

social science

# Are Competitive Parties More Responsive to Middle-Income Preferences?

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*The following is an excerpt from a longer piece.  
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## INTRODUCTION

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IS founded on the principle of political equality for all citizens (Dahl 2007). However, recent trends in political culture have demonstrated a growing anxiety regarding the treatment of constituents of different incomes. Much criticism of presidential candidates Mitt Romney and Donald Trump revolved around their perceived inability to empathize with the middle-class. Likewise, populist movements such as Occupy Wall Street and the political efficacy of Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren are driven by a perception of political inequality. Studies of representation have demonstrated that these anxieties are justifiable. Gilens and Page (2014) argue that the United States responds nearly exclusively to high-income constituents, and Bartels and Achen (2016) find that representatives rarely have incentives to improve representation in response to constituent opinion.

These findings run parallel with recent research demonstrating that parties alter their representational strategies in response to political insecurity. Lee (2016) finds that parties are more likely to adopt team-like behavior aimed at increasing electoral benefits, and Koger and Lebo (2017) find that majority parties are rewarded for winning controversial inter-party fights. This is consistent with a wide literature finding that parties increase responsiveness in response to increased political competition.

This study joins these two veins by examining how the likelihood that enacted policy will be responsive to constituent incomes changes relative to shifts in party competition. I find that policy becomes more responsive to middle-income preferences as competition increases, but that high-income preferences remain more meaningful across all circumstances. This indicates that party leaders adopt an agenda-setting strategy in order to maximize middle-income votes when competition is highest.

[...]

## THEORY AND EXPECTATIONS

### *Income and Responsiveness*

Numerous studies have indicated that MCs display preferential voting behavior in favor of their high-income constituents. This is a multifac-

eted effect: high-income constituents are more effective at communicating preferences (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 2013), are more likely to vote or donate to the MCs reelection bid (Bonica 2013), and are more likely to have similar social backgrounds with their representative. Several studies have indicated that high-income constituents yield strong influence over the policy-process (Gilens 2011, Bartels 2008). Therefore, I expect responsiveness to be higher for constituents with higher incomes.

*Hypothesis 1: Under normal circumstances, the majority party will be more responsive to the preferences of high-income citizens.*

#### *Competition and Responsiveness*

There is also a rich literature indicating that parties become more responsive when competitiveness increases. Parties are generally viewed as integral to policymaking: Schattschneider (1942) believed that a functioning democracy is impossible without strong political parties and Aldrich (1995) believed that democracy is “unworkable” without strong political parties. Lee (2016) found that competitive parties will focus on issues likely to positively differentiate them from their competitors, and Lebo and Koger (2017) find that competitive parties experience electoral benefits for winning contentious policy fights. Because marginal members expect electoral consequences for the policies they support (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002) and consequences for losing the majority are severe (Connelly and Pitney 1994), I expect responsiveness to improve as the likelihood of a shift in majority increases.

*Hypothesis 2: Intra-chamber competition will be positively correlated with responsiveness for all income levels.*

Likewise, there is some evidence suggesting that the gains from improved responsiveness will accrue primarily to the middle-class. Gilens (2011) found that Congress tends to slightly improve its middle-income responsiveness in the year proceeding a presidential election. Likewise, formal theories of voter prioritization suggest that the most effective strategy will target the middle voter (Downs 1957, Krehbiel 1998). Economic studies of tax policy have likewise suggested that congressional elections bias policy toward the middle class (Stigler 1970, Przeworski and Stokes 1999). Therefore, when competition is the highest, I expect policy to become more reflective of middle-income interests.

*Hypothesis 3: As intra-chamber competition increases, majority party responsiveness will tend to increase for middle-income constituents at a higher rate than for other income levels.*

#### *Ideological Distance and Responsiveness*

Political polarization also likely has an effect on representation, given that policy enactments are more difficult when party leaders must appeal to a broader coalition. (Enns et. al. 2013) I therefore make the assumption that responsiveness will decrease as ideological distance grows.

*Hypothesis 4: Ideological division will be negatively related to responsiveness for all groups.*

## METHODOLOGY

I will test these hypotheses by examining policy enactments in the U.S. Senate from 1981-2002. The Senate is in a unique position for examining the intersection of representation and competition. First, because all policy must pass the 60-vote filibuster, the Senate can be considered the limiting factor in whether a policy is enacted. Therefore, changes in policy are likely to be most dependent on institutional circumstances in the Senate. Second, the Senate is elected to six-year terms, meaning that only one-third of Senators are up for reelection every year. Because Senate elections increasingly occur as national 'waves' (Campbell 2011), the need to defend more seats at the end of the six-year term often creates an artificial advantage for one party. Therefore, in contrast to the House's two-year elections, the Senate class designations mean that simple seat advantages may not be truly reflective of a majority party's advantage. Finally, in contrast to the vast institutional control that House leaders hold over their members, Senators are considered free to vote without fear of party coercion. This allows for a clearer view of individual decision-making, and provides for a more credible theoretical claim should competitive parties be found to alter representational strategies.

*Constituent Preferences and Policy Outcomes*

In order to measure the link between constituent preferences and policy outcomes, I will use survey responses on specific policies considered by Congress for the years 1981-2002. These questions ask for constituent approval of specific government

policy, and are weighted according to income quintiles at the time of the survey's administration. These questions are then assigned a binary value indicating whether the policy was subsequently enacted by Congress.<sup>1</sup>

There is also a control variable, 'Ideological Disagreement', which measures the difference in 1st dimension DW-Nominate scores between the median Senator and the Senator at the 60th percentile from the majority party. As the 60th Senator is the last required vote to sustain a filibuster, policy change should be representative of their ideology relative to the median (Krehbiel 1998). Although an imperfect measure, controlling for this score should reduce the influence of ideological gridlock on policy outcomes.

The comparative influence of citizens is measured as the likelihood that an increase in support will result in the policy's enactment. This is denoted with the following logistic regression model:

$$(4.1): \\ \text{Logit}(\text{Policy Enactment}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Preference}) + \beta_2(\text{Ideological Distance}) + u$$

Therefore, the logit regression coefficient will be a measure of the elasticity of policy change to change in preferences. This model will be run for each income quintile, yielding five scores at the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th predicted income percentiles.

<sup>1</sup> Thank you to Dr. Martin Gilens at Princeton University for providing this data. It can be accessed at <https://www.russellsage.org/economic-inequality-and-political-representation>.

*Measuring Political Competition*

Most measures of political competition assume the majority party seat margin as the primary measure of political competition (see: Lee 2016, Gilens 2011). However, in the context of principal-agent behavioral theories, the more relevant measure of political competition is the expected electoral differential—the level of expectation by the majority party that control of the chamber will switch following the next election.

Roughly one-third of the Senate is up for reelection every year. However, only a certain proportion of these seats can be considered competitive—defined here as having an average margin of victory of less than 5 points for presidential candidates in the last two elections. For the majority party to retain control of the chamber, it must win enough of these competitive seats to maintain control of the Senate. It can do this either by successfully defending its own competitive seats or flipping a seat held by a minority party senator. The likelihood that either party will win a seat is assumed to be the percentage approval rating of the incumbent president of the same party (or the disapproval rating for presidents of opposite parties).

This measure can be expressed as a cumulative binomial distribution function:

$$(4.2): \sum_{k=n(maj)-\pi}^n \binom{n}{k} x^k (1-x)^{n-k}$$

In which  $n$  is equal to the total number of competitive seats defended by both parties,  $n(maj)$  is the number of competitive seats defended by the majority, and  $\pi$  is the majority party seat margin. Therefore,  $k$  is the number of competitive seats the ma-

ajority must win to retain control of the Senate. Presidential approval rate (disapproval if divided government) is denoted as  $x$ . This is based on findings that one of the primary determinants of congressional elections is the popularity of the incumbent President (Jacobson and Carson 2015).

This measure can be accurately described as a joint probability function: of all possible outcomes, what is the probability that the majority will not win enough state level races to retain control of the chamber? While an admittedly imperfect measure, this variable improves upon the current method of using majority seat margin as a proxy for competitiveness. For the period 1981-2002, the size of the majority had a -0.24 correlation with a shift in control of the Senate; the competitiveness measure described above had a 0.38 correlation with a shift in control.<sup>2</sup> These comparisons are detailed below:

Year	Probability of Shift	Seat Margin	Senate Flipped?
1982	96.0%	3	No
1984	0.1%	5	No
1986	64.7%	3	Yes
1988	18.6%	5	No
1990	0.4%	5	No
1992	0.0%	6	No
1994	42.5%	7	Yes
1996	88.0%	2	No
1998	28.4%	5	No
2000	61.2%	5	No
2002	96.3%	1	Yes

Table 1. Results from Competitiveness Function

<sup>2</sup> Thank you to Jacob F.H. Smith at University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill for pointing out the weak correlations between majority party size and chamber competitiveness.

Competition is then treated as an intervening variable, in order to test if responsiveness changes depending on political competition. This is expressed in the following logistic regression model:

$$(4.3): \\ \text{Logit}(\text{Policy Enactment}) = \beta_0 + \\ \beta_1(\text{Preference}) + \beta_2(\text{Ideological} \\ \text{Distance}) + \beta_3(\text{Competition}) + \\ \beta_4(\text{Preference} * \text{Competition}) + u$$

Finally, in order to investigate potential agenda-setting strategies, I split policies by levels of agreement. Low-agreement policies are defined as one or more quintiles having above a 10-point difference in approval; high-agreement policies are all those below a ten-point difference. Finally, as with differences in income, each regression is run using preferences for each quintile.

## RESULTS

### *Responsiveness by Income Percentile*

The logistic regression model indicates positive results for all income quintiles: as preferences become more positive, the likelihood that a policy will be enacted increases. However, these results were not consistent across all income groups. Most notably, the logistic regression coefficient was larger at the highest income quintiles. This indicates that changes in constituent preferences are more influential on government policy at higher income levels. These differences are expressed graphically in Figure 1.

These results indicate that income is a salient factor in a constituent's ability to shape government policy, with higher income constituents better able to shape policy. How-

ever, do these differentials shift in response to increased political competition? I include political competition as an intervening variable, and generate second-degree polynomial predictions for the logistic regression coefficient. These results are expressed in Figure 2.

Intervening preferences with political competition yields similar differentials to the restricted model, in that constituents at the 90th income percentile experience the greatest influence over government policy, followed by constituents at the 50th and 10th income percentiles. The 90th income percentile improves slightly under greater political competition, but remains relatively stable. The 50th income percentile improves significantly to  $P=0.70$ , at which it decreases slightly. The 10th income percentile experiences a diminished increase before a drop at  $P=0.55$ , but remains largely stable.

Given limits in plenary time and assuming economic policymaking must include tradeoffs between groups. This zero-sum nature of economic policymaking would imply that increases in responsiveness to one group would result in decreases in responsiveness to other groups. This contrasts with the above findings: low- and middle-income preferences increase as political competitiveness increases, but high-income preferences do not decrease.

[...]

## CONCLUSION

This data indicates that middle-income preferences do improve with increased political competition, but that policy remains preferentially responsive to high-income prefer-

ences. Additionally, much of the perceived effect can be accounted for as electorally-conscious agenda-setting by the majority party.

This finding can inform many of the current debates on congressional behavior. Because majorities are unresponsive to middle-income preferences when competition is low, it would follow that stronger and more frequent competition will force behavior toward the majority.

Likewise, many of the mechanisms of representation have intrinsic bias. Although its effects are subjects of continued debate, the modern necessity of campaign fundraising creates incentives for preferential representation. Legal reforms to campaign financing laws would likely dampen this effect.

Similarly, the significant personal and professional time constraints involved with running for political office mean that low- and middle-income constituents do not have the means to directly influence policy. Those who are able to run for political office tend to be from privileged backgrounds, with substantive implications for the policies they champion and support (Carnes 2013).

The work of advocacy organizations such as EMILY's List and WISH have been effective at increasing the number of women legislators in both parties—it is not unreasonable to expect that a similar effort could increase the number of working-class legislators.

Finally, these differences in influence affect the quality and effectiveness of enacted policies. Scholars have already demonstrated that the U.S. Congress cannot effectively address its most pressing issues due to partisan polarization and resistance

from wealthy interest groups (Hacker and Pierson 2006).

Understanding how parties may prioritize constituents differently under certain circumstances advances our knowledge of policy-making decisions and improves our ability to shape the institutions tasked with our representation.




Figure 1. Policy Responsiveness by Income Level




Figure 2. Policy Representation Under Competitive Conditions

# Economic Development and Cultural Assimilation

Exploring the Tensions in Xinjiang, China

*Rylee Price*

THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY, Xinjiang has been a region marked by constant conflict and tensions with the federal Chinese government. Situated in the northwest corner of China, Xinjiang is one of China's National Autonomous Regions and is home to many of China's ethnic minority groups, although it is primarily occupied by the Uyghur people. Although the structure of the Chinese government has changed over the course of the nation's history, resulting in changes in the legal status and rights of minority groups and National Autonomous Regions, the tensions between the Uyghur people and the central Chinese government have remained fairly constant, regardless of these shifts in policy. Stemming largely from conflicts between the local identity of Uyghur people and the collective national identity of China, these tensions have been manifested in the ways that the government regulates the use of Uyghur language and religion, among other cultural expressions. As a result, some Uyghur separatist groups have staged violent protests and outbreaks, leading the government to increase its already numerous restrictions on Uyghur cultural expression. Yet, while more recent government reforms have sought to uphold the cultural identities of ethnic minority groups, the new policies fall significantly short of resolving the present tensions. As these policies do not fully benefit the Uyghur people and aim to lead to a development that is typically manifested as assimilation into Han Chinese culture, the tensions between the Uyghur people and the Chinese federal government are unlikely to be resolved by current Chinese policies.

Although the Xinjiang region is considered to be a part of the People's Republic of China, the Uyghur people that inhabit it are a distinct ethnic group from the Han Chinese that compose the dominant ethnic group in China. While the Han people primarily speak Mandarin, a Sino-Tibetan language, the Uyghur people speak Uyghur, which belongs to the Turkic language family (Clothey & Koku, 2017). Additionally, the Uyghur people typically practice Islam, a religion that is fairly uncommon across the rest of China (Davis, 2008). Over time, the attitude of the Chinese federal government towards such differences from the dominant Han culture has varied, ranging from extremely intolerant to actively seeking a pluralistic society. During the 1960s, the communist party in China adamantly opposed the local expression of cultural heritage in minority groups, seeing it as detrimental to the unity of the Chinese state, which led to the destruction of many cultural expressions of the Uyghur people, including limitations on their language, religion, and cul-



tural dress (Davis, 2008). While more recent policy changes have attempted to restore some of these previously restricted freedoms, the historical limitations on Uyghur cultural identity have led to several separatist movements among the Uyghur people. Desiring to establish Xinjiang as an independent nation from China, several militant groups have arisen in recent years, attempting to free Xinjiang from Chinese control (Davis, 2008). However, rather than serving to achieve freedom, these outbreaks have instead led to increased restrictions on the Uyghur people, as the Chinese government believes it must respond to a military threat (Davis, 2008). Further compounding these conflicts, when the government has thus intervened to establish a firmer Chinese identity in the Xinjiang region, it has implemented policies designed to bring about development (Zenz, 2014). However, rather than finding the specific areas that Uyghurs believe need improvement, the government has determined that development is solely evidenced by increased economic output and has therefore implemented policies designed to increase the economic production of Xinjiang (Zenz, 2014). In this way, these policies have perpetuated the conflicts between the Uyghur people and the federal Chinese government because Uyghur needs have been ignored when these policies have been established.

In response to the consequent dissatisfaction expressed by the Uyghur people, the central Chinese

government has altered its policies in order to give minority groups a more secure right to cultural expression. To this end, the 1984 constitution of the People's Republic of China includes several clauses that seem to grant these groups more freedom to use their own language, participate in local government, and practice their own religion (Potter, 2005; Wu, 2014). However, while this constitution seemed to hold promise for ethnic minorities, it has been ineffectively implemented, thus failing to accomplish its goals and satisfy minority groups (Potter, 2005; Zenz, 2014). One prominent factor leading to this failure is that the religious and linguistic freedoms granted in the constitution are only to be implemented if they serve to perpetuate the philosophy of socialism (Potter, 2005; Zenz, 2014). The People's Republic of China is a socialist state, and as such, the government has sought to unify all regions of the country under a common socialist philosophy, therefore mandating that linguistic and religious expressions must reinforce this belief in socialism. This contingency allows the local government in Xinjiang to restrict activities, such as Muslim worship practices, that it views to

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be oppositional to socialism (Potter, 2005). Additionally, the effects of the provisions for Uyghur people have been weakened by the influx of

Han migrants into areas that were historically populated by Uyghur people. This influx has served to dilute the concentration of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, decreasing their represen-

tation in local government and reducing the potency of laws created to protect the rights of minority groups when they are centered in a specific area (Potter, 2005). Simultaneously, as Han presence has increased in areas that were traditionally inhabited by Uyghurs, the Han people have experienced more of the benefits of development in these areas, receiving better jobs and more government positions (Wu,

*As language is an expression of identity, the forced shift from Uyghur to Mandarin has been viewed by some people as a direct strategy for forcing Uyghurs to assimilate to the dominant Han culture* ❧

2014). In these ways, the attempts by the Chinese government to support the Uyghur people residing in Xinjiang have not benefitted the Uyghurs as they have failed to address the root of the problem but instead have benefitted Han people living in Xinjiang rather than the Uyghurs.

One manifestation of these shortcomings of Chinese policies to satisfactorily address the tensions present between Uyghurs and the central Chinese government is the way that the government addresses Uyghur religion. Most Uyghur people are Muslim, a religion that is fairly uncommon throughout the rest of China (Clothey & Koku, 2017). As Islam is not seen to adhere to socialist values and ideologies, the religious practices of the Uyghurs are severely restricted to serve the stated purpose of maintaining the national unity of China (Potter, 2005). To this end, laws have been implemented in Xinjiang specifying where Islam can be practiced and who can practice it. For instance, religious leaders must fit certain political criteria set by the state, and minors are not allowed to take part in religious activities (Clothey & Koku, 2017). While many Uyghurs

argue that these laws violate their right to practice their religion, the Chinese government justifies them as ways to protect national safety. In the past, some groups of Islamic extremists have staged violent outbreaks in Xinjiang, leading the government to increase security and regulations around the religious practices of Uyghurs, attempting to prevent any further violence from occurring (Davis, 2008).

However, in spite of the numerous obstacles prohibiting the Uyghur people from the full practice of their religion, many Uyghurs have found solidarity and encouragement in their faith through the use of Internet chat groups, referencing the Koran or religious stories when writing to each other (Clothey & Koku, 2017). Thus, although the government has limited the ways in which Uyghur people can practice Islam, they have managed to maintain their religion as a part of their cultural identity.

In a similar fashion, the central Chinese government has attempted to limit Uyghur people's expression of their cultural identity by regulating the use of their language. As language is an expression of identity, the forced shift from Uyghur to Mandarin has been viewed by some people as a direct strategy for forcing Uyghurs to assimilate to the dominant Han culture. However, both the central Chinese government and the local government in Xinjiang have made efforts to compromise between Chinese unity and plurality by instating a bilingual education policy (Teng, 2001). Through this policy, schools in Xinjiang conduct educa-

tion in both Mandarin and the local vernacular language, which is typically Uyghur. Yet, while this policy seemed to strike an appealing compromise between the interests of the Chinese state and those of the Uyghur people, its implementation has created increasing disparities between Uyghur and Han culture by creating a language ideology in which Mandarin is associated with more success and wealth than Uyghur is. By using Mandarin to teach subjects that are viewed as more beneficial in finding and attaining employment, such as math and science, while teaching others in local languages, the education system has begun to portray Mandarin as a language of success, which has consequently decreased the appeal of speaking local minority languages (Zenz, 2014). Additionally, when universities teach Mandarin to students whose first language is that of a minority group, teachers also tend to emphasize socialist values, thereby facilitating assimilation into the predominant Han culture (Zenz, 2014). While this educational policy has led to a decreasing number of people, especially children, speaking Uyghur in Xinjiang, many Uyghur people have resisted the destruction of their language by establishing online chat groups in which they practice the Uyghur language in order to preserve their cultural authenticity (Clothey & Koku, 2017). However, although this drive to maintain the integrity of the Uyghur language has helped to preserve Uyghur culture, it has potentially put the Uyghur people at an economic disadvantage. According to research by Tang, Hu, and

Jin (2016), even when education levels are controlled, Uyghur people get less prestigious and poorer paying jobs because they are less proficient in Mandarin. This is evidenced by the fact that vast numbers of Uyghur people work in agriculture, instead of skilled labor, despite the increasing urbanization of Xinjiang (Fischer, 2013). In this way, the conflict between Uyghur people and the government about the language in which Uyghur children should be educated is indicative of a much larger struggle between economic development and cultural preservation in Xinjiang.

Due to the significant contrasts between socialist Chinese society and Uyghur culture, tensions have existed between the two groups throughout the majority of China's history. While the Chinese government's current policies on the National Autonomous Region of Xinjiang appear to be

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more tolerant than some of the highly restrictive policies employed by past political parties in China, they are still inadequate to resolve the conflicts between the Uyghur people and the federal government, as the policies better benefit Han migrants than Uyghur people. Additionally, policies that enable Uyghurs to preserve their cultural identity through the practice of religion and use of language are contingent upon these practices upholding Chinese socialist ideals. Thus, rather than enabling the Uyghur people to maintain their cultural integrity, these policies have instead served to assimilate the Uyghur people into the dominant Han culture. In the name of unity and development, the Chinese govern-

ment has begun to destroy the cultural expressions that form the core of Uyghur identity. Furthermore, the economic advances that the government has sought to produce in Xinjiang are not necessarily synonymous with development, as they have led to greater levels of civil unrest and discontent. Accordingly, it can be seen that development is not necessarily best measured in terms of economic advancement, but that many other factors hold positions of importance when determining if a region is improving. If these other factors were considered by the Chinese government in determining how best to interact with the Xinjiang region, it might be possible to peacefully resolve the present tensions. However, this peaceful resolution will never be accomplished with the present policies of assimilation and forced economic development.

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# Trust in the Police in Latin America

## Understanding the Urban and Rural Divide

*Abigail Sewall*

*The following is an excerpt from a longer piece. For full text, please visit [www.honorsjournal.com](http://www.honorsjournal.com).*

### ABSTRACT

TRUST IN THE police is low throughout Latin America, particularly among residents of urban areas. The principle aim of this investigation is to determine why people in rural areas exhibit higher levels of trust in the police than their urban counterparts. This study focuses on the instrumental perspective of explaining trust, which emphasizes the importance of the performance of the police. Measures of negative experiences with the performance of the police are used to explain the difference in trust between urban and rural areas. The analyses find that people in urban areas are more frequently victimized by crime and solicited for bribes by police officers. Additionally, through regression analyses these differences in experience are determined to be a significant explanation for the differences in trust. The role of police performance in informing citizen trust has important implications for improving trust.

[...]

### METHODS

In order to test the hypothesis, this study uses data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This Vanderbilt University project is a region-wide survey that asks a representative sample of participants demographic and value-based questions. I use data from 2004 to 2014. Although the survey contains all countries considered to be part of the “Americas,” I use responses from the countries traditionally considered Latin America. These countries are: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Dominican Republic.

The dependent variable, trust in the police, is derived from the following LAPOP survey question: “Do you trust the national police?” This question is measured on a scale of one to seven, one being “Not at all” and seven being “A lot.” Whether the participant resides in an urban or rural area is measured with a dummy variable, which is called “Urban” for the purpose of this investigation. Other independent variables are measures of a participant’s experience with the performance of the police. The first independent variable mea-

asures the extent to which a participant has been a victim of crime. The survey question asks participants how many times they were victimized in the preceding twelve months, zero being the lowest amount and twenty being the highest. The other variables used to measure experience with the performance of the police is whether or not a citizen has been solicited for a bribe by a police officer. This is a dummy variable which asks participants, "Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the past 12 months?" This variable is selected to measure experience with the performance of the police because it represents how susceptible a police force is to corruption. Admittedly, police bribery could fall under the procedural justice perspective as well. For the purpose of this study, it is considered a measure of performance because it falls under the "performing their duty fairly across communities" aspect of police work discussed in Sunshine (2003).

*This decrease demonstrates that the independent variables are partly explaining the relationship between living in an urban area and having lower trust in the police*

I employ a number of control variables in this study. The control variables are mainly selected for their relevance in previous literature (Jamison 2011, Cao & Zao 2005, & Stamatakis 2016). The control variables chosen are sex, age, years of education received, and wealth. Wealth is measured using an index of asset ownership: a refrigerator, a cellular phone, a microwave, a washing machine, a television, indoor drinking water access, an indoor bathroom, and a computer. As the relative wealth of a participant becomes higher, the value of the index increases. The Cronbach's Alpha for the index is 0.799, meaning the combination of the different indicators creates a fairly reliable measure of affluence.<sup>1</sup> The number of control variables is fairly low, as it is best to include fewer and more relevant controls in order to keep the number of observations in the analysis high. In addition to the previously listed con-

<sup>1</sup> More details on the wealth index can be found in the table in Appendix 1.

	Model 1: Baseline			Model 2: + Victimization			Model 3: + Police bribes			Model 4: All study variables		
	Coeff	SE	p> t	Coeff	SE	p> t	Coeff	SE	p> t	Coeff	SE	p> t
Urban	0.230	(.035)	0.000	0.186	(0.036)	0.000	0.218	(0.036)	0.000	0.179	(0.037)	0.000
Victimization				-0.149	(0.030)	0.000				-0.129	(0.029)	0.000
Police bribe							-0.653	(0.034)	0.000	-0.584	(0.033)	0.000
Sex	0.044	(.015)	0.010	0.024	(0.017)	0.167	-0.008	(0.014)	0.567	-0.02	(0.017)	0.259
Age	0.005	(.002)	0.041	0.002	(0.002)	0.120	0.004	(0.002)	0.075	0.003	(0.002)	0.189
Years of Education	-0.016	(.005)	0.004	-0.013	(0.005)	0.024	-0.014	(0.005)	0.010	-0.012	(0.005)	0.038
Wealth	-0.029	(.015)	0.064	-0.037	(0.013)	0.008	-0.022	(0.014)	0.139	-0.031	(0.012)	0.020
Country fixed effects	Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes		
Contant	3.157	(.136)	0.000	3.393	(0.129)	0.000	3.345	(0.142)	0.000	3.552	(0.136)	0.000
N	131,381			67,402			129,648			66,229		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.072			0.082			0.082			0.090		

Table 1. OLS Regression Models for Trust in the Police

trols, I include country-fixed effects because there are many cultural and situational differences among Latin American countries.

In order to evaluate the variables above, I estimate ordinary least squares regression. I use multiple models in order to measure the effect of the independent variables on the relationship between living in an urban or rural area and trust in the police.

[...]

#### MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS

Table 1 presents the OLS regression results. I use four models to see the effect of inserting each one of the main independent variables on the relationship between trust in the police and living in an urban or rural area. The first model is the baseline, which is a model that only looks at the relationship between trust in the police and the controls. In the second and third models, the main independent variables are added to the regression individually in order to see the effect they have on the coefficient "Urban". Because I am not simply investigating why people do or do not trust the police, but rather how the environment they live in has an effect on trust, it is necessary to see how adding new variables to the model impact "Urban". In the baseline model, "Urban" has a coefficient of 0.230 and is statistically significant.

In the second and third models, adding the independent variables that measure personal experiences with performance decreases the value of the "Urban" coefficient. In the second model, where I add the measure of victimization, the coefficient for urban drops from 0.230 to 0.186, a 19% decrease from the baseline co-

efficient value. In the third model, where I add the dummy variable for whether a participant has been solicited for a bribe, the coefficient does drop in value but to a lesser extent: from 0.230 to 0.218, approximately a 5% decrease. It is also important to note the coefficients of the respective independent variables in these models. In the second model, a one unit change in "Victimization" lowers trust by 0.149 on the five-point scale. The negative value indicates that the more frequently a participant is a victim of a crime the level to which they trust the police decreases. In the third model, "Police bribe" lowers trust by a large amount: 0.653 on the five-unit scale. The negative relationship indicates that answering "yes" (yes=1, no=0) to the question "Have you been solicited for a bribe by the national police?" corresponds with lower trust in the police.

In the final model, with all the variables, the coefficient for "Urban" drops from the baseline of 0.230 to 0.179 and stays significant, about a 22% decrease in value. In this model the coefficient for victimization is -0.12. "Urban" and both the independent variables have the same, unchanged, statistical significance. This decrease demonstrates that the independent variables are partly explaining the relationship between living in an urban area and having lower trust in the police. The fact that "Urban" is still statistically significant indicates that "Victimization" and "Police bribe" do not entirely explain the urban rural divide.

#### CONCLUSION

Why do people in rural areas trust the police more than people in urban areas? For starters, experience

matters! Because the regression models show a significant drop in coefficient on "Urban", means that the negative experiences with the performance of the police are accounting for some of the differences in trust between urban and rural areas. More specifically, adding "Victimization" to the regression decreases the value of "Urban" by 19% on its own and "Police Bribery" decreases the value of "Urban" by 5% on its own. Together they account for about 22% of the effect. From these results, it is also clear that being a victim of a crime has a far stronger effect in explaining the urban rural gap in trust than police bribing.

In order to make changes that would result in higher levels of trust in the police it would be prudent to improve the quality of police work. More specifically, cracking down on crime and insecurity is a viable way to improve trust in urban areas because being a victim of crime is a strong factor in eroding trust. Moreover, taking action to combat police corruption can also be an important practice. Overall, through examining trust in the police from the lens of a citizen's personal experiences, it becomes clear that the quality of police work and the way police interact with citizens while on the job needs to improve before citizens can develop a more trusting relationship with them.

The results of this study bring up some possibilities for further investigation on trust in the police in Latin America. What other factors about living in an urban or rural area might result in differences in trust in the police? To begin, the hypothesis

states that it is negative experience with the performance of the police that causes lower levels of trust in urban areas; however, I was unable to test positive experiences with the performance of the police. Positive experiences with police performance likely raise trust. For example, if I were able to test the effect on trust of a police officer addressing a reported crime or resolving a disturbance, perhaps we would see how experiences positively impact trust. Unfortunately, accessible and representative data on positive experiences with the police is not available. Similarly, it would be interesting to see how other measures of negative experiences with the performance of the police affect trust in Latin America, such as being arrested or fined by the police. These additional measures of negative experiences can potentially further support the hypothesis. Finally, questions of trust in institutions lend

*In order to make changes that would result in higher levels of trust in the police it would be prudent to improve the quality of police work* ☞

themselves well to a qualitative approach with more open-ended questions for participants, be-

cause issues of values like trust often cannot be explained fully through a series of multiple choice questions as they appear in a survey like LAPOP. Moreover, issues of trust are heavily cultural, so more nuanced in-depth analysis through interviews would supplement the use of survey data well.

To begin, an investigation could be done using interactions with the same data. An interaction of living in an urban area and being a victim of a crime will show us if these two factors compounded make one less likely to trust the police than someone who is simply from an ur-



ban area. Having these interactions run for both urban and rural areas can tell us whether being a victim of a crime or being solicited for a bribe have the same impact on trust in urban and rural areas despite trust in urban areas being lower overall. Also, doing a case study with more focused information on the criminal justice system in a particular Latin American country could create more politically and culturally informed results. It is hard to go into specifics on criminal justice policy in Latin America as a whole because these factors vary in each country. A suggestion for case studies are Mexico and Peru. Mexico would be a good case study due to the abundance of information and resources their government provides. Peru would also be interesting to investigate because it is the only country where rural residents have lower trust in the police than urban residents. An in-depth case study on one country which looks at both specific dynamics of that country's police force, coupled with the survey data I use in this investigation, could tell us more about the causes of trust in the police in urban and rural settings.

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# Analysis of a Ute Pipe and Pouch

## The Role of Gifts in Settler Colorado

*Jack Piephoff*

*The following is an excerpt from a longer piece. For full text, please visit [www.honorsjournal.com](http://www.honorsjournal.com).*

IMAGINE, IF YOU will, the kind of world Colorado was in the 19th century. At once brand new to some yet ancient to others, the Territory of Colorado became a battleground as American miners began to move into the mountains, displacing thousands of Ute through government treaties. The miners were drawn to the Territory, and later state, of Colorado because of rich mineral resources made available through the forced displacement of the Ute. The Homestead Act of 1862 also served to further incite people to move west, as it provided American citizens with 160 acres of land for settlement (Act of May 20). During this period of time, specifically the late 1870s, an important Ute Chief gifted an Anglo-American settler a beautifully ornamented pouch and pipe. In the 1950s, the pouch and pipe ended up at the CU Museum of Natural History through a donation by the settler's daughter. Through the analysis of the artifacts themselves, as well as their historical context, we can begin to see these artifacts as more than simply a pouch and a pipe and begin to understand them in their fully realized social, historical and cultural context.

This paper will focus on the analysis of two physical artifacts, a Ute pipe (UMC 13667) and pouch (UMC 13655), in the context of their time as well as their context in the CU Boulder museum collection. Through the study of these artifacts, I hope to illustrate the role of gifts in mid 19th century Colorado as they pertain to the Ute and new Anglo-American settlers. To begin, one must first have an understanding of the artifacts themselves. The pipe is comprised of two separate pieces, a wooden stem and a bowl presumed to be made of yellow clay (see Exhibit 2). The bowl forms a 90 degree angle and is approximately 5.08 cm long. The pipe stem measures 17.78 cm long. Both the bowl and pipe stem show signs of tobacco residue, suggesting that they were indeed used and not simply decorative.

[...]

An interesting aspect of these artifacts is that they were disconnected for a time. Both were in the University of Colorado Museum of Natural History, but were stored separately and not known to have been related. However, a grad student working in the museum noticed in the records a letter from the donor of both objects saying that they were meant to be together. This new information allows us to analyze the pouch and pipe in their fully realized

context, rather than as incomplete singular artifacts severed from one another.

CU museum records indicate that this pouch was gifted by Chief Ouray to W.S. Home between the period of 1878-1880. The artifacts ended up in the CU museum through Jeanne Home, the daughter of W.S. Home. In a letter to the President of the University of Colorado dated 1950, Jeanne Home, stated:

*I have in my possession a beaded Indian bag, 20x7 inches, given by Chief Ouray of the Utes to my father, W.S. Home, around 1880. I was told it was made by Princess Chipeta, buried near Ouray, Colo., and also told it was made to hold a peace pipe, the bowl and stem of which are still in the bag.*

Through correspondence with the President of CU Boulder and the Board of Regents, Jeanne arranged to have her “Indian trophies” bequeathed to the museum upon her death, as she felt CU Boulder was the most geographically appropriate home for them. At some point in the intervening years between then and 2015, the pouch and pipe were separated. To fully understand the story and significance of these artifacts, we must first understand the players surrounding their creation and use.

Chief Ouray was born in Taos, New Mexico in 1833 to a mother belonging to the Uncompahgre Ute tribe, and a father who was half Jicarilla Apache. Ouray grew up speaking Spanish and English, and did not learn Ute or Apache until later in his life. In 1851, Ouray gave up his existence of sheep herding in New Mexico and moved to western Colorado. Ouray joined the Tabe-



Exhibit 1. University of Colorado Museum of Natural History (13655)



Exhibit 2. University of Colorado Museum of Natural History (13667)



Exhibit 3. (Balster)

guache Ute, as his father had recently become a respected leader of the tribe. In 1858, Ouray married his first wife Black Mare. Together, they had a child, Queashegut. Unfortunately for Ouray, shortly after the birth of Queashegut, Black Mare died and 5 years later Queashegut was kidnapped by Sioux while out with Ouray on a buffalo hunt. After the death of Black Mare, Ouray married the then 16 year old Chipeta. Upon his father's death in 1860, Ouray became Chief of the Tabeguache Ute of Colorado. Ouray went on to play a vital role as a peacemaker between the United States and the Ute until 1880, when he passed away from Bright's disease at the Ignacio Agency, after traveling there to negotiate more with the federal government (Jefferson 35).

Chipeta was born in 1843 around the Conejos area of Colorado. Chipeta was born Kiowa Apache but was adopted into the Uncompahgre tribe of Utes. After her marriage to Ouray, Chipeta became an important leader as well and was regarded as wise and intelligent. Chipeta was also reputed to be extremely talented in the arts of beadwork and tanning (McCook). Ouray and Chipeta lived together on a ranch south of present day Montrose from 1875 until Ouray's death in 1880.

The next player in this story is a much greater mystery than either Ouray or Chipeta. William S. Home "helped develop s.w. Colo[rado]" according to his daughter Jeanne in her letters to the museum (Home). No mentions of the name exist in death, birth, marriage, court, or other records from the region and timeframe. Perhaps because she did not view it as important, Jeanne omitted vital information about her father's occupa-

tion and his residence. This information would allow us to better examine the context and meaning of the gift. However, for this paper I am working under the assumption that W.S. Home was one of many thousands of men who flocked to Colorado after the discovery of gold in Denver in 1859, or after one of the subsequent mineral rushes such as Pikes Peak or the San Juan Cession. Home could also have been a trapper, although that trade had been steadily declining for roughly 3 decades before this gift was given to Home ("A Brief History of the Fur Trade").

Now that we have the necessary knowledge about the people connected to these artifacts, we can begin to look into the cultural and historical context of the period in order to gain an understanding of the purpose of this gift. The Ute have inhabited Colorado for longer than recorded time and resided there, isolated from the European world, until the Spanish made contact in the 18th century. Their way of life was changed little through these interactions. However, trappers began to move into Ute territory in the 19th century in search of beaver and other profitable skins. Around the 1840s, as more permanent trade settlements began to appear in the area, the Ute started to trade beaver pelts and buffalo robes to Anglo-Americans for goods such as cloth, tobacco, whiskey, flour, and trinkets (Jefferson 45). The eventual decline of the fur trade in the second half of the 19th century gave the Ute hope they would be able to retain most of their ancestral lands after the trappers departed. However, with the discovery of mineral wealth in the San Juan mountains and surrounding areas came a great influx of miners and other white set-

tlers who would eventually forcibly displace the Ute.

Tensions continued to rise between the Ute and the Anglo-Americans as more land was taken. For instance, as per the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, signed in 1848 by the United States and Mexico, the United States honored Spanish and Mexican land grants that overlapped with Ute territory (Jefferson 19). This angered many Utes, as many had been assured the rights to their lands through previous treaties with the United States government.

After Ouray's ascension to chief and his marriage to Chipeta, tensions between the United States government and the Ute resulted in a conference being called at the Conejos agency in 1863. Ouray was in attendance, along with representatives from all bands of Ute. The Tabeguache Ute resisted the efforts of the United States to get them to move, but they did agree to stay within a reservation and give up some land in return for livestock and goods for 10 years. The Ute made a wise decision, giving up land that was already infested with settlers, and in return getting material goods and food to supplement the declining wild game in Colorado. Despite the agreement, however, the United States never delivered these goods to the Ute (Jefferson 22).

After a particularly rough winter in 1864, with little buffalo left to hunt, some Ute were forced to beg in Colorado City and around the San Luis valley for food (Jefferson 22). This begging, partly a result of the United States not holding up their end of the 1863 agreement, reportedly caused tensions and led people to petition the government for the removal of the Ute. This resulted in the

calling of a D.C. conference, which Ouray attended. On March 2nd, 1868, representatives from 7 bands of Ute met with United States officials. They agreed on the creation of a single reservation in the western third of Colorado, with an Indian Agency to be built on the Los Pinos river. During this trip to D.C., Ouray was designated chief of the Ute by the U.S. government. In reality, the U.S. simply designated him spokesperson to simplify their interactions with the Ute. After the matter was settled, the Ute leaders returned to Colorado to tell their people about their new reservation.

Shortly after the Ute left for the Los Pinos agency, it was discovered that the San Juan mountains were rich with minerals and other resources. Thus, the Ute were once again directly in the middle of land desired by Anglo-Americans. Miners began to move into the San Juan mountains in great numbers especially from 1871 to 1876 (Jefferson 95). Eventually, the Ute signed the Brunot Agreement of 1874, ceding the Brunot area, including much of the San Juans, to the United States (Berry). This agreement gave up the San Juan mountains, the heart of Ute land, and opened it up for miners to settle, even though they already had begun to settle before the agreement was signed. This treaty led to a period of relative peace, but an event at the White River agency in 1879 would bring tensions back to a boil.

Nathaniel Meeker was an employee of the federal government, sent to the White River Reservation to be the Indian Agent. His job was to distribute supplies to the White River Ute, as well as to "civilize" them. Meeker was appointed in 1878 and began attempting to convert the

Ute from their ways of horse racing and hunting to agriculture and pastoralism. He wanted them to build permanent houses and begin farming, while the Ute simply wanted to continue on with their way of life. Frustrated, one day Meeker ordered a worker to begin plowing a field that he knew was an important horse racing and grazing field. Meeker began to plow the 200 acre plot with no regard to the wishes of the Ute, when he was confronted by a few Ute, including Chief Douglas (Dawson 11). While it initially appeared that Meeker and Chief Douglas had reached an agreement, eventually the situation escalated to the point where some Ute fired a warning shot off at the plowmen. Meeker reacted by calling for the army, which the Ute took as a declaration of war.

Days passed and the army began to approach the reservation, violating various treaties signed between the Ute and the United States government. Ouray, ever an advocate for peace between the Ute and the United States, urged the White River Ute to not fight. The following is the message that Ouray sent via courier to the White River agency after hearing about the events:

*You are hereby requested and commanded to cease hostility against the whites, injuring no innocent persons or any others further than to protect your own lives and property from unlawful and unauthorized combinations of horse thieves and desperadoes, as anything further will ultimately end in disaster to all parties. (Dawson 78)*

Despite Ouray's order, a group of Ute warriors went out to meet the command led by Major

Thornburgh and engaged in a lengthy battle that lasted for six days and ended only when the American troops received backup cavalry. While this was going on, Ute warriors attacked and killed Meeker, along with seven other agency employees (Dawson 51). The Ute who attacked the agency also held three women and two children hostage for 23 days, one of them Meeker's wife and another his daughter. These events would go down in popular history as the White River War, although the Meeker Massacre is the most well remembered part of this conflict. I provide this information about the White River War and Meeker Massacre to help convey the political and social atmosphere of Colorado during the years 1879 and 1880, which will allow us to understand this gift better.

[...]

Thanks to the serendipitous reconnection of these two artifacts, we have been able to examine them in a context unavailable to previous researchers. Knowing that these two artifacts were meant to go together changes the significance of the gift and led to the emergence of a new discourse related to these objects and their intended use. Through historical and cultural analysis, we were able to, with relative assurance, verify the timeframe that these artifacts were purported to be created in, as well as verify that the style and materials used were extant in Ute culture. It is my hope that this paper has outlined the potential uses and meanings behind the gifting of a Ute pipe and pouch in mid 19th century Colorado.

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# Civic Stratification in Independent Candidacies

A typology of independent candidates  
to executive office in Mexico

*Antonio Huizar*

*The following is an excerpt from a longer piece. For full text, please visit [www.honorsjournal.com](http://www.honorsjournal.com).*

## ABSTRACT

READING MEXICO'S RECENTLY established figure of independent candidates (ICs) in 2014 as an expansion of democratic political rights, I develop a typology of ICs to executive office that illustrates the differentiated access to political rights within a wider context of civic stratification. I argue this electoral mechanism has benefited particular social groups with more economic resources and political capital, and not the average citizen it was purported to benefit. My findings present six main categories of ICs: citizens/activists, entrepreneurs, politicians, bureaucrats, media figures, and *oficialistas*.

*Keywords:* Mexico, independent candidates, elections, political rights, civic stratification

## ABSTRACTO

Interpretando el reciente establecimiento de la figura de candidatos independientes (CIs) en el 2014 como una expansión de derechos políticos democráticos, este artículo desarrolla una tipología de CIs a cargos ejecutivos que ilustra el acceso diferenciado a derechos políticos dentro del contexto la estratificación cívica. Planteo que este mecanismo electoral ha beneficiado a particulares grupos sociales con mayores recursos económicos y capital político, y no al ciudadano promedio que suponía beneficiar. Mis resultados arrojan seis principales categorías de CIs: ciudadanos/activistas, empresarios, políticos, burócratas, figuras mediáticas, y oficialistas.

*Palabras:* México, candidaturas independientes, elecciones, derechos políticos, estratificación cívica

[...]

## METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS

For the development of my classification of ICs, I systematically compiled data on candidate profiles to create two sets of data with different units of analysis. The first dataset takes the IC as the unit of study; it is an original dataset that records candidate demographic, biographic, and electoral information. The first data point I recorded for IC dataset was the level of school-



ing and the educational institutions attended. Level of schooling was given a value from 0 to 4; 0 denoting no information; 1, primary education (elementary); 2, lower secondary education (middle school); 3, upper secondary education (high school); and 4, university education. Likewise, I recorded the type of degree attained and the institution. Besides educational attainment, level of schooling in the Mexican political context is a useful indicator of shared cognitive bases, networking sources, and social capital.<sup>1</sup>

Additionally, I recorded previous political participation as a 0 or 1 indicator variable; a 1 indicating membership in political parties or participation in previous elections as party members or candidates. Likewise, I researched and recorded their business activities and entrepreneurial networks. I recorded membership in civil or business associations and business ownership as indicator variables. I did the same for any history of unelected government posts. For this part of the data collection, I consulted the databases of the National Electoral Institute (INE) and local electoral bodies which sometimes publish registered candidates' *curricula vitae* (CV) of candidates as well as other basic candidate information. State electoral institutes' websites also host electoral information like turnout, results, and the votes for each IC. My primary source of electoral data like turnout,

results, and IC presence was the Statistical Consulting System of the Federal Elections, or *SICEEF*, which provides downloadable electoral data from municipal, state, and federal elections between 1994 and 2016.<sup>2</sup>

For candidate information not published by the ICs or electoral institutions, I consulted local and national print and electronic news sources. Smaller, rural municipalities had no news sources of their own, but medium-sized municipalities and large urban centers all had at least one print and electronic news source listing specific sections by municipality or region. I used this function to search for information about ICs from smaller municipalities where their only information was basic demographic data recorded by the electoral authorities. Additionally, I searched these news publications for candidate names, nicknames, and variations.

Moreover, ICs' websites and social media pages hosted biographical, educational and professional data that I crosschecked with secondary news sources and the electoral authorities' information. For ICs that have previously formed part of any state or federal legislatures, CVs are available in the legislatures' websites. In sum, the IC dataset consists of name, state/municipality, year of election, gender, education, occupation, occupation type, political membership, labor union

*Regular citizens experience independent candidacies as a civic deficit because their material, human, and economic resources do not allow them to effectively exercise this right as other IC types* ∞

<sup>1</sup> Camp, Roderic Ai. *Mexico's mandarins crafting a power elite for the twenty-first century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002: 43.

<sup>2</sup> Instituto Nacional Electoral, *Sistema de Consulta de la Estadística de las Elecciones Federales 2014-2015*, (Ciudad de México, 2017), produced by the Instituto Nacional Electoral, <http://siceef.ine.mx>.

membership, membership in civil or business associations, electoral performance (votes, percentage, and victory), and lastly, IC type according to my classification.

The second dataset, called the Marginalization Index, was last published in 2015 by the National-Population Council (CONAPO) and it uses the municipality as the unit of analysis; it consists of sociodemographic and electoral variables for all 2,440 municipalities. The Marginalization Index is developed and made publicly available by the CONAPO, a public Mexican institution dedicated to inform, formulate, and evaluate “demographic planning.” The index measures the level of socioeconomic marginalization of all Mexican states and municipalities by collapsing education, housing, population distribution, and income into one variable called the Marginalization Index.<sup>3</sup> This municipal level data consists of the state/municipality, total population, the Marginalization Index and its subcategories, and the IC indicator variable that I added;

<sup>3</sup> Secretaría de Gobernación. Dirección General de Planeación en Población y Desarrollo. *Índice de marginación por municipio 1990-2015*. March 18, 2016. Distributed by the Consejo Nacional de Población. [http://www.conapo.gob.mx/es/CONAPO/Datos\\_Abiertos\\_del\\_Indice\\_de\\_Marginacion](http://www.conapo.gob.mx/es/CONAPO/Datos_Abiertos_del_Indice_de_Marginacion)

1 indicating one or more ICs in a municipality.

In this study, I expound governor ICs as specific case studies; municipal ICs serve to reinforce and refine the results but the ideal types of my typology in the Weberian sense are the gubernatorial ICs. In this study, I choose to focus only on ICs to executive and not legislative office because responsibilities and campaigns differ in modality and scope. A candidate to executive office has a different relationship to the voter because the responsibilities of the office are different and the perceived distance with constituents are more proximal than for a legislator.

[...]

RESULTS

Summary

The results of my typology of ICs to executive office in Mexico captures six categories of ICs, in order of their frequency: citizens/activists, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, politicians, media figures, and *oficialistas*. This classification illustrates the disparities in access to the IC electoral mechanism and the civic stratification of this political right. I hypothesized average citizens benefit less from ICs

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	-	2,440
Model	12.8272892	2	6.41364461	F(2, 2437)	-	91.08
Residual	171.614924	2,437	.070420568	Prob > F	-	0.0000
				R-squared	-	0.0695
				Adj R-squared	-	0.0688
Total	184.442213	2,439	.075622064	Root MSE	-	.26537

ic	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
pop_tot	3.33e-07	4.41e-08	7.56	0.000	2.47e-07 4.20e-07
index1	-.0464986	.0057271	-8.12	0.000	-.0577291 -.0352681
_cons	.0679127	.0057373	11.84	0.000	.0566623 .0791632

Figure 1. Regression table: IC, Index, Population

However, the most immediate question is what types of ICs will be running in the 2018 Mexican elections from the municipal to the federal level. One politician and one *oficialista* IC are running for president, while three other aspiring ICs did not meet the requisites – which they persistently criticized – despite their national prominence. Given the recent implementation of the 2014 RPE, the IC figure will only become more prevalent and important in future Mexican elections. This research can be a reference for citizens and policymakers to expand access to independent candidacies, making them more attainable to the average citizen whom these candidacies were intended to serve.

```
4 . reg ic index1 pop_tot analfabeto sin_primaria sin_electric
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	-	2,440
Model	15.2373808	5	3.04747617	F(5, 2434)	-	43.84
Residual	169.204832	2,434	.069517187	Prob > F	-	0.0000
				R-squared	-	0.0826
				Adj R-squared	-	0.0807
Total	184.442213	2,439	.075622064	Root MSE	-	.26366

ic	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
index1	-.0647401	.0156689	-4.13	0.000	-.0954658 -.0340143
pop_tot	2.59e-07	4.56e-08	5.67	0.000	1.69e-07 3.48e-07
analfabeto	.0075412	.0016205	4.65	0.000	.0043634 .0107189
sin_primaria	-.0050733	.0011085	-4.58	0.000	-.007247 -.0028995
sin_electric	.0046007	.0019925	2.31	0.021	.0006935 .0085078
_cons	.1214622	.0312988	3.88	0.000	.0600872 .1828373

Figure 2. Regression table: IC, Index, Population, Index Subcategories

and though, numerically, there are more citizen ICs, civic stratification is not merely about becoming an IC, but also about the following institutional arrangements that make it difficult for disadvantaged groups to effectively exercise a political right, as I demonstrate beginning in § 4.2.

As Figure 1. illustrates, ICs are more common in municipalities with lower degrees of marginalization on the marginalization index (*index1*). This confirms Holzner's findings on the political participation of the poor and my own hypothesis that ICs are less common in areas with high levels of social marginalization. Figure 1. also demonstrates that ICs are most common in municipalities with higher populations (*pop\_tot*).

Figure 2. is a regression table that includes the previous variables as well as other variables in the Marginalization Index: illiteracy, lack of elementary education, and lack of access to electricity. Interestingly, higher levels of illiteracy (*analfabeto*) are also correlated with IC presence in a municipality while more people without elementary education is correlated with a lower likeliness of IC presence. Furthermore, less access to electricity is correlated with less ICs.

This regression model explains more of the variance but it does not tell us more than Figure 1. Like in Figure 1, all variables are statistically significant for other IC types here and in the rest of the results I present.

In sum, I recorded 279 ICs to municipal presidencies between 2015-16, some of them competing in the same municipalities. Below, summaries of the classifications are provided in order of their frequency.

1.Citizens/activists: count with developed social networks and formal organizations; lower levels of navigational capital, formal schooling, and economic resources.

2.Entrepreneurs: university-educated; extensive economic resources; established social networks facilitating campaign infrastructure; some amount of political capital.

3.Politicians: former party members; usually renounce party membership after failing to obtain a candidacy; count with recognition among electorate (social capital); navigational capital and political experience.

4.Bureaucrats: accrued navigational and political capital;

Figure 3. Gubernatorial Independent Candidates 2015-2017

Candidate	State	Year	Private Sector	University Education	Previous Party Affiliation	Previous Bureaucratic Post	Previous Political Office	Civil Society/Labor Association	Classification
Francisco Gabriel Arellano Espinosa	Aguascalientes	2016	+	+	PRI		+		Politician
Benjamín de la Rosa Escalante	Baja California Sur	2015	+	+	PRD	+			Bureaucrat
Luis Antonio Che Cu	Campeche	2015			PRD			+	Activist
Javier Guerrero Garcia	Coahuila	2017		+	PRI	+	+		Politician
Luis Horacio Salinas Valdez	Coahuila	2017	+	+				+	Entrepreneur
José Luis "Chacho" Barraza González	Chihuahua	2016	+	+					Oficialista
Alejandro Campa Avitia	Durango	2016		+	PRI	+		+	Bureaucrat
Teresa Castell	Edomex	2017	+	+				+	Oficialista
Hilario "El Layín" Ramírez Villanueva	Nayarit	2017	+		PAN		+		Media Figure
Antonio Ayón Bañuelos	Nayarit	2017	+	+					Entrepreneur
Víctor Manuel Chávez Vázquez	Nayarit	2017	+	+				+	Entrepreneur
Jaime Heliodoro "El Bronco" Rodríguez Calderón	Nuevo Leon	2015	+	+	PRI	+	+	+	Politician
Ana Teresa Aranda Orozco	Puebla	2016	+		PAN	+			Politician
Francisco Cuauhtémoc Frias Castro	Sinaloa	2016	+	+	PRI		+		Oficialista
José Francisco Chavira Martínez	Tamaulipas	2016	+	+	PRD		+	+	Politician
Jacob Hernández Corona	Tlaxcala	2016		+	PRI, PRD		+	+	Activist
Juan Bueno Torio	Veracruz	2016	+	+	PAN	+	+		Politician
Alma Rosa Ollervides González	Zacatecas	2016	+	+					Entrepreneur
Rogelio Soto Acuña	Zacatecas	2016	+	+					Entrepreneur

Entrepreneurs: 6      Politicians: 5      Oficialistas: 3      Bureaucrats: 2      Activists: 2      Media figures: 1

likely not a party member and better known for career public service, not public office; appeal to technocratic experience.

5. Media figures: able to capitalize on their presence in media (mainly TV and radio); count with familiarity among electorate; extensive economic resources and social capital.

6. *Officialistas*: close ties a to political party (exclusively the PRI in this study); campaign aims to divide opposition vote, not achieve victory; deployed in states and municipalities where the election is competitive between two main contenders; appeal to "independent" brand.

Some ICs have characteristics that approximate them to more than one category. For example, some politicians have held bureaucratic positions and some entrepreneurs have been part of a political party. For those cases, I use the Weberian typological approach, meaning that the determinant of their IC category is their *most salient and accentuated activity or characteristic* in relation to their candidacy.

[...]

#### CONCLUSION

In this work, I have argued that independent candidacies are available to limited sectors of the population, mainly those with more resources (human, economic, political) due to the civic stratification of political rights. Through my typology of ICs to executive office, I have demonstrated that the IC figure is more accessible to economically and politically advantaged social groups. The citizen/activist IC was the most

common in my study, but it was also one of the least electorally successful and financially capable. Moreover, activist ICs are the only type to come from lower social strata, the other five types are characterized by more economic resources. They are also the only IC type that embodies the intended benefactor of this expansion in political rights: the average citizen. Despite their frequency, citizen ICs face more institutional impediments during the registration process and the campaign. Regular citizens experience independent candidacies as a civic deficit because their material, human, and economic resources do not allow them to effectively exercise this right as other IC types.

Additionally, I hypothesized these candidacies are less common in municipalities with lower population and lower socioeconomic development. Using the Marginalization Index, I demonstrated this is true. However, outliers like Oaxaca, higher on the Marginalization Index at the state and municipal levels, challenge this claim while also presenting opportunities for future research. What explains higher electoral participation among the poor? What types of ICs are most successful and where? Unfortunately, my research was limited because it did not answer these two questions. Moreover, my research only studied candidates to executive and not legislative office. Expanding this typology to legislative candidates might reveal observations in my existing typology. Other limitations included the lack of data for many candidates in rural municipalities far away from population centers. This absent candidate data will surely refine the observations I have made with my classification and possibly raise further questions.