

Oleg Baranov, Assistant Professor

PhD, University of Maryland, 2011

FIELDS

Auction Theory • Market Design • Microeconomics • Computational Economics

CURRENT RESEARCH INTERESTS

Market Design, theory of multi-object auction

SELECTED PUBLISHED PAPERS

“An Efficient Ascending Auction for Private Valuations,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, Volume 177, September 2018, Pages 495-517.

“Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns,” (with Christina Aperjis, Lawrence Ausubel and Thayer Morrill) *AEJ: Microeconomics*, 9(3): 1-27, 2017.

“Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction,” (with Lawrence Ausubel) *American Economic Review (Papers & Proceedings)* 104(5): 446-451, 2014.

“A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction,” (with Lawrence Ausubel) *Economic Journal*, 127(605) 334-350.

SELECTED WORKING PAPERS

“Revealed Preference and Activity Rules in Dynamic Auctions,” (with Lawrence Ausubel.)

“Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information,” (with Lawrence Ausubel.)

“Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction,” (with Christina Aperjis and Lawrence Ausubel.)

“Iterative Vickrey Pricing in Dynamic Auctions,” (with Lawrence Ausubel.)