

ONLINE APPENDIX

I. Coding of Ethnopolitical Groups

The existence of ethnopolitical groups was determined through an extensive search of comparative and country-specific interdisciplinary datasets (namely the *Black Africa Handbook* and *Minorities at Risk*, the only two reliable datasets available at the time of coding in the 1990s) and literature on the processes of ethnopolitical group identity construction in the colonial and pre-1990 post-independence periods. Coders looked for six activities and considered a group to be politicized if at least one of the following existed: (1) organized group mobilization primarily in ethnic associations or cliques of leaders within the same party, the bureaucracy, or the military; (2) articulation of grievances by leaders claiming to speak for a group; (3) participation in collective action or (violent or nonviolent) conflict with other groups or the state or subjection to state violence; (4) encapsulation within or domination of an officially designated administrative unit; (5) occupying a disproportionate number of high positions in the bureaucracy or the military; and (6) controlling disproportionate socioeconomic resources. Once politicized in any of these ways, groups are assumed to have the potential for future politicization. The dataset is available at <http://spot.colorado.edu/~bakerab>.

II. The Correlates of Democratic Survival

For some of the same theoretical reasons—more geographically expansive political order, numerous coalition opportunities, minorities less prone to permanent exclusion—we also suspect that large-divided-group societies are conducive to regime survival once democracy has emerged. However, making claims about the roots of democratic sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa is precarious. The number of African countries that have been democratic for 20 years or more is

miniscule, so there is a small- N problem to any empirical analysis. Moreover, Przeworski and Limongi demonstrate that democratic breakdown is more probable in low-income societies, so sub-Saharan Africa's poverty may swamp the causal effects of ethnopolitical demography. As a practical matter, our focus on transitions has broader applicability than a focus limited to democratic sustainability, since it implies that ethnopolitical demography is just as relevant for regime type in the (depending on the dataset) 20-some African countries that have never had a democratic spell as it is in the 20-some that have.

Results are reported in the table below. The impact of the LDG configuration on the sustainability of democracy is positive in every model, and the coefficients are of similar magnitude to those on the corresponding LDG variables in the transition results. The standard errors, however, are at least twice as large, and only two of these 16 coefficients are statistically significant. As expected, we have less statistical power in explaining the sustainability of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, because of the relatively small number of democratic country years. There is some support for the claim that the LDG ethnopolitical configuration does decrease the likelihood of democratic breakdown: Botswana and Mauritius, both LDG societies, are the region's longest lived democracies. Yet LDG countries are not impervious to democratic breakdown, as evidenced by events in Sierra Leone, Malawi, Zambia and Mali. In the end, our statistical findings lend us more confidence in arguing that LDG's positive impact on democracy is through its encouragement of transitions to democracy than in arguing that it is through LDG societies' ability to sustain democracy.

Appendix Table: Correlates of Democratic Survival in Sub-Saharan Africa

	Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland				Boix, Miller, and Rosato				Polity IV				Freedom House			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
<i>Ethnopolitical Variables</i>																
Weighted fragmentation within the largest group	.392 (.273)	.115 (.213)			.112 (.210)	.636 (.764)			.221 (.177)	.192 (.173)			.047* (.021)	.039 (.031)		
Large divided group countries (40% cutoff)			.906 (.665)				2.16 (2.11)				.277 (.555)				.162* (.066)	
Large divided group countries (50% cutoff)				.790 (.786)				2.48 (2.05)				.757 (.642)				.034 (.057)
Politically relevant ethnic groups (PREG)	4.18 (2.89)				-.841 (2.77)				.735 (.962)				-.002 (.051)			
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF)		1.15 (1.44)				-11.8 (17.0)				-193 (.776)				-.047 (.130)		
Homogeneous countries			6.21 (∞)	6.51 (∞)			11.56 (∞)	12.8 (∞)			-.477 (.998)	-.334 (1.01)			.060 (.062)	.108† (.060)
Other multiethnic countries			Base- line	Base- line			Base- line	Base- line			Base- line	Base- line			Base- line	Base- line
<i>Alternative Explanations</i>																
Plurality electoral system	.587 (.813)	-.179 (.641)	.376 (.744)	.505 (.845)	-1.00 (1.19)	4.22 (6.88)	2.49 (3.80)	3.11 (3.58)	.134 (.685)	-.002 (.628)	-.053 (.601)	.236 (.726)	.009 (.052)	-.005 (.064)	-.036 (.041)	-.045 (.069)
Number of democratic years before 1990	-.135 (.122)	-.094 (.094)	-.036 (.098)	-.044 (.101)	-.097 (.171)	-.731 (1.08)	-.152 (.334)	-.191 (.330)	.014 (.050)	-.001 (.045)	-.029 (.053)	-.013 (.055)	-.002 (.007)	.001 (.012)	.006 (.009)	.017* (.008)
Years as a competitive one-party regime	.228† (.125)	.183 (.130)	.034 (.115)	.028 (.115)	.174 (.228)	-.785 (1.30)	-.246 (.497)	-.315 (.484)	.015 (.013)	.010 (.100)	-.001 (.099)	-.008 (.104)	-.017 (.007)	-.015 (.009)	-.015* (.006)	-.008 (.006)
Former British colony	-3.52 (2.44)	-1.52 (1.71)	-.386 (1.14)	-.257 (1.07)	1.99 (3.19)	9.94 (14.5)	2.45 (4.86)	2.99 (4.79)	-1.68 (1.17)	-1.11 (1.04)	-.649 (.977)	-1.09 (1.05)	-.166 (.069)	-.170* (.070)	-.198* (.080)	-.226* (.100)
Former French colony	-2.16† (1.23)	-1.69 (1.31)	-.309 (.754)	-.396 (.774)	.165 (.833)	.870 (1.28)	.194 (.764)	.214 (.774)	-1.21 (.892)	-.833 (.859)	-.706 (.771)	-.999 (.824)	-.172 (.073)	-.168* (.074)	-.208* (.076)	-.188* (.091)
GNI per capita	2.01* (.732)	1.85* (.830)	.745 (.703)	.762 (.751)	1.149* (.585)	.532 (.903)	.126 (.227)	.031 (.968)	.812† (.419)	.696 (.372)	.821* (.393)	.839* (.405)	-.003 (.021)	-.005 (.022)	-.014 (.023)	-.025 (.023)
Years since independence	.415 (.302)	.316 (.286)	.186 (.252)	.199 (.255)	.107 (.189)	.227 (.427)	.169 (.227)	.181 (.226)	-.054† (.032)	-.048 (.031)	-.054† (.030)	-.057† (.032)	.000 (.002)	-.000 (.002)	-.000 (.002)	.000 (.002)
Population size	.488† (.275)	.621 (.417)	.437 (.236)	.484 (.253)	.245 (.254)	.282 (.426)	.935 (.820)	1.07 (.780)	.132 (.280)	.083 (.267)	.075 (.291)	.142 (.312)	-.020 (.024)	-.003 (.053)	.008 (.034)	.057 (.028)
	48 countries, 1990-2008 (N=909)				48 countries, 1990-2007 (N=861)				46 countries, 1990-2012 (N=1,055)				48 countries, 1990-2012 (N=1,101)			

Note: † = p < .10, * = p < .05. Dependent variable is 1 for democratic country years and 0 for autocratic country years. Entries are coefficients from dynamic probit models, except for Freedom House models which are entries from dynamic linear probability models (dynamic probits did not converge with the Freedom House data). Entries in parentheses are standard errors. Results are average estimates over ten multiply imputed datasets. Each model's coefficients are not listed in their entirety: the remaining ones are listed in the corresponding columns in Table 3. Models do not include country fixed effects, since they have time invariant covariates.