

**Nuclear Balance for Rival Neighbors:
Achieving Stability for Pakistan and India**

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Introduction

In an interview, former President Barack Obama was asked what kept him up at night; he candidly replied, “Pakistan”, referring to recent nuclear rhetoric coming out of the country (Soherwordi, 2016). The historically violent rivalry between Pakistan and India, both states armed with nuclear weapons, has led many to call the region a nuclear hotspot. Nuclear balance between Pakistan and India is at the forefront of contemporary debates surrounding the effectiveness and use of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War world. These debates seek to answer the question: what role do nuclear weapons play in the post-Cold War world? To analyze this question, nuclear balance between India and Pakistan is the perfect case study.

The evolution of events regarding Pakistan and Indian nuclear balance is significant in two major ways. Firstly, what occurs between the states regarding nuclear weapons acts as a major test of international relations theories such as deterrence, balance of power, nuclear optimism, and nuclear pessimism. Secondly, in a world where nuclear proliferation is a likely future, Pakistan and India serve as a case study of what nuclear balance between states could look like in the future. What occurs in Pakistan and India regarding nuclear balance will directly impact the course of policy of all state actors across the world in relation to nuclear weapons.

Nuclear deterrence is meant to prevent nuclear war and conflict, however since both Pakistan and India officially became nuclear powers, there have been multiple conflicts that have broken out between these states. Although these conflicts have varied in degree, the two state’s relationship after acquiring nuclear weapons begs the question, has the presence of nuclear weapons made the relationship between Pakistan and India more volatile? Or, do nuclear weapons truly act as a stabilizing force between the states? *This paper operates under the argument that when analyzing the effects of Pakistani and Indian nuclear balance, the presence*

of nuclear weapons in both states has resulted in greater regional stability than if one or neither state possessed a weapon.

Background and Previous Works (Lit Review A)

Necessary Background

The current state of nuclear weapons balance between Pakistan and India has much to do with the historical relationship between the two states. British-controlled India was partitioned into two states, India and Pakistan, in 1947 by the British upon the empire's departure from the region. The partition created Pakistan, a Muslim majority country, and India, a Hindu majority country. When each state established a governing body, there was distrust and anger from the events of partition. These sentiments along with a disagreement over which state would control the region of Jammu and Kashmir led to the first war between the states in 1947, a conflict that remains unresolved (Ganguly, 1995). For an in-depth chronology of the Indo-Pakistani conflict which has resulted in four wars since partition, reference, "*Wars Without End: The Indo Pakistani Conflict*" written by Sumit Ganguly.

To understand why nuclear weapons have created a more stable relationship between India and Pakistan, it is necessary to briefly go over the relevant background of nuclear development in each country. The histories of the attainment of nuclear weapons and the motivations behind them for both Pakistan and India are lengthy and controversial. India originally began developing its nuclear program in response to the threat of Chinese incursion after the Sino-Indian war in 1962 (Hoyt, 2001). Once India developed and tested its first nuclear weapon, this proved threatening to Pakistan, who then rushed to obtain the means to build its own nuclear weapon (Hoyt, 2001). India successfully tested its first nuclear weapon in 1974 and Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon in 1998. For a comprehensive understanding of the

evolution of each state's nuclear stance and evolution of nuclear doctrine before 2000, reference, “*Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and The Dangers of Strategic Myopia*” by Timothy Hoyt and “*Against Nuclear Apartheid*” by Jaswant Singh.

India's stance on nuclear proliferation and use globally is also relevant. When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was put in place in 1986, India refused to sign the treaty which it accused of creating a global hierarchy of have and have nots in regard to nuclear weapons. It is one of the four countries (India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea as of 1985) who did not sign the treaty and have not to this day. For further background and analysis of the NPT in relation to both global nuclear proliferation once again refer to, “*Against Nuclear Apartheid*” by Jaswant Singh and, “*Pinioning the Genie: International Checks on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons*” Ian Smart.

Additional Puzzles not Addressed

Other puzzles related to this subject matter will now be mentioned to clearly delineate the topic of this body of work from others. A puzzle that was briefly mentioned in the previous section involves how Pakistan and India have transitioned over time regarding nuclear balance and doctrine. The work of both aforementioned authors Hoyt and Singh attempt to answer this question through an analysis of response to events (Hoyt) and the balance between moral duty and strategic necessity (Singh). Another puzzle that arises is the role of outside powers in Pakistani and Indian nuclear balance. Are outside powers to blame for the current situation and hostilities between Pakistan and India? A piece by F. Soherwordi titled, “*Balance of Power in South Asia: The Politics of Nuclear Deterrence Between Pakistan and India*” explains the intervention of global powers, both during and post-Cold War, and how this impacted the state of nuclear balance. This paper will not be analyzing outside intervention from states such as China

and the United States, but this has played a significant role in the development of nuclear balance between Pakistan and India.

It is necessary to mention that other work has attempted to address the puzzle of nuclear weapons' effect on the relationship between Pakistan and India. In the past, this specific puzzle has been analyzed by looking either at the end results of conflicts in terms of optimism or by looking at the onset of conflict in terms of pessimism. Prior to this paper, these arguments have stood as opposites in the debate over the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and India. This paper's approach to addressing this puzzle is unique as it will bridge the truth and value in each of these perspectives. Further, it will be shown how both nuclear optimist's arguments and nuclear pessimist's arguments can be used to prove that nuclear weapons do produce a stabilizing effect in the region.

Theories Informing Causality (Lit Review B)

There are several theories that inform the argument that nuclear weapons have produced a stabilizing effect between Pakistan and India. The specific theories that will be used to prove the causality of the argument are deterrence theory, balance of power theory, nuclear optimist theory, nuclear pessimist theory, and de-escalation theory.

Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory states that a rational actor will not attack another if the other has the means of causing unacceptable damage after being attacked (Quackenbush, 2010). The concept of deterrence has always existed as an objective of an actor's security strategy even before it became widely publicized and acknowledged in the Cold War (Morgan, 2012). Deterrence as a strategy is any means of, "using threats to influence the strategic calculus of the other side" regardless of the weapons or means of warfare involved (Adamsky, 2013). In the Cold War,

deterrence theory became the leading nuclear strategy which involved forces and concepts such as the nuclear TRIAD, securing second strike capabilities, and mutually assured destruction (MAD). Nuclear deterrence was viewed as the necessary component of keeping a cap on all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Deterrence theory is viewed as a success as it kept nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, from engaging in conventional or nuclear war. The purpose of nuclear deterrence is to make conflict so costly that any rational actor would avoid conflict all together.

Deterrence theory is fundamental to the argument that nuclear weapons have stabilized the relationship between Pakistan and India as each side has ensured that all-out war or any use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic to both states using deterrence strategy. It is through deterrence, that nuclear weapons have made it so mass conventional or nuclear war between Pakistan and India is in neither state's best interest and therefore it will not occur.

Balance of Power Theory

Balance of power theory emerged from realist thought and describes how states seek to ensure survival by preventing another state from gaining enough power to be a dominant actor (Nexon, 2009). It is believed that, "the minimum requirements for a balance of power system include the existence of at least two or more actors of roughly equal strength, states seeking to survive and preserve its autonomy, alliance flexibility, and the ability to resort to war if need be" (Schweller, 2016). Overtime, balance of power has been understood to work in different ways. Some believe the system has worked "autonomously," meaning balance of power in the international community is a result of "states pursuing their narrow self-interests" (Schweller, 2016). Recently, a modern approach to balance of power theory has emerged and it is this approach labeled the "manually operated" approach which informs this body of analysis.

The manually operated approach to balance of power theory ascribes the maintenance of a stable system to “a function of human contrivance, with emphasis on the skill of diplomats and statesmen, a sense of community of nations, of shared responsibility, and a desire and need to preserve the balance of power system” (Schweller, 2016). This approach to balance of power is more accurate in describing and analyzing the relationship between Pakistan and India, especially surrounding nuclear weapon’s stabilizing effects.

Nuclear Optimist Theory

Nuclear optimist theory argues that the presence of nuclear weapons between rival states acts as a stabilizing force and claims that, “states are dissuaded from acts that raise risk” due to nuclear weapons (Karl, 1997). Much of the argument and theory proclaimed by nuclear optimists stems from the Cold War (Karl, 1997). A quote from Kenneth Waltz best exemplifies the beliefs of nuclear optimists, “the presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious. . . . Why fight if you can’t win much and might lose everything” (Karl, 1997). Nuclear optimists suggest that when rivals possess nuclear weapons, the calculus that goes into any conflict is much more careful to mitigate the risk of the use of nuclear weapons (Waltz, 2008). Further, the theory suggests that states that possess nuclear weapons and have disputes are more likely to negotiate and keep a cap on the disputes to prevent escalation to the use of a nuclear weapon.

In the work of Kenneth Waltz titled, “*Nuclear Stability in South Asia*” Waltz takes the optimistic stance by pointing out how the end results of multiple conflicts (i.e. no nuclear war and no large scale conventional war) proves the success of deterrence between Pakistan and India. The argument of this paper is built on the assumption that optimistic views surrounding the effects of nuclear weapons on stability between Pakistan and India are correct. Further, Waltz is correct in his claim that, “nuclear weapons make leaders more behave sensibly instead of brash

and reckless” (Waltz, 2008). While this analysis supports the optimist approach, by only focusing on the end result nuclear optimist theory is limited in scope. Optimist theory does not give enough weight to the onset of conflict and the transgressions which occur during the conflict that led to the end result.

Nuclear Pessimist Theory

In contrast to nuclear optimist theory, nuclear pessimist theory rejects the claim that nuclear weapons stabilize regions and further rejects that the United States and Soviet Union nuclear relationship can be modeled elsewhere (Karl, 1997). Nuclear pessimists believe that the United States and Soviet Union's stable nuclear balance is unique and cannot be replicated for reasons that include vast distance between the states, unique military and political factors that do not exist in other regions, and “the absence of a previous legacy of hostility” (Karl, 1997). Pessimists doubt the ability for deterrence to hold in other contexts and often point to the hostilities between Pakistan and India as evidence of traditional deterrence not holding up.

The work by Scott Sagan titled “Nuclear Instability in South Asia” takes the pessimistic view that nuclear weapons in Pakistan and India have destabilized the region. Although this proposal rejects the notion that nuclear weapons are destabilizing, nuclear pessimists are correct in giving significant weight to the onset of the crisis. The way in which nuclear pessimists theorize the importance of the onset of conflict directly informs the hypothesis and will be a focal point for the event analysis section of this paper.

De-escalation Theory

Optimists and pessimists leave out the middle ground, and the idea that methods used to de-escalate a conflict in the midst of conflict matter. The work and theories of Karthika Sasikumar in his piece “India-Pakistan Crises under the Nuclear Shadow: The Role of

Reassurance” are what fill this gap and complete the argument that nuclear weapons have stabilized the region. Sasikumar suggests that optimism fails to address the importance of the developments and rhetoric during a conflict leading to a non-nuclear outcome (Sasikumar, 2019). His theory specifically addresses the use of threats and reassurance, specifically in the case of India, to prove his theory (Sasikumar, 2019). Sasikumar's theory directly informs the argument in that it places the importance on the progression of the conflict itself and not on just its onset or its conclusion. De-escalation theory plays an essential role as this theory is what binds the accuracies of nuclear pessimist theory and those of nuclear optimist theory to create a nuanced and modern understanding of how nuclear weapons have stabilized the Pakistani and Indian nuclear balance.

Methodology

To support the argument that nuclear weapons are a stabilizing force between Pakistan and India, the two major conflicts that occurred after 1998 between Pakistan and India that resulted in the threat of the use of nuclear weapons will be analyzed. These two events are the Kargil Conflict in 1999, and the terrorist attacks in 2001 on the Indian Parliament leading to the subsequent troop buildup along the border. Each event will be briefly summarized followed by a breakdown analysis of the conflict. This breakdown will include analysis of the onset of the conflict, the methods used during the conflict for de-escalation, and conclude with the result of the conflict. Each of these sections will be analyzed in relation to nuclear escalation by both sides to prove that the possession of nuclear weapons allowed each side to keep a cap on the conflict and prevent the incident from escalating into all out conventional or nuclear war.

By giving equal weight to all phases of a conflict, this research will provide a holistic and evidence-based understanding of the impacts of nuclear weapons between India and Pakistan.

Additionally, this methodology is a unique and modern approach to understanding the role of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and India as it combines theories that are typically considered contradictory.

Event 1: Kargil Conflict, 1999

Introduction

The Kargil Conflict was a battle between Pakistan and India in 1999 in the region of Jammu and Kashmir which took place along the Line of Control (LOC) in the Kargil district. The Kargil Conflict is more significant than just a war between two states in that it was a rare open armed conflict between two nuclear armed states. Additionally, this war has been heralded by the international community and analysts as demonstrating “considerable restraint” from both sides (Gill, 2019). The Kargil Conflict is thus the logical starting point when looking at the role of nuclear weapons in a conflict between Pakistan and India.

Onset-Progression-Conclusion

Before analyzing the progression of the Kargil Conflict, it is necessary to briefly describe the strategic significance of the region. Kargil, although remote with rugged terrain, sits strategically beside India’s National Highway 1 (NH1) which is the major supply route for Indian military forces which occupy the Siachen Glacier (Gill, 2019). NH1’s positioning near the LOC and the vulnerability of the roadway to severe weather conditions makes NH1 a “severe vulnerability” for Indian strategic objectives in Jammu and Kashmir (Gill, 2019).

The *onset* of the Kargil Conflict was brought on by several factors. In the 1990s, tensions were high between both states as each country was ramping up nuclear testing. Additionally, conflict and rebellion within Jammu and Kashmir was growing more violent with speculations of

Pakistani military and ISI operatives involved in the training and planning of insurrection efforts. In addition to these factors, the Pakistani military was reeling from the major defeat suffered to India in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which many of the planners of the Kargil assault were involved (Gill, 2019). Pakistani forces were the first to make an aggressive move as the Pakistani military dispatched forces to capture locations on the Indian side of the LOC (Gill, 2019). These efforts were successful early on and went largely unnoticed for several weeks before the Indian army launched a counterattack (Gill, 2019).

Many claim that the onset of this conflict was due to a perceived nuclear umbrella that the Pakistani military believed empowered them to launch an assault without repercussion (Gill, 2019). This belief is demonstrated to be inaccurate when analyzing the strategists behind the Kargil assault on the Pakistani side. The Kargil assault was planned by four Pakistani generals: COAS Musharraf, Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Muhammad Aziz Khan, 10th Corps commander Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmad and Major General Javed Hassan (Gill, 2019). Multiple reports demonstrate that these generals did not realize or consider the added strategic significance of nuclear weapons (Gill, 2019). There is convincing evidence that the generals who planned the assault viewed the assault in a non-nuclear context, i.e. the context that existed 15 years prior (Gill, 2019). Therefore, at the onset of the Kargil Conflict, aggression from the Pakistani side was due to lack of acknowledgement from military planners of the role of nuclear weapons, not nuclear weapons themselves.

The *progression* of the Kargil conflict reveals how nuclear weapons stayed the hand of both India and Pakistan when they were faced with different means of escalation. During the progression of the conflict, both sides were also faced with high casualties, especially the Indian army early on. Many point to this fact as evidence that nuclear weapons did not keep a conflict

from ensuing and therefore are not a stabilizing force between India and Pakistan. In actuality, the relatively high death toll as the conflict progressed was largely due to information issues and strategic missteps unconnected to nuclear capabilities. For example, at the start of the conflict, the Indian army was unaware of any threat for three weeks and only sent a small troop deployment to deal with what they perceived to be small militia activity (Gill, 2019). Predictably, the Indian forces were wiped out by heavily armed and well positioned Pakistani forces. Once the Indian army mobilized and made a proper threat assessment, it was faced with rooting out an entrenched, but poorly supplied Pakistani force resulting in greater casualties (Gill, 2019). Soon, with the Indian forces mobilized, the poorly supplied Pakistani forces were pummeled by a ground and air attack (Gill, 2019).

Although poor planning played a role in the poorly supplied Pakistani forces, the primary reason more troops were not dispatched to maintain Pakistani supply lines was due to the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons. To hold supply lines and maintain Pakistani troop positions, there would need to be massive mobilization of troops and the support of more than just four generals. The Pakistani military refused to fully commit to the Kargil Conflict due to the presence of nuclear weapons which demonstrates the impact nuclear weapons had on restraining Pakistani forces. When looking at the progression of strategy on the Indian military's side, there are two facts that demonstrate how nuclear weapons kept the Indian army restrained. Firstly, the Indian military never crossed the LOC, which proved to be extremely difficult especially for its air forces (Gill, 2019). Many critics of this decision believe that it led to more casualties for the Indian army, but it was a strategic decision by India to keep a cap on the conflict (Sasikumar, 2019). Secondly, the Indian army never opened a second front which would have strategically crippled the weaker conventional forces of the Pakistani military. It is

undisputed and even addressed by the Indian Prime Minister at the time, that this option was not on the table due to Pakistan's nuclear capability (Sasikumar, 2019).

The Kargil Conflict *concluded* with the Pakistani forces withdrawing due to Indian military success and surmounting international pressure. Throughout the conflict, threats were made by both sides regarding nuclear weapons which were alarming yet acted as a stabilizing factor. The threat to use nuclear weapons captured the international community's attention and led to pressure from numerous countries such as the United States and China for the two to end the conflict (Sasikumar, 2019). The United States got directly involved and demanded that Pakistan withdraw its troops which they subsequently did (Sasikumar, 2019). The Kargil Conflict ended with casualties totaling approximately 1000, which Indian officials report 527 of which were Indian soldiers (Gill, 2019). The Kargil Conflict concluded with no large-scale conventional mobilization anywhere but in Kargil, and no use of a nuclear weapon.

Analysis

The Kargil Conflict remained constrained with both India and Pakistan working actively to keep a cap on the conflict due to the presence of nuclear weapons. The onset of the Kargil Conflict was a result of military generals not considering the role of nuclear weapons. Had the generals been able to overcome their inherent bias and recognized nuclear weapon's strategic role, they would not have attempted such an offensive.

Each side had multiple opportunities throughout the war to escalate, yet both showed restraint and worked to keep the conflict contained, even to the dismay of critics and popular nationwide opinion (Sasikumar, 2019). The Kargil Conflict ended without any use of a nuclear weapon and with no large-scale, prolonged, multi-frontal assault. The onset of the conflict stemmed from a lack of awareness of nuclear weapons, the restrained progression of the conflict

was due to nuclear weapons, and conclusion with Pakistani forces withdrawing and international pressure was due to each side posing nuclear weapons. It was nuclear weapons that kept the Kargil Conflict stable enough to not fall into all-out war between Pakistan and India.

Event 2: Terrorist Attack in 2001 and Subsequent Border Build-Up

Introduction

In December of 2001 the Parliament of India located in New Delhi was attacked by members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist groups who were believed to be operating out of Pakistan (Sasikumar, 2019). The attack was unsuccessful, however it led to the largest troop buildup of Indian military personnel along the LOC (approximations reach 800,000) since the war in 1971 (Sasikumar, 2019). The Indian Parliament attacks, and the subsequent troop buildup marks the second most significant conflict where the nuclear option stabilized relations.

Onset-Progression-Conclusion

The *onset* of the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 and subsequent border build up was due to two factors. The global war on terror gave the Indian government greater flexibility to mobilize a massive number of troops very quickly with little outside intervention. In the world's eyes, India was only taking the necessary measures, like those the United States were taking at the time, to secure the state's security (Roy-Chaudhury, 2003). Some claim that India was able to mobilize this many troops in a threatening way along the LOC because nuclear weapons gave the state an umbrella to act aggressively, thus destabilizing relations. However, it was the context of the war on terror which gave India justification to act in this manner. Additionally, at the onset of this terrorist attack, former PM "Vajpayee's party was facing four

crucial state elections at the time” and there were mass calls for retribution for the attack (Sasikumar, 2019). In this context, it becomes clear that the onset of this conflict was largely political and a method of saber rattling for the politicians (Sasikumar, 2019).

The *progression* of this conflict featured a multi-month standoff between Pakistani and Indian troops along the LOC (Sasikumar, 2019). During this conflict, like Kargil, neither side crossed the LOC which is attributed to the presence of nuclear weapons. Had nuclear weapons not been present, although it is unlikely that this conflict would have resulted in a mass invasion, India may have launched small scale strikes using its superior conventional military to appease the public and punish Pakistan for allowing the terrorist groups to operate. Nuclear weapons ensured that this conflict progressed sensitively with both state’s militaries operating with utmost caution.

In addition, during the progression of this conflict, although there were “threatening signals,” diplomatic efforts of stabilizing reassurance took place between the states (Sasikumar, 2019). Firstly, India ensured a clear line of communication with Islamabad which each state utilized to exchange specific locations of nuclear facilities while the conflict progressed (Sasikumar, 2019). Further, India also disclosed its planned test of a medium range ballistic missile to Pakistan to maintain transparency and stability (Sasikumar, 2019). Each side possessing nuclear weapons and forming agreements around these weapons allowed the states to maintain diplomatic channels during a time of crisis.

The conflict *concluded* with a large withdrawal of troops by both sides in October 2002 with plans to withdraw all troops by 2003 (Sasikumar, 2019). Although the conflict featured threats of nuclear weapons by both sides, no nuclear weapon was ever close to being fired

(Sasikumar, 2019). Additionally, Pakistan complied with Indian demands to turn over heads of terrorist organizations and vowed to take a stronger stance on the terrorist networks operating out of Pakistan (Roy-Chaudhury, 2003). In 2003 former Indian PM Vajpayee gave a speech titled “Hand of Friendship” directed at Pakistan, which subsequently led to an era of eased tensions and peace between the states (Roy-Chaudhury, 2003). Cross-border terrorism nearly halved and Pakistan’s commitment to anti-terrorist operations strengthened (Roy-Chaudhury, 2003).

Analysis

The 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament and subsequent border build up began with a terrorist attack that was used for political purposes. It was not nuclear weapons that brought on instability, it was the political use of a terrorist attack. The progression of the conflict demonstrates restraint and sensitivity by both Pakistan and India to prevent escalation. It was nuclear weapons that prevented escalation and it was nuclear weapons that promoted diplomatic efforts to de-escalate and restabilize relations. This terrorist attack was specifically chosen from the multitude of those which occurred after 1998 because it had the most destabilizing effects. The other attacks in this period, such as the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, used similar methods, but at a smaller scale to de-escalate. Nuclear weapons act as a stabilizing force during destabilizing events, such as terrorist attacks, which are frequent between Pakistan and India.

Conclusion

By combining the accuracies of nuclear optimists, nuclear pessimists, and de-escalation theory, this body of work was proven that nuclear weapons have and will continue to act as a stabilizing force in relations between Pakistan and India. Pakistan and India are states with a turbulent relationship that is likely to remain so into the future. Nuclear weapons' role in this

relationship acts as a constant that maintains the cap on large scale conventional war or nuclear exchange.

The Kargil conflict demonstrates how nuclear weapons were used to constrain a conventional military conflict of relatively large scale. It is unlikely that a conventional conflict of this scale will occur again between Pakistan and India because of the presence of nuclear weapons. The Kargil Conflict stemmed from outdated military ideology which created a highly unstable crisis. Had nuclear weapons not been in possession of both sides, the Kargil conflict would have spiraled out of control as each side would have been incentivized to escalate. Nuclear weapons removed this incentive and will continue to do so if both states possess them. Terrorist attacks are the likely flash points of conflict between India and Pakistan for the foreseen future. Nuclear weapons assure that each side does not overreact to such attacks, and that counter measures are pursued with the utmost caution and clarity.

The nuclear balance between Pakistan and India has stabilized the state's relationship. Calling Pakistan and India a “nuclear hotspot” is inaccurate and blatantly false. Nuclear weapons are the fire extinguisher to the blaze that can emerge from the Pakistani and Indian relationship.

Further Research

Pakistan and India are two states armed with nuclear weapons that experience conflict. Although the stance of this paper is that the conflict is kept in check by the presence of nuclear weapons, a comparison-based research model would provide insight into the deeper intricacies of how deep this effect goes. In the future, it would be informative to take the events analyzed in this piece and apply them in a non-nuclear context. Meaning, the researcher would find a similar event to both the Kargil Conflict, as well as the 2001 attack/build up elsewhere in the world between states not in nuclear balance. It would be informative to compare the transgressions of

the non-nuclear context, versus the nuclear context of Pakistan and India. Additionally, further research into how international pressure affects Pakistani and Indian diplomacy would be relevant to further understand the approaches each side takes to de-escalate nuclear conflict. In each of the events, an outside nation such as the United States assisted in negotiations and de-escalation. Further research into this dialogue and its effects would better inform the argument.

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