Where in the World is Russia? Geopolitical Perceptions and Preferences of Ordinary Russians

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Abstract: Two political geographers present the results of an extensive survey and examine the effects of post-Soviet territorial reconfiguration of the Russian state on ordinary Russians’ sense of national identity, and opinion on a range of political, economic, and social issues. The survey, comprising 1,200 face-to-face interviews, probed Russian attitudes to determine which states of the former USSR they view as culturally closest to Russia and which they wish to reunify with Russia. Differences in responses show a clear split between Slavic, Eurasianist, and Baltic geopolitical visions. The findings shed light on the willingness of ordinary Russians to support reunification with other parts of the former USSR. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F02, F22, Z13. 6 figures, 3 tables, 68 references. Key words: geopolitical traditions, Eurasianism, former Soviet Union, Russia, Near Abroad, military intervention, surveys.

The breakup of the Soviet Union is a national tragedy on an enormous scale, [from which] only the elites and nationalists of the republics gained. . . . I think that ordinary citizens of the former Soviet Union and the post-Soviet space gained nothing from this [breakup]. (Vladimir Putin, February, 12, 2004)

A dozen years after the collapse of communism, the ghost of the Soviet Union still haunts the political rhetoric and territorial imaginations of Russians. The break-up of the Soviet Union also severed the political unity of diverse peoples and regions across a vast swatch of Eurasia. While library shelves are filled with material discussing the demise of the Soviet Union as a communist state, far less has been written about its end as a unified territory and the effect that this disintegration had on the geopolitical imaginations of the Russian people. Unlike other post-communist states, which returned to a pre-communist past for symbols of its national identity, Russia faced a crisis of identity. In pre-communist and communist times, its territorial extent far exceeded that of the contemporary Russian state. More than any other post-communist society, therefore, the Russian has had to deal with feelings of loss. While Russians have struggled not only to make economic and political transitions, they also have had to re-conceptualize their country within a territory for which there are few historical antecedents.

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The search for a new national identity has been ongoing in Russia since 1991, becoming a centerpiece of Putin’s strategy to resuscitate state authority in the wake of the Yel’tsin years in the Kremlin. In the words of James Billington (2004, p. 12), “No nation ever poured more intellectual energy into answering the question of national identity than Russia,” and at least since the mid-19th century, the Slavophile/Westernizer dichotomy has been at the core of debates on that identity (e.g., Billington, 2004; Khasanova, 2004; Zevelev, 1999, 2001a).

The territorial restructuring of the former Soviet Union has altered the geopolitics of Eastern Europe and Russia’s Near Abroad. In the aftermath of the USSR’s disintegration, Tsymburskiy (1993) described Russia as an island surrounded by a sea of very diverse countries stretching from Finland to Korea—a “great limitrophe,” or buffer zone separating Russia from the true centers of European and Asian civilization. Recent Russian foreign policy asserts the right to neutralize threats and instability in this zone so that Russia will not be pulled into conflict with the countries beyond it or be subject to attacks from anti-Russian forces within it (Moscow News, December 13, 2004). Particularly important to the discussion of Russia’s borders is the presence of roughly 25 million ethnic Russians in the bordering states, especially in eastern Ukraine, northern Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Estonia. According to Zevelev (2001b, p. 53) the essence of the ethnonationalist political program “... is to build a Russian state within the area of settlement of the Russian people and other Eastern Slavs. Politically, this means reunification with Russian diasporas and the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, and northern Kazakhstan (the last of which [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn calls ‘southern Siberia’).”

Such views are not inconsequential, as public opinion can still influence policy decisions made by the federal government in post-Soviet Russia. That being said, however, few today would argue that Russia is a fully developed democracy, as the short-term trend since 2000 is marked by concentration of power in the presidency and increased control over the Russian media. In this light, it could be argued that public opinion matters even less today than it did several years ago. Be that as it may, public opinion remains a force that Russia’s current leaders (unlike CPSU General Secretaries) still must consider quite seriously.

We hypothesize that the territorial reconfiguration of the Russian state has affected ordinary Russians’ sense of national identity (both positively and negatively), and that this, in turn, has influenced public opinion across a wide range of political, economic, and social issues. The collapse of the Soviet Union generated new mental maps for Russians, maps that do not always match the contemporary political map of state borders. Such imaginings of Russia are frequently connected to beliefs about what sort of country Russia is and should be, how Russia is viewed by the rest of the world, and how it is shaped by Russian foreign policy objectives.

Turning to foreign policy, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the resulting “war on terror,” and the United States war in Iraq brought U.S.-Russian geopolitical relations into a new era. Immediately after 9/11, Putin pledged support to the U.S. in the war against international terrorism and acceded to the Pentagon’s requests to fly through Russian airspace in

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2The “Near Abroad” (the 14 countries of the former Soviet Union, excluding Russia) is a term launched by the Russian Foreign Ministry in the early 1990s to denote a special zone of influence for Russia (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000).

3Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the noted Russian writer, Soviet dissident, and GULAG survivor, is viewed by many as the founding father of Russian ethnonationalism.

4Zimmerman’s (2002) survey of 30 elites conducted in 1999 revealed that public opinion was perceived to influence Russian foreign policy only moderately, with an average score of 3.01 on a scale from 1 to 7 (7 being the highest).
order to reach the former Soviet bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Since then, the relationship has deteriorated following U.S. intervention in Iraq, and especially more recently as a result of differing candidate preferences and views about the conduct of second-round Presidential elections in Ukraine in November 2004; these elections generated Russian fears of Westerns effort to absorb that nation within EU-NATO structures.

Our research is intended to assist efforts to define the region that ordinary Russians view as their “home territory,” presumably an area to be contested with the West in the face of continual European Union and NATO expansion to the east.

RUSSIAN METAGEOGRAPHIES

Lewis and Wigen (1997) have described “metageographies” as the geographical structures that people carry around in their heads, through which they order everyday and long-term spatial information. They are simplified geographies based on fact, experience, and myths that are largely unexamined by the people that use them. Metageographies are formed mostly by the context in which people develop political values and ideals, most if not all strongly influenced by media images as well as personal travel experiences. Russians, for example, might retain significantly different metageographies depending on generation, inasmuch as the younger ones reached maturity in a different country than the older generations of Russians, whose formative years were influenced by the Soviet state under Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev. It is this kind of demographic difference that our research project seeks to understand and explain using ideological, geopolitical, locational, and demographic characteristics.

Russia currently exists at its smallest territorial extent since the time of Peter the Great three centuries ago. By 1650, the country stretched from Eastern Europe to the Pacific Ocean. In 1850, Russia had incorporated most of the territory that would later become the Soviet Union’s, including the bulk of the area that would become the five Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan as well as the three Caucasus republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Since territory and nationalism are closely related concepts, the primary question is how Russians view the territories that have been “lost,” both in a sovereignty sense, linked to the break-up of the Soviet Union, and in a geopolitical sense, tied to the encroachment of Western organizations onto traditional Russian spheres of influence. Can a group see a significant change in its territory without experiencing a significant change in its national self-identity? Could Russia experience a revival of ethnic-based nationalism, driven by irredentism, similar to Hungary or Turkey which pledged support for their co-ethnics across international borders earlier in the 20th century? A sense of national identity is not merely an internal phenomenon, but also constitutes a response to the position of the nation and its territorial state (or lack thereof) within the world as a whole. Zevelev (2001b, pp. 1-2) argued that Russia, in her efforts to “establish special ties with its ‘compatriots abroad’, is not only seeking domination in

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5It is still unclear whether ordinary Russian citizens were willing to shift traditional geopolitical certainties as quickly. Two and one-half years after the 9/11 attacks, 55 percent of Russians surveyed believed the United States played a “negative” role in the world, and only 12 percent a positive role (Petrova, 2004).

6The key to understanding the Russian backing of the Ukrainian presidential candidate Yanukovich is the long-standing cultural and economic affinity of the Slavic neighbors and the worry that, “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 18).
Eurasia but also looking to resolve the haunting legacy of the former empire—an empire in which, ironically, Russians denied themselves for centuries an articulated identity."

Sparked by NATO’s expansion, questions of great power conflict, territorial control and influence, and national identity have once again become part of the agenda of politicians, scholars, and journalists both in the West and in the former Soviet Union. Much of their research and commentary has focused on the role of an expanded NATO, wars in the Balkans and Chechnya, the new U.S. presence in Central Asia, and the effects of these developments on East-West relations. With the exception of a few researchers, the focus of geopolitical interest has been at the scale of the state and on the actions of governments or pronouncements of leading public intellectuals.

It is not clear how the space and place perceptions of “homeland” by ordinary Russians create national and geopolitical visions. This is somewhat surprising given recent debates within Russian society over symbols of national identity. However, there is one national symbol, the political map of Russia, that cannot be altered through action of the State Duma or easily resolved through public debate. It is a map that shows Russia as a specific territory, a territory that does not include the other republics of the former Soviet Union, a delimitation that happened quickly and without deep reflection or real debate. The map, though, is much more than just a symbol. Unlike most national symbols, it reflects demarcated political borders, sometimes recognized and accepted as legitimate by the international community but at times contested by the adjoining states. The same line drawn on the map has not only differing symbolic meanings for the two groups on either side of it, but also very real geopolitical implications. Do the regions that ordinary Russians feel are important coincide with the territorial aspirations of the various forms of Russian nationalism? Our research project seeks to understand the relationship between territory and national identity in the Russian population, while disaggregating the large nationwide sample by socio-demographic, regional, and voter-preference categories.

PARADIGMS OF RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICAL ORIENTATION

Governments, geopolitical intellectuals, and foreign policy elites use geopolitical codes and scripts to assist the public in interpreting foreign policy actions and to promote specific agendas that could in turn mobilize public opinion to influence those actions. The codes are passed on to the public through “geopolitical scripts,” public performances that impart a regularized way of viewing a situation or region (Ó Tuathail, 2002).
Do the fears and preferences of ordinary people act as constraints on the foreign policy actions of the state? Do ordinary people adopt the geo-visions of the elites? These questions are the core of what Kolossov (2003) has termed “low geopolitics”: i.e., how ordinary people feel about their own country, its place in the world, and about other countries and their place in the world. All such feelings are shaped by the metageographies that people carry—all the knowledge they have gained as well as all the ignorance, stereotypes, and prejudices.

The relevant term that will be used throughout our research study is “geopolitical vision”:12 “any idea concerning the relation between one’s own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy” (Dijkink, 1996, p. 10). The feelings, thoughts, images, and ideas people have about places that constitute geopolitical vision may or may not match reality or a “normative preference.” Often, differing perceptions based on mythic ideas come into conflict, as is the case of Russian and Ukrainian nationalists (see Kolossov, 2002).13

The study of perceptions of ordinary people is necessary in order to test the efficacy of geopolitical images and ideas that are constantly being created and recreated by governments and foreign policy elites (and also by mass media).14 As with any interpretation, the message alters as it moves from elites to ordinary people. The visions of the elites may be accepted in part, altered, or altogether rejected. The best way to collect data that highlight the geopolitical visions of people is to survey them. Geopolitical visions are not always clearly defined and most people would be hard pressed to elaborate their own view of the world in an unstructured manner. However, with surveys we can collect data on people’s attitudes toward particular places and toward particular foreign policy goals or ideas. For example, the survey used in our research project asked Russians whether or not they feel Russia is close in terms of culture and world outlook to each of the states of the former Soviet Union. The answers to this question can be compared to those relating to other questions asking Russians about reunification of the Soviet Union, about borders, or about potential military alliances.15 By collecting a variety of information on attitudes and perceptions of the world outside Russia and potential Russian foreign policy goals, we can construct collective geopolitical visions of Russia’s “place in the world,” or what might be called “geopolitical imaginations.”16 These imaginations cannot be divorced from the “geopolitical culture” of the state, defined as “the cultural and organization processes by which foreign policy is made in states” (Ó Tuathail, 2003).

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12The term is borrowed from Dijkink (1996) and is defined similarly to Kolossov’s “low geopolitics.” Ó Tuathail (2003) points out that Dijkink’s definition is nearly identical to Newman’s (1999) definition of geopolitical imagination.

13A more narrow definition might be better suited for analysis of elite visions, but ordinary people are unlikely to have clear normative visions of the world. It is believed that Russians’ geopolitical visions consist of overlapping perceptions of the world. While these perceptions include normative positions, we cannot assume that a single clear normative position is held by non-elites.

14Ó Tuathail (2003) describes a “discursive policy process” of “geopolitical writing” in which foreign policies and actions are constantly being characterized and re-characterized not only by the state, but by think tanks, corporate lobbyists, newspaper editorials, and the “punditocracy”—namely media figures who have access to op-ed pages and are deemed to have important opinions about foreign policy.

15It is assumed that we can examine the correlations in the answers of people with similar geopolitical visions.

16Ó Tuathail (2003) has proposed a heuristic approach to geopolitical study that begins with the basic assumptions regarding a state’s position in the world (geopolitical imagination). This imagination includes the civilizational grouping of a state (are we part of the West?); feelings of status, influence, and power relative to other states; and perceptions of the national identity of the state (Duara, 1995).
2003, p. 10). Here assumptions made by the public and the history of how it viewed foreign policy tend to shape the way in which geopolitics is formed.17

Within the broad sphere of geopolitical culture, one usually finds a number of different geopolitical traditions. And in Russia, such traditions are based on competing views of the country as a European or a Eurasian power, with a spectrum of traditions ranging from the liberal, Westernizing school of thought to a right-wing nationalist position that seeks a strong, centralized authoritarian state embracing all of the former Soviet Union. This spectrum of Russian geopolitical traditions is summarized as three paradigms—Moderate Eurasianism, Extreme Eurasianism, and Westernism—all described below. Our focus here on where Russians think their borders lie is intrinsically related to these geopolitical traditions.

TERRITORY AND IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

Before proceeding to detail the findings of our survey, brief comments on nationalist and geopolitical visions relating to territory and on Russian identity within their territory may be useful in explaining our approach. In fact, perceptions or visions of territory are no less important in the debate on Russian identity than monuments, anthems, or the flag.

Nationalism, Territory, and Geopolitical Visions

The theoretical framework for the exploration of the geopolitical visions of ordinary Russians is based on aspects of identity formation that are rooted in territory. We show how the collective sense of nationalism and perceptions of Russia’s place within the world come together to form specific territorial visions. Thus, while the three paradigms presented below strive to provide separate bases for the geopolitical visions of ordinary Russians, it is expected that similar visions may have multiple sources.18 It is further expected that the sources of geopolitical imaginings differ across socio-demographic groups in the Russian population. We seek to test whether the Russian population exhibits the sets of national visions identified by some investigators19 as “Westernizing Nationalism,” “Moderate Eurasianism,” and “Extreme Eurasianism.” The territorial aspirations associated with each of these three classifications raise the central question of our study presented in this paper. Do the regions that ordinary Russians feel are important match the territorial aspirations of the three main Russian geopolitical traditions?

Various explanations of the bases of nationalism have been proposed, but all views appear to agree that nations exist in space and are attached by location or by vision to some territory. This understanding applies to a nation-state, to an ethnic separatist movement, as well as to an irredentist claim. Though seemingly beyond dispute, the importance of territory should not be understated. The assertion that a piece of territory is “national space” is a political statement that affects not only people living in that territory, but also people in adjoining

17Geopolitical culture helps to create normative goals (geopolitical visions) of a state’s foreign policy. These goals are then justified through geopolitical discourses that are colored by a state’s geopolitical culture. In the United States, for example, a geopolitical culture has arisen whereby foreign policy issues tend to be framed in universal, moralistic terms about freedom. The public has come to expect this and the state apparatus tailors its geopolitical scripts to match it.

18For example, two respondents whose vision of Russia’s borders includes Ukraine, Belarus, and parts of Kazakhstan may have different reasons for the same vision.

territories who must re-conceptualize the neighboring spaces, and either accept or reject the national assertions of others upon those spaces.

People tend to have emotional attachments to places, and their perceptions, feelings, and emotions about particular places give them meaning. Thus, the territorial space of a nation has a meaning beyond the political power accruing from its control of the land. The history of a nation, its struggles, conflicts, defining moments, and tragedies all happen in particular places that not only shape the character of those places, but also the character of the nation. Consequently, territory is a vital component of national identity as an emotive source of imagining what the nation is all about. According to Knight (1982, p. 526), there is a fundamental problem relating to the location of national boundaries when territory is thought of as “space to which identity is attached by a distinct group who hold or covet that territory and who desire to fully control it for the group’s benefit.” Such a conception of territory tends to encourage social construction of national boundaries that do not necessarily match state borders. Moreover, we should realize that one of the principal emotive attachments to place comes when a group believes it has been wrongly dispossessed of a territory (Murphy, 1990).

Inasmuch as Russian territorial consciousness extends beyond the country’s present borders, “Russia” and “Russian identity” are not confined within the space of the Russian Federation. Thus, the breakup of the Soviet Union was not simply the collapse of a communist regime, but also the dissolution of the Russian Empire. A sense of nationalism and a spatial perspective of what should be part of the Russian state are rooted in what Adrian Jones (1995) calls an oikos (“nation-self”), in which the nation was defined by its authority (the Tsars and later Soviet rulers promoted cults of personality). This peculiarity of Russia developed because the nation never had to “choose” what or who is “Russian”—a concept never clearly defined. All peoples residing within the state’s borders were Russian (Rossiyskiy/Rossiyskaya) regardless of whether or not they were ethnically Russian (Russkiy/Russkaya), simply by virtue of being subjects of the Tsar (see Dijkink, 1996).

Russian geopolitics has always focused on the Russian Near Abroad, a place with historical and cultural meanings to Russians (e.g., Kolossov, 2001). For the West, this semi-circle of countries surrounding Russia has been of strategic interest because of its potential for the country’s containment. For Russia, the Near Abroad is not simply a set of areas to control for strategic reasons, but also territories that are intimately related to Russia through ties of history, economy, and culture. Thus, the imposition of borders upon “Russian” space is seen as both unnatural and impermanent. After all, Russia’s international political history has always been dominated by action on her frontiers.

Russian Identity within Its Territory

One the many differences between Russia and the other former republics of the Soviet Union is the fact that unlike the other 14 states, it took Russia 10 years to settle on all the basic national symbols, such as its flag and anthem (e.g., Chafetz, 1997). Goble (1998) has argued that Russian identity is, “in several important respects, less clearly defined than are the identities of many of the other nations in this region.” Thus, Russia has been a state trying to create a nation, rather than a nation building a state. This understanding follows Dunlop’s (1993) assertion that the Tsarist empire was not a Russian empire in terms of ethnicity but rather one based on the personal authority of the Tsar over all peoples within his empire.

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20As noted above, the present borders of Russia exclude many areas that have long been ethnically Russian (e.g., eastern Ukraine, Crimea, and northern Kazakhstan).
Similarly, the idea of Soviet identity under communism was, in theory, a civic identity that applied to all citizens of the Soviet Union. In practice, however, complex Soviet nationalities policy allowed and even encouraged the building of national traditions in non-Russian areas while pursuing Russianization by language (see Slezkine, 1994). What the Soviet state did encourage, however, were efforts by Russians to pursue similar explorations into their own historical past. Territorially, the RSFSR was never associated with a historical Russian homeland, but really constituted a catchall region for groups that did not qualify for republic status. Slezkine (1994) has claimed that Russians were left out of the territorial and historical national identity constructions developed during the Soviet period. It is therefore not surprising that a sense of “Soviet” identity was more common among Russians than other ethnic groups (ibid.).

This “ethnic neutrality” of Russians is borne out in survey research. In the 1970s, surveys showed that Russians were far more tolerant toward coworkers of other nationalities and toward interethnic marriage than were the non-Russian samples (Pain, 2000). Pain found that while ethnic prejudices rose through the first half of the 1990s (peaking in 1995), ethnic prejudice has decreased since then, while overall xenophobia has increased. Believing that the idea of an ethnic Russian state is relatively weak, Pain claimed that what is usually called “Russian nationalism” is not only a pathological response to the disintegration of the foundations of Soviet society, but also a maladjustment to new economic and geopolitical realities. Russian identity is thus still wrapped up in the power and well-being of the state itself.

Consequently, the RSFSR was never just “Russia,” as Russians always associated the notion of Russia with the Soviet Union, even regarding other Soviet nationalities as being “attached” to Russia (see Slezkine, 1994 and Pain, 2000). This view is not one of ethnic diversity in the Western sense, but rather reflects a pervasive feeling by Russians of a sense of history and geography that has always included other peoples.21 Clearly, the idea of Russia goes far beyond Russian ethnicity, something also reflected in the formal name, the Russian Federation. This vision of Russia as a collection of Russian and non-Russian (both Slavic and non-Slavic) peoples is essentially Eurasianist.

METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND HYPOTHESES

Our research presented in this paper is based on a nationwide survey of Russians conducted in March 2003. The key concepts examined through survey data are the geopolitical traditions that imply differing visions of Russia’s preferred borders. The survey collected data on preferences toward states for the purpose of mapping territorial preference in the former Soviet Union and levels of support for certain hypothetical foreign policy actions. Responses to these questions can be grouped by geopolitical visions, and our survey also included socio-demographic questions that are useful in identifying which groups in Russian society tend to hold particular geo-visions.

We retained the Moscow-based firm Fond Obooshchestvonnoye Mneneiye (Foundation for Public Opinion, or FOM) to conduct the survey from March 2–13, 2003 in 76 cities, towns, or rural areas across 40 subjects of the Russian Federation. FOM used five criteria in selecting rayons to be surveyed in their samples: (1) geographic location within Russia (West, Central, Siberia, etc.); (2) urban or rural status; (3) population density; (4) national (ethnic) composition; and (5) the higher-order administrative unit within which the rayon is located.

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21This notion of Russia as a multi-ethnic region continues to be reflected today in the recently approved words of the Russian national anthem that describes Russia as “an eternal union of fraternal peoples.”
(oblast, kray, or republic). These criteria facilitated the selection of rayons that together were representative of the entire country with its geographic and cultural diversity. The survey consisted of 1,200 in-home, face-to-face interviews incorporating 30 questions, with an average completion time of 20 minutes. With one exception, the questions asked were “closed”—i.e., the respondent selected (from five options) the answer that corresponded most closely to his or her own views.22

FOM selected respondents through a routing method for polling districts that was designed to make the survey representative of the Russian population by use of quotas on age, gender, and education. Additionally, the surveying points were chosen by FOM to be representative of the Russian population by type of settlement.23 Seventy-five percent of respondents were from urban areas and 25 percent from rural, while women comprised 55 percent of the survey population. Survey results with respect to political party preference indicated that the sample is representative, as they matched closely other similar polls conducted by FOM at roughly the same time. The survey’s margin of error is 2.9 percent.

The purpose of the survey was to gather information that can be used to construct the geopolitical visions of Russians and to identify subgroups of the population that correspond with particular visions. The survey can be divided into four broad groups of questions. The first asks about specific countries of the former Soviet Union in order to identify the territorial visions that Russians have of the extent of Russia. It was expected that Eurasians would have an idealized vision of Russia existing at some greater territorial extent than today. A second group of questions asks about hypothetical policy positions in the former Soviet Union, and a third about places and policy beyond the former Soviet Union. These two groups of questions did not look for preferences not for specific countries, but rather for policy actions in the former Soviet sphere of influence (the FSU and Eastern Europe). They contributed to an understanding of the type of foreign policy that respondents wished Russia to pursue (i.e., examine issues of Russia’s national mission). Finally, numerous socio-demographic questions were asked in addition to the one on political party affiliation. Our research in this paper focuses on understanding responses to the first set of questions.

Our expectations for the different geopolitical traditions (Westernizing Nationalism, Moderate Eurasianism, and Extreme Eurasianism) were based on the writings of intellectuals and policy advisors associated with each. For Westernizing Nationalism, we expected no territorial aspirations, since any expansion of Russia would conflict with the clearly expressed wishes of this tradition to assert Russia’s place in Europe and the Western world. Westernizers also strongly support Russia’s membership of the ad hoc alliance led by the United States in the “war on terrorism” (O’Loughlin et al., 2004a). Moderate Eurasianists do not have a single territorial vision but want, at a minimum, a return of the Slavic states of Belarus and Ukraine to Russia. Other moderates favor a complete reunification of the Soviet Union. A distinguishing attitude toward territory, however, is that moderate Eurasians reject the notion of a forced reconstitution of the Soviet Union and hope for a voluntary reunification.

22Respondents had the right to refuse to answer any question and every opinion-based question had a response category of “hard to say.” The one non-closed question was, “Please name five republics of the former Soviet Union that in your opinion Russia should have political and economic relations with.” In this question respondents were free to name any five republics, but were constrained in that only 14 states were acceptable answers (respondents were given a list of these countries). Additionally, respondents could answer “none,” “all,” or “hard to say.”

23The categories of settlement were: Moscow; St. Petersburg; oblast/republic capital with more than one million inhabitants; such capitals with less than one million people; rayon center, small city, urban settlement; and village.
Extreme Eurasianists view all of the former Soviet Union as part of Russia (Laurelle, 2004). The writings of Aleksandr Dugin (1999; see also Ingram, 2001) probably best reflect this position, but the Eurasianist Party (molded around his ideas) did not have much of an electoral appeal in the 2003 Parliamentary elections.24

A second set of survey questions attempts to gauge whether Russians view a larger Russia as a fantasy or as a possibility; respondents were asked primarily about what actions they would be prepared to take to achieve their territorial aspirations. From the work of O’Loughlin (2001), we know that ordinary Russians typically do not share the geopolitical fantasies of elites. Thus, after the imaginary geographies are mapped, the belief (or disbelief) in the attainability of such geopolitical visions also must be assessed. The questions ask whether Russians are willing to pay a price to achieve their geopolitical visions. For example, are some Russians willing to use military force while others are not? Do some Russians seek economic but not political reunification of the Soviet Union?

With respect to the implications for policy action, we expect that Westernizers should respond negatively to these questions. Westernizers do not think that Russia’s true borders lie outside Russia, and should not seek to reunite with any part of the former Soviet Union. They do not believe that Russia should have undue influence over the countries of the former Soviet Union, nor that Russia must protect ethnic Russians living abroad. By contrast, the Moderate Eurasianist position presented in the literature is that Russia’s borders lie somewhere in the FSU and that Russia should try to attain them, but not by use of military force. Russia should have influence in the states of the former Soviet Union and should protect Russians abroad, but not if it means resorting to military intervention. Finally, we expected that Extreme Eurasianists would believe that Russia’s borders should envelop the entire former Soviet Union and that the country should use all necessary means to reunite with the former Soviet republics. Russia should protect Russians abroad, even if use of military force is required.

THE SURVEY DATA: DESCRIPTIVE AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

Examination of survey data gauging Russian respondents’ geographic and political views reveals rather clearly that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are the three FSU countries that respondents feel culturally closest to and with which they hope to secure political and economic ties. According to survey responses, a “split” exists between “Westernizers” and “Eurasianists.” Roughly half of those surveyed were not interested in any form of reunification with part or all of the former Soviet Union, whereas another 40 percent appeared to harbor some dreams of “Greater Russia” (and an additional 10 to 15 percent remained unsure).

Table 1 summarizes the position of the survey population with respect to changing Russia’s borders. Over half of respondents (53.5 percent) did not want reunification to be pursued as a goal of the Russian state. Just over one-third of respondents felt that it could be pursued through political channels, by economic means, or military intervention (including

24The Eurasianist Party received only 170,786 of the national party-list votes across the country, or only 0.28 percent of the total [see http://gd2003.cikrf.ru/etc/prot_fed_2003.doc; accessed December 1, 2004]. On occasion, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), has expressed positions on Russia’s borders that reflect Extreme Eurasianism, but these statements are inconsistent. For example, he has argued for a pan-regional divide of the world in which Russia would control the regions on its southern border all the way to the Indian Ocean (Zhirinovskiy, 1993). However, the extremist position can more accurately be identified as limited territorially to the former Soviet Union.
Less than one-half of one-percent wanted Russia to use military force to reconstitute the borders of the Soviet Union. These results indicate a pervasive sense of pragmatism in the population when it comes to changing borders and adjusting territorial control. Russians do not want to risk war to remake their borders. In a country where surveys consistently show the greatest concern lies in improvement of the quality of life of its citizens, Russians do not want scarce state resources diverted to the pursuit of geopolitical objectives, and do not place politics highly on their list of priorities. This pragmatism occurs at all income levels; cross tabulation of income categories with “desire to reunite with the countries of the former Soviet Union” revealed no significant association between the two.

To probe the issue of post-Soviet border changes further, respondents were asked if they thought that the borders of Russia should extend into at least some parts of the FSU. Here the interpretation of “some parts” was left to the respondent. The issue in this case is whether respondents felt that the current borders match their own conception of what Russia’s borders should be. The results, seen in Table 2, show almost an exact split in the population. Nearly half the respondents (45.4 percent) believed that it is not possible to redefine the present borders, whereas 40 percent thought that Russia’s borders should extend into parts of the FSU and nearly 15 percent could not answer the question.

The issue of pragmatism is addressed further by the survey question shown in Table 3. If a respondent does not accept present borders, should Russia pursue whatever its true borders are? As noted above, 40 percent of respondents did not agree with the current borders of Russia. In Table 3, a slightly smaller ratio (35.4 percent) want Russia to pursue its true borders. This indicates that those who are unhappy with the present borders are perhaps

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Table 1. “If Russia Should Seek to Reunite with the Countries of the Former Soviet Union, by What Means Should This Be Pursued?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not want it pursued</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only by political means</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only be economic means</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only by military means</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All means are possible</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

25 Similar pragmatism in geopolitical thinking was found in a study of Russian survey data that revealed a substantial gap between the geopolitical visions of many elites and the pragmatic beliefs of ordinary Russians (O’Loughlin, 2001).
26 Bashkirova (2003) found that politics ranked sixth among priorities of Russians, after family, work, friends, free time, and religion. Russians are most concerned with matters that relate to their personal situation.
27 One of the goals of this study is to find out who sits on each side of this divide, what areas are important to them and why, and what an optimal border might be. The implicit contradiction between little support for border redrawing through Russian state actions and majority support for some adjustment in the alignment of Russia’s borders can be explained by the immediacy and practicality of the costs of action. Russians are highly pragmatic about state spending for non-domestic programs.
28 About nine-tenths of those who think that the present borders are drawn incorrectly want the state to pursue some means of changing them.
less pragmatic than the population at large about the possibility of state action. At this early stage of analysis, it can be hypothesized that two population groups exist in Russia, a pragmatic one that cares little for geopolitical action and a more activist group that believes that the location of Russia’s borders represents a real problem.

**RUSSIAN VIEWS ON POSSIBLE REUNIFICATION WITH POST-SOVIET STATES**

A different picture of Russians’ views of a larger country emerges when questions of border changes are set aside. Respondents were asked to answer “yes” or “no” (or “it’s hard to say”) to whether they would like to see political and economic reunification with each of the 14 other individual states of the FSU. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan scored very high as targets of a hypothetical reunification, with over 75 percent support. However, even the lowest scoring state, Turkmenistan was still named by over 50 percent of respondents (see Fig. 1). These comparative ratios suggest several hypotheses about views of the FSU. First, it establishes the primacy of Ukraine and Belarus in the minds of ordinary Russians. Kazakhstan and Moldova, states that also have large Russian populations, follow Ukraine and Belarus.\(^{29}\) The high ranking of these four countries reflects the importance of the presence of ethnic Russians in a territory and feelings of similarity denoted by a shared Slavic culture.

\(^{29}\)The Russians are concentrated in the breakaway region of the Dniester Moldovan Republic in the eastern part of Moldova.

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**Table 2.** “Some Say that Russia’s Borders Should Extend into Some of the FSU, Others Think That It Is not Possible to Redefine the Present Borders. Do You Agree with the First View or the Second?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely with the first</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly with the first</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly with the second</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely with the second</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.** “If You Agree That Russia’s True Borders Lie Outside Russia, Should Russia Actively Try to Reach Its ‘Real’ Borders?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accept present borders</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely agree</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly agree</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely disagree</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Second, these data show the difference between the “fantasy” and “reality” of geopolitical visions. While less than half of respondents want true border changes when no qualifiers are attached or specific borders discussed (see Table 1 above), every state of the FSU was named by over 50 percent of respondents as a potential target of reunification. This is the “no-costs” option, inasmuch as no problems or methods related to potential unification are mentioned in the question. The comparison confirms that most Russians would welcome a reunification of the states of the FSU in principle, but have significant reservations about it when there are costs associated with reunification. Presumably, our respondents assume that Russia and its citizens would bear most of the burden. Thus, when costs, especially the military, are taken into account, the geopolitical fantasy of border changes fades in the harsh light of reality.

A third question that can be answered after examining our data is whether Russians distinguish among the rest of the states of the FSU. Which states are perceived as important to Russia, after the top four states (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova) are nominated? For many Russians, the states with small numbers of Russians or a relatively brief history within the Russian Empire are barely distinguishable as names on a map. This possibility is certainly part of the larger issue in the development of geopolitical visions, since personal geographic “knowledge surfaces” vary quite greatly. Mapping this surface would show how peaks of knowledge and valleys of ignorance influence how any respondent constructs maps of meaning about spaces and places. There is some evidence of this interaction in the survey results. For instance, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are confused by some respondents. Other FOM surveys disclose that the ignorance of Russians about the former republics of Central Asia is higher than that about other former states of the Soviet Union. For example,
67 percent of Russians could name the capital of Armenia (Yerevan), 75 percent could name the capital of Belarus (Minsk), and 61 percent were correct about Moldova’s capital (Kishinev); however, only 38 percent knew the capital of Turkmenistan (Ashkabat), and 31 percent of Kazakhstan (Astana)\(^\text{30}\) (see Petrova, 2001a; 2001b; 2002a; and 2003). In the case of Turkmenistan, a third of the survey respondents had a hard time even expressing any opinion about the country (Petrova, 2003).

Unlike other republics, Ukraine and Belarus were never “foreign” territories conquered by Russia. The territory and peoples of what would become known as Ukraine and Belarus were always part of a Russian realm (or Russia was of theirs as the case might be with the Kiev-centered medieval kingdom of Rus).\(^\text{32}\) The ethnic and linguistic distinctions between

\(^\text{30}\)In the case of Kazakhstan, Petrova (2002a) presumes the low score is due to the recent move of the capital from Almaty to Astana. Overall, the ignorance level of Turkmenistan was higher than that of Kazakhstan.

\(^\text{31}\)Recent discussions about a possible federation between Russia and Belarus, advocated by President Aleksandr Lukashenko, is probably influential in pushing this state to the top of the chart ahead of Ukraine.

\(^\text{32}\)Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists, however, are quick to point out historical connections with the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Ukraine) and the Poland-Lithuanian Kingdom (Belarus).

**Fig. 2.** Responses to the question: “Culturally and in world outlook, is Russia close to <individual country name>?“ The bars indicate the ratio of respondents who responded affirmatively to each country name.
the groups were traditionally seen as minor. Ukrainians were called “Little Russians” and in the case of Belarusians the name literally means “White Russians.” At the time of independence in 1991, three-quarters of Ukrainian citizens spoke Russian (Rowland, 2004). In 1990, Belarus’s new constitution (still within the Soviet Union at the time) established Belarussian as the official language of the state, but Russian was so widespread that the law allowed for a 10-year transition (Urban and Zaprudnik, 1993).

The high rank of Kazakhstan in fourth position indicates that the respondents are distinguishing between an Islamic country with a sizeable Russian minority and the others that are more geographically removed from Russia’s borders. It is likely that Russians say “yes” to possible reunification and stronger economic ties with countries to which they feel culturally close. In terms of geopolitical visions, “Nativism” as identified by Tuminez (2000) specifically targets those regions (Ukraine, Belarus, and northern Kazakhstan) that are seen as culturally very similar (almost identical) to Russia.33

A somewhat different picture emerged when, instead of being asked specifically about each state in the FSU, respondents were told to name five countries of the FSU with whom they would like to see Russia develop or maintain strong political and economic ties. Only three states (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) are named by over 50 percent of respondents as states with which Russia should maintain political and economic ties. Furthermore, when faced with a pragmatic choice associated with economic costs to be borne by Russia, the importance of all states declines.

SLAVS AND SOVIETS: TWO VIEWS OF EURASIANISM

It is now time to delve more deeply into the multiple visions of territory encompassed by Eurasianism (e.g., see Shlapentokh, 1997). The literature suggests that a moderate Eurasianist vision widens the borders of Russia to include Ukraine and Belarus, whereas an extreme version includes all of the former Soviet Union. This section of the paper presents evidence from our survey supporting the existence of these two distinct territorial visions. The first vision is referred to as “Slavic” and the second as “Soviet” Eurasianism.

Feelings of Cultural Closeness toward Countries of the Former Soviet Union

For every state of the former Soviet Union (except Russia), survey respondents were asked, “What do you think? Is Russia close or not close, culturally and in world outlook, to <name of state>??” The words “and in world outlook” were included in the question to encourage the respondent to reflect beyond the simple indicators of language, geographic distance, and religion when answering. These words allow the respondent to think in terms of historical, political, and economic attachments that might make him or her feel a state is close to Russia.34

The graphs in Figures 3A–3D display the percentage of respondents who consider a particular state close to Russia and also consider the state in the title of the graph to be close to

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33In a wider sense, part of Eurasian ideology is that all the people of the former Soviet Union share some cultural/historical/political identity based on their position as part of the Eurasian heartland. Tuminez (2000, p. 191) described this notion among Eurasianists as thinking in terms of a “superethnos.”

34One might claim that the phrase “in world outlook” is redundant, as the concept is inherent in culture. However, the survey was not administered to social scientists but to lay people. The idea is to allow respondents the freedom to express what they feel at an “emotional level.”
Fig. 3. Bi-variate responses to the question whether the respondent thinks that Russia is “culturally and in world outlook” close to the individual states of the former Soviet Union. The graphs show the ratios agreeing with statement for the country named at the top and the other states of the Near Abroad.
Russia. The objective is to ascertain whether certain countries group together at similar levels of preference. For instance, we expect Ukraine and Belarus to be viewed in similar terms of cultural similarity to Russia. Likewise, we expect that the Turkic states would be grouped and viewed as equidistant from Russia in cultural terms. To illustrate the point, the graph in Figure 3A shows us that 72 percent of those who feel that Russia is close to Lithuania also feel that Estonia is close to Russia as well. But, conversely, only 21 percent of the respondents who believe that Belarus and Russia are close also think that Estonia and Russia are close. To facilitate comparisons, Figure 3 displays data for typical regional representatives; Estonia for the Baltic states in Figure 3A; Ukraine for the Slavic neighbors in Figure 3B; Georgia for the Caucasian states in Figure 3C; and Kazakhstan for the Central Asian states in Figure 3D.

In further reference to the cultural closeness in the Estonian example (Fig. 3A), it is not surprising to find the Baltic States grouped together at the top. The Baltic states are unique among the former republics of the Soviet Union for several reasons. First, of the post-Soviet states, the Baltic countries have unique historical political and economic connections to Western Europe. Second, they have moved far closer to the West since the break up of the Soviet Union by joining both NATO and the EU. Finally, in Estonia and Latvia there are large Russian minorities (28 and 30 percent, respectively).35

It is interesting that those who feel that Ukraine and Belarus are culturally close to Russia are least likely to feel that the states of the Baltic region also are culturally close to Russia (Fig. 3A). This is perhaps surprising because one would think that Ukraine is more “Western” (thus sharing geopolitical aspirations with the Baltics) than the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, the rating here is not on a scale of “Westernness” but rather of how close these states are viewed to Russia in a cultural and geopolitical (“world outlook”) sense. There is clearly a divide between the Baltics—now members of the European Union and NATO—and the rest of the former republics who are at least nominally members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Ukraine and Belarus are ranked close to each other on all graphs.36

The clear impression from Figure 3B is that the vast majority of all subsamples (the respondents asked about each individual state) believe that Ukraine is culturally close to Russia. There is less than an 8 percentage-point difference between the top and the bottom states. If Turkmenistan is close to Russia, then Ukraine must surely be as well, and the differences between all possible options are minuscule. There is no doubt in the minds of Russians which post-Soviet state retains the strongest ties to Russia. Not surprisingly, the graph for Belarus (not shown) is very similar, with all states showing more than 90 percent agreement that Belarus and Russia are culturally close.

Georgia as an example of a Caucasian state is examined in Figure 3C. Here there is the first evidence of a geographic divide between a Slavic and a Soviet vision of cultural closeness to Russia. Less than 30 percent of those who think that Ukraine and Belarus are culturally close to Russia rank Georgia also as close. This divide likely represents two types of

35Both Latvia and Estonia have been accused by Russia of turning ethnic Russians into second-class citizens with language and other regulations that prevent ethnic Russians from achieving citizenship.

36The connection of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus however, is not only cultural. Ukraine and Belarus were completely integrated into the Russian, and later Soviet, economic system. The infrastructure, capital, and trade relations of Ukraine and Belarus were created over centuries within a system centered on Moscow or St. Petersburg. This not only created pathways of interconnection that fostered closer cultural development, but amalgamated Ukraine and Belarus into a single, Russian economic-political system.
geopolitical visions. The first is the Slavic vision which includes Ukraine and Belarus (and perhaps Moldova because of the strong Russian presence in the Trans-Dniester Republic). The second is a Soviet vision that includes all of the former Soviet Union. The Slavic vision correlates geographically with a Nativism or Moderate Eurasianism, whereas the Soviet vision coincides with that of Extreme Eurasianism.

Comparison of the graphs of Figures 3C and 3D indicates that respondents who see a Slavic bloc (the ones who think Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia are culturally close) view Kazakhstan as closer to Russia than Georgia. This is not an unlikely result, as northern Kazakhstan is predominantly populated by Russians who still constitute about 30 percent of its population.37 It is clear that those who place the Central Asian states close to Russia are the ones who are most likely to place Kazakhstan close to Russia as well (Fig. 3D). Here the split is again one of Slavic versus Soviet orientations. Those with Soviet orientations place Kazakhstan in the Russian cultural sphere. All Turkic-Islamic states score more than 80 percent in Figure 3D, demonstrating that the vast majority of respondents who think that these Central Asian states are close to Russia also believe that Kazakhstan is no different in this regard.

Attitudes on Political and Economic Reunification with Russia

Respondents were prompted to give an answer of “yes,” “no,” or “I don’t know” when asked whether they would support political and economic reunification of Russia with each of the 14 states of the former Soviet Union. The results indicate several interesting geographical groupings, with a general pattern similar to that of the responses on cultural affinity seen in Figures 3A–3D. The Baltic states group together and again there is evidence of a divide between Soviet and Slavic visions of which countries should unite with Russia.

Looking at the Estonian example as representative of the three Baltic states (Fig. 4A), it is unsurprising that the latter bunch tightly. Those who support reunification with Ukraine and Belarus are the least likely to support reunification with Estonia. For those who hold a Slavic geopolitical vision, the Baltic countries are simply much too Western in orientation, as evidenced by membership in international organizations and in historic linkages, and thus are less than ideal partners for Russia. Similarly, the graph for possible unification with Ukraine repeats the pattern for the cultural-similarity graph of Figure 3B. Although the order of countries is changed, the very high percentages (97 to 99 percent) for all possible unification partners indicates that all respondents, regardless of Western, Slavic, or Eurasianist orientation, believe that if any country unites with Russia, then Ukraine should be joined as well.

The Slavic vision re-emerges in Figure 4C, in the question about possible unification with Georgia. The four lowest ranks are occupied by Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Moldova.38 Nonetheless, Georgia is considered a viable reunification partner for Russia by a majority in each of the state combinations, and does not show the larger range of opinion as seen in the graph for Estonia (and secondarily, Kazakhstan).

Over 80 percent of Russian respondents support economic and political reunification with Kazakhstan, and those who support this reunion also rank other Central Asian countries

37Kazakhstan is also much more important economically to Russia than the other Central Asian states due to its vast oil and gas reserves as well as its agricultural lands in the north that had always been part of a Russian “agricultural triangle.”

38As indicated earlier, we believe that the presence of large Russian minorities in the latter two states moves them into the category of possible Slavic partners for Russia.
Fig. 4. Bivariate responses to the question of whether the respondent would like to see political and economic reunification between Russia and the individual states of the former Soviet Union. The graphs show the ratios agreeing with the statement for the country named at the top and the other states of the Near Abroad.
at the top of their lists. This grouping makes sense simply due to a strong geographical-spatial argument. If you support reunification with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan, you simply must also support reunification with Kazakhstan, if for no other reason than simple contiguity. Unlike Latvia or Estonia, which contain similar proportions of ethnic Russians, Kazakhstan is not bordered by Europe, but by a potentially hostile and unstable group of lesser-developed countries.

To summarize the findings, our questions on cultural closeness and possible reunification partners indicated that Russians are able to discern differences among the 14 states of the former Soviet Union. They tend to group the Slavic states of Ukraine and Belarus together consistently, to which they add Moldova and Kazakhstan on occasion because of the presence of Russians in these Near Abroad countries. They cluster the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as different from the rest of the post-Soviet states in their strong orientation toward European institutions and cultures, and in some respects they are viewed as less “Russian” than the Islamic states of Central Asia and the Caspian basin. There is not much differentiation between the Caucasian and Islamic countries, based on religion, location, geopolitical orientation, democratic status, or political composition. Kazakhstan is seen as closer to Russia in cultural and economic terms than any other Islamic state.

Should Russia Protect Russians Living Abroad?

Two questions were asked of survey respondents about the status of Russians living outside of Russia, the first being, “Do you think that Russia should protect Russians who live abroad?” Boris Yeltsin observed in 1996 that protecting Russians abroad was a major priority of his presidency (RFE/RL, 1996), and Russian Patriarch Alexey II was quoted as saying of the Russians in the Near Abroad, “you are flesh of flesh and blood of blood of our people (and that) . . . we see it as our duty to take part in all actions aimed at consolidating the unity of our compatriots living abroad” (RFE/RL, 2001). Ninety-three percent of respondents in our survey agreed, indicating that Russia should protect Russians living in the former Soviet Union. The second question asked whether or not the respondent would still hold the same position if it meant using the Russian military to protect their co-nationalists abroad. When this condition was imposed, the level of support for protecting Russians abroad dropped dramatically to 38 percent. This difference of 55 percentage points in the ratios supports the conclusion of O’Loughlin et al. (2004a) that Russians are averse to military solutions to geopolitical challenges in the Middle East (Iraq), Central Asia (Afghanistan), or within Russia itself (Chechnya).

Interesting differences in levels of support are revealed when the responses are disaggregated by socio-demographic categories (see Fig. 5). That respondents with the highest level of education are more likely to support efforts to protect Russians abroad than are respondents with the lower levels of education is somewhat surprising. This may occur because those with the lowest education feel that Russia cannot afford to waste resources on problems

39 Given the context of the other survey questions, “abroad” here refers to the Near Abroad (former Soviet Union).
40 Interestingly, a comparative survey shows ethnic Russians in the Near Abroad are heterogeneous in their political ideologies, national identities, and degree of attachment to their states of residence. Few look with favor on any possible Russian intervention in local affairs (Barrington et al., 2003).
41 Only the variables that showed significant differences in the responses in chi-square analyses are displayed in Figures 5 and 6.
beyond her own borders when domestic economic problems loom so large. It is also noteworthy that the category “practicing religious” (people attending services several times a year or more) is near the top of the scale. For Eurasianists (particularly Nativists), the Russian Orthodox Church is inseparable from Russian culture and ethnicity (Smith, 1999). Those who attend services regularly (in this survey population, 95 percent of those in this category are Orthodox) participate not merely in a religious act but in a cultural one as well. It is logical to assume that this group is more likely to feel and express much sympathy for their co-ethnics outside the borders of Russia.

Age and gender are also significant predictors. Women are 8 points less likely to take the position of protecting Russians abroad, and evidently the overall trend is that the younger the respondent, the more likely he or she is to support the position of protecting Russians abroad. This is somewhat surprising, although young men are the most likely voters to support Putin’s favored party, Yedinstvo Rossiya, and thus likely to disproportionately support that party’s position of using whatever means necessary to protect Russians abroad. Older respondents rank lower for several reasons. First, they tend to support the Communist Party in disproportionate numbers, and the Communists, while becoming increasingly nationalist during the last 10 years, do not represent the activist end of the spectrum of geopolitical ideology. This space remains the domain of the right wing. Indeed, Communist Party supporters only support the position slightly more than the average Russian. A second possible explanation for the low ranking of older respondents is that they may simply have a bitter

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**Fig. 5.** Distribution of affirmative responses to the question “Do you think that Russia should protect Russians who live abroad?” The bars indicate the average “percent yes” for each of the sociodemographic groups portrayed.
memory of the use of Russian troops abroad, due to Russia’s experience in Afghanistan and World War II.42

Opinions on Reunification of the Former Soviet Union

In response to the general question about reunification of Russia with some or all of the other 14 former Soviet republics, 53 percent of the respondents indicated that they did not want reunification pursued. In this section, we examine the specific socio-demographic and political characteristics of those who do not support unification. The significant correlates are shown in Figure 6.

Looking first at the socio-demographic and party data, the bottom of the scale reveals clearer relationships than the top. Three of the four lowest indicators (least opposed to pursuing reunification) are “less than average education,” “over 70 years of age,” and “lowest income,” all indicators describing people who are not doing well in the Russian transformation society. Poorer, less educated, alienated people are more likely to support a nationalist-patriotic geopolitical vision (reunification of the Soviet Union) and we assume that those who are not doing well look to a past that they perceive as a better time. These are the ones who Kuchins (2002) termed “pessimists,” because they often do not believe that their lives can be better under the post-Soviet system than under the Soviet one.43

The top end of the scale (most opposition to any moves toward reunification) shows Yedinstvo Rossiiya voters (the “party of power,” or Putin supporters) and the highly educated. Respondents who are happy with the status quo are logically most likely to want Russia to refrain from pursuit of reunification. The current Russian geopolitical trajectory is working for them, so they would appear to be averse to the risks posed by expansionism or interventionism. This group does not need to look to the past, because the present is a better time for them. Without nostalgia for the Soviet Union as individuals, it is not likely that they would desire some territorial reconstitution of it. Those who do not want to pursue reunification are more likely to be Westernizers.

The political/geographic indicators that lie below the mean on Figure 6 clearly represent a conservative, imperialistic geopolitical group. Respondents who support the Communist Party and who believe that Russia should use the military to protect Russians abroad, as well as influence the internal affairs of states comprising the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, want reunification.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Aleksandr Dugin’s third edition of the Foundations of Geopolitics (Dugin, 1999) has the subtitle “myslit’ prostranstvom” (“think spatially”), and urges Russians to build on their unique upbringing in “the great space” of Eurasia (Billington, 2004, p. 81). Over the past 10 years, the study of geopolitics has become increasingly prominent in political geography, and more visible in public debate in Russia. The study of ordinary people and the use of surveys

42 O’Loughlin et al. (2004a) found that older women, in particular, were unsupportive of the “war on terror,” which they attributed to an ingrained mentality about peace held over from Soviet times.

43 A “rational-economic conflict avoidance” approach suggests that those who are worst-off in society would be the least likely to want the state to turn resources toward foreign rather than to domestic affairs. Conversely, better-off groups would be found at the top of the scale. The location of poor populations at the bottom of Figure 6 means that for expensive foreign policy propositions, the respondents are not economically rational.
opens up geopolitics in a way that will allow for a greater understanding of how geopolitical culture, visions, discourse, and the construction of foreign policy are interpreted by the public.

The surveying of Russia’s population on attitudes toward countries in the former Soviet Union has shown that ordinary citizens have geopolitical visions. The arena of competition between geopolitical ideologies, scripts, and traditions exists not only in the halls of government and institutions of foreign policy, not only in the editorial pages of newspapers or the images on nightly news, but also within the minds and hearts of the public. The division in the Russian public between Westernizers and Eurasianists is likely to influence foreign policy in Russia for years to come.

Fig. 6. Distribution of negative responses to the question “Do you think that Russia should pursue the reunification of the Soviet Union?” The bars indicate the average “percent no” for each of the socio-demographic groups portrayed.
The nature of geopolitical visions in Russia is both practical and emotional. Emotive geopolitics can be read in the words of President Putin that open this presentation, characterizing the breakup of the Soviet Union as a “national tragedy.” At a hypothetical level, the majority of Russians desire a reconstitution of the Soviet Union; every country of the former Soviet Union is favored for reunification by over half of the survey respondents. However, the practical geopolitics of Russians reveal important schisms in society. Although Putin vowed in February 2004 that “we cannot only look back and curse [the break up of the Soviet Union]. We must look forward,” (quoted in McGregor, 2004), many ordinary Russians cannot follow suit. Only 45 percent of our survey respondents accept Russia’s current borders as the “true” ones, and 37 percent of Russians would like Russia to pursue these true borders by some means. When queried about specific costs (such as use of military force), the emotive dreams yield to practical reality. The immediate implication of this study is that for Russian elites (or Western propagandists) geopolitical scripts that rely on emotive responses to gain the support of Russians for foreign policy actions are likely to prove inadequate. Moreover, those with the least problems domestically (the affluent, urban, young, and well educated)—who can perhaps afford to care about foreign policy rather than the mundane world of domestic policy—are the ones least likely to support territorial aspirations in the Near Abroad.

The geopolitical visions of ordinary Russians can be anticipated by certain socio-economic and demographic indicators. A Westernizing vision is held by those who can be classified as “optimists.” The Westernizers accept the present-day borders of Russia and do not feel that Russia must exercise any kind of suzerainty over the former Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. This group is young, urban, educated, and affluent. The countries of the former Soviet Union have little emotional or practical pull on this group. The other major geopolitical bloc in Russian society is the Eurasianist camp. This group would like to see Russia pursue at a minimum a reunification with Ukraine and Belarus, while maintaining a high degree of influence in the former Soviet Union as well as in countries of the former Communist Bloc. The camp is characterized as being male, religious, and inclined to vote for the Communists or the LDPR.

With regard to the enduring question of Eurasianism in contemporary Russian politics, it is important to note that this paradigm does not represent a single, monolithic view (see Kerr, 1995). We theorized here that two types of Eurasianism would be identifiable, Moderate and Extreme, and that they are associated with different territorial preferences. There is certainly a greater value placed on Ukraine and Belarus (Moderate Eurasianism) than on the rest of the former Soviet Union (Extreme Eurasianism). By some measures (economic and political ties) Kazakhstan would be part of the former group. Ukraine, Belarus and (to a lesser extent) northern Kazakhstan have a long and special geographical, cultural, and historical role in Russian history. They form, together with European Russia, the economic and population core of what once was the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. It is therefore unclear whether or not the basis of this “Slavic” vision is cultural, economic, or historical, but few Russians would consider Ukraine or Belarus important on only one of these levels.

One of the areas of inquiry that needs to be pursued in future research on Russia are regional differences in survey preferences. We know, for instance, that southern Russia has been more conservative and traditional (more likely to prefer the Communist party in elections) relative to a more reformist north (Clem and Craumer, 2000). It would be interesting to

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44 The link between the economic reality of the household (or perhaps locality) and how people react to geopolitical scripts is worthy of further research.
probe the regional differences as they relate to geopolitical visions. The possibility of a Nativist vision regionally concentrated in southern oblasts in Russia would support the central idea of sobornost’ in Eurasianism. The Nativist view of the Russian nation is a primordialist one that views national identity as connecting people to territory in an organic sense—i.e., the nation has always existed on the land and is part of its natural landscape. Are Russians in agrarian areas more likely to hold a primordialist sense of national identity, and does this primordialist sense of identity extend to Ukrainians and Belarusians? Other possible investigations might search for a “border effect,” to determine whether Russians residing in border regions have different feelings toward the Near Abroad than those living far from those borders. Meanwhile, the question of where Russia’s borders lie persists, complicated by the large Russian diasporas in neighboring states and the long history of expansion and contact with Slavic and Islamic populations.

REFERENCES


45This ideal of Russians as a communal people dating to an agricultural past centered on village life evokes spiritual and ethical feelings of the community as the most important element of society (as opposed to the individual).


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