

**PSCI 7108: STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION GRADUATE SEMINAR**

**UMC 404
TH 3:30 - 6:00PM
FALL 2015**

Professor: Megan Shannon

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Office hours: Tuesdays, 12:30 - 1:45pm and 3:30 - 5:00pm

During office hours, I'll be located on the first floor of Norlin Library, at a table as close to the Laughing Goat as possible.

Course Description

Can countries find order in an anarchic world? If so, how? This course explores a particular type of cooperation: the constitution of global order and the international organization of states. We investigate various sources of international order, including regimes, institutions, law, and norms. We also explore how states cooperate in a number of issue arenas, such as peace and security, human rights, and environmental issues. By the end of the semester, you will be able to explain when and why countries cooperate, and how order emerges in an anarchic world.

We explore the constitution of global order from the perspective of strategic choice. Strategic choice is a simple yet powerful way of looking at the world. It assumes that actors are purposeful, and that they make decisions by anticipating what other actors will do. This simple assumption can explain a number of global phenomena, from the formation of institutions to the decision of institutions to intervene in civil wars. However, strategic choice is not the only way of looking at the world. We will explore the limits of strategic choice, particularly by investigating the dysfunctional behavior of institutions.

We also investigate how we can best determine the effect of international institutions. Throughout the semester we will rigorously explore the research methods used to assess how institutions change behavior. We will devote one week in particular to discussing how we infer the causal effect of institutions, focusing on new experimental research.

Exploring the constitution of world order not only tells us a great deal about global politics, it provides insight into human nature. We ask if human beings can work together to provide collective goods, or if our self-interests are too strong to foster sustained cooperation.

What This Class Promises to You

This class shows you the study of social science as it applies to international cooperation and organization. As social scientists, we will identify puzzling events in international politics. We will construct logical answers to those puzzles. We will develop ways to see whether our answers are right or not. We will look for evidence that can help confirm or reject the answers to the puzzle. We'll identify the holes in the answers and even provide arguments that run counter to the story. We'll draw conclusions about how right or wrong our stories are.

By the end of the semester, you will be able to determine if and how institutions help or hinder countries in meeting global challenges. You will refine your habit of questioning events in the world around you, constructing answers to your questions, looking for evidence to support or reject your answer, formulating conclusions, and communicating your thoughts clearly in speaking and in writing.

What You Bring to the Class

As part of the University of Colorado community, we strive to find truth. We are a research community that seeks to understand the world around us. CU cannot achieve those goals without the engagement of its graduate students. That means your participation in this class is valuable. You have unique gifts, skills, and insights that advance our search for truth and knowledge. If you withhold participation, it stifles and hinders the ability of the community to conduct research.

By enrolling in this class, you have the opportunity to develop, enhance, and contribute knowledge about international organization and cooperation. We pursue knowledge by reading materials on international cooperation, discussing social science and world events, and writing about our understanding of global politics. This class stresses active learning and is taught in a seminar style. As members of this class, you and I commit to:

- Being in class, and being on time
- Doing the readings in advance
- Engaging in the class discussion and using technology only to further that discussion

Grades

Puzzle Papers, 30%

Throughout the course of the semester, you will write three short papers that identify a puzzle in the area of international cooperation (see the Zinnes reading for what constitutes a puzzle). You'll explain why you have identified a puzzle (and not merely a question). You will then propose a theory that answers the puzzle, specify a testable hypothesis, and develop a way to test the hypothesis. You'll also identify relevant scholarly literature to help establish the puzzle and the theory. Ideally, any one of these puzzle papers could be expanded into a research design. Each paper should be no more than four pages, typed, double-spaced, Times New Roman 12 point font, 1" margins, page numbers. You must turn in one puzzle paper by October 22, two by November 19, and three by December 10. Puzzle papers may be rewritten for a higher grade. All rewrites must be turned in by December 10.

Two Reviews, 20%

Notice on the syllabus that a number of articles are marked with a star*. Choose two of these articles and write a review of each. Your review will be written as if you are reviewing the paper for a professional journal. This entails a short summary as well as a critical analysis of the paper. You may also suggest some alternative ways the author could test the theory, or some extensions of the existing empirical tests. Ultimately, offer a recommendation of publish as is, publish with minor revisions, revise and resubmit, or reject. You will choose the articles you will review on the first day of class, and everyone will choose a different article. Each article review should be at least three pages, typed, double-spaced, Times New Roman 12 point font, 1" margins, page numbers. The review must be turned in the same day the article is discussed in class.

Recommended reading: Miller, E., Pevehouse, J., Tingley, D., Rogowski, R., and Wilson, R. (2013). How to be a peer reviewer: a guide for recent and soon-to-be Ph.D.'s. PS: Political

Science and Politics, 46(1).

I am happy to talk with you extensively about the puzzle papers or reviews as you work on them. Writing these need not be a solitary process.

Attendance and Participation, 25%

Attendance is expected. To function as a class, your oral participation is needed. This includes asking good questions and offering sound critical analysis to further the class discussion.

Final Research Design, 30%

As a final project for the class, you will write a research design. It can be an extension of any of your puzzle papers, or it may be an entirely different idea. The research design should be 12 - 15 pages in length. It should a) clearly state a research question, b) review and synthesize the relevant literature, c) develop a theory to answer the question and derive testable hypotheses, and d) develop a research design to evaluate the hypotheses empirically, describing the data that can be used to test the hypothesis or identifying case studies. The research design may not replicate any work that you have previously completed for a graduate seminar. The research design must be emailed to me by Wednesday, December 16th, 10:00pm..

Requirements for Students Taking the Class Pass/ Fail

Students taking the class pass/ fail must achieve at least a B for attendance and participation. They must also write one review paper. Finally, they must either write two puzzle papers or one research design.

Grade Scale

The grading scale for the course is as follows. Grades ending in .5 or higher are rounded up to the nearest whole percentage point:

	B+ 89 - 87	C+ 79 - 77	D+ 69 - 67	
A 93 - 100	B 86 - 83	C 76 - 73	D 66 - 63	F 59 - 0
A- 92 - 90	B- 82 - 80	C- 72 - 70	D- 62 - 60	

The Grade of A

The grade of A is given to work that expresses clear, cogent, novel, and logical arguments. Work that receives an A does not merely summarize existing literature - it offers new and meaningful contributions. It uses evidence from scholarly works and reputable sources to back up its conjectures. It fully considers a number of possible stories before settling on the right one. Work receiving an A is clearly written and organized, in a manner that is accessible to people outside of the class.

A student receiving an A grade is able to identify a dependent and independent variable in a given piece of scholarly work. The student can explain the relationship between variables being tested, as well as the way those variables are operationalized and measured. The student can identify weaknesses in the empirical test of the relationship and propose alternative ways of testing the relationship. The student knows what conclusions are supported by the empirical test and which conclusions are not.

A grade of A indicates novel and creative thinking. The student develops unique criticism of existing empirical work, and suggests appropriate ways to remedy flaws in the literature.

The Grade of B

The grade of B is given to work that makes arguments, but the argument is not logically consistent. It provides some evidence for its conjectures, but the evidence is not always relevant or does not strongly support the story. It summarizes the literature more than it offers unique contributions.

A grade of B can identify dependent and independent variables and hypotheses, but may exhibit some confusion over the results of an empirical test. It is not able to critically assess the limits of a particular test or suggest alternative ways of testing the relationship. B work may also be somewhat confused about the extent to which conclusions are supported by an empirical test.

A grade of B takes potshots at existing empirical work, or offers elementary and rote criticism. It does not provide meaningful alternative ways to address flaws in the literature.

The Grade of C

The grade of C is given to work that expresses unclear and muddled arguments. It avoids taking a definite position and tries to straddle a number of different stories. The work does not provide clear evidence for its conclusions. It relies on emotions or personal opinion to support its conjectures. Finally, the writing is unclear and disorganized.

Work receiving a C has trouble identifying theory, dependent variables, independent variables, or hypotheses. It does not engage in much critical assessment of empirical tests. It may be able to identify conclusions that are drawn in a particular work, but cannot adequately explain how the evidence provided supports those conclusions.

Academic Integrity

Both you and I are responsible for upholding academic integrity. By my writing this syllabus, and by your enrolling in this course, we agree to uphold the CU Academic Honor Pledge, which says:

As citizens of an academic community of trust, CU-Boulder faculty and students do not lie or cheat whether they are on campus or acting as representatives of the university in surrounding communities. Neither should they suffer by the dishonest acts of others. Honor is about academic integrity, moral and ethical conduct, and pride of membership in a community that values academic achievement and individual responsibility. Cultivating honor lays in the foundation for lifelong integrity, developing in each of us the courage and insight to make difficult choices and accept responsibility for actions and their consequences, even at personal cost.

All incidents of academic misconduct should be reported to the Honor Code Council (honor@colorado.edu and 303-735-2273). Students who are found to be in violation of the academic integrity policy will be subject to both academic sanctions from the faculty member and non-academic sanctions (including but not limited to university probation, suspension, or expulsion).” Other information on the Honor Code can be found at <http://honorcode.colorado.edu>.

Attendance and Religious Observances

Campus policy requires that faculty deal reasonably with students who, because of religious obligations, will miss scheduled exams, assignments or required attendance. Please discuss with me in advance if you will miss class because of a religious obligation.

Classroom Behavior

Students and faculty each have responsibility for maintaining an appropriate learning environment. Those who fail to adhere to such behavioral standards may be subject to discipline. Professional courtesy and sensitivity are especially important with respect to individuals and topics dealing with differences of race, color, culture, religion, creed, politics, veterans status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity and gender expression, age, disability, and nationalities. Class rosters are provided to the instructor with the student's legal name. I will gladly honor your request to address you by an alternate name or gender pronoun. Please advise me of this preference early in the semester so that I may make appropriate changes to my records. See policies at <http://www.colorado.edu/policies/classbehavior.html> and at http://www.colorado.edu/studentaffairs/judicialaffairs/code.html#student_code.

Discrimination and Harassment

The University of Colorado Boulder (CU-Boulder) is committed to maintaining a positive learning, working, and living environment. The University of Colorado does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age, disability, creed, religion, sexual orientation, or veteran status in admission and access to, and treatment and employment in, its educational programs and activities. (Regent Law, Article 10, amended 11/8/2001). CU-Boulder will not tolerate acts of discrimination or harassment based upon Protected Classes or related retaliation against or by any employee or student. For purposes of this CU-Boulder policy, "Protected Classes" refers to race, color, national origin, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, creed, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, or veteran status. Individuals who believe they have been discriminated against should contact the Office of Discrimination and Harassment (ODH) at 303-492-2127 or the Office of Student Conduct (OSC) at 303-492-5550. Information about the ODH, the above referenced policies, and the campus resources available to assist individuals regarding discrimination or harassment can be obtained at <http://www.colorado.edu/institutionalequity>.

Schedule of Topics and Readings

The schedule of readings may be modified as needed. I will post copies of some readings (mostly the book chapters) on D2L. For the most part, you should search for the readings on Google scholar or through the library's website.

What are Institutions, and How Can We Study Them?

September 10 (UMC 325)

Required:

- Zinnes, Dina. Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher.
- Gladwell, Malcom. What Social Scientists Learned From Katrina. The New Yorker Magazine.
- Shepsle, Kenneth and Mark Bonchek. 1997. Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. W.W. Norton. Chapters 8 - 10.

Additional:

- Krasner, Stephen. 1995. Compromising Westphalia. International Security.

The Strategic Choice to Form Institutions

September 17 (UMC 325)

Required:

- Lake, David and Robert Powell, eds. Strategic Choice and International Relations, Ch 1,2, and 4.

- Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 3-6, 10.
- Conybeare, John A.C. 1980. International Organization and the Theory of Property Rights. *International Organization* 34: 307-334.

Additional:

- Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science* 162: 1243-1248.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge University Press.
- Oye, Kenneth. 1985. Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. *World Politics* 38(1):1-24.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books. Chapters 1-4, 6-7

The Decision to Comply with Institutions

September 24 (UMC 404)

Required:

- Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization*, 52(2): 269-305.
- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? *International Organization*, 50(3): 379-406.
- Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 611-622.*
- Simmons, Beth and Daniel Hopkins. 2005. The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods. *American Political Science Review* 99(4):623-631.

Additional:

- Bearce, David, Cody Eldredge, and Brandy Joliff. 2015. Do Finite Duration Provisions Reduce Bargaining Delay? *International Organization* 69(1):219-239.
- Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. *International Organization*, 47(2): 175-205.
- Simmons, Beth A. 1998. Compliance with International Agreements. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1: 75-93.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties. *International Organization* 57 (4): 801-827.

Bargaining and International Institutions

Oct 1 (UMC 325)

Required:

- Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen Milner, and Xun Pang. 2015. International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations. *International Organization*.
- Bayer, Marcoux, and Urperlenain. 2015. When International Organizations Bargain. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. *International Organization* 59(2):363-398.*
- Chaudoin, Stephen. 2014. Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes. *International Organization* 68(4):877-911.*

Additional:

- Putnam, Robert. 1988. The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*.

The Reputation Effects of Institutions

Oct 8 (UMC 404)

- Simmons, Beth, and Judith Goldstein. Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations. Working Paper.
- Tingley, Dustin and Barbara Walter. 2011. The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach. *International Organization* 65(2):343-365.*
- Chaudoin, Stephen. 2014. Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements. *International Organization*.*
- Weisiger, Alex and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2015. Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics. *International Organization* 69(2):473-495.

Institutions as Independent Actors

Oct 15 (UMC 404)

- Finnemore, Martha. 1993. International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy.* *International Organization* 47:565-597.
- Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52:887-917.*
- Johnson, Tana. 2014. *Organizational Progeny*, selected chapters.

The Dysfunction of Institutions

Oct 22 (UMC 404)

- Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization* 53(4):699-732.
- Simpsen, Alberto, and Daniela Donno. 2012. "Can International Election Monitoring Harm Governance?" *Journal of Politics* 74(2):501-513.
- Additional reading TBA

Human Rights Institutions

Oct 29 (UMC 404)

Required:

- Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? *The Yale Law Journal* 111(8): 1935-2042.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2009. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3 and 4.
- Powell, Emilia J. and Jeffrey K. Staton. Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation. *International Studies Quarterly* 53(1):149-174.*
- Fariss, Christopher. 2014. Respect for Human Rights Has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability. *American Political Science Review* 108(2):297-318.

Additional:

- Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. *International Organization* 54(2): 217-252.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression. *International Organization* 59: 593-629.
- Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. *International Organization* 62(1): 65-101.

Environmental Cooperation

Nov 5 (UMC 404)

Required:

- Mitchell, Ronald. 1994. Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. *International Organization* 48 (3): 425-458.
- Ringquist and Tatiana Kostadinova. 2005. Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol. *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (1): 86-102.
- Ward, Hugh. 2006. International Linkages and Environmental Sustainability: The Effectiveness of Regime Networks. *Journal of Peace Research* 43 (2): 149-166.
- Von Stein, Jana. The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (2): 243-268.*
- Tingley, Dustin and Michael Tomz. 2014. Conditional Cooperation and Climate Change. *Comparative Political Studies*.*

Additional:

- Michele B. Battigal and Thomas Bernauer. 2009. National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy? *International Organization* 63 (2).

Nov 12 - No Class (Peace Science Meeting)

Peace, Security, and International Justice

Nov 19 (UMC 404)

- Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2014. Beyond Keeping Peace? *American Political Science Review*.
- Passmore, Shannon, and Hart. Working Paper on United Nations Peacekeeping
- Simmons, Beth A., and Allison Danner. 2010. Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court. *International Organization* 64(2): 225-256.*
- Chapman, Terrence and Stephen Chaudoin. 2013. Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court. *International Studies Quarterly*.*

Causal Inference and Experimental Research of Institutions

Dec 3 (UMC 404)

Required:

- Hyde, Annual Review 2015, Experiments: Lab, Survey, and Field.
- Chilton, A. and Tingley, Dustin. Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments. *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 52(1):173-238.
- Findley, Michael, Daniel Nielson, and J.C. Sharman. Using Field Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation. *International Organization* 67(4):657-693.
- Barabas, Jason and Jennifer Jerit. 2010. Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid? *American Political Science Review* 104(2):226-242.

Research Design and Puzzle Paper Workshop

Dec 10 (UMC 404)

- Each student must present either one puzzle paper or their full research design to be workshopped by the class.

Other recommended reading

- McDermott, Rose. 2011. New Directions for Experimental Work in International Relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 55:503-520.
- Finnemore, Martha. 1993. International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy. *International Organization* 47:565-597.
- Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52:887-917.
- Risse-Kappan, Thomas. 1996. Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO. In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. by Peter J. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Allee, Todd and Paul Huth. 2006. Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover. *American Political Science Review* 100(2).
- Gent, Stephen E., and Megan Shannon. The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and Adjudication: Getting Into a Bind. *The Journal of Politics* 72.02 (2010): 366-380.
- Huth, Paul K., Sarah Croco, and Benjamin J. Appel. 2011. Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts Since 1945. *American Political Science Review* 105.2: 415-436.
- Mattes, Michaela and Burcu Savun. 2009. Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design. *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (3).
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization*, 55(4): 761-799.
- Wednt Alexander. 2001. Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design. *International Organization* 55(4):1019-1049.
- Morrow, James. 2001. The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties. *International Organization* 55(4):971-991.
- Duffield, John S. 2003. The Limits of Rational Design. *International Organization*, 57(2): 411-430.
- Goldsmith, Jack L. and Eric A. Posner. 2005. *The Limits of International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Staton, Jeffrey and Will Moore. 2011. Judicial Power in International and Domestic Politics. *International Organization* 65(3):553-587.
- Huth, Paul K., Sarah Croco, and Benjamin J. Appel. 2011. Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts Since 1945. *American Political Science Review* 105.2: 415-436.