OTPIC Officially Retired
As of December 2, 2005, the Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict (OTPIC) has been officially retired, and is no longer open to new registrations.
The successor to OTPIC is a course called Dealing Constructively with Intractable Conflicts (DCIC). The new curriculum is built around one of our major projects, Beyond Intractability, and offers a much more extensive and informative set of learning materials than that available through OTPIC.
Alexander George,"United States-Japan Relations Leading to Pearl Harbor," chap. in Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), pp. 19-23.
In July 1941, the U.S. threatened Japan with an oil embargo unless Japan withdrew from China. Rather than withdraw from China and abandon its imperialist aspirations, Japan chose to attack the U.S. while it still had the oil reserves needed to wage war. George argues that in this case "coercive diplomacy provoked the adversary into a decision for war."[p. 12]
George points out that, although the U.S. was also pursuing various deterrence strategies against Japan, the threat of an oil embargo was a more ambitious strategy of coercive diplomacy. The threat of embargo was intended not to deter Japan from taking some considered action, but to compel them to withdraw from a current activity.
George suggests a number of reasons why coercive diplomacy not only failed, but actually provoked war in this case. First, U.S. officials failed to recognize that Japan had more at stake in the matter than did the U.S. As the situation progressed, the U.S. sharpened its demands, which in turn sharpened Japan's resistance. Second, the U.S. strategy relied almost entirely on threats, and made very little use of incentives. This left Japan to choose among almost equally unacceptable options. Finally, misperceptions, miscalculations and ambiguous signals between the U.S. and Japan contributed to the escalation of the conflict.
Use the "back" button to return to the previous screen.
Copyright © 1998-2005 Conflict Research Consortium -- Contact: email@example.com