logically possible, and, secondly, that physicists have advanced theories involving particles that would travel backwards in time, if backwards causation is logically impossible, this should surely be a very deep result, rather than an immediate consequence of the analysis of the concept of causation.


To turn to your other question, traditionally one of the most worrying objections to any non-reductionist account of causation is that if causation is a fundamental relation, not reducible to non-causal properties and relation, shouldn't it enter into at least some fundamental laws of physics? But then, given that our world does not seem to contain any backwards causation, if there were laws involving the relation of causation, those laws would be temporally asymmetric. The objection is then that the basic laws of physics are not temporally asymmetric.

LN: I understand that you and David Albert have had a disagreement over these metaphysical issues; do you suppose you might outline the debate between you two?

MT: The vast majority of philosophers of physics, including David Albert, hold that the fundamental laws of physics – such as Maxwell's laws of electromagnetism – are temporally symmetric, and this is something that I had thought I had learned from Jack Smart when I was in Australia.

Holding, as I do, that causation needs to be analyzed in a non-reductionist fashion, this was troubling, for the reason just mentioned. I had, however, a conversation with Professor Paul Beale in the physics department here at the University of Colorado, and he pointed me in the direction of the Liénard-Wiechert equations, and what I learned when I looked at those equations, and related ones in textbooks of electromagnetism, is that many of the laws of electromagnetism are formulated in terms of what are known as 'retarded-time' equations. So it turns out, for example, that the force at some location *S* at time *t* that is due to some particle *P* depends, not on where *P* is and how it is moving at time *t*, but on where *P* was at an earlier time *t**. This is because, given that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light, changes in the location of *P* cannot affect the force field that exists at point *S* more quickly than the time it would take light to travel from *P*'s location to point *S*.

My disagreement with David Albert and other philosophers of physics then turns out to involve a distinction between two types of laws. First of all, there are laws in the strictest sense, where these are laws that do not depend upon the initial state of the universe. Secondly, there are laws in a looser sense, that do depend upon the initial state of the universe. So, for example, in a Newtonian world, Newton's laws of motion and his law of universal gravitation would be laws in the strictest sense, whereas the law of increasing entropy, since it does depend upon the initial state of the



David Lewis

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“When I came to the University of Colorado, however, I found myself teaching epistemology for the first time in many years, and I then became aware that skepticism poses a much more serious problem for indirect realism than I had previously realized.”

Interview — Michael Tooley, *cont.*

universe, would be a law only in the looser sense.

Given this distinction, David Albert and almost all other philosophers of physics hold that the retarded-time laws of electromagnetism are laws only in the looser sense, whereas I hold that they are laws in the strictest sense.

David Albert’s defense of his view involves the claim – which I grant – that one can describe a possible initial state of the universe, involving the locations of charged particles and of electric and magnetic fields at various points in the initial space, such that the retarded-time equations follow from that initial state in virtue of Maxwell’s equations. My response is that while that’s true, one can show that the probability that the required type of distribution of electric and magnetic field strengths would exist is infinitesimally close to zero. So while it is *possible* that the retarded-time laws are not laws in the strictest sense, this is *unlikely in the extreme*.

LN: Apart from causation, what other metaphysical topics are you interested in?

MT: In recent years, a number of philosophers have embraced the Aristotelian idea that powers, propensities, dispositional properties, and the like can be ontologically fundamental, whereas I hold that such non-categorical properties are reducible to causal laws involving categorical properties. Thus, to say that salt is water soluble, for example, is to say that there is some categorical property C such that salt has property C, and there is a law of nature that entails that something’s having property C and being in water causes that thing to begin dissolving.

The alternative Aristotelian view is that there is some intrinsic property P such that if an object has property P at some time *t*, and is in water at time *t*, that *entails* that the object will be dissolving for some temporal interval

immediately after *t*. My objection to this idea is that having an intrinsic property P at time *t* and being in water at time *t* is an intrinsic state of affairs, and an intrinsic state of affairs is one that can exist regardless of what states of affairs do or do not exist at times other than *t*. Consequently, the claimed entailment relation between what exists at time *t* and what exists at some temporal interval after *t* is logically impossible.

LN: Yes, I must agree there is something deeply puzzling about a non-causal analysis of dispositions. You are a supporter of the A theory of time. What work do you see yourself contributing to this debate in the near future?

MT: I think that my contributions to the debate between tensed, or A-theories of time, and tenseless, or B-theories of time, is likely to be fairly limited. In *Time, Tense, and Causation*, my basic goal was to defend a growing block view of time, according to which while past and present states of affairs are actual as of the present moment, future states of affairs are not. There, in addition to offering a direct argument for that view, along with defending it against various objections, I also attempted to show that no other tensed view of time is tenable. Accordingly, if the growing block view of time turns out, in the end, to be untenable, one must conclude that a *tenseless* account of the nature of time is correct.

Is there more that I would like to do in this area? Occasionally there are weak objections to a growing block view, and I have recently finished a paper replying to an objection advanced by Craig Bourne and David Braddon-Mitchell, where they argue that on a growing block view, it is impossible to know that it is *now* now. In addition, I am frequently amazed to see continuing defenses of presentism – where this is the view that the only things that fall within the scope of our most inclusive quantifiers are presently existing things and

states of affairs – and I have a draft of a very long paper setting out objections to presentism. But returning to that is at the end of a long queue, and I want to concentrate on positive projects at the moment.

LN: You’ve said you intend to shift gears and conduct research in epistemology. What views are you advocating in that domain?

MT: When I first went to the Australian National University in 1974 on a three-to-five-year research appointment, my main goal was to write a book defending indirect realism, where this is the view, first, that the only things that one is directly aware of are one’s own presently existing mental states, and, secondly, that these are also the only things of which one can have non-inferentially justified beliefs. I quickly learned, however, that Frank Jackson had finished a dissertation defending indirect realism, which was subsequently published as his book *Perception*. As I did not feel that I had much to add to Jackson’s argument, I abandoned that project.

When I came to the University of Colorado, however, I found myself teaching epistemology for the first time in many years, and I then became aware that skepticism poses a much more serious problem for indirect realism than I had previously realized. However, I also became convinced that the responses that philosophers typically offer to skepticism are unsatisfactory. The result was that I became very interested in the project of attempting to develop a refutation of skepticism.

In thinking about that project, I concluded that the starting point should be an attempt to refute skepticism about induction, so I surveyed the attempts that philosophers had made with regard to that, and I found that none of them struck me as promising. A turning point occurred, however, when I was talking with Graham Oddie, and, somehow, we got to talking about

Thomas Bayes. Graham asked me if I knew what Bayes had done in his posthumously published, 1763 essay, and, not having read Bayes' essay, I replied that I assumed that he had proved Bayes Theorem! Graham then told me that that was just a small part of Bayes' essay, and that Bayes' main goal was to provide a justification for inductive reasoning.

I therefore turned to Bayes' "An Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances," and I found that his approach was based on what initially seemed like a plausible equiprobability assumption about families of propensities. It turns out, however, that when the concept of a propensity is analyzed using the idea of causal laws, it becomes clear that Bayes' equiprobability assumption is unsound.

With many philosophical mistakes, that's the end of the story. Some mistakes, however, may point one in a promising direction, and this seemed to me to be so in the case of Bayes. In particular, if one asks whether Bayes' equiprobability assumption can be modified to eliminate the error, the answer is that if one can make sense of the idea of a governing conception of laws of nature – where this is the idea that laws of nature, in the non-probabilistic case, rather than being merely certain cosmic regularities, are instead atomic states of affairs that underlie and entail those regularities – then one can revise Bayes' equiprobability assumption in a way that eliminates the error. My central project in epistemology, accordingly, is to set out a defense of induction that rests upon such a revised equiprobability assumption.

There are, of course, many other very challenging skeptical problems, two of the most important of which are skepticism about the past, and skepticism concerning the existence of a mind-independent external world. But I'm hopeful that if one can find a satisfactory response to skepticism concerning induction, that will help one to tackle those other problems.

LN: It does certainly seem that an adequate rejection of skepticism must treat of the justification for inductive reasoning. Moving to, as you've dubbed

it, the Socratic side of philosophy, what work do you intend to pursue?

MT: A few years ago, I did an online bibliography on abortion for Oxford University Press, and in reading through the articles, I was struck by the extent to which many authors were unfamiliar with crucial arguments. So, it occurred to me that it would be good if someone wrote a book setting out the main arguments, in deductive form, along with a discussion of the central objections that can be raised against each argument. I still find that idea appealing, but at the moment it's very much on the back burner.

One thing I would like to write about, however, is the epistemology of miracles, since I think that so much of what is written in this area is very weak. In the case of philosophers who are skeptical of miracles, it is often argued that one could never have good evidence for the occurrence of a miracle – something that does not seem plausible to me – while in the case of those who believe in the occurrence of miracles, it seems to me that there is an almost universal failure to consider all the types of evidence that are relevant.

LN: So, under what sort of *a posteriori* conditions would belief in a miracle be justified then?

MT: Two very different cases need to be distinguished. First, belief in *present-day* miracles should be relatively easy to confirm. If a number of us were at an end of year philosophy gathering, talking together, and all of us drinking water, if someone said that it would be nice to have some wine, at which point someone asked us what type of wine we would like, and then when each person answered, the water in that person's glass changed into the relevant type of wine, I think it would be perfectly reasonable for all of us to believe that we had witnesses a miracle. Similarly, if we were next to a swimming pool, and a member of the department proceeded to walk across the water, we might, of course, want to investigate a bit further, but I think it could very quickly become reasonable for us to believe that a miracle had occurred.

On the other hand, the justification of beliefs in *past* miracles – something

that is crucial in the case of many religions – is less straightforward, and those who hold that some such beliefs are reasonable almost never consider the total evidence that is relevant. For example, if one is arguing that it is reasonable to believe that Jesus was resurrected from the dead, one should ask whether the synoptic Gospels are reliable on *other* matters. In Matthew's Gospel, for example, there is the story about graves being opened, and the dead walking about the city. This would be a remarkable event, and if it really happened, why is it not mentioned in either Mark's Gospel or Luke's Gospel, or in other writings at the time? Similarly, all of the Gospels affirm the existence of demons, and tell of cases of illnesses caused by demonic possession, but there is no evidence today for the existence of demons, let alone of illnesses caused by demonic possession. Then there are the miracle stories in the Old Testament. Is it reasonable to believe, for example, that the sun stood still in the middle of the sky for several hours during the battle of Jericho? Shouldn't one be struck by the fact that there is no other report of that remarkable event?

There are also, however, many other types of evidence that are relevant, including, for example, the discussion by A. D. White, in the chapter entitled "The Growth of Legends of Healing" in his book *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology within Christendom*, of miracles ascribed to St. Francis Xavier, where White shows that events that were not in any way miraculous were dramatically transformed into remarkable miracles, including ones of resurrecting people from the dead. In addition, it is claimed in the Gospels that those who believe will have certain powers, most notably, the power to heal. Consequently, one can consider whether miraculous healings do in fact take place. A number of investigations of whether such healings occur have been carried out – for example, by a committee of the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1920, by a committee of the British Medical Association in 1956, by D. J. West in *Eleven Lourdes Miracles* (1957), and in scientific studies, most notably the STEP project (Study of the Therapeutic Effects of Intercessory Prayer) in 2006 – and none of these have found that any evidence for the occurrence of

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"I think that Philosophy should lie at the heart of any educational system whose goal is to enable people to think critically about their fundamental beliefs and values."

Interview — Michael Tooley, *cont.*

miraculous healings.

LN: You also intend to do some work on the problem of evil, but you find current formulations lacking. What suggestions do you hope to make to improve the argument?

MT: The evidential argument from evil claims that the evil that exists in the world makes it unlikely that God exists. This claim has, I think, a fairly strong intuitive appeal, but one needs to aim at a rigorous formulation of the argument, and that, in turn, calls for a theory of logical probability. In *Knowledge of God*, the debate volume that I co-authored with Alvin Plantinga, I showed how the argument can be formulated in terms of two familiar theories of logical probability, one based on state descriptions, and the other on structure descriptions. However, there are objections to both theories: in particular, neither theory can provide the basis for a complete justification of induction.

If one wants a completely rigorous formulation of the argument from evil, then, one needs a satisfactory theory of logical probability. This may seem like very bad news! However, it is also possible to have a less ambitious goal, such as that of showing that there is a sound version of the argument from evil *if inductive skepticism is unsound*. Thus, one might appeal to the idea of inference to the best explanation, and argue, first, as Paul Draper has done, that the hypothesis that God exists is not the hypothesis that best explains the goods and evils found in this world, and secondly, that if one rejects the principle of inference to the best explanation, one cannot escape from inductive skepticism.

LN: Finally, now looking back on a successful career in philosophy and having seen the discipline develop, what direction do you suggest the field ought to take in the next decades?

MT: Two of the main concerns that I have are as follows. The first

concerns the lack of rigorously established positive results in philosophy. Peter Van Inwagen has claimed, for example, that no philosopher has succeeded in giving a rigorous proof of a single, positive, philosophical thesis. Perhaps that's an overstatement, but at the very least there have been very, very few such proofs, and given that philosophy, rather than being a new kid on the block, originated over two millennia ago, that is, I think, something that philosophers should find very worrying.

What is to be done? I think that philosophers should aim much more at proofs of conditional propositions, so that rather than claiming to have shown that q is the case, where what has done is to offer the combination of a rigorous proof of the proposition that if p is the case then q is the case, together with a wonky argument for p , one should content oneself with a rigorous proof of the conditional proposition, perhaps accompanied with some speculations about possible ways of attempting to find a proof of p .

The other concern is this. Back in 1975, Peter Singer wrote a piece published in the *New York Times Magazine*, entitled "Philosophers Are Back on the Job," pointing out that philosophers were once again tackling important ethical issues. Moreover, it is certainly true today that there is an enormous amount of work being done by philosophers in the area of applied ethics. However, there are some striking areas of neglect. Thus, it can be argued, for example, that much of what is wrong with the world is due to the fact that, on the one hand, most parents cripple their children by inculcating beliefs for which there is no rational basis, and, on the other hand, elementary and secondary schools – and universities as well, for that matter – then do nothing to counter this virtually universal indoctrination, and to develop in children a disposition to think critically about important beliefs and values. Why

is it, then, that philosophy of education – an area that goes back to the very beginning of philosophy with Socrates and Plato – is a more or less completely neglected area in philosophy, and why is it that the topic of the crippling of the young by indoctrination is a topic that never seems to appear in anthologies in applied ethics? (Are there any topics that do appear in such textbooks that are of comparable importance?)

LN: I agree that philosophy ought to play a much more central role society, and especially in education. By what means would you most like to see this implemented?

MT: First of all, what philosophy courses should all students take? The most important, in addition to a course in critical thinking, seem to me to be courses in applied ethics, in philosophy of religion, in philosophy of mind, and in social and political philosophy.

Secondly, though I think that philosophy should lie at the heart of any educational system whose goal is to enable people to think critically about their fundamental beliefs and values, I don't think that philosophy on its own is enough. The reason is that, even a person who has acquired outstanding critical thinking skills will often be unable to make significant progress in certain crucial areas in the absence of relevant, non-philosophical knowledge. Consider, for example, the fact that most American do not accept an evolutionary account of the origin of human beings, or the fact that many American believe that they have immaterial minds or souls that will survive the deaths of their bodies. It is impossible to think critically about the origin of human beings if one has not had a course on the theory of evolution, and one that really focuses on human evolution in particular, where students are exposed, for example, to the DNA evolution for human evolution. Similarly, one is unlikely to make much progress in

thinking about whether humans involve some sort of immaterial substance in the absence of knowledge about the relation between neural circuitry and various psychological capacities. Or consider the choices that people will face in deciding upon which political party to support, or which politicians to elect. It is very difficult to think critically about this if one's knowledge of societies is more or less confined to the society in which one lives: one needs to

have knowledge of other societies, of the programs that have been implemented in those societies, and of how the quality of life in those societies compares with that in one's own.

Finally, I think that the latter courses, besides being crucial in their own right, will also enable philosophy courses, especially in applied ethics and in social and political philosophy, to focus in an effective fashion on a wider range of

important issues, and, in particular, will provide crucial topics for discussion in courses on critical thinking.

LN: Brilliant, I think most philosophers would find that very compelling. I believe that is all we will have time for, thank you so much for your wisdom and conversation.

MT: It was a pleasure talking with you.

New Philosophy Courses

The upcoming Academic year will see the introduction of two new courses offered by CU Boulder's Philosophy Department.

Philosophy & Sports

Sport is a huge and highly influential social institution that raises a number of interesting philosophical questions.

Despite substantial philosophical literature on sport, including international journals and textbooks, we don't directly address these questions in our current curriculum.

Many of these questions are ethical, from general questions about the value of sport, the nature of fair play, and gender equality, to specific questions about doping in sport and collegiate athletics. Other questions are conceptual and lend themselves to philosophical analysis. For example, what is a sport? What is sportsmanship? As organizations such as the NCAA and NFL increasingly come under public scrutiny, it's important to have a venue to think critically and philosophically about the social issues raised by sports.



Ethics & Information Technology

The rapid emergence of new technology is forcing our society to confront a series of difficult questions about digital security, artificial intelligence, and the social implications of automation. At a more personal level, we all face dilemmas about our own privacy, virtual connectedness, and digital consumerism. Although our department offers a range of courses in ethics, none of them address these concerns in a systematic manner. Topics to be covered in this course include privacy, security, identity, hacking and cyber crime, automation technologies such as drones and self-driving cars, artificial intelligence, and virtual reality.

Interview — Heather Demarest

Dr. Heather Demarest is a newly hired professor at CU Boulder. Originally from Boulder after some time away, she returns to take up an assistant professorship in the philosophy department. I met her in her office one afternoon to find out more about her background, areas of specialty, and current research.

Lorenzo Nericcio: Hi Dr. Demarest, it's great to meet you.

Heather Demarest: Please, call me Heather, and it's good to meet you too Lorenzo.

LN: So, I think it would be great to start out with some background information

about you. What path took you away from home and how have you found yourself back again?

HD: After graduating from CU with degrees in philosophy and physics, I spent a year on a ranch in Montana, where I realized how much I loved and missed philosophy. So, I went to Oxford

Interview — Heather Demarest, *cont.*



Heather Demarest

“According to special and general relativity, there are many, equally good ways of separating spacetime into spaces at times. Physics gives us no good reason to believe that our intuitive notion of simultaneity is correct. But, many philosophical views rely on objectively privileged states-at-times.”

for two years to get a BPhil in philosophy, then to Rutgers for a PhD. That’s where I met my husband, Zak, and where we had our first kid. We were both hired as assistant professors at the University of Oklahoma for four years, where we had two more kids, before I landed my dream job back here!

LN: What is life like now that you are settling back into Boulder?

HD: Awesome! I have family here, which is so fun, and especially wonderful for our kids. Everyone in the department has been really welcoming, and I love Boulder so much—the hiking is spectacular, our neighborhood is filled with kids, and the bike paths go everywhere. We don’t have a car, so we walk or bike everywhere—it’s been surprisingly easy and has had a lot of unanticipated benefits.

LN: Wow, I can’t imagine getting around without a car; though really, I would rather we didn’t have to bother with the things at all. Right, on to more philosophical matters then: I understand your research pertains primarily to the philosophy of physics and related issues in metaphysics. Tell us a bit about that.

HD: Yes. I enjoy thinking about physics and its implications for

metaphysics. For instance, according to special and general relativity, there are many, equally good ways of separating spacetime into spaces at times. Physics gives us no good reason to believe that our intuitive notion of simultaneity is correct. But, many philosophical views rely on objectively privileged states-at-times. For instance, the literature on personal identity presupposes that people exist at times, or temporal stages of people exist at times, or that minds and brains have states at times. Relativity just doesn’t back it up. My research spells that out, and argues for better ways to think about these traditional debates.

LN: I share the attitude that our best physical theories are much more robust sources of justification than our intuitions when it comes to metaphysical issues. However, at least *prima facie*, something about personal identity seems like we ought to be able to intuit or reflect on *something* about its fundamental nature without relying on physical theories.

HD: Yes. We can think of metaphysics intuitions as providing some reasons for belief, and scientific results as providing other kinds of reasons. For instance, many philosophers have the metaphysical intuition that psychological continuity is required for a person to persist over time. But, physics also has something to say about the nature of time. For instance, if my brain is in a strong gravitational field, different parts of it will experience time differently—the chemical processes in the left hemisphere, for instance, would proceed more quickly than the processes in the right (assuming my left ear is turned toward the massive object). I’m interested in working out the implications of physical time for our metaphysical views.

LN: Do you think you might go into more depth about the relation you propose obtains between our mental or brain states and the phenomena we usually consider

relevant to personhood, and how relativity throws a wrench into this?

HD: Sure. From the (partly) metaphysical assumption that a person’s mental state at a moment depends only on her brain state at that moment, and the physical assumption that special relativity yields many equally good states-at-times, we can derive the conclusion that there are many equally good mental states. Each way of ‘slicing’ spacetime into spaces at times will slice a brain into slightly different brain states-at-times. These two assumptions imply that there are infinitely many thoughts arising from a single brain! The only way out of it is to reject one of the assumptions.

LN: Could it be, then, that persons *just are* frame-dependent? That is, similar to the way that other event-descriptions are relative to the frame of description, could it not be the case that the whole of a person, which on some very plausible views is just a succession of events of the right kind, is also frame-relative?

HD: Yes, perhaps it’s not a *reductio*, but merely a surprising consequence. It does seem odd to say that I exist, but only *relative* to a way of slicing up spacetime. Relative to another, equally good way of slicing it, someone else exists!

LN: I agree this does lead to some counterintuitive results! —So much the worse for our intuitions then. Speaking of counterintuitive results, what does relativity theory have to say about the nature of objective causation? I understand you’ve done significant work in this domain too.

HD: Yes, I have a similar argument for the relativity of causation. The two assumptions in this case are the metaphysical assumption that ordinary causal judgments are correct, and, again, the physical assumption of special relativity. Since relativity tells us that distance, duration, and the time-

order of distant events is frame-dependent, when those quantities enter into causal claims, the causal claims themselves are frame-dependent. What causes an accelerated particle to survive long enough to hit a distant object? According to one frame of reference, it's because the particle's high speed slows its clock down (time dilation), so it lasts longer. But, according to an equally good frame of reference, the particle's clock isn't slowed down. Rather, the distance is shortened (length contraction). There seem to be two, equally good, but frame-dependent causal explanations.

LN: This is very interesting; so where do you suppose then our sense of objective causation comes from?

HD: I suppose it's probably just because our intuitions developed at very slow relative speeds. In fact, special and general relativity have *extremely* counterintuitive consequences. My research grapples with those consequences.

LN: I can think of a few philosophers I know who might find all this very troubling! Do you see a way that someone who holds a more traditional philosophical view of causation, like event causation or the counterfactual theory, might salvage their view, or is all of this lost once relativistic considerations are brought in?

HD: There are always ways out. It just depends on how plausible you find the premises, compared with the conclusions. Some people think the intuitive implausibility of relativity is a reason to reject that assumption. They can simply deny that all reference

frames are equally good. But, this is a high cost, and my money is on the highly confirmed physics. Another way out is to maintain objective causation by rephrasing causal claims that involve relativistic speeds so that they only include spacetime-point-sized events, spacetime regions, and spatiotemporal distances. So, here it depends whether you find the rephrasing more objectionable than the frame-dependence.

LN: As I understand it, relativity also has some disturbing consequences about other seemingly foundational concepts, like objective time ordering. Can you tell us about the conceptual issues here?

HD: Sure. As I mentioned, simultaneity turns out to be frame-dependent. Whether or not two distant events, call them A and B, happen at the same time is not an objective fact. According to one frame of reference, they happen simultaneously, in another, A happens before B. And, in yet another frame of reference B happens before A. This gets particularly troubling when we think A and B are causally related, as we do in the case of entangled quantum systems. Measurements of spin or polarity, for instance, implies a causal connection of some kind between the particles. But, there is no objective fact about whether particle in situation A caused particle in situation B or vice versa.

LN: It certainly seems that the universe grows more bizarre the more we learn about it and the more we attempt to understand how our conceptual frameworks ought to map onto it! Moving on to social matters, I have read

that you do some work on the status of women in philosophy. What research have you conducted in that area?

HD: I wanted to see why women make up 50% of philosophy intro classes but only 35% of philosophy majors. So, while I was at the University of Oklahoma, I conducted a study that surveyed hundreds of undergrads. I correlated statements about continuation with other topics and found a surprisingly strong connection between similarity (as measured by the statement: I feel similar to the kinds of people who become philosophers.) and continuation.

LN: Those statistics are troubling, but it's hopeful that you have found substantive results. Given your findings, what policies would you suggest to better retain women students in philosophy?

HD: It would be good for instructors to highlight the ways in which their students are similar to professional philosophers. They're not all white men with beards, or disembodied minds. They're complex human beings. If students can relate to them (even something as simple as, "Oh, I also have to take care of an aging parent," or "I've been to a protest before too.") there's a good chance it could improve the number of people from underrepresented groups who continue in philosophy.

LN: I wholly agree! On that note, I think we will conclude. Dr. Demarest, thank you for your time.

HD: Of course. My pleasure!

"It would be good for instructors to highlight the ways in which their students are similar to professional philosophers."

Center for Values and Social Policy Update


Is it wrong to conceive a child so tissue can be removed from it and used to save the life of another child? Is it wrong to breed Munchkin cats for sale, given that such cats are known to suffer from a variety of health problems? These questions were the focus of discussion during the final round of the first-ever Colorado High School Ethics Bowl Tournament,

organized and sponsored by the Center for Values and Social Policy and held on the CU campus early last February. The tournament brought together eight teams from five high schools in Colorado to discuss a variety of ethical issues in a friendly and collaborative form of competition. The event marked a major advance in the Center's service to the community outside the university

and also helped to kick off one of the most active and productive years in the Center's history.

Later that month, for example, the Center hosted the first of a record three Visiting Fellows for the spring semester: Thierry Ngosso (St. Gallen, Switzerland) gave two talks on business ethics. He was followed later that term by Tom

CU graduate student Spencer Case and Russ Jacobs (Washburn University) debating the nature of marriage during the poster session at CVSP's Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress VIII.



Dougherty (Cambridge) who gave a public lecture on sexual consent, and Helen Frowe (Stockholm) a leading scholar of military ethics who also headlined the 2017 Morris Colloquium on "Cultural Property and the Ethics of War".

of marking its tenth anniversary milestone, the Center introduced a second annual RoME prize, the Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Ethicist Prize, and hosted a day-long workshop on animal ethics as a lead-in to the conference, co-

profession, the Center's weekly Center Talks are the main way it helps to connect our own faculty and students throughout the academic year. In most previous years, Center Talks were largely, and sometimes entirely, limited to

"The Center hosted its fall Visiting Fellow, Elizabeth Brake (Arizona State), who gave a Center Talk and headlined a public panel event, both on issues concerning disaster response and vulnerable populations..."

CVSP Visiting Fellows come to Boulder for longer stays than typical visiting speakers do, and in addition to giving talks, they hold informal sessions with our graduate students and faculty and teach guest sections of some of our undergraduate courses. The program thus helps to increase the diversity of subjects and perspectives our students and faculty are exposed to.

Over the summer, the Center celebrated the tenth anniversary of its annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress. RoME was created by Alastair Norcross when he joined our Department in 2007, has taken place without a hitch every year since in large part because of the tremendous amount of work he continually puts into it, and has become the Center's signature event. RoME X took place from August 10-13, and again featured three distinguished keynote speakers, an almost bewildering array of talks and poster presentations from philosophers across the country and around the world, and the awarding of the annual Young Ethicist Prize. In addition, as a way

sponsored by the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals.

The fall 2017 semester was no less productive. The Center hosted its fall Visiting Fellow, Elizabeth Brake (Arizona State), who gave a Center Talk and headlined a public panel event, both on issues concerning disaster response and vulnerable populations, and organized two major public panel events in collaboration with, and sponsored by, CU's Center for Western Civilization Thought and Policy: one on abortion and animal rights, and one on the nature and importance of academic freedom. This fall, the Center also welcomed two year-long visitors who are being supported by CWCTP: 2017-18 Scholars in Residence Ben Bryan and Izaak Taylor each gave a Center Talk in the fall and are scheduled to give one in the spring.

And speaking of Center Talks, one final noteworthy feature of the Center's 2017 activities was the number of visiting speakers that were featured in that series. While RoME is the Center's major annual contribution to the

presentations by our own faculty and students. But in this past year, the Center was able to feature talks by a number of visitors. In addition to the four CVSP Visiting Fellows and two CWCTP Scholars in Residence noted above, these included talks by Krister Bykvist (Stockholm), Helena de Bres (Wellesley), David DeGrazia (George Washington), Lester Hunt (Wisconsin), Eden Lin (Ohio State), and David Plunkett (Dartmouth). And perhaps most excitingly, the Center was pleased and proud to sponsor Center Talks by three of our former PhD students, all of whom now have jobs as professors at other institutions: Barrett Emerick (St. Mary's College of Maryland), Kendy Hess (Holy Cross), and Noel Saenz (University of Illinois).

The Center is always looking for new ways to pursue its mission. If you are interested in supporting the Center or have questions or suggestions about it, please contact the Director, David Boonin, at:

david.boonin@colorado.edu.

Faculty News: 2016-2017

Mitzi Lee — Mitzi taught courses in ancient Greek philosophy in 2017, and also worked on her book, *Justice in Aristotle's Moral and Political Philosophy*, under contract with Oxford University Press. She gave talks based on her work at the Chicago Consortium in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy (October 2016), Ancient Philosophy Workshop at Rutgers (October 2016), Union College (September 2017), and Workshop on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics at Catholic University (October 2017). She is also serving on the American Philosophical Association task force that is writing the Good Practices Guide for the profession.

Graeme Forbes — In 2017, Graeme Forbes was pleased to receive a Boulder Faculty Assembly Award for Excellence in Research. In the same year, he emailed final versions of three invited papers to the publishers: one on Kit Fine's recent work on vagueness, for a volume on the work of, you guessed it, Kit Fine (OUP); one on intensionality, for a volume on non-propositional intentionality (OUP); and one on the pragmatics of free-choice disjunction, based on his keynote talk at a conference in Sicily the year before, for a volume on pragmatics (Springer). All three books should appear in 2018. He also gave a keynote, on event semantics, at the Bridge Day Conference on Logic and Language, in Stockholm in June; and, a day later, he played the role of opponent at a PhD defense at Stockholm University. His urge to retire is clearly well-motivated, undermined only by his urge to win more awards.

Matthias Steup — Matthias participated in the 13th Russell conference in Healdsburg, CA, where he presented a paper on the question of how one knows one isn't a brain in a vat. He also submitted the final versions of three papers to the publishers. In the first, for a volume on evidentialism, he argues that evidential fit cannot be grounded on explanatory relations. In the second, for a volume on skepticism past and present, he discusses the connection between skepticism and the internalism-externalism distinction. In the third, a contribution to a symposium on Rik Peels' book *Responsible Belief*, to appear in the *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Steup defends his thesis we have no less control over our beliefs than over our actions.

Rob Rupert — Rob spent the past summer as a Research Fellow at the Center for Mind, Brain, and Cognitive Evolution at Ruhr University in Bochum. He gave talks there, as well as in Cologne, Budapest, Lublin, Edinburgh, Stirling, and at the Pacific Division of the APA. He continued in his roles as Director of Graduate Studies in Philosophy and as an Associate Editor of the *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. For the first half of the year, he chaired the Arts and Sciences Council, the faculty governance body for the College of Arts and Sciences. He led a research group for his advisees and two reading groups, one on artificial intelligence and the other focused on issues to do with mind and self. He hosted a visiting Ph.D. student from Dusseldorf and won a CU-Boulder College Scholar Award.

Iskra Fileva — Iskra published an essay titled, "Can Character Traits Be Based on Brute Psychological Facts" in *Ratio* while her "Historical Inaccuracy in Fiction" was accepted by *American Philosophy Quarterly* and will appear there 2018. Her favorite essay from 2017, though, is "What Do Oceanians Believe? Bad Faith and a Hope for Sanity in 1984," a book chapter for 1984 and *Philosophy*, a collection on Orwell's (strangely relevant today) dystopian novel. If you have ever wondered how the government in a totalitarian regime succeeds in making even intelligent and reflective people believe all manner of falsehoods, her chapter offers an answer. In addition, Iskra gave a talk on psychopathy at Stanford and another one on Moore-paradoxical beliefs -- this one co-authored with philosopher and psychoanalyst Linda Brakel -- at the 2017 meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, which took place in England. Psychopaths, in case you are curious, do not have *morally* bad characters because they do not have moral characters at all. Also, Moore-paradoxical propositions, despite what the name suggests, can be thought and asserted without irrationality.

Michael Huemer — In 2017, Michael Huemer solved ten paradoxes of philosophy. This included the liar paradox, the sorites paradox, the puzzle of the self-torturer, Newcomb's paradox, the surprise quiz paradox, the two-envelope paradox, the paradoxes of the principle of indifference, the ravens paradox, the shooting room paradox, and the sleeping beauty problem. These solutions will appear in his book *Paradox Lost* in 2018.

Heather Demarest — Heather joined CU's Philosophy Department this fall. Her paper, "Powerful Properties, Powerless Laws," was published by OUP, in *Causal Powers*, edited by Jonathan Jacobs. She also had her paper on her research of undergraduate retention published in *Analysis*. She gave presentations at the New England Philosophy of Time Workshop, the Metro Area Philosophy of Science in NY, and the Workshop for Pre-Tenure Women in Philosophy.

Chris Heathwood — Chris had two articles accepted for publication: "Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure" in *Utilitas* and "Which Desires Are Relevant to Well-Being?" in *Noûs*. He gave talks at Yokohama National University and Keio University in Japan, the Pacific APA in Seattle, the Kansas Workshop on Well-Being, and Syracuse University. His PhD student Jonathan Spelman defended his dissertation splendidly and took up a Visiting Assistant Professor position in Ohio. Heathwood also became, for the 2017-2018 academic year, a Faculty Fellow at the Murphy Institute at Tulane University in New Orleans. His accomplishments there include the dodging of ten hurricanes.

Graduate Student Accomplishments

Cheryl Abbate — Cheryl presented her paper "In Defense of Cats: Why cuddly killers aren't really devastating ecosystems and who is" at the Front Range Student Ecology Symposium.

Alexander Beard — Alexander published his paper "HIT and brain reward function: a case of mistaken identity (theory)" (co-authored with C. D. Wright & M. Colombo) accepted for publication in *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C*. He also had a review of *Explanatory Pluralism* (C. Mantzavinos) forthcoming in *Analysis*.

Mark Boespflug — Mark had his paper "Locke's Principle of Proportionality" accepted for publication by *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie*. His paper "Reid and the Dogmatists" was accepted for publication in *Synthese*. He presented his paper "Locke on Testimony" at St. Norbert College and Weber State University. He presented his paper "Robert Holcot on Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief" at Marquette University. He also presented his paper "Newman on Faith and Reason" at the University of Oxford. Additionally, he presented his paper "The Rejection of the Medieval Conception of Voluntary Belief" in Berlin, Germany. Mark also received a Graduate Research Award from the Center for the Study of Origins for AY 17-18, and was awarded the department's Stahl Prize.



Mark Boespflug

Jasmine Carter — Jasmine had her paper 'Not Really a Market Without Limits' published in *Journal of Value Inquiry*. She received the department's Mills Teaching Award for Best Teaching Assistant of the Year for 2016-17. She was awarded the Adam Smith Fellowship through the Mercatus Center for AY 2017-18. She also received a Humane Studies Fellowship through the Institute for Humane Studies for AY 2017-18. Additionally, she was chosen to be a Freedom & Security Graduate Fellow with the Center for Western Civilization, Thought & Policy for 2017-18. She was invited to attend the following conferences and colloquia: Liberty & Responsibility in Adam Smith Conference held by Liberty Fund (August 2017), Applied Research in the PPE Framework Colloquium held by Mercatus Center (May 2017), Classical Liberalism in Contemporary Political Philosophy Colloquium held by Institute for Humane Studies (Mar 2017). Additionally, Jasmine has been invited to be a panelist (on a panel entitled "Great Thinkers of Classical Liberalism") at the Association for Private Enterprise Education's 2018 Meeting in Las Vegas (April 2018).



Jasmine Carter

Judith Carlisle — Judith presented her paper "Kierkegaard's Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Picture of Dorian Gray" at the 2nd Triennial Dominican Colloquium.

Spencer Case — Spencer served as the graduate student co-president in AY 16-17. He was also appointed as a board member of the Michael Polanyi Society. He received a Summer Graduate School Fellowship for Summer 2017. Additionally, he won the department's 2017 Jentzsch Prize.

Philip Choi — Philip presented his paper "Is John Buridan an Epistemic Fallibilist?" at the Uppsala Graduate Conference in History of Philosophy and at the 2017 Cental Division APA. He presented his paper "Perceptual Indistinguishability, Skepticism, and Disjunctivism: Scotus and Ockham" in Berlin, Germany in September 2017. He will be presenting his paper "Ockham on the Epistemic Nature of Faith" at Boston College in March 2018. He won a Thomas Edwin Devaney Dissertation Fellowship for 2017-18. He will be staying in Hazel Barnes Flat in London, visiting Cambridge and Oxford for doing research necessary for his dissertation from Jan 29-Feb 7, 2018. Additionally, his papers received a couple of rejection in 2017 (and he thinks that this is an achievement).

Daniel Coren — Dan had his paper "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry" accepted for publication in *Acta Analytica*. His paper "Always Choose to Live or Choose to Always Live" accepted for publication in *Southwest Philosophy Review*. He had his paper "Why Does Aristotle Defend the Principle of Non-Contradiction Against its Contrary?" accepted for publication in *The Philosophical Forum*. His paper "On Young's Version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities" appeared in *Philosophia: The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel*. Additionally, a paper appeared in a subsequent issue of *Philosophia* entitled "A Response to Coren's Objections to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility," which is a reply to Dan's aforementioned paper. Dan presented his paper "Always Choose to Live or Choose to Always Live" at the 2017 Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference. This paper was also accepted to the 2017 Northwest Philosophy Conference. Dan's review of David Riesbeck's book *Aristotle on Political Community* (Cambridge) will appear in the next issue of *Ancient Philosophy*. Additionally, Dan received a Graduate School Dissertation Completion Fellowship, AY17-18.



Daniel Coren

Sam Director — Sam had his paper "Why the Perfect Being Theologian Cannot Endorse the Principle of Alternative Possibilities" accepted for publication in the *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion*. His paper "A Dilemma for Saulish Skepticism: Either Self-Defeating or Not Even Skepticism" was accepted for publication in

Disputatio. He also had his paper “The Inhumanity of Cards Against Humanity” accepted for publication in *Think: Philosophy for Everyone*. Additionally, his paper “After Death, It Can Get Worse: Did Amazon Harm Philip K. Dick After His Death?” was published in *The Man in the High Castle and Philosophy*. Sam’s paper “Speciesism, Prejudice, and Epistemic-Peer Disagreement” was accepted for presentation at the 2018 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. He presented his paper “Does Plato Endorse A Public Reason Theory?” at the 2017 Institute for Humane Studies Summer Graduate Research Colloquium. His paper “Why the Perfect-Being Theologian Cannot Endorse the Principle of Alternative Possibilities” was accepted for presentation at the 2016 Virginia Tech Graduate Philosophy Conference. His paper “Peer Disagreement, Moral Skepticism, and Self-Defeat” was accepted for presentation at the 2017 Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference at the University of Utah. Additionally, Sam won a Humane Studies Fellowship for AY 17-18, as well as a graduate student travel grant from the APA.



Samuel Director

Jay Geyer — Jay presented his paper “The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty to Moral Exculpation” at the 2017 meeting of the Eastern Division of the APA. Also, his paper “Moral Uncertainty and Moral Culpability” was accepted for publication in *Utilitas*. Jay presented his paper “Lowering Expectations for Expected Moral Value Theory” at the Mountain Plains Philosophy Conference at Weber State University.

Derick Hughes — Derek presented his paper “Rational Autonomy and Irrational Bias” policy at the 2017 Philosophy of Social Sciences Roundtable.

Anthony Kelley — Anthony presented his paper “Alcoholics, Firefighters, and the Responsibility Argument” at the University of Pennsylvania and his paper, “Well-being and Alienation” at the University of Tampere in Finland. He is also scheduled to give talks at Mississippi State University and the University of Kansas in February and July, respectively.

Ben Kultgen — Ben received a 2016-217 Graduate Student Teaching Excellence Award.

Cristian Larroulet Philippi — Cristian presented his paper “Distorted Quality Signals in School Markets” at the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Michael Sechman — Michael served as the Climate Committee Graduate Student Representative, AY16-17

Joseph Wilson — Joe won an Origins Project RAship for AY17-18.

Interview — Katie Cunliffe

Katie Cunliffe recently graduated magna cum laude from CU Boulder’s undergraduate Philosophy program. We caught up with her to discuss her future after graduation.

Q: How did you find your way into Philosophy at CU?

A: I actually started out as an English major, but Intro to Philosophy ticked off a core requirement. This was my first exposure of any sort to Philosophy, and I have to say that Kacey Warren was a really wonderful teacher who truly sparked my interest in the subject. I found the sheer **breadth** of topics, mostly ethical and political ones, refreshing, and this was something I hadn’t really experienced in the same way in any other class. Soon enough, I was taking so many credits in

Philosophy that it didn’t make sense not to continue somehow, at least as a Minor. And then at some point one of my English teachers actually took me aside at the end of the class and asked me whether I had considered doing an Honors thesis. (At that point, that’s something I didn’t even know people did.) He suggested I think about a topic that excited me, and as I sat down to think about it, I realized that any topic that was genuinely exciting to me was really a Philosophy topic, not an English topic. So I ended up changing my major to Philosophy!

Q: What strike you as the most important philosophical problems that you’d still like to spend more time thinking through?

A: In terms of legal philosophy, which is a special interest of mine, I’m still fascinated by the question

of what law is actually meant to *do*. Is the *primary goal* to influence people’s actions? Should the law be aligned with some kind of ethical code, and, if so, is there an ethical code that is generalized enough and well-known enough to play this kind of role in the first place? These are fundamental, basic questions that one should have thought about before doing anything related to law.

Q: What are you doing now? Plans for the immediate future?

A: Since I graduated I’ve been



Philosophy is the perfect major—I'm probably massively biased—but I really think it is the perfect major for Law School."

Interview — Katie Cunliffe, *cont.*

working as an assistant first in a law office and now in a mediation office here in Boulder, and I've spent a good amount of time preparing for Law School. At work, more often than not we're dealing with divorce-related issues like parental rights and duties, time sharing agreements, and the like, and what I do is to act as a kind of liaison between the two parties. What kinds of issues are involved? Is there a domestic violence issue underlying the dispute? Yes, it can be hard at times: I'm now much more aware than ever before of just how common domestic violence is. But it can also be really

satisfying for us when we're able to work out some kind of resolution from a difficult set of issues.

Q: How has Philosophy helped you on your way?

A: Philosophy is **the** perfect major—I'm probably massively biased—but I really think it is **the** perfect major for Law School. It has prepared me really, really well. The quality of my writing is just so much better than what it was. Obviously English was helpful, as well, but when it comes to forming arguments—well, let me put it this

way: I feel **comfortable** going into a law degree in a way that students from most other majors probably just don't. The LSAT—as miserable as it was!—covered so many types of questions that we covered in our Philosophy classes. In one section, for example, you're picking out the flaws in the argument and then either strengthening or weakening it—all of that is stuff we do in Philosophy all the time. So Philosophy is something that has really helped me in my preparation and I'm sure will continue to help me in law school, too.

Welcoming New Graduate Students

Alexander Beard:

Alexander Beard joins the PhD program this fall. He received his BA in Philosophy from the University of California Santa Cruz, and his MA in Philosophy from California State University Long Beach. Alex's primary interests are in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science. When not doing philosophy, Alex enjoys petting other people's dogs, and listening to "Let's Groove" by Earth, Wind & Fire.



Thomas Bonn:

Thomas Bonn joins the department as a first-year PhD student. He earned a B.A. in Liberal Arts from St. John's College in Annapolis, where he came to love the great works of the Western philosophical tradition. While he believes in the credo "nihil philosophici a me alienum puto," his main interests lie in ancient philosophy, early modern philosophy, and ethics, with favorite authors including Plato, Leibniz, Descartes, Wittgenstein, and Parfit. When not loving wisdom, he enjoys playing chess and tennis, meditating, and writing.



Richard Alonzo Fyfe:

Richard Alonzo Fyfe is returning to graduate school after a long time away. When he was in high school, he promised himself that he would "leave the world a better place than it would have otherwise been if he had not lived". He then spent his time trying to figure out what he had just promised and how he could know whether he had been successful. Consequently, his primary interest is in metaethics. Though he insists that he is a moral realist and cognitivist, his favorite philosophers are David Hume and J.L. Mackie.



Derik Hughes:

Derik joins the PhD program this fall after completing his BA at Cal Poly Pomona. He is broadly interested in questions that surround agency and action, and problems in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics related to these questions. His specific interests range from the problems of free will and moral responsibility, to recent issues surrounding the moral and social implications of cognitive biases.

Ali Laird:

Ali Laird joins the M.A. program this fall after completing a B.A. in Humanities at Villanova University. Her primary interests are in philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology, especially issues relating to the relationship between scientific knowledge and metaphysical commitments, how science informs public values, and the role of truth claims in policy-making. She is also interested in land use policy in the West.



Lorenzo Antonio Nericcio:

Lorenzo Antonio Nericcio joins the CU philosophy MA program this fall with the intent to study applied ethics—particularly utilitarianism—and public policy. His focus within in this area is on emerging technologies and society, with a particular interest in artificial intelligence ethics. He completed his BA in philosophy at California Polytechnic State University in Spring of 2017.



Cristian Larroulet Philippi:

Cristian Larroulet Philippi is from Chile. He studied economics (BA and MA) and worked as a researcher at J-PAL for some years in Chile and India. His interest in methodological and normative issues of the scientific practice led him to go to the UK to study an MSc in Philosophy of the Social Sciences at the LSE. Although naturally interested in most things that are relevant, he is particularly interested in philosophy of science, political philosophy, and the overlaps between those two areas (e.g. the 'values in science' literature, Science Policy, etc.).

Elliot Spears:

Elliot Spears joins the MA program this year. He received his BA in philosophy, and communication from CU boulder in 2016. His main areas of interest in philosophy are: metaethics, medieval philosophy (especially Aquinas), and philosophy of religion.

Jonathyn Zapf:

Jonathyn Zapf joins the MA program. His previous studies led him to receive degrees in biology, French, and psychology, each of which he finds largely irrelevant to his philosophical interests (which include Plato and epistemology generally). Jonathyn acquired a 10-week old puppy during his first semester in grad school, which, in retrospect, was a bad choice; though this did give him the occasion to name said pupper "Arisdoggie," which made the choice (slightly) less bad.

Graduation: Spring 2017

Graduate Students

Doctorate of Philosophy

Paul Bowman
Eric Lee
Dan Lowe
Matthew Pike
Jonathan Spelman
Alexander Zambrano

Master of Arts

Joshua Egner
Heather Stewart

Jentsch Prize

Spencer Case

Stahl Prize

Mark Boespflug

Mills Teaching Award

(Best TA)

Jasmine Carter

Morrison Teaching Award

(Best GPTI)

Dan Lowe



Graduation: Spring 2017

Undergraduate Students: Bachelor of Arts

Nathaniel Armstrong

Joel Ayers

Ashna Basnet

Tyler Black

Nicholas Bloom*

Samuel Bodo

Giuseppe Bonanno*

Preston Bryant

Garrett Cease*

Colin Cherney

Griffin Cohen

Jenasys Collier

Katherine Cunliffe (*magna cum laude*)

Evan Dedolph (*magna cum laude*)

Thomas Duran

Gabrielle Filter

Marcos Gallegos

John Giblin

Matthew Greene

Meghan Hargaden

Jack Hernandez*

Jeffrey Houd

Sheldon Huck

John Kealey

Tori Kinoshita

Christopher Kunz

Kevin Liebrock

Ayman Maghrabi

Brian Morton

Ayana Otteman

Corissa Peterson*

Mattias Rohn

Martin Ryeiss

Michael Satterelli

Daniel Schwartz

William Singleton

Robert Thomas*

Grace Tobin

Flor Torres

Alexandra Van Der Linden

Chad Verdi

Connor Walters

Tucker Wentz (*cum laude*)

Nicholas Wright

James Zoller

**with Distinction
(GPA 3.75 and above)*

Special Requests

We humbly ask that those who are able and willing consider donating to the department in order to aid future research and education efforts here at CU Boulder.

Funding for teaching prizes for PhD students:

The Department established in 2014 two teaching prizes for our graduate student teachers, the Claudia Mills Teaching Prize for the outstanding Teaching Assistant of the year, and the Wes Morriston Teaching Prize for the outstanding Graduate Part-Time Instructor of the year. The prizes are awarded each year to two graduate students, and are intended both to recognize outstanding teaching of undergraduates in the philosophy department, as well as to acknowledge Prof. Mills' and Prof. Morriston's own outstanding contributions to undergraduate teaching during their own career.

Each prize comes with \$500 cash along with recognition of the honor in the department's commencement ceremonies at the end of the year.

Past recipients of the prize include:

Mills Prize – Alexander Zambrano (2015), Zak A. Kopeikin (2016)

Morriston Prize – Andrew Chapman (2015), Matthew Pike (2016)

We would like to establish permanent endowments for these prizes, both to put them on a sound financial footing and to increase the amount. We welcome contributions to these prizes, in order to honor these professors for their outstanding teaching at CU-Boulder, as well as to recognize and encourage excellent teaching in the department.

Funding for MA students:

Some of our MA students are without guaranteed funding, which means that they must pay their own way in order to study here. We welcome contributions to sponsor an MA student, with anywhere from \$5000 to \$20,000, which would be enough to defray or cover the costs of tuition, fees and living expenses for a year.

Undergraduate prizes:

We would like to establish prizes for undergraduates, such as a prize for the graduating senior philosophy major with the highest GPA in philosophy, or a prize for best essay by a philosophy student. Each of these could be established as a named prize, to be announced each year at Commencement, with a cash prize. A \$10,000 gift would allow us to establish an endowed fund to pay for an annual prize of \$300.

POPCO funding:

We welcome contributions to our Philosophy Outreach Program of Colorado 'POPCO' outreach program, which sends philosophy faculty and graduate students to high schools all across the state, to teach a class on philosophy introducing students to the topics in philosophy. Since philosophy is not regularly taught in high schools, this is an important way of introducing students to our subject. The POPCO program pays participants for gas/mileage and travel expenses for their trips.

Travel funding for graduate students attending the RoME Congress:

The department hosts the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress every summer, which has become an important and popular conference on ethics. We welcome contributions to a fund that enables graduate students from other institutions to travel to the conference and present their work. Even \$85 will defray the costs of their conference registration.

Summer Funding for PhDs:

Our PhD students are funded during the academic year with teaching fellowships with stipends between \$15K and \$18K. But they are not paid during the summer, unless they win a summer teaching assignment. For the other students, we seek summer funding, so they can spend their summer months studying and working on papers and dissertations. \$2K is sufficient to support a graduate student for the summer, especially if they can be paid as Research Assistants on work-study.



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Please visit our website at www.colorado.edu/philosophy/ for more information on faculty, students, projects, upcoming conferences and talks, and the general goings-on of the department.



Hellems Arts and Sciences Building, home of CU Boulder's Philosophy Department, as viewed from the Mary Rippon Theater