

**Instructor:** Oleg Baranov (*Assistant Professor, Department of Economics*)

Instructor Info		Class Info	
Office:	ECON 14A	Class Location:	HLMS 267
Voice:	303.492.7869	Meeting Times:	TTH 9:30 – 10:45
Email:	oleg.baranov@colorado.edu	Office Hours:	MF 9:00 — 10:00
Website:	www.obaranov.com		(or by appointment)

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## 1 Class Website

All course materials will be posted on the [Canvas](https://canvas.colorado.edu/) website that can be accessed at <https://canvas.colorado.edu/>.

## 2 Course Description

Economists are increasingly involved not just in studying but in designing practical market mechanisms. These include auctions to sell diamonds, timber, electricity, procurement contracts and radio spectrum; matching algorithms to assign students to schools, or candidates to jobs; as well as marketplaces and mechanisms to sell internet advertising, trade financial securities, or reward innovation. The field of market design studies how to construct rules for allocating resources or to structure successful marketplaces. It draws on the tools of game theory and mechanism design to identify why certain market rules or institutions succeed and why others fail.

The course consists of three parts. In the first part, we review the fundamental concepts from the game theory and develop strategic thinking. In the second part, we look at the “matching markets” that operate without prices, highly unusual for economics. Examples include assigning students to schools, assigning donor kidneys to transplant patients and college admissions. The third part of the class is on auctions and good auction design. Examples range from simple auctions used by eBay and Christie’s to auctions used in financial markets, auctions used by Google, Facebook and Microsoft to sell advertising, and auctions used by government to sell large-scale complex assets such as radio spectrum.

## 3 Textbook/Readings

A textbook for this class is “Market Design” by Guillaume Haeringer. Additional readings will be indicated in lecture slides and available on the class website. The readings are

mostly economics journal articles, or popular press articles, that provide some context for the class. All listed papers (at least large parts of them) should be readable.

## 4 Informal Readings

A book “*Thinking Strategically*” by Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff is a very famous book suitable for the Game Theory part of the class. A book “*Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design*” by Alvin E. Roth is an easy read suitable for the Matching part of the class.

## 5 Prerequisites

The course is available to students who have completed ECON 3070 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory. The class does not require prior knowledge of mathematical concepts beyond the ones covered in ECON 1088. However, the course includes a great deal of math, economic theory and extensive strategic arguments. Students should expect theoretical arguments in every class.

## 6 Administrative Drops

Any student who miss **ALL** three first class meetings (14, 16 and 21 January) will be administratively dropped from the class.

## 7 Assessment

There will be two midterm exams, the final exam and ten problem sets.

<b>Problem Sets</b>	10 problem sets	20% of the grade (dropping the lowest score)
<b>Attendance</b>	30 lectures	10% (see details in the Attendance section below)
<b>Midterms</b>		20% each
<b>Final Exam</b>		30%

There will be no make-up exams. A student who misses a midterm due to an excused absence will have the additional weight shifted to the final. Feel free to form study groups to review and discuss lecture/reading materials, and homework assignments but you must submit individual work for grading.

## 8 Attendance

A student can miss TWO classes without an excuse. After that, any unauthorized missed classes will be reflected in the course grade. In order to get any credit for attendance, you need to attend at least 50% of classes. For example, consider a student who had missed 7 classes out of 30 (1 excused absence and 6 unexcused absences). The attendance score for this student is 7.2% and it is calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adj. Att} &= \frac{30 - 7 + 2}{30 - 1} * 100 = 86\% \\ \text{Unadj. Att. Score} &= 10 * \frac{86 - 50}{50} = 7.2\% \\ \text{Att. Score} &= \min\{ 10\%, 7.2\% \} = 7.2\% \end{aligned}$$

## 9 Tentative Course Outline

Week	Covered Material	Slidepack
PART 1: GAME THEORY		
1 - 2	Dominance and Iterative Dominance	1a
2 - 3	Nash Equilibrium	1b
4 - 5	Mixed Strategies & Dynamic and Bayesian Games	1c
<b>Feb 20th</b>	<b>MIDTERM I (in class)</b>	
PART 2: MATCHING		
5 - 6	Two-Sided Matching	2a
6 - 7	Two-Sided Applications	2b
8	One-Sided Matching, Kidney Exchange	2c
9	School Choice	2d
<b>Mar 19th</b>	<b>MIDTERM II (in class)</b>	
PART 3: AUCTIONS		
10 - 12	Auction Theory	3a
13	Auction Design	3b
13	Common-Value Auctions	3c
14	Multi-Item Auctions	3d
15	Sponsored Search Auctions	3e
16	Financial Exchanges	3f
<b>May 5th</b>	<b>FINAL EXAM (at 4:30 pm, regular classroom)</b>	

## 10 Tutors

The Economics Department provides a free drop-in tutorial lab which provides assistance on all core courses in the major, and occasionally on other undergraduate courses in the Department. See appropriate links here <https://www.colorado.edu/economics/undergraduate-program>.

## 11 Detailed Course Outline

1. Overview of the class (syllabus, overview of the content, introduction into game theory and market design)

### Game Theory Part

2. Static Games (dominant and dominated strategies, iterative elimination of dominated strategies, Nash Equilibrium)
3. Dynamic Games (subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction)
4. Incomplete Information (simple games with incomplete information, concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium)

### Matching Part

5. Introduction to Matching Markets (“marriage market” and one-to-one matching, stable matches, the Deferred Acceptance algorithm, existence result, optimal matches for both sides of the market, incentives of participants, roommate problem)

*Readings:*

“College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage” by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962)

6. Stable Matching and Orderly Markets (stable matchings and orderly markets, the problem of market unravelling, case study: medical residents and the NRMP, medical fellowships, law clerks, college admission)

*Readings:*

“What Have We Learned from Market Design” by Alvin Roth (2008)

“The Re-Design of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design” by Alvin Roth and Elliott Peranson (1999)

7. House Allocation and Kidney Exchange (House Allocation Problem, efficient outcomes and the core, serial dictatorship, the top trading cycles algorithm and its variations, kidney exchanges)

*Readings:*

“A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England” by Alvin Roth, Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver (2005)

“Kidney Exchange: A Life-Saving Application of Matching Theory” (2005)

8. School Choice ( School Choice Problem, the Boston algorithm and its incentives, deferred acceptance and top trading cycles as alternatives, problem of ties, case studies: NYC and Boston)

*Readings:*

“The New York City High School Match” by Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag Pathak and Alvin Roth (2005)

“The Boston Public School Match” by Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag Pathak, Alvin Roth and Tayfun Sonmez (2005)

“School Choice” by Joseph Malkevitch

## Auctions Part

9. Introduction to Auction Theory (private value model, first and second price sealed bid auctions, all pay auctions, ascending auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, eBay auctions - equivalence and nonequivalence to the second-price auction)

*Readings:*

“The Bidding Game” National Academy of Sciences Beyond Discovery Report (2003)

10. Designing Good Auctions (how to design an auction, facilitating entry, reserve prices, bidder subsidies, collusive bidding, optimal auction design)

*Readings:*

“What Really Matters in Auction Design” by Paul Klemperer (2002)

11. Common Value Auctions (common value model, the winner’s curse, examples and applications, aggregation of information, application to oil lease auctions)

*Readings:*

“An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information” by Ken Hendricks and Robert Porter (1988)

“Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse” by Richard Thaler (1988)

12. Multi-Unit Auctions (multi-unit auctions, uniform price, pay-as-bid price (discriminatory), demand reduction, Vickrey pricing and efficient auction design, case study: treasury auctions)

13. Sponsored Search Auctions (the sponsored search market, Google’s advertising auction, bidding incentives and equilibria, other ways to run the auction, Facebook’s Vickrey auction, optimal design in search auctions (Yahoo case study))

*Readings:*

“The Economics of Internet Search” by Hal Varian (2007)

“Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design” by Jonathan Levin and Paul Milgrom (2010)

14. Financial Markets and High-Frequency Trading (electronic markets for trading equity and other financial securities, the use of auctions for IPOs, real-time trading and market clearing, competition between exchanges)

*Readings:*

“Concept Release on Market Structure” by SEC (2010)

“The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response” by Eric Budish, Peter Cramtom and John Shim

## 12 University Policies

If you qualify for accommodations because of a disability, please submit your accommodation letter from Disability Services to your faculty member in a timely manner so that your needs can be addressed. Disability Services determines accommodations based on documented disabilities in the academic environment. Information on requesting accommodations is located on the [Disability Services website](#). Contact Disability Services at 303-492-8671 or [dsinfo@colorado.edu](mailto:dsinfo@colorado.edu) for further assistance. If you have a temporary medical condition or injury, see [Temporary Medical Conditions](#) under the Students tab on the Disability Services website.

Students and faculty each have responsibility for maintaining an appropriate learning environment. Those who fail to adhere to such behavioral standards may be subject to discipline. Professional courtesy and sensitivity are especially important with respect to individuals and topics dealing with race, color, national origin, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, creed, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, veteran status, political affiliation or political philosophy. For more information, see the policies on [classroom behavior](#) and the [Student Code of Conduct](#).

CU Boulder recognizes that students’ legal information doesn’t always align with how they identify. Students may update their preferred names and pronouns via the student portal; those preferred names and pronouns are listed on instructors’ class rosters. In the absence of such updates, the name that appears on the class roster is the student’s legal name.

All students enrolled in a University of Colorado Boulder course are responsible for knowing and adhering to the Honor Code. Violations of the policy may include: plagiarism, cheating, fabrication, lying, bribery, threat, unauthorized access to academic materials, clicker fraud, submitting the same or similar work in more than one course without permission from all course instructors involved, and aiding academic dishonesty. All incidents of academic misconduct will be reported to the Honor Code ([honor@colorado.edu](mailto:honor@colorado.edu)); 303-492-5550). Students found responsible for violating the academic integrity policy will be subject to nonacademic sanctions from the Honor Code

as well as academic sanctions from the faculty member. Additional information regarding the Honor Code academic integrity policy can be found at the [Honor Code Office website](#).

The University of Colorado Boulder (CU Boulder) is committed to fostering a positive and welcoming learning, working, and living environment. CU Boulder will not tolerate acts of sexual misconduct, intimate partner abuse (including dating or domestic violence), stalking, or protected-class discrimination or harassment by members of our community. Individuals who believe they have been subject to misconduct or retaliatory actions for reporting a concern should contact the Office of Institutional Equity and Compliance (OIEC) at 303-492-2127 or [cureport@colorado.edu](mailto:cureport@colorado.edu). Information about the OIEC, university policies, [anonymous reporting](#), and the campus resources can be found on the [OIEC website](#).

Please know that faculty and instructors have a responsibility to inform OIEC when made aware of incidents of sexual misconduct, discrimination, harassment and/or related retaliation, to ensure that individuals impacted receive information about options for reporting and support resources.

Campus policy regarding religious observances requires that faculty make every effort to deal reasonably and fairly with all students who, because of religious obligations, have conflicts with scheduled exams, assignments or required attendance. In this class, please see me at least two weeks prior to any conflicts due to religious observances.

See the [campus policy regarding religious observances](#) for full details.