

Econ 8747: Industrial Organization Theory

Fall 2022

Professor Yongmin Chen
Office: Econ 108
Class Time: TTH: 2:00-3:15 PM
Office Hours: Wednesday: 11:15-3:15 PM.

Recommended books: (1) *The Theory of Industrial Organization* by Jean Tirole (1988), MIT Press, (2) *Industrial Organization: Contemporary Theory and Practice* by Pepall, Richards, and Norman, and (3) *Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3 (HIO 3)*, 2007, Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter edits). *HIO 3* surveys the major developments in IO after Tirole's book and can be downloaded electronically through CU library. Tirole (1988) remains as the classic graduate IO textbook. You are encouraged to read the entire book and work out the exercise problems there (even though we only cover a few parts of the book in the course).

Lecture Notes: I will make available some lecture notes/slides on the Canvas page for the course. These lecture notes/slides and other course material are to be used only by students who are enrolled in the course. You may not reproduce, distribute, or display them without my written permission.

Grading: Grades are based on homework (30%), presentation and class participation (30%), and a term paper (40%).

Term Paper: The purpose of the term paper is to get you started on a research topic of your choice. You should have a research question, and can either (i) build and analyze a model, deriving results to answer the question; or (ii) conduct a literature review and discuss how you will proceed with the research, or (iii) extend the research from a published paper with new results. The term paper should contain a title, abstract, and references; about 12-18 pages long, double spaced.

A tentative course schedule is as follows. There can be changes to this schedule during the semester, which will be announced in class. You are responsible for updating course information according to announcements made in class. The starred articles are required readings. You should also read additional assigned articles (at least briefly), especially on topics that you would like to explore more. You will be asked to write short reviews/discussions of some papers (each

review/discussion is about 2 pages long, double spaced; but occasionally you may do a longer review). When you review a paper, you may provide a summary, discuss the research question(s), motivation, main findings, and the contributions. You may also discuss the model in more detail and potential issues that can be further studied for a few papers that you would like to explore more.

Course Schedule:

1. Introduction: Research Framework and Methods

8/23, 8/25

Readings:

- Tirole—read chapters and work through the exercises; Pepall; Tables of Contents, HIO 3.
- Varian, H. “How to Build an Economic Model in Your Spare Time”, 1994, updated in 2009.
- Jonathan B. Berk, Campbell R. Harvey, and David Hirshleifer, “How to Write an Effective Referee Report and Improve the Scientific Review Process”, Journal of Economic Literature, 2017

Planning for presentation: Each student will choose a paper to make a 35-minute presentation in class.

2. Monopoly Pricing

8/30, 9/1, 9/6

- Discrete-Choice Demand
- Multi-product Pricing
- Price Discrimination and Differential Pricing
- Product Bundling
- Behavioral Consumers

Readings:

- Tirole Ch. 1.
- M. Armstrong and J. Vickers, “Multiproduct Pricing Made Simple”, JPE, 2018.
- *M. Armstrong and Y. Chen, “Discount Pricing”, Economic Inquiry, 2019.
- Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer, "Salience and Consumer Choice," JPE, 2013).

- *Ellison, Glenn, “A Model of Add on Pricing” QJE, 2005
- *Ellison, Glenn, “Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization”, 2006, MIT.
- Shota Ichihashi, “Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers”, AER, 2020.
- Justin P Johnson, David P Myatt, “On the simple economics of advertising, marketing, and product design”, AER, 2006.
- Maskin, E., and J. Riley, “Monopoly with Incomplete Information”, RAND, 1984.
- *Chen, Y. and M. Riordan, “Profitability of Product Bundling”, IER, 2013.
- Chen, Y. and M. Schwartz, “Differential Pricing when Costs Differ: A Welfare Analysis”, RAND, 2015.
- *Monika Mrázová and J. Peter Neary, “Not So Demanding: Demand Structure and Firm Behavior”, AER, 2017.
- *Andrew Rhodes and Chris Wilson, “False Advertising”, RAND, 2018

Assignment 1 (due 8/30): Exercise 1.1-1.9 in Tirole.

Assignment 2 (due 9/6): Reviews: Mrázová and J. Peter Neary (2017), Rhodes and Wilson (2018).

3. Product Differentiation and Price Competition

9/8, 9/13, 9/15, 9/20, 9/22, 9/27, 9/29

- Spatial Models of Product Differentiation
- Representative Consumers: existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics
- Random utility models of product differentiation
- Market Structure and Price

Readings: Ch. 5, 6, 7 in Tirole

- Armstrong and Vickers (2019), “Discriminating against Captive Customers”, AER: Insights.
- *Chen, Y. and M. Riordan (2007), “Price and Variety in the Spokes Model”. EJ.
- Chen, Y. and M. Riordan (2008), “Price-Increasing Competition”, RAND, 39 (4), 1042-1058.
- Chen, Y., J. Li and M. Schwartz (2021), “Competitive Differential Pricing,” RAND.
- *Perloff, J.M. and Salop, S.C. (1985). “Equilibrium with product differentiation”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 52, pp. 107-120.

- *Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson, “Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information suppression in competitive markets”, QJE, 2006.
- *Andrew Rhodes and Jidong Zhou (2022), “Personalized pricing and competition”, Toulouse School of Economics working paper.
- Salop, Steven (1979). “Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods,” RAND.
- *Stole, Lars, “Price Discrimination in imperfectly competitive markets.” HIO 3.
- *Tom Holmes, “The Effects of Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly”, AER, 1989.
- *Zhou, J., “Competitive Product Bundling”, Econometrica, 2017.

Assignment 3 (due 9/15): Exercise 5.1-5.9; 7.1-7.3 in Tirole.

Assignment 4 (due 9/22): Reviews: Perloff and Salop (1985); Chen and Riordan (2007).

Assignment 5 (due 9/29): Reviews: Gabaix and Laibson (2006); Rhodes and Zhou (2022).

Student Presentation 1 (9/29): Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Rhodes and Zhou (2022).

4. Antitrust Applications of Oligopoly Competition: Horizontal and Vertical Mergers

10/4, 10/6, 10/11

- Evaluating Horizontal Mergers
- Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers

Readings:

- Deneckere, R. and C. Davidson (1985), “Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition,” RAND, 473-486.
- *Salop, S., & Scheffman, D. (1983). “Raising rivals’ costs.” *AER*.
- *Salop, Steve (2021), “A Suggested Revision of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3839768.
- *Chen, Y. (2001) “On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects”, *RAND*.
- Chen and Riordan (2007). “Vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and ex post cartelization”, RAND.
- *Serge Moresi and Steve Salop (2021), “When Vertical is Horizontal: How Vertical Mergers Lead to Increases in `Effective Concentration”” *Review of Industrial Organization*.
- Serge Moresi and Marius Schwartz (2021), “Vertical mergers with input substitution: Double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare”, *Economics Letters*.

- Carl Shapiro (2021), “Vertical Mergers and Input Foreclosure Lessons from the *AT&T/Time Warner Case*”, *Review of Industrial Organization*.
- * “Horizontal Merger Guidelines”, FTC and DOJ, 2010.
<https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf>

Assignment 6 (due 10/11): Reviews: Salop and Scheffman (1983); Moresi and Salop (2021).

Student Presentation 2 (10/11): “Horizontal Merger Guidelines” by FTC and DOJ, 2010; Moresi and Salop (2021).

5. Dynamic Competition

10/13, 10/18, 10/20, 10/25

- Strategic Behavior: Ideas and Applications
- Dynamic Price Competition
- Repeated Interactions and Collusion
- Dynamic Pricing Based on Consumer Purchase History
 - A Model of Ex-post Differentiation due to Consumer Switching Costs (Chen, 1997)
 - A Model of Ex ante Differentiation due to Heterogeneous Consumer Preferences (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000)

Readings:

- Ch. 6 in Tirole
- *B. Douglas Bernheim and Erik Madsen, “Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels”, AER, 2017
- Klemperer, Paul, “The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs”, RAND (1987), 138-150.
- *Joseph Farrell and P. Klemperer, “Competition in Markets with Switching Costs and Lock-In”, HIO 3.
- *Chen, Y. “Paying Customers to Switch”, JEMS (1997), 877-897.
- Chen, Y. and J. Percy, “Dynamic Pricing: When to Entice Brand Switching and When to Reward Consumer Loyalty”, RAND, 2010.
- *Curt Taylor, “Supplier Surfing: Competition and Consumer Behavior in Subscription Markets”, RAND, 2003, 34, 223–46.

- *Fudenberg, D and J. Tirole, “Consumer Poaching and Brand Switching,” RAND (2001), 634-657

Assignment 7 (due 10/20): Exercise 6.1-6.10 in Tirole.

Assignment 8 (due 10/27): Reviews: Taylor (2003), and Bernheim and Madsen (2017).

Student Presentation 3 (10/27): Taylor (2003); Bernheim and Madsen (2017)

Planning for Term Paper

6. Privacy, Data, and Information Security

10/28, 11/1, 11/3

Readings:

- *Acemoglu, D., Makhdoumi, A., Malekian, A. & Ozdaglar, A. (2019), ‘Too much data: Prices and inefficiencies in data markets’, NBER Working Paper No. 26296.
- Daron Acemoglu, Azarakhsh Malekian, Asu Ozdaglar, “Network security and contagion”, JET, 2016.
- *Bergemann, D., Bonatti, A. & Gan, T. (2019), ‘The economics of social data’, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper.
- Shota Ichihashi, “Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers”, AER, 2020.
- Richard Posner, “The Economics of Privacy”, AER, 1981.
- Alessandro Acquisti, Curt Taylor and Liad Wagman, “The Economics of Privacy,” Journal of Economic Literature, June 2016.
- *Curt Taylor, “Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information”, RAND, 2004.
- Athey, S. and J. Gans (2010). The impact of targeting advertising technology on advertising markets and media competition. AER, 100 (2), 608–613.
- Anderson, R. and T. Moore (2006). The economics of information security. Science 314 (5799), 610–613.
- Goldfarb, A. and C. Tucker (2011). Privacy regulation and online advertising. Management Science 57 (1), 57–71.
- Haan, M. A. and Moraga-González, J. L. (2011). "Advertising for Attention in a Consumer Search Model." Economic Journal, Vol. 121, pp. 552--579.

- Sanjeev Goyal and Adrien Vigier, “Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks”, REStud., 2014.
- Chen, Y. “Marketing Innovation”, JEMS, 2006.
- Chen, Y., X. Hua, and K. Maskus, “International Protection of Consumer Data”. Journal of International Economics, 2021.

Assignment 9 (due 11/1): Reviews: Bergemann et al. (2019); Taylor (2004); Ichihashi (2020).

Student Presentations 4 (11/4): Two of the three papers above.

7. Platform Economics

11/8, 11/10

Readings:

- Goldfarb, A. and C. Tucker (2019). “Digital Economics”, Journal of Economic Literature.
- *Athey, S. and G. Ellison, 2011, “Position Auctions with Consumer Search”, QJE.
- *Eliaz, K. and Spiegler, R. (2011). "A Simple Model of Search Engine Pricing." Economic Journal, Vol.121, pp F329-39.
- *Chen, Y. and C. He, 2011. “Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet,” Economic Journal.
- Chen, Y. and T. Zhang, “Entry and Welfare in Search Markets”, Economic Journal, 2016.
- Chen, Y. and T. Zhang, “Intermediaries and Consumer Search,” IJIO, 2018.
- *Chen, Y., Z. Li and T. Zhang, “Experience Goods and Consumer Search”, 2020.
- *Choi, M., Y. Dai and K. Kim (2018). "Consumer Search and Price Competition." Econometrica.
- *Andrew Rhodes et al. “Multiproduct Intermediaries” (2021), JPE.
- Edelman, B. and J. Wright (2014) “Price Coherence and Adverse Intermediation”, QJE, 2015.
- Bar-Isaac, H., Caruana, G. and V. Cunat, “Search, Design and Market Structure”, AER, 2012.
- *de Cornière, A., and G. Taylor (2013) "Integration and Search Engine Bias," RAND
- Dinerstein, M., Einav, L., Levin, J. and N. Sundaresany, “Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce”, AER, 2018.

- Justin Johnson, “The Agency Model and MFN”, Review of Economic Studies, 2017
- Hagiu, A., and B. Jullien, "Search Diversion and Platform Competition," IJIO, 2014.
- Armstrong, M, Vickers, J, and Zhou, J., “Prominence and Consumer Search”, RAND, 2009.

Assignment 10 (due 11/10): Reviews: de Cornière and Taylor (2013); Johnson (2017); Rhodes et al. (2021).

Presentations 5 (11/10): two of the three papers above.

Working on the Term Paper

8. Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights

11/15, 11/27, 11/29, 12/1, 12/6

A. Overview

- Basic Questions for the Economic Analysis of Innovation
- Some Statistics about Innovation Inputs and Outputs
- Analytical Framework

B. Market Structure and Innovation Incentive

- The Schumpeterian View (1942)
- Arrow’s Analysis (1962): Process Innovation
- Preempting Monopoly: Gilbert and Newbery (1982)
- Product Innovation: When is Arrow’s Ranking Reversed?
- Vertical Organization and Innovation Incentive
- Exclusive Contracts and Innovation

C. Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Innovation

- The Fundamental Trade-off: Static vs. Dynamic Efficiency
- Common Forms of IPRs
- Optimal Patents: Single Innovation
- The Division of profits in sequential innovation

- Antitrust and Innovation
- Patent Damages/Remedies
- IPRs and Continual Innovation
- IPRs and Innovation in Developing Countries

Readings:

- U.S. National Science Board. "[Science and Engineering Indicators 2014](http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/)".
<http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/>
- Arrow, K. (1962). "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovations," R. Nelson ed. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press.
- Chen, Y and T. Puttitanun (2005). "Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Developing Countries", Journal of Development Economics, 78: 474-493.
- *Gilbert, R. and Newbery, D. (1982). "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, 72: 514-526.
- Chen, Y and M. Schwartz (2013). "Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs. Competition", Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.
- Chen, Y and D. Sappington (2010). "Innovation in Vertically Related Markets", Journal of Industrial Economics.
- Chen, Y and D. Sappington (2011). "Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare", American Economic Journals: Microeconomics.
- Chen, Y. (2014) "Refusal to Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and Antitrust". Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
- *Chen, Y., S. Pan and T. Zhang (2018). Patentability, R&D Direction, and Cumulative Innovation" International Economic Review.
- Chen, Y. and D. Sappington (2018). "An Optimal Rule for Patent Damages under Sequential Innovation," RAND.
- *Green, J. and S. Scotchmer (1995). "On the Division of Profits in Sequential Innovation". RAND Journal of Economics, 26: 20-33.
- Gilbert, R. and C. Shapiro. (1990). "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," RAND Journal of Economics, 21: 106-112.
- Hunt, R. (2004) "Patentability, Industrial Structure, and Innovation". Journal of Industrial Economics.
- O'Donoghue, T., S. Scotchmer, and J-F. Thisse (1998). "Patent Breadth, Patent Life and the Pace of Technological Progress". Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.

- Scotchmer, Suzanne. 2004. *Innovation and Incentives*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- *Segal, I. and M. Whinston. (2007) "Antitrust in Innovative Industries". American Economic Review.
- Shapiro, C. (2016). "Patent Remedies," American Economic Review, 106: 198-202.
- Vickers, John. 2010. "Competition Policy and Property Rights." Economic Journal, 120: 375-392.

Assignment 11 (due 11/22): Exercise 10.1-10.10 in Tirole.

Assignment 12 (due 12/6): Reviews: Green and Scotchmer (1995); Segal and Whinston (2007).

12/8: working on the term paper.

Term paper due on 12/15, before or at 9:00 pm.

University Policies

Classroom Behavior

Both students and faculty are responsible for maintaining an appropriate learning environment in all instructional settings, whether in person, remote or online. Those who fail to adhere to such behavioral standards may be subject to discipline. Professional courtesy and sensitivity are especially important with respect to individuals and topics dealing with race, color, national origin, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, creed, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, veteran status, political affiliation or political philosophy. For more information, see the [classroom behavior](#) policy, the [Student Code of Conduct](#), and the [Office of Institutional Equity and Compliance](#).

Requirements for COVID-19

As a matter of public health and safety, all members of the CU Boulder community and all visitors to campus must follow university, department and building requirements and all public health orders in place to reduce the risk of spreading infectious disease. CU Boulder currently requires COVID-19 vaccination and boosters for all faculty, staff and students. Students, faculty and staff must upload proof of vaccination and boosters or file for an exemption based on medical, ethical or moral grounds through the MyCUHealth portal.

The CU Boulder campus is currently mask-optional. However, if public health conditions change and masks are again required in classrooms, students who fail to adhere to masking requirements will be asked to leave class, and students who do not leave class when asked or who refuse to comply with these requirements will be referred to Student Conduct and Conflict Resolution. For more information, see the policy on classroom behavior and the Student Code of Conduct. If you require accommodation because a disability prevents you from fulfilling these safety measures, please follow the steps in the “Accommodation for Disabilities” statement on this syllabus.

If you feel ill and think you might have COVID-19, if you have tested positive for COVID-19, or if you are unvaccinated or partially vaccinated and have been in close contact with someone who has COVID-19, you should stay home and follow the further guidance of the Public Health Office (contacttracing@colorado.edu). If you are fully vaccinated and have been in close contact with someone who has COVID-19, you do not need to stay home; rather, you should self-monitor for symptoms and follow the further guidance of the Public Health Office (contacttracing@colorado.edu).

Accommodation for Disabilities

If you qualify for accommodations because of a disability, please submit your accommodation letter from Disability Services to your faculty member in a timely manner so that your needs can be addressed. Disability Services determines accommodations based on documented disabilities in the academic

environment. Information on requesting accommodations is located on the [Disability Services website](#). Contact Disability Services at 303-492-8671 or dsinfo@colorado.edu for further assistance. If you have a temporary medical condition, see [Temporary Medical Conditions](#) on the Disability Services website.

Preferred Student Names and Pronouns

CU Boulder recognizes that students' legal information doesn't always align with how they identify. Students may update their preferred names and pronouns via the student portal; those preferred names and pronouns are listed on instructors' class rosters. In the absence of such updates, the name that appears on the class roster is the student's legal name.

Honor Code

All students enrolled in a University of Colorado Boulder course are responsible for knowing and adhering to the [Honor Code](#). Violations of the Honor Code may include, but are not limited to: plagiarism, cheating, fabrication, lying, bribery, threat, unauthorized access to academic materials, clicker fraud, submitting the same or similar work in more than one course without permission from all course instructors involved, and aiding academic dishonesty. All incidents of academic misconduct will be reported to Student Conduct & Conflict Resolution (honor@colorado.edu); 303-492-5550). Students found responsible for violating the [Honor Code](#) will be assigned resolution outcomes from the Student Conduct & Conflict Resolution as well as be subject to academic sanctions from the faculty member. Additional information regarding the Honor Code academic integrity policy can be found on the [Honor Code website](#).

Sexual Misconduct, Discrimination, Harassment and/or Related Retaliation

CU Boulder is committed to fostering an inclusive and welcoming learning, working, and living environment. University policy prohibits sexual misconduct (harassment, exploitation, and assault), intimate partner violence (dating or domestic violence), stalking, protected-class discrimination and harassment, and related retaliation by or against members of our community on- and off-campus. These behaviors harm individuals and our community. The Office of Institutional Equity and Compliance (OIEC) addresses these policies, and individuals who believe they have been subjected to misconduct can contact OIEC at 303-492-2127 or email cureport@colorado.edu. Information about university policies, [reporting options](#), and support resources can be found on the [OIEC website](#). Please know that faculty and graduate instructors have a responsibility to inform OIEC when they are made aware of any issues related to these policies regardless of when or where they occurred to ensure that individuals impacted receive information about their rights, support resources, and resolution options. To learn more about reporting and support options for a variety of concerns, visit [Don't Ignore It](#).

Religious Holidays

Campus policy regarding religious observances requires that faculty make every effort to deal reasonably and fairly with all students who, because of religious obligations, have conflicts with scheduled exams, assignments or required attendance. See the [campus policy regarding religious observances](#) for full details.