

Econ 8747: Industrial Organization Theory

Spring 2025

Professor Yongmin Chen

Office: Econ 108

Class Time and Location: MW: 3:30-4:45 PM; ECON 119

Office Hours: MW: 1:30-3:00 PM.

Recommended books: (1) *The Theory of Industrial Organization* by Jean Tirole (1988), MIT Press, (2) *Industrial Organization: Contemporary Theory and Practice* by Pepall, Richards, and Norman, and (3) *Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3 (HIO 3, 2007*, Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter edits). Tirole (1988) remains as the classic graduate IO textbook. You are encouraged to read the entire book and work out the exercise problems there (even though we only cover a few parts of the book in the course). Pepall et al is a good read for more recent issues and intuition. *HIO 3* surveys the major developments in IO after Tirole's book and can be downloaded electronically through CU library.

Lecture Notes: I will make available some lecture notes/slides on the Canvas page for the course. These lecture notes/slides and other course material are to be used only by students who are enrolled in the course. You may not reproduce, distribute, or display them without my written permission.

Grading: Grades are based on homework (30%), presentation (30%), and a term paper (40%).

Term Paper: The purpose of the term paper is to get you started on a research topic of your choice. You should have a research question and can either (i) build and analyze a model, deriving results to answer the question, or (ii) conduct a literature review and discuss how you will proceed with the research, or (iii) extend the research from a published paper with new results. The term paper should contain a title, abstract, and references; about 12-18 pages long, double spaced.

A tentative course schedule is as follows. There can be changes to this schedule during the semester, which will be announced in class. You are responsible for updating course information according to the announcements made in class. The starred articles are required readings. You should also read some additional assigned articles (at least briefly), especially on topics that you would like to explore more. You will be asked to write short reviews/discussions of some papers,

to commit you to reading the paper more carefully and to practice writing (each review/discussion is about 2 pages long, double spaced, but occasionally you may do a longer review). When you review a paper, you may provide a summary, discuss the research question(s), motivation, main findings, and the contributions. You may also discuss the model in more detail and potential issues that can be further studied for a few papers that you would like to explore more. Each of you will present a paper during the semester, which helps you practice how to organize and present research.

Course Schedule:

1. Introduction: Research Framework and Methods

1/13, 1/15

Readings:

- Overviews: Tirole, Pepall et al., and Tables of Contents in HIO 3.
- Varian, H. “How to Build an Economic Model in Your Spare Time”, 1994, updated in 2009.
- Jonathan B. Berk, Campbell R. Harvey, and David Hirshleifer, “How to Write an Effective Referee Report and Improve the Scientific Review Process”, Journal of Economic Literature, 2017

Planning for presentation: Each student will choose a paper to make a 35-minute presentation in class during the semester.

2. Monopoly Pricing

1/22, 1/27, 1/29

- Discrete-Choice Demand
- Multi-product Pricing
- Pass through, Price Discrimination, and Differential Pricing
- Product Bundling
- Behavioral Consumers

Readings:

- Tirole Ch. 1.
- M. Armstrong and J. Vickers, “Multiproduct Pricing Made Simple”, JPE, 2018.
- *M. Armstrong and Y. Chen, “Discount Pricing”, Economic Inquiry, 2019.

- Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer, "Salience and Consumer Choice," JPE, 2013.
- Ellison, Glenn, "A Model of Add on Pricing" QJE, 2005
- *Ellison, Glenn, "Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization", 2006, MIT.
- *Shota Ichihashi, "Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers", AER, 2020.
- Justin P Johnson, David P Myatt, "On the simple economics of advertising, marketing, and product design", AER, 2006.
- Maskin, E., and J. Riley, "Monopoly with Incomplete Information", RAND, 1984.
- Chen, Y. and M. Riordan, "Profitability of Product Bundling", IER, 2013.
- *Chen, Y. and M. Schwartz, "Differential Pricing when Costs Differ: A Welfare Analysis", RAND, 2015.
- Monika Mrázová and J. Peter Neary, "Not So Demanding: Demand Structure and Firm Behavior", AER, 2017.
- *Andrew Rhodes and Chris Wilson, "False Advertising", RAND, 2018
- *Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris. 2015. "The Limits of Price Discrimination." AER.
- *Andre Veiga (2023), "Price Discrimination in Selection Markets", Review of Economics and Statistics.

Assignment 1 (due 1/22): Exercise 1.1-1.9 in Tirole.

Assignment 2 (due 1/27): Review two of the following: Rhodes and Wilson (2018); Ichihashi (2020); Veiga (2023)

3. Product Differentiation and Price Competition

2/3, 2/5, 2/10, 2/12, 2/17

- Spatial Models of Product Differentiation
- Representative Consumers: existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics
- Random utility models of product differentiation
- Market Structure and Price

Readings: Ch. 5, 6, 7 in Tirole

- *Armstrong and Vickers (2019), "Discriminating against Captive Customers", AER: Insights.

- Armstrong, M. and Y. Chen, “Inattentive Consumers and Product Quality,” Journal of the European Economic Association, (2009), pp. 411-422.
- *Chen, Y. and M. Riordan (2007), “Price and Variety in the Spokes Model”. EJ.
- *Chen, Y. and M. Riordan (2008), “Price-Increasing Competition”, RAND, 39 (4), 1042-1058.
- Chen, Y., J. Li and M. Schwartz (2021), “Competitive Differential Pricing,” RAND.
- *Perloff, J.M. and Salop, S.C. (1985). “Equilibrium with product differentiation”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 52, pp. 107-120.
- Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson, “Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information suppression in competitive markets”, QJE, 2006.
- *Andrew Rhodes and Jidong Zhou (2024), “Personalized pricing and competition”, AER.
- *Sephora Mangin (2024) “When is competition price-increasing? The impact of expected competition on prices”, RAND.
- Salop, Steven (1979). “Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods,” RAND.
- *Stole, Lars, “Price Discrimination in imperfectly competitive markets.” HIO 3.
- Tom Holmes, “The Effects of Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly”, AER, 1989.
- Zhou, J. (2017), “Competitive Product Bundling”, Econometrica.
- Zach Y. Brown and Alexander MacKay (2023), “Competition in Pricing Algorithms”, AEJ: Micro.
- de Cornière, A. and G. Taylor (2024), “Anticompetitive Bundling When Buyers Compete”, AEJ: Micro.

Assignment 3 (due 2/5): Exercise 5.1-5.9; 7.1-7.3 in Tirole.

Assignment 4 (due 2/12): Review three of the following: Mangin (2024); Rhodes and Zhou (2024); Brown and MacKay (2023); de Cornière and Taylor (2024).

Student Presentations 1-2 (2/12, 2/17): Armstrong and Vickers (2019); Rhodes and Zhou (2024); Ichihashi (2020); Brown and MacKay (2023).

4. Antitrust Applications: Horizontal and Vertical Mergers

2/19, 2/24, 2/26, 3/3

- Evaluating Horizontal Mergers
- Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers

Readings:

- Deneckere, R. and C. Davidson (1985), “Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition,” *RAND*, 473-486.
- *Salop, S., & Scheffman, D. (1983). “Raising rivals’ costs.” *AER*.
- *Salop, Steve (2024), “The 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian Integration”. *Review of Industrial Organization*.
- *Chen, Y. (2001) “On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects”, *RAND*.
- Chen and Riordan (2007). “Vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and ex post cartelization”, *RAND*.
- *Serge Moresi and Steve Salop (2021), “When Vertical is Horizontal: How Vertical Mergers Lead to Increases in `Effective Concentration’” *Review of Industrial Organization*.
- *Serge Moresi and Marius Schwartz (2021), “Vertical mergers with input substitution: Double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare”, *Economics Letters*.
- *José Luis Moraga-González, Evgenia Motchenkova, and Saish Nevrekar (2022). “Mergers and innovation portfolios”. *RAND*.
- * “Merger Guidelines”, DOJ (2023). <https://www.justice.gov/atr/2023-merger-guidelines>

Assignment 5 (due 2/26): Review three of the following: Salop and Scheffman (1983); Moresi and Salop (2021); Moresi and Schwartz (2021); Salop (2024).

Student Presentations 3-4 (2/26, 3/3): Moresi and Schwartz (2021); Salop (2024); Moraga-González, Motchenkova, and Nevrekar (2022); de Cornière and Taylor (2024).

5. Dynamic Competition

3/5, 3/10, 3/12, 3/17

- Strategic Behavior: Ideas and Applications
- Dynamic Price Competition
- Repeated Interactions and Collusion
- Dynamic Pricing Based on Consumer Purchase History
 - A Model of Ex-post Differentiation due to Consumer Switching Costs (Chen, 1997)
 - A Model of Ex ante Differentiation due to Heterogeneous Consumer Preferences (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000)

Readings:

- Ch. 6 in Tirole
- *B. Douglas Bernheim and Erik Madsen, “Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels”, AER, 2017
- Klemperer, Paul, “The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs”, RAND (1987), 138-150.
- *Joseph Farrell and P. Klemperer, “Competition in Markets with Switching Costs and Lock-In”, HIO 3.
- *Chen, Y. “Paying Customers to Switch”, JEMS (1997), 877-897.
- Chen, Y. and J. Percy, “Dynamic Pricing: When to Entice Brand Switching and When to Reward Consumer Loyalty”, RAND, 2010.
- *Curt Taylor, “Supplier Surfing: Competition and Consumer Behavior in Subscription Markets”, RAND, 2003, 34, 223–46.
- *Fudenberg, D and J. Tirole, “Consumer Poaching and Brand Switching,” RAND (2001), 634-657
- *Doh-Shin Jeon, Domenico Menicucci, and Nikrooz Nasr (2023). “Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs, and Data Portability”, AEJ: Micro.
- *Didier Laussel, Ngo V. Long, and Joana Resende (2020). “The curse of knowledge: having access to customer information can reduce monopoly profits”. RAND

Assignment 6 (due 3/5): Exercise 6.1-6.10 in Tirole.

Assignment 7 (due 3/12): Review two of the following: Taylor (2003); Bernheim and Madsen (2017); Jeon, Menicucci, and Nasr (2023); Laussel, Long, and Resende (2020).

Student Presentation 5 (3/17): Taylor (2003); Doh-Shin Jeon, Domenico Menicucci, and Nikrooz Nasr (2023).

Planning for Term Paper

6. Digital Data, Privacy, and Information Security

3/19, 3/31

Readings:

- *Acemoglu, D., Makhdoumi, A., Malekian, A. & Ozdaglar, A. (2019), ‘Too much data: Prices and inefficiencies in data markets’, NBER Working Paper No. 26296.
- Daron Acemoglu, Azarakhsh Malekian, Asu Ozdaglar, “Network security and contagion”, JET, 2016.
- Richard Posner, “The Economics of Privacy”, AER, 1981.
- Alessandro Acquisti, Curt Taylor and Liad Wagman, “The Economics of Privacy,” Journal of Economic Literature, June 2016.
- *Curt Taylor, “Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information”, RAND, 2004.
- Anderson, R. and T. Moore (2006). The economics of information security. Science 314 (5799), 610–613.
- *Goldfarb, A. and C. Tucker (2011). Privacy regulation and online advertising. Management Science 57 (1), 57–71.
- Goldfarb, A. and C. Tucker (2019). “Digital Economics”, Journal of Economic Literature.
- Sanjeev Goyal and Adrien Vigier, “Attack, Defense, and Contagion in Networks”, REStud., 2014.
- Chen, Y. “Marketing Innovation”, JEMS, 2006.
- Chen, Y., X. Hua, and K. Maskus (2021), “International Protection of Consumer Data”. Journal of International Economics.
- Shota Ichihashi, “Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers”, AER, 2020.
- Shota Ichihashi (2023), “Dynamic Privacy Choices”, AEJ: Micro.
- *Guy Aridor, Yeon-Koo Che, and Tobias Salz (2023) “The effect of privacy regulation on the data industry: empirical evidence from GDPR”. RAND
- de Cornière, Alexandre, and Romain de Nijs. 2016. “Online Advertising and Privacy.” RAND Journal of Economics 47 (1): 48–72.

Assignment 8 (due 3/19): Review: Taylor (2004); Goldfarb and Tucker (2011).

Student Presentation 6 (3/31): Taylor (2004); Goldfarb and Tucker (2011); Guy Aridor, Yeon-Koo Che, and Tobias Salz (2023); Shota Ichihashi (2023); or the requirements and impacts of GDPR.

7. Consumer Search and Competition

4/1, 4/7, 4/9, 4/14, 4/17

Readings:

- Stigler, G. 1961. "The Economics of Information". JPE.
- Diamond, Peter. 1971. "A Model of Price Adjustment." Journal of Economic Theory, 3, 156-168.
- Varian, Hal. 1980. "A Model of Sales." American Economic Review, 70, 651-659.
- *Stahl, Dale O. 1989. "Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search." AER, 700-712.
- *Wolinsky, A. 1986. "True Monopolistic Competition as a Result of Imperfect Competition," QJE, 101: 493-511.
- *Armstrong, M, Vickers, J, and Zhou, J., "Prominence and Consumer Search", RAND, 2009.
- Bagwell, K. and G. Ramey, "Coordination Economies, Advertising, and Search Behavior in Retail Markets", AER (1994), 498-517.
- Baye, Michael and John Morgan. 2001. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets." AER, 91, 454-474.
- *Zhou, J. 2014. "Multiproduct Search and the Joint Search Effect", AER.
- *Bar-Isaac, H., Caruana, G. and V. Cunat, "Search, Design and Market Structure", AER, 2012.
- Athey, S. and G. Ellison, 2011, "Position Auctions with Consumer Search", QJE.
- Chen, Y. and C. He, 2011. "Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet," Economic Journal.
- Chen, Y. and T. Zhang, "Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Heterogeneous Searchers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011.
- *Chen, Y. and Zhang, T., 2018, 'Entry and Welfare in Search Markets,' Economic Journal, 128 (608), pp. 55-88.
- *Chen, Y., Li, Z., and Zhang, T., 2022, 'Experience Goods and Consumer Search,' American Economic Journals: Microeconomics, 14 (3), pp. 591-621.
- *Chen, Y. 2024. "Search and Competition Under Product Quality Uncertainty". Journal of Industrial Economics.
- *Eliaz, K. and Spiegler, R. (2011). "A Simple Model of Search Engine Pricing." Economic Journal, Vol.121, pp F329-39.

- Haan, M. A. and Moraga-González, J. L., 2011, 'Advertising for Attention in a Consumer Search Model,' *Economic Journal*, 121, pp. 552—579.
- *Nocke, V. and Rey., P. (2024). "Consumer Search, Steering and Choice Overload," *Journal of Political Economy*,
- *de Cornière, A., and G. Taylor (2013) "Integration and Search Engine Bias," *RAND*.
- Dinerstein, M., Einav, L., Levin, J. and N. Sundaresany, "Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce", *AER*, 2018.
- Rhodes, Andrew. 2011. "Can Prominence Matter Even in an Almost Frictionless Market?" *Economic Journal* 121: 297--308.
- Rhodes, Andrew, Makoto Watanabe and Jidong Zhou (2021). "Multiproduct Intermediaries", *JPE*
- Rhodes, A. and Zhou, J., 2019, 'Consumer Search and Retail Market Structure,' *Management Science*, 65, pp. 2607-2623.
- Teh, Tat-How and Wright, J., 2022, 'Intermediation and Steering: Competition in Prices and Commissions,' *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 14(2), pp. 281-321.
- White, Alexander. 2013. "Search Engines: Left Side Quality Versus Right Side Profits." *International Journal of Industrial Organization* 31: 690-701.
- Hagiu, Andrei, and Bruno Jullien. 2011. "Why Do Intermediaries Divert Search?" *RAND Journal of Economics* 42 (2): 337–62.
- de Cornière, Alexandre, and Greg Taylor. 2019. "A Model of Biased Intermediation." *RAND Journal of Economics* 50 (4): 854–82.

Assignment 9 (due 4/1): Review three of the following: Eliaz and Spiegler (2011); de Cornière and Taylor (2013); Zhou (2014); Rhodes et al. (2021); Nocke and Rey (2024).

Presentations 7-8 (4/14, 4/17): Eliaz and Spiegler (2011); Zhou (2014); Rhodes et al. (2021); Nocke and Rey (2024).

Working on the Term Paper

8. Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights

4/21, 4/23, 4/28, 4/30

A. Overview

- Basic Questions for the Economic Analysis of Innovation
- Some Statistics about Innovation Inputs and Outputs
- Analytical Framework

B. Market Structure and Innovation Incentive

- The Schumpeterian View (1942)
- Arrow's Analysis (1962): Process Innovation
- Preempting Monopoly: Gilbert and Newbery (1982)
- Product Innovation: When is Arrow's Ranking Reversed?
- Vertical Organization and Innovation Incentive
- Exclusive Contracts and Innovation

C. Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Innovation

- The Fundamental Trade-off: Static vs. Dynamic Efficiency
- Common Forms of IPRs
- Optimal Patents: Single Innovation
- The Division of profits in sequential innovation
- Antitrust and Innovation
- Patent Damages/Remedies
- IPRs and Continual Innovation
- IPRs and Innovation in Developing Countries

Readings:

- Arrow, K. (1962). "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovations," R. Nelson ed. *The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity*, Princeton University Press.
- *Gilbert, R. and Newbery, D. (1982). "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," *American Economic Review*, 72: 514-526.
- Chen, Y and T. Puttitanun (2005). "Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Developing Countries", *Journal of Development Economics*, 78: 474-493.
- Chen, Y and M. Schwartz (2013). "Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs. Competition", *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*.
- Chen, Y and D. Sappington (2010). "Innovation in Vertically Related Markets", *Journal of Industrial Economics*.

- Chen, Y and D. Sappington (2011). “Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare”, American Economic Journals: Microeconomics.
- Chen, Y. (2014) “Refusal to Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and Antitrust”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
- *Chen, Y., S. Pan and T. Zhang (2018). Patentability, R&D Direction, and Cumulative Innovation” International Economic Review.
- Chen, Y. and D. Sappington (2018). “An Optimal Rule for Patent Damages under Sequential Innovation,” RAND.
- *Green, J. and S. Scotchmer (1995). “On the Division of Profits in Sequential Innovation”. RAND Journal of Economics, 26: 20-33.
- Gilbert, R. and C. Shapiro. (1990). "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," RAND Journal of Economics, 21: 106-112.
- Hunt, R. (2004) “Patentability, Industrial Structure, and Innovation”. Journal of Industrial Economics.
- O’Donoghue, T., S. Scotchmer, and J-F. Thisse (1998). “Patent Breadth, Patent Life and the Pace of Technological Progress”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.
- Scotchmer, Suzanne. 2004. *Innovation and Incentives*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- *Segal, I. and M. Whinston. (2007) “Antitrust in Innovative Industries”. American Economic Review.
- Shapiro, C. (2016). "Patent Remedies," American Economic Review, 106: 198-202.
- Vickers, John. 2010. "Competition Policy and Property Rights." Economic Journal, 120: 375-392.
- José Luis Moraga-González, Evgenia Motchenkova, and Saish Nevrekar (2022). “Mergers and innovation portfolios”. RAND.

Assignment 10 (due 4/28): Exercise 10.1-10.10 in Tirole.

5/7: Term paper due before or at 9:00 pm.

University Policies

Classroom Behavior

Students and faculty are responsible for maintaining an appropriate learning environment in all instructional settings, whether in person, remote, or online. Failure to adhere to such behavioral standards may be subject to discipline. Professional courtesy and sensitivity are especially important with respect to individuals and topics dealing with race, color, national origin, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, creed, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, veteran status, political affiliation, or political philosophy.

For more information, see the [classroom behavior policy](#), the [Student Code of Conduct](#), and the [Office of Institutional Equity and Compliance](#).

Requirements for Infectious Disease

Members of the CU Boulder community and visitors to campus must follow university, department, and building health and safety requirements and all applicable campus policies and public health guidelines to reduce the risk of spreading infectious diseases. If public health conditions require, the university may also invoke related requirements for student conduct and disability accommodation that will apply to this class.

If you feel ill and think you might have COVID-19 or if you have tested positive for COVID-19, please stay home and follow the [guidance of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention \(CDC\) for isolation and testing](#). If you have been in close contact with someone who has COVID-19 but do not have any symptoms and have not tested positive for COVID-19, you do not need to stay home but should follow the [guidance of the CDC for masking and testing](#).

Accommodation for Disabilities, Temporary Medical Conditions, and Medical Isolation.

If you qualify for accommodations because of a disability, please submit your accommodation letter from Disability Services to your faculty member in a timely manner so that your needs can be addressed. Disability Services determines accommodations based on documented disabilities in the academic environment. Information on requesting accommodations is located on the [Disability Services website](#). Contact Disability Services at 303-492-8671 or dsinfo@colorado.edu for further assistance. If you have a temporary medical condition, see [Temporary Medical Conditions](#) on the Disability Services website.

If you have a required medical isolation for which you require adjustment, please notify me and the TA ASAP to allow the for proper arrangements.

Preferred Student Names and Pronouns

CU Boulder recognizes that students' legal information doesn't always align with how they identify. Students may update their preferred names and pronouns via the student portal; those preferred names and pronouns are listed on instructors' class rosters. In the absence of such updates, the name that appears on the class roster is the student's legal name.

Honor Code

All students enrolled in a University of Colorado Boulder course are responsible for knowing and adhering to the [Honor Code](#). Violations of the Honor Code may include but are not limited to: plagiarism (including use of paper writing services or technology [such as essay bots]), cheating, fabrication, lying, bribery, threat, unauthorized access to academic materials, clicker fraud, submitting the same or similar work in more than one course without permission from all course instructors involved, and aiding academic dishonesty.

All incidents of academic misconduct will be reported to Student Conduct & Conflict Resolution: honor@colorado.edu, 303-492-5550. Students found responsible for violating the [Honor Code](#) will be assigned resolution outcomes from the Student Conduct & Conflict Resolution as well as be subject to academic sanctions from the faculty member. Visit [Honor Code](#) for more information on the academic integrity policy.

Sexual Misconduct, Discrimination, Harassment and/or Related Retaliation

CU Boulder is committed to fostering an inclusive and welcoming learning, working, and living environment. University policy prohibits [protected-class](#) discrimination and harassment, sexual misconduct (harassment, exploitation, and assault), intimate partner violence (dating or domestic violence), stalking, and related retaliation by or against members of our community on- and off-campus. These behaviors harm individuals and our community. The Office of Institutional Equity and Compliance (OIEC) addresses these concerns, and individuals who have been subjected to misconduct can contact OIEC at 303-492-2127 or email cureport@colorado.edu. Information about university policies, [reporting options](#), and [support resources](#) can be found on the [OIEC website](#).

Please know that faculty and graduate instructors must inform OIEC when they are made aware of incidents related to these policies regardless of when or where something occurred. This is to ensure that individuals impacted receive outreach from OIEC about resolution options and support resources. To learn more about reporting and support for a variety of concerns, visit the [Don't Ignore It](#) page.

Religious Accommodations

Campus policy requires faculty to provide reasonable accommodations for students who, because of religious obligations, have conflicts with scheduled exams, assignments or required attendance. Please communicate the need for a religious accommodation in the first two weeks of the semester. See the [campus policy regarding religious observances](#) for full details.

Mental Health and Wellness

The University of Colorado Boulder is committed to the well-being of all students. If you are struggling with personal stressors, mental health or substance use concerns that are impacting academic or daily life, please contact [Counseling and Psychiatric Services \(CAPS\)](#) located in C4C or call (303) 492-2277, 24/7.

Free and unlimited telehealth is also available through [Academic Live Care](#). The [Academic Live Care](#) site also provides information about additional wellness services on campus that are available to students.