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The *Colorado Journal of Asian Studies* is an undergraduate journal published by the Center for Asian Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Each year we highlight outstanding theses from our graduating seniors in the Asian Studies major.

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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

The Center for Asian Studies is pleased to publish five senior theses from the 2013-2014 academic year. Each senior graduating with a degree in Asian Studies is required to complete a research project under the guidance of a faculty advisor on any topic related to Asia. Each year, students produce excellent work on a wide variety of topics, and this year was certainly no exception. Stanley Barnes' essay opens this volume with an investigation of the steps China should take to raise rural incomes in his thesis, "Improving Incomes in Rural China: Investment in Infrastructure and Education." In "Fresh-Faced Boys and the Cute Boy Next Door: Evolution and Splintering of Masculinity in Japan through Men's Fashion Magazines *Men's No-No* and *Fine Boys*," Sharon Chang looks at the construction of masculinity in contemporary Japan. The theses by Joshua Griswold and Dennis Morin fit nicely with the Center for Asian Studies' annual theme, "Catastrophic Asia." Griswold's "A Fight for the Right: An Analysis of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Dispute and the Possibility of Military Escalation" focuses on an ongoing potential military flashpoint in East Asia, and Morin's "Growing Apart: The Redevelopment and Rehabilitation of Beirut" on the aftermath of a brutal military conflict in West Asia. Kelsey Reed's essay concludes the volume with her analysis of labor law in China, entitled, "A Close Examination of Chinese Labor Laws and the Issues of Implementation."

Improving Incomes in Rural China: Investment in Infrastructure and Education

STANLEY BARNES

INTRODUCTION

China's emergence as an economic powerhouse has had huge benefits for the Chinese people, but at the same time many problems have also arisen from China's rapid rise. In terms of economic inequality, China's urban-rural divide is now at an all-time high. Rural citizens continue to migrate towards China's coastal cities in search of work, even though they will not be eligible for government benefits and services while living in another province. The number of protests has also dramatically risen in the past few decades to nearly 180,000¹ per year, thereby threatening the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. In addition, the western world is continually complaining about China's unfair export policies, arguing that they have helped spur China's economic growth at the expense of growth in the West.²

In order to maintain its power the Chinese central government knows that the only thing it can do is to continue to grow the economy, especially in rural areas. To do this they have instituted a new policy called the Harmonious Society Policy to try and find one solution to all of their largest problems.³

One of the main ways that the Harmonious Society Policy is helping to raise the incomes and standard of living of rural Chinese regions is by investing in rural infrastructure and education. By investing in infrastructure and education the

Chinese central government is trying to provide more employment opportunities and higher incomes to rural citizens.

China's central government has aimed to improve the lives of rural citizens by investing in many areas, but there are three main areas that have seen the highest investment returns in terms of generating more rural jobs and higher rural incomes. Improving rural education, improving and building new rural transportation infrastructure, and providing more sources of cheap electricity to rural regions have so far had very high investment returns. China's central government has decided to continue to heavily invest in these areas because improving these three things will have the highest marginal return in terms of improving people's lives, raising rural incomes, and increasing rural economic growth rates. These three areas are also some of the main signs of a modernized society. The central government has many reasons to believe in continuing with this approach. This approach is also supported by many academic papers and other types of evidence that I will discuss later in this paper.

Providing rural regions with cheaper and better access to electricity improves the lives of rural Chinese citizens in many ways. For example, rural citizens will no longer need to constantly keep fires going to warm their homes or to cook. Having electricity makes it so these citizens can gather less firewood each year saving them time. Electricity also indirectly lowers in-home pollution and reduces environmental degradation. This is mainly due to the decreased need for fires. Providing electricity to rural citizens also gives them the ability to use more products that require electricity such as dishwashers and laundry machines. Using household appliances will make rural citizens' lives easier as well as raise their consumption and standard of living. Providing cheaper and more electricity will also encourage more

¹ T. Orlik, "Unrest Grows as Economy Booms," *Wall Street Journal*, September 26, 2011, 1.

² M. Avery, M. Zhu, and J. Cai, *China's Emerging Financial Markets: Challenges and Global Impact* (Singapore, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Asia, 2009).

³ J. Lin, Y. Zhuang, M. Tang, and T. Lin "Inclusive Growth Toward a Harmonious Society in the People's Republic of China: An Overview," *Asian Development Review* 43, no. 2 (2012): 83-109.

employment in rural regions because businesses will be more likely to move production facilities to areas that have cheap labor and ample amounts of cheap electricity.⁴ The central government also needs businesses to provide these employment opportunities in rural areas so as to improve the lives of these rural citizens.

Providing rural regions with new transportation infrastructure, specifically roads and railroads, will also have large positive benefits for China's rural population. Transportation will not only be better and cheaper from shorter routes, but in addition, building the new transportation systems will encourage private investment in places that were previously inaccessible. Labor in the countryside has always been cheaper than labor in urban areas, but before new roads and railroads were constructed, accessing these rural regions was so expensive that it was not worth the cost. Now, with the new roads and railroads, many businesses will consider opening factories in more rural areas so as to take advantage of the cheaper inland labor.⁵ Farmers also now have the ability to sell their products at new markets and having cheaper transportation costs will only add to their profits. Finally, more jobs will be provided by the government to build and maintain the transportation networks. New roads and railroads have linked rural regions with urban ones and will be increasingly large drivers of higher rural economic growth rates.

In conjunction with material investments, the Chinese central government is also heavily investing in improving rural education. Better education will help vastly improve rural citizens' quality of life and incomes. By receiving a better education, rural Chinese will be presented with better job opportunities, receive better wages, and will be better at managing their own businesses and lives. Improving rural education will also encourage businesses to move

operations into the countryside, thereby providing more employment opportunities. China's rural regions will have more effective labor forces than before and businesses will not have to pay directly for any of the increased costs of schooling. This more educated labor force will have better skills and at the same time will work for lower wages than its urban counterpart, thereby providing a large incentive for businesses to move production facilities to rural regions. Improving the education that rural citizens receive is one of the most important things China's central government can do to bring rural regions' standard of living up to the quality of urban regions.

Improving rural education, providing more access to cheap electricity, and creating new transportation capabilities directly impact the economic opportunities of rural Chinese. Larger investments in these areas will have immediate positive impacts on rural wages and job opportunities and will help improve rural China's standard of living. However, the real question that needs to be asked about these investments is how best to go about doing them. Through 2004 the central government spent a staggering 6 trillion Chinese Yuan⁶ on rural urbanization and development, but urban areas still had and still have a much higher standard of living than rural ones. This paper answers the question of how best to go about investing in rural China's infrastructure so as bring rural China's quality of life to a level near that of urban China.

These three investments provide more and better job opportunities to rural people. Doing this not only improves the lives of rural people, but also helps solve many problems for the Chinese central government. Not only will rural domestic demand rise with higher incomes, but it will also help stop the migration from the interior to the coast. The central government is realizing that the only way to prevent mass migration is to provide equal opportunities to people everywhere so that there is less of an incentive to migrate. In a sense the central government is now trying to equalize rural inland Chinese provinces with urban coastal ones.

⁴ S.C. Bhattacharyya, and S. Ohiare, "The Chinese Electricity Access Model for Rural Electrification: Approach, Experience and Lessons for Others," *Energy Policy* 49, no. 1 (2012): 676-687.

⁵ S. Fan, L. Zhang, and X. Zhang, "Reforms, Investment, and Poverty in Rural China," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52, no. 2 (2004): 395-421.

⁶ Ibid.

Background

China's current problems started when Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms were initiated in 1978. Since then China's economy has been growing at a blistering average pace of almost 10% per year.⁷ This growth has helped pull hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, but at the same time most of this growth has revolved around increasing China's export capabilities. This has led to huge increases in GDP in China's urban coastal regions where production and export centers are based. At the same time, China's rural inland regions, which were already poorer than urban coastal areas, have grown at a much slower pace. Over the past 30 years rural regions have grown much more slowly than urban regions, leaving the so-called "peasant" class behind. Per capita GDP is often three times higher in urban areas than in rural areas.⁸

In the past few decades this uneven growth has led to both widespread "illegal" migration towards China's urbanized coast as well as widespread protest by peasants. These peasants argue that the Chinese central government is not doing anything to better their lives while at the same time taking their tax money to support urban export centers. Every single year there are hundreds of thousands of protests in China, many of which protest the increasing wealth disparity.⁹

After seeing rural discontent grow in 2005, Hu Jintao tried to make a change by having China's central government invest heavily in developing and urbanizing China's inland rural areas. Hu Jintao did this through the Harmonious Society Policy; a plan partially meant to help fix the wealth gap between rural and urban areas.¹⁰ This policy helps solve multiple issues for the Communist Party, which was starting to feel more and more pressure to equalize China's inland and coastal economies at the time. This is

⁷ Rongxing (2012).

⁸ B. Chen, and Y. Yao, "The Cursed Virtue: Government Infrastructural Investment and Household Consumption in Chinese Provinces," *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 73, no. 6 (2011): 856-877.

⁹ Rongxing (2012).

¹⁰ Lin, Huang, and Tang, "Inclusive Growth Toward a Harmonious Society in the People's Republic of China."

also a policy that Xi Jinping (China's current president) has continued to follow. By seeing that many of China's problems are intertwined the government is seeking to tackle all of the major issues at once by using the same policy.

One of the main things the Harmonious Society Policy has assisted with is raising the standard of living and incomes of rural regions by investing in rural infrastructure and development. The central government recently announced that, as part of the Harmonious Society Policy, they would invest \$158 billion in infrastructure in China over the next few years.¹¹ These investments will have high returns in helping to promote rural economic growth. Many of these projects are also labor intensive and so will provide jobs to rural Chinese who would have migrated to coastal cities instead. The central government is essentially solving two problems with one solution by investing in rural areas: migration rates toward cities will fall and rural incomes will begin to grow at an increasing pace.¹²

This investment should also help solve another problem by raising China's domestic demand and thereby helping to balance China's imports and exports. This is because by receiving higher incomes, rural Chinese will be able to consume more goods and therefore more goods will be imported to meet the higher consumption demand. From 2000 to 2008 the consumption portion of China's GDP fell from 62% to 48% as Chinese citizens began saving more and spending less.¹³ At the same time, China's export share of GDP increased from 2% to 8%.¹⁴ This resulted in China having large trade surpluses. The rest of the world has become increasingly frustrated with China's trade policies. Increasing domestic consumption and importing more goods should help alleviate international trade pressure and frustration. By increasing domestic demand China will both be able to both sustain a high growth rate and import more foreign goods. China has already heavily developed its export

¹¹ J. Woods, "5 Ways to Play China's Infrastructure Buildup," 2012.

¹² Wang, Chu, and Hong (2011).

¹³ Binkai (2011).

¹⁴ Ibid.

capabilities. The marginal return to another Yuan invested in further export development will not yield as much economic growth as putting that same Yuan towards increasing domestic demand. Investing in rural regions will encourage domestic demand and therefore generate a high return by promoting increased private consumption.

By encouraging more rural consumption, Hu's Harmonious Society Policy aims to help resolve the rural/urban economic divide. Through investing in infrastructure and urbanization projects in rural/inland China, the government has been able to show that it is working extremely hard to equalize China's rural and urban populations. Investing in rural areas is supposed to help raise the standard of living of rural Chinese as well as provide them with an opportunity to earn higher wages, thereby increasing their consumption. Whether this policy has been as effective as it should be is a question of great debate, but it has undoubtedly helped improve rural living standards and will continue do so as the government invests more in developing these rural regions.

Investment in Transportation Infrastructure

One of the main areas that China's government has been investing in is the creation and improvement of roads and railroads in rural regions. So far roads and railroads have proved to be a great investment for developing China's inland transportation infrastructure and promoting more local and regional trade. Scholars have been able to quantitatively prove that land transportation infrastructure, when compared to air and water transportation infrastructure, has the highest return on investment. This was most recently shown in the study "Transport infrastructure and regional economic growth: evidence from China."¹⁵

Land transportation infrastructure being a better investment than other infrastructure types is especially true in central, western, and inland Chinese regions where there are few

opportunities to invest in other types of transportation infrastructure. Inland rural regions also tend to have China's poorest populations and incomes are more based off of agriculture than in coastal urban regions. The highest proportion of the population work as farmers who need to be able to transport their crops to local and regional markets. The most efficient and cheapest way for them to transport their crops is generally by truck to local markets, and then by railroad if crops are being shipped to more distant major cities. This makes providing more roads and railroads essential to these rural populations so as to allow them to access more markets with their crops.

Spending on water transportation infrastructure is not perceived as a good investment because it will have low economic growth returns in rural and inland China.¹⁶ This is because the majority of inland Chinese farms are not located along rivers and so rarely use water to transport their goods. They also often just use irrigation to get water to their farms. There are few rivers in inland China, which makes it very hard to transport crops by water. The closest large river to a farm or village can be dozens of miles away making water transportation useless. In addition, the rivers and creeks in inland China are generally smaller than those in coastal China due to the lack of water and higher elevation. Smaller rivers mean smaller boats and a lessened ability to mass transport crops. Air transportation is also unfeasible for the transportation of both people and crops because it is too expensive for the majority of rural and inland citizens.¹⁷ In addition, airports are almost always located near major cities with dense populations and there are far fewer of these in Central and Western China than in Eastern China.

This basically means that farmers are forced to move their surplus crop by truck to local village markets if they want to sell it for cash. If farmers want to instead sell their crops in major cities, where crop prices may be higher, they will likely have to use the railroads. The railroads are cheap, direct, and quick so they often present

¹⁵ Qiang, Chu, and Junjie (2011).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

farmers with the best opportunity to sell crops for a higher profit in more distant markets.

Improved land transportation infrastructure helps not only farmers, but also inland merchants and other businesses. New and improved roads provide merchants and businesses with a lower opportunity cost when it comes to traveling and selling their wares in nearby markets and cities.¹⁸ Distances traveled will be shorter and there will be less wear and tear on vehicles so merchants and businesses can have higher profits by still traveling to the same markets. Markets that were previously unprofitable, due to travel, might also finally become profitable thereby pushing businesses to sell their goods in new markets. Rural villages and towns also benefit because they will now have a broader selection of goods their residents can buy due to more products being sold in their areas. This improved travel will also create more competition between producers, which in turn will force producers to improve the quality of their goods. More competition will force down profit margins and prices for goods, thereby providing a larger consumer surplus to rural Chinese citizens. Lower prices will push rural Chinese to save less and consume more as they trade out saving for higher consumption due to a larger wealth effect.

One major problem with constructing thousands of miles of new roads is dealing with the pollution that is emitted as a by-product of cement production. Fortunately, a company called Ceratech, based out of Virginia, has created cement from fly ash that can be produced with minimal pollution.¹⁹ Fly ash is a by-product of coal power plants.²⁰ This fly ash cement is known to be stronger than regular cement and can be cooked at far lower temperatures than regular cement.²¹ If the central government uses this new type of cement, then they will be able to build thousands of miles of new roads with little pollution. In fact, if they use the fly ash from the thousands of coal power plants in China then they

can even hypothetically reduce pollution by not having to send the fly ash to landfills.²²

Railroads are the other main type of land transportation investment. Railroads have the same benefits as roads for inland businesses and merchants, but to a lesser degree. Railroads allow merchants and businesses to sell their wares at both near and distant markets such as coastal cities. However, many of the goods produced in rural regions are cheap and easily made so cities are generally already able to efficiently produce them for a much lower price. In addition to this, cities are the places where goods are usually already produced and so cities are already exporting their surplus goods to rural inland regions.

Railroads do, however, heavily benefit rural inland consumers. Railroads allow factories (that are almost always based in or near cities) to export their goods in bulk to rural and inland regions for a much cheaper transportation cost than would be incurred if goods were transported using roads. Railroads make it so that if rural citizens want to buy factory-produced goods, they can buy them at a much cheaper price. Much like roads, railroads also make it feasible for more factories to send their wares to rural markets and still produce a profit. This inevitably increases competition to sell similar goods in rural markets. The increased competition then both forces prices down and the quality of goods up, which both benefit consumers in the end.

Railroads also have huge benefits for Chinese travelers. Migrant workers will often travel to visit relatives back in their home provinces. Every year millions of Chinese travelers use the railroads to get to these destinations.²³ This is especially true of poor and working class Chinese. The main reason that they use the railroads is that they are both relatively fast and relatively cheap.²⁴ For many passengers, traveling by rail is

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ I. Amato, "Green Cement: Concrete Solutions," 494 7437 (2013).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ X. Liu, P. Cheng, and A. Chen, "Basic Research and Catch-Up in China's High-Speed Rail Industry," *Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies* 9, no. 4 (2012): 349-367.

²⁴ Ibid.

the only economically feasible way to get to different destinations within the China.

Land transportation is by far the best and most feasible way for inland and rural Chinese to travel and transport goods because the initial investment in either a vehicle or ticket (in the case of railroads) is affordable.²⁵ Society's and government's return to an investment in better roads and railroads is also far higher than an investment in improving water or air transportation. This is true in both terms of economic returns and social returns. Traveling or transporting goods anywhere by airplane is just too expensive and inland China has too few waterways to make water transportation worth the investment in long canals or more boats.

Land transportation investment also has the largest side effects on employment opportunities.²⁶ New roads and railroads have directly provided jobs in poorer Central and Western China. This is because the Chinese central government has had to hire new workers to construct the new infrastructure and to maintain it. The construction of this transportation infrastructure is also highly labor intensive, meaning that when the government does construct new roads and railroads hundreds to thousands of workers are hired.²⁷ This need for more workers has also helped raise wages in these rural regions due to a higher demand for labor while supply is held constant. These new jobs then provide these rural Chinese with a decent source of income that they are then able to spend on consumer goods. New roads and railroads also encourage businesses to offer more employment in rural regions.²⁸ China's rural inland labor is extremely cheap and by providing an improved transportation network businesses will be more inclined to build production

facilities in these regions.²⁹ These new production facilities will offer new employment to rural citizens that will vastly improve their quality of life and increase their incomes. With more employment opportunities rural Chinese citizens will be more inclined to stay in their home provinces.

China has already started to see migration towards coastal regions slow down because better economic opportunities are starting to emerge in Western and Central China. These opportunities are both directly and indirectly related to improved transportation infrastructure. By building infrastructure the Chinese central government is not only improving transportation, but is also helping grow the rural economy and raise domestic consumption.³⁰ This improves the economic growth of rural Chinese provinces and helps them come closer to the high standard of living of the coastal provinces. Rural workers who may have previously moved to coastal cities for work are now more likely to stay in rural inland China because they now have better job prospects.

In conclusion, improved land transportation encourages more trade due to a cheaper transport cost for both goods and people. Better land transportation also makes it so that cities can more easily transport goods out to rural regions and for a cheaper transportation cost. Farmers can also more cheaply ship their goods to distant markets. In the end better transportation infrastructure allows rural inland consumers to buy both more and better goods at lower prices. This encourages more consumption and helps raise the rural inland population's standard of living. The new transportation infrastructure investment also provides good job opportunities to previously unemployed rural workers. Continued investment in roads and railroads has helped and will continue to help raise the economic growth rates and increase the standard of living of rural Chinese provinces.³¹

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ L. He, and F. Duchin, "Regional Development in China: Interretional Transportation Infrastructure and Regional Comparative Advantage," *Economic Systems Research* 21, no. 1 (2009): 3-22.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ J. Hong, Z. Chu, and Q. Wang, "Transport Infrastructure and Regional Economic Growth: Evidence from China," *Transportation* 38, no. 5 (2011): 737-752.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

Investment in Energy Production Infrastructure

Electrifying all of rural China is another major infrastructure investment currently being made by the Chinese central government. Currently, electricity is common in urban and coastal Chinese households, but rural Central and rural Western China are lagging in the electrification of households. As of 2009, a rural Chinese household used on average only 30% as much electricity as the average Chinese household.³² This shows that rural China is still far behind urban China in terms of electricity use.

The electrification of rural China will improve the standard of living of rural Chinese citizens in numerous ways and should be well worth the investment. One way that rural Chinese will see their lives improve is that they will be able to use appliances, such as dishwashers and refrigerators, which they were never able to use before. Currently only 33% of rural Chinese households use refrigerators and 12% use air conditioning units.³³ If rural China gained better access to cheap electricity these numbers will greatly increase. The electrification of rural areas will also encourage businesses that use large amounts of electricity to move to these regions.³⁴ These businesses will offer employment opportunities to millions of Chinese that will better their lives.

Fully electrifying rural China presents the central government with many issues that it never had to face when electrifying urban China. These issues must be addressed if this plan is to work. The first issue is that the central government must create facilities to generate enough power to provide the necessary amount of energy to support these rural households. To generate ample power the Chinese central government must engage in a massive expenditure plan to build more power generation

³² Bhattacharyya, and Ohiare, "The Chinese Electricity Access Model for Rural Electrification: Approach, Experience and Lessons for Others."

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ C. Shyu, "Rural Electrification Program with Renewable Energy Sources: An Analysis of China's Township Electrification Program," *Energy Policy* 51, no. 1 (2012): 842-853.

facilities in all regions of the country. The types of facilities built in each region is dependent on the combination of cheapest, least polluting, and best sources of energy available in each specific region. The second issue that the Chinese government must deal with is determining how best to link up rural households with energy production facilities. Because many of these households are in such remote areas, this task can be very difficult. The government plans to make connecting rural China to the power grid cheaper and easier through things such as the Brightness Program, which China launched in 1998.³⁵ The Brightness program is a program that focuses on providing cheap electricity to rural Chinese households.³⁶

To be able to supply electricity to rural China, the central government and local governments must develop energy production facilities that are best suited to their respective regions. In Central and Southern China there are an ample number of large and medium sized rivers that make hydroelectric power the best method of electricity production. In Western and North-Central China the flat plains make wind power a great source of energy. In Northeastern China there are large coal deposits and many rivers that make coal and hydroelectric power the best source of energy. Coal power presents a major pollution problem, but if hydropower becomes the main source of energy production and is substituted for coal power then pollution from coal power production can be mitigated.

Central and Southern China are the rural regions with the largest populations and so need the largest amount of electricity generation. These areas have a great source of energy in hydroelectric power. Southern China, specifically the provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan, has tall mountains and large rivers running through it, which creates the perfect scenario for mass hydroelectric power generation. The Brahmaputra, Mekong, Salween, Yangtze, Pearl, and Yellow Rivers all run through the region of South-central China; however, there are many

³⁵ Bhattacharyya, and Ohiare, "The Chinese Electricity Access Model for Rural Electrification: Approach, Experience and Lessons for Others."

³⁶ Ibid.

more medium and small rivers that are also suitable for hydroelectric power. Furthermore, power-sharing agreements can be made for rivers that flow through both China and other countries so as to prevent any disputes from arising. Creating large dam networks along these rivers will be very suitable for both flood control and generating a large amount of power, which then could be used by households and factories.³⁷ Inexpensive waterpower will also provide a great reason for energy-intensive businesses to move operations to the region and provide jobs to the rural citizens.

China already has a long history of using water power to generate electricity. The Three Gorges Dam, which was recently built along the Yangtze River, provides perhaps the best example of massive hydroelectric power generation. The Three Gorges Dam supplies power to nine different Chinese provinces and on average generates 627 gigawatt hours of energy per year.³⁸ The Three Gorges Dam has, however, caused both populist and political problems, such as forcibly moving at least 1.3 million Chinese citizens.³⁹ In the long run the massive amount of clean power generation and the huge economic benefits should justify the central government's investment. The Three Gorges Dam has also made it much easier to control floods downstream and the massive amount of clean power generation means that these provinces can use less coal, and thereby reduce pollution.⁴⁰

The Three Gorges Dam is on one of China's largest rivers and something of its size would be nearly impossible to repeat. It is, however, possible for China's government to heavily invest in dams in Southwest China that can produce sufficient amounts of electricity to power the entire region.⁴¹ Enough energy can even be produced to hypothetically be exported to

developing countries such as India, Myanmar, and Laos. An investment in more dams will also provide jobs to the region, which can help raise economic growth.⁴²

Western and Northern Chinese provinces have few rivers and so hydroelectric power generation is not a feasible possibility for supplying power to the entire region. The region does, however, have vast plains that make wind power the preeminent choice for producing enough electricity to power the region. The vast plains of Western and Northern China have incredibly strong winds, especially during the 8 months surrounding winter time, that provide this region with the power source it needs to generate electricity.⁴³ Winter also happens to be the time when rural citizens in these provinces are using the most energy, specifically to heat their homes.⁴⁴ China already accounts for 26% of the world's wind power production and much of it comes from Western and Northern China.⁴⁵

Producing wind power for rural citizens in this region has three major problems that must be dealt with. The first is that a large proportion of the population, especially in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, are migratory herders and don't settle down in one place all year.⁴⁶ Although this population has been gradually settling down, it would still be almost impossible to get electricity to a sizable portion of the population. The second major problem is that these regions are the most sparsely populated in all of China and so getting power to rural towns and villages can be very costly. The third issue is that wind power generation is currently one of the most expensive types of energy production⁴⁷ and so there is a good chance that many of the citizens of this region will be unable or unwilling to pay for the unsubsidized electricity that is produced.

To solve the first issue the government will need to either convince the herders to settle

³⁷ Ao, Peng, and Xielin (2011).

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ E. Eckholm, "China Shifts on How to Resettle Million People for Giant Dam," *The New York Times*, May 25, 1999.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ G. Veeck, *China's Geography: Globalization and the Dynamics of Political, Economic, and Social Change* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ma (2001).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ B. Klagge, Z. Liu, and P. Campos Silva, "Constructing China's Wind Energy Innovation System," *Energy Policy* 50, no. 1 (2012): 370-382.

⁴⁶ Fan (2013).

⁴⁷ Ma (2011).

down or allow them to go without electricity. A combination of these two options is probably the best plan. The government should continue to allow the herders to go about herding for as long as it is profitable for them and there are no better alternatives. Inevitably, however, more migrant herders will turn towards a more settled life. The government must make sure that it has already established enough electricity production capacity to supply electricity to herders' new homes. The central government should also attempt to build new industries out in these regions, such as mining, farming, and oil production, to encourage herders to settle down sooner rather than later. If the government provides large enough economic incentives for herders to settle down, then they will do so.

Providing jobs to the population must also be a priority of the central government if rural populations are expected to be able to pay for electricity. These western and northern regions have the economic advantage of having vast metal and oil reserves that could be (and to some degree are already) exploited to generate more jobs and large profits.⁴⁸ Inner Mongolia already happens to be one of the wealthiest regions in China in terms of GDP per capita, mainly due to the mining of vast natural resource deposits.⁴⁹ If the Chinese central government offers a profit sharing plan that will allow rural citizens in the North and Western regions of China to earn a decent living then many of the herders will settle down. Farming is also a major industry in these regions that can provide more employment opportunities to newly settled people. Once settled down the herders will be able to take advantage of the settled lifestyle, which includes access to better education, better jobs, better schooling and access to electricity.

The second problem that China's government needs to solve is figuring out how to supply electricity to a sparsely populated region. This, however, is an area where wind power has a huge advantage over other types of power generation. Because power production is not centralized in one power plant, it is possible to have either fewer or smaller wind turbines in rural villages

and towns with smaller populations. These populations will not even necessarily need to be connected into a centralized power grid because they will have ample energy production from their wind turbines.

If part of the population is trained to be able to maintain the wind turbines and villages are connected to the grid, then some villages might even be able to install enough turbines to produce surplus energy, which can then be exported to other regions of the country. This will help raise the incomes of these rural villages, which in turn will increase their standard of living and consumption. The best part about this is that wind-powered energy production is generally a passive job where the rural citizens can continue with their daily lives and will need to spare only minimal amounts of time to maintain the wind turbines.

This idea of village-maintained wind turbines will, however, require a substantial subsidization of the higher education, specifically engineering education, of a small proportion of citizens from these regions. Many of these citizens who do earn these engineering degrees will likely want to move to coastal China due to more competitive incomes and a higher standard of living.⁵⁰ The government can easily counter this by instituting a deal which will be similar to the ROTC program in the United States. In exchange for full subsidization of their education by the central government, engineers will agree to work on maintaining wind turbines in remote northern and western Chinese villages. The central government can also lure engineers to work on wind turbines in these rural villages by agreeing to pay them higher wages.

The third issue of wind power being very expensive is also the largest issue. Installing a wind turbine requires a sizable initial investment that is then only slowly recuperated over time because the cost of maintaining wind turbines is high and energy production is relatively low. That being said, using any other type of energy would also require a large initial investment for power lines to connect rural towns and villages to the

⁴⁸ Yan (1993).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Y.D. Wei, *Regional Development in China: States, Globalization, and Inequality* (London, New York: Routledge, 2000).

power grid and to the power plant itself. Initially putting in the wind turbines is something that the central and provincial governments will have to either heavily subsidize or fully pay for because the rural villages are all fairly poor. If the governments are willing to pay down the initial investment then revenues from power consumption can go to the government until the initial investment is paid off. After this the profits from power generation can go to a village fund, which will provide these villages with a stable source of income that can be spent at villages' own discretion.

The best plan is to force rural villages that meet minimum population requirements to install excess wind power production capacity so that these villages can produce a surplus of wind power. This surplus can then be distributed back to the grid and in the long-term the towns and villages will automatically have a stable source of revenue. This will require a much bigger initial investment from the government due to the need for more financing of the wind turbines and connection to the grid, but in the long-term it will likely serve the villages best. Regardless of how the central government specifically deals with the installation of the wind turbines, it is best for them to use wind power to supply Western and Central-Northern China with electricity due to the availability of wind in the region.

When it comes to Northeastern China, coal is by far the cheapest source of energy that can be used to produce electricity.⁵¹ Northeastern China needs this cheap energy because the region consumes vast amounts of energy for two reasons: a harsh climate and an economic reliance on heavy industry.⁵² Because Northeastern China is so far north and so far inland it has a very cold winter and a very hot summer. This makes it so that buildings use a huge amount of energy just to keep inside temperatures stable.

Northeastern China uses lots of coal because it is very abundant and the local economy relies

mainly on heavy industry, specifically metal refining such as steel production.⁵³ This is mainly because when the Japanese occupied Manchuria they immediately invested in creating heavy industry in the region. Ever since the Japanese occupation, Manchuria has been one of China's main hubs of heavy industrial production. When China opened up to the world in the 1980's the heavy industry portion of the economy did struggle, but China's rapid urbanization has helped turn this around by creating a high demand for steel to build office and residential buildings.⁵⁴

Even when the Japanese controlled the region, coal was the preferred source of power generation. China already has thousands of coal fired power plants producing energy in the area, but this has led to very high pollution levels.⁵⁵ China's northeastern region produces so much pollution that smog from China eventually ends up covering portions of Korea and Japan.⁵⁶

Using just coal for power generation provides the government with a conundrum: how does it supply enough cheap electricity to the region to meet demand while at the same time lowering pollution levels? In the long-term China's best option to cheaply provide electricity to the northeastern region of China is to use two sources of energy. Hydroelectric power can be used to supplement coal power. Hydroelectric power can generate a massive amount of power in the late spring, summer, and early fall when the ice is melting and river volumes are large. When the volumes then shrink and are too small to supply enough energy to be able to fully power the entire region, utilities can begin to switch over to using more coal power. Coal power will then only be needed to make up the difference between energy demand and the energy supplied by hydroelectric power generation.

China's Northeastern region has a fair number of rivers that can be used for hydroelectric power generation. The Liao, Amur,

⁵¹ J. West, "Where One Coal Power Plant Stops, Another Begins," *Atlantic Monthly*, September 27, 2013.

⁵² National Development and Reform Commission, "Northeast Revitalization Plan" (2007).

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ J. Ryall and A. Yoo, "Japan, South Korea Concerned that China's Smog will Affect Them," *South China Morning Post*, November 6, 2013, 1.

Songhua, and Yalu rivers can be used to provide varying amounts of hydroelectric power. These rivers, unlike the large rivers of Southern China, are much smaller and have smaller flows in the winter due to the cold climate, but can still produce power. Currently Northeastern China (Manchurian China in this case) has only eight dams; four of which are on the Yalu River and three of which are on the Songhua River.⁵⁷ Although two of these rivers already have multiple dams along them, more dams can still be built. Potential hydroelectric energy production is smaller than in Southern China and so other energy sources, such as coal, must still be used. Northeastern China can greatly reduce pollution output by switching over to using more hydroelectric power generation during the warmer months. Northeastern China cannot rely completely on hydroelectric power, but using more of it will do a lot to reduce pollution output and clean up the environment.

Switching over to using more hydroelectric power has other positive externalities as well. Coal power is an active process in that you need miners to be constantly mining coal. This forces a large proportion of the population to be stuck mining and prevents them from being able to produce other goods and services. China also has notoriously poor mining safety standards, which have indirectly led to thousands of deaths as a result.⁵⁸ Using more hydroelectric power will cut the number of mining related deaths, injuries, and diseases such as lung cancer.

Hydroelectric power has the advantage of being a passive source of power generation. All one needs to do to generate hydroelectric power is open the dam's floodgates and water will pour downstream through the turbines thereby generating electricity. The only people that are needed to run the power plant are a few engineers to make sure that the dam is in good shape and that reservoir water levels are managed correctly. Hydroelectric power does require a much larger initial investment than coal due to the fact that a whole dam has to be built,

but in the long run the investment will be paid off by cheaper energy and a better environment. A larger portion of the population will also be disease free from less coal mining and they will be able to work in other industries producing goods and services.

Improving China's energy production in rural inland regions is one of the best things that the central government can do to improve the standard of living of China's rural population. By gaining access to ample sources of cheap power, China's rural population will be able to do things that they could never have done before such as invest in and use household appliances or keep the lights on at night to study for school. In addition to the direct affects, investing in more energy production will surely bring more jobs to these rural regions that will help bolster economic growth and raise rural incomes. Cheap sources of energy will encourage firms to move production facilities to these regions where there is enough energy to power factories and labor is cheaper. Cheap energy production will also allow these regions to export energy to coastal provinces and other countries. Doing this will also encourage more domestic trade between regions. In the long run investing in more energy production facilities in rural and inland China will help push these regions towards full economic equality with coastal and urban China.

Investment in Education

One of the best ways to increase a person's job opportunities, income, and standard of living is to give them a better education. As civilizations become more developed, there is a greater emphasis placed on investing resources in education due to its high return. The most developed countries in the world also generally happen to be the most world's most educated nations. All OECD countries currently maintain minimum education attainment levels of passing through 12 grade levels. If China hopes to someday become a developed country and diminish its inter-regional inequality, investing in better education in rural and inland regions is a great place to start.

⁵⁷ Industcards, "Hydroelectric Power Plants in China" (2013).

⁵⁸ M. Lelyveld, "China Cuts Coal Deaths," *Radio Free Asia*, February 25, 2013, 1.

Throughout history rural Chinese students have always faced far greater barriers than urban students to receiving an education. One of the biggest barriers faced by rural students is the opportunity cost of attending school.⁵⁹ Because much of rural China's economy is based off of agriculture, children and young adults can contribute to providing production and income for their families at a much earlier age than their urban counterparts. In urban areas, people generally need a decent education to gain employment because most economic activity is in the production of goods and services that are not as simple as farming. Plowing fields, sowing seed, and maintaining terraces is manual labor that virtually anybody can do, which is why rural children are put to work at a very young age. If rural children go to school instead of working, parents are forced to make up for the lost labor by either working more or hiring outside labor.

Another major barrier to education that rural citizens face is the high cost of travel. Because rural areas are so much less densely populated than urban ones, schools are often located far from people's homes. Traveling to school often takes a long time because students either have to walk there or parents have to invest a large amount of resources in getting their children to school. Today many rural schools have students stay for the week then go home for the weekend, but even this solution has its problems.⁶⁰

Education has always been very important in Chinese culture, but only since China began reform in 1978 has it been a main investment for the central government. When Deng Xiaoping made his "Four Modernizations," education was supposed to be a major backbone, especially for the "Science and Technology" portion of the plan.⁶¹ Ever since then China's spending on education has grown rapidly. Since 1999 China's spending on education has grown at a rate of 20% per year and is now over \$100 billion

dollars.⁶² Even with China's massive investment in education, rural and inland regions still remain at a huge disadvantage relative to urban and coastal regions. Almost all of China's illiterate and semi-literate population reside in rural and inland villages where there are few education opportunities and resources.

Learning how to read and write starts in primary school, which all Chinese children are required to go through. China's current schooling system requires a compulsory nine years of schooling.⁶³ This is equivalent to having to pass through primary and middle school in the U.S. Although almost all students in urban areas pass through all nine grades, the proportion of students passing in rural regions is far lower. The inter-regional disparity in levels of educational attainment is even more drastic when it comes to passing through the "high school" grade levels.⁶⁴ This rural-urban disparity is most prevalent in university and graduate education achievement levels.⁶⁵

If China is to equalize its educational achievement between regions, it must start from the ground up. Focusing initially on getting all rural students through primary and secondary school is a must. From 1960-2001 China's literacy rate improved from 60% to 85.5%.⁶⁶ Although this is a remarkable achievement, more can clearly be done to get this rate up to 100%. The vast majority of citizens who are still illiterate live in rural regions and so improving literacy rates in these regions should be the first problem the central government focuses on resolving.

Currently enrollment rates are virtually the same at nearly 100% in both urban and rural primary schools.⁶⁷ Only when it comes to secondary school do enrollment rates change between regions.⁶⁸ This means that either China's rural illiterate population is illiterate because

⁵⁹ Z. Zhao, "A Matter of Money? Policy Analysis of Rural Boarding Schools in China," *Sage Journals* 6, no. 3 (2011).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ I.C.Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

⁶² D. Shukman, "China 'to Overtake US on Science' in Two Years," *BBC News*, March 28, 2011.

⁶³ E. Hannum and M. Wang, "Geography and Educational Inequality in China," *China Economic Policy* 17, no. 3 (2006): 253-265.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Qian and Smyth (2008).

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

they did not go to secondary school, or that there were vast differences in the quality of education received between rural and urban regions.

As it turns out, previous studies done by the World Bank have shown that the main difference in inter-regional literacy attainment is mainly due to the quality of education received in primary school, although enrollment in secondary school also has effects on a child becoming literate.⁶⁹ Because primary and secondary schools are funded by local governments, wealthy urban schools are able to spend far more per student on education than poor rural schools. This allows urban schools to hire the best teachers and spend more on educational resources that in turn help students learn to read and write.

The Chinese central government is going to have to somehow equalize spending on education between urban and rural primary schools. The best way to do this is to use funds from the central government and put them towards improving the facilities and materials of rural schools. In addition, because teachers often prefer to live in an urban environment, the government may also need to further subsidize the pay of good teachers so they will be willing to work in poor rural regions. In the end providing more funding to supplement the education funds of rural governments appears to be the most efficient way to improve the literacy rates and education opportunities of rural China.

High literacy rates are also dependent upon students continuing on to secondary school. The enrollment rates of secondary schools (middle schools) vary far more than those of primary schools and are highly dependent upon the region that a school is in.⁷⁰ Urban China has an almost 100% secondary school enrollment rate while rural enrollment rates are usually lower. This problem is most pronounced in Western China where 10% of students do not move on to secondary school.⁷¹ The percentages of primary school students who do not enroll in secondary school in Guizhou and Tibet are respectively 21%

and 45%.⁷² Getting these students to enroll in secondary school is essential to them becoming fully literate.

Secondary school is technically mandatory for all Chinese students, although rural parents and students often ignore this rule altogether. Getting students to enroll in secondary school can be relatively easy, but there are many fundamental issues. The main issue is that secondary school students are right around the age of puberty and so their parents often want them to start working on the farm or in their family business. In addition, parents of poorly performing students are unlikely to want to waste the time of their children with more schooling when their children will not learn very much. Attending secondary school can be easily incentivized by both imposing fines on parents who do not send their children to secondary school and by subsidizing the attendance of secondary school.

The fines can be similar to those imposed under the One Child Policy. Essentially if your child is not enrolled in secondary school you pay a hefty fine. This will make it so that there is a much smaller opportunity cost for parents to send their children to secondary school, because even if children are not available to help on the farm or with the family business, at least parents can avoid the fine. Money from these fines can also go towards funding secondary schools. This makes the sting of a fine all the more bitter for parents because they will be funding the education of other students while at the same time their child receives no education at all.

The subsidization of secondary schooling can come in multiple forms. First the school can pay parents cash for their lost labor. Because children will no longer be working, parents will have to work more themselves, produce less, or hire outside labor. The government can also subsidize the schooling by paying for the transportation and feeding of students. This will take a large financial burden off of the parents, who will then be more inclined to invest their child's time in receiving an education. By using the incentives of both fines and subsidies, rural secondary school enrollment rates will reach the same levels as urban secondary school enrollment rates.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Hannum and Wang, "Geography and Educational Inequality in China," 253-265.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

When it comes to post-secondary school education (high school), urban China has far higher school enrollment rates than rural China.⁷³ This is not necessarily as related to literacy rates as primary and secondary school education achievements, but it is highly related to students being able to find better job opportunities and earn higher incomes. While only 8% of rural Chinese enroll in post-secondary school, 62% of urban Chinese do so.⁷⁴ Employers are clearly more inclined to hire people who have more education, and so it is far easier for urban educated Chinese to find well-paying jobs.

Evening out post-secondary attendance rates between urban and rural regions is the second thing the central government should focus on after improving the rural-urban gap in literacy rates. To diminish this gap the central government must give rural students (and their parents) the proper incentives to attend post-secondary school. This issue, just like rural literacy rates, comes mainly down to the issue of funding.⁷⁵ Most rural Chinese post-secondary schools are not even worth the time because the education received is so awful.⁷⁶ In addition, because students are at an age where they can start working, the opportunity cost of being a student is very high. If the central government subsidizes rural students' post-secondary education then it is likely that many more students will enroll in these schools. The central government can also give cash payments to student's parents as a way to make up for the lost labor of their children.

One of the final things that must be done to get rid of rural-urban education inequality is to provide a national curriculum. Because schools are generally run by regional governments, curricula often vastly differ between provinces.⁷⁷ This leads to rural regions often teaching things that are no longer relevant or worth the cost of the education. Providing a curriculum that is taught by all schools, and that is modeled on the curricula taught by the best schools, will make it

so that rural governments will spend their education funds far more efficiently and rural students will benefit as a result.

Providing a national curriculum will ensure that rural students are being taught the exact same subjects as urban students. Rural students will then be able to better compete with urban students when it comes to taking national college entrance exams and applying for jobs. Instituting a national curriculum will also allow teachers who move to teach in different regions to use the exact same teaching styles that they had been using previously. Good teachers who are moved from urban schools to rural schools will be far more effective in these rural schools because they will already know how to best to teach their specific subjects. Overall providing a national curriculum will do a lot to ensure that rural students receive a similar quality of education to that of urban students.

Equalizing education between rural and urban regions is one of the most important investments that the Chinese central government can make to bring rural citizens' quality of life up to urban standards. The central government must first focus on bringing the rural literacy rate up to 100% to match the urban literacy rate. To do this the central government must provide additional funding to rural schools and increase the enrollment rates of rural secondary schools. The Chinese central government must also put more money towards increasing the quality of education and increasing enrollment rates in post-secondary schools. By providing incentives to attend school and by raising the quality of education, rural citizens will begin to receive an education equal to the one received by urban students. Finally, the central government must institute and enforce a national curriculum that will provide rural schools with same subjects and quality of education as urban schools. This will allow rural students to better compete with urban students when it comes to college entrance exams and job opportunities. By providing all rural students with a better education they will see significant increases in their standard of living and life opportunities. Rural students will become more competitive in job markets, will receive higher incomes, and will have an overall better quality of life.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Conclusion

Investing in rural and inland China's infrastructure and education is one of the best ways for China's central government to bring China's poorer rural regions up to the same standard of living as urban regions. Investment in infrastructure and education will bring rural China better job prospects and higher incomes that will also encourage rural citizens to stay in their home province instead of migrating towards wealthier coastal cities. Bringing up rural China's standard of living will help solve multiple problems for China's central government; rural areas will be wealthier and will help raise domestic demand, there will be fewer anti-government protests in rural China, China's massive migration will be mitigated, and China will begin to start balancing their imports and exports thereby diversifying their economy and making it stronger.

If the Chinese central government is to invest in rural China's infrastructure there are three main areas that the government should look to invest in. The first is transportation infrastructure, specifically roads and railroads to link inland China's towns and villages with the rest of China. New and improved transportation infrastructure will generate more trade and travel between inland regions and firms will gain access to cheap inland Chinese labor. Inland and rural Chinese consumers will also gain access to a cheaper and larger variety of goods.

The second infrastructure investment that the Chinese government will need to make is providing more power generation in rural and inland Chinese regions. Investment in more hydroelectric power generation in Northeastern, Northern, Central, and Southern China will provide lots of cheap electricity for these rural regions. This also will attract businesses that will offer employment to millions of these rural Chinese. In addition, these regions will be less reliant on energy derived from fossil fuels such as coal and so pollution will be diminished. In Western and Northern China the central government should invest in wind power due to the region's windy conditions. Wind powered energy generation will allow many rural Chinese

who live in Western and Northern China to finally have access to cheap electricity.

The final, and probably most important, investment that the Chinese central government must make is in rural and inland China's education. Rural China lags far behind urban China in educational achievements and school enrollment rates. If rural China is to be able to compete with urban China when it comes to getting jobs and high incomes then the central government must supplement the education funds of rural provincial governments. The central government must also institute and enforce a national curriculum that will allow urban and rural schools to have the same education standards. Investing in rural China's education will bring rural China improved job opportunities and higher incomes.

Investing in these three areas will help raise rural China's standard of living up to levels near the standard of living of urban China. In doing this China will be well on its way to becoming a developed nation with falling levels of social and economic inequality.

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Fresh-Faced Boys and the Cute Boy Next Door: Evolution and Splintering of Masculinity in Japan Through Men's Fashion Magazines *Men's No-No* and *Fine Boys*

SHARON CHANG

PREFACE

I myself, grew up in a multicultural environment. Born and raised in Colorado, I have gone through American education my whole life and been exposed to a culture unique to my state. However, my parents are immigrants from Taiwan and, from them, I have also received cultural information. My ties with Taiwan, however, may be stronger than most other Taiwanese Americans. My parents consume a lot of Taiwanese media and I have visited my family there on a number of occasions. I have also decided to study abroad there to learn Chinese (although I already speak it to a middle schooler's level of fluency) twice on my own volition; each session was 3 months long. Due to my exposure to Taiwanese culture and American culture, I grew up with a very flexible and varied idea of cultural norms that included both Western and Eastern ideals. This set me up to freely accept other ideas of masculinity as proposed by Japanese media.

As I got older, I became interested in Japanese media, primarily Japanese cartoons called *anime* at first. These beautiful, androgynous boys and men who soared past on the screen fighting and winning the hearts of similarly beautiful women captivated me. However, being surrounded by a peer group who also indulged in this hobby, I was still blissfully unaware of how the beauty ideal between Asia and the West (particularly America) was different. Even as I became interested in Japanese popular culture's current top stars, a manufactured boy band named Arashi, the difference in masculine ideals was not noticeable to me.

When I finally studied abroad in Japan during my junior year of college, I slowly came to recognize that something of the male ideal was different. I would talk to my foreign friends who, too, were now thrown into a vastly different

culture and I found the critique of the boys quite jarring. Many thought it was very unmanly and unappealing how skinny the boys were. I had also encountered this with the Japanese exchange student who was my friend. They were tiny and fragile which made me feel like I could easily break one over my knee.

As my time in Japan continued, my gay friend got a boyfriend and I was able to experience a little alternative Japanese culture when I went to a gay club for my friend's birthday. His boyfriend, Satoru¹, was a tanned, muscular go-go dancer who got up on stage and started gyrating at the enthusiastic screams of the people in the crowd. I was reminded of my many conversations with the Japanese boys I knew, asking why they were so skinny or their responses to offhanded comments about their size. They said that the stereotype of people who were gay was that of a muscular, tanned man and Satoru was the one who fit that description perfectly.

It was not until I returned to America that the cultural differences I had gathered culminated into the topic of this paper. The catalyst was my acquaintance with Shotaro who was a gym enthusiast and Americanophile. Upon first glance, Sho looked very much like a typical Asian American. He was swathed in Abercrombie & Fitch clothing, tanned, and muscular. He loved exercise, he said, and assured me, on multiple occasions, that he was not gay and liked women perfectly fine. I personally would not have thought he was gay and, through many iterations of his heterosexuality, my idea of cultural male aesthetic differences finally solidified in my head.

It was completely opposite. In America, men were expected to be athletic, muscular, hairy, and simply clothed in a t-shirt and pants. The stereotypical "gay" man was effeminate, soft-spoken, fashion-conscious and spoke with a lisp.

¹ Names changed to protect privacy.

On the other hand, although there are many “types” or *kei* of young men in Japan, most shared common traits of well-dressed in the fashion of their “type,” and skinny or athletic but not overly muscular. The homosexuals were the muscular and tanned individuals, who, even if they were simply exercise enthusiasts, led people to wonder about their sexual orientation.

What are the circumstances that led to such a different portrayal of masculinity in Asia, but specifically Japan? Where, then do these ideals of masculinity fall into place in relation to the oft-stereotyped Japanese salaryman? Through this paper, I seek to answer or form theories to answer these questions.

Introduction

The Internet is one of the catalysts that ushered in the increasing global popularity of Asian culture. At first it was anime, but, increasingly, it is also Asian pop culture. Impeccably styled hair, fashionably form-fitting clothing, faces that could be described more as beautiful rather than handsome, and silly variety shows that make audiences feel as though they are just the boy next door. However, from the point of view of an American, these men may seem effeminate but these are, in fact, an expression of masculinity in its own right.

Although femininity and the Japanese woman along with her experience in Japanese society are widely studied subjects, there is considerably less literature on Japanese masculinity. In fact, S. Craig (1992) noted, “men and masculinity have frequently been treated as the ‘norm’ and men’s portrayal in the media have often been seen as unproblematic or even exemplary.”² The gender conditioning of men in Japan is almost unconscious whereas the conditioning of women is conscious. When women in Japan follow traditional gender roles and divisions of labor, this conformity is a conscious decision. However,

² James Roberson, “Fight!! Ippatsu!! : ‘Genki’ Energy Drinks and the Marketing of Masculine Ideology in Japan,” *Men and Masculinities* 7, no. 4 (2005): 1, accessed April 4, 2014, <http://jmm.sagepub.com/content/7/4/365>.

Japan has seen improvement in the equality in gender roles. Although there is still progress to be made, Japan now ranks behind Russia and the Philippines in terms of young people who believe that men should work outside and women should work inside.³ I believe that masculinity is just as important to study in terms of Japanese society and gender relations because one does not exist in a vacuum without any influence whatsoever from the other.

In fact, in Japan itself, the men’s studies (*dansei gaku*), as it is termed, did not truly become a discipline until the late 1990s which grew, in part, from the increased study of women and the decrease in the national birthrate.⁴ While studies of the traditional hegemonic salaryman masculinity have been conducted, Japanese masculinity is changing and its evolution warrants study. In this paper, I will examine the evolution of the hegemonic salaryman masculinity into the multitude of masculinities now presented in Japanese media today while focusing mainly on current men’s fashion magazines. Many people make guesses about another’s gender through appearance. Therefore appearance is one of the most apparent ways gender is expressed and as such, fashion magazines propose certain ways to express gender. Other reasons for the selection of fashion magazines are because they are widely consumed and available, aspirational, and prescriptive. Men’s fashion magazines are an interesting study in masculinity through the visual representation of gender. I hope to gain new insights about masculinity today and its current incarnation by examining men’s fashion magazines.

³ Futoshi Taga, “Rethinking Japanese Masculinities: Recent Research Trends,” *Genders, Transgenders, and Sexualities in Japan*, ed. by Mark McLelland and Romit Dasgupta, (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2005: 149), accessed April 6, 2014.

http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=U95wiILL5gkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA153&dq=japanese+masculinity&ots=RqktmLEsis&sig=MUwwqDCpCxc1Q6BKF_j8jrjdcKA

⁴ Ibid.

Traditional Hegemonic Masculinities and its Evolution

In 1995, Connell came up with a framework of gender in which he defined masculinity as "configurations of practice structured by gender relations."⁵ He further expanded upon the idea that gender structures can be broken down into four dimensions: power relations, production relations, emotional relations and symbolic relations. "Power relations" refers to the dominance of one gender over another. "Production relations" refers to the division of labor among genders. "Emotional relations" refers to the concern of symbols that signify gender or the sexual or non-sexual emotional attachment to an object. Thus, it can be said that masculinity is the "processes and practices of the above four facets in relation to femininities and the effects of these upon individuals' physical as well as emotional experiences, identity, and society."⁶ This shows that in the creation of masculinity, its relation with femininity is an important aspect of that construction. Therefore, in the discussion of masculinity, women will inevitably play a role either directly or indirectly.

A highly visible construction of masculinity is hegemonic masculinity which, as Connell (1995) points out, is "not the most statistically common type of man but rather the most desired form in relation to social, cultural, and institutional aspects."⁷ Often, the dominant, or hegemonic, masculinity is considered the salaryman masculinity.⁸ The typical salaryman works at a

large company and is paid a monthly salary (thus the term, "salaryman"). Large companies are a part of the construction of hegemonic masculinity because they are culturally and socially most desired workplace in Japan. The attractiveness of these careers is typified through higher incomes, security, and presence of in-company welfare.⁹ The salaryman masculinity exemplifies the patriarchal heterosexual family as the ideal family construction. As this rapid industrialization spread in the modern era, there was an increasing separation of the public and private spheres of a person's life and this also created a division of labor separating the two genders: men would work in the public sector in large corporations and women would find domain the private sector at home.¹⁰ As more middle-class salarymen entered the workforce, their devoted, stay-at-home wives were the complements that supported them from home. In this highlighted context, the masculinity was established as a loyal, working man who supported his family financially as the provider of the household as well as a father and reproductive partner. However, by the mid-1970s, the construct of the salaryman household was heralded as the public ideal and epitome of wealth and affluence produced by Japan's economic miracle. However, when the economic bubble burst in the 1990s, the notion of salarymen came under criticism as a gendered construct.¹¹

In Hidaka's 2010 book, *Salaryman Masculinity: The Continuity of and Change in Hegemonic Masculinity in Japan*, the creation and evolution of the salaryman masculinity is explored extensively through a study of three generations of salarymen. The main foundation of the salaryman masculinity was essentially built in the 1960s and 1970s. When these men were born before the end of World War II, they were undoubtedly influenced by nationalistic propaganda espousing the idea of the *yamato-damashii* (the Japanese spirit which one fulfills

⁵ Connell (1995): 44 as cited by Tomoko Hidaka, introduction to *Salaryman Masculinity: The Continuity of and Change in the Hegemonic Masculinity of Japan*, (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2010, 1), accessed April 8, 2014.

http://books.google.com/books?id=Mh7axkxFF8oC&pg=PR9&lpg=PR9&dq=men+and+masculinities+in+japan&source=bl&ots=sHH_q_rYyr&sig=7B0mf1G_IYtwnOCJW3NinYXatf8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=qj9CU7a0CqiiyAHJIIHADg&ved=0CDkQ6AEwBDgK

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Connell (1995): 77 cited in Ibid., 2.

⁸ Dasgupta (2005a, 2005b, 2003, 2000), Gill (2003), Ishii-Kuntz (2003), Miller (2003), Robertson (2003), and Robertson and Suzuki (2003) cited in Hidaka,

Salaryman Masculinity: The Continuity of and change in the Hegemonic Masculinity of Japan, 2.

⁹ Ibid., 6.

¹⁰ Ibid., 2.

¹¹ Ibid.

their duties to the nation and Emperor through fearless sacrifice). However, when Japan lost the war, this national spirit then morphed with renewed vigor in the form of '*kigyouenshi*,' or corporate soldiers, who would devote themselves to the reconstruction of the nation through their work at national corporations. This was achieved in periods of high economic growth. This generation's establishment of seniority, lifetime employment, and company-based welfare system led for the next generation of the 1970s and 1980s to simply follow in the first generation's footsteps. The companies manipulated them into unconsciously exerting themselves for the company. Both the second generation and the companies that employed them did not question this relationship at all and their work led to the usage of words such as '*karoshi*' (overwork) and '*waakahorikku*' (workaholic). However, when the economic bubble burst in the early 1990s, the cozy relationship between the companies and their workers slowly degenerated and the survival of the company became more important than the workers themselves. The third generation lacked the solidarity of uniting under a singular goal of the first two generations. Their lifestyle is far more individualized by the two generations before them. However, since they work for the second generation and the first generation to a lesser degree, their ideals of masculinity live on in the third generation.¹²

The salaryman aesthetic itself is quite uniform and consists mostly of two-piece suits and ties that provides little room for customization and self-expression. The aesthetic itself reflects the culture and expectations that come from being a salaryman. The suits provide general uniformity which reflects in the Japanese saying that the nail that sticks up is hammered down. At the same time, suits emphasize the shoulders (often with shoulder pads) and slim the waist which highlight the manly, inverted-triangle body shape. This body shape is traditionally associated with men and manliness across cultures.

¹² Ibid., 6-8.

Masculinity as Developed by the Media

Mass media has become a form of cultural dissemination as it provides a wider audience of overlapping experience. However, with the democratization of technology and the Internet consumers have an increased ability to access niche media and interact with it at a deeper level. An important psychological concept in understanding media's relationship to the construction of masculinity is the cognitive theory and, in particular, observational or vicarious learning. This means that people learn by imitating other people. On a deeper level, by learning from other people, one internalizes these behaviors and incorporates them into one's own psyche. By seeing other people do certain things on media, one comes to understand what is expected of them and how to go about achieving this. In particular, gender as a social construct is learned this way. Through the analysis of media, Kervin (1990) suggests how "gender ideology is being constructed at any particular time"¹³ and also because media can "create, reflect reinforce and otherwise [be] imbricated in the reproduction of dominant gender ideologies."¹⁴

Roberson's 2005 study of the 'genki' energy drink advertisements exemplifies the principles that are espoused by the salaryman masculinities. 'Genki' drinks are "popular medicinal" drinks that are often infused with vitamins and other supplements like (Korean) ginseng, caffeine, and garlic among other ingredients. Roberson chose the 'genki' energy drinks because these advertisements in particular sought to invigorate salarymen as their main message therefore adding to the hegemonic masculinity despite the fact that both men and women consume it. Many of these advertisements focus on salarymen who are tired after working long hours and need an extra boost of energy which the 'genki' drinks provide. Another theme that 'genki' drink commercials focused on was outdoors and sports. In Japan, like other parts of the world, sports are an important part of how hegemonic masculinity

¹³ Roberson, *Men and Masculinities*, 266.

¹⁴ Ibid.

is perpetuated and learned (Ishii-Kuntz, 2003).¹⁵ These commercials showed men excelling at their sports and performing difficult maneuvers. In both themes of the 'genki' drinks, there is an intense focus on the male and masculine body. Men here are represented as being active, muscular, physically active, powerful, confident, and skillful. There is a strong association being made on bodily strength, skill, and stamina to overcome obstacles and defeat foes. This one way of how masculinity is established and reinforced through mass media. In these advertisements, the element of physical strength, which is thought to be an element of Western masculinity, is present. Considering when the salaryman masculinity was established, this Western influence is unsurprising. Post-WWII Japan was in the throes of rapid industrialization after a humiliating defeat by Western nations, namely the United States. Although the athleticism represented here is not necessarily representative of the physical state of the salaryman, it symbolizes the overbearing masculinity that stresses the capability to conquer tasks (even if they are only those set by the company) and membership to the public, outside social sphere. While the original form of salaryman masculinity may be dying out as its original generation grows older, the basic essence of the salaryman masculinity is reinforced by the 'genki' drinks.

Although the idea of the salaryman masculinity is at the forefront, one of the most important theoretical discoveries in the field of men's studies was that there is no singular construct of masculinity; rather, there are multiple masculinities.¹⁶ In a language study by Sreetharan (2004), age also factors into the differing constructs of masculinity. In the study, the use of 'manly' speech registers across three generations of Japanese men is used as a form of expressing masculinity. It is seen that expressions of masculinity are demonstrated differently depending on the age of the man in question. Sreetharan found that younger men are found to use traditionally masculine registers whereas

¹⁵ As cited by Roberson, *Men and Masculinities*, 266.

¹⁶ Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity: The Continuity of and change in the Hegemonic Masculinity of Japan*, 1.

older men are more likely to use neutral and polite terms in speech. Sreetharan offered the explanation that, as boys grow into men and start holding their own jobs, manliness is shown by achievements (such as company promotions or material goods) rather than the posturing of young men who do not have much to show for their prowess yet.¹⁷

This drives home the point that there are multiple masculinities. Some research has been done already on fringe masculinities which are subordinated and marginalized by the hegemonic model of masculinity.¹⁸ Also, there has been literature about salarymen (e.g. Hidaka's 2010 book on salarymen) but there have not been many studies about the younger generation of men in Japan and how they understand and show their masculinity. In Darling-Wolf's (2004) analysis of Japanese masculinity, "media texts create and circulate social meanings, the polysemy of mediated messages (Fiske, 1995) also allows media consumers to actively engage in varied and multiple subjectivities, some of which may fall outside the confines of traditional or dominant codes of gender representation (Barthes, 1975; Hall 1980)."¹⁹ As such, due to the multiplicity of media and its targeted audiences, multiple masculinities can be created. Also, due to modernization efforts in post-WWII, Japan is "consequently a likely terrain for multiple and

¹⁷ Cindi Sturtz Sreetharan, "Students, Saraiiman (pl.), and Seniors: Japanese Men's Use of 'Manly' Speech Register," *Language in Society* 33, no. 1 (2004): 100-101, accessed April 6, 2014.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4169317>.

¹⁸ Lunsig (2002, 2001); McLelland (2005a, 2005b, 2003a; 2000); Pflugfelder (1999) for gay men; Gill (2003); Roberson (2003, 1998); Sunaga (1999); Taga (2001) for marginalized men as cited by Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity: The Continuity of and change in the Hegemonic Masculinity of Japan*, 3.

¹⁹ Fabienne Darling-Wolf, "Women and New Men: Negotiating Masculinity in the Japanese Media," *The Communication Review* 7, no. 3 (2004): 286, accessed April 8, 2014.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10714420490492193>.

diverse representations and interpretations of masculinity to emerge.”²⁰

As such, I believe that the hegemonic masculinity is transforming from the traditionally demonstrated in salaryman masculinity. The start of the transformation is illustrated by the popularity of Japanese pop star Kimura Takuya largely among women. Increasingly, in studying masculinity, women cannot be excluded from the sphere of masculinity as they have a say in what is desirable. After all, one of the main goals of conforming to gender norms is to make oneself more desirable to the opposite sex. In a small ethnographic study by Darling-Wolf (2003), women in Japan were found to be quite critical of the images of masculinity presented to them. Although only a handful of women from a small southern Japanese community were interviewed, the information that was reaped proved very interesting. In these interviews, the women often compared the men in today's media with the “old days” when men were ‘quiet men, men that were a bit awkward, especially when trying to express their feelings.’²¹ The younger men in the media were perceived more like the boy-next-door and someone who one could definitely relate to. Another woman mentioned that “earlier celebrities seemed more ‘manly’ than today's idols who were judged to definitely not be ‘the macho type.’²² Darling-Wolf noted that, because the women saw popular male idols these days as less manly, this was “a natural evolution of contemporary gender identity.”²³ In addition, to some women, these androgynous looks were not seen to diminish a man's masculinity. Those interviewees resisted any idea that these idols looked more “feminine” than their predecessors. However, some of the younger women interviewed thought the newer generation of men to be “childish” and “cute” and certainly less reliable. With such critical eyes about today's male idols, these findings support the study mentioned earlier about women in Japan being

more objectively conscious about gender norms and stereotypes than men.

In a 2003 study on Kimura Takuya, Darling-Wolf established the marketing and presentation of the talent, actor, and singer as the formulation of a different type of masculinity. Kimura Takuya, or Kimtaku as he is widely known, rose to fame largely through a combination of his involvement in the band SMAP and his appearances in key trendy dramas. SMAP is one of the many boy bands managed by Johhny Kitagawa who is known for churning out beautiful boys in bands who then go on and dominate many other forms of popular media. By looking at Kimura, four factors of masculinity are discussed: his visual aesthetic, his stance as a sex object, his feminine or sensitive side, and his masculine side created through male bonding and violence.²⁴

For the visual aesthetic of androgyny, Japan has had a long history of gender-bending and beautiful boys. Examples abound, but to name a few, there are the *otokoyaku* (female actors playing male roles) of Takurazuka and the *onnagata* (male actors playing female roles) in Kabuki.²⁵ Although Kimura has cross-dressed and has been made up to look like a woman,²⁶ these actions do not detract from his reputation in the eyes of his fans that he is manly. Also, through a series of photos in magazines and teasing roles in dramas,²⁷ Kimura's body as a sex object has been brought to the forefront. This very much speaks to his largely female following but also reinforces to the men watching this that a muscular body (and therefore sexiness) desirable masculine traits. As for his portrayal of his feminine side,²⁸ although he has a tough guy image in certain dramas, there are scenes of Kimura dealing with deep-seated emotional issues or crying. This also

²⁰ Fabienne Darling-Wolf, “Male Bonding and Female Pleasure: Redefining Masculinity in Japanese Popular Culture,” *Popular Communication: The International Journal of Media and Culture* 1, no. 2. (2003): 74-75, accessed April 8, 2014.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15405710PC0102_1.

²¹ Ibid., 78-79.

²² Ibid

²⁷ Ibid., 76-77.

²⁸ Ibid., 78.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 291.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

portrays a certain type of softer masculinity that is seen as acceptable since it is displayed on widely consumed and popular media. Lastly, through male bonding and violence, Kimura also demonstrates a more traditional, or “western,” masculinity. First of all, Kimura is a member of an all-male band SMAP and is often loved and revered for their close bonds with each other. The members been with each other since their teens and now are well into their late thirties and early forties are known to call each other brothers. In addition to male bonding, Kimura also plays a number of roles that involve physical violence. While this also plays into male bonding in the adage that men talk with their fists, Kimura's characters also see reform from their past violent selves.²⁹ These scenes of violence and related male bonding again underscore the thought that physical prowess are one of the main ways masculinity is portrayed. As we can see in the smattering of masculinities that are portrayed by Kimura, what is desirable is a strong man who is sensitive, sensual, beautiful, and powerful. He can protect with violence but can be reformed to gentler ways.

Masculinity in Men's Fashion Magazines

Although Kimura Takuya was the most prominent symbol of the change in the hegemonic salaryman masculinity, he is no longer the most widely consumed popular culture symbol, especially by the younger generation. I decided to examine the younger generation as they are the newest evolution of Japanese masculinity. Instead of looking at mass media such as television commercials which have a more general audience, I decided to look at something a little more intimate and immediately relatable: fashion. When people choose to wear on a daily basis is a portrayal and concrete example of societal gender norms. Simmel, G. (1957) published a theory about fashion as an imitation of the higher social classes in an effort to decrease the distance between them. However, the main point is that Simmel also notes that

fashion is a struggling dichotomy between fitting into the dominant fashion of the time and differentiating the individual wearing such fashion.³⁰ In fashion magazines, this dichotomy is apparent. None of these outfits are completely outrageous and completely unseen; on the other hand, each is an attempt at individuality. I will be focusing on the aspect of fashion that differentiates individuals from the larger mass and analyze what this difference says about the masculinity portrayed.

Thus I looked at two popular men's fashion magazines: *Fine Boys* and *Men's Non-no*. I compared issues of the different publication from the same month they were put on shelves. I believe that this is a more accurate way of published in the same month since weather is an important factor in considering what clothing to wear or recommend to readers. By comparing magazines published in the same month, this also rules out the possibility that clothing could look more or less simple depending on the availability for the season or simply the style of the season.

In Japan, children from elementary school through high school are usually required to wear uniforms to school. This limits the amount of time that one can wear *shifuku*, or “personal” or casual clothing. As a result, during this time, students are not overtly concerned with how they wear their casual clothing and how they present themselves. Also, students at this age are often discouraged by both their parents and schools to have part-time jobs which limits their spending money. However, once they enter university, they are allowed the freedom to wear whatever they wish to school. This suddenly provides for more freedom of expression than they have previously experienced. It is unsurprising that this newfound freedom may lead to nervousness of how one should present oneself at school and in what style. Restrictions against having part-time jobs are also lifted which allows these college students to have more disposable income. As these young men and women reach adulthood, they are gradually able to drink freely and have

²⁹ Ibid., 79-82.

³⁰ Georg Simmel, “Fashion,” *American Journal of Sociology* 62, no. 6 (1957): 543, accessed April 27, 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2773129>.

fewer limitations on their movements of where and when they can go to places. Japanese universities require less work than universities in the United States which also allows these young people to have more free time. During their previous schooling, and especially during high school, studying is imperative to get into a reputable university and therefore landing a lucrative and stable job. After these students enter university, the pressure to excel academically is essentially lifted.³¹ Because of all of the factors mentioned above, college age provides a unique opportunity to study the construction of masculinity because this is the first time young men can and must express their masculinity in an outwardly apparent fashion. Both of the men's fashion magazines that I examined both had readership in the college-attending age group. How they choose to go about doing so provides insight into the ongoing, new construction of masculinity of today's youth.

The first magazine that I examined was *Men's Non-no*. *Men's Non-no* is actually a men's version of the women's fashion magazine *Non-no*. According to the Japanese authority on media, *Zasshi Shinbun Soucatarogu* (Magazine and Newspaper General Catalogue), *Men's Non-no* was first published in 1986. The readership breakdown is 42% college or specialty school students, 38% are men in the workforce, 17% are high school students and 1% is an unspecified population. This fashion magazine is geared towards men who want a pleasant, yet refined style that has been carefully selected and offered up. The magazine is created with an audience of men ages 15 to 25 years old who want to have fashion that very current.³² The content spans the targeted age range well. There are both articles about suits and the how-tos about wearing

them³³ which young men who are preparing to start job hunting or even enter the workforce would find useful alongside articles about drinking and being drunk³⁴ for the younger audience who have yet to start drinking and are curious about it. *Men's Non-no* promotes an image of masculinity that is closer to the hegemonic salaryman representation of masculinity especially that which was promoted through the 'genki' energy drinks. This is shown through the aesthetic choices of the editors in the layout of the magazine, model selection, promoted clothing and hairstyle choices, backgrounds, and presence of sports-related advertising.

The layout of *Men's Non-no* is very clean. The clothing is presented in clearly delineated lines and grids in which the clothing and model photos are arranged. The general aesthetic of the magazine is minimalist. Spreads with a single, enlarged photograph with a neatly arranged block of text is very common. Even the titles of the articles are stylishly placed and unobtrusive. The titles are so discreet that effort must be spent to discern the titles from subheadings within the article. However, this design choice added to the overall minimalist feeling of the magazine which contrasts sharply the women's fashion magazines that I looked at. I looked at *Men's Non-no*'s sister, and original, magazine, *Non-no*, as well as *ViVi*, *CanCam*, and *Cutie*. Although some of these magazines had large photograph spreads, half or more of the pages were busy and filled with large photos as well as smaller "cut-outs" of the models. The words are also squeezed into small spaces between photos. The titles of the pages are in garish, neon colors that bring the reader's attention to them immediately. There are some thoughts that can be gathered from this obvious difference in layout. First, the magazine could be making a conscious and obvious effort to differentiate *Men's Non-no* as different from women's magazines and, by proxy, different from women. This highlights the point that in a society with two prominent genders, distinction of each

³¹ Yoshi-Fumi Nakata and Carl Mosk, "The Demand for College Education in Postwar Japan," *The Journal of Human Resources*, 22, no. 3 (1987): 388-389, accessed May 2, 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/145745>.

³² Media Research Center, *Zasshi Shinbun Soucatarogu*, trans. Sharon Chang (Tokyo: Media Research Center, Date of Publication), 266.

³³ Masayuki Ozawa, "How to Choose Two-Piece Suits," *Men's Non-no*, June 2013, 172-179, trans. Sharon Chang.

³⁴ Hiromi Sato, "The Truth About Alcohol," *Men's Non-no*, May 2013, 236-239, trans. Sharon Chang.

gender is made, in part, by separating and differentiating from the opposite gender. The minimalism may also speak to men. As per the fashion and connotations in recent trends, minimalism is often associated with classiness and perhaps these men wish to portray their classiness in this manner. There is a portion of the readership that is part of the workforce. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think that these men would want to have a magazine that spoke to them about it. On the same vein, this simplicity also speaks to the younger readers who may wish to emulate an adult look. This is also consistent with the idea that there are different expressions of masculinity depending on age, as I mentioned earlier in the paper. Adults should have a certain look about them where as college age, high school, middle school, etc., should have different looks and therefore different expressions of masculinity.

Second, I took a look at the models that are presented in *Men's Non-no*. This includes both models featured in the actual magazine content itself as well as in the ads. I noticed that there are many foreign fashion companies featured in the magazine. Some of these companies include, but are not limited to: Burberry, Giorgio Armani, Lacoste, Diesel, Levi's, and Hermes. The models for almost all of these advertisements were foreign; namely people of European descent were featured. I thought of two possible explanations for this. The first is that *Men's Non-no* consciously chose these foreign models in trying to establish a stronger connection with the West. As mentioned earlier, Western masculinity plays a role in the salaryman hegemony and these Western men are seen to be more 'manly' with their muscles, physical strength, body hair, and more chiseled features. This diverges greatly from certain traditional East Asian and Japanese expressions of masculinity that promoted woman-like beauty. There is support for the thought that *Men's Non-no* is actively promoting this Western style is that the dominant fashion found in the magazine is very closely related to a fashion style called *ame-kaji*, or American casual. *Ame-kaji* is, as the name suggests, very similar to the fashion that can be seen on the streets of America, t-shirts and either pants or long shorts are ubiquitous. A common footwear choice is sneakers. The jacket of choice

is usually a hooded sweatshirt. Second, there is a possibility that these companies universally use the same images to promote their products regardless of the localization of the publication. However, I would argue that this is actually a deliberate choice as magazines do not blindly lease out page space to anyone who is willing to pay. These fashion magazines must make a conscious choice about which brands and fashions to allow in the content so that it is consistent with the image they are trying to achieve in order to maintain their desired readership.

As for the models that were featured in the actual content, many of them have more manly traits, the most notable one being facial hair. Body and facial hair is thought to be more 'manly' by Japanese men. Often, there are references in popular culture that when one is incredibly manly, it is as if chest hair starts sprouting. Again, this may be another reference the desirable traits in Western masculinity that is also present in salaryman masculinity. Also, there were older models that looked to be in their thirties or forties. This is consistent with the idea that *Men's Non-no* may be trying to go for a more adult look. They also feature famous people and not every day people that one might run into on the street. Some of the models include the designers themselves, celebrities, and athletes. A possible explanation for the selection of these people is that these are people that the readership may look up to. Not only are these figures that the younger readership can look up to, but the older readership can also admire these models as well. The use of these famous people works especially well with appeal to a younger audience because younger people may be in a greater need for role models. However, for older people who may not necessarily need role models, the choice of these celebrities as models adds legitimacy to the claims and outfits that *Men's Non-no* is pushing forward within its pages.

Another aspect that is telling about masculinity is the way the models are posed. If one flips quickly through the pages of a *Men's Non-no* magazine, the fact that hardly any of the models are smiling becomes apparent. Also, many of the models look disinterested and look as though they were stopped on the street and were

quite unhappy about it. These men look gruff with their hands either crossed or stuffed into their pockets. In most cases, if the models are not looking at the camera, then they look like they are functioning in everyday life – this might be hanging out with friends, waiting, or commuting, etc. On the other hand, models in women's fashion magazines usually have their models either smiling or looking doe-eyed into the camera. Otherwise, they are having fun but always conscious of the camera. That is to say that they are always being consciously posed. They are always posed in a fashion that is cute but artificially constructed. This difference is another way masculinity is being portrayed. This includes the aforementioned element of presenting masculinity in contrast with femininity. However, another point that can be added is that men who are a part of the hegemonic masculinity are unattached and uninvolved. This is consistent with the division of labor where men work outside the home and do not take a significant role in the home or in raising the children. This is clearly communicated by the models in the pictures. The ideal man is cool and unfazed by anything that comes his way.

Next, I examined, in detail, the exact style worn by the models of *Men's Non-no*. The combinations of items are very simple. They are usually combinations of t-shirts or long-sleeved shirt and pants or shorts. On top, there is some sort of covering that is a jacket, blazer, or coat. Sometimes hats are worn but usually they are baseball caps. Although sometimes the pieces themselves are interesting in the print or cut, they are rather standard. One might even say that the composition of basic clothing pieces found on the models could be found without much of a problem in the US. As mentioned earlier, there is even a style called *ame-kaji* or American casual. Perhaps, it is not so far of a stretch to think that this style came from the West, specifically the US. Sometimes they even feature clothing from abroad, an example was an article about fashion in New York.³⁵ Various men are pictured on the streets of New York. The selection process and motivation for the choice street fashion is

³⁵ "Complete Fashion Snapshot," *Men's Non-no*, July 2013, 49-51, trans. Sharon Chang.

unclear, but the fact that New York is mentioned supports the conjecture of the desire for *Men's Non-no* to create a link with the U.S. Again this reinforces the concept of Western masculinity in Japan. Men are expected to have simple, largely effortless style that emphasizes low maintenance. This is put in contrast with the stereotypical woman who spends countless hours on her hair, makeup, clothing, shoes, and nails, among other things. Again, this is a definition of gender by contrast.

As for the color schemes of the clothing chosen is also very telling. Many of the clothing colors in *Men's Non-no* either consist of dark colors or dark colors with a very vivid color. Often blacks are used somewhere on the outfit along with bold patterns. Sometimes the clothing that these men wear is what seems to be haute couture where one would be hard-pressed to find it on the streets anywhere. An example would be ridiculously patterned shirts and pants that match.³⁶ Another outfit is a large-brimmed black hat with a black mesh long-sleeved shirt over a black or sleeveless t-shirt and knee-length shorts.³⁷ The reason why this sort of clothing might be in this fashion magazine is because all of these haute couture-like outfits are very edgy. This element of danger and uniqueness is a desired trait in men as found in the appeal of Kimura Takuya's bad-boy characters as I have discussed before. It is thought that men's work is more dangerous so this form of fashion can be reinforcing to this point. Another possibility is to portray that the readership of *Men's Non-no* is unique. By having noticeably unique characteristics, the readership of the magazine can live vicariously and feel as though they, too, are unique because they wear clothing in the style of the magazine. Although seemingly ironic and contradictory, perhaps these fashions are not those of the people surrounding the reader and, by following this fashion, they are able to differentiate themselves. Another explanation is that the style, and therefore form of masculinity,

³⁶ "Hankyu Men's, Limited Edition Items," *Men's Non-no*, May 2013, 148, trans. Sharon Chang.

³⁷ Kai Tokuhara, "Make the Strongest Color, Navy, Your Own!" *Men's Non-no*, June 2013, 94, trans. Sharon Chang.

the fashion is trying to portray is the “bad boy” look or the “deviant” look. This creates the idea that men live dangerously and uncaring of the way other people and society look at them. This appeals to the inner feeling of being a man who is in the wild and able to do whatever he wants. This is the masculinity that is portrayed through the aforementioned ‘genki’ drink advertisements and institutionalized sports in schools. The freedom to do what one pleases is afforded to these men through power which can be manifest through physical or influential power.

On the same vein as clothing, the hairstyles in *Men's Non-no* are worth noting. The men have simple haircuts that seem to have no product in it. The color is usually natural black; although that is not to say that an occasional flash of brown or blond cannot be seen on the glossy pages. Although there are many models with short, boyish haircuts, some models can also be seen with unconventional hairstyles. Bob haircuts, bowl cuts, and even shoulder-length hair with no layers can be seen. The naturalness and effortlessness of these hairstyles is also contributing to the construction of masculinity. Men cannot be too fussy about their looks, especially their hair. Spending too much time on and caring excessively about one's own looks is considered unmanly as this behavior is stereotypically associated with women. This juxtaposition of gender expectations really emphasizes what it means to be ‘manly.’ However, there is a curiosity that I noticed in the models for *Men's Non-no*. There are a few models that have medium long to very long hair. There was even an instance when a model with a beard and long hair braided his hair. Upon thinking about it, I have no clear explanation for this occurrence. The only conjecture I could possibly push forward is that long hair is what *Men's Non-no* believe to be a Western, ‘manly’ look. One may find that these ideas reference the hair metal bands of the West who have long unkempt hair, sometimes facial hair, and are generally considered rather manly than not. Another possible explanation is that, precisely because such long hair is not the norm, these models are trying to establish that they are unique for the same reasons as mentioned earlier in this paper. It seems that, although long hair is traditionally

associated with women, this does not appear to be a problem in these representations of masculinity. In women's fashion magazines that I looked at, more often than not, have models with long hair. Therefore, this stylistic choice is still unclear and has no clear conclusions in my analysis.

Similarly the settings in which *Men's Non-no* chose to shoot the models in are a topic of interest and support the image portrayed by the hair and clothing of the models.. Some shots are simply done against a white background. However, it is the photographs where you can see scenery that beg for extra analysis. Many of these settings are urban. Each photograph is set in large cities that are clearly concrete jungles. The buildings or walls are discolored. There are multiple pictures in a rooftop setting and large skyscrapers can be seen in the distance. Sometimes the models are even pictured against urban graffiti and abandoned houses with the window or door broken.³⁸ If there are other buildings in the background that look still functional, they are built in an unmistakably modern style. Glass and funky shapes abound in the architecture captured in the background. These background characteristics also contribute to the ‘bad boy’ and edgy image that the hair and clothing give and for similar reasons. Also, these support the masculine ideals of the salaryman hegemony which involves competence, confidence and skill. The bad boy image especially emphasizes physical competence because it boasts physical danger and the confidence to handle oneself in a variety of situations. Although some of the readers might live in these places, it also serves to romanticize these settings. While some readers may live in these inner-city types of places and thus can and wish to identify with this fashion which constructs its image around the setting, the fashion magazine also serves to romanticize the bad boy image. Cities are often thought to be the center of culture and often the originator of many fashions and subcultures. As such, people who grew up in the *inaka*, or countryside, are often scorned by city-dwellers. Therefore these

³⁸ “Rad Musician’s Harem Pants,” *Men's Non-no*, May 2013, 31, trans. Sharon Chang.

countryside readers may wish to associate with the city and the masculinity that it suggests and provides.

Another characteristic that was particularly prominent was the presence of activities promoted. This could be either in the form of advertisements or simply what the models were pictured doing. The presence of men participating in sports is a fairly common occurrence in *Men's Non-no*. The most obvious manifestation of this is in the section titled MN Sports Headline which is an interview with a world-class athlete. However, there are also advertisements where athletes are pictured. For example, athlete Shota Matsushida is pictured weight lifting on a machine while promoting for Oakley.³⁹ Also, the models are pictured carrying baseball bats or tossing baseballs.⁴⁰ There are regular advertisements for Harley-Davidson motorcycles. Also, there is typically a section about road bicycles detailing different models of bicycles available.⁴¹ Although one might expect car advertisements as is often present in American men's magazines, there is a marked lack. However, it is worthwhile to note that, due to the infrastructure of Japan, a car is a luxury good as the advanced public transportation allows one to move freely around cities and the country. Similarly, cars are only obtained later in life because of their luxury status if obtained at all. Therefore, it falls outside the readership of *Men's Non-no*. As I mentioned earlier, sports is an important vehicle to construct masculinity regardless of the country. The presence of sports in *Men's Non-no* reinforces the aspects of physical prowess and determination to overcome as essential parts of masculinity. The readership will understand masculinity through the prowess of sports because they see the models participating in such activities.

Lastly, I noted that women hardly ever grace the pages of *Men's Non-no*. The men are mostly pictured with other men doing activities. This

may seem commonplace as it is a magazine for men's fashion and it would make sense for there to only be men as men will be wearing the clothing. However, deeper analysis is necessary here. This separation shows the true segregation between the sexes and the strong presence of homosociality. Men are only friends with men and women exist in a separate sphere. In fact, women do not play a large role in the construction of masculinity in *Men's Non-no*. There is nothing about women preferring a certain style over another. There is also limited conversation about the relationship between men and women. There certainly are articles involving the opposite sex with topics such as long-distance relationships,⁴² when to confess love to a girl,⁴³ and planning the best date ever.⁴⁴ However, these focus heavily on what the man should do and not so much about what the woman wants out the relationship. The women are not asked or polled about what they prefer the men to do. This effectively bars women from entering the conversation for the construction of masculinity. Not only do they not have a say in the aesthetic construction of masculinity, but they also do not have a say in how they would like to be treated by men. If the magazine truly sought to please women, it would make sense to go ask women about what they would like. On the other hand, at least two, if not more, male celebrities are featured in interviews in each issue of any women's fashion magazine.

Here some references can be made about sexuality in this context. Since women do not participate in the creation of masculinity, perhaps it can be concluded that women also do not play an active role in masculine sexuality, but a passive, receiving role. As men are mostly pictured with other men, masculine sexuality might be largely a function of men seeing how

⁴² Hiromi Sato, "Today's Long-Distance Relationships," *Men's Non-no*, March 2013, trans. Sharon Chang, 96-99.

⁴³ "The Definitive Authority! Our (Love) Confession," *Men's Non-no*, March 2013, 91-95, trans. Sharon Chang.

⁴⁴ Hiromi Sato and Sawa Ishi, "The Best Date in Your (Personal) History," *Men's Non-no*, June 2013, 218-220, trans. Sharon Chang.

³⁹ Oakley Japan, "Beyond Reason" advertisement, *Men's Non-no*, May 2013, 108.

⁴⁰ "100 Style Sample of Stylish Button-Up Shirts," *Men's Non-no*, May 2013, 36-37, trans. Sharon Chang.

⁴¹ Kohji Ogata, "Let's Start the Bicycle Life," *Men's Non-no*, June 2013, 186-191, trans. Sharon Chang.

their experiences compare with each other. Also, it could be that their sexuality is something that focuses largely on their own pleasure and desires rather than their female counterpart. Thus, the female plays the role of the passive acceptor of men's sexual desires. The sexual roles of both also reflect gender roles and gender expectations within Japanese society. Men are expected to have the more proactive role that mostly revolves around other men as a peer group.

In comparison, *Fine Boys* provides a drastically different view of masculinity from *Men's Non-no*. *Fine Boys* was also first published in 1986. Its readership largely consists of men in their early twenties before they enter the workforce. The magazine itself focuses on the "high casual" style and publishes a plethora of fashion information on interior design, hair styles, grooming, digital goods, cars, etc.⁴⁵ Although both magazines overlap in terms of the targeted age groups, *Fine Boys* is far more specific and has a smaller age range for its readership. This magazine focuses heavily on college-age men and provides guidance for boys who have just entered university. I examined the same factors in *Fine Boys* as I did in *Men's Non-no*: the aesthetic choices of the editors in the layout of the magazine, model selection, promoted clothing and hair style choices, backgrounds, and presence of sports.

While perusing *Fine Boys*, the layout of the magazine was something that immediately stuck out to me: it was very similar to the sample of women's magazines of *Non-no*, *Vivi* and *Cutie* that I examined. The titles of the articles were in bold and sometimes even neon colors and very large so that it immediately drew the reader's attention to it. Around a larger image, smaller images of models or clothing items are scattered around. Text about the appeal of the item, its price, and the brand are squeezed in next to the pertinent picture. Upon first glance, the information on each page is overwhelming and may feel like one cannot find a good place to start. However, once used to the format, reading the magazine became very fun and entertaining. The headlines are

extremely catchy and, due to their size and color, are easy to find therefore making browsing for a specific topic very easy. These aesthetic and design choices are made possibly because boys at this age require and seek as much information as they can possibly get. Another possible reason for this is that the need to differentiate from women is not as strong for either this generation or this age group. Perhaps having certain traditionally feminine characteristics are not only accepted but desired. However, I am led to believe that the reason behind such a change in the relationship to femininity is because masculinity in Japan is evolving. This change is probably being ushered in by the new generation. Perhaps what is now desired is a masculinity that is not so dominant, but instead is can be dominated by women. I will explore this thought further as I analyze other characteristics of the *Fine Boys* magazine.

Next, the models themselves warranted closer inspection. First, they were much younger than a majority of those found in *Men's Non-no*. However, this was expected as *Fine Boys* has a much narrower readership and thus would draw from college-age boys. Also, these boys were very fresh-faced. Much of this feeling is influenced by the fact that they are often smiling either at the camera or at something else. These boys looked like they were enjoying whatever they were doing whether it was being photographed or whatever activity they are pictured doing. Although the idea is that these boys were caught in a candid photo, it is obvious that their poses are also purposefully constructed much like the models in women's fashion magazines. Many of these boys are pictured waiting or commuting but pleasantly doing so with a cute smile on their faces. Due to the postures, activities, facial expressions, and poses of the models, the overall feeling of the magazine is indisputably "cute." These boys seem harmless and very much like the boy-next-door that a mother would introduce to her daughter. Because this is such a heavy theme within the magazine, it is presumable that this posture is desirable to the readership. This "cute" masculinity is very different from the masculinity of the salaryman masculinity as well as the masculinities of earlier generations. I argue that this masculinity is more accepting of feminine traits because this is desirable to

⁴⁵ Media Research Center, *Zasshi Shinbun Soucatarogu*, trans. Sharon Chang (Tokyo: Media Research Center, Date of Publication), 263.

women themselves. No longer is the “bad boy” image universally appealing as it might have been in the past. Now, women are demanding this cute, innocent, and largely harmless masculinity. With the recent increase in women in higher education and the workforce,⁴⁶ (Sugihara & Katsurada. 2002:445), women are now taking a more active role in shaping the type of masculinity that they desire. They now wish to exert more power in gender relations which is not as accepted in the traditional model of salaryman masculinity.

However, this is not to say that *Fine Boys* is completely devoid of any mention of masculinity. In some pages, there are definite mentions of the appeals of being more ‘manly.’ For example, there are articles that offer readers information about ‘manly’ clothing and techniques to dress well⁴⁷ or to emphasize the wearer’s “maleness” through a certain print.⁴⁸ However, the items that bring out the ‘manliness’ of the wearer should be done with moderation as another article offers suggestions for pieces that are modern in style but not overtly *yancha*, or mischievous.⁴⁹ I believe that this term requires some further explanation. The term *yancha* can also apply to ‘bad boys’ who like to play and go about the typical activities associated with that label. As such, this headline illustrates a deviation from the headstrong, ‘bad boy’ model of masculinity. The masculinity demonstrated in *Fine Boys* is trying to strike the delicate balance between overtly “masculine” while maintaining enough “manliness” to appeal to the ladies. The “manliness” is necessary to provide some sort of distinction between men and women, but not be so extreme to the point where women feel unsafe, unappreciated, and completely powerless.

⁴⁶ Yoko Sugihara and Emiko Katsurada, “Gender Role Development in Japanese Culture: Diminishing Gender Role Differences in a Contemporary Society,” *Sex Roles* 47, nos. 9/10 (2002): 445, accessed April 4, 2014. <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1021648426787>.

⁴⁷ “‘Manly’ Clothing and Technique to be Stylish,” *Fine Boys*, November 2013, 29-33, trans. Sharon Chang.

⁴⁸ “If Bandana Print Shirts Emphasize Manliness, Isn’t that Good!” *Fine Boys*, July 2013, 39, trans. Sharon Chang.

⁴⁹ “Current, Not-too-mischievous Skate Style Mix!” *Fine Boys*, May 2013, 103, trans. Sharon Chang.

Next, I examined the clothing presented in the magazine and it provided a plethora of points to analyze. Despite *Men’s Non-no* also being a fashion magazine, *Fine Boys* is noticeably more heavily weighted towards fashion rather than other supplemental content like news, events, cooking, or celebrity or athlete interviews. First, I noticed that all of the outfits in *Fine Boys* required significantly more layering than the clothing styles in *Men’s Non-no*. The models are wearing t-shirts, layered with a long sleeved shirt and then maybe a vest followed by a button up or blazer whose sleeves can be rolled up to show the shirt underneath. They are decked out with a necklace and also numerous bracelets and even anklets. As for the pants, they can have baggy or slim cut long pants made from a variety of materials. Shorts are also an option, but there are multiple lengths of pants to choose from. The patterns on both tops and bottoms can range anywhere from solid to two-toned to completely garish print. While the variation of clothing items and the layered look presented could be a clever marketing ploy to induce the readers to consume and buy more articles of clothing, I would like to believe that there is deeper meaning. I believe this large selection of possibilities and combinations of different pieces provides a dressing and styling experience closer to that of a woman’s wardrobe. In addition, while hats are a possible accessory option, many of the models do not have headwear (although some sport purely decorative glasses) and instead have elaborately waxed and styled hair. I will talk in greater detail about this later. The available and propositioned clothing combinations and styles support the proposition that feminine traits are becoming more acceptable. Spending time and effort on outfits is no longer frowned upon, but now there are magazines that help instruct clueless young men as to how to go about doing so. Also, this means that appearance is becoming increasingly important as an expression of masculinity. Before, during the salaryman masculinity, men essentially wore suits which, in essence, functioned as uniforms. At the same time, clothing that was deemed too feminine was, and still is, actively avoided. Therefore, effort (and knowledge as well) in fashion is required in the

masculinity proposed by *Fine Boys* in particular to appear adequately male.

Like I mentioned earlier, I believe the waxed hair look that of Japan is of particular interest because it is styled in a way that is rarely found elsewhere except for its imitators in other Asian countries. The wax is applied to create more body in the hair but also lets individual chunks of hair to be identified from the rest resulting in a more "lifted" look. From personal experience, doing this is not easy and takes a lot of time and effort as well as practice. However, over the duration of my contact with Japanese boys, I have found that a very large portion of them are able to do this. The effort it takes to style hair in this way in tandem with the effort taken to dress oneself stylishly also illustrates the new masculinity as, in part, one of visual aesthetic. Perhaps without these particular traits, women would not find a man masculine. These hairstyles can also be used to draw inferences about masculine sexuality. Due to the effort necessary to style hair in the desired manner, the hair is only to be seen not touched. Especially if these men are concentrating on impressing women with their appearance, they would not want the time and effort put into styling their hair just so to be ruined through touch. I have also experienced this in my interactions with Japanese male exchange students since they often have wax in their hair and abhor physical contact with their hair. The popularity of these high-maintenance hairstyles can also show that women can appreciate the way these men style themselves but are not allowed to initiate contact. That is to say, women, regardless of their actual interest in the man, must wait for the man to make the move.

Another point of interest is the color schemes of the clothing presented. While *Men's Non-no* provided an edgier look with contrasting colors, *Fine Boys* goes for a much softer look. While that is not to say that there are no bright colors in the outfits of the models, the contrast is softened by neutral tones of black and/or white as well as warm colors of brown. While *Men's Non-no* had some outfits that were all dark colors or all light colors, in most of the *Fine Boys* outfits, there is a good balance of dark, light, warm, and bright. Even in a largely monochrome outfit, there is at

least one piece that brings a pop of color which takes the harsh edge off. However, the abundance of brown really caught my attention. In many cases, there was at least one piece on the outfit that is a variant of brown. *Men's Non-no* had brown to a lesser degree and mostly consisted of black in the outfits. These warm colors contribute to the cute, nice, boy-next-door feeling that is emitted by the fashions of the magazines as well as the models themselves. Looking at the outfits, I could feel a pleasant feeling as the models were a nice balance of color. This was different from *Men's Non-no* which was a very polarizing experience; I either liked it or disliked it. Sometimes I even felt uncomfortable with the color combinations and contrast. Again, the difference in the color scheme in *Fine Boys* supports the idea that the magazine is pushing forward a different type of masculinity that is more feminine than its predecessor. They are trying to appeal to women more by decreasing the differences between the sexes therefore coming off as harmless, cute, and relatable.

Also, a special feature of *Fine Boys* that I found similar to that of women's fashion magazines was that there are often articles detailing how one could go about using the same article of clothing yet coming up with a multitude of different-looking outfits. This feature was largely absent in *Men's Non-no*; each outfit was created and existed in its own separate sphere without much relation to the outfits around it. However, *Fine Boys* will tout a certain item as the next big thing or the newest "in" item. Women's fashion magazines also do the same thing. One explanation for this is that *Fine Boys* is targeted towards college age boys who have yet to amass a large wardrobe and therefore do not have many options. Therefore, if they are able to purchase one item and make it work in a variety of ways, then the reasoning behind the purchase can be more easily rationalized and purchasing behavior more likely to happen. This is reinforced by the average prices of pieces found in each magazine. While *Men's Non-no* sports outfits that average around ¥50,000 and above whereas *Fine Boys* rarely has any pieces that go above ¥50,000 and usually average in at around ¥12,000. However, there are two point of analysis that can be looked at here: the attention paid to the "in" thing and

increased variety of outfit combinations. Traditionally it is women who are greater consumers of fashion and trends.⁵⁰ By having *Fine Boys* cater to these fashion trends, this shows a greater sensitivity to women's opinions in the creation of masculinity. However, there is an increase in the splintering of masculinity in which the masculinity espoused by *Fine Boys* may only be a piece. On the other hand, the picture of masculinity in *Men's Non-no* was that of a more unique look. Seeing as the masculine ideal presented by *Men's Non-no* is more Western, perhaps this attention paid to trend followed by the community or masses may be a return to the traditionally collectivist culture of Japan and as such may be more of a Japanese expression of masculinity. Although this new model of masculinity may deviate from the generation before, it may be seen as a conformation to traditional Japanese masculinity.

I examined the settings in which the models of *Fine Boys* we photographed as the setting provides an important queue to the reader in terms of the overall feeling and atmosphere of a picture. First of all, many of the models have been cut out of the background (probably from a green screen) and placed on a largely white page with occasional quadrilaterals of bright colors. The background in combination with the colors of the outfit provides a very clean, bright, and fresh feel. This also works well with the layout aspect of the magazine by providing more space to insert text. However, when there are backgrounds (which are usually found in larger pictures), the setting is quite different than those found in *Men's Non-no*. The backgrounds of *Fine Boys* are often set in very quaint settings. If I were to try to describe it further, the backgrounds make me feel like they are taken at a small town in Europe. This "small town in Europe" feel contributes to the overall cuteness factor of the magazine. When not at this setting, the models are pictured waiting or commuting. The backgrounds have been

lightened considerably which matches the white backgrounds of the rest of the magazine. This technique, however, gives the pictures a lighter feel which may seem almost to give the same impression of clean morning light. All of these backgrounds and settings enhance the clean, refreshing, and innocent image of the magazine and the outfits. Again, this is presenting a softer, less opposing depiction of masculinity.

Overall, the feel of *Fine Boys* in terms of setting, models, and layout is very similar to that of women's fashion magazines. While this could be a result of having an editor with such experience, I would like to believe that it is more than that. Should it merely be an arbitrary decision by the editor and not accepted by the readership, I believe that the format would not persist for more than a few issues. Accordingly, all these factors come together to form the overall feeling and creation of masculinity. The idea of masculinity as cute instead of cool or powerful may be the up and coming the current incarnation of accepted masculinity, but this may end up being just a subculture of masculinity.

One of the biggest differences in the models of masculinity presented by these two magazines is the influence of women in the construction of each type of masculinity. Women participate in the construction of masculinity not only as a comparison point but also as voice to say what they desire to see from men. After all, one of the main purposes of expressing gender in a heteronormatively acceptable way is to attract partners of the opposite sex. As I covered earlier, *Men's Non-no* did not have content regarding women's perspective on what would be appealing or masculine. However, *Fine Boys* featured an abundance of women and their opinions on what types of aesthetics in men's fashion appealed to them. For example, one headline proclaimed that these main pieces of clothing to wear during the commute are guaranteed to be popular with the ladies.⁵¹ However, the most impressive element in women's participation in the conversation of the

⁵⁰ Tadashi Suzuki and Joel Best, "The Emergence of Trendsetters for Fashions and Fads: Kogaru in 1990s Japan", *The Sociological Quarterly* 44, no.1, (2003): 65-66, accessed April 27, 2014.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4120758>.

⁵¹ "Mix-and-Matchable Essential Pieces for the Commute that are Popular with the Ladies," *Fine Boys*, May 2013, 142-147, trans. Sharon Chang.

shaping of masculinity was how often and how much data was collected by *Fine Boys* as to what was desirable to the ladies through surveying the women themselves. A particularly popular method was to allow women to "coordinate" their own desired outfits for the male models to wear. They would then write some reasons behind the appeal of certain pieces. An example of this is found in an article where women pinpointed certain t-shirts that they found appealing and would induce them to chase a boy.⁵² This surveying of women was also used in the special insert called *The Moteru Hon*, or the "popular" book that was included in the May 2013 issue of *Fine Boys*. To further explain the term *moteru*, or popular, specifically the term refers to being popular with the opposite sex. On each page of *The Moteru Hon*, there were small inserts of ladies talking about which items they liked and why.⁵³

Along with the discussion of women in the participation of the creation of masculinity, sexuality is also a point of interest. Although women are coordinating the outfits of the men pictured in *Fine Boys*, this is only clothing. There is no commentary on the more rudimentary level of bodily aesthetics. Women do not comment on what types of body shapes they prefer. Also, with the amount of effort needed to set the popular hairstyles espoused by the magazine, it almost creates the feeling that these men are to be looked at and appreciated visually, but not touched. The multilayered clothing styles drive this point home through the very basic fact that it is much more difficult to remove so many more layers. These layers almost create a barrier between the men and women. One thought about the meaning of this is that sexuality is not often a topic to be brought up in public. Although there are more sexualized representations of women in other forms of media, there is no place for it in fashion and, in particular, *Fine Boys*. While this could be contributing to the "safe" feeling of this masculinity exudes, wider societal implications

⁵² "Girls Invade (*Fine Boys*) to Pick Out T-Shirts that Induce Them to Chase Guys," *Fine Boys*, July 2013, 42-49, trans. Sharon Chang.

⁵³ *Fine Boys*, *The Moteru Hon*, *Fine Boys*, May 2013, 1-42, trans. Sharon Chang.

can be found. There is still no dialogue between the sexes about sexuality. Although there are dialogues within each sex about sexuality, these seem to be isolated and insulated from the other. Another point of interest is that this magazine does not discuss sex, even as a forum for male discussion of sex. This lack of "sex talk" is perhaps a perpetuation of an asexual childhood phase. This idea is also supported by the emphasis on the "cute" look found in *Fine Boys* since "cute" is often associated with children.

The participation of women in the creation and shaping of masculinities is one of the greatest differentiators to previous models of masculinity. Here, women have a huge say in what they like. This can be interpreted as the equalization of sexes. The audience for the readers of *Fine Boys* is young women in college. These women are more highly educated and have the means and motivation to lead a professional career which may mean the absence of complete dependency on a male provider in their lives for quite some time perhaps even never. In the face of these stronger women, men in this space must find new ways to appeal to these women who have also changed their tastes.

Concluding Remarks

Although both of these magazines were geared toward a very similar age group, the aesthetic styles of each are different. As such, it can be concluded that there are also very different ways to show masculinity. Since both of these magazines are popular and widely read, it is also reasonable to assume that both of these are acceptable forms of masculinity. Although there is a strong notion in the West that masculinity is related to the salaryman lifestyle, these magazines as well as studies mentioned earlier supports the fact that there is more than one publicly accepted form of masculinity. Because there are multiple forms of masculinity, it is possible that popular favor is shifting to a new one. Masculinity and its expression depends on age as well as mentioned in the study by Sreetharan.⁵⁴ In addition, masculinity, like many

⁵⁴ Sreetharan, *Language in Society*, 100-101.

other things in Japan, is subject to fads. Japan has had a history of being very fad sensitive and following a variety of trendsetters. Traditionally, post-WWII, trendsetters were usually movie stars largely because they were the most prominent source of visual information. However, when television became widely available in the 1960s, the youth took the role of trendsetters. From here, the newest "in" fashion changed rapidly. For example, in the mid-1960s, bowling and miniskirts became popular. Then, in the 1970s, blue jeans became popular among college students which subsequently spread to other groups such as children and older age groups. In the late 1970s, surfer fashion rose to popularity. Later, in the early 1980s, youth who listened to more avant-garde music like punk and techno started setting trends favoring black in clothing.⁵⁵

Although it is likely that the cuter, more feminine, and sensitive masculinity will grow to be the new hegemonic masculinity, it is difficult to say now. Perhaps, even the notion of a hegemonic masculinity will become outdated. With this increasingly niche media, it appears that Japanese masculinity is shifting and splintering into differing forms that are still acceptable. Another reason is that women are increasingly able to exert influence in the social sphere. It goes without saying that heterosexual men will seek women in some form or another and that, in itself, serves as leverage into the gender conversation as well as recent trends towards gender equality. Women are marrying later as there has been an increase in equal opportunities for both sexes to education. Women are also choosing to stay in their careers or work while raising a family which was rare only a few generations ago. Many young Japanese people are choosing to not have any romantic relationships or marry from other countries (Sugihara & Katurada, 2002:445). While there are still many men who believe in the traditional gender roles of the father who works outside the house and the mother who works inside the house, women are increasingly preferring a more egalitarian division of labor. The evolving, more gentle masculinity is possibly a reflection of these changing ideals. Whether or not this becomes the

new dominant masculine ideal is something only time will tell. However, because of the gradual change in the equality between sexes, Japanese masculinity's evolution will be an interesting one to watch. This is especially true because Japan is still in a time of transition when the salaryman masculinity which found its roots in traditional Japanese thought of *yamato-damashii* is disappearing and prime for a new masculinity to emerge.

Although I have provided some analysis and proposed explanations for specific images of masculinity in modern Japanese media, greater study, including the interviews and ethnographic study, are necessary to draw more solid conclusions of deeper reasons and meaning behind masculinity in modern Japan. It will also be interesting to see how the young men of Japan shape masculinity as they grow older and go to work in an increasingly global world in the post-2008 economic decline.

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A Fight for the Right: An Analysis of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Dispute and the Possibility of Military Escalation

JOSHUA GRISWOLD

INTRODUCTION

Throughout their history China and Japan have had countless territorial disputes over mainland regions, large islands, and groupings of small islands. In the recent century the most disputed territorial claim between these two countries has been the Diaoyu, in Chinese, or Senkaku, in Japanese, Islands. This grouping of Islands lay in the East China Sea and consists of eight tiny islands roughly 6.3 km^2 in total area. Only two of these islands are over 1 km^2 (the largest being the Diaoyu/Uotsuri Island at 4.3 km^2), while five are entirely barren. Currently, these islands are inhabited and have had no report of human economic activity. These islands lay approximately 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles southwest of Japanese Ryukyu Islands, and 230 nautical miles east of mainland China. Thus the location of these islands allows for arguably similar claims in distance to the islands between China, Japan as well as Taiwan.

Although the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands themselves are not necessarily attractive in land mass or vegetation, they do represent several attributes that both China and Japan desire. The particular location of these islands is desirable for national defense. Should either country achieve non-denial legal claim to the islands, they would gain a distinct advantage in an enlarged frontier, putting the opposing country in a disadvantage position. Though no distinct plans of military instillation on these islands has been stated by either country, there are rumors of the possibility of establishing a submarine base, radar system, or a missile base on the Diaoyu/Uotsuri Island. This possibility of future military outposts compels both countries to seek sovereignty of the islands in order to secure national defense in the case the opposition were to win the debate.

Though both China and Japan are seeking the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands for

national security purposes, both countries are also interested in the lucrative economic benefits that the islands would provide either country. Due to International Law, the country who gains sovereignty of these islands would also lay claim the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the 40,000 km^2 surrounding continental shelf. The EEZ provides ownership of any natural resources in the vicinity to the county in control. Since the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East suggested the possibility of large hydrocarbon deposits in the surrounding waters, both countries increased their fight for claim to these islands. Due to both countries increasing appetite for energy usage, this attribute of natural resources has become more of a motivating factor in this debate than the desire to secure national defense.

Though both national security and economic benefits are compelling factors for both country to claim sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Sankaku Islands, the political implications are even more consequential if either country were to lose the debate of the sovereignty of these islands. Both China and Japan are surrounded by neighboring countries, all of which have boarder, or island, disputes with them. In order to uphold their stance within these disputes, both China and Japan must maintain a strong perception in which neighboring countries will respect. If either country were to lose this debate of these islands, their rigid stance in their other boarder disputes would be challenged, which could possibly give their neighboring countries an advantage in these boarder disagreements.

This paper will analyze the current claims of the Diaoyu/Sankaku Islands, whether either country has a legitimate claim to the sovereignty of these islands, through international law. In addition, this paper will also speculate the possibility of military escalation between China and Japan as a direct result of the growing

tensions of this dispute and how a military confrontation could possibly play out.

Immersion of the Dispute

After the Empirical Japan was forced to surrender to the U.S. and sign the *Peace Treaty of San Francisco*, many islands under Japan's control were placed under the trusteeship of the U.S. However, over time, Japan regained its authority and the U.S. began returning islands to Japan. The U.S. and Japan released a joint statement in 1969 that led to the *Ryukyu Reversion Agreement of 1971*, which stated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as a part of Okinawa to be returned to Japan. This spawned nation-wide protest of Chinese students in the U.S. for several months. The majority of the concerns of these students were presented in a letter written to the U.S. President and Congress. While at the same time the Republic of China (ROC), the government in Taiwan, claimed rights to exploration of oil potential off the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and planted a flag on the islands in order to attempt to physically claim sovereignty. The Japanese government refuted this claim and demanded that the ROC abandon their assertion of the islands. However, in December 1970, the People's Republic of China (PRC) intervened in the dispute and stated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (and Taiwan) were sovereign territory of China and that exploration by foreign countries would not be tolerated.

Although later in this dispute the U.S. took a neutral stance, in April 1971 the "U.S. State Department issued a statement that President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku had reached an agreement, by which the U.S. would return Okinawa and the 'South-western islands,' that included the Senkaku Islands, to Japan in 1972."¹ In addition, the agreement between Japan and the U.S. concerning the Ryukyu Islands, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, was signed, returning the islands to

Japan. Although the U.S. issued this statement and signed the agreement with Japan, they desired to improve relations with the PRC, and took a neutral stance over the dispute.

After the U.S. officially handed over custody of these islands to Japan, Japan derecognized the ROC and created a formal relationship with the PRC. This officially shifted the dispute of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from a territorial dispute between Japan and Taiwan, into a possible starting point of conflict between two China and Japan. Since Okinawa and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were returned to Japan in 1972, Japan has continually sent its Maritime Security Forces (MSDF) to remove Chinese fishermen from the area surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In 1978, when China and Japan were attempting to negotiate a formal treaty, several individuals of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party argued that the dispute should be settled before the negotiations were to be finalized. Due to this, the Japanese Youth Federation erected a light house on the Diaoyu/Uoturi Island in order to attempt to solidify Japan's territorial claim over the islands. This caused massive protests all over China, which encouraged the PRC to send fishing vessels to surround the island to combat Japan's claim to the islands sovereignty. Though relatively calm in regards of direct confrontation, this is the first physical claim that both countries attempted to make on the islands. This conflict only lasted a week and negotiations were then continued. Due to the tensions and lack of progress on reaching a compromise on the sovereignty of these islands, both countries signed the *Treaty of Peace and Friendship* in October 1978. Both China and Japan agreed that the dispute should be shelved. Deng Xiaoping, China's Vice Premier at the time stated that: "It is true that two sides maintain different views on this question... It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable."² Due to this mutual agreement, the dispute was defused in

¹ Pan Zhongqi, "Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2007): 73.

² Ibid., 74.

hopes that an agreement could be reached in the future by a younger generation.

However, in 1990 the dispute remerged due to Japan's right-wing group, the Nihon Seinensha, desiring to renovate the light house that was built on the Diaoyu/ Uoturi Island. Taiwan responded to this by sending two fishing vessels with Olympic athletes on them to plant an Olympic torch on the islands. Notwithstanding, Japan's MSDF prevented the vessels from reaching the islands. In response, Taiwanese and Hong Kong citizens protested by burning Japanese flags and destroying Japanese goods. The PRC quickly entered the dispute once again and claimed the islands to be a territory of China. Due to the tensions, the dispute was yet again shelved for future discussion.

With the continual shelving of this dispute, tensions between the China and Japan were repressed, only to surface several times throughout the 1990's. In 1996, Japan declared an EEZ around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, taking effect July 20, 1996. Once again the Nihon Seinensha erected a lighthouse on the northern inlet, hoping the government would recognize it. Though this lighthouse was destroyed by a typhoon, another one was built soon after on September 9. Yet again, protests broke out in China, particularly in Hong Kong and Taiwan. These activists in Hong Kong and Taiwan started a nation-wide movement called "Defending Diaoyu Movement" (Baodiao Yundong). Large numbers of these activists mobilized and made their way to the islands. In an attempt to swim to an islet, due to this, a Hong Kong activist drowned on September 26. On October 7, activists were able to reach the islands and erect the PRC and ROC flags, but were immediately removed by the Japanese.

These physical confrontations between the Japanese government and Chinese protesters continued through the late 1990's and the early 2000's. The boundaries were pushed more and more by both sides. Chinese protesters sent scientific vessels into the proximity of the islands while right winged groups in Japan built a shrine on one of the islets. In a response to this aggressive act the PRC stated that "the Diaoyu Island and its adjacent islets have been an integral part of China [and therefore we] demand

that Japan honors its commitment, restricts the right wing activists, and prevent similar incidents from recurring."³ Yet again, Japan responded that the islands were Japan's territory and that they maintain physical control of them.

The first aggressive physically action within this dispute took place in January 2004 when two Chinese fishing vessels near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were attacked by Japanese MSDF patrol boats. Though no bodily harm was reported, this was the first instance of physical interaction between these opposing countries. This led to more and more physical confrontations. In March 2004, seven activists from China landed on the islands, only to be arrested and detained by the Japanese Coast Guard ten hours later. This landing spawned official protests in Japan while the PRC criticized the arrests of the activists. The most destructive of these protests, and the most violent interaction of this debate to date took place on April 23, 2004, when a member of a Japanese right-winged groups crashed a bus into the Chinese consulate in Osaka. This in turn led to more protests in China.

In 2004 Japan began to demonstrate its claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands through natural gas exploration of the EEZ in the East China Sea. This was a direct counter to China's construction of a natural gas compound nearby. Due to the protests that broke out in both countries to this competing natural gas exploration, on October 19, 2004, Japan and the PRC promised to enter bilateral discussions of East China Sea oil exploration. However, this had little effect, since in January 2005, Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. and Teikoku oil Co. began discussions of drilling near the areas in the East China Sea that both Japan and China had laid claim to. This led to Japan's declaration of oil and gas test drill on April 13, 2005. In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated, "In defiance of China's legitimate proposition, the Japanese side attempts to impose its unilaterally claim 'median line' on China. The Chinese side has never accepted and will not accept it. Japan's action constitutes a severe provocation to the interests of China as well as the norms governing international relations.

³ Ibid., 75.

China has lodged a protest to the Japanese side, and reserves the right for further reaction."⁴

The countless attempts to resolve this dispute of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has yet to be resolved in any matter. Japan and China continue to lay claim to the sovereignty of these islands. Through international law and each countries claim to these islands, it may be possible to find which country truly is the lawful owner of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Yet, with or without this discovery, the continual tension over this dispute proposes the possibility of a military confrontation between China and Japan.

Japanese Claim

Japan justification for its claim over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is evoked by international law concerning *terra nullius*. *Terra nullius* is translated into English as "land that belongs to no-one" (NSFA). This law allows for an existing government to claim a non-inhabited land or in this case an island. Originally, this law came into existence in order to justify early colonization. In accordance to international law, if the islands were truly *terra nullius*, then Japan has fully legal right their sovereignty. The Japanese government states, "From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly made by the Government of Japan through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture and by way of other methods. Through these surveys, it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of China."⁵ This claim of *terra nullius* was not confirmed by a third party, but was accepted as fact by many other countries. However, China argued against this claim in the 1970's, yet this was almost one hundred years after the Japanese claimed sovereignty over these islands.

On April 28, 1952, when the *San Francisco Peace Treaty* came into effect, Japan surrendered the Bonin Islands and the Ryukyu Islands under U.S. trusteeship. Between both countries, Japan and the U.S. the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were

assumed to be a part of the Ryukyu Island grouping. However, the name Senkaku did not directly appear in this treaty. Although China has never consented to the content within the *San Francisco Peace Treaty*, the PRC does use this lack of appearance of the name Senkaku as a part of their argument to the legitimacy of Japan's claim to Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

When the *San Francisco Peace Treaty* was ratified by the *Ryukyu/Okinawa Reversion Agreement*, the U.S. returned both the Ryukyu and Okinawa Islands back to Japan. In accordance to this agreement, the Ryukyu Islands, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands included, were given to Japan to be subject to their jurisdiction. Since this agreement, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have been under Japan's jurisdiction. The fact that Japan has maintained control over these islands provides Japan with the law of possession for their claim to the sovereignty of the islands.

In addition to the current possession of the islands, Japan also claims that until the 1970's, China never laid claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In 1968 the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East suggested the possibility of potential oil reserves in the EEZ surrounding these islands. Japan utilizes this fact that China only became interested in the islands due to the economic desire of natural resources that Diaoyu/Senkaku Island's EEZ could provide.

Japan's claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is lawful and just through international law. However, their entire argument rests on the fact that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were in fact *terra nullius*. If the islands were in fact "no man's land," then Japan has every right to their sovereignty. To counter this, China declares that they discovered and incorporated the islands into their dynasty long before the Japanese laid claim to them.

Chinese Claim

In order to counter Japan's claim of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands being *terra nullius*, China cites ancient Chinese documentation that the islands date back to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). In addition, the PRC also utilizes documentation that suggests that these islands

⁴ Ibid., 76.

⁵ Ibid., 77.

were incorporated into the Ming and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties. According Chinese studies, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were discovered as early as 1372. After their discovery, these islands were then used as navigation aids for Chinese fishermen. Later in 1556, China claimed to have used the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands into maritime defenses. The final claim to the sovereignty of these islands by China is the fact that two years prior to Japan's discover of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Dowager Empress Cixi of the Qing dynasty issued an imperial edict that awarded these islands to a Chinese alchemist who had gathered rare medical herbs from the islands. All three of these claims attempt to predate Japan's claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in order to prove China's legitimacy to the sovereignty of these islands.

Current State of the Dispute

As this dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has become more heated, the most recent actions taken by China have caused many to consider the possibility of military escalation between China and Japan. On November 23, 2013, China's Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced the creation of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). This zone was subjected to six rules laid down by the PRC:

1. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea ADIZ must abide by these rules.
2. Aircraft must identify themselves and keep in communication with Chinese authorities while flying over the zone. This includes clearly marking the nationality of the aircraft and maintaining two way communications with China's Foreign Ministry and Civil Aviation Administrative.
3. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should follow the instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. As well as permitting China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions
4. China's Ministry of National Defense is the administrative organ and empowers the MND to explain the rules.⁶

The creation of this ADIZ is speculated to be China's response to Japan's recent nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In September 2013, Japan bought these islands from a private Japanese owner. Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang stated that "China is resolute in its will and resolve to defend its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. This current situation is totally caused by Japan's erroneous actions."⁷ As states, the creation of the ADIZ was China's attempt to claim sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. However, in accordance with national law, this ADIZ has no legal foundation since the islands are still legally controlled by Japan. In the eyes of the international community, this was a futile and illegal attempt to claim possession of these islands.

This announcement of the ADIZ aroused drastic criticism from both Japan and the international community. As the U.S. is allies with Japan as well as an upholder of international law, this ADIZ was met with condemnation and was challenged immediately. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated, "This development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region... This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations... This announcement by the People's Republic of China will not in any way change how the United States conducts military operations in the region."⁸ With this statement and the view point of the U.S. clearly stated, the U.S. challenged this declaration by sending two B-52 bombers over the air space of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands without informing the PRC. These bombers were neither armed nor accompanied by any escort planes. Though the U.S. claimed this flight was a part of long planned exercise called Coral Lightning, it demonstrated a clear challenge to China's new ADIZ. Although China stated that they would enforce this new ADIZ, the flights that did not

⁶ Zachary Keck, "China Imposes Restrictions on Air Space Over Senkaku Islands," *The Diplomat*, November 23, 2013, accessed March 5, 2014.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

abide by the ADIZ regulations were neither confronted nor challenged by any Chinese aircraft. In accordance with this challenge, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea also agreed to not abide by any of the self-proclaimed rules of China's ADIZ. In addition to the U.S. bombers, the civilian flights of these three countries did not experience any Chinese interventions.

Although the Chinese did not directly interfere with any violating flights of its new ADIZ, China did send out patrol planes in order to attempt to patrol its ADIZ. The Chinese air force conducted its first patrol of the ADIZ on November 23, 2013, consisting of two reconnaissance planes with fighter jets for support. In a direct response, Japan sent fighter jets. No confrontation occurred, however, the increase military activity within this air space has increased the international community's awareness of this dispute between China and Japan.

China's ADIZ has caused the most military movement within the region since WWII. In no other prior escalation of this dispute have fighter jets been scrambled to ensure sovereignty of the islands. In addition, the U.S. had not had to directly challenge the Chinese in this particular region. As one can see, this dispute is escalating in tension could possibly lead to conflict between China and Japan.

Treaties and Obligations

In order to understand the likelihood of escalation between China and Japan due to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute, the relationship between the Japan and the U.S. must first be considered. This relationship has given Japan the capability to stand firm in many international arguments and territorial debates, this dispute being one of them. To fully understand this relationship, the treaty marking the end of WWII must be taken into account, as well as all other treaties that have been created in accordance to this original base of alliance.

To mark the official end of WWII and the surrender of Japan to the Allied Powers, the *Treaty of Peace*, or also known as *Peace Treaty of San Francisco*, was signed on September 8, 1951.

Within this treaty it is stated that the U.S. is required to defend Japan against a foreign aggression. The *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* between the United States and Japan replaced the as *Peace Treaty of San Francisco* on September 8, 1951 and states: "ARTICLE III: The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack."⁹ This article states that the U.S. and Japan will develop capabilities in order to resist and armed attack. In regards to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute, in 2012, it was clarified that these islands are not covered by the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* between the United States and Japan.

Further means of resistance against and armed attack are laid out in the *Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*. Within these guidelines, the actions of both Japan's MSDF and U.S. forces are described in detail for a response to an armed attack against Japan. Within Article IV: Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan, it is stated that "When an armed attack against Japan takes place, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage" (MOFA). In addition to this commitment to assisting Japan against an armed attack, when an attack is imminent, the "Two governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism... and will prepare to respond to activities which could develop into an armed attack against Japan."¹⁰ Within all three statements, whether an attack has already happened or is immanent, the U.S. has a direct obligation to bilaterally assist the Japanese MSDF. Although the U.S. is obligated to assist Japan in these stipulated situations, there is no such declaration within either the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* or the *Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation* that state the U.S. is required to assist Japan during or after a preemptive attack on an opposing nation.

⁹ MOFA.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Where the Lines are Drawn

Speculating the likelihood of a military conflict between China and Japan, and consequently the U.S., each country has declared their stance on when they will enforce military action. For simplicity, these stances will be referred to as an artificial line that each country has drawn to represent what actions of the opposing country will and will not be tolerated. Crossing this line, in most cases, will lead to a military confrontation.

As a sovereign nation, Japan has every right to defend its homeland and its territory. Japan has not partook in any aggressive military campaign or actions since the *Peace Treaty of San Francisco*. As stated in this treaty, Japan can and has only maintained a small MSDF in order to uphold its own sovereignty. Though this MSDF has not partook in offensive aggressive actions, they have displayed force in a defensive manner, as seen in several incidences in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute. As stated in the *Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, Japanese is within its international legal right to defend its homeland in the event of an armed attack. However, any offensive action on their part would break their alliance with the U.S. Due to this, Japan line is drawn strictly on maintaining its sovereignty. If this is challenged Japan will respond accordingly.

As already stated in the *Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation* and the *Peace Treaty of San Francisco*, the U.S. is obligated to assist Japan bilaterally in any armed attack. In addition to this predetermined obligation of assistance of Japan, recently at a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US assistant secretary of state for East Asia, Daniel Russel stated, "The president of the United States and the Obama administration is firmly committed to honoring our defense commitments to our allies."¹¹ This stance of U.S. support of Japanese defense, both militarily and politically have been demonstrated recently in several engagements with China. Mentioned earlier in summarizing the current

state of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute, when China claimed the ADIZ over the disputed islands, the U.S. responded in two ways to challenge this claim. Politically, the U.S. agreed with allies not to partake in the regulations set down by China within this ADIZ. Militarily, the U.S. sent two B-52 bombers into the ADIZ in order to call China out on its claim to respond to any violation of their ADIZ regulations.

In addition to the U.S. reaction to creation of the ADIZ, the U.S. also assisted Japan in resistance against China's aggressive actions in regards to the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). This is the first year that China is hosting this symposium. At this symposium, all Pacific Ocean bordering countries are invited to have their Navy partake in cooperative and constructive forum as well as parading their ships. However, this year China has decided not to invite Japan to this symposium. A senior American defense official stated that "It is so totally high school. "We were, like, 'Really? You're going to do that?'"¹² As a shock to the U.S. and the international community, the U.S. decided to respond by not sending any naval vessels to parade at the symposium. A Pentagon official "As of this moment, there is no intent to send a U.S. ship to participate."¹³ Though this was a petty attempt to exclude Japan from the WPNS, the U.S. responded against it in order to support their ally Japan.

As demonstrated, the U.S. has supported Japan in all manners of aggressive action from China. This depicts that the U.S. has also drawn a line of defensive action. The U.S. will not escalate or provoke the situation between China and Japan, but will challenge any aggressive action China with corresponding intensity. This would also include military action, if indeed China first acted in a military manner against Japan.

When analyzing where China has drawn the line in accordance to whether or not to act in a military manner against Japan is rather difficult to determine. As demonstrated through China's declaration of the ADIZ, China clearly believes the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to be their territory, though currently under the control of Japan. The

¹¹ Helene Cooper, "In a Test of Wills with China, U.S. Sticks Up for Japan," *The New York Times*, April 6, 2014, accessed April 10, 2014.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

lack of resolve within the dispute allows China to take the stance that Japan is defending these islands with their coast guard and MSDF as military act. Through this logic, any military or aggressive action on China's behalf could be illogically justified as self-defense.

While on the other hand, since the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are currently under Japan's control, Japan draws its line in on a mere means of self-defense. Though there have been several incidences, in regards to these islands, with certain radical political parties in Japan and Japanese civilians in protest of Chinese actions, Japan has only responded defensively to aggressive action of China. In many cases stated early in the History of the Dispute, Japan's MSDF was obligated to remove and challenge Chinese citizens and vessels from entering their territory. Though the sovereignty of these islands is under dispute, Japan is still in every right, in accordance with international law, to defend these islands. Hence the actions that have been taken thus far dictate that Japan has drawn its line in a defensive nature, only instigating aggression when first met with aggression.

These arbitrary lines are drawn in order for each country to stipulate to the public, and opposing country that they will in fact respond in a similar manner if any action crosses these lines. Yet, China's declaration of sovereignty of these islands demonstrates that their line has already been crossed since Japan will not relinquish control of these islands. Thus, through their rational, aggressive action is in some manner necessary.

Reason to Avoid Conflict

However, China has yet to put forth any direct aggressive action against Japan. This raises the question of "why haven't they?" If China has dictated that they are justified in defending the sovereignty of these islands, then they should have already commenced a direct action in the island's defense. Yet the most aggressive action that China has taken is to create a passive aggressive ADIZ in order to threaten their dominance in the area. Which was met with challenges by multiple countries without any

Chinese retaliation. Hence, there must be alternative motives for reasons why China has not committed any direct aggressive action against Japan.

Although each country, the U.S., Japan, and China have dictated instances when they would be prepared to instigate military action, there are several reasons why each country would avoid a military conflict at all cost. In the recent decades, China "has grown into one of the largest and most dynamic economies in the world and become the manufacturing workshop of the world."¹⁴ Due to this, Japan and the U.S. have created a relationship with China that is based heavily on interdependency of trade. This relationship has come to define many economic capabilities of all three of these countries. Thus the primary reason these three countries have not begun aggressive military action against each other has been this interdependent trade relationship.

Due to today's globalization, almost every country in the world is entirely interconnected more so than ever before. The relations between China, Japan and the U.S. is among one of the most complex and interdependent in the world. P.J. McDonald stipulates that "international trade facilitates the emergence of an underlying harmony of interests among countries around the world by increasing communication across societies and encouraging individuals to reject nationalism."¹⁵ In the last two decades the trade relationship between China and Japan has been economically beneficial for both countries. Thus the commercial liberal theory of international trade and foreign direct investment believes that this interdependent trade relation "should bring peace to a bilateral relationship through 'harmony of interests', because no wants to fight a war with a nation with which it trades or in which many of its companies open factories."¹⁶ Due to this liberal theory on international trade,

¹⁴ Theun.

¹⁵ P.J. McDonald, *The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and International Relations Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 39.

¹⁶ Hiroki Takeuchi, "Sino-Japanese Relations: Power, Interdependence, and Domestic Politics," *Int Relat Asia Pac* 14, no. 1 (2014): 8.

it is believed that nations would seek wealth before power. During Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Japan in 2008 to see Abe Shinzo, both leaders "emphasized common interests by defining their association as 'mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests.'"¹⁷ However, since the change in leadership in China from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, this Sino-Japanese relationship has become more strained again. Though strained, the understanding of healthy economic trade between both China and Japan has been utilized to enforce their withholding of military escalation of these islands.

In a similar manner, Sino-American economic interdependence is almost more important to wealth of each country than Sino-Japanese interdependence. Although the U.S. is viewed by many as the sole super power in the world, Chinese analyst view "U.S. leadership not necessarily [as] a threat to Chinese sovereignty, but [as] a requirement for a stable global economy that is a precondition for Chinese economic development."¹⁸ Due to China's attempt to attract foreign investment through low export cost and low wage factory workers, American and other foreign countries have flooded China and have become increasingly dependent on this decrease in prosecution costs. "Trade with China, during this period [1990-2012], took up a considerable portion of total U.S. trade worldwide. Up to 14% in 2009, showing the growing importance of China to the U.S. market."¹⁹ Though China will eventually run out of low wage workers, the current state at which China can provide these individuals to Western companies will amount to a heavy dependence from the U.S. and other foreign investments. In addition, in 2013 American companies made a combined US\$ 45 billion in China,²⁰ this in itself provides incentive for a healthy relationship with China. The "loss of access to the U.S. market would also have a negative effect on China's ability to attract investment from other

countries,"²¹ due to the fact that the majority of other foreign investment is construction in the U.S. In addition, the U.S. has found a quality source of cheap labor and low export cost that allow for sales prices to be lower in order to increase sales in the U.S. Thus China's and the U.S.'s interdependence is vital to both countries, a relationship that would suffer greatly if a military conflict aroused between China and an American ally.

In many ways, the evolution of the current global economy has induced complementary system between China, Japan and the U.S., rather than competing with each other. Due to China's population, low wage, and natural resources and the high demand in Japan and especially the U.S. for low priced consumerism, this mutually benefiting interdependent relationship is the key reason China has avoided any drastic military escalation over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute.

Personalities and Predictions

However, Nguyen Thuan confirmed in his study of Sino-American economic interdependence as a deterrent of armed conflict, that "economic interdependence alone is not sufficient to create lasting stability between these two most powerful nations."²² Looking back on history, the most prevalent example of this was World War I. Britain and Germany had strong economic trade relations prior to WWI. Yet, "their strong economic ties, however, failed to prevent the two countries from entering in one of the most disastrous wars in human history."²³ Thus, one cannot fully determine that strong economic interdependence can necessarily deter armed conflict between nations. Consequently, there is a need to conclude the likelihood of the outbreak of armed conflict between China and Japan, and not without standing causing a conflict between China and the U.S. In order to come to such a

¹⁷ Ibid., 16.

¹⁸ Phillip C. Saunders, "Supping with a Long Spoon: Dependence and Interdependence in Sino-American Relations," *China Journal* 43 (2000): 55-81.

¹⁹ Theun.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Saunders, "Supping with a Long Spoon."

²² Nguyen Thuan, "Economic Interdependence: A Deterrent to Sino-American Armed Conflict," Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2013. N.p.: n.p., n.d.

²³ Ibid.

conclusion, recent actions, events, popular opinion and political views will be combined to create a perceived personality of each of these countries. Thus allowing for a probable prediction of intended action in the near future.

As discussed earlier, Japan has taken a defensive stance on its claim to the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. While the islands are clearly in their possession, they have yet to take an offensive action against China. However, recent military expansion hypothesis otherwise. Though military expansion must be within the confines of the Japanese-American bilateral military support arrangements, on April 19, 2014 Japan announced the breaking ground of a radar station on an island near Taiwan. Japanese defense minister, Itsunori Onodera, stated, "This is the first deployment since the US returned Okinawa in 1972 and calls for us to be more on guard are growing. I want to build an operation able to properly defend islands that are part of Japan's territory."²⁴ This decision to declare the implementation of this new radar station, which will give Japan the capability to monitor mainland China, demonstrates the political perception Japan has of this island dispute. As Japan understands that an aggressive action would compromise their U.S. bilateral military support of an armed conflict, imposing forward deployed defensive monitoring systems is the most offensive move Japan can make. This, in accordance with the increasing Chinese military budget, "doubled from 1989 to 1994, and doubled again from 1994 to 1999, and again from 2005 to 2009,"²⁵ has caused Japan to be weary of China's intentions in East Asia. As the Japan watches China's GDP and military budget continually increase, the Japanese government is stuck in a conflicting bind of agreement with the U.S. and fear of Chinese aggressive outward growth.

Japanese politicians are not the only ones who are aware of this Chinese attempt of East Asian dominance. The Japanese public has continually demonstrated its full support of the

Japanese claim of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Unified as a sense of nationalism, Japanese citizens have continually prompted physical claims of these islands, whether it is the planting of a Japanese flag, or the erection of a lighthouse. Due to this innate civilian support of Japan's claim of these islands, the Japanese government is under even more pressure to ensure the sovereignty of these islands.

Also, depicted earlier, Japan has responded militarily to China's aggressive action; such as responding with scrambling jets when China patrolled its self-declared ADIZ, continual attempted landings of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and finally this new forward radar surveillance system. To accumulate the personality of the Japanese MSDF, they will defend these islands in fullest in order to continually demonstrate Japan's capability of self-defense. The Japanese personality, as of recently, has grown in aggression towards the overbearing Chinese desire for growth, yet its stands ready to defend its sovereignty. Due to the U.S.'s full support, Japan will stand its ground politically and militarily against China, but they will not instigate any direct action against China that could escalate and armed conflict.

The U.S. poses a rather interesting stance on this island dispute. As depicted earlier, the U.S. challenged China's creation of the ADIZ by not adhering to the self-proclaimed rules of the ADIZ and fly military aircraft, B-52 bombers, through the air zone. In addition to the clear challenge of China over stepping its international rights, on April 24, 2014, Obama declared, "Our commitment to Japan's security is absolute and article five [of the security treaty] covers all territories under Japan's administration, including the Senkaku islands...We don't take a position on final sovereignty on the Senkakus but historically they've been administered by Japan and should not be subject to change unilaterally."²⁶ This is a straight forward statement that if a diplomatic solution is not reached, and China does in fact resort to violence

²⁴ Reuters, "Japan Risks Angering China with Military Expansion," *Theguardian.com*, April 19, 2014, accessed April 30, 2014.

²⁵ Thuan, "Economic Interdependance."

²⁶ Justin McCurry, and Tania Branigan, "Obama Says US Will Defend Japan in Island Dispute with China," *Theguardian.com*, April 24, 2014, accessed April 30, 2014.

in order to attempt to claim these islands, the U.S. will no doubtfully meet them militarily in order to up hold their agreement with Japan.

Yet to look at the U.S. population and their view on this subject, the support of an armed conflict is almost non-existent. Although the U.S. population is supportive politician treaties and political ties with allies, if an armed conflict were to occur the U.S. population would be weary due to the last 13 years of war that the U.S. has already been involved in heavy military conflict in the Middle East. Thus the U.S. does lack some popular support of its defense of Japan against China, however, a growing China has risen as a fear for not only the U.S. government but U.S. civilians as well.

In accordance with the *Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, depicted in the U.S.'s reactions to Chinese recent aggression, and as stated by Obama, the U.S. is fully ready to defend the sovereignty of Japan against any foreign aggression. Though the U.S. population may not be fully behind a long term military engagement against China, defense of Japan has been stipulated as the U.S. first priority in relation to this island dispute. China should, in turn understand that the U.S. is fully ready to up hold its alliance with Japan if military aid is needed.

Yet, China has continually attempted to test U.S.'s resolve in this matter. The most recent of which was Qin Gang's response to Obama's statement of defending Japanese sovereignty, "The U.S. should respect facts, take a responsible attitude, remain committed to not taking sides on territory and sovereignty issues, speak and act cautiously and earnestly play a constructive role in regional peace and stability."²⁷ China continually claims territorial rights to these islands, even though they have been in Japan's possession since the *Ryukyu Reversion Agreement of 1971*, and since 1890's prior to their submission of these islands to the U.S. for oversight. Thus the international community, the U.S. included, would view any violent or armed aggression towards "reclaiming" these islands as irrational and unwarranted. Yet, "Offensive realist assumption that the causes of war are based on political and military-strategic

considerations rather than being either advanced or hindered by purely economic ones."²⁸ This realist approach would determine that China would not necessarily consider the economic ramifications if the PRC concluded that an attack in order to reclaim the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands was in their best interest.

In regards to the population's support of this dispute, China has even more of a populous support base of construed nationalism in anti-Japanese conflict than Japan has against China. Depicted earlier, the Chinese people have boycotted Japanese goods, attempted to land on the islands, and rioted in the streets of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and even in the U.S. due to many of the "unjust actions" of Japan and the U.S. in regards to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. This anti-Japanese nationalism in China is well rooted in Chinese history due to the many conflicts between China and Japan. Thus, China has a large majority of its population support in it's over barring attempts to reclaim the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and would most likely have if China were to act violently in the processes of "reclaiming" these islands.

As an emerging power, China has begun to experiment with its new found international weight. Thuan also states that, "Emerging powers are not usually satisfied with their roles and status in the current system; therefore, tend to take steps to secure their frontiers and then reach out beyond them by challenging territorial boundaries, international institutional arrangement, and hierarchies of prestige."²⁹ Through this understanding, China may not be quite accepting of remaining the country with the second largest GDP, behind America,³⁰ and this lack of acceptance could in turn strive China to make aggressive attempts to increase its power through expansion.

China has demonstrated through many political announcements, military actions and budget growth and population support that it will reclaim the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Though the current state of affairs display China as only

²⁸ Thuan, "Economic Interdependance."

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ A.R. Dougald, "Soaring Eagle, Crouching Dragon?" *International Journal* 66, no. 2 (2011): 487-495.

²⁷ Ibid.

attempting to do this through politics, armed conflict is a considerable possibility for them. If any military conflict were to arise over the dispute for these Islands, China will be the one to instigate it.

Conclusion

The length of history in regards to this dispute between China and Japan of the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has brought this dispute to the forefront of awareness of the international community. Though many believe that the interdependent economic relations between China, Japan, and the U.S. would deter any armed conflict, as mentioned earlier, Germany and Britain were almost as equally of trading partners prior to WWI. Yet it is not merely the economics or an emerging countries desire for expansion that can predict a conflict or a war. In the case if WWI, "an assortment of factors-including bilateral economic relations; shifts in the global distribution of power; development in military technology; domestic political processes; ideological trends; questions of radical, religious, cultural, and national identity; the actions of key individuals; and the sequencing of critical events-combined to lead Britain and Germany"³¹ to the brink of war. Thus, almost all aspects of international relations must be fully considered to make a full and likely predication. Yet one must also consider all of the other implications that could cause countries today to avoid a conflict. Today one must consider a number of factors such as "emergence of common non-traditional threats, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons, international institutions, democratization, etc."³² which have contributed to the relatively stable Sino-American relationship for the last several decades.

Yet, if leaders of any country so desire a particular outcome and are willing to make the sacrifices necessary, other factors may be irrelevant, "a contributing factor in impoverishment of some nations and tensions

between other nations are largely irrelevant to leaders' decisions to engage in, or refrain from, intense forms of interstate conflict... Leaders may not pay special attention to the potential harm such a conflict may cause to a trading relationship."³³ Thus even though the effects of current affairs, trade relations, population support can assist in the prediction of the likelihood of near future armed conflict, the choice is ultimately up to the desire of each nations leaders. Though the future cannot be predicted in full, whether or not China will in fact attack Japan, the personalities of each country involved in this dispute predict that if an armed conflict were to occur, China is the likely country to instigate it.

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³¹ Thuan, "Economic Interdependance."

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

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Growing Apart: The Redevelopment and Rehabilitation of Beirut

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INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the nineties, after the dust had settled from the harsh, sectarian fighting of the Lebanese Civil War, the city of Beirut had devastating amount of damage inflicted upon it. All around the city and in the downtown or city center, buildings were collapsed from bombings and bullet holes were common place all around many of the buildings. Much of the city's reputation from the past as being an Arab Rivera was now lost as the city now had an reputation of war and sectarian violence. The only way for the city to recover was to rebuild its former glory and return to the days of hotels and markets filled with industrialists, westerners, tourists, celebrities, and the general who's who of the day. If the city were to recover, it would need a concerted effort. Something that would bring the residents together, unite a nation and end the continuing cycle of religious violence that had been characteristic of the city for the previous decades. The dream of its citizens was to restore the former pride of a noble nation and people with a rich history going back to the times of the Romans, Crusades, Ottomans, and the era of colonialism. A new start was needed, a reconstruction of the war torn city to patch the bullet holes and the sectarian divisions within the city. The hope was to put the past behind and progress into the twenty first century with a twenty first century city. Plans for tall skyscrapers, promenades, marinas, and shopping centers with the finest fashions, and western outlets were going to make this transformation that the city desperately needed. The world had just seen the end of the Soviet Union and it was clear in which direction the world economy was heading, making the urgency of action all the more important. The city needed to prove to the world that it was ready to reenter the global economy and serve as place of investment, leisure, and one where the fear of violence was not an issue. All these sentiments and more led to reconstruction and rehabilitation of Beirut. The question of whether it would bring the

city together, all of its religious sects, all of its social classes, and all of the business interests was left unanswered.

Development is inherently political though. It permanence creates divisions within societies and within political alliances. Development drives a city in terms of its future, it culture, its feel, and its political landscape. In any city around the world the direction of construction and city planning is a hot button issue. Fears over gentrification make the lower classes afraid that they could be pushed out of an area which they have always known as home. Investors worry about the changing dynamics of a real estate market and how that can affect their portfolios. Business' concerns focus on building a competitive city that can attract the best and brightest talent from around the world to help drive the local economy. Residents worry about aesthetics and whether change will make them feel as if they are in a new city, one they are unfamiliar with compared to the one they had grown accustomed to. They wonder how this city will change the feel of a city, whether or not future will bring a new culture and group of residents at odds with the historical way of order. Whether or not a new breed of people will come in and shake things up and upset the social balance and order that had been established by previous generations and governments. Politicians and bureaucrats concern themselves with logistical issues, how can the city move, retain or gain efficiency. How the city will be able to have a healthy government, free from corruption while maintaining tax basis' and general order. All of these issues make the topic of development inherently political, and the case of Beirut is of no exception. A city and country known for its political divisions having to rebuild itself while trying to bring various communities of class and faith together was and remains a task of monumental difficulty. Everyone has a different vision or opinion on how redevelopment should take place but only one solution can come into being. It is difficult not to disappoint certain

members of a community in relation to development. The best any government can try to do is satisfy all vested parties, but unfortunately this is not always the case.

The history of Lebanon and Beirut is a complicated one. There are religious groups from almost all the major faiths. There are large Muslim communities, split along Sunni-Shia lines as well as Druze communities and smaller sects. Christians are as diverse with Maronite Catholics, as well as Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and forms of Protestants as well. Political alliances are not always cut and dry with religious affiliation but the divisions among the religious communities are well established and not necessarily hidden from view. The Shiites tend to live in the southern part of Lebanon along the Israeli border and the western side toward the Mediterranean sea, as well as, the north eastern border with Syria. They also are known to inhabit the southern part of Beirut and its southern suburbs. The Sunni Muslims have pockets within the country, a couple in the south east and a few up north around the city of Tripoli near the northern border with Syria. They do have a substantial population within the country and that is represented with their share of parliamentary seats. Christians inhabit the northern suburbs of Beirut and much of the western coast up to the Sunni city of Tripoli. The Druze have smaller pockets around Beirut and in the eastern mountains. This underscores that not only do these groups worship in different forms and places, they tend to live apart from one another, having different tastes, morals, beliefs about political organization, as well as, economic policy. These divisions have been around for generations and have tended to intensify as time progressed. Through Ottoman colonialism to French colonialism, occupation by Syrian and Israeli forces, as well as, the incursions between Lebanon and its neighbors the country has grown apart. To say that there are singular beliefs on just about any political or cultural topic would be inaccurate. The French tried to reconcile these differences when they made their hasty but were unable to overcome these deep divisions. Not only were they unable to undo the sectarian divisions of the country, their actions actually widened not only the spatial separation but the social and political separation as well. The era of French

colonialism preceded the Lebanese Civil War and can be seen as one of the leading causes of it.

Sectarianism did not start with the French alone however. The divisions often along religious lines go back to the nineteenth century and during the time of the Ottoman Empire. In the years preceding the Ottoman's rule over the Levant, many of the religious communities were living in mixed communities and power was distributed based on nobility, with status and loyalty determining ones position in society. As time went on, the politics of sectarianism began to grow and the old order was replaced with one that used religious affiliations as a way to order society. This was useful for the occupying forces as it was easy for them to conceptualize the various populations based on similar religious practices. What this practice became to be known as was Ta'ifiyya. This is basically the arabic word for secularism but became the basis for political alignment from the Ottomans transitioning into the French Mandate.¹ The French took control of the region following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. Based on the Sykes-Picot agreement, the French took control of Lebanon and Syria, while the British took control of Palestine and Trans Jordan. They administered based on religious sects, just as the Ottomans had done before, but the French had solidified that system of governance. By the time they had left, the political structure of the country was dependent on a power sharing agreement between the various communities. In 1936, the French issued two decrees stating the existence of seventeen official "historical communities."² This can only be seen as administration through segregation. It is similar to the British practice of divide and conquer. When the French eventually left, the power sharing agreement that was left for the Lebanese was known as the National Pact. This was set up in 1943, a few years before the complete French departure and was essentially an agreement to split up political offices based upon religious affiliation. The character of the government was to be predetermined along sectarian lines, in the

¹ Sara Fregonese, "Between a Refuge and a Battleground: Beirut's Discrepant Cosmopolitanisms," *Geographical Review* 102, no. 3 (2012): 316-336.

² Ibid., 321.

hopes that the various groups would have adequate representation and could enable a coexistence. The President of Lebanon would be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister would be a Sunni Muslim, and the head of Parliament would be a Shiite Muslim. Laws within the individual communities, whether that be religious, family or employment law would be handled by the individual communities. This ultimately led to continual strife and conflict within the country between the various religious sects. According to Sara Fregonese, the situation on the ground as, "constant shifts between violence and peace because of the metasystem [sic] that governs it."³ These divisions eventually led to the Lebanese Civil War which created great destruction for the country and Lebanese. The war did not end the sectarian division and the development following the conflict resembled the political polarity within the country.

This thesis will demonstrate how the background of the political universe has impacted the direction of the political and social redevelopment of Beirut and contributed to the division of an already fractured city and country. Using development has a political tool, the various parties have been able to take advantage of economic and political aspirations for some and a salvation for the inequalities and neglect for others. We now see a Beirut that has become even more split along lines of religious and class affiliation as development and redevelopment have taken different directions. On the one hand, the capitalist, Solidere took a globalist approach, while Hezbollah used a populist approach of social resistance through their construction arm, Jihad Al-Binna.

First, it is important to assess the damage from the civil war and how the responses to it were formulated. Contrary to the prevailing belief that Lebanon was a functioning democracy at the time, the sectarian tensions soon spilled into violence on the streets of Beirut. Most would argue that the root of the fighting alongside the established tensions among the religious communities was the dissatisfaction with the National Pact. Its power sharing agreement with an allotment of political offices split between the Christians and Muslims in

a six to five ratio respectively. With this rose questions of accountability and the fairness of a system that seemed to predetermine the outcome of political elections. Opposition was always dissatisfied with this arrangement and even an agreement to make the allotment of seats more equitable did not simmer the tensions that arose from it. "In the 1970s, various internal tensions inherent to the Lebanese system and multiple regional developments contributed to the breakdown of governmental authority and the outbreak of civil strife in 1975. The cause of the Lebanese civil war was neither exclusively internal nor exclusively external, nor was its settlement. The civil war came to an end at a specific historical juncture when movement toward internal reconciliation coincided with favorable regional and international developments."⁴

Along with the political inequalities of the time there was a growing economic gap between the wealthy Lebanese and the poor. Beirut had become primarily a service economy that catered to the outside world for business leaving behind the less educated member of society. People had to relocate due to rising cost of living and this created pockets of poverty around the city especially on the outside. There were constant street demonstrations signaling the frustrations of the residents.

The War and its Damages

The Lebanese Civil War started in 1975 and was fought in various stages with multiple countries becoming involved and developing factions within the country. One of the groups to form was the Lebanese National Movement, who called for reforms of the administration and political processes for the country. They had also aligned themselves with the Palestinian forces that had been in the country as refugees from the conflict with Israel. Solidarity with the Palestinians and the Palestinian cause was popular in Lebanon but their ongoing conflict with Israel and their instability made it a difficult partnership. On the other side, a group of conservative forces led by

³ Ibid., 321.

⁴ Hassan Krayem, "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement," *American University of Beirut*.

the Christian Phalangist group started the Lebanese Front. This group advocated the status quo and favored the system of federalism and split representation. While many citizens might have been split on the issue as to what system of government they would approve, sectarian alliances generally were the cause for any loyalty or support. Initially the Lebanese National Movement or LNM had the upper hand.⁵ However, the Syrian army intervention in 1976, which resulted in LNM losing much of the achievements it had gained early on. Their alliance with the Palestinians caused them great devastation, especially with the Israeli invasion of the country in 1982. This ultimately strengthened the Lebanese Front. The war did not have a simple start and finish but was fought with multiple lulls in violence and foreign invasion. Events such as the assassination of Bashir Gemayel signified the continuing conflict even when the situation started to seem to settle down. In these interim periods, multiple outside parties tried to broker peace between the sides but to no avail. The Reagan administration sent in troops and diplomats to try to calm the violence and set up relations between the Israelis and Lebanese but ultimately failed and withdrew American forces from the conflict.

The internal war was also getting out of hand as well. Militias aligned by religious affiliation were setting up control of their respective areas of influence. There became enclosed areas of militia control that would be exclusively for Christians or exclusively for Muslims. Each one of these groups declaring a level of sovereignty over their areas. From the Christian side there would be calls for a "Christian Republic" and partition from the rest of the country.⁶ Radical Islamic movements were also gaining influence in the region using the rallying cries of Islamic Republic and pan-Islamism.

During the 1980s multiple conventions met with the goal of bridging the gaps between the various forces. In 1983 groups from the major factions met in Geneva to discuss a way to end the conflict and begin the period of reconciliation. By December 1985, groups from the Syrians, Christian Lebanese Forces, confessional militias, Shiite Amal Movement, and representatives from the Druze

factions met together in Damascus. They agreed to the Tripartite Agreement which instituted social and political reforms aimed at finally ending the conflict. Unfortunately, President Amin Gemayel and his intelligence chief ousted the leader of the Lebanese Forces and the agreement was considered null and void. Political instability and violence between the various sides continued and eventually the public got tired of the constant destruction and the occupations by the various neighboring countries. In 1989 General Aoun and the Lebanese troops under his command started a "War of Liberation" aimed at ending the Syrian presence in the country and the presence of all foreign forces. Eventually, this effort failed and infighting between the Maronites broke out. There was also fighting between the two major Shiite sects as well, on one side being Amal and the other the new militant group Hezbollah, who's main message was that of religious populism. Eventually the public started to take matters into their own hands. One example of this grass roots effort was the labor demonstrations along the Green Line.⁷ The labor movement protested the derogatory effects of the war on the people and the economy. At this point, the war was winding down, the Israelis had enough to worry about with the intifada, the end of the war between Iraq and Iran let the other Arab countries to focus their attention on the Lebanese Civil War, and the United States wanted to expand its influence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The agreement that eventually ended the war was known as the Taif Agreement or the National Accord Document. It had the support of the Syrians, the Arabs, as well as the international community. The Lebanese Civil War lasted from 1975 to 1990. Notable events such as the Sabra and Shatila massacres made headlines around the world casting a shadow on the Israeli army's ability to protect the citizens during their occupation of Lebanon. The Marine barracks bombing which left over 200 American service men dead left a painful memory for the Americans. The seemingly endless war was a devastating episode in the history of the country and for the region as a whole. The effects of the conflict can still be felt and seen today on the streets of Beirut. Only time could heal the wounds caused by this

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

terrible tragedy. It left roughly 150,000 people dead and 300,000 wounded. It left a city much in ruins.

The main area of devastation during the civil war was what was known as the Green Line. This was the demarcation between the various forces, primarily Christian and Muslim. It ran right through the heart of central Beirut and experienced some of the harshest fighting during the war. Hotels, which were common place in the heart of the city before the war, hosting elites from the world over were fought over, the last to fall being the Holiday Inn. Its demise culminated in a battle in which one side was attacking from the roof top bar tossing bombs to the opposition militias below.⁸ The area was almost completely empty. It resembled a waste land of abandoned buildings, streets filled with rubble and dust. Empty shells of buildings and markets that had been demolished or completely bombed out littered the city. Since the city was split, the residence in the western part were blocked off from the disposal site on the eastern side so what grew was a toxic waste site that was in need of cleaning and the infrastructure as a whole was in need of cleanup. The devastation started early on in the war and there were multiple attempts to try and rehabilitate multiple areas of the city during the war. But every time there would be a perceived end of hostilities, the fighting would continue until the agreement was reached in the early nineties. Only then could the real effort for a reconstruction and rehabilitation for a city and its residences begin. The government set up a private corporation with the blessing of the state to facilitate the redevelopment of the city center, the company was known as Solidere.

Solidere and Central Beirut

To deal with the monumental task that was before the Lebanese government of rebuilding a city that had seen devastation over the fifteen years, they realized that they needed a concentrated effort with a master plan and an organization capable of completing the work. What

was formed was the joint stock company, the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut Central District. For short, it was known as Solidere, based on its French acronym. It was developed at a time of great change in global politics, the USSR had just collapsed and the Washington consensus was firmly established as the economic path for the nineties. Many socio-economic themes were present in the outlook of the company. Globalism, capitalism, nationalism, liberalism, all of these played an important role of developing the strategy for the firm when it started its task to rebuild the city. What they wanted to do was rehabilitate the city, bring the residences together while attracting the investors and industrialists that had made the city a business hub before the outbreak of the civil war. But questions about equality and corruption were soon raised, as people questioned who this affluence and development was really for. People were concerned about the ability of the city to bring all sections of society together through the project, rich and poor, Muslim and Christian, as well as urbanite and non-urbanites. The government had set up this company with the perceived blessing of the people but was soon accused of only catering toward a specific group of clientele. People felt excluded from a city center which they had seen grow, die, and become reborn in another form. The political nature of development was quickly realized.

The effort to reconstruct the city center has been seen as a move born of strong political will and a determination to complete the project no matter the impediments. Law 117 passed in 1991 approved the establishment of the firm and gave them the legal ability to take over the process of reconstruction in the city center, with the approval of a master plan. In 1994 the company was officially formed and their work was ready to begin. A couple issues were at hand. One was the fact that many buildings in the area were not quite completely demolished but were none the less an obstacle impeding the complete rebuilding of the area. Following the master plan, the company sought to create a uniform redesign of the inner city. The company basically became the "a planner, a developer, and a manager of the city center." Demolitions of the former buildings were to take place but there was speculation that the

⁸ Fregonese, "Beirut's Discrepant Cosmopolitanisms," 325.

company was acting in a way to try to clear space for its overall goals. Work to take down the damaged buildings went thought even though they had not yet been officially approved. The city had already gone through a devastating war that had destroyed many of the building in the city center but as Saree Makdisi put it. "Not only were buildings that could have been repaired brought down with high-explosive demolition charges, but the explosives used in each instance were far in excess of what was needed for the job, thereby causing enough damage to neighboring structures to require their demolition as well. Thus for each building "legitimately" demolished several other buildings were damaged beyond repair, declared hazards, and then demolished themselves with the same zeal for the big explosions. It is estimated that, as a result of such demolition, by the time reconstruction efforts began in earnest following the formal release of the new Dar al-Handasah plan in 1993, approximately 80 percent of the structures in the downtown area had been damaged beyond repair, whereas only around a third had been reduced to such circumstances as a result of damage inflicted during the war itself."⁹

Opposition started to grow as people were questioning the role of the company and the sincerity of their desires to rehabilitate the city. Some saw the company as trying to take advantage of the situation, creating more damage than was necessary in an effort to wipe a clean slate for construction without having to consider historical structures. Objections were raised and were heard loudly when Roman ruins were found as workers started to excavate to build the foundations of the new structures. Ultimately the plans were reconfigured around the recovered ruins.¹⁰ The politics of history and the preservation of it was on full display during the period of demolition.

Another issue for the company was how to compensate the owners of the destroyed properties. Most of the population had evacuated the area to escape the conflict but none the less had legitimate claims to ownership in that part of the city. What the company did was actually provide

these individuals and investors with a sort of primary stock. The property was being expropriated so the owners did not have a say over whether they could contest the accumulation of real estate, but they did receive stock which could be liquidated for other financial endeavors. The company was valued at 1.82 billion USD and 1.17 billion USD were issued to holders of properties that had been destroyed in the city center and would be incorporated into the new master plan of the city. When the company went public it issued what is known as B shares which represented the other investors, who had to adhere to strict Lebanese rules concerning stock holdings. The company set out an aggressive marketing strategy to build interest in their properties, with ads in the Financial Times and The New York Times.¹¹ They were trying to prove to the world that they were bringing Lebanon back into the spotlight as a regional hub for business and investment. They issued glossy photos and booklets that offered stunning artistic conceptions of what the future of the city would look like. Their stated objectives include,

- Involves the recovery of the public domain, with the installation of a complete modern infrastructure.
- Provide an urban design framework for the new construction and or the restoration of preserved and historic buildings with a good integration between old and new, tradition and innovation, control and creativity in architectural expression.
- Creates public spaces including gardens, squares, belvederes, promenades and trails.
- Uearths layers of the city center's history
- Reestablishes the fabric and neighborhood structures accommodating a broad mix of land use ranging from business and institutional to residential, cultural and recreational facilities.
- Offers a flexible, market oriented development framework, encouraging the emergence of a sustainable environment.
- Creates poles of attraction for the city center renewal.

⁹ Saree Makdisi, "Laying claim to Beirut: Urban narrative and spatial identity in the age of Solidere," *Critical Inquiry* 23, no. 3 (1997): 661-705.

¹⁰ Ibid., 681.

¹¹ Ibid., 676.

- eates a vibrant, 24-hour active downtown.Cr¹²

To gain a fuller understanding the political and economic basis for the direction of the project, one must examine the economic world view of the people in charge of the company and how that translated into real estate and development.

If one were to put a face on the Lebanese governments plan to redevelop the city, as well as the company Solidere tasked with overseeing the project, none would fit better than Rafik Hariri. The man known as Mr. Lebanon became a billionaire through his work in engineering and was the primary force behind the establishment of the company. During the time of Solidere's early inception, he also had significant power within the Lebanese government. He served as Lebanon's Prime Minister from 1992 until 1998 and then later on in the early 2000s. His influence in politics was firmly established with a coalition that had control over the parliament and popular support. The citizens of the country generally felt he represented their views in areas such as the Syrian occupation and the direction and rehabilitation of the country. His leadership within the country was seen by many as possibly corrupt. This due to the fact that the man, who had a controlling share in a company, whose task is to rebuild the city center for the country, was also in charge of the political mechanisms used to approve projects and issue permits for the various logistical stages of development. He used the redevelopment of the city to implement his political and economic vision of the city and the country as a whole. His political party, the Future Movement now carries the banner for his political manifestations.

The Hariri family, as well as, the Future movement in general can be seen as advancing a neo-liberalistic political manifestation for the country. They have a rhetoric which is almost completely capitalistic in nature. It strived to make the country open to foreign investment, service industries, and make Lebanon a stopping off point for doing business in the rest of the region. Catering to Western and Gulf business men, the party and its representatives in the Lebanese

Parliament had a very globalist view when it came to their economy. Their hope was to create a country where capital and the advancement of the business sector will eventually lead the country into a prosperous future. This line of thinking was popular in the early nineties as the fall of the Soviet Union spelled the end for collectivist economies based upon the practice of a highly centralized economy. The same world view was advanced by the Prime Minister of England in the eighties, Margaret Thatcher and the American President Ronald Reagan. On their own website the company described their political and economic manifesto in the following ways. "Based on the inevitable link between liberal democracy and the economic and social well-being, the Future Movement supports a liberal and open economy, based on the principles of a market economy, adopting policies that support the private sector. This arises from the fact that Lebanon's strength and the reason behind its unique role in the east are based on the protection of the Lebanese system of public liberties in its political, economic, cultural, social and communication dimensions, the right to private property, banking secrecy and the free flow of capital, and the independence of the judiciary."¹³

With this economic world view it is no surprise to see the type of development that the company advanced. Observers have noted that the marketing attributed to the redevelopment projects undertaken by the company. Everywhere people look now, they are bombarded by images of Western looking people living cosmopolitan lifestyles enjoying the benefits of a globalized economy. All of this is giving the impression to the audience of a city that is catching up to the world and that by opening itself to the outside world. A new awakening to the benefits of capitalistic markets missed out upon while the country was at war. Themes such as modernity and cosmopolitanism can be helpful when trying to conceptualize this type of vision and growth. When made successfully it can change the outlook of a nation. If the people really feel that they can succeed and find a way to prosper in a global economy then the benefits of an open society and economy can be realized. Along with this theory of

¹² <http://solidere.com/city-center/urban-overview/master-plan>. Solidare website, listed under stated objectives.

¹³ Makdisi, "Laying claim to Beirut: Urban narrative and spatial identity in the age of Solidere," 696.

economic motivation, the planners hope to prove to the outside world that the country is ready for investment and has the capabilities to serve as a place of business. It hopes to give the impression of economic and political stability, discounting the fears that violence and conflict, especially within the various religious sects is not a concern for the vested parties.

One of the ways that a nation can prove its modernity and the wealth that it possesses and is capable of possessing is through ambitious building projects that have impressive visual qualities. This type of development has been widely used in Gulf countries as well as in Eastern Asia, especially China. It incorporates impressive architecture, clean lines, as well as organized spaces. The designs for the new office structures in the city center, as well as, the grand hotels that are planned for construction have impressive visual aspects that give the viewer a moment of optimism. These architectural qualities don't normally translate into higher returns on investment but they do represent an attitude of accomplishment. This isn't intended to attribute this to a physical representation of "new money". However, more established economies tend to not have the same type of flair when it comes to real estate development, even when it concerns city centers. As stated earlier the most common examples of the visually stunning architectures come from emerging economies such as China and the Gulf countries who have recently gotten into unofficial competition as to who can build the tallest building in the world, largest mall, and other facilities that require an incredible amount of capital and energy and are often used to highlight the potential of a nation. This is no different in Lebanon. The Civil War drove a wedge through Lebanese society so the impressive nature of the development can be seen as a way to bring sects together under the ideals of impressive design. If the country can look good it can feel good, similar to the broken windows theory employed in New York during the nineties. If people can live in a clean society then they will feel better about their own lives and therefore make an effort to keep up with the rate change. This can be associated with the desire for "ordered space."

If the past before the Lebanese Civil War can be seen as a chaotic city with markets having

venders spilling their products onto the streets and buildings dating back to multiple periods of architecture and occupation, the drive for a new clean ordered space is an effort to bring the city in an opposite direction. Along with the stunning architecture with its clean lines, the goal of the Solidere reconstruction is the desire to create an ordered city, with a sense of space and a higher degree of function within it. With an ordered space without clutter, trash, and a sprawling rate of development, the government and planners can control the overall feel of the city. Lost in this cleaning up is the character that so many associate with an urban space. There is no longer a sense of randomness, the ability to turn a corner and feel as if you are in another city, but just simplified streets where things are easily explained and there is a rational sense of all that inhabits the area.

Ordering space takes, well, a lot of space. The fact that Solidere demolished much more than was needed to begin with during the process of clearing the war torn buildings can be seen as a way to open up land for the grand projects that are built at a neighborhood at a time, not piecemeal buildings. There are benefits to an ordered, planned space though. In almost any city around the world experiencing growth, there is a concerted effort to make sure any future development will not hamper future development or existing development. Apart from the potential of losing character of a neighborhood or a city, the clean development can create a living space which can adequately address the needs and concerns of its citizens. Schools and other social services can be placed in areas which directly benefit those who can use them. But the ultimate draw back to this mode of planning is that those in charge have the ability to make their vision imposed on others even if they are not in the best interests of those affected. What we have seen in Beirut is a concerted effort to make the development of the city center as ordered as possible. There are clean walkways, wide streets to make it easy to enter and exit the area, as well as large, indoor, air conditioned malls, which cater to the desires of a cosmopolitan clientele. Trying to rid itself of a past where trash and chaos was commonplace in urban environments, the development has made clean space a top priority.

It is not only in space that ordering has been developed; an ordered space can translate into an

ordered society. With the wide boulevards, crowds are easily managed and the ability for government to control those who the state deems troublesome is improved. Class implications come into play with an ordered society. The wealthy have their enclaves with their high end boutiques, Western luxuries, as well as parking for their SUVs. It has the ability to widen the social gap between the rich and poor, as well as, the economic and academic achievement gaps. When spatial separation is higher, the various economic classes or religious sects, as in Lebanon's case, there is a psychological separation between the various parties. Resentment and suspicion of the other groups will start to grow as a common experience and common causes are less likely to develop. This can be troublesome considering the main factor contributing to the Lebanese Civil War was the sectarian differences and the spatial separation demonstrated in the years before the war. What can happen is that people will feel that their city is no longer theirs; or, at least parts of the city are no longer meant for them or desirable to them. It can also have negative consequences on the development and on the local businesses. Catering to a specific clientele can be disastrous if that group cannot provide the economic support that is necessary to create returns on investment. An open society and an open space that invites a wide array of customers and businesses create greater economic diversity and greater sustainability than one which excludes rather than includes. The problem that Solidere created was the lack of inclusion within its redevelopment of the city center. In its effort to create a city that attracts the wealthiest individuals from around the world to invest in their city, they have excluded those who call Beirut their home and have possibly damaged the city and its inhabitants ability to grow and adapt in a changing market.

In an effort to keep an image of a clean, orderly, high class, and cosmopolitan neighborhood, reports have revealed that the new city center is not for the greater Beirut popular, but rather for the wealthy elitists that the development has tried to attract. Even though many of the residences had to suffer through the Civil War and watched their tax dollars help to finance the reconstruction of the city, they feel that they have been left out, cast aside as unwanted. Just as the space is ordered

there is a sense that the area should be held exclusively for properly orderly people, who are not a risk to safety and business. Many people have felt that this is not a mere safety check or an effort to keep away criminals or terrorists. Rather, it was meant to exclude ordinary people who are not excessively wealthy and have average casual appearances. Surrounding the city center, there have been reports of armed military personnel along with private guards making sure that those deemed troublesome are not allowed into the area, or questioned to a great degree. Fences and concrete barriers have also been erected as a way to prevent the ability for a truck bomb or other types of terrorist activity.¹⁴ This can be excused to a certain degree. The various political factions and religious sects within the country have fought in the past and there is an effort to make sure this does not happen again. Adding to this is the instability in neighboring countries and the possibility for fighting to spill over into Beirut. Security screenings are not entirely foreign to the residence of the city as well, but there is a sense that this development was not meant with the desires and the needs of the local population. Rather instead there is a feeling that the development is mainly for the attraction of foreign capital and business people from the West and around the Arab world.

Another issue at hand is the high cost of living associated with these new areas. Many of the middle class and especially the lower class residences cannot afford to live or shop in these new apartment buildings or shopping spaces that have sprung up in the city center. "Residential properties are of a large size and come with very high prices that appeal more to the Arabs from the Gulf who come occasionally to do business rather than to the local population. This leads to streets that are mostly empty at night, with buildings that rarely reveal a lit-room, and the sign of someone living there. Beirut's urban reconstruction is in fact seen as a missed opportunity for enhancing social cohesion."¹⁵

¹⁴ Gruia Badescu, "Beyond the Green Line: Sustainability and Beirut's Post-War Reconstruction." *Development* 54, no. 3 (2011): 358-367.

¹⁵ Ibid., 362.

This issue has the potential to become problematic for Solidere and the city in the future. If there is not an opportunity for a healing between various sects, whether that is through a shared pride in the rehabilitation of the city, or a new familiarity through close contact, the suspicions and infighting of the past could return. In addition to this, one could raise the concern about the ability for the project to be profitable with a number of vacancies and a lack of customers for the shops to survive. Many residences of the city have refused to spend their time and money in the new city center as well as the other Solidere projects for this economic isolation and the feeling of the desire for their exclusion.

This is the unfortunate consequence of development that was used to try to spur economic growth or recovery. It is not just Beirut where this is a problem, but in many regions around the world and in many cities. Through gentrification many residences are pushed out in an effort to attract a more affluent customer with the hopes of improving the local economy. This is the goal of the Lebanese government and of Solidere, to return the city to the Paris of the East and reclaim the service economy that was present before the war. For the people of Beirut, they feel they have been left behind and that the direction of development is not in their interests but in the interests of the government, the investors of Solidere, and of the business people who are the target of the marketing. Not too far from the high rise development, with its glamour and ordered space, a contrasting mode of reconstruction and rehabilitation is being practiced in the southern suburbs of the city. Instead of using high end development to rebuild the city and gain support for the new Beirut and new Lebanon, the political and militant group Hezbollah has seized upon religious populism and neglect of certain economic classes to create a development plan to gain popular support.

Hezbollah and the Southern Suburbs

In 2006, Israel entered into a conflict with the Shiite political and militant group Hezbollah, drawing the entire nation into conflict. The

southern suburbs of Beirut were being shelled constantly by war planes from the Israeli Air Force and the damage was starting to resemble that of the Civil War. Once again the city was under siege, and along with Solidere, Hezbollah had the task of rebuilding parts of the city and its suburbs. Using religious populism and class politics they set out a plan to recover from the conflict and use these for political advantage. In many ways, their work can be seen as a contrast to the direction and goals of the development group Solidere, but they also share many of the same basic economic principles. This section of the essay will focus on how the redevelopment of Hezbollah controlled areas has been used for political purposes, adding to more spatial separation between the various sects within the country, as well as, widening the cultural gap between the Lebanese.

The southern suburbs are predominantly Shia and are run by the group Hezbollah, which translate from Arabic into the "Party of God." They are an Islamic political group that has a militant wing that represents what they consider to be the repressed Shiite Lebanese. They suffer from years of neglect and carry the rallying cries of religious nationalism and anti-Zionism. Branded in the West as a terrorist organization, they have been able to recover from multiple conflicts and have used these conflicts to consolidate power within their areas of influence in order to gain political relevancy and legislative power in government. They have been able to take advantage of this and build upon their appeal based on a reconstruction plan marketed as a program for the poor and the oppressed.

The group has its roots in the Lebanese Civil War, forming after the 1982 Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. It immediately took on a role of working to improve the situation for the Lebanese Shiites drawing inspiration from the Islamic Revolution in Iran a few years before. In 1985, Hezbollah issued a manifesto calling for, among other things, the destruction of Israel, and the expulsion of the United States and France from the region. In it, the group professes loyalty to the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a loyalty that still extends to this day. By using the populist message of Zionist resistance and working to free the Shia population from the subjection that they had suffered for years at the hands of the Lebanese

government, the organization was able to attract many loyal members and allies around the Middle East. They primarily operate in southern Beirut and in southern Lebanon, as they can operate effectively in Shiite neighborhoods. Over the years they have drawn attention and condemnation from the West over incidences such as the Marine barracks bombing in 1983, which ultimately led to President Reagan withdrawing U.S. forces that had been deployed to Lebanon to help end the war. Although the group has denied involvement in many terrorist activities, they have been held responsible for terrorist attacks around the world, including ones in Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Bulgaria, usually targeting Israeli or American interests. The group has even been accused of having a hand in the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Their message is resistance and their methods are seen by some as extreme, but to their supporters they are freedom fighters.

Their last conflict with Israel brought about a renewed devastation to their neighborhoods and to the city of Beirut itself. The conflict started on July 12, 2006 as an ambush from Hezbollah on Israeli forces on the other side of the boarder. They killed three soldiers and took another two hostage. Hezbollah wanted to exchange the soldiers for Lebanese prisoners held by Israel, but were refused. The Israelis responded with heavy artillery, a ground invasion, and airstrikes on Lebanese infrastructure and Hezbollah targets. The Israeli government at the time also laid blame on the central Lebanese government in the beginning, claiming that since the attack originated in Lebanon, it was the responsibility of the government and therefore they had culpability. Part of the rational was to punish the Beirut upper class and non-Hezbollah Lebanese and get them to rid the country of the radical Islamist group. Rafik Hariri International Airport was struck followed by a sea and aerial blockade. Bridges and other public facilities were destroyed and, once again, the city was feeling the effects of war. Hezbollah continued to fire rockets into Israel as the war went on. Finally after 34 days of fighting a UN sponsored agreement ended the hostilities but not before over a thousand Lebanese had died in the fighting.

Overall there have estimates that as many as 20,000 homes had been either damaged or

destroyed as a result of the fighting.¹⁶ Hundreds of apartment building had been destroyed and in the rural parts of the country livestock was left rotting in the summer sun. Estimates and accounts vary but some have numbers of over 100,000 people being displaced during the fighting and those people returned home to their neighborhoods which once was filled with homes and apartments to piles of rubble and rebar littering the landscape. Although Hezbollah had declared a "divine victory" in the fighting, many of residence lost much of what they had before the war had started. The neighborhoods were devastated economically and in terms of infrastructure. This created a difficult situation for Hezbollah. On one hand they represented themselves as resisters, working to help the poor Shiite Lebanese overcome the injustices that had plagued their community for so long. Hezbollah used popular rhetoric of standing against Israel, who they held responsible for the hardships that they had been living through. However, it was Hezbollah who had started this war. After all, it was their operation that was a cross border raid into Israeli territory, provoking a heavy handed response from the Israeli Defense Forces. When people returned to their homes there was a certain level of resentment against the Islamic group as people saw them responsible for the damage caused to their city and neighborhoods. "Damn Hezbollah, damn Nasrallah," yelled one older Shiite woman in a headscarf as she surveyed the destruction of her family's grocery store in Saddiqine, just 3 miles from the Israeli boarder. Her neighbors and family quickly quieted her by pointing the presence of a western journalist, but none disagreed. In the tiny hamlet, a few hundred yards from the remains of her store, Hezbollah volunteers were operating heavy machinery to locate bodies trapped under a collapsed house. A Hezbollah escort barred a journalist from conducting interviews in English, apparently concerned people might express

¹⁶ Mona Fawaz, "The Politics of Property in Planning: Hezbollah's Reconstruction of Haret Hreik (Beirut, Lebanon) as Case Study." *International Journal Of Urban & Regional Research* 38, no. 3 (2014): 922-934.

criticism of Hezbollah if he couldn't understand the conversation."¹⁷

The Hezbollah leadership knew that they had to do something or the blame for the destruction caused during the war would be placed on them. They were, however, in a better position to do so after the war with Israel. Before the war they had a significant amount of influence in the southern suburbs and in southern Lebanon in general, but after the war the group was able to capitalize on the destruction to gain even more influence over the local population and the political system. The central Lebanese government, notorious for neglecting the less affluent Shia areas of the country and capital, had to deal with the task of repairing the large scale infrastructure that was damaged during the fighting. Their pace of progress was much slower than Hezbollah, as much of the support for the central government came from international donor nations. As a result, the response was as delayed. Regardless of the frustrations many felt toward Hezbollah for starting the war, there was also a sense that the militant group had achieved a sort of victory. Standing up to Israel and holding it own, the organization was admired for not getting bullied around during the fight. Combining the growing weakness of the central government and the growing populism of the group which runs along sectarian lines, they have been able to consolidate power and influence in many areas.

If one were to venture out into their areas they would notice a presence of Hezbollah, which is always suspicious of outsiders and who would subvert their religious populist message of Islamic governance. Much of this has to do with the physical response that Hezbollah had to the devastation of the war. They knew that if they did not act, the local Shia and greater Lebanese population would question the role of the organization and the support they receive raising the possibility that their influence would suffer. In light of this circumstance the organization put together a concerted effort to rebuild areas that had suffered during the war and to compensate and care for the well being of those who had lost their homes and property during the fighting. What

¹⁷ Mitchell Prothero, "STRIFE AMID THE RUINS," *U.S. News & World Report* 141, no. 7 (2006): 42-45.

Nasrallah issued was a Wa'd, arabic for promise, to rebuild the neighborhoods "more beautiful than they had been before."¹⁸

Hezbollah has multiple social service units that serve underneath its banner. One of which is the Martyr's Foundation, which pays compensation to those fighting what it considers a holy struggle, whether that be through actual combat or just as a victim of conflict, usually as a result of fighting Israel. There is a Foundation for the Wounded who receive compensation based on injuries suffered during the conflicts, as well as a Khomeini Support Committee. But the group that they have in charge of the reconstruction efforts in the areas under their control is Jihad al-Binna. Which means in arabic roughly "holy struggle construction." They see their task as one that is as important as fighting their enemy. That by rebuilding at a quick and efficient pace they are continuing their religious struggle. The development group was formed at the end of the Lebanese Civil War and has a stated mission of reversing the hardships caused by the war. Their stated objectives include the following:

- To establish many constructional and humanitarian projects such as hospitals, schools, cultural centers and public clinics in order to raise the social level of the population in Lebanon.
- To dig and install artesian wells, to construct water tanks and towers, besides the installment of a water network, irrigation canals and sanitary sewers.
- To construct developed houses to accommodate the orphans and war casualties
- To help the farmers with different development and extension methods to properly use their land and increase their production level and incomes
- To install electrical networks and generators in the vary far villages.
- To construct many educational and training institutions mainly for orphans and poor people.
- To help refugees find shelters during the emergent war crisis.¹⁹

¹⁸ Fawaz, "Politics of Planning," 922.

¹⁹ Brochure from Jihad al-Binna Development Association. Provided by Hezbollah's Foreign Relations Office, May 1998.

They have the backing of many international non-governmental organizations and charities and foreign governments. The amount of money they receive from the Islamic Republic of Iran has always been noted in the press, and it does appear that Tehran has provided a significant amount of financial support for the group and their reconstruction efforts. When the residences of the southern suburbs and the Hezbollah controlled neighborhoods that had experienced damage during the war returned to their homes they found representatives from Jihad al-Binna ready to assess the damage to their properties. Overall it is estimated that the group has spent somewhere between 300 million to 400 million dollars in their efforts to compensate victims of the conflicts with Israel. There was no shortage of claims and they had a calculated method for distributing compensation. Those whose homes were no longer habitable were offered up to \$12,000 to help pay for rent as well as to buy supplies such as furniture and other goods lost in the rubble. The group hired contractors to rebuild damaged homes who did tasks such as fixing elevators, replacing kitchens and kitchen appliances as well as other parts of people's homes that were damaged.²⁰ Their effort was one that in contrast to the Solidere plan of leveling neighborhoods and reconstructing a completely new city center from scratch. Hezbollah and their construction arm had an approach of reconstructing what had been there before, making the streets and neighborhoods look the way they did before the fighting had begun. This led to confusion though as to who actually was the property owner of the various buildings and homes. Some tenants who had to actual claim to any property were not able to receive compensation besides a couple hundred US dollars to replace smaller items lost in the fighting. This shows that while there is a contrast in the mode of reconstruction is different with the overall objectives but the economic philosophy of private property and supply and demand were still apart of the Hezbollah economic model.²¹

²⁰ Shawn Teresa Flanigan, and Mounah Abdel-Samad, "Hezbollah's Social Jihad: Nonprofits as Resistance Organizations," *Middle East Policy* 16, no. 2 (2009): 122-137.

²¹ Fawaz, "Politics of Planning."

Where Hezbollah makes an effort to differentiate itself from the central Lebanese government is through its charitable works for the poor Shia residences of Beirut and southern Lebanon. Neglected from the central government the Shiite populations have to rely mainly on Hezbollah to provide social services as well as infrastructure such as water and waste management. Their efforts mainly target Shia populations that live within their communities, sometimes reaching Sunni or Christian Lebanese but not too often as they do not have the desire to be seen as encroaching upon other sect's territories and neighborhoods. But they claim to have provided assistance on need and not just on religious affiliation but this can be attributed to an exception to the rule. This underscores the sectarian nature of the results their work. This has been used as a political tool by Hezbollah, which uses the neglect as a political tool and a rallying cry to its Shia supporters. This fits with their message as being a champion of the poor and downtrodden. It is an effective message due to the fact that many Shiite Lebanese feel that their poverty is not the result of failed fortunes but of oppression. The attitude among many Shia is that if the central government will not step in and help to better their lives it is better for them to do so themselves. "Decades after the end of the civil war, the Lebanese government remains inert, unable to provide for many the basic needs of its population. In this vacuum, Hezbollah has emerged to become one of the country's most important and competent service providers... While the Lebanese government has almost ceased to offer social-welfare services, Hezbollah has become one of the country's largest and most reliable providers."²²

Hezbollah has set up its own school systems which offer an alternative to Lebanese public school system which is notorious for its poor quality. For many families it is seen as a last resort. The organization provides money for books, supplies, and other forms of financial assistance for its families and students and there are estimates that the Hezbollah school system provides an education for about 14,000 students.²³

²² Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, "Hezbollah's Social Jihad," 128.

²³ Ibid., 126.

The organization has also set a network of health services within their constituencies providing another alternative to the central government which has been accused of providing services based on political patronage. Their health network which is titled the Islamic Health Unit has set up 3 hospitals, 12 health centers, 20 infirmaries, 20 dental clinics, 10 civil defense programs and social health programs. The efficiency of their operations has actually led the central government to hand over operations of many government hospitals to the group in the areas of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. Once again they provide health services to the poor for free or next to nothing costs. They have gained the reputation as a competent provider of social services in contrast to the central government who is seen as ineffective if not neglectful of the southern suburbs and southern Lebanon.²⁴

These efforts have led to considerable amount of political support for the group in Lebanese Parliamentary elections. Using their social services as a political message they have been able to rally popular support among disadvantaged populations on top of their religious populist message and resistance to Israel and Zionism. It is no surprise that most of the support for the political wing of Hezbollah comes from lower class Shia Muslims within the country. In a survey about the various social services in Lebanon, including health and education, 64 percent of Shia Muslims claimed Hezbollah to be the primary provider of support in the country. 72 percent of lower class Shiites claimed their political allegiance to the organization. Not only has the group claimed loyalty from the Lebanese Shia population but the Palestinians living within the refugee camps have for the most part pledged their allegiance to the group, although this can be mostly attributed to their resistance against Israel, but the group has also provided assistance to the camps as well.²⁵ Hezbollah had multiple members of their organization in the Lebanese cabinet, have broken down coalition governments, one of which being a Hariri led government, and have had a significant amount of seats in the Lebanese Parliament.

They have the ability to garner support through their message of resistance. Their supporters and NGO employees talk about their work as a contribution on the battlefield, whether that be against Israel or a central government that has neglected them for far too long. Some observers fear that this will lead to more recruitment of terrorists and fighters. One can see these social efforts as a way to lure impoverished Shia Muslims into a greater sense of piety and resistance against Israel. There are no exact figures as to how many people have been recruited or how many are expected to be recruited, but this possibility highlights the effects of providing goods and services its correlation with communal support for their militant operations.

Political Nature of Development

As demonstrated we have seen how the development of neighborhoods and the reconstruction efforts following conflict are inherently political. On one hand we see an effort to turn the city center and the Beirut in general into a cosmopolitan city catering to the needs of foreign businessmen with an effort to draw capital into the country. On the other we see a group that uses the rallying cry of resistance against oppression and occupation along with its efforts to rebuild a neighborhood and provide welfare services to its citizens. This gap between the two modes of development have lead to a widening gap between the Lebanese society. The Solidere led effort has a goal of making the country a wealthy service industry economy that lets wealth trickle from the top down. Their investment in wide boulevards and impressive buildings set up a future of wealth and prosperity, although this situation is not ideal for those who are disadvantaged and oppressed. With Hezbollah we see an organization that uses the rhetoric of the disadvantaged to build society from the ground up. By providing social services they have been able to rally support from those who have no place in central Beirut among the trendy shops and nightclubs that cater to young western oriented individuals.

We see a widening social gap between the two sides as a result of development. Each side is

²⁴ Ibid., 125.

²⁵ Ibid., 132.

creating an atmosphere that markets toward their own constituencies. The Beirut city center has a hip environment with shops that carry foreign brands, restaurants that serve hard liquor, and women can be seen walking around in skirts without any head covering. Contrast that with southern Beirut and southern Lebanon where the concept of moral leisure flourishes. The shops there cater to more local tastes, are usually smaller, mom and pop style places, that do not serve items that are at odds with the local religious customs.²⁶ Id like to note that these are not absolute realities but more in relative terms.

The success of the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the city of Beirut is different based on who you ask not matter what background they come from. A wealthy or affluent individual from the city is proud of impressive nature of their city and that it has opened its doors to the outside world offering opportunity and wealth that was originally unavailable. And there are those who feel that the direction in the city center has left them behind, creating a new space that is exclusive and does not resemble the Beirut of the past. For some the answer lies in the message of social justice. Their loyalties stand with those who stand with them. This method of thinking is quite common in the Middle East. For Western nations who are concerned about individuals being attracted to those who are against their interests, they should note the influence of welfare systems and how they translate into political support.

Development is much more than just buildings or pre-planned neighborhoods and zoning practices. It sets the tone for a city, it creates economic opportunity or disadvantage. It changes the feel, the look, the way people feel about themselves and their heritage. It can cause people to kill or be killed, take up arms against enemies foreign and domestic. All around the world we see new cities and the rebirth of those from the past. The problems and benefits vary around the globe but we see patterns and trends that know no language, or ethnicity, or political affiliation. Overall people have the same goal of trying to improve their lives for the better and to bring their

country into their vision of a just future. Beirut's future is far from certain. The war in Syria could have a disastrous effect on Lebanon which has already seen a large influx of refugees and the possibility of other Islamic organizations trying to take over the country. The wealth of the region is not guaranteed for the future as governments push to end the use of fossil fuels and develop domestic sources of energy. All of these will have a lasting effect on the country and its economy. Whether the new Beirut will be able to cope with the world changing around it is for now a question unanswered.

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²⁶ Mona Harb, and Lara Deeb. "Contesting Urban Modernity: Moral Leisure in South Beirut." *European Journal Of Cultural Studies* 16, no. 6 (2013): 725-744.

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A Close Examination of Chinese Labor Laws and the Issues of Implementation

KELSEY REED

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2010, fourteen individuals independently jumped to their death at a Foxconn factory, a large technology supplier for Western corporations such as Apple, Dell, and Hewlett-Packard. These suicides were said to be brought on by the harsh working and living conditions that Foxconn employees must endure. This news brought worldwide media attention to take a closer look at the working standards in China's factories and the people behind the "made in China" stamp.

The suicides at Foxconn led to further investigation of the working and living conditions of their labor force. According to interviews with Foxconn employees, the assembly line operators will work up to 12 hours a day, with only a rest day every two weeks.¹ Workers feel pressure from management to be forced to work overtime for up to 120 hours a month. These hours go far beyond what is legally allowed in China. In addition, wages are low. Their salary is only slightly higher than the minimum wage standards.² Employees will live with nine other co-workers in cramped and dirty dormitory style rooms on the factory campus.³ Their co-workers and roommates are all strangers to them. The campus provides eating, sleeping, and recreational facilities so employees do not need to leave. All of these factors lead to isolation, a major cause of suicide.⁴

This cruel environment is not unique to just Foxconn factories. China Labor Watch (2012) found characteristics of unsafe working conditions, low pay, long hours, and other illegal treatment of workers in number of other factories that supply to Apple, as well. While there is significant amount of

media coverage to show Apple suppliers mistreatment of workers, this paper will further demonstrate that labor violations are a common occurrence in many work environments throughout China. This paper will be divided into six sections: Chinese Labor Laws, Trade Unions, Discrimination, Workplace Safety, Wages, and Child Labor. Each section will demonstrate that although, there are extensive labor laws in place to protect Chinese workers, the problem stems from employers ignoring these laws, and government officials poor performance in implementing and enforcing the policies.

Background

China's economic development over the past few decades has been incredible. In 1978, China's GDP was valued at 148.2 billion dollars. By 2012, China's GDP grew to 8.2 trillion, making it the second largest economy in the world, just behind the United States.

Prior to 1978, China was state-run economy. In urban areas, people were organized into Danwei, or work units. In this system, housing, food, medical, and other expenses were taken care of by the government. After 1978, China began to slowly liberalize its economy. The Danwei system and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) slowly disbanded due to economic productivity competition from the rapidly growing private industry. In order to maintain social stability, the government pushed for economic growth. As China develops, Chinese citizens move from working primarily in primary industries to secondary and tertiary industries.

¹ SACOM, "Workers as Machines: Military Management in Foxconn," October 12, 2010.

² Ibid.

³ David Barboza, "After Suicides, Scrutiny of China's Grim Factories," *New York Times*, June 6, 2010.

⁴ SACOM, "Workers as Machines."




Figure 1.1
China Labor Bulletin

The majority of the workers in factories are temporary migrants, from the rural Western regions of China. As of 2013, it is estimated that there are as many as 262 million rural migrant workers. Migrant workers have been a key factor in China's economic success. They have supplied China with a bountiful of unskilled and low paid labor. However, due to the Hukou system, they are consistently marginalized. Because they do not hold an urban Hukou, migrant workers do not receive the same benefits as urban residents, including access to healthcare and education.

Migrant Workers of Total Urban Population




Figure 1.2
China Labor Bulletin, taken from Chan (2012)

The Hukou system was implemented over a decade in the 1950s in order to restrict internal movements in China. Mao intended to keep a majority rural population by limiting social services to be provided to only holders of an urban Hukou. Upon economic reforms starting in 1978, the Chinese government eased Hukou restrictions in order to meet the high demands of industrialization. Millions of workers have

migrated into China's major cities in order to gain economic opportunity. These migrant workers will tolerate harsh working conditions and low pay because they will gain so much more money than they would have if they stayed home.⁵

II. Chinese Labor Laws

Overview

When initially thinking about labor laws in China, one would most likely have a negative perception. With the news of scandals of harsh working conditions and unfair wages, it could be assumed that labor laws are incomplete or obsolete. Surely the mistreatment of workers is a result of a lack of a concrete law to protect workers. However, upon further evaluation, Chinese labor laws are quite extensive and are comparable to other major countries. This section focuses on two major Chinese labor laws: the 1995 Labor Laws and the 2008 Employee Contract Law. Not only is it important to get a basic understanding of what each of these law implicate, but to also understand why they are needed and analyze their effectiveness in protecting workers' rights in a growing economy.

Labor Regulation from 1944-1994

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party quickly implemented policies that provided urban workers welfare and job security. Due to the consequences of an ineffective Socialist system, widespread unemployment and a failing economy fell upon China. In the post-Mao era starting in 1978, SOEs reforms included increases in wages to boost employee performance and the introduction of labor contract to replace the previous lifelong employment policy. Workers became more self-reliant in finding and keeping jobs, as well as wages being determined by the employer instead of the state. Although the government did intervene in labor policies and regulation, a national labor law never officially existed.⁶

⁵ China Labor Bulletin, "Migrant Workers and their Children," June 6, 2013.

⁶ Ngok Kinglun, "The Changes of Chinese Labor Policy and Labor Legislation in the Context of Market Transition," *Japan Focus* (Spring 2008).

Comparison of Chinese Labor Laws to the United States and Japan

Category	China	United States	Japan
Holidays and Vacations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Paid vacation of at least 5 days if work same job > year 1 rest day/ week 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No mandatory leave or paid vacation No guaranteed rest day/week 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least 10 days/year of paid vacation days (will increase if work at same company longer)
Working Hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8 hrs/day 40 hrs/week 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 40 hrs/week (no limit on number of hours in a day) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8 hrs/ day 40 hrs/ week
Overtime Pay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 150% if work longer hours 200% if work on day of rest 300% on legal holidays 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 150% if work more than 40 hrs/ week 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 35% more if work on days off 25% more if work more hours in a day
Maternity Leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 98 day maternity leave, 15 days before birth Paid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 12 weeks after birth Unpaid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8 weeks Partially paid
Child Labor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Child labor prohibited under 16 years old 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Child labor prohibited under 14 years old Hours work/week limited until 16 years old 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Child labor prohibited under 15 years old Above 12 years old allowed with special permission
Wages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimum wage set by state and increased based on economic development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimum wage set by state and increased based on economic development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimum wage set by state and increased based on economic development
Health Insurance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workers placed on state-wide health insurance plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Optional health insurance (will be effective Jan. 1, 2014) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partial universal health insurance

Figure 1.2

In the early 1990's SOEs gradually began to privatize. Due to market forces, the former SOEs laid off million of redundant workers resulting in high unemployment rates. With the SOEs no longer directly under the control of the government, labor abuses by the private employers increased dramatically. Between the years of 1992-1993, the number of labor disputes increased by 51%.⁷ These factors led to the need of an official labor law, and thus resulted with the 1995 Labor Law.

1995 Labor Law and the Issues of Implementing Labor Laws

The new Labor Law included issues concerning salary, overtime and vacation time, labor contracts,

women and minors' rights, social insurance, termination stipulations, and labor disputes.⁸ As stated in Article 1, the goal of the law was to "protect the legitimate rights and interests of laborers, readjust labor relationships, establish and safeguard the labor system suiting the socialist market economy, and promote economic development and social progress". It is assumed that the goal of the law is to be in the interests of the workers.

Chinese authorities use a tiered approach when implementing labor laws. This means that there are different penalties for different levels of

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

severity in violations.⁹ For minor violations, authorities will issue only a warning. If the employer quickly fixes the problem, then no fine will be imposed. For more severe violations, a fine will be issued, but it can be drastically reduced once the problem is fixed. This method allows for the government to use its limited resources for more critical cases. However, there is little incentive for employers to be proactive about the laws, because there is basically no punishment for minor infringements. The risk of getting caught is less costly than following the laws in the first place.¹⁰ In order for the tiered system of law enforcement to work, China needs to have much higher risks and tougher enforcements.

Although labor laws are established by the central government, actual enforcement of the laws is left to the local governments. This decentralization creates further problems of effective enforcement because of the selfish interest of the local governments. Because the decentralized governments want to bring investment into their region, local governments will be more relaxed on enforcement to attract companies. Furthermore, local governments are focused on suppressing labor conflicts in order to not draw negative attention to their region. The governments will then focus on suppressing the uprising instead of fixing the underlying cause.¹¹

As stated before, the system does not encourage a proactive approach for employers to avoid punishment. High sanctions are not commonly imposed upon employers. Instead, authorities want low conflict and cooperation from the employers. The authorities focus on educating them instead of punishing them. But as Harper Ho notes, this phenomenon is not unique to China. The United States also takes a cooperative approach when dealing with labor law violators. High sanctions are also not commonly given because it costs time and money to enforce them. Employers are less willing to ignore or end up appealing high sanctions, which very is costly for the government.

⁹ Virginia E. Harper Ho, "From Contract to Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation Under China's New Labor Legislation," *Columbia Journal of Asian Law* 23, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 35-107.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

Labor inspectors have little power overall. They are not only few in number relative to the large number of employers, but they are also not taken seriously by the employers.¹²

Employee Contract Law of 2008

In the years leading up the 2008 law, China saw the number of labor strikes and protests increase dramatically.¹³ The already in place laws concerning employees signing contracts have been ineffective in solving employee-employer labor disputes.¹⁴ According to Lichtenstein et al., less than a fifth of employees signed a contract upon employment.¹⁵ Employee's wages, working conditions, duties, hours, etc., would be unclearly stated in the contract. These strikes were too drastic and too frequent to be ignored. With the ever-growing economy, China has also experienced and increased in the demand for labor. Most rural migrant workers have already moved into the larger, Eastern cities, causing a labor shortage and workers gained more power to demand higher wages and more rights. The rise of technology of cell phones and social media allowed for workers to better communicate across all of China to compare their wages and working conditions.¹⁶




Figure 2.2
China Statistical Yearbook

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Nelson Lichtenstein, et al., "China's New Labour Contract Law: Is China Moving Towards Increased Power for Workers?" *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (April 2009): 485-501.

¹⁴ Dan Harris, "The Impact of China's Labor Contract Law," September 15, 2008.

¹⁵ Lichtenstein, et al., "China's New Labour Contract Law: is China Moving Towards Increased Power for Workers?"

¹⁶ Ibid.

Article 1 of the 2008 Employee Contract Law states that the law is intended to “protect the lawful rights and interests of workers, and establish and develop harmonious and stable employment relationships”. Its main purpose was to employer the worker through improving the relations between and employer and employee.

In order to ensure a “harmonious society”, this law stipulates exactly what needs to be included in an employee contract. Likewise, it specifically lists the penalties for not providing a contract. It similarly lists the specific grounds for termination and severance and allows for employers to sue the employers directly, instead of seeking the help of the state. Employees working for the same employer for more than ten years would enjoy additional benefit, including making it almost impossible to terminate them.¹⁷

2008 Employee Contract Law Success

The number of labor disputes reached its highest number in the year immediately following the implementation of the law. This spike shows that Chinese workers are aware of their rights, and will take actions to protect them. The Labor Contract Law has also not deterred foreign direct investment away from China. Many companies are now using contracts with employers that explicitly set forth an employee's benefits and terms for termination. It is costly for an employer faced with a lawsuit. This further incentivizes an employer to get it right the first time, instead of going to court.¹⁸

However, there have been incidents of company manipulation of employees after the 2008 Law was enacted. Huawei, a large technology company, had senior managers tell employees working for the company around eight years to resign and then rehired them with new contracts. The new contracts not only included less pay, but they also restarted the employment term for these employees.¹⁹ They now have to wait longer to enjoy the benefits set forth in the Contract Law for employers working ten or more years for a company. Huawei clearly bullied these employees,

so they would have to continue on a termed based contract and receive less benefits.²⁰

Overview of All Labor Laws in China

The following section summarizes the basic provision set for in Chinese Labor laws. The below information is inclusive of all legislation relating to workers' rights enacted since 2013. The 1995 Labor Law was written in guidelines with international laws.²¹ China's Labor Law is similar, and in some cases, even more complete in protecting workers in comparison to other developed countries. Chart 2.1 illustrates the similarities between China's labor laws and the next top grossing GDP countries' labor laws: the United States and Japan. In some cases, Chinese laws are more complete than the United States and Japan. Health insurance is covered in China, where it was only optional in the United States in 2014, and partial in Japan. China also guarantees paid vacation days and a rest day at least once a week. The United States does not have any mandatory leave or paid vacation. It can be concluded that China's legislation concerning labor rights is indeed conclusive.

Minimum Wage

China's minimum wage system sets an hourly and monthly minimum wage. The minimum wage is set by the local government and differs between cities and provinces. Minimum wage has increased dramatically over recent years. Between 2008 and 2012 the average growth rate of the minimum wage standard was around 12%. It is projected that China's minimum wage should continue to grow by 13% annually through 2015 (China Briefing, 2013). Below is a chart comparing major producing city's minimum wage.

¹⁷ Harris, “The Impact of China's Labor Contract Law.”

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Lichtenstein, et al., “China's New Labour Contract Law: Is China Moving Towards Increased Power for Workers?”

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Kinglun, “The Changes of Chinese Labor Policy and Labor Legislation in the Context of Market Transition.”

City/Province	2012 Minimum Wage (RMB)	2013 Minimum Wage (RMB)
Shanghai	1450	1620
Beijing	1260	1400
Guangzhou*	1300	1550
Shandong*	1240	1380

Figure 2.3*China Briefing*

*Minimum wage in these cities further differs between districts within the city. Included here is the highest wage.

Overtime

Overtime is given to employees that work over 8 hours a day or more than 40 hours per week. Overtime compensation differs when it is worked. Below is how compensation is separated into three categories:

- If an employee works overtime on a weekday, he or she shall receive 150% of normal wages.
- If an employee works overtime on a given rest day, he or she shall receive 200% of normal wages.
- If employee works on a national holiday, he or she shall receive 300% of normal wages.

Employers cannot require their employees to work more than one hour in a day (or 3 hours in special situations), nor can they require their employees to work over time of 36 hours per month. The 2001 Labor Union Law also requires the employer to inform the labor union of any overtime hours.²²

Holidays and Annual Leave

The Chinese government includes 11 days of national holidays; these include but are not limited to:

- New Year's Day
- Spring Festival
- International Labor Day
- National Day²³

Women are also granted a half day on Women's Day. Typically, workers will arrange to have a

²² Baker & McKenzie, "China Employment Law Guide," *Baker & McKenzie International* (January 2013).

²³ "Labor Law of the People's Republic of China," implemented January 1, 1995.

seven-day holiday during Spring Festival and National Day.²⁴

Annual leave is given to each employee but the number of days given differs on work experience.

Number of Years Worked for Employer	Number of days of Paid Annual Leave
1-10 years	5 days
10-20 years	10 days
>20 years	15 days

Figure 2.4*Jackson, 2011*

Maternity

Women are allowed 98 days of maternity leave. Under the special provisions of the Labor Protection of Female Employees law, women are given an extra 15 days for difficult or multiple births. Women will receive a maternity allowance from the maternity insurance. If she does not have insurance, then the employer will pay her the same wages she earned before her leave.²⁵

Discrimination

Employers cannot discriminate on the basis of ethnicity, race, sex, religion, handicapped status, infectious diseases, or migrant workers. According to the Protection of Rights and Interest of Women Act, women are to have equal rights as men and to file lawsuits for harassment.²⁶

Social Insurance

Employers are required to contribute to the social insurance funds. These funds include: Old Age Pension Insurance, Basic Medical Insurance, Occupation Accident Insurance, Unemployment Insurance, and Maternity Insurance. The rates that employer and, occasionally, employees are required to make are determined by local governance.²⁷

²⁴ Nathan Jackson, "What are the Major Aspects of Chinese Labor Law?" *University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development* (April 2011).

²⁵ Lancey Zhang, "China: Maternity Leave Extended from 90 Days to 98 Days," *Library of Congress*, June 18, 2012.

²⁶ Baker & McKenzie, "China Employment Law Guide."

²⁷ Ibid.

Labor Contracts

Chinese Labor Law stipulates exactly what needs to be included in an employee labor contract. Examples include but are not limited to:

- Working hours, rest, and leave
- Exact job description
- Labor compensation
- How employees are protected under harsh conditions.

The law also states the exact consequences of not signing an employee contract. If an employee contract is not signed within one month of employment, the employee shall receive 200% of expected salary. If no contract has been signed within one year of employment, it will be assumed that the employee and employer have entered into a no-term contract.²⁸

Termination and Severances

China has a no at-will termination policy. Employers can only terminate employees under the circumstances directly listed by the law. According to Article 39 or the Employee Contract Law, an employer can terminate an employee *without* a 30-day notice in the following circumstances:

- The employee does not satisfy the requirements of the position during the probation period.
- The employee has violated the company's rules.
- The employee causes serious damage to the employer due to negligence of his/her duties.
- The employee forms a relationship with another employer at the same time that hinders his/her performance at the job, or if the employee is corrected, but does not make a change.
- The employee commits a federal crime.²⁹

An Employer can terminate an employer for the following reasons *with* a 30-day notice:

- The worker becomes ill or injured from a non-work-related cause and cannot perform the original job after medical treatment is

finished, nor can he perform any other positions arranged by employer

- The worker is unable to perform his job after training or changes to his position.
- Objective circumstances have changed in which the labor contract is affected and cannot be performed. Only after agreement could not be made after alterations to the original labor contract is conducted between the employer and the employee.³⁰

The law also gives provisions for workers that are protect from termination. Examples include: pregnant women, employees injured or suffer disease from a work related incident who lost partial ability to perform job, or employees who have worked for 15 years and were within five years of retirement. Employers are only allowed for collective dismissals for exact situations stipulated in the law and with a 30-day notice for all employees affected.³¹ Employers are required to pay severance to fixed term employees who have not renewed their contract. Severance is typically one month's average salary for each year of employment. The severance is capped at 12 months' salary.³²

Conclusion

After a brief introduction to Chinese Labor laws, it can be concluded that these laws are as adequate if not more in comparison to other countries. In order to raise working conditions, the Chinese government does not need to amend its legislation. Instead, it needs to make policy changes in order to ensure that these regulations will not be violated.

III. Labor Unions in China

Introduction

In 2010, a wave of automobile labor strikes overtook the Pearl River Delta. The first strike began at the Foshan Nanhai Honda Parts Manufacturing Company in May 2010. By July, twenty more strikes occurred throughout the

²⁸ Edward J. Epstein, "China's New Labor Contract Law," *Troutman Sanders* (2008).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Jackson, "What are the Major Aspects of Chinese Labor Law?"

automobile industry occurred. These strikes all shared similarities of demanding wage increases and improved working conditions.³³

China has experienced an increase in labor strikes in recent years. Between the years of 1993 and 2003, the number of reported incidents has increased from 10,000 to 60,000. Zeng Qinghong, the president of the Guangdong Automobile Association, connects the increase in labor strikes to labor unions in China having been relatively unsuccessful in resolving labor disputes. Unions not only have a small presence, but the workers also do not trust them as a means to fairly represent their interests.³⁴

The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is the only trade union allowed in China. It is designed in a hierarchical way of incorporating all unions under its control. The ACFTU's structure was taken from the Soviet Union model of being an extension of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Thus, the party has complete control over the ACFTU.³⁵

The ACFTU is the largest trade union in the world. It encompasses around 170 million members, showing that it can have extensive influence over industrial relations in China. Despite its enormous capacity to influence employer-employee affairs within China, the ACFTU has been criticized that it has done little to help the average Chinese worker and does not work on their interests.³⁶

This section will give a brief introduction on the structure of the ACFTU and explain further as to how the ACFTU and the CCP are interconnected. Next, it will go on to argue that the ACFTU is not a legitimate trade union because it takes on the side of the companies, instead of working on the best interest of the workers. Consequently, labor strikes should remain illegal in China until the ACFTU becomes a better representation of the workers.

³³ Bai Ruixie, "The Role of the All China Federation of Trade Unions: Implications for Chinese Workers Today," *Workingusa* 14, no. 1 (2011): 19-39.

³⁴ Zeng Qinghong, "Regulate the Right to Economic Strike so as to Create Harmonious Labor Relations," *Proposal to National People's Congress* (2011).

³⁵ B. Taylor, and L. Qi, "Is ACFTU a Union and does it Matter?" *Journal of Industrial Relations* 49, no. 5 (2007): 701-715.

³⁶ Ibid.

Finally, a case study of the establishment of labor unions in Walmart will even further exemplify that the ACFTU works to benefit the Communist Party instead of the workers.

ACFTU Structure

The ACFTU is organized in a hierarchical structure. The highest level of organization is at the national level and broken up into smaller levels (see figure 3.1). The national level of organization has four divisions: The National Congress of Chinese Trade Unions, The Executive Committee of the ACFTU, the ACFTU Presidium, and the Secretariat. Each level elects the members of the level below them. The lower levels will take care of the affairs concerning the ACFTU while the higher levels are in recess. The leadership of the ACFTU is composed of the Chairman, Vice-Chairpersons, and the Secretariat. These individuals are all party members and are appointed on by party leadership.³⁷

There are three local levels of organization: Province (including autonomous regions and municipal cities), city, and county. Again, these are organized in a hierarchical manner of leadership. For instance, the provincial level of union federation has supreme power over the city, and the city has power over the county level of union federation. Congresses governing these local union federations must meet every five years. Finally, members of the same enterprise, industry, or governmental department can form a grassroots union. However, it is important to remember all of these bodies are under the control of the ACFTU and the central government.³⁸

At the Grassroots trade union level, the ACFTU constitutions dictates that committees must be established that will be elected every 3 or 5 years. Each union must establish an audit committee that will oversee the proper use of trade union funds. A Women Workers Committee must also be established to will protect and represent the interest of women workers.³⁹

The 1992 Trade Union Law requires enterprises, institutions, or governmental departments with 25 or more employees to

³⁷ "Organizational Structure of the ACFTU" (2007).

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

establish a trade union to represent their workers. With enterprise, institutions, or governmental departments with more than 200 workers, a full time trade union chairperson will be appointed.⁴⁰

Union members contribute .5% of their monthly salary to the unions source funding. Enterprises, institutions, or governmental departments are required to give 2% of their total employee payroll to the unions, as well.⁴¹ However, the ACFTU relies heavily on government support. External research shows that without the

Structure of the ACFTU At the National Level




Figure 3.1
ACFTU

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

government funding, the ACFTU would be bankrupt.⁴²

The legitimacy of the ACFTU as a Union

The ACFTU has received international criticism over the legitimacy of it being a true representation of the Chinese workers' interest and rights. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) stands strong in not recognizing the ACFTU as a union. Taylor and Li argue that the ACFTU operates as a "state organ" and as an extension of the CCP to pursue the interest of the Party instead of the workers.⁴³

The criticism of the ACFTU does not come from its alliance with a party, as most labor unions are associated with a political party, but because there is only one party in China. This does not allow for competition between unions. Other unions cannot form that could offer better opportunities, thus forcing the ACFTU to be held accountable for its intended duties.⁴⁴

The ACFTU has been successful in drafting legislation concerning workers' rights, such as the 2008 Labor Contract Law. As seen in the previous section, China has extensive laws protecting workers' rights that are comparable to Western counterparts. However, the ineffectiveness of the ACFTU comes from its incapability to apply and enforce these laws on the workers' behalf. As will be discussed in later sections of this paper, incidents of employee discrimination, low wages, and employee safety are common within China. The government and ACFTU have done little to punish offenders.⁴⁵

In situations of employee/employer dissent, workers do not turn to their unions for help, not because the workers do not like the unions, but because the unions are incapable of acting on their interests. Unions in SOEs chose to subdue conflict in order to keep the SOEs competitive in the market economy. In the private sector, unions are established in order to make the appearance that they exist rather than actually provide support to the workers. In the 1990s, in response to the

⁴² Taylor and Qi, "Is ACFTU a Union and does it Matter?"

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ruijie, "The Role of the All China Federation of Trade Unions."

growing privatization of companies, Deng called for a number of unions to be created. As a result, many paper unions were established. These unions were used to reach the national quota, but did not really exist in reality.⁴⁶ Although recent trends show an increase in unions in China, these numbers can be misleading, as most workers do not know that they actually are present.⁴⁷

According to the Trade Union Law, members are guaranteed the right to elect, be elected, and vote on their representing chairs at the enterprise level. But in truth, fair and free elections do not usually occur. Elections rarely happen as managers are frequently appointed as union leaders by the higher union chairs. When direct elections do take place, elected leaders are given special privileges that place their loyalty to the ACFTU instead of toward the workers' wellbeing.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the ACFTU has been criticized to be ineffective in its ability to protect workers in periods of turmoil. In the 1990s, 30 million workers were laid off as SOEs were privatized. The ACFTU failed to neither protect or provide workers any support when they were guaranteed employment for life previously by the state.⁴⁹ In response to the 2008 global crisis, The Hong Kong Liaison Office of International Trade Union Organization criticized the ACFTU "rather passive and establishment focused response to the crisis as well as their focus on the survival of enterprises at the expense of worker benefits has done little to change the already poor image of them as a union in the eyes of workers."⁵⁰ This shows the negative international perception of the ACFTU.

Finally, the ACFTU cannot be a legitimate union because the government does not allow for labor strikes to occur. It simply is neither legal nor illegal as there is no clause in the Constitution concerning labor strikes. Zeng Qinghong, the president of the Guangdong Automobile Association, argues that strikes guarantee workers' rights and gain bargaining power. However, as stated in the 2008

⁴⁶ Taylor and Qi, "Is ACFTU a Union and does it Matter?"

⁴⁷ Ruixie, "The Role of the All China Federation of Trade Unions."

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ IHLO, "ACFTU in a Time of Crisis: Back to Old Ways?" (April 2004).

Labor Laws, the ACFTU's goal is to create a harmonious society between employers and employees. Unfortunately, as a result of this policy, the party chooses to appease the employers before the employees. The ACFTU has been slow or absent in response to conflict. The ACFTU and the party choose to overlook the underlying problems of the works' dissent in favor an appearance of peace.⁵¹ This leads to the question as to whether or not labor strikes should be allowed in china.

Should Labor Strike be legalized in China?

Although labor strikes are not new to China, the 2010 labor unrest in the Pearl River Delta brought worldwide media attentions and Chinese officials to question the government's methods in subduing labor strikes. Zeng Qinghong, in his address to the National People's Congress, attributes the strikes to the growing wealth disparity in China. Labor strikes are common for a society going through development in order for laborers to attempt to improve their own economic situations. Not only are strikes used for economic purposes, but they are also used to promote the workers' legal rights, as well. Because the ACFTU poorly represents the workers' rights, the workers must take matters into their own hands.⁵²

In an ideal Socialist society, labor strikes would be obsolete as the proletariat is the ruling class. However, recently, labor strikes have become a more common method for workers to express their dissent. The Chinese government has taken the side of suppressing any labor unrest quickly as possible in order to preserve peace.⁵³ As labor strikes are becoming to be used more commonly as a means to increase salary and improve employee treatment, the government's stand on labor strikes will need to change in order to create a more feasible transition to a more democratic society.

Article 27 of the *Trade Union Law* acknowledges the practice of strikes. It states at the times of strike the trade union should "hold consultation with the enterprise or institution or the parties concerned, present the demand of the workers and staff members, and put forward

⁵¹ Taylor and Qi, "Is ACFTU a Union and does it Matter?"

⁵² Zeng, "Regulate the Right to Economic Strike so as to Create Harmonious Labor Relations."

⁵³ Ibid.

proposals for solution. With respect to the reasonable demands made by the workers and staff members, the enterprise or institution shall try to satisfy them". This statement not only provides a broad procedure for strike negotiations, but also assumes that the enterprises by agreeing to reasonable demands of the workers in order to restore peace.

Qinghong further argues that the right to strike should be legalized because it guarantees workers' rights and is crucial for "China's establishment of a lawful economy.⁵⁴" Legalizing strikes would show the government's positive attitude and the promotion of the workers' interests. Qinghong argues that legalizing strikes would not cause more labor unrest to occur in China. In societies where strikes are legal, labor unrest is uncommon. Legalizing strikes would just regulate the procedure and the steps taken to ensure more peaceful relations will all parties involved.⁵⁵

Although legalizing strikes would allow for workers to gain bargaining power, this paper takes on the argument that China is not ready to legalize strikes until issues concerning the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the ACFTU representing the workers' interests are resolved. Legalizing strikes would suggest that the strikes would be coordinated by the ACFTU. However, the issue arises, as argued previously, that the ACFTU is not an adequate representation of the workers. Labor unions must be fixed to ensure a democratic representation before strikes should be formally legalized. Furthermore, Chinese workers are neither organized nor knowledgeable fully on their rights in order to coordinate an effective labor strike.⁵⁶

ACFTU's Involvement in Private Enterprise and the Case of Walmart

One of the ACFTU's biggest challenges has been organizing trade unions in foreign enterprises.⁵⁷ In 2003, the ACFTU turned its attention to unionizing

the private industry. Many multinational companies did not follow the 1992 Trade Union law that requires enterprises with more than 25 employees to establish a union, nor were they pressured to do so by either the government nor their workers. However, in 2003, the ACFTU began blacklisting companies that failed to follow the law.⁵⁸

A major target of this unionization movement was Walmart. The government publicly denounced Walmart for its negative business practices. Although Walmart responded by arguing that they do not need unions because their workers already feel that they are being treated fairly, the ACFTU persisted and approached their workers by educating them on their rights.⁵⁹ Finally, in July 2006, a Jinjiang Walmart created a grassroots union. Within two weeks, six other unions formed. But the ACFTU's involvement stopped there. In a few months following a written five-point memorandum for the unions, union committers were composed of managerial staff and had no power to negotiate wages or other benefits.⁶⁰

The implementation of unions in Walmart was regarded as a success for the ACFTU.⁶¹ It was the first time the ACFTU took a bottom up approach to unionization by going to the employees first. Second, the ACFTU provided the means and support to set up the union.⁶² However, Ruixue argues that the ACFTU's lack of involvement within Walmart after unions were established shows the weakness and de-legitimacy of the ACFTU.⁶³ Because the ACFTU stopped its involvement shows that they were more concerned with establishing themselves in the workplace over representing the workers' interests. The unionization in Walmart was a way for the ACFTU and the CCP to extend

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Chang Kai, "How the Government Deals with Strikes," *Economics and Finance Net* (August 5, 2010).

⁵⁷ B. He, and Y. Xie, "Walmart's Trade Union in China," *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 33, no. 3 (2012): 421-440.

⁵⁸ Y. Zhu, M. Warner, and T. Feng, "Employment Relations with Chinese Characteristics: The Role of Trade Unions in China," *International Labour Review* 150, no. 1/2 (2011): 127-143.

⁵⁹ He, and Xie, "Walmart's Trade Union in China."

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Zhu, Warner, and Feng, "Employment Relations with Chinese Characteristics."

⁶² He, and Xie, "Walmart's Trade Union in China."

⁶³ Ruixue, "The Role of the All China Federation of Trade Unions."

their control into the affairs of the private company.

Conclusion

Overall, the ACFTU cannot reflect workers' interests because of its relations with the CCP. Because it is an extension to the CCP, competition between unions cannot be established that would force the ACFTU to better represent their workers. The ACFTU aligns with the CCP's ideology that is more business focused. This results in the ACFTU siding with the enterprises over protecting the employees. The ACFTU is only a trade union in name. In order for the ACFTU to adequately perform its duties it must become a separate entity from the CCP and make structural changes to allow for democratic elections and labor strikes. These will greatly democratize and legitimize the institution.

IV. Employee Discrimination

Introduction

In early 2014, Cao Ju, a young female professional, was refused a position at a private tutoring company in Beijing on the basis of her gender. Cao Ju took the company to court. Surprisingly, Chinese court ruled in favor of the prosecutor. Cao Ju's case was the first gender discrimination lawsuit in China.⁶⁴

Although this case depicts China moving in the direction of equality, discrimination is still a prevalent issue in the work environment. Females predominantly receive lower wages, and job ads commonly list their preferences for male or female workers, and appearance. Beyond gender discrimination, migrant workers face harsher working conditions and less pay than their urban counterparts. Discrimination based on other factors, including disabilities, age, ethnic and religious differences, and health status is prevalent in modern China.⁶⁵ Over the years, the Chinese government has implemented laws to protect

marginalized workers. These laws explicitly advocate for equal treatment in the workplace. However, despite these laws, employment discrimination cases are rare. They are often seen as unpopular and politically sensitive. Therefore, employment discrimination is a tolerated phenomenon practices by private and government employers.⁶⁶

Gender Discrimination

Throughout its long history, China has been a patriarchal society. After the Communist Revolution in 1949, the status of women increased and the government called for equal treatment of men and women. In the workplace, under the Danwei System, all workers were paid the same and productivity was not a major concern. Thus, gender was not a factor. However, as China made free market reforms, in order to stay competitive, firms have been forced to reduce production costs. Female workers are not seen as productive as male workers due to predisposed stereotypes that a woman's priorities are at home and will cost the firm extra expenses such as maternity leave. Preferences for male workers are seen in hiring rates. Recent male college graduates have an 8% higher hiring rate than female college graduates with the same qualifications.⁶⁷

Conventional ideas of women restrict females from attaining jobs and being promoted. Employers are reluctant to hire female workers or promote them to higher positions, as they believe that women are more dedicated to their households instead of their professional life. It is a common perception that women are more likely to quit in order to stay home once they have children. Companies are less willing to hire women that are pregnant or wanting to have children as maternity leave is an additional cost to the company (The 1995 Labor Law requires the employer pay the a women during the 98 day maternity leave). Women are also not viewed as being strong leaders and being "too much trouble", and thus not being able to hold higher, managerial positions.⁶⁸ Therefore, even if women have the equal

⁶⁴ China Labor Bulletin, *Plaintiff Obtains 30,000 Yuan in China's First Gender Discrimination Lawsuit*, January 9, 2014.

⁶⁵ China Labor Bulletin, "Employment Discrimination in China," November 20, 2012.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Roberts (2012).

⁶⁸ Ibid.

qualifications for a higher position, men are more likely to be promoted than women.⁶⁹

Gender discrimination in China is most clearly seen in job advertisements. Unlike in the United States, it is legal for the hiring party to show their gender preference for the job. Women are often wanted in professions that do not require a college education, including sales and clerical positions. Ads that call for women will list physical requirements such as age, height, and beauty. Often these jobs are the “face” of the company and the first people that a client would see.⁷⁰

Kuhn and Shen viewed thousands of employment advertisements on Zhaopin.com, a popular job search engine in China. In their findings, 5.5% of ads preferred male applicants.⁷¹ Five percent of the total advertisements preferred female applicants. They also found in jobs requiring fewer skills, a gender preference is more likely to be listed. As the job skills requirements increase, gender preferences were less common. Kuhn and Shen concluded from this data that a glass ceiling does *not* exist to keep women out of high-skilled, well-paid jobs.⁷² Women are less likely to be immediately disqualified based on their gender in high skilled jobs.

Like in the United States, wage discrepancies between men and women is a controversial issue. Zhang and Dong discovered that there is a significant wage difference between men and women.⁷³ Overall, women earn 60% as much as men. China's market reforms have led to greater gender wage differences. Privately Owned Enterprises are more likely to pay women lower wages as compared to State Owned Enterprises. SOEs are more likely to protect women's interests. But in POEs, market competition dominates and enterprises will seek the lowest factors of production costs. Although discrimination does occur in China, Zhang and Dong believe that in the long run, discrimination will slowly dwindle due to market competition.⁷⁴ As the labor supply

diminishes, employers will be forced to increase wages and working conditions in order to attract workers.

Sexual harassment is also prevalent in China. In a survey conducted by the Sunflower Women Workers Center, a non-profit promoting women's rights in China, surveyed 134 women. Seventy percent of the respondents said that they have experienced some form of sexual harassment in their working career. Fifteen percent of the responders said they have quit their jobs due to sexual harassment. The Law of the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women prohibits the sexual harassment of women.⁷⁵ However, clearly, this is a major issue that needs to be addressed by the Chinese government.

Migrant Workers

Another major form of employee discrimination in China is Hukou based discrimination. The Hukou or household registration system is given to Chinese citizens and categorizes him or her as either rural or urban based on their birth region. Those with a rural registration lack access to healthcare, education, and housing subsidies. In the workplace, migrant workers face job and wage discrimination. In addition, Zhang Nyland and Zhu found non-urban Hukou holder have less access to training, social insurance, welfare benefits and promotion.⁷⁶

Like gender, job advertisements can show preference for urban workers. In most cases, a prospective employee's Hukou status will be taken into consideration during the hiring process. Employers are required by the local government to employ rural migrants. But migrant workers are viewed as temporary workers and seen to be eventually returning back to their hometown. Therefore, firms will not hire on migrant workers as permanent employees or give them long-term contracts.⁷⁷

Also similar to gender discrimination, it is a common perception that migrant workers cannot hold more important or managerial positions. Employers will reason that migrant workers are

⁶⁹ China Labor Bulletin, “Employment Discrimination in China.”

⁷⁰ Kuhn and Shen (2013).

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Zhang and Dong (2008).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ “The Sexual Harassment of Women Factory Workers in Guangzhou,” (2013).

⁷⁶ Zhang Nyland and Zhu (2010).

⁷⁷ Zhang, et al. (2010).

only temporary. They also do not have a high education level. Finally, migrant workers are seen as unfit to hold higher positions because they do not have good face or are unreliable. Along the same lines, migrant workers are more likely to be overlooked for promotions.⁷⁸

A temporary worker has further consequences. Firms' costs of training migrant workers are considerably lower than the cost of training programs for urban workers. Unions have also been accused of not recognizing membership of migrant workers.⁷⁹

Finally, Zhang et al. furthermore discovered that migrant workers earn about 33-85% less money than their urban counterparts, even if they have the same job and qualifications.⁸⁰ Migrant workers are often excluded from insurance and social security programs. Lastly, Migrant workers are often not paid on time or for working overtime.⁸¹ However, it is important to note that wages earned by these migrant workers are especially larger than they could have earned in their rural hometown. Migrant workers are therefore more willing to work for less pay because it still exceeds their rural income. In addition, expensive insurance and other benefits are not

completely necessary for migrant workers, because they will return home.

Other Forms of Discrimination

The Employment for People with Disabilities Act requires large firms to have 1.5% of their workforce to be reserved for disabled persons; otherwise, they are forced to pay a fine. Unfortunately, this law is often ignored and not enforced due to local corruption. A survey conducted in 2010 found that only 34-49% of disabled persons capable of caring for themselves had jobs.⁸²

Discrimination based on ethnic and religious lines is also common in China. Job applicants with an ethnically diverse name are more likely to be passed over compared to job applicants with the majority Han ethnicity surname, regardless of skill. Ethnic requirements can be seen in some job advertisements, as well. Ethnic minorities are also less likely to be seen in the service sector. It is a common perception that because as they are unfamiliar, they will drive away customers.⁸³

Lower skilled job advertisements will call for younger applicants. In the manufacturing sector, firms almost hire exclusively individuals younger

Comparison of HRM Activities of Urban Workers and Migrant Workers

HRM Activities		Urban Workers	Rural Migrant Workers
Recruitment	Position	Technical and Managerial	Mainly auxiliary
	Employment Type	Mainly contracted	Mainly casual or rented workers
Training	Amount	Extensive	Limited
Reward System	Salary	Performance and Efficiency based	Piece-rate, time-rate, or fixed
	Benefits	Full benefits	Partial Benefits, no paid leave, less bonus
Performance Evaluation	Promotion	More opportunity, can be managers of all levels	Less opportunity, usually are confined to team leaders
Social Security	Amount Covered	Majoring has been covered	Majority has not been covered
Unions	Membership	Most are union members	Most are not union members

Figure 4.1

Source: Zhang and Dong, 2008

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Roberts (2012).

⁸² China Labor Bulletin, "Employment Discrimination in China."

⁸³ Ibid.

than 30, Young workers can be paid less and have more energy. Therefore, they are more cost efficient. A person's appearance and height can also be a factor for eligibility for a job, especially in the service sector. Homosexuality is still a taboo topic in China and is not often talked about. Therefore, it takes on a "don't ask, don't tell policy". No law in China exists that protects someone from sexual orientation discrimination.⁸⁴

Finally, an individual's health status can also be a factor from him or her from getting a job. Although scientifically disproven, many Chinese still believe HIV and HBV are highly contagious and can spread easily. Employers are particularly sensitive from hiring potential employees with these diseases in fear of contracting it themselves. Therefore, some employers will require mandatory testing upon recruitment, immediately disqualifying HIV and HBV positive individuals from a job.⁸⁵

Law and Procedure

The Chinese government has made positive steps to end employee discrimination. At the international level, the Chinese government signed onto the International Labor Organization movement on employee discrimination. Although this action showed that China is willing to work with international institutions to fix internal problems, the international institution does not have hard power to enforce its policy, and thus, in reality, had no concrete effect on ending discrimination.⁸⁶

The law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women implemented in 2005, focuses on sexual harassment and gender discrimination. This law is intended to promote better treatment of women. However, by doing so it required employers to present special treatment for their female workers, such as providing maternity leave and nursing breaks, and thus resulting in employers less willing to hire them due to the extra costs. In addition, this law prohibited women for certain jobs in industries such as mining and logging, due to these jobs being too dangerous. This creates the standard that women are less

capable than men. Retirement age for men (60) is five years longer than women (55). While this law was anticipated to benefit women, it has actually resulted in greater gender inequalities. Firms are less likely to hire women because they will not be there as long as men because of the earlier retirement age. A woman's pension will also be lower than a man's. Pensions are related to years worked as a firm. If they worked five years less, they will receive five years less pension payments. Overall, laws intended to protect women's rights have actually resulted in greater gender inequality.⁸⁷

The Employment Promotion Law of 2008 repeatedly addresses equality on employment opportunity and working conditions. It also provided the means for victims of discrimination to seek legal support and bring lawsuits on discrimination to Chinese courts. Roberts argues this law is flawed because it does not provide remedies for discrimination, nor does it provide a procedure for firms that violate this law. There is little incentive for victims to bring cases to court because few results will occur.⁸⁸

Roberts further lists issues with legislation.⁸⁹ Many victims cannot afford legal assistance or take off work to follow through with legal proceedings. Furthermore, success rates for these cases are low. Most victims of discrimination, mainly migrant workers, are less educated and are not fully aware of their rights. Another problem Robert argues with these laws are sanctions against violators are too low. It is more cost productive for firms to violate laws and receive the sanctions than it is to not discriminate. Firms will not be pro-active to avoid fines and will only make changes to their policy after they are caught.⁹⁰

Conclusion

Gender discrimination is the most visible form of discrimination in China. Due to predisposed ideas of women, females are less likely to be hired or promoted for a job, because they are viewed as weak and their priorities at home instead of the workplace. Discrimination based on one's Hukou

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Roberts (2012).

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

registration results in urban workers receiving better treatment and higher pay than migrant workers. It thus creates an even further gap between urban and rural residents. Other forms of discrimination including disabilities, ethnic, age, and health routinely affect Chinese citizens' lives.

While national laws do exist to protect workers from almost all forms of discrimination, employers will often bypass the laws. These laws are also ineffective in helping victims of discrimination to receive compensation for the acts done unto them. Roberts suggests policy changes that need to be made in order to end employee discrimination.⁹¹ A law needs to be passed that specifically address rules against employment discrimination. Discrimination cases should be brought into arbitration or courts. Finally, Roberts argues that independent trade unions need to be established in China in order to better protect the interest of workers.⁹²

V. Workplace Safety

Introduction

In June of 2013, 120 employees were killed in a poultry plant fire in Jilin province. Reports show that the high death from this accident was caused by blocked fire exits. If precautions were taken to ensure the safety of workers during an emergency, many deaths would have been prevented.⁹³ Instances of unsafe working conditions are extremely common. In a report issued by the State Administration of Work Safety in 2010, on average, 218 workers die every day. This equals 79,552 deaths annually. In comparison, according to the U.S Department of Labor, the United States' annual death rate in 2012 was 4,383. When taking population differences into consideration, China's workplace fatality rate is four times higher than the United States'. As these numbers are high alone, scholars will argue that these statistics are

most likely even higher due to dishonest reporting from the government.⁹⁴

While work related fatalities have been decreasing since the all-time high in 2004 of 136,000 deaths due to reforms, workplace safety remains a major concern for labor rights activists. Although labor laws are implemented to project workers' safety, research shows that many companies do not follow these laws. In order to make a safer work environment, changes need to occur both legally and institutionally that have the interests of workers' instead of the firms'.

Laws and Institutions Concerning Workplace Safety

The Work Related Injury Insurance Regulation requires employers to pay the medical expenses of any work related injuries, disabilities, or occupational diseases. An employer will pay a certain percentage of their employees total payroll depending on a level of how dangerous the work is, ranging from .5% of the payroll to 2%. The more dangerous the work being performed, the more the insurance the employer is required to pay. The Work Related Injury Insurance Regulation will determine the amount that will be given to an employee for compensation of a workplace injury.⁹⁵

Likewise, current labor laws stipulate that employers must inform all employees of occupational hazards during the hiring process. Laws are also in place that requires safe and hygienic working conditions. In larger factories, a safety supervisor must oversee workers, and employees are subject to safety training classes. Employees also have the right to refuse to perform hazardous tasks.⁹⁶

While there is national laws that guarantee a safe workplace, enforcement and safety regulatory agencies are overseen at the county levels. The local civil courts will impose the punishments and fines for violators. Local official will be held accountable for any incidents that occur in their area.⁹⁷

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ C. Buckley, "Over 100 Die in Fire at Chinese Poultry Plant," *New York Times*, June 4, 2013.

⁹⁴ S. Hon, and Jie Gao. "Death versus GDP! Decoding the Fatality Indicators on Work Safety Regulation in Post-Deng China." *China* (2012).

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

Trends

Hon and Jie's report measured workplace fatalities compared to the overall GDP growth in a country.⁹⁸ They found that the number of fatalities have increased during China's GDP growth. China reached its highest number of fatalities in a year in 2004, and has slowly declined since then due to governmental intervention. Figure 5.1 shows the total number of worker fatalities from 2001 to 2009.

Hon and Jie also recorded the number of fatality distributions among provinces.⁹⁹ Guangdong had the highest number of fatalities from 2004 to 2008 at 50,404. Zhejiang is the next province with the highest number of fatalities at 37,467.

China Labor Watch surveyed 260 injured personnel in a hospital in Shenzhen. 96.1% of the injured workers were migrant workers, showing that migrant workers are the most vulnerable to workplace death and injury.¹⁰⁰ This is often due to that migrant workers are more willing to perform riskier tasks, as they are in greater need for money and thus less willing to turn down work. The average age of injured workers was 26 years old and mostly all are men. Men are more likely to work in the heavier more dangerous positions than women. The average education level was also relatively low.¹⁰¹

One of the most shocking numbers that came out China Labor Watch's poll was that 90% of the surveyed workers had no knowledge of a labor law in existence at all. It can be concluded that employees are rarely educated of their rights upon being hired and are not given the proper training to refuse dangerous work or to demand safer working conditions. Also, even though law requires it, only 65% of the injured workers had labor contracts.¹⁰²

Seventy three percent of the hospitalized workers have work injury insurance. Although this number does show a positive trend in comparison




Figure 1
China Statistical Yearbook

to the other numbers in this survey, it does not always guarantee that they will get compensation for their injuries. Employers will often find ways to not affiliate themselves with the injured workers in order to not be responsible for their payments. They will sometimes even pay off the hospitals in order to not have them report the injuries to the local governments.

On average, the injured employees worked 11 hours a day, despite the legal working day being at 8 hours. This confirms that the cause of workplace accidents is often fatigue.¹⁰³ The Work Related Injury Insurance does not cover injuries caused by the workers' fault, which is often the case when workers are tired and overworked.

Finally, only 13% of these workers were being paid their full salary while being hospitalized, even though this is required by law to do so. It will take on average 1,070 days for an incident to be filed, decided on, and enforced. Because employee cannot wait that long to not get paid, they will agree to a settlement with the employer, which is usually substantially lower than what they should earn. As many as 79% of the interview workers said that they needed legal aid. This number undisputedly displays the strong need for legal aid and consultation in general to all worker throughout China.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ China Labor Watch, "The Long March: Survey and Case Studies of Work Injuries in the Pearl River Delta Region," November 20, 2007.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ D. Bardsley, "The National: China's Workplace Safety Scrutinized in New Report Showing over 200 Deaths a Day," *China Daily* (2011).

¹⁰⁴ China Labor Watch, "The Long March."

Conclusion

Victims of work related injuries and deaths are usually male, migrant workers. Additionally, an appalling number of the victims would not receive compensation for their injury, nor are they knowledgeable of their rights to a safe work environment. One of the biggest issues with workplace safety supervision is that it is left to local government enforcement. As local governments compete with one another to attract businesses, they are more willing to overlook safety violations, which then results in a race to the bottom phenomenon. The local governments are more interested in the investors instead of the workers. Improvements have been made recently as local governmental officials are held directly responsible for any incidents that occur in their region.¹⁰⁵

In February of 2014, the Chinese legislation was looking to revise a bill concerning workplace safety. The new law would improve supervision over employers to ensure that they are aware of their responsibilities. The fine for violators would also be raised. For larger companies that will not suffer as much from the fine, the government will blacklist these companies.¹⁰⁶

In order to improve workplace safety, workers should be educated on their rights upon being hired. The ACFTU should be more involved in protecting their workers. Supervisions need to happen more often, and penalties for violators need to be even more severe.

VI. Wages

Introduction

China is known globally for being the source of cheap, unskilled labor. It is the reason why thousands of multinational enterprises have moved their business into China, and the cause of the Chinese enormous economic growth. But as China's economy grows and develops, factors such as an increase in education levels, workers' rights, and a decrease in the labor supply, have all raised

¹⁰⁵ Hon and Gao. "Death versus GDP!"

¹⁰⁶ "China Mulls Revisions of Workplace Safety Law," *China Daily*, January 9, 2014.

the average wages in China. But China's minimum wage standards are far too low to keep up with the ever-growing living costs in China. Besides low wages, employees often do not paid on time or even do not receive the promised salary at all.

Numbers

Wages in China have grown rapidly over last few decades. At the beginning of the opening up of China in 1978, Chinese civilians were earning only 3% of wages Americans were earning at the time.¹⁰⁷ However, the opening up of the Chinese market did not immediately result in an increase in wages. From 1978 to 1997, wage growth only increased about .1% annually. It wasn't until the Chinese government made reforms to allow private enterprises in the late 1990s, did dramatic changes in wages occur. From 1998 to 2010, on average, wage growth has been 13.8% annually.¹⁰⁸

Country	Annual Manufacturing Wage (\$)
Philippines	\$4,325
China	\$3,558
Thailand	\$2,896
India	\$1,004

Figure 2
Li et al. (2012)

In terms of productivity to determine if Chinese labor is becoming more expensive or not, Li et al. calculated that since 1997, wages have increased faster than productivity.¹⁰⁹ While wage growth increased 13.8% annually, the gross labor productivity annual growth rate is only at 11.3%, thus concluding Chinese labor is getting more expensive.

China's current average wages are among the top in the Southeast Asian region. Below is a chart of the annual manufacturing wages converted to US Dollars in 2008. Wages have increased throughout all of China. But different groups of workers have seen these wage increases differently. Wages in the more developed coastal

¹⁰⁷ H. Li, L. Li, B. Wu, and Y. Xiong, "The End of Cheap Chinese Labor," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26, no. 4 (2012): 57-74.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

region are considerably higher than wages in the less developed inland regions. Migrant workers' wages increase significantly slower than national average wage. Finally, wage gaps between industrial sectors exist.¹¹⁰

Minimum Wage

The 1995 Labor Laws implemented a minimum wage law that would differ depending on the area. While the minimum wage did increase over time (see below chart), the minimum wage increases have been slower than the growth of average wages in China. In 1994, the average minimum wage was about 54% of the national average wage. But in 2001, this ratio dropped to an average of about 26%. This is far below the international average that places the minimum wage at about 40-60% of the national average wage. Figure 6.2 focuses on the four regions that this paper has focused on for wages. It shows the minimum wage compared to the average wages. The ratio should increase in order to be more comparable to international standards. It should be noted that

Shanghai and Beijing display especially low ratios due to the high average wage in those cities.¹¹¹

The minimum wage is much to low throughout all of China. In Shanghai, the minimum wage per month equates to around 213 US Dollars. In comparison, a worker living in Colorado making minimum wage will earn about \$1,200 a month. The living costs of Shanghai are the same to living costs in Boulder, Colorado. It is not feasible for workers living in Shanghai to live off of these wages.

Wage Arrears

Although wages have increased, payments for wages are often delayed or are not paid in full. According to a MOHRSS report, as many as 218,000 cases were filed in 2012 of workers complaining over wage arrears. The national and local governments have made changes in order to get these numbers down. In 2011, the Chinese government made non-payment of wages to workers a criminal offense, but this changes has brought about only 152 criminal cases.¹¹²

Year	Shanghai Minimum Wage (RMB)	Beijing Minimum Wage (RMB)	Guangdong Minimum Wage (RMB)	Shandong Minimum Wage (RMB)
1994	220	210	320	170
2008	840	800	860	760
2010	1120	960	1030	920
2012	1450	1260	1500	1240

Figure 3.2
Yuan et al. (2014)

Area	Minimum Wage per Month (RMB)	Average Wage per Month (RMB)	Ratio
Shanghai	1280	6419.25	19.94%
Beijing	1160	6319.50	18.36%
Guangdong	1300	3762.67	34.55%
Shandong	1100	3166	34.74%

Figure 4.3
Yuan et al. (2014)

Conclusion

The Chinese government is planning to raise the minimum wage. China's 2011-2015 Five Year Plan includes a section with a goal to raise minimum wage to be 40% of the average wages. Some fear that these wage increases will cause enterprises to relocate to countries with even cheaper labor and slow China's GDP growth. Li et al. argues that this will not occur.¹¹³ A stronger link will form between wages and productivity.

¹¹¹ L. Yuan, K. Shang, and X. Li, "Study of the Effect of Minimum Wage Increases in China," *Management Science and Engineering* 7, no. 2 (2013): 45-49.

¹¹² China Labor Bulletin, "Migrant Workers and their Children."

¹¹³ Li, Li, Wu, and Xiong, "The End of Cheap Chinese Labor."

¹¹⁰ China Labor Bulletin, "Migrant Workers and their Children."

Employees will look to get more education in order to increase their income, and human capital will rise. This will finally lead to China becoming a high technology producer. China will shift from a labor-intensive industry country to a high technology industry country. Therefore, the Chinese government should not be afraid to increase minimum wage, as it will not slow the economy.

VII. Child Labor

Introduction

In the summer of 2007, Chinese news sources broke the story that the government has liberated over 500 forced laborers from brick kilns in Shanxi and Henan province. Of the 532 rescued workers, 109 were minors.¹¹⁴ These forced laborers were abducted by human traffickers and sold for around 500 Yuan a person. They were then starved, beaten, and forced to make bricks. Some children have been isolated from the outside world for as long as 7 years.¹¹⁵

While Child labor is strictly illegal in China, incidents of child labor are still prevalent. Exact number on child workers in China is difficult to obtain as it is illegal, and cases are rarely disclosed, but scholars estimate that there are between 2 million and 3.5 million child workers in China.¹¹⁶ These child workers are subjected to long working hours with little pay and harsh working conditions. They also suffer emotions and psychological abuse from their employers. China labor regulations stipulates that employers cannot "recruit, employ or facilitate the employment under the age of 16". Furthermore, minors between the ages of 16-18 are prohibited from participating in certain unsafe or labor-intensive industries, such as mining. Child labor in China is not due to a lack of regulations, but a lack of enforcement.

Causes of Child Labor

Because China has historically been an agricultural economy, child workers have been expected to work at the farm. During the Cultural Revolution, the government sent urban minors to

rural areas to work in the agricultural sector in the Send-Down-Youth-Movements. Cui and Dong acknowledge that the Chinese culture in itself encourages child labor.¹¹⁷ The Confucian Analects of filial piety would result in children wanting respect their parents by working.

Child labor is most common in the Southern coastal area of Guangdong and Zhejiang. Child laborers mostly all migrate from poorer rural areas into more industrial areas with places of work. A major cause of child labor is poverty. Many children will choose to drop out of school in order to help their families. Parents will also occasionally take their kids out of school if they are not performing well. These families will weigh the cost benefits of paying the expensive school fees in order to continue their education and taking them out earlier to work.¹¹⁸

Although poverty does lead to child labor, China Labor Bulletin argues that a lack of an adequate rural education system results in an increase in child labor.¹¹⁹ Because the Chinese government does not allocate a significant amount of money to fund the rural education system, school fees are left up to parents. These heavy fees are a major motivator for parents to take their children out of school. Additionally, the school system does a poor job in monitoring school attendance and discouraging school dropout rates.¹²⁰

Negative Consequences

Li and Wang found that 74% of child laborers are girls. They most often work in textile and toy factories in low skilled, repetitive tasks.¹²¹ Although in recent time the labor supply have been greater than the labor demand, many factories will want to hire child workers. This is due to the low cost of employing children. Out of the children that China Labor Bulletin surveyed in Guangdong province, the average child workers earn 200-400 Yuan a month (around 30-60 US Dollars). In addition to their cheap cost, employers also like to

¹¹⁷ Cui and Dong (2004).

¹¹⁸ "Small Hands" (2007).

¹¹⁹ China Labor Bulletin, "Migrant Workers and their Children."

¹²⁰ "Small Hands" (2007).

¹²¹ Li and Wang (1998).

¹¹⁴ French (2007).

¹¹⁵ Zhe (2007).

¹¹⁶ Minli and Jun Sung (2011).

employ child workers due to them being more docile and compliant.¹²² They are less likely to complain to their employer, as they are not aware of their rights. Finally, because they are illegal workers, employers do not have to pay fees required by the government such as social security or health insurance.¹²³

Enforcement is a major issue to stopping child labor. If caught with child workers, an employer is fined with 5,000 Yuan fee per child, per month the child was employed there. Only if they use excessive force, is an employer liable for criminal punishment. Inspectors will announce when they are inspecting a factory. Therefore employers can easily hide their child workers from them.¹²⁴ Local governments are also more willing to overlook violations in child labor laws in order to increase economic productivity in their area. Overall, the benefits of hiring a child worker outweigh the risk associate with it.

Conclusion

With child labor news stories breaking out, the government has made significant steps to stop these instances from occurring. In order to stop child labor in China, the government needs to impose harsher punishments for offenders in order to make the cost of employing a minor higher than the benefits. Employers should be charged criminal offenses instead of being just fined.¹²⁵ Inspections should occur more often and random in order to not allow for employers to hide their young employees.

Finally, the government needs to focus on improving the education system in the rural areas. Children in rural areas are significantly more disadvantaged than rural children due to lack of educational resources. With an improved educational environment, children will be more incentivized to stay in school and earn a higher education.

¹²² "Small Hands" (2007).

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

VIII. Conclusion

It is undisputable that labor abuses are widespread throughout all of China. Despite definite laws, employees face discrimination and hazardous working conditions with low pay. Children are also often employed. With only one labor union allowed in China, there is no non-government institution to protect them. Workers must adhere to these harsh working conditions.

It can be argued that, in order to attract foreign investment, China has undergone a race to the bottom phenomenon; this meaning that China will overlook employee treatment in order to cut costs and keep their competitive edge. The government has received just criticism by looking past their own laws to keep their economy growing. Although China's labor standards might get worse, before they get better, China will not keep spiraling down. In the near future, China will make changes that will make their actions comparable to Western Countries' standards. Negative employee treatment is merely a step on the development ladder. As China even further develops, workers will gain the education and knowledge needed to demand rights from their government. It will come to a point where the government can no longer overlook these discrepancies and will take steps to ensure that not only will there be sufficient labor laws, but these laws will be actually implemented, as well.

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