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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

Each year, the Center for Asian Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder highlights one or two themes in its sponsored programs. In 2012-2013, the theme was “Listening to Asia.” It is appropriate that in this second issue of Colorado Journal of Asian Studies, the leadoff article by Christopher Wicoff challenges our understanding of how a “fake” pop star can be a singing sensation. We are also pleased to see for the first time projects by students in the Leeds School of Business (Tori DaHarb and Rachel Young). The latter project is the first marketing plan to be included in C/AS. Whether it is about baseball traditions in Japan (Jonathan Campbell) or the political disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Elizabeth Chavez), whether it is about village level elections in China (Dashiell Nathanson) or the Chinese One Child Policy (Emma Rafaelof), these theses highlight the importance and uniqueness of Asia.
INTRODUCTION

With the progression of human civilization come technological advancements that begin to blur the line that distinguishes man from machine. Things like robotics and artificial intelligence are redefining the relationship between the two. Many workers have been replaced by more efficient and inexpensive machines in years past. However, many professions could be considered to be exclusive to man's domain; jobs that machines cannot conceivably perform, even with the most advanced artificial intelligence or sophisticated operating performance. One such profession would have traditionally been that of the singer. Thanks to music composition synthesizers, the music of a full symphonic orchestra can be produced by a single computer, but a singing voice is one instrument that could not be produced by anything other than a human singer. A synthesizer could be used to touch up a vocal track, but the voice had to originate from the vocal cords of a living, breathing human being. This has been the case since the inception of music in human history, until the year 2004.

This was the year that the Yamaha Corporation released their revolutionary vocal synthesis software, Vocaloid. Vocaloid utilizes voice banks comprised of sound bites recorded from actual singers. As such, humans are still a necessary component of the Vocaloid production process. If I were to make the analogy wherein Vocaloids stand to replace singers, just as machinery replaced factory workers; it would be as if to say that the factory workers were then called in to perform maintenance on the machinery, changing their role, but allowing them to continue to be a part of the production process overall. This is especially true considering that as new versions of the Vocaloid software are released, these singers are still called in to do additional recording work to supplement the existing voice banks.

The earliest promoter of this software was Sapporo-based musical equipment importer, Crypton Future Media. The resulting vocal tracks created with the early release of Vocaloid sounded unappealing, as it sounded too robotic. It was when Yamaha released their Vocaloid2 platform that a satisfactory singing voice could be produced. In 2007, Crypton released what would soon become the most commercially successful voice bank software suite in the industry, and unit number one of their Character Vocal series, named Hatsune Miku. More than a disembodied voice, the product's packing was adorned with the image of a young girl with long, teal pigtails drawn in the style of Japanese animation. Boasting a higher singing range than any human can manage, this computerized girl would go on to become one of Japan's most celebrated divas. The improvements
to the core Vocaloid software are apparent when listeners can easily mistake her voice for a human singer’s. This is shown to be the case in Asahi Shimbun’s YouTube video exposé, where a Hatsune Miku song is being played for the visitors of a crowded street in Shibuya, and Asahi’s film crew was sent to interview passersby about the music they were hearing. A majority of them did not suspect that the voice they were hearing was computer-generated, and some reacted with shock when they were told. Her music tends to appeal more so to the otaku demographic, which would be likened to nerd culture, though Vocaloid music is becoming progressively more mainstream.

One of the better examples of Hatsune Miku’s growing international appeal is the 2011 Toyota Corolla ad campaign, featuring Hatsune Miku. Toyota aired television advertisements where a CG representation of Hatsune Miku would drive a Corolla, interact with street vendors, prepare for her Los Angeles concert, etc. Of course, some of her more popular music was featured in these commercials. These commercials filled ad space on television broadcasts, but they were also featured on YouTube, where they drew in a large number of viewers. The ad campaign won the Association of National Advertisers’s Multicultural Excellence Award in November 2011 at the Multicultural Marketing & Diversity Conference. This is because it was made to appeal to young Asian Americans, and was produced in conjunction with Asian American marketing firm interTrend.

The increasing popularity of Hatsune Miku in Japan and abroad is bringing to the surface a disparity between cultural views on reality, it would seem. In Japanese society, whether or not Hatsune Miku is “real” is not debated. Dissenters may decry her for being a blight on the image of Japanese popular culture both at home and abroad, but her existence is not questioned. In the English-speaking countries explored in this study, even indifferent parties will use words such as “fake” or “not real” to describe her and her music. Consider CBS News’s article, “Hatsune Miku: The world’s fakest pop star”, posted November 9th, 2012. In this article, she is reported to be a hologram, which is not entirely factually accurate. Nor is she necessarily a digital avatar, as the article then goes on to clarify. Many fans denounced the article for its use of the word “fakest” in the title, as it’s not uncommon for her music to be called “fake” or “not real” in order to attack her. Take, for example, a YouTube video uploaded October 2nd, 2011, by popular YouTube channel TheFineBros, titled “KIDS REACT to Hatsune Miku”; part of their “Kids React to” series. When asked, “So, are you now a fan of Hatsune Miku?” a couple of their responses included, “You can’t be a fan of it! I mean, it doesn’t exist!”; “She’s not real! Why could I be a fan of her if she’s not real?”; “I’m done. She’s not a real person; this isn’t real music. I don’t want to listen to it anymore.” Though the relative ages of the respondents may be a factor, it further illustrates the idea in the west that only “real” people can produce real music. Though people from these English-speaking countries seem less open to the idea of a digital diva, it’s also true that she has been gaining popularity in the internationally as well. Some of her English-speaking fans and staunch supporters argue vehemently against the notion that she is fake.

I wish to explore the implications of the real versus fake debate in terms of different cultural interpretations of these concepts. It is my hope that by examining different attitudes in Hatsune Miku’s native Japan versus English-speaking nations, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Australia, as represented by their interactions on the Internet, Hatsune Miku’s primary domain. To begin with, we’ll take a look at what exactly one can accuse of being fake about her and whether or not the label “fake” should carry the necessary amount of negative connotation that it does. If fans are to argue that she is “real,” what about her makes her real? Herein lies some of the core issues that represent a divide in how people in countries like the United States, Great Britain, Australia, etc., and people in East Asia perceive reality, at least in the case of such two-dimensional characters.

Over the past couple of decades, the idea of romance between a human and a two dimensional character has become more of a popularized notion, at least amongst otaku, which in turn has caught the public eye in East Asia. There are those

\[1\] www.youtube.com/watch?v=xBZolipfjkQ
\[2\] www.youtube.com/watch?v=UaA2liN9LKM
\[3\] www.youtube.com/watch?v=egcfC7PCneQ
who seek to court virtual maidens and even those who would forego the pursuit of a human mate, preferring instead the favor of these digital girls. To be certain, this is a far less understood and accepted concept in the English-speaking nations. It is however, one more challenge to the idea that a virtual being is not “real”, by virtue of the fact that it’s difficult to quantify the feelings of love in terms of “real” and “fake”.

The fact of the matter is that Hatsune Miku is a Japanese pop cultural sensation, and even goes as far as to embody but one unique expression of “Japaneseness”, which will be further explored later. She has come to represent, for some people, an undeniable national identity, which has caused a clash between Japan and other cultures that would seek to express their own cultural values through her. If it is permissible to view her as having such cultural significance, it provides a new perspective on the issue of reality versus nonexistence. After all, if enough people can identify with this existentially dubious entity, can a fake being become real?

WHAT DOES “FAKE” MEAN?

One peculiarity of Hatsune Miku is that her fans not only embrace, but seemingly celebrate the slightly less than human aspects of her singing. Take, for example, the extremely popular 初音ミクの消失 (Hatsune Miku no Shoushitsu, The Disappearance of Hatsune Miku)⁴, a song about Hatsune Miku being deleted and her strong desire to continue singing. A Vocaloid legend with over five million views on Nico Video alone, this song is noteworthy for pushing to the limits of human ability by featuring a tempo that reaches two hundred forty beats per minute, and this song in particular is widely considered nearly impossible for human singers to sing, though some have tried. Fittingly, for a song that most humans would not be able to replicate, the singing sounds less human than in her slower songs. The intention behind these sorts of long, chaotic sequences of fast-paced words is likely to be spoken word lyrics, which is an Achilles heel of Vocaloid, due to the difficulty of replicating the intonation of natural human speech. As such, these parts of this song sound like little more than unintelligible gibberish at first. A native Japanese speaker will likely have trouble making sense of it. This song’s popularity has lead to it receiving a novelization, and it is not the only Hatsune Miku song to have derivative works adapted from it.

The composer of this song, cosMo@暴走P (cosMo@bousouP) is a very popular composer and his style is characterized by these sorts of hyper speed songs. Rather, his genre of choice is 電波ソング (denpa song, electromagnetic/nonsense song), which is characterized by any of the following characteristics: intentionally bad, ambiguous lyrics, outside of the norm, strange sound effects (that cause the rhythm to crumble), and the inability of listeners to get it out of their head after hearing it once. This genre is avant-garde and the term “denpa song” is labeled as Internet slang. (niconicopedia) cosMo excels at this genre and his works have demonstrated the less human aspects of Hatsune Miku’s voice, and even popularized them.

Another aspect of Hatsune Miku’s songs that this calls attention to is the overarching theme of a great number of her songs dealing with her existence as a computer program as she desires to sing or fulfill her purpose in life. In these songs, she will even lament her existence as computer data. One such song is えれくとりっく・えんじぇう (erekutorikku・enjeu, electric angel)⁵, in which she addresses the listener, who takes on the role of the composer, and shows her deep appreciation and gratitude for giving her existence meaning by making her sing. Her emotions become more human as she expresses her desire to not be alone and despair whenever the listener leaves the computer. She is most happy when she sings, because her voice makes the user happy. This is a popular concept, as love begins to blossom between humans and fictional characters. Another video, though not initially Vocaloid related (before long, a Hatsune Miku cover of the song was produced), mirrors this song’s sentiment. It is called RAINBOW GIRL (a pun, as the words for two-dimensional and rainbow sound alike in Japanese), and is about a young man who buys a visual novel, and the love that he and his digital

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⁴ www.youtube.com/watch?v=VWA7d8FdGqk

⁵ www.youtube.com/watch?v=-I7jmxpqLmY
girlfriend share. She laments being only able to converse with him through predetermined lines and longs for the day that she might be able to feel his touch. She is filled with despair when he brings home a new visual novel one day and begins to install it, and in the bittersweet climax, she is forced to accept that all games have an ending and she was faced with hers. This particular video caught the attention of some English-speaking websites and before long, a slew of mocking comments flooded a YouTube page where it had been uploaded. Most of which were, "so ronery ;_;" which is not only meant to poke fun at the otaku who appreciate the company of virtual maidens, but also of the Japanese language and its use of 和製英語 (wasei eigo, English phrases made specifically for the Japanese language), due to the fact that it sounds unnatural to English speakers. It was originally uploaded to Nico Video⁶, and though having to register an account on a Japanese language site was a hurdle for English-speaking users, soon the original video had "so ronery ;_;" scrolling across it as well. This is one case of a lack of cultural understanding, relating to the idea of romance between man and machine being bizarre or unsettling to English speakers. This disparity will be explored in greater depth a little later.

It could be said that one of the major evolutions of Hatsune Miku, how she is marketed, and her fans, reflects the desire to bridge the divide that separates her two dimensional world and our three dimensional world. By virtue of the fact that she has no defined personality, though it is one of her stronger points in terms of marketability, it is not possible for her to become human. In spite of this and the fact that she began as a mere computer program, she has become so much more. One way in which her presence is breaching into the physical world is by way of Crypton and Sega teaming up to have her perform live on stage in concert. Since releasing their hit rhythm game, Hatsune Miku Project Diva, Sega is the biggest name in producing 3D computer generated Vocaloid performances. For these concerts, Sega’s Vocaloid character models and dance choreography are used in conjunction with advanced hologram technology, as well as existing popular songs, to allow Miku and her fellow CV series Vocaloid relatives sing and dance on stage before massive crowds of cheering fans.

Sega and Crypton understand the desire of fans to see Hatsune Miku living and breathing in the material world and are successful in marketing from this angle. Hatsune Miku Project Diva f is a triumph in this regard. It utilizes the camera and augmented reality functionality of the Sony Playstation Vita the room they are in with Hatsune Miku present in the room with them. Users can then pose her and position her in the room, where they can then take pictures with her. Additionally, the augmented reality features can be used to allow Miku to perform miniature concerts in the user’s room in the same way. Another use of similar technology could be seen in the 2013 collaborative advertising campaign of Hatsune Miku and Domino’s Pizza of Japan⁷. More specifically, an official iPhone application was released as part of the promotion. Using this application, users can take pictures of Miku in the room wielding a pizza slicer. Additionally, Domino’s pizza boxes came printed with special designs on them. By using the augmented reality mode of the application, users can simply point their phone’s camera at the box and the design becomes a stage upon which Miku begins to perform a concert atop. Much like the augmented reality features of Hatsune Miku Project Diva f, this application brings the nonhuman entity that is Hatsune Miku one step closer to existing as a part of the human world.

Sega has also made an effort to make the inverse possible. A prominent feature of the Project Diva series is Diva Room, a digital space that players can decorate with different types of digital furniture, decorations, and themes. In this virtual room, Miku or other Crypton Vocaloids will lounge about and enjoy a range of leisurely activities. The player’s only involvement is as a spectator, but the aesthetic nature of this feature is meant to allow players to spend time with Miku in an intimate setting, as if to become a part of her world. The player can also purchase gifts to give to her in this room, adding slightly to the interactivity and allowing the player to express their affection for her and for her to express her gratitude to her fans.

⁶ www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm1586342

⁷ www.youtube.com/watch?v=gW2D_Votd2Y
So we see here a contradiction in how Japanese consumers perceive Hatsune Miku. In some regards, fans are endeared to her because of the fact that she is not human. Were she just another human pop singer, she would certainly be less of a novelty and far less likely to become the popular culture phenomenon that she is. If the theory of the uncanny valley can be applied to music, Vocaloid fans are likely to exhibit behavior that defies the theory. Despite not sounding completely natural as a human voice, fans embrace her singing. Others react predictably, showing signs of being disturbed by a somewhat human-sounding voice produced by a machine. Yet in spite of this, it’s also apparent that fans want her to become more human; to have a human form and to exist in human society. This is most probably the result of one of the limitations of a virtual diva. Fans cannot shake her hand, receive her autograph, talk to her, etc. This is a departure from the current conception of celebrities, which is to say Hatsune Miku is unlike traditional celebrities, in that she does not have a public face.

So in the end, what does it mean to say she is fake? Fake carries a negative connotation generally, and in my observations, are used to demean her and diminish the technological and artistic achievements of the software and the creators who use it. Not all who would use this word to describe the music are necessarily attacking her, but it appears that that their conception of what separates reality and fiction, existence and nonexistence, is fundamentally different from people in Japan who are exposed to Hatsune Miku more frequently. If the music is called fake, is it because it is not produced with a human voice? Her voice was given to her by humans, using a human voice as a foundation. Singers in the United States will sometimes use auto tuning to supplement their natural voices, as a stylistic choice, or even to improve the singing abilities of people who lack talent. Using a synthesizer to augment a human’s singing voice is not so different from what the Vocaloid software accomplishes. Additionally, is the presence of a human singing voice what truly constitutes music? Consider instrumental pieces, both classical and modern, in which the idea that they are truly music is not disputed. In the end, the human singing voice is one type of musical instrument or accompaniment. Singing produced by the Vocaloid software fulfills the same purpose. Each song features additional accompaniment, from everything between guitars and pianos to shamisen and koto. In calling the music fake, is this selectively judging each instrument’s role in the song? In other words, is it possible to take a fake song and make it real by simply removing the vocal track produced with the Vocaloid software?

This issue of real or fake extends well beyond the realm of mere music. It is also important to remember that Hatsune Miku is an entity comprised of not only a voice, but a face and body as well. She is not adored simply for her music, as her merchandising might serve to demonstrate. Her image is plastered all over the walls of the ever popular arcades found in Japanese cities, as well as figures of her, which are available in the crane games in said arcades. She can be seen in conveniences stores, professional car racing, concert halls, etc. It’s undoubtedly hard for a Japanese person in a more urban area to write her off as fake, as it becomes increasingly more difficult to avoid her; something tantamount to avoiding being exposed to a major pop culture icon of the human variety. As a matter of fact, in a poll of one thousand people, aged twelve to thirty-nine, a reported ninety-five percent responded that that they knew of Hatsune Miku. (animeanime.jp)

**VIRTUAL ROMANCE: VIRTUAL IMPOSSIBLE?**

What does a vocal synthesis program stand to tell us about interpersonal relationships in modern day Japan? For the program and the music itself, it’s not quite related. On the other hand, Hatsune Miku, as a virtual maiden is a unique cultural phenomenon. This phenomenon is not limited to Hatsune Miku herself, who is just one more in an emerging trend of such characters. This seems to be a significant point of divergence between Japanese culture and western thinkers, as the idea of love between a person and a fictional character is ridiculed in the west. In Japan, it’s a relatively new concept as well, but is not immediately written off as being bizarre or unnatural.

Hatsune Miku’s character design, originally created by popular artist KEI, is based on a Japanese idealization of female beauty. She is
young, attractive, with exotic eye and hair color, in peak physical condition, and sports a fashionable wardrobe. All of these are ideal attributes that are sought after in a mate, so why would it not make sense for male fans to be attracted to her? Traditional thinking would say that it’s due to her lack of a third dimension or her cartoonish look. But what if that was starting to become less of an issue in modern Japan? It’s not mainstream thinking, but it is spreading. One difference between Japan and the English-speaking countries we are examining, in terms of societal expectations placed upon adults, is that reading comics (manga) and watching cartoons (anime) is not looked down upon as childish. Adults can be seen in public consuming such media regularly. Pixiv, a popular Japanese website in which artists will post their artwork, has a huge selection of provocative Hatsune Miku fan art, many of which are pornographic in nature. Similarly, at Comiket, a massive biannual convention where fan comics are bought and sold, many such pornographic materials are made available.

These virtual maidens are also important when considering economic trends, as their otaku fans have enabled them to make a huge impact. Otaku culture is also often characterized by its rampant consumerism, creating a massive demand for such goods. In and of itself, this is a peculiar phenomenon though. The consumerist nature of the otaku subculture has been creatively exploited in very clever ways, from a marketing perspective. Take for example, the case of a small town in Akita prefecture, Japan, called Ugomachi, where the sales of their locally grown rice increased exponentially after they commissioned popular visual novel artist Nishimata Aoi to create an attractive and cute female mascot for their rice. Upon shipping bags of the rice with the character printed on them, a reported two years’ sales worth of rice was sold in a single month. The website for the company went from five hits per day to five thousand. The character printed on the bags had no name and no representative works. The rice was sold by virtue of the fact that a cute girl adorned the packaging. Incidentally, this started a trend with Nishimata Aoi being called in to design random mascot characters for other food items, such as strawberries and watermelons. In both cases, sales were bolstered by the addition of such mascots\(^8\). This is a testament to the influence of character goods in any market, thanks to the buying power of otaku.

The popularity of these fictional characters as objects of romance can better be understood in the framework of Japanese views on gender relations. Even in modern day Japan, the idealized female is meek, young, innocent, virginal, and will forfeit her ambitions when it is time to settle down and raise her children. This is an antiquated ideal and is inconsistent with the reality of modern Japanese women. However, they are raised in the belief that this is the sort of woman they should strive to be. This is in line with the old concept of Yamato Nadeshiko (大和撫子), or the perfect woman. She is refined, elegant, reserved, obedient, and of unparalleled beauty. Young girls are to strive to become her. Because these are Japanese societal expectations imposed upon girls, the reality is undoubtedly uncomfortable to process for those who are raised to believe that this is how women should be. This is because modern Japanese women are born into a more liberated, modern society where the shackles of such oppression are far looser than in traditional times. This is a prominent shift, but another prevailing concept, that of ryosai kenbo (良妻賢母, good wife and wise mother), introduced in the wake of the Meiji Restoration, remains in the societal subconscious. As could be inferred from its meaning, it is the ideal that girls should seek to devote themselves to their family life. In modern day Japan, a woman working in a corporation is expected to choose either between her career ambitions or family life.

In the 1920s, in the wake of rapid westernization after the Meiji Restoration, mobo and moga (modern boys and modern girls, respectively) became emerging trends in young people. Moga were known to smoke, behave in more stereotypically masculine ways, and have sex at their own discretion. This was the beginning of a breakdown of traditional moral values. Fast forward to the present, a similar archetype of young female is common in Japan, the so-called gyaru. In actuality, we’re seeing another sort of paradigm shift on a wholly different order. It has

\(^8\) hwww.sankakucomplex.com/2008/12/19/ita-rice-proves-huge-success/
been identified in Japanese discourse as the “herbivore male” and “carnivore female,” wherein an increasing number of males are showing a disinterest in pursuing relationships and are showing a greater interest in fashion and affairs that are considered to be not masculine. Conversely, more and more females are showing signs of frustration with such lukewarm reception and general lack of attention from these herbivorous males and are more aggressively pursuing relationships on their own terms. This shift in traditional gender roles undoubtedly comes as a shock to some. For some males, it is easier to seek comfort in a relationship with a fictional female companion. Most of these digital maidsens are created to be virtual Yamato Nadeshiko. They cannot disobey their suitors, their beauty is as timeless as it is without flaw, and they will show affection for their suitors unconditionally. The fear of rejection or the discomfort of changing gender roles does not apply to these relationships. Another factor is that their purity is far less likely to become compromised.

The concept of purity has been ever present in Japanese society since the days of the earliest known Shinto practices. It comes in many forms, but the ideal is mostly consistent. For example, one who prepares a body for cremation is impure and shunned. Similarly, one who handles the flesh of dead animals, such as a Tanner, will likely be discriminated against for his impurity. In terms of a woman’s purity, the loss of her virginity is viewed as loss of purity. This is relevant even in modern Japan. Consider the case of Minegishi Minami, a popular idol of the hit mega idol group AKB48. In a recent scandal, she was seen exiting the apartment of a male band member. This caused a huge fan outcry, as she had betrayed her fans by becoming impure. In response, she posed the question, “Why aren’t we allowed to date?”; a remark that would only bring more scorn upon her. Finally, she posted a video of herself on the Internet, prostrating herself before her fans. A sobbing Minegishi apologized as she shaved her head as penance for her actions. She was thereafter demoted and will not be performing onstage with the group again. (Billones) This is an extreme standard set by the Japanese idol industry, which molds young people into marketable commodities.

Let’s consider, on the other hand, a virtual idol. Hatsune Miku in particular can never be guilty of this manner of so-called “betrayal.” Never will she lose her virginity, be caught up in an embarrassing scandal, or even age. In her case, she is deliberately denied any semblance of a personality for this reason, but it is not impossible for two-dimensional characters to be caught in such a scandal. One recent and infamous example is the case of the hit manga Kannagi. This series enjoyed a great deal of popularity thanks to its lead female protagonist. In one chapter, it was alluded to that she might have had a boyfriend in the past. Though this was not an explicit indication that she had lost her virginity, there was a massive fan outcry from otaku fans afterwards, with one user going as far as to destroy his collection of the series and post pictures of it online, as if to burn the author in effigy. This is not an uncommon reaction coming from angered otaku fans.

Idols are popular amongst otaku, but can easily fall from grace with a minor scandal or even some signs of aging. A market for digital idols has been created recently and there are companies ready to capitalize off of this fact. One of the more popular examples is The Idolm@ster, a simulation game where the player plays the role of a producer who is tasked with raising and promoting a fledgling idol. Each prospective client is a highly desirable young girl and skillful play is rewarded by the possibility of courting the idol at the end of her story. Another popular genre is visual novels, or as they are more infamously known in the West, “dating simulations.” This is a genre that has existed for decades and tasks the player with courting any one of a number of fictional females. A subgenre of this is otome games, where the roles are reversed and a female protagonist courts a collection of attractive males. This genre spawned an infamous game that is meant to replace conventional love altogether, known as Love Plus. This is a game where after courting one of three digital maidens, the game will allow the player to continue dating her for all time. She will even get angry if the player misses a date. So infamous is this game that one man traveled to Guam in order to marry his Nintendo DS, as he had fallen in love

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with one of these two-dimensional girls. Another man, a Tokyo resident, fell in love with this same game and had a wedding ceremony carried out in Tokyo by a real priest, who made sure to inform the man that the marriage was not legally recognized. This particular game seems to be conducive to producing these sorts of examples, as it has lead to divorce in some cases. A 2010 online survey asked women, “What if a man you like immerses himself in Love Plus?” and of 817 total respondents, 27.4% responded, “I would come to dislike him,” while 72.6% answered, “I would still like him.” (Kossori Enquete)

HATSUNE MIKU & JAPANESENESS

The implications of denouncing Hatsune Miku as being “fake” or “not real” become more problematic as she begins to embody a new form of expression of Japanese national identity. That is to say that while many of Hatsune Miku’s songs are of genres that originated in the west, such as pop and rock, her music can take on a distinctively Japanese flavor. To call this music fake is to deny the “Japaneseness” of this somewhat new form of music. This term has been used in a number of scholarly circles. I choose to use it to describe things that are evocative of traditional Japanese culture, as expressed through artwork, literature, performance pieces and the like. Japan has been subject to westernization, both self-imposed and through external forces. This has made more apparent the lines that would have distinguished between something that is intrinsically “Japanese” and something that is merely made in Japan. In this regard, it is worth noting that one special property of Vocaloid music is that it has the magical property of bringing back old forms of Japanese music and making them hip and appealing to younger generations. There are many examples of this, but we will examine only a few notable ones.

鏡音ハハ花合戦 (Kagamine Hachi-hachi Hana Kassen)\(^{10}\) is a song that harkens back to the days of the Edo period (1603-1868). It is a song of two people, Kagamine Len and Rin, who fall in love and play a game of flower cards, a popular card game of the time. The lyrics progressively weave this narrative while also occasionally referencing the flow of the card game. The song’s composer, モジャP (mojaP), is known for composing rock, electric, and ballads, but one thing that makes this song stand out is the fact that he himself played the shamisen portions of this piece, opting not to use a synthesized shamisen track instead. The shamisen is a traditional Japanese three-stringed instrument. A shamisen in this day in age will likely only be played in traditional songs for the purpose of preserving Japanese musical heritage. To be featured in popular music such as a Vocaloid song is uncommon, to say the least.

番風 (tsugai kogarashi)\(^{11}\) evokes the feelings of a stylized folk song. The composer, 仕事してP (shigotoshiteP) chose the slightly less technologically sophisticated voices of Kaito and Meiko to perform this piece. It tells the tale of two entities that fall in love, but the path ahead is wrought with hardship. They are embodied by the imagery of a pair of cold wintry winds, and leaves dancing in the wind. This song is 仕事してP’s most popular song and has been inducted into the Nico Video Hall of Fame.

いろは唄 (iroha uta)\(^{12}\), in spite of its rock ‘n’ roll guitar and bass, evokes a strong feeling of the “Japaneseness” of Japanese traditional music. Its lyrics are based on a famous old poem, used to teach the proper ordering of Japanese syllabary, as every character of the Japanese syllabary is used in the poem and each is used only once, making it a perfect pangram.

結ンデ開イテ羅刹ト骸 (musunde hiraitė rasetsu to mukuro)\(^{13}\) is a unique piece, even by Vocaloid standards. It is described as having a melody consistent with Japanese music, but with an air of madness about it. Its stated themes are “innocence” and “discomfort.” It is a song about demons and corpses, like tales from old Japanese folklore. The promotional video, hand drawn by the composer ハチ (hachi), is styled to resemble hanafuda cards from the Edo period.

The final example to be provided here has become the most proliferated in Japanese society’s cultural awareness thus far. 千本桜

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\(^{10}\)www.youtube.com/watch?v=9zhrDj4KRLc

\(^{11}\)www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kp0GxrSHtsg

\(^{12}\)www.youtube.com/watch?v=6FpLW4-5Ffl

\(^{13}\)www.youtube.com/watch?v=EykE57fi-QE
(senbonzakura) recaptures a lost essence of “Japaneseness”; lost after World War II and during the occupation. Depending on one’s interpretation of the lyrics, it’s not unreasonable to call this song a criticism of the rapid westernization of Japan, spanning the Meiji Restoration to the occupation by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. The promotional video released with the song showcases some powerful imagery to drive home the message of the song. The setting is reminiscent of the Taisho period, where westernization had become part of the status quo, coming out of the Meiji period. As such, Miku and her Vocaloid companions are dressed in western attire common to that time period. Kaito, Meiko, and Luka play the roles of adults who are working to make a living, while Miku, Rin, and Len are children, still holding onto the innocence of youth. This is further driven home by imagery such as Miku riding a bicycle and wave upon wave of red pinwheels. The lyrics evoke a strong sense of the will of the citizens of country torn apart by the flames of war. A most curious line in the first verse also presents some unique imagery: “悪霊退散ICBM” (akuryou taisan refers to the quelling of evil spirits by forcefully scattering them). The preceding lines accuse the revolution of imposing an audacious (western) way of life upon a carefree, antiwar country. It could be left up to interpretation, but the ICBM that wards off evil spirits could refer to the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the evil spirits being the imposed westernization; leading the charge to see to it that when Japan recovers from the war, it is time to reclaim that lost national and cultural identity. The song itself is a strong expression of cultural identity for postwar Japan. Whether it’s due to the strong message and imagery, the beautiful and artistic promotional video, or the incredibly catchy song itself, senbonzakura is wildly in Japan for the time being. So popular is it, that it has seen several CD releases, it has been featured in a video game, it has received its own novelization, it has had special themed boxed lunches sold at convenience stores, it has been performed as an actual wagaku piece by a wagaku music troupe, and is to be adapted into a feature length musical. Its popularity cannot be understated. In fact, with an understandable degree of controversy, fans have gone as far as to propose making the song the national anthem of Japan, replacing the “dated” and “gloomy” kimi ga yo (君が代).

For some, Hatsune Miku is very much a symbol of Japanese national identity. Japanese fans are proud of their virtual diva; so much so that racial tension has come about in response to certain events. For instance, one Chinese user uploaded a song he composed to Nico Video. This song, 月・西江 (Moon West River), is sung completely in Chinese. It features a soft tune highly reminiscent of traditional Chinese music. The composer, Solpie, was the target of many malicious comments as a result of the release of this song. That Hatsune Miku would be made to sing in Chinese offended the sensibilities of these users, and Solpie received many racist comments on Nico Video. So troubled was he by these attacks that he removed the video. To this day, a Japanese language version of the song can be found on Nico Video, however. This level of harassment stems from the ideal that Miku is an expression of Japanese cultural identity, where the Chinese have no place. Mainstream Japan, a mostly homogenous society, is still relatively unaccepting of foreign presence within its borders and it seems fans are less accepting of foreign presence within its Vocaloid creative sphere. This is mostly only applicable to other East Asian peoples, as Japanese producers will occasionally use English in their songs, especially in the case of Megurine Luka, who is the first Crypton Vocaloid to feature full English support. It’s not necessarily the case that foreign composers cannot utilize Vocaloid, but rather that they cannot utilize Hatsune Miku without fear of backlash. They can use Chinese Vocaloid Luo Tianyi or Korean Vocaloid SeeU, but the fact remains that they are openly discouraged from using the popular and iconic Hatsune Miku. The double standard for English speakers still stands, as Hatsune Miku is set to have English language support implemented in the future to satisfy the demands of Hatsune Miku’s growing western fan base.

Another famous incident of racial tension brought about in the wake of the ever increasing popularity of Hatsune Miku is the February 2012 case of the mass deletion of Hatsune Miku videos

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14 www.youtube.com/watch?v=2LUgH_X7sFM

15 blog.esuteru.com/archives/7026956.html
from YouTube. A malicious user collective banded together to have Miku videos removed from YouTube en masse. They did so by claiming that the users who uploaded these videos were infringing upon a copyright held by them. These claims were clearly fraudulent, as rights to the content belong to the producers of the original songs, and the group had no connection to any of these individuals. YouTube will honor such claims with little to no evidence to substantiate them, and deftly remove the offending content, making this an easy operation for the perpetrators. Restoring the deleted content is a much more complicated matter, though a fan movement to try to do so occurred. This became an issue of race when Japanese users demonized Koreans, accusing them of being the culprits. With little to no evidence to support this claim, the notion caught on various Japanese websites. The circumstantial evidence to back this claim was essentially the idea that Korean users were bitter over Hatsune Miku’s videos ranking higher on YouTube than their K-Pop stars; that is to say that a mere Japanese computer program was of more renown than flesh and blood Korean performers. In the end, the group was never identified, so these claims could not be verified. In retaliation, a multinational fan movement, known simply as “Save Miku”, combatted YouTube’s hasty deletions by submitting counter-notifications. This movement picked up speed on Japanese websites, English-speaking websites, and sites tied to other nationalities as well. In the end, all videos were either restored or reuploaded without issue.

It is not necessarily as if to say that Japanese people would hear here more traditionally-inspired Vocaloid songs and feel some manner of affirmation of their cultural heritage, but it also stands to reason that the producers of such songs are, to an extent, expressing their identity as Japanese artists. In so doing, the relevance of their more traditional heritage can be conveyed in an appealing and accessible manner. Consider once more the example of those who were, even if in jest, suggesting that senbonzakura become the new national anthem. Younger generations of many societies tend to place less importance on cultural heritage, instead favoring hip and fashionable trends. As such, popular culture though Hatsune Miku may be, her music also has value as such forms of expression. To label it as “fake” is to devalue its significance; to relegate it to being some fluff with no substance.

CONCLUSION

Fans of Hatsune Miku, both in Japan and abroad, share a common bond. They appreciate music with vocal tracks produced by vocal synthesis software, but moreover, they are fans of a pop idol sensation that happens to walk an ill-defined line that serves as a border between reality and unreality. Whether she more so belongs on one side of that line or the other is widely up to the individual, and I feel that it’s apparent that this conception has everything to do with the society in question. In the end, these fans enjoy the overall experience of Hatsune Miku, and it’s difficult to deny the reality of an experience. For some, this experience is far more profound, as their feelings for this two-dimensional humanoid entity come to resemble what human beings conceive as the love shared by two people. Whether or not the object of their affections is real is less relevant than the reality of these feelings. Other feelings worth exploring are pride in one’s nation and its national treasures. If a fictitious character allows one to connect to his/her nation’s traditional art forms through a modern reinvention of them, then it is once again a reality for the individual.

It is not to say that people who call Vocaloid music “fake” or “not real” are attacking it, so much as they are giving insight into their world view. English-speaking nations are more prone to assign these labels to Vocaloid music, which is likely in part due to the fact that this is a foreign concept. With more exposure to and interaction with such trans-human entities, the reality would likely become increasingly difficult to deny. As Hatsune Miku continues to gain recognition on the world stage, we’ll be able to observe changing attitudes in this regard.

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Aadhaar:
Bridging Cultural Gaps in a Developing India

TORI DAHARB

While India is one of the world’s burgeoning economies, it also hosts one of the world’s fastest growing populations. As a result, new government programs have appeared to aid the positive development of India’s future. One offers a brand new Tata Car, the world’s cheapest automobile, to citizens in exchange for the unique identification number that is distributed through the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). UIDAI is the government association representing the distribution of the newly approved Aadhaar programs throughout India on a national, state and local level. Aadhaar will give each citizen in India an identification card and biometric scan, which links them to a secure government network covering the entire nation. UIDAI estimates, “Nearly half of India’s population would have the Aadhaar card by 2014 and nearly one in three Indians by the end of this year.” Not only will Aadhaar be one of the largest identification systems in the world, it will also revolutionize aid distribution to rural citizens in India, according to UIDAI/ the Indian government. Manmohan Singh, the current Prime Minister of India, has even stated the Aadhaar program, “will lead to better targeting of subsidies and reducing delays in the delivery of benefits such as scholarships and pensions to the intended beneficiaries. It will also help in curbing wastages and leakages.”

Corruption, manipulation and inefficient government spending have plagued India and Indian politics, population organization and distribution of aid have been at the root of these massive, expensive issues. Aadhaar lives up to its name and aims to establish a foundation for the future organization of these expenses and hopefully improve the current systems of operation in the Indian government through their relationship with the citizens of India. As of now, even identifying who an actual Indian citizen is would be difficult. Currently India has multiple systems for aid distribution and subsidy disbursement like the Public Distribution System (PDS), which research has shown to have major accountability and problems with corruption. By utilizing technology and individual biometric IDs, Aadhaar will allow for the possibility of cash transfer schemes, putting aid funds directly in the hands of the recipient. Inadvertently this will also give each Aadhaar ID holder access to banking accounts, and the potential to save—a concept vital to poverty alleviation programs like microfinance throughout the world, yet hard to make tangible to people who do not know where their next meal will come from. Beyond poverty alleviation, Aadhaar will streamline voting and tax collection strategies, and as BJP members also state, directly

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1 Central Intelligence Agency
2 Richardson, Mary. “India Will Offer Cars to Citizens Who Sterilize Themselves.”
3 UIDAI.gov
4 PTI. “Aadhaar Card to Reach 600 Million Mark by 2014: UIDAI.”
5 Mehdudia, Sunjay, and Manmohan Singh, PM. “Direct Benefit Transfer Will Curb Wastage, Says Manmohan.”
6 Parikh, Kirit S. “Right to Food and Foodgrain Policy.”
7 Bhatti, Bharat. “Aadhaar-Enabled Payments for NREGA Workers.” Economic & Political Weekly
8 Ledgerwood, Joanna. Microfinance Handbook: An Institutional and Financial Perspective
9 “All in the Name of the Poor.” Economic & Political Weekly.
tackle ongoing corruption issues politically and economically in India.\textsuperscript{10}

However, questions about the efficacy of Aadhaar remain. For example, how will Aadhaar’s distribution of cash transfers and work payments affect the average laborer? India encompasses many complex social/economic worlds that often contradict one another. Many individual roles in Indian society have followed the same traditional structures for thousands of years. The roles of dharma and one’s place in society have dramatically different effects for poorer rural citizens than upper socio-economic groups in urban areas. If cash is transferred directly to a rural Indian farmer, and at a minimal cost, how can we verify predictions that this money will be spent by those farmers in order to improve their lives, create nutritional value, and increase crop output and daily revenues? Will recipients of Aadhaar only become susceptible to more and newer technologically savvy forms of corruption and manipulation?

While Aadhaar ID cards will represent Indian citizens from every curve of the country, besides new technology,\textsuperscript{11} it has not addressed how it will innovate on previous systems like PDS\textsuperscript{12} in order to translate its importance for poverty alleviation to the actual poor. Besides physically taking the time to conduct high-cost qualitative primary research with a secure sample size of the population,\textsuperscript{13} modern and contemporary literature can also act as a direct link to the voice and culture of the people Aadhaar aims to represent. Literature is a median in which under represented individuals in India have been able to express and voice their hardships in ways interviews cannot. The lived experiences of these classes can be seen through various authors, within India’s past and present. The psychological and economical hardships of these classes are no secret, but their “actual” needs are often overshadowed by generalizing statistics and massive programs, which cater to what statistics may show for a need, versus creating an actual impact. Through literature, it becomes apparent how complex an idea such as age can be to a rural Indian villager, or how the idea of India has no relevance or relationship with citizens whose life revolves around bonded labor through unavoidable debt cycles or the local landowners possibly corrupt leadership.

Beyond Aadhaar, NGOs, government agencies, and even the United Nation’s Millennium goals created for the sole purpose of poverty alleviation seem ridiculous to implement beyond the confines of a comfy office space.\textsuperscript{14} Political influences and corruption are also the root cause of slow implementation of policies, and the approval of poverty alleviation policies which actually indirectly benefit schemes to make profit a bottom line\textsuperscript{15} non efficient spending of funds and their correlation to successful education, nutritional intake, and consistent law enforcement. Seemingly accurate accusations have been made against the BJP party’s support of Aadhaar on paper for its potential anti-corruption benefits, yet indirectly it will allow for budget cuts to subsidize spending through cash transfers—a much cheaper form of distribution.\textsuperscript{16} While cash transfer schemes have the capability of lowering costs, they also have the capability of reaching more citizens for the same costs to the government. As long as poverty exists in India, there will be direct demand for government policies, which look beyond a simplistic bottom line of profit. Poverty in India persists because of a host of social and hierarchical reasons that the literature works of Premchand and Devi also stress. These inequitable social systems need to be addressed before poverty can be eliminated. Profit or government saving may even be possible with the application of basic economic principles of supply and demand to

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\textsuperscript{10} Bhatti, Bharat. “Aadhaar-Enabled Payments for NREGA Workers.” \textit{Economic \& Political Weekly}


\textsuperscript{12} Bhatti, Bharat. “Aadhaar-Enabled Payments for NREGA Workers.” \textit{Economic \& Political Weekly}

\textsuperscript{13} Standard Market Research Processes

\textsuperscript{14} Yunus Muhammad, \textit{Creating a World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism} (Chapter 1, “A New Kind of Business,” pp. 3-10)

\textsuperscript{15} Kapur, Devesh. “The Shift to Cash Transfers: Running Better but on the Wrong Road?” \textit{Economic \& Political Weekly}
procurement procedures throughout India. Many NGOs are said not to support the Aadhaar scheme for fear of losing their rights to continue operations in India all together, not because of their concerns with Aadhaar operations and policies. There support will also be vital to Aadhaar’s long term success, and in turn could greatly benefit their aid efforts.

While politicians and policy makers are constrained by the confines of the political world; literature goes beyond a bottom line of profit in order to represent the many flaws the author sees in society hopefully without those same outside political influences. Premchand, a prominent early twentieth century Hindi novelist viewed literature as a main outlet to show the constant unrest in society and represent the complexities of the structure of Indian society, through literary works past and present.

Through literary analysis, comments and predictions by scholars currently studying Aadhaar as well as past poverty alleviation schemes instated in India, this paper will question whether the Aadhaar program will be able to create a foundation for sustainable Indian development on multiple socio-economic levels. Through analysis of Indian Subsidies and their evolution into cash transfer schemes, potential corruption alleviation, and finally linking the prominent literary themes of renowned writers Premchand and Devi to direct flaws in these government programs, it becomes apparent the root issues for connecting the diverse worlds that make up India may be much more complicated than a 12 digit-identification number, but not impossible.

As a marketing and Asian Studies major bridging humanities research to the work of business and economic analysis not only creates a well rounded view but seems to be imperative for government systems representing the diversity any nation encompasses. Through researching Aadhaar and other government programs within India, it also shows how complex and detailed national programs are and the intricate webs of influence they weave through all levels of society. While seemingly unconnected these two fields of study have helped shed light on the importance of asking basic questions. What is India’s main goal? Development. How do you spur development? Bring the poor, underrepresented and discriminated classes the ability to create a life for themselves. As a marketer, my first goal is to identify a customer through various demographic and psychographic analyses in order to serve this customer’s wants or needs in the best possible manner. I find a major parallel to this with the Aadhaar program, the Indian government aims to spur development, but the question becomes which customer they are ultimately aiming to fulfill the wants and needs of? The impoverished, the outspoken, or the pockets of political supporters? Through the works of Premchand and Devi their psychological representation of the underrepresented classes in India makes it blatantly apparent the lack of correlation in what the impoverished people of India can utilize in a government program and what government programs have actually been instated. While Aadhaar is a new initiative, if it truly wants to enable a solid foundation for the future of India, it will find itself facing the same cracks as other programs without the backing and faith of the people it aims to “serve” to begin with.

Beginning in 2006, Aadhaar programs aim to offer an innovative approach to poverty alleviation in India. If implemented successfully, Aadhaar will numerically become one of the largest individual identification programs in the world. China, with the world’s greatest population, has identification schemes based upon the family unit making the identification process somewhat less detailed, but by essentially establishing an individual social security number for every (volunteering) citizen in India, the Aadhaar database will represent and have to continually update data for more than 16% of the world’s population. Making it a massive, huge, amazing undertaking. To put it simply, “[Aadhaar] is a road that in some sense connects

17 “Reforming or Replacing the Public Distribution System with Cash Transfers?.” Economic & Political Weekly
18 “Reforming or Replacing the Public Distribution System with Cash Transfers?.” Economic & Political Weekly
20 Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact-Book
every individual to the state.”

This program will not only represent an identification number but also manage aid distribution, tax collection and salary disbursement – major social programs even separate government departments in America and developed world have trouble effectively managing. Located in the planning division of the Indian government and under the umbrella program, Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), Aadhaar has the potential to radically change previously slow moving, dated, government systems through utilization of new identification technologies and the capabilities for a massive all inclusive biometric database to store and analyze information collected through Aadhaar, ensuring its accuracy and potentially limiting the ability for easy corruption strategies.

It only takes a simple Google alert or a glimpse at Indian news sources to see successes and failures of Aadhaar initiatives are being measured daily as states and national policy makers drive resources into the Aadhaar program and new Aadhaar initiatives.

Aadhaar in its basic form will represent a 12-digit identification number, specific to each Indian individual. Demographic information will be taken along with a retinae scan, photograph and 10-digit fingerprint. Originally conceived to combat lack of accurate census information and to tackle illegal immigration issues, the first rollouts of the Aadhaar program began in Tembli, a rural village in Maharashtra, in 2009. Currently Aadhaar operates on state and national levels throughout India and Aadhaar registrant numbers grow in the thousands weekly.

Registration for Aadhaar occurs on a voluntary basis. Although in many cases for those who receive any form of government aid or employment, not registering can mean a major loss of vital food sources, grain, fertilizer and work. The Aadhaar program will act as direct link between government funds, programs and people, those who are not registered with the program will not be able to reap its growing list of benefits and necessities (employment, bank accounts, aid, education registration, proof of citizenship). In recent months many currently using the Aadhaar program have become frustrated over the inability to access additional programs, like cash transfers because of technological and human errors in their local Aadhaar distribution poling centers.

Unlike other systems in Asia, the Aadhaar system will exclusively focus on the individual, and deliberately exclude information such as caste, tribe and religious affiliation. These categories are of particular sensitivity in India and have plagued its past with discriminatory disputes between different opposing groups. Caste has been an integral part of the functioning Indian community and places each person or family group within society in a specific role. It would not be abnormal to be in India and asked what caste you belonged to directly following an introduction. Tribal groups and members are also a highly controversial topic, and face daily discrimination and land rights violations, including by the Indian government.

Hindu-Muslim-Sikh and other minority religious groups have been hostile to one another at different points throughout Indian history. Leaving these highly sensitive labels out of the Aadhaar identification process will leave less opportunity for discrimination and shows the Indian government’s move to offer well rounded equity-driven identification for all.

Indians living throughout the world planned and implemented the beginning stages of operations for Aadhaar under the leadership of Nandan Nilekani. Chairman of UIDAI, Nandan Nilekani has received worldwide recognition for his work with Infosys Technologies, coined the Apple technological company of India in this book, Imagining India. Entrepreneur, economist and innovator, Nilekani represents the modern

21 Scanning 2.4 Billion Eyes, India Tries to Connect Poor to Growth
22 UIDAI. UIDAI. Government of India
23 If you do not know what a ‘Google Alert’ is please reference appendix.
progressive view of India’s future. This view portrays India as a main stakeholder in the developed world. His extensive work in the business world and success of Infosys Technologies has given him huge networking capabilities. Aadhaar is one of his first ventures into the Indian political arena.

While bureaucratically configured, Aadhaar’s internal structure aims to transcend inefficiencies found in other Indian governmental offices, “One less-obvious benefit emphasized by Nilekani is the empowerment of people through increased competition,” instead of many differing local levels offices and levels of government communication and services distributed to individual citizens, Aadhaar incorporates them into one streamlined effort. Through the implementation of new procedures and business principles, this system focuses on speed, new technology, strict deadlines and efficiency in order to reach Aadhaar benchmarks. While Aadhaar’s comprehensive database has been explained previously, Aadhaar’s aggressive timeline may create additional problems for reaching broader program goals. “Since the program began in 2010, more than 300 million Indians have acquired a unique ID number associated with 12 biometric markers,” Aadhaar transcends previous small government plans like the PDS system which are supposedly less efficient and took much more time to put into action.

Technology will play one of the key roles in eliminating the high costs of reaching India’s rural populations, where a lack of infrastructure makes aid distribution burdensome. All Aadhaar information will be linked through a single network and information will be uploaded via the internet to a single database. If operating correctly it will help to limit the large amounts if

30 Crook, Clive. “India’s Biometric IDs Put Its Poorest on the Map.”
31 Crook, Clive. “India’s Biometric IDs Put Its Poorest on the Map.”
33 The system will be able to work offline in some cases, and load data at a later, more convenient time (Sharma, Vikas. “Aadhaar- A Unique Identification Number: Opportunities and Challenges Ahead.” Journal Anu Books).
34 Parikh, Kirit S. “Right to Food and Foodgrain Policy.”
35 Bhatti, Bharat. “Aadhaar-Enabled Payments for NREGA Workers.” Economic & Political Weekly
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37 Mukherjee, Arindam. “Aadhaar a Few Basic Issues.” Outlook India
help to show if these cracks in the system can be smoothed over.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{AN EVOLUTION: FROM SUBSIDIES TO CASH TRANSFERS}

Poverty within India is no new concept, and many government expenditures have been created in order to circumvent the major social issues surrounding poverty, and \textit{poverty traps} in India create.\textsuperscript{41} The Indian government supports and distributes many different subsidies for natural resources such as kerosene, fertilizer (agriculture), power, irrigation and grain.\textsuperscript{42,43} Currently corruption in India on a macro level is tied to kerosene and gas subsidies dating back to the Green Revolution supported by Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister (1947-64).\textsuperscript{44} These subsidies aimed to protect India's domestic markets, by blocking international trade and importation with some of the highest tariffs in the world.\textsuperscript{45} Originally subsidies are thought to help build up infrastructure create jobs, and a national bond among newly conformed states.\textsuperscript{46} Subsidies have done just that in many instances throughout the world, and are implemented daily for this reason.

While the high tariffs of the past have been lowered, these subsidies also act as non-tariff barriers to trade today and at times oversaturate markets, including the fertilizer market. Not only has India's government implemented these legislations in the past on an international level, they also limit grain and other vital resource distribution by state lines, directly contradicting their public distribution system (PDS) which aims to streamline the process of aid distribution, in a similar manner to a cash transfer. This means grain produced through subsidy funding in one state will not be distributed to another state or physically cross state lines. Creating a system in which one state may have higher wheat grain outputs cannot benefit or trade with a state which has more rice grain outputs. Or if in one state water is more scarce, like Rajasthan, it will be more expensive to grow crops than another state, both states will essentially be given the same amount of funding and will not be able to equitably distribute the grain amongst one another. Because the current PDS system operates in this inefficient manner, the PDS system operating state-by-state will become obsolete with the implementation of the Aadhaar system, which theoretically incorporates economies on a national level.\textsuperscript{47} By enacting these state restrictions, government funds are spent redundantly in the production of such resources/goods as fertilizer as well as aid in lowered supply for increased demand, resulting in overly inflated prices. From an outside view, these policies seem ridiculous and it is hard to believe they were ever instated, "It is a mystery exactly why the Indian Government subsidizes plants whose cost of production are more than double world process...instead of arranging for long-term fertilizer imports."\textsuperscript{48} Historically however, they did foster growth of local infrastructure and economies, but are financially inappropriate for the creation of long-term wealth and sustainable communities. The case and study of subsidies also offer a prime example for the need to constantly update, reform and represent the needs of the everyday person. Failing to do so not only results in massive amounts of lost capital, but does more harm than good to the legislation's intended benefactors.

Fertilizer subsidies have policies that are currently being reformed, but offer just one of many instances in which subsidies directly aid corruptive behavior and burden those they are

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Crook, Clive. "India's Biometric IDs Put Its Poorest on the Map."
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Smith, Stephen C., \textit{Ending Global Poverty: A Guide To What Works}
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Source Economic and Political Weekly article
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  \item \textsuperscript{48} Kapur, Devesh. "The Shift to Cash Transfers: Running Better but on the Wrong Road?"
\end{itemize}
meant to benefit. "Between 2000-2001 and 2009-2010 while annual fertilizer consumption in India grew by over 50%, food grain output grew by just 11%" meaning people used 50% more fertilizer, but only increased the amount of crops they grew by 11%. "Jha and Ramaswamy (2011) have estimated that the income support provided to the poor in 2004-05 through [Public Distribution Systems] was Rs 2,100 crore, whereas the total subsidy was Rs 20,400 crore...thus only 10% accrue to poor, 19% to non-poor, 28% is due to excess cost of operation and 43% is due to illegal diversion...more than 40% of PDS grains do not reach consumers." These statistics show the lack of a correlation between Government Indian and their effect on alleviating poverty, in a sense they are paying for a whole meal at a restaurant, but only being served rice. These statistic also make it clear how the “international price of wheat was approximately 30% cheaper than wheat in India.”

The cost of Aadhaar will actually lesson the cost of subsidies to the Indian government through the cash transfer program. Currently the Indian government spends almost 197,000 Rs Crore with a total of 2.04% of all government expenditures is spent on fertilizer, power, and irrigation subsidies.

With anticipated changes from subsidies to cash transfers, this number will decrease substantially, while also increasing the percentage of funds directly reaching rural populations from lowered administration costs. Politically this decrease in budget most likely has acted as a major catalyst in the rapid implementation of the Aadhaar program, which may leave major holes open to corruption. "The fact remains that, at the moment, we do not have reliable estimates of "Aadhaar-relevant leakages." Corruption in India is an issue that has played a major role in Indian news, protests, and call for action. "For political reasons, the government has been promoting the direct transfer scheme as an anti-corruption measure, But the real objective of the government is, of course, that it sees a way to reduce its major subsidies bill." It has been recommended that this transition of subsidies to cash transfers be enacted through the use of coupons linked to a citizens ID card. This still begs the question, who will receive this funding, and how does the Indian government determine who the “poor” truly are?

Kirit S. Parikh, Economic and Political Weekly contributor and Founder Director of Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, who has written on Indian subsidy consumption, suggests identifying the rich and excluding them versus identifying the poor and excluding the wealthier, which may very well be possible through the Aadhaar system. However, Parikh also addresses an even bigger issue pertaining to grain subsidies, do rural Indian households want more grain? "Deaton and Dreze (2009) have observed declining consumption of cereal calories by rural households...this suggests the poor may not want to consume more cereals and ... providing food grains may also not improve nutrition outcomes." It seems at times as though going out to ‘rural areas’ throughout India and simply asking what is needed, may lead to more efficient aid than controlled expenditures. Parikh also suggests cash transfers linked to an “entitled woman” of the household. His argument links to that of microfinance founder, Muhamod Yunus in that funds given directly to women create a multiplier effect in social development initiatives. Women,

49 Kapur, Devesh. “The Shift to Cash Transfers: Running Better but on the Wrong Road?”
50 Kapur, Devesh. “The Shift to Cash Transfers: Running Better but on the Wrong Road?”
57 “All in the Name of the Poor.” Economic & Political Weekly.
The government, as a mass response to these corruption protests has also advertised the Aadhaar program. These protests have shed light of the mass corruption found in underpaid Indian police forces, local government, and business transactions (among many other examples). But what is a cash transfer? Could they help alleviate corruptive subsidy abuse in rural and urban India in the long term, or act as a surface level, short-term solution funding political interests and not those of the rural citizen in poverty?\textsuperscript{63}

To tackle these questions it is important to note corruption may be defined in many different ways. According to a standard corruption perception index (CPI), India ranks 94\textsuperscript{64} out of 176 countries with a score of 36 (100 being a completely corruption free nation). In comparison the US ranks 19 with an overall score of 73.\textsuperscript{64} Meaning India has much more of the CPI’s defined “corruption.” However the definition of corruption varies greatly throughout the world, and the statistical information represented above, comes with a western, developed nations bias. What these protests, Lokpal and Aadhaar show however, is a response to corruptive behavior and the ability for it to be reduced in the future—great leaps forward on the pathway of efficient development initiatives in India.

Corruption concerns on a micro level in India coincide with fraud, embezzlement, deception, collusion and extortion.\textsuperscript{65} The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) and Public Distribution Systems (PDS) currently handle rural employment and poverty payments in India. The inefficiencies and massive misuse of government funding on these two programs can be attributed to this micro-level forms of corruption. Forms of corruption Aadhaar hopes to help circumvent. But will Aadhaar even be able to break long-term corruptive practices, in many cases considered more of a norm and way of life for many in India?

While we look to determine the success and failures of government programs in India, and the
future of Aadhaar, the question of what the people need to alleviate themselves from poverty seems to be left unanswered in the mass amounts of statistical academic text. Also, how we access the lived experience of people whose lives are circumscribed by poverty – it’s access to this “lived experience” that literature can offer in depth views of, and from that, what people “need” can be extrapolated into powerful productive initiatives. I was first made aware that a basic understanding of what poverty encompasses and the staple needs of the poor are somewhat overshadowed in the complex solutions institutions like the World Bank have created for the world through the founder of the Grameen Bank, Muhammad Yunus and his book Banker to the Poor. Polak’s projects and companies form what has newly been coined social business, or non-profits creating self-sustainable profit for themselves rather than relying on donations. Polak outlines “Twelve steps to practical problem solving” in the first chapter of Out of Poverty. The second step specifically relates to the future of Aadhaar and it success as a program- “Talk to the people who have a problem and listen to what they say.” While many articles touch on statistical information regarding inefficient spending on programs like PDS, the need to lesson corruptive behavior, or how Aadhaar will take the actual biometric data. Parikh touches lightly on the subject of what the poor actually need when looking specifically at improvements in dietary consumption. Right now India offers grain subsidies to those who are malnourished, which will eventually transfer into a direct transfer with the Aadhaar card. But people who cannot afford grain, may not need only grain and or may have access to grain and need those funds for milk or some other substance of nutritional value. This also brings about previous and possibly the biggest issues with the logic behind the Indian Government’s grain purchasing programs—an instance where the numbers and the voice of the people directly contradict government operations and funding allocations.

While numbers show the inefficiencies behind lack of developmental progress in many of Indian Government programs that could also easily plague Aadhaar literature brings a direct explanation and reasoning behind why they show what they show. To a villager it’s no surprise to them that a local government official pockets funds and outwardly discriminates against various castes, this is a way of life. Literature puts a story behind the numbers and reaffirms there meaning yet also adds an extended connection and relatable factor to a cause. It’s easy to hear a statistic and believe it’s honesty while hear a story and assume its falsity but in many cases the opposite is true. Arundhati Roy, Indian author of The God of Small Things, sheds beautiful light on the facts of literature:

“Writers imagine that they cull stories from the world. I’m beginning to believe that vanity makes them think so. That it’s actually the other way around. Stories cull writers from the world. Stories reveal themselves to us. The public narrative, the private narrative - they colonize us. They commission us. They insist on being told. Fiction and nonfiction are only different techniques of story telling. For reasons that I don’t fully understand, fiction dances out of me, and nonfiction is wrenched out by the aching, broken world I wake up to every morning.”

Indian literature creates a great alternative outlet for the voice of citizens in India in which the Aadhaar card aims to benefit. Literature represents an alternative view to statistical based articles and an outlook direct interviews do not always reach. Modern and contemporary Indian writers such as Mahasweta Devi (Bengali), Prem Chand (Hindi), Arundhati Roy (English), and many others all easily convey the disconnect between the different societal spheres within India. When looking at a program as big as Aadhaar, not incorporating and acknowledging the vast differences, wants and

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66 Nobel Peace Prize Winner, founder of the Grameen Bank, and author of the best-selling novel Banker to the Poor
67 Mohammad Yunus has also written a book on this, please see Creating a World Without Poverty
68 Out of Poverty, 13
69 Out of Poverty, 13
needs of the people it will be representing will indirectly leave these minority groups disconnected from the program and unable to benefit from Aadhaar’s poverty alleviation schemes.

Mahasweta Devi, a prominent Indian writer consistently represents the tribal (adivasi) peoples of India through short stories and critiques the ways they have been ignored, exploited, fetishized by mainstream Indian society and institutions. Many see Tribal Indians as an underrepresented minority group in India, Indian tribals view themselves as continually outcast by government programs. In many cases sent to jail without cause, unable to obtain property of government work visas. This is a view Devi shares, she writes that tribals are “suffering spectators of the India that is traveling towards the twenty first century” (Imaginary Maps xi). Many tribal groups today live illegally on land they have been moved into from their original villages in order to make way for the industrial era of India. Many are thrown into jail for unknown reasons in these new settlements or survive off of illegal alcohol production, for lack of legal employment opportunities.

To combat the many forms of discrimination these tribals face from other Indians and even local government institutions, like the local police force, Mahasweta Devi (Devi) translates their stories and folklore into outspoken literature.

Her Bengali-language stories have continued to inspire social movements throughout India. Born in Dhaka, East Bengal (Bangladesh CE), Devi completed her higher educational studies in India. Although not from a poverty stricken, lower caste background, her stories mainly target misrepresented groups and social issues in Northern Indian states such as Bihar. As critical interventionist in the affairs of tribals, her vast accomplishments span literary, and social awards, short story collections and many novels.

In one of her more of her popular translated works, Imaginary Maps, a collection of three short stories, Devi’s shows the various roles of village society and the exploitation faced by many inhabitants as well as the portrayal of national government regulations as secondary to village “kings” and money lender stipulations on prices of goods and services. In “The Hunt,” a strong-willed female goes against societal norms and across ethical boundaries to protect her tribe from outside influences. Her bold actions, protect her tribe and preserve the traditions the outside world cared nothing for, they only wanted to use tribal resources for easy profits until there was nothing left. Devi shows trust is something that has never been earned among Tribal groups from their governments who constantly value land and resources they reside on more than their own human well-being.

In Duoloti the Bountiful, Devi makes the point that institutional frameworks such as a government census are incomprehensible to many of those they are intended to record and benefit:

“You’ll write my age? Write, write, maybe ten, maybe twenty, eh? What? I have grandchildren, I can’t have so few years? How old are people when they have grandchildren? Fifty, sixty? No, no how can I be sixty? I have heard that our brave master is fifty. I am Ghasi by caste, and poor. How can I have more age than he? The master has more land, more money, everything more than me. How can he have less age? No, sir, write ten or twenty.

The 1961 census took place in this way.”

Psychographics and demographics blend into a single form of categorization, making a process such as voting no simple feat in this rural town. Devi’s work is thus able to convey many themes found throughout her literature of oppression, exploitation misunderstanding in a single paragraph. Simply collecting the analytical data of a nation’s people may give predictive trends for the future, but can these forecasts predict their actual impact on the individual? Their needs? Not when

72 Laura Brueck Lectures, Subversive Indo-Pakistani Literature Course
73 Multiple editions of her work have been translated into English by Spivak
75 Douloti the Bountiful, (33)
the foundation of data collection, poverty indexes and surveys are reliant on creating concrete factors like age in an abstract world where the concept itself of age is determined not by years, but life experiences. It is no wonder the ‘modernised’ world of India and the Indian government has experienced many roadblocks in the path of development for all of its citizens. This makes believing a concept like Aadhaar, giving everyone a set identification number, and set amount of cash transfer based on their predicted needs hard to visualize with accuracy. Devi’s creative literature in this way represents a more realistic approach than statistical data to the lives and views of the needs of underrepresented and poverty stricken classes in India. 

Devi and renowned early twentieth century Hindi litterateur Premchand both find an inherent need to represent these exploited castes and tribes. This internal compulsion to bridge the worlds of differences in outcast groups with the wealthy elite and literate classes of India can be directly seen in Devi’s interviews and a speech by Premchand at a literary awards banquet.

“I think a creative writer should have a social conscience. I have a duty towards society. Yet I don’t really know why I do these things. The sense of duty is an obsession. I must remain accountable to myself” (Devi)⁷⁶. Her work revolves around her duty to speak out for the underrepresented people of India, much like the internal struggle Premchand expressed, “A litterateur or an artist is, by nature progressive... he always feels dissatisfied with the present mental and social conditions. He wants to end these disgusting conditions so that the world becomes a better place to live and die in.”⁷⁷ As a writer both Premchand and Devi rely on their compulsion to represent the struggle of outcaste and ignored Indian throughout their careers. While neither are necessarily apart of a down trodden or oppressed group within India, they are some of the first to give a voice to these groups in India and connect outside readers with the “lived experiences” of their hardships.

Premchand also draws greatly on the Indian path of dharma or duty. As one of the four main goals of Hindu texts, Premchand depicts the transformation dharma can undergo within the differing frameworks of society. We can see this concept of duty play out and questioned in a scene between the main character Hori and his son Gobar, “Well God created us all equal.”/”That’s not so son, God creates great or small, wealth is a reward for penance and devotion”⁷⁸ Hori continually follows his duty to society at all costs, and further pushes himself and family into debt ridden poverty throughout Premchand’s novel Godaan. Someone like Hori is still a highly relevant individual as a customer of the Aadhaar program and shows the perpetual acceptance of corruptive behavior within Indian society. It’s the honest hard working and even those just trying to survive off of a systems which continually hold these inequitable corruptive systems in place. If Aadhaar shows citizens they are valued equally among one another, people may just start to believe it. Dharma on a national level, can be seen as a parallel to nationalism, a powerful belief that has inspired revolutionary change throughout the world.

Hori’s son on the other hand continually questions if your primary duty should be to society or to yourself, through his father he sees the corruption and manipulation as merely a ploy to exploit the poor and lower castes by the rich, not each man’s moral path of life. Showing a need for programs like Aadhaar to break corruptive and inefficient systems for future generations looking to escape from the bondage many find themselves facing in village societies. However when we look at Aadhaar’s policies such as cash transfers and purchasing schemes, these changes to not seem to directly support social change, only changes in overall systems that cut costs. If cash-transfers are to work, panchayat and village politics will need to be regulated and coincide with changes in income, and avoid these government funds landing directly back into the hands of moneylenders and village land owners.

Premchand did not grow up as a low-caste poverty stricken individual, but he did encounter and question this continued theme of duty. Orphaned by 14, married by 15 and supporting his

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⁷⁷ Godaan, v

⁷⁸ Godaan, 31
Premchand continually sought out literature and eventually moved into a career of education and writing. Today he is known as one of the greatest Hindi writers of all time, and one of the first to express issues of caste, nationalism, and ultimately dharma versus basic human ethics within his early 20th century works. He strove to represent the theme of nationalism Aadhaar conveys, yet began with the lowest, outcast society members, not the politically powerful who are continually represented as overly corrupt and weak within his literature.

Premchand shows the somewhat revolutionary breakage of societal norms through realistic representations of everyday life in India. Through the perspective of individuals of every level of caste and socio-economic background in a rural India, Premchand shows breaks in the logic of continued duty to the village society and how each role is interrelated to one another. In one instance, lower caste poor males gather to be chosen for work and the weak, older, unskilled workers have still not been chosen. A man unknown to them walks up and proclaims he will hire them all for an above average wage for the day, they proceed to go with him only to find he will be paying them not for hard back-breaking labor, but to play kabadi-kabadi\(^{79}\). They are baffled as to why anyone would pay for them, old men, to play a children’s game. They show up for this work and enthusiastically play without outward question. On the other end their new employer has been promoting this unique match up for weeks to the upper caste and well to do for weeks—and raking in major cash. Showing exploitation from our perspective shows its transformation into new definitions depending on your socio-economic level. How can a system fight ‘corruption’ for the rural populations of India if they themselves do not see a current practice as corrupt?

In another scene Rai Sahib, the county land manager (Zamindar), shows how he is completely dependent on the exploitation and welfare of the poor, “Don’t try to tell me you’re the only one taking up the sword on behalf of the peasants. My fortunes rise and fall with the peasants.”\(^{80}\) When systems like Aadhaar come into play, and aim to create a sense of equality among the traditionalism of rural village and the modernizing worlds they will be in direct competition with these powerful landowners who have extorted their control over hierarchical village life and problems are bound to arise. One of the main issues will be corruption, and how to limit the opportunities for it to occur. Not only are there huge logistical errors with a cash transfer scheme, major amounts of continued corruption and budget cuts but there is also the simple challenge of systems like Aadhaar establishing a relationship with the people it is trying to connect. The biggest barrier to entering rural areas in India and throughout the world is a lack of infrastructure resulting in high administrative costs just to reach people. Aadhaar will bridge gaps between modern societies and old systems which have been operating in much the same way for hundreds of years. In order for this to have the desired effect, it will be imperative to follow Ambedkar, an outspoken voice for Dalits and author of the Indian constitution’s words, political and social progress cannot occur without one another.\(^{81}\) Before Aadhaar can connect each system in a single database it must first connect Indians on a social level, a feat Premchand and Devi have spent their entire careers trying to accomplish.

**ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS?**

Micropayments and microfinance have become a huge worldwide trend. Aadhaar is looking beyond the scope of basic identification to combat corruption and highly inflated loan programs. Not only will Aadhaar initiatives focus on distributing direct cash transfer subsidies to individuals based on need, it will also give every Aadhaar recipient access to a bank account. Participating banks have been pre-approved by Aadhaar and will be

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\(^{79}\) Indian playground game somewhat like the American version of tag.  

\(^{80}\) Godaan, 214  

\(^{81}\) Annihilation of Caste is reprinted from: Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1.
accessed through India’s growing cellular network. Microfinance initiatives are highly expensive.

Currently India has implemented a 26% loan interest rate ceiling to avoid high profits from microfinance programs. However microfinance is extremely expensive to operate and in order to have sustainable institutions CGAAP has also initiated their own formulas for calculating fair loan costs and product offerings. While this paper will not go into depth on this issue, Aadhaar initiatives will greatly help to lower loan operation costs and allow for microfinance institutions (MFIs) to access rural areas, yet still remain independent of unsustainable and limited subsidy funding.83

IN CONCLUSION

Late one evening a few months ago, a friend and finance consultant was visiting Boulder and we began discussing the future of Aadhaar. Problems mentioned above besides, hypothetically there is an Indian future with the majority of citizens are handed accurate ID cards which are now connecting each citizen to the banking industry. But how will this work? Who will prevent monopolistic megabanks from eliminating higher-interest savings rates and how will these banks be able to provide value interest on these small scale, expensive savings accounts if everyone has one. The government through cash transfers will be supplying most of this money creating an even more complex interconnected web, going way beyond reserve ratio requirements. International investments and trade may become even more vital to India’s growing market as a result, but may also aid in the growing income gap Aadhaar, cash transfers, microfinance and the government are “saying” they would like to circumvent. Add continued corruption to the mix and it’s easy to see why the cycle of village life, poverty and hierarchical acceptance is merely a cheap wheel to regard with concern, yet keep turning. Writers will be imperative to representing these under acknowledged groups within India and expressing an alternate voice of the people beyond the developed world.

Instead of fighting poverty cycles in India and throughout the world with macro- issues with a hopeful trickle down effect, it’s time we use technology, literary resources and directly serve the needs of those government programs aim help.84

“do the best you can until you know better and when you know better, do better.”85

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82 Cell phone programs are highly successful in Africa and have been for years (more so than developed nations)

83 From the world bank and other major organizations

84 Polak, Paul

85 Angelou, Maya. ““Do the Best You Can until You Know Better. Then When You Know Better, Do Better.”.” Goodreads.


Poverty Traps Chart prepared by Bruce Paton, Assistant Professor at San Francisco State University, based on S.C. Smith, Ending Global Poverty: A Guide to What Works, Chapter 1.


A Marketing Plan:  
Crest Oral Care Products in Rural Indian Markets  
RACHEL YOUNG  

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Introduction  
Crest is one of the leading manufacturers of oral hygiene products in America and is one of the most trusted producers of consumer goods. Founded in 1955 by Proctor & Gamble, Crest sells a variety of toothbrushes, toothpastes, mouthwashes, flosses, and tooth whitening kits. The growth of internationalization has led to Crest's interest in entering foreign markets, and so the following marketing plan has been developed for rural India.  

Cultural Analysis  
This cultural analysis reveals some important trends and customs which will affect the strategy Crest uses when entering rural Indian markets. The rural population of India is expanding, and along with this expansion individuals are seeing increased income rates. Having more money allows families to participate in the recent consumerism trend brought by large companies to rural markets. This new-found spending has created customers who are willing and eager to try new products, but trust plays an important role in brand selection and the creation of loyalty in rural markets. Once rural consumers have found a brand or product that they trust in, they become fiercely loyal.  

Consumption habits in rural India have some negative effects on the mouth and dentition. The use of betel nut, paan, bidis, tobacco, and tea (each explained later), all produce staining on the teeth and increase the likelihood of developing oral cancers, tooth decay, and other diseases of the mouth. Good oral hygiene has not thoroughly penetrated rural India, and so it is to the advantage of all involved (Crest, rural villagers, and local governments) for Crest to sponsor educational programs in schools, at festivals, at sports competitions, and other venues, to teach proper use of our products as well as the benefits they provide.  

New road systems and the growth of the telecommunications sector in rural India have made reaching these consumers easier and more viable for foreign companies like Crest. In the state of Uttar Pradesh, ownership of phones, computers with internet capabilities, and televisions is spreading awareness of products and brands.  

Women are the primary buyers for households in rural India, and so Crest should target some of our marketing campaign at this sector by developing methods of promotion and distribution which align with the daily lifestyles of rural women. Possible venues for selling our products include haats, video vans, local schools, kirana stores, and door-to-door salespeople such as the women involved in the Project Shakti campaign. Each of these will be explained in more detail later.  

Competitive Analysis  
Crest's two main competitors in rural India are Colgate and Hindustan Lever. Both have been in the rural marketplace for many years and have developed trusted relationships with the locals. Colgate runs a program in south India called Jagruti, which focuses on teaching proper oral care practices to rural populations. Hindustan Lever sponsors a program called Project Shakti, where rural women are empowered to become entrepreneurs and earn their own money selling Fast Moving Consumer Goods.  

Due to the nature of oral care products being fairly homogeneous, both of Crest's competitors follow a similar pricing strategy; selling small portions of their toothpaste for very low prices, followed by several different size and price options to fit the budget and lifestyles of a variety of customers.  

Marketing Plan  
Crest will target individuals living in rural Uttar Pradesh who speak Hindi and practice Hinduism. Since women do most of the purchasing for the household, our distribution plan will work to fit in
with their lifestyles, for example by bringing the products to the home through the use of door-to-door salespeople. Our pricing strategy will fit with almost any budget, as each of our products, be it toothpaste, toothbrushes, mouthwash, or floss, will be packaged and priced to fit with the market and the buying power of both the poor and the middle class.

Crest will market our products as a preventative measure for fighting the negative effects of orally consumed stimulants such as betel nut, tobacco, and bidis. Awareness of the damage these items can do to one’s teeth will be spread through pictures of mouths from individuals who brush regularly, compared with those of non-brushers and users of the aforementioned substances. Crest will also work with local governments to make educational presentations in schools and at other venues to teach the public about our products and the positive benefits they can add to one’s life.

**CULTURAL ANALYSIS**

**Geographical Setting**

The nation of India is the seventh largest country in the world and the second largest country in Asia. Located on the southern side of the Asian continent, India shares its borders with eight nations including Pakistan, China, Tibet, and Nepal. The vast size of India provides for a land of many climates and environments, and a large portion of the nation is still undeveloped, as much of the natural geography of the country makes road-building and other infrastructure projects expensive and difficult to perform. The wide variation in weather patterns and levels of development across India heavily influences marketing decisions as Crest will need to find feasible ways to transport our products to rural customers, as well as innovate packaging which can withstand the process of moving to the consumer and hold up against natural elements such as the yearly monsoon.

India is such a large nation that for Crest’s marketing plan we chose to focus on the state of Uttar Pradesh, which runs along the northern border with Nepal. The fourth largest state in India, Uttar Pradesh is roughly the size of England, and has running through its center the holy river Ganga, also known as the Ganges.

**Population and Demographics**

A July 2012 estimate calculated the Indian population at 1,205,073,612 people, making it the second largest population in the world after China, and the growth rate is estimated at 1.312%. In 2011, 31.16% of the population lived in urban areas, with a massive 68.84%, or 833 million people, living in rural areas. For the sake of the 2011 census, the Indian government defined urban as “All places with a municipality, corporation, cantonment board or notified town area committee, etc.” The census report further defines urban areas as having a minimum population of 5,000 people, at least 75% of the male workers engaged in non-agricultural pursuits, and a density of population of at least 400 per square kilometer. Rural areas are described as any area not fitting the description of an urban area.

According to the 2011 census, growth in the rural population has been steadily declining, due to many villagers moving to larger cities or immigrating to other countries in order to find new jobs and earn more money. The expansion of urban areas out into regions once classified as rural also may have an effect on the statistics of declining rural populations. Yet despite the decreased growth rate in rural areas, the rural population continues to expand at a rate 12.18%. Therefore, the rural population offers a sizable market for the sale of oral care products, and our company can rely on the continued growth of this population segment into the future.

The influence and importance of the caste system in India cannot be understated. The concept of castes is difficult to truly understand for individuals who don’t belong to the culture, and it is a practice with many, many layers and unwritten rules for day-to-day conduct. Although it was officially banned by the Protection of Civil Rights Act of 1976, many areas of India still continue its practice. Caste tends to play a larger role in the daily interactions of rural Indians than in urban dwellers, due to the less modernized lifestyles of the countryside and because caste is easier to determine in small populations that have lived together for generations.
The prevalence of caste prejudices and the underlying role they play in the everyday lives of rural Indians will have an impact upon Crest entering into these markets, and our company should focus to understand and work with this social structure. For example, entrepreneurs who belong to the 'Scheduled Classes', also known as the Dalits or Untouchables, will probably have a difficult time trying to sell their goods to members of other classes.

Another issue could involve the traditional codes of conduct for each rank of society- namely that our company should consider the expectations and requirements for different classes, since these will vary in the acceptance level of particular activities associated with work and socialization. "...the leading of a 'dharmic' life require[s] the so-called caste Hindu to work continually to maintain personal and collective purity."7 Dharma refers to one's duty or way of life associated with the "code of morality, worship, [and] conduct prescribed for a caste..."8 A study done in 2010 showed that "...community ties influence the types of business behavior in a controlled setting in India..."9 This is important because Crest cannot expect to encounter the same arrangement of individuals by social status in each area we try to enter, and so our company will have to adjust to the system village by village in order to mesh well with the customs and the local population.

The rural population of Uttar Pradesh is the largest in India, with 81%, or 155.11 million individuals, living outside of urban centers.10 The state has 112,804 villages, and is one of the most densely populated states in India, with 473 people per square kilometer as compared to a national average of 274 per square kilometer.11 Hence Uttar Pradesh, with its large rural population, is an excellent choice for developing Crest's rural marketing plan, with the intent to eventually extend our products into other rural areas of India.

Religion
The dominant religions in India are Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, and Christianity, and much of the population is devoutly spiritual. "Religion provides a cosmology to its adherents, a way of coming to terms with the dilemmas of existence."12 In many rural communities, beliefs about the causes of ailments being linked to evil spirits are still prevalent.13 Exorcisms are often routinely performed to relieve the afflictions of village members, sometimes en masse or on other occasions on an individual basis. Hence rural populations who Crest hopes to market to may need to be taught about the scientific background to the company's products and why oral hygiene is beneficial to one's health and can help prevent medical problems.

In Uttar Pradesh, 86% of the population, or roughly 134 million individuals, practices Hinduism, while another 20%, or 30.7 million people, practices Islam. All other religions practiced within Uttar Pradesh, namely Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Jainism, among others, each have fewer than 1 million followers within the state.14

Since Hinduism is the dominant religion in India, and especially in Uttar Pradesh, it's important to look more deeply at its teachings to determine if our products or practices conflict in any way with the faith. Hinduism teaches a form of vegetarianism, where followers refrain from eating meat, poultry, fish, and eggs. Fortunately, our products do not in any way conflict with this strict diet, and Hinduism does not have any teachings against the use of medicines or other health care practices where products may be ingested (since toothpaste can be accidentally swallowed by the user from time to time).

Further research may be needed to determine if there are any undiscovered issues relating to Hinduism and the growth of the commodities market in India. Since religion is heavily stratified by location through the subcontinent, each locality may have a different set of beliefs and customs that must be considered when entering the market. For example, family values represent a strong foundation for the Hindu faith, and while some individuals may conclude that by purchasing and using products such as toothbrushes and toothpaste they are helping their family to be healthier, others may interpret the growth in consumerism as a step away from renunciation as it is taught in the Hindu scripture of the Bhagavad Gita. Religion is such a deep and personal aspect of a person’s life that it is truly difficult to determine how each being will react to a given situation, such as the introduction of new products and daily routines like the brushing of one’s teeth.
Languages
The dominant languages of India are Hindi and English, and the government officially recognizes 16 other languages. In rural populations, language is determined by location, but each area may also have developed its own dialect within the mother language group. An estimated 136.7 million rural Indians speak at least two different languages, a result of mixing groups of people living near enough to each other to trade and interact. Despite Hindi’s recognition as the official State language of India, the use of Hindi can lead to negative feelings in some states. Over 100 million Indians speak English, outnumbering all of the English speakers in Western Europe. In rural marketing, many labels use English for the brand name, thus Crest can keep its traditional logo upon entering into India. The official language of Uttar Pradesh is Hindi as well.

Daily Life and Lifestyles
India is such a large and diverse country that lifestyles vary widely across the nation. A study performed on a village in Uttar Pradesh followed the daily lifecycles of both men and women. Women typically wake between 4 and 5 a.m., make tea for the family, and then spend the majority of the day cleaning the house, doing any shopping, cooking, tending to the fields, and serving tea to the men. Indian women are typically the first to wake up in the morning and the last member of the household to go to bed at night. “It is they who have to run the house, make the food stores last for the requisite time, and keep control over the produce of all livestock.” As per this same study, men typically wake between 5 and 6 a.m. whereupon they have a morning glass of tea before leaving for work. When men return from work, many of them enjoy taking a break to drink tea and smoke tobacco.

Popular items to consume daily include tea for all family members and tobacco for men. The Uttar Pradesh study found that “In between meals tea, tobacco and fruits of the season may be consumed by those that wish to do so.” Further, “Hemp and hemp resin are smoked in bowls by a majority of the men.” The 2011 Indian Census found that, within Uttar Pradesh, 22.5% of the rural population (36.6% of males and 8.2% of females) chews tobacco on either a regular (at least once per day) or occasional basis. Smokers in Uttar Pradesh make up 13.8% of the rural population (24.7% of males and 2.7% of females). Tea is also often sweetened with sugar. These consumption habits can produce negative effects on the mouth and dentition, due to the chemical components of tobacco, tea, and sugar. For this reason, Crest’s entrance into Uttar Pradesh can provide the people with a beneficial option for fighting the results of sustained use of substances which can, over time, cause teeth to become infected, rot away, or fall out all together.

There are several products, namely betel nut, paan, and bidi cigarettes, commonly consumed in rural India which have a negative effect on the mouth, and so will need to be addressed in our message to consumers on the importance of oral care. A 2012 study done in the Uttar Pradesh city of Mainpuri reported that 82% of the male population and 21% of the female population consumed tobacco products regularly. Of this percent, 41% of men smoked, 21% chewed or applied the tobacco, and 20% used mixed forms. For the women, 11% smoked, 9% chewed or applied, and 1% mixed. When compared back against populations from other similar-sized areas in India, male tobacco usage in Mainpuri was second only to that in Trivandrum, Kerala, at 83%. Rural areas report even higher levels of tobacco use than their urban counterparts, often with consumption being at least two to five times as much. Oral cancer rates are also high due to prolonged use of these oral stimulants, with 60% of reported cancer cases in India being of the mouth. This represents an opportunity for Crest to market ourselves around this high level of tobacco use, and develop product placement for fighting the negative effects it can cause on the mouth.

Betel nut, also known as areca nut, is the fruit of the areca palm and can be consumed either by itself (as supari) or a powdered form of the nut can be mixed with a variety of ingredients, including tobacco, betel leaves, and lime, to make a betel quid or paan. Betel quids are then placed in the mouth between the cheek and gums, and for several hours will provide a stimulant to the user. By holding the paan in the mouth for an extended time period, users actually expose themselves to greater damage from the product by giving it more
time to eat away at the dentition. Use of betel nut with tobacco is the most popular form of consumption by far. In several studies done throughout India on supari and paan consumption, it was found that betel nut users were anywhere from 20 to 60% more likely to consume forms with tobacco included than without.27

"In populations resident in south and East Asia the use of areca nut is strongly interwoven into local art and craft, folklore, social customs, religious practices and cultural rituals."28 As the consumption of betel nut is a common and accepted part of society which individuals rely on to give them the energy to make it through a busy day, Crest and the Indian government cannot expect to be able to eliminate the use of this product. Thus, by working together through programs designed to teach villagers about the damage betel nut can do, but also the preventative measures daily oral care can provide, we can help to spread awareness of the negative aspects of using this product, as well as take advantage of rural consumers’ new knowledge to sell them our toothcare merchandise.

Bidis are a form of unfiltered cigarette also popular across India. "The cured flakes and dust of dark tobacco leaves are hand-rolled in dried tendu leaves (a broad-leafed plant native to India) and tied at both ends with colorful thread."29 Bidis are often flavored with such tastes as chocolate, vanilla, mango, clove, and menthol, making them popular with younger individuals, which influences smoking habits from an early age. A recent study in Mumbai has shown that bidis are actually more harmful to the human body than filtered cigarettes, as bidi smokers are 42% more likely to develop oral cancers than their regular cigarette smoking counterparts.30 Once again, bidi consumption is an accepted and routine part of daily life for many Indians, and so can offer Crest another opportunity to teach good oral health care practices to rural populations in order to combat the negative effects of prolonged use.

**ECONOMY**

Since the early 1990s, India has been moving towards an open-market economy. A 2011 estimate calculated India’s Gross Domestic Product as US $4.421 trillion (in terms of purchasing power parity), with per capita GDP at $3,700.31 As of 2010, an estimated 29.8% of the population lived below the poverty line, both in rural and urban areas.

According to India’s Store Wars, close to 500 million people have just begun earning enough money to break free of the poverty line. The author goes on to state that "...a sustained urban household consumption growth rate could lead to 6.3 million new non-farm jobs in rural areas and US$91 billion in real rural household income over the next decade."32 This prediction is based on a study done by Roopa Purushothaman of India’s rapidly changing consumption and production patterns. As stated earlier in the section on population and demographics, nearly 69% of India’s population is rural. Purushothaman avers that rural India’s economy is growing at a faster rate than that of urban areas, and that "...rural-urban inequality has turned around since 2000, and the spending gap between rural and urban India is starting to converge."33 This is positive news for Crest, suggesting that rural populations
can afford our products and will be seeking out goods which can further benefit their lives.

The National Council on Applied Economic Research reports the breakdown of rural income as of 2010 as follows: 96 million households are ‘deprived’, with annual household income of less than 90,000 rupees, 46 million households are ‘aspirers’, with annual income of between 90,000-200,000 rupees, 8 million households are ‘seekers’, with income between 200,000-500,000 rupees, followed by 1.5 million ‘strivers’ with 500,000-1 million rupees, 830,000 ‘rich’ with 1-10 million rupees, and 16,000 ‘super-rich’ with annual household incomes of more than 10 million rupees. Research also suggests that “…India’s total retail market could be worth about US$615 billion by 2013…”, of which rural consumers are predicted to spend about 52.5%, or around US$315 billion, mostly through non-organized outlets.

These statistics suggest that a significant portion of the population can afford to spend a few rupees per month on oral care products such as toothpaste. However, a significant portion of the rural population may first need to be reached with messages on the importance of oral hygiene. Since the vast majority of rural individuals are only just recently earning enough to purchase goods beyond what they need to survive, many will be unfamiliar with the value of dental care products and their typical use. Thus Crest should consider sponsoring educational programs throughout our target regions to teach consumers about the benefits of oral care.

Currency Strength
As of late November 2012, the Indian rupees stood at Rs55.448 for US$1 in international currency exchange markets. There has been a historical weakening of the rupee against the US dollar, since one dollar will now buy more rupees than it did several years ago. However, according to forecasts.org, the rupee is expected to hold fairly steady on into 2013, with a slight weakening of 0.662 around February, followed by slim growth to an exchange rate of Rs 55.1 for US$1. For rural populations, this means that for at least the next year, each rupee will buy roughly the same amount of goods as it does today. For Crest, the exchange rate will stay fairly stable, meaning that our company should not have to be concerned with rapidly fluctuating rupee values and the uncertainty in profits associated with unsteady exchange rates.

Income Statistics
In rural India, income is primarily earned through agricultural activities, trades and crafts such as masonry, tailoring, and carpentry, and the performance of rituals. A study done on a village in Uttar Pradesh found that many rural inhabitants earn their livelihoods through farming, although “Most of agricultural produce is kept for self consumption.” Depending on the monsoon and other weather conditions for the year, this village’s residents earned anywhere from 20-50% or more of their income through agriculture. Another study conducted on several different villages in Uttar Pradesh found that “Agriculture is the main source of living for nearly 90 per cent [sic] of the people in all these villages.”

Non-agricultural trades in rural India have begun to pick up speed and are now, according to a study done by Future Capital Research, driving at least half of the rural economy.

Yet despite the recent growth in rural markets, the 2007 India Economic Summit reported that “…836 million Indians, covering both the rural and urban poor, live on less than 20 rupees…a day and a huge number of those live on less than nine rupees a day.” These numbers are important for any company attempting to gain access to these markets, as a very large portion of the population cannot afford to spend large amounts on sundries and other Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCGs). Fast Moving Consumer Goods are defined as “frequently purchased essential or non-essential goods such as food, toiletries, soft drinks,
disposable diapers.” FMCGs are also usually fairly inexpensive and tend to have a fast turnover rate on store shelves. Further studies conducted by India’s National Council of Applied Economic Research suggest that only 20.8% of the population is actually poor.

In Uttar Pradesh, generally husbands and other male members of the household are the main breadwinners, with 72.2% of rural men participating in some form of work from the age of 15 on. Women on the other hand have a work rate of only 6.1%. For Crest, these statistics mean that men will often be away from the home working, while most of the women are doing household chores. Hence women may be an attractive target market for our company since they are running errands for the family and may have free time during the day to take part in programs designed to teach them about oral health.

Despite the varying reports on the economic condition of rural Indians, Crest must keep in mind that much of our target market is still only just above the poverty line, and so the company should strive to provide our products at the lowest price possible while still turning a profit. By producing goods which fit within the budget of the vast majority of rural Indians, we can reach a larger portion of the population with less expensive goods, thus selling more at a lower price, which in turn can lead to increased profits. Our marketing plan should focus on making money through quantity sold, not high prices, which will benefit both the company and the customers who will have access to our oral care products.

**Political System**

India’s government is a federal republic with 28 states and seven union territories. Its constitution states that the nation is a “sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic.” Due to its democratic structure and movement towards a free-market economy, India is aligning itself with the capitalistic interests of other large nations such as the United States, thus making business easier to carry out between the two countries.

On a more localized level, the panchayat system is one of the oldest forms of government on the subcontinent. Also known as panchayat raj, the term translates to a “government gathering of five”, referring to a group of the community’s respected elders who come together as a council of sorts to aid in disagreement resolution as well as, more recently, handle the day-to-day administration of the village. The panchayat raj system could be quite useful for Crest as an inroad into rural markets, and in fact may be a necessary part of our market plan, as we could utilize their knowledge of the peoples and customs to develop a customized strategy for each area. Crest can also work through these local governments to teach the villagers about proper dental care practices, by means such as giving presentations in schools, holding sports competitions, or giving road-side demonstrations.

**COMMUNICATION**

**Infrastructure**

Rural Indian markets are often difficult to reach due to low levels of infrastructure and the vastness of the subcontinent. Most villages do not have access to either airplanes or trains. In 2000, India’s Prime Minister announced the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) program which had a goal of connecting all rural areas with more than 100 people with all-weather roads by 2007. However, the project is still on-going today, and as of 2005, Uttar Pradesh had only increased its rural connectivity by 10% from the 50% infrastructure the state had in 2000 when the program began. Unfortunately, the Indian Government is staying fairly hushed-up on the matter of the PMGSY’s progress, and so more up-to-date statistics were unavailable without permission.

**Telephones**

According to the CIA World Factbook, there are 32.7 million landline telephones and 893.9 million cellular telephones in use in India as of November 2012. Overall ‘teledensity’ in India is around 75%, with urban being 100% saturated and rural areas growing in the number of installed telephone lines. In 1994, mobile cell phone service was first introduced to the nation, and with the recent addition of a massive satellite system, India has expanded its telecommunications capabilities to become one of the fastest growing telecom markets in the world. In Uttar Pradesh, households using either landlines or mobile phones were reported in
the 2011 Census at 64.8%, with 61% of households relying solely on cell phones.50

**Broadcast Media**
According to Doordarshan, as of 2011, 28.5% of rural households have a TV, which equates to roughly 379,000 households.51 Doordarshan is one of the largest public service broadcast television channels in India and has historically had a bias towards rural programming. However, recent trends show that “...farmer-targeted television advertising has stepped out of Doordarshan and is appearing on other nationally broadcasted channels now.”52 Many international companies are taking advantage of television advertising in rural markets, viewing the opportunity as a way to introduce new products and build brand familiarity. However, since the number of households with televisions is still so low, it may not be profitable for Crest to advertise through this medium. As for Uttar Pradesh, 22.2% of rural households own a television, while only 0.9% have access to cable and satellite.53

**Internet**
Internet use has been growing at an astounding rate across India, and rural consumers too are able to access the Web via mobile phones as well as computers. The Internet and Mobile Association of India reports that there are 31 million active users of the Web in rural India, and "Entertainment is the primary driver of internet use in rural India."54 Internet use is also predicted to continue growing in both rural and urban areas, so Crest should consider utilizing this tool and creating a website aimed at rural consumers, one which can operate both on home computers and on mobile devices.55 The 2011 Census reported that Uttar Pradesh had close to 33 thousand households with internet.56 However, because many individuals can also access the internet over their mobile devices, internet penetration in Uttar Pradesh is actually much higher.

**Availability and Impact of Media**
The 2011 Census reported that within the state of Uttar Pradesh, rural possession of a computer either with or without an Internet connection stood at 5.3%, while 64.8% of rural households had either a telephone or mobile phone.57 When viewed based on the percentages this appears to be a low number, but when we take into consideration the sheer size of the Indian rural marketplace, we then see that around 8 million people own a computer, which is a sizeable segment of the population. For Crest, this and the preceding data on the growth of the communications market suggests that our company would profit from creating advertising campaigns which are technology based. However, there remains a large portion of the population that will not be reached through these methods, and so Crest must utilize other forms of promotion in order to meet other customers.

We should consider developing a website for individuals to have access to information about proper use of our products and their benefits, and also to relevant data concerning our efforts marketing oral care products to rural consumers. The availability of telephones provide Crest with the opportunity to stay in contact with members of the community through which we sell our products as well as spread dental hygiene facts, rather than needing to send representatives into the field every time the company needs to communicate with our partners. It also allows for rural customers with phones which can access the internet to visit the aforementioned Crest Indian website and obtain information about our company and products.

Due to the inconsistent availability of technology in rural India, Crest must examine and consider several other options for both spreading word about our products as well as selling goods to consumers. One choice is the use of *haats*, or village marketplaces. These bazaars usually occur weekly, and a wide variety of goods can be purchased through the local entrepreneurs who set up shop at each. With over 43,000 *haats* in India, they represent an excellent opportunity to meet the consumers on their own ground and introduce them to our products with visual aids, free samples, and salespeople who can explain how to use our merchandise.58 Additionally, “Most (98%) rural folk are regular visitors at *haats*, with women accounting for two of every five *haat* visitors, making *haats* a fertile ground for any big bang communication aimed at rural consumers.”59

*Haats* have recently been heavily targeted by large companies hoping to break into the rural market,
therefore Crest will need to offer a unique and memorable experience to shoppers in order to cut through other advertising clutter and remain in the minds of consumers.

A second option for spreading our message and goods is through the use of van operations, where large vans equipped with television monitors, computers with internet access, and sample products drive around to rural villages. At each village the vans will open up panels and doors to create a mobile-information center, where customers can watch videos, look at our website, play games from Crest, and learn about our products, as well as purchase any of our merchandise. These vans can be a fun way to spread the word about good oral care and the goods we offer. Crest must remember to cooperate with local officials for the purpose of gaining permission to set up temporary locations with our vans.

A fantastic venue to advertise and promote Crest products is at local schools. By working with and through educational facilities, Crest can bring the message of proper dental hygiene to children in a learning setting, thus giving impact to the material. Crest should work to develop a program for rural schools where representatives come in, give a brief presentation to the children about oral care and Crest’s products, and then engage the kids in a series of fun activities designed to promote learning as well as give them something fun to tell their families about taking care of their teeth. With children as our messengers bringing home news of these products and their benefits, adults too will learn about the existence of and medical reasoning behind Crest’s merchandise.

Channels of Distribution
Multiple forms of distribution are available within India and Uttar Pradesh, including hub and spoke, affinity groups, syndicated distribution, Haat activation, mobile traders, and use of marketing cooperatives. The three most appropriate channels of distribution for Crest are hub and spoke, affinity groups, and Haat activation. Hub and spoke refers to a central distribution center from which goods travel out through ‘spokes’ to the consumer, so Crest would need to set up warehouses in larger towns and then find ways to deliver our products down the line to smaller villages, such as by deliverymen with bicycles.

Affinity groups are utilized by, for example, Hindustan Lever did by approaching groups which met to discuss how to save money and empowering the women therein to become entrepreneurs and earn their own income. So Crest could follow a similar pattern and approach groups like those concerned with improving health in rural populations to create a program where we work through those groups to reach our customers.

Haat activation is a newer concept which is growing in popularity and is an exciting new tool for businesses. Using this channel, branded companies enter into village marketplaces and ‘activate’ brand recognition in rural consumers by catching the attention of the locals. For Crest, we could consider putting on performances, giving away free samples of our products, or any number of other activities which would help our brand and our message to stick in the minds of villagers.

Kirana are small, often family-owned shops which sell a variety of goods ranging from food to health care products to other daily staples, rather like a small grocery or convenience store. These stores provide a very close and personal experience for the shopper, as the owner of the shop will generally help out with much of the purchase, either by fetching items for the customer or providing his or her own opinion on the goods being sold. Due to the level of influence such shopkeepers have over the promotion of the products they carry, it is important for companies like Crest to strive to build a firm and trustworthy relationship with store owners. By doing this, our company can rely on positive and reliable information about our products reaching the consumer through a source they know and trust, namely the shopkeeper.

Door-to-door salesmen and saleswomen are another popular distribution method in India. Project Shakti, explained in more detail under Hindustan Lever below, utilizes rural women to sell products both door-to-door and in their own shops. This channel offers the chance for women who are home doing chores to get their shopping done without having to leave the house, as well as gives them the personal opinions of the
salesperson as to which products are best. Crest could use door-to-door salespeople to reach out-of-the-way homes and customers who perhaps cannot leave their houses, as well as busy women who are home all day and don’t have time to leave to shop. The word-of-mouth generated through this channel is also beneficial to a company new to enter the market, and can be a great way to introduce Crest’s products to consumers already inundated by large companies attempting to build brand loyalty.

A kirana in India

Indian Oral Care Additional Information

For thousands of years Indians have been cleaning their teeth through the use of ash, salt, branches of the neem tree, twigs, and even tobacco. These ingredients are often rubbed or, in the case of sticks, brushed on the teeth to scrape off excess material, and then spat out, to varying results. The neem tree is a marvelous exception, as it contains natural antimicrobial and antifungal properties. Typical use involves chewing on the end of a neem branch until it is frayed, like a paintbrush, and then scrubbing the teeth, much as is done with a toothbrush. Due to the multiple benefits the neem tree provides, disagreements over patents on the plant as well as an interest from foreign companies in incorporating the tree into their products has led to a recent battle for rights to this precious product. Please refer to Appendix A for a more in-depth look at the neem tree controversy.

As per a 2011 study on India’s oral care industry, only 15% of Indians brush their teeth twice per day, and per capita consumption of oral care products is only 127 grams (compared to 300 in Europe and 255-304 in Asia). “Various sporadic studies have shown that there is a rising level of dental diseases in India...The two most prevalent diseases are dental caries and periodontal diseases, followed by malocclusion and oral cancers.” This growth in dental issues is probably a result of the influx of Western foods and desserts full of sugar.

The Dental Council of India found in a 2004 study that by age five, dental caries are experienced in 50% of children, followed by 61.4% for individuals fifteen years old, and by the time one reaches 35-44 years of age, the likelihood of dental caries reaches 79.2%. The same study also found that 29.3% of Indians 65-74 are toothless, a condition known as Edentulousness. Unfortunately, rural penetration of oral care products is one-third that of urban India, leaving a good deal of room for companies to enter the rural market and introduce their products, as well as influence the above statistics with better oral health care practices.

Examples of poor dental care

COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS

Competitors and Competitors’ Products

Crest has two main competitors for market share of oral care products in rural India, namely Colgate Palmolive and Hindustan Lever. Both follow a different form of market strategy for rural areas, which will be discussed in more detail below.

Colgate Palmolive

The Colgate brand of oral care products is sold through the Colgate Palmolive Company, which has had a presence in India since the 1920s but has seen its greatest growth in the years following 1976. The company markets not only oral care products, but also several other types of Fast Moving Consumer Goods, such as body wash, liquid hand soaps, and dish washing paste.

Colgate markets several different oral care products in India, under either of two categories:
‘Oral Care’ or ‘From the Dentist’, the latter being more treatment-based than the first. Colgate offers eleven different toothpastes, eight toothbrush models, a toothpowder, two whitening products, a mouthwash, and several other products for fighting gingivitis, sensitivity, and mouth ulcers.

Sold in both urban and rural markets, Colgate has adopted several different product strategies to meet with varying demand across the subcontinent. For example, Colgate offers a 10 gram sachet of toothpowder for Rs 1.50, as well as several other packet sizes at varying price points, all to appeal to different levels of spending consumers can afford. Along these same lines, Colgate also offers 15 gram toothpaste packets for Rs 3, 35 gram Dental Cream packets for Rs 10, and toothbrushes that come with 30 grams of toothpaste for Rs 8.50. This last product, the combination brush and paste, has become one of the fastest moving products in rural markets, and has seen a high response rate, thereby drawing in new customers and creating familiarity with the Colgate brand. Colgate also developed its toothpowder specifically for rural Indian markets, where much of the market for the product is located.

In 2001, the company launched Colgate Jagruti, a program designed to educate rural populations about oral care practices and products. The program focuses mainly on the south of India, working with populations of less than 2000 individuals. Colgate closely monitors the viability of each district within its Jagruti program, in an effort to distinguish profitable markets from unprofitable ones.

**Hindustan Lever**

Hindustan Lever, which is itself a subsidiary of Unilever, is Colgate’s largest competitor in India. Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Company was first registered in 1931, followed by the registration of Lever Brothers India Limited in 1933. In 1956 the two companies merged with United Traders as Hindustan Lever Limited. When India began to open up its markets in the 1990s, Hindustan Lever was suddenly forced to compete with foreign as well as local companies, and so the FMCG giant was forced to seek new markets and unique selling practices in order to continue profit growth. This search led them to consider rural markets as a viable group of consumers.

Hindustan Lever's products for oral care are Pepsodent and Closeup. Pepsodent, also sold under the name Mentadent, was introduced to Indian markets in 1993 and offers a variety of toothbrushes and toothpastes. Closeup was India’s first gel toothpaste, and the company has utilized celebrity endorsers to spread awareness of the product. As of 2011, Hindustan Lever held 30% of the market, between both the toothpaste and toothbrush categories.

Hindustan Lever follows a similar packaging and pricing strategy as Colgate, with small, single-serve packets being sold for just a few rupees. Pepsodent is offered in 20 gram packets for Rs 5, 40 gram packets for Rs 10, 80 gram packets for Rs 20, and 175 grams for Rs 40.

In 2002, Hindustan Lever launched a new initiative, Project Shakti, through which the company sells its products. Project Shakti involved a new marketing scheme where representatives from Hindustan Lever approached rural women who belonged to self-help groups and asked if they would be interested in becoming micro-entrepreneurs and selling the company's...
products. Since many of the self-help groups involved finding ways for women to save or earn more money, as well as make loans to other women in the group, Project Shakti has found many willing participants. Each woman is given training in how to run a small business, such as bookkeeping practices and commercial knowledge, and then she is given the choice to either work with Project Shakti as a distributor or set up her own business. For those who decided to start their own business, they can find funding through their self-help groups or get a loan through microfinance banks Hindustan Lever has established.78

The impact of the Project Shakti movement has been incredible. New sources of income are now available to poorer families and for single women, and products from around the world are making their way into rural markets. The communities in which Project Shakti operates have grown and benefitted from the influx of money and goods. Sharat Dhall, the head of the project, said in 2005, “Shakti is a quintessential win-win initiative... It is a sales and distribution initiative that delivers growth, a communication initiative that builds brands, a micro-enterprise initiative that creates livelihoods, a social initiative that improves the standard of life and catalyzes affluence in rural India.”79

MARKETING PLAN

Target Market

Upon entering the Indian marketplace, Crest’s ideal goal is to reach all individuals within the country who do not already practice proper oral hygiene. However, for the purpose of this study and penetration of the rural Indian marketplace, Crest’s target market developed through the cultural analysis above focuses on the 155.11 rural-dwelling Indians in the state of Uttar Pradesh.80 We will further break down our target market by Hindu practicing and Hindi speaking, with a push to reach all members of the family with our message.

Men and women are both involved in the purchase decision making process, but women are primarily the household members who make the actual purchase, so we can adjust our distribution and promotion strategy to better fit the places and times when women will be shopping. Since only 6.1% of rural women work a regular job, much of their time is spent taking care of the home, which could influence our distribution system towards door-to-door selling.81

Children will also play an important part in this process because they bring home knowledge learned in school, a practice which Crest can take advantage of to teach children and, through them, other members of the household about proper oral care. Users of betel nut, paan, bidis, tobacco, and tea will also be targeted with messages about Crest’s capacity as a preventative tool for future oral issues caused by regular consumption of these items.

Income plays a role in our target market, but not to the same extent as is the norm, since we have developed a pricing and packaging strategy which accounts for the low spending power of the majority of rural Indians. Any household which is capable of spending at least a few rupees per month will be able to afford our products.

As for television, phone, and internet access, these will all play a role in getting our message to the consumer, but does not constitute a parameter for our target market. Crest will benefit from the ability to reach these individuals with advertising and further information, however, the capacity to access any one of these three communications networks will not directly affect the purchasing power of this population.

Product

Crest is an established brand with a large selection of products available to the consumer, including toothbrushes, toothpastes, mouthwashes, floss, and tooth whitening kits. Our products are trustworthy and capable of providing the customer with fresh breath, healthy teeth and gums, and the prevention of future oral diseases. For the purpose of entering rural Indian markets, Crest should start by promoting all of our products save for tooth whitening kits, since rural consumers do not for the most part have the income to afford these products. However, once Crest has established itself in the marketplace, we can then consider introducing tooth whitening products to the aforementioned customers who do indeed have earnings to afford as well as the aspirations to try out products designed to whiten teeth.
Crest absolutely must not assume that simply because we are operating in rural markets consumers will only be interested in and able to afford small portions of our products at a time. As mentioned earlier, the level of rural purchasing power has dramatically increased in the past ten years, and is predicted to continue to grow, with villagers finding new sources of income as more and more companies move into these regions. As per the National Council on Applied Economic Research, 10.4 billion rural households are already earning an annual income of over Rs 200,000 (or roughly $3,700), leaving them with some extra money to spend on novelties and other non-essential goods. These individuals have shown a trend towards being more interested in purchasing higher-end personal care products, such as the ones their urban counterparts use. They will also possibly prefer to buy larger supplies, like a small, medium, or large tube of toothpaste rather than a single-use packet, since they have the income to afford a larger purchase at one time. Therefore, Crest must consider entering the market not only with smaller sachets of our products, but also with the full size versions. We will need to first complete a much more in-depth analysis of each population in order to determine which villages will respond best to each different type of product.

Crest already produces toothpaste packets and tubes in the sizes most suitable for entering a rural market, namely 10 and 15 ounce single-serve or double-serve packets, 25 gram so called “travel” tubes, and 3, 4, and 6 ounce full tubes. Each of these should appeal to a different portion of the population based on income, shopping habits, brushing habits, and personal preference. Of Crest’s many toothpaste options, classic Crest Cavity Protection Toothpaste is the suggested leader to enter the market with, which can then be followed by our other toothpaste lines. The key is to establish Crest as brand within rural markets with a basic line of products that will please consumers and entice them back to make repurchases as well as try our other available merchandise.

Crest also offers many different styles of toothbrushes. Once again, it is best for our company to enter the market with a strong leader, so the Oral-B CrossAction Pro-Health Toothbrush is an excellent choice for this task. With its flashy design and vibrant colors, plus the multiple benefits offered by the gum stimulators and tongue cleaner, this brush is sure to catch the eye of consumers.

As for mouthwash and floss, Crest’s Pro-Health Multi-Protection Rinse fights plaque and gingivitis, and kills 99% of oral germs, thus leaving the breath fresher. Crest can sell one liter bottles of our mouthwash, which will appeal to families who will share the bottle, as well as 36 milliliter bottles, for individuals or households with a smaller budget. The Oral-B Glide Pro-Health Deep Clean Floss helps fights gingivitis and contains a micro textured surface area to aid in collecting bits of material stuck between the teeth. Floss can be sold in its typical four meter package, as families can take advantage of sharing the product, and it can also be sold in single-use packets of 18 inches.
Crest should start by marketing its already existing products to rural Indian markets. However, the Indian marketplace and palate is different from that in America, and so our company should consider innovation of new products as an important aspect of operating in rural India. Colgate has introduced Colgate Activ Salt, a toothpaste which has a “dash of salt” added to appeal to rural consumers who traditionally used salt to clean their teeth. Products like this help to bridge the gap between accepted and time-honored habits with new technology and medical practices.

If Crest wants to consider creating new products for rural India, our company should look at traditional products used to clean teeth, like ash, salt, and neem tree branches (please refer to Appendix A). Incorporation of any one of these items into a new brand of toothpaste or toothpowder could aid in taking marketshare from Colgate and our other competitors in India, although it will require a hefty advertising and promotion campaign to introduce an entirely new product. Thus Crest should focus on selling its current products, and only after we have established brand trust and loyalty in India can we consider expanding our product base.

Product Strategy
To differentiate our company from the competition, Crest should focus on dental hygiene in relation to tobacco and betel nut use. None of our competitors have campaigns aimed at this growing issue, and so Crest can make headway into these new markets by placing our products as a preventative measure for future oral diseases caused by the consumption of chewing products. Our packaging and displays should reflect this message, by utilizing Hindi and perhaps graphics to notify the customer as to the benefits of the product.

Crest should also look into festivals, sports competitions, school events, and any other situation in which people gather together, so that our company may set up speakers and presentations to teach the public about our products. Visual aids combined with audio tend to remain in the minds of consumers longer than either one by itself, therefore if Crest develops a colorful and eye-catching presentation paired with intriguing aural accompaniment, our ability to catch and maintain the attention of the public at these events will be much greater.

Since many individuals will be unfamiliar with oral care products, it is important for Crest to provide an outlet for questions and further information our customers will need about our products. The first step is to make sure that each member in our supply chain and distribution channel has proper facts about oral hygiene, and that they understand the product well enough to pass this knowledge on to the consumer. This will require a form of education program in which Crest thoroughly explains and provides further training to each shop keeper or other vendor of our merchandise before they even sell their first toothbrush. Crest will also need to periodically send representatives back to each shop in order to refresh the material in the minds of our distributors as well as provide them with any further learning or training they can use to help the customer.

The internet is also a great channel for reaching our customers with information about Crest’s products. Although internet penetration is not extremely high in rural India, there is still a significant portion of the population that has access in one way or another to the Web. By creating a user-friendly website with easy-to-understand instructions paired with graphics (for those who are illiterate or poor at reading), Crest can provide further answers to those with questions about our products.

Throughout all of our marketing activities, Crest needs to implement a system through which to gauge the response and acceptance rate, purchasing power level, and viability of each area in which we operate. This will be necessary in order to determine which of our activities are successful and which should be reconsidered and restructured, or done away with all together.
Promotional Strategy
There are multiple different promotional tools which Crest can mix together to reach our target market. One of the main recommendations is that throughout all forms of promotion which our company utilizes, we should always seek to tie in our signature blue and red label, both by placing our logo on all displays and products, as well as by using the color combination to spark brand recognition in the minds of consumers. In these rural markets, it’s also very important to notify and remind customers of the trustworthy nature of our products and company, and so Crest should utilize any opportunity to let our target market know of our good standing in foreign markets as well as the beneficial nature of our products, which will over time aid in building trust between our customers and our company.

Along similar lines, Crest should consider developing a short, catchy song in Hindi which will then be played by our vans, in our commercials, on our website, and possibly even on small store displays. The song should be fun while at the same time remind customers of how to use the product and the benefits it will bring. An example of such a tune might translate to something like: “Brush twice per day brush brush brush to keep your sparkly whites for life. Crest will help you with minty paste to win this fight fight fight.”

Due to the nature of our promotion, namely the positioning of Crest’s products as tools for preventing dental diseases caused by consumption of orally ingested stimulants, we recommend that our advertisements and displays feature pictures of the healthy mouths of Crest users compared to mouths which don’t receive regular brushings and mouths negatively affected by betel nut, paan, bidi, tobacco, and tea use, so that consumers will have a better visual idea of the benefits of using our products. Whether these graphics are featured on the small displays at a kirana, in a school at a Crest presentation, or on the side of one of our vans, they will catch the attention of the population and spread our message of Crest as a preventative measure for combating these issues.

For direct promotion, Crest should develop a website aimed at rural Uttar Pradesh villagers who speak Hindi. For the 33 thousand rural households in the state which have access to the internet, on top of the 61% of rural Uttar Pradesh households which own a mobile phone and presumably can surf the Web on these devices, a website will offer the opportunity to further explore our brand, our goal in India, and the use of our products. Design of the website should incorporate bright, fun graphics paired with flashy wording to grab the visual attention of users. In order to draw more traffic into our website, Crest can also offer games, ways to compare our products with those of our competitors, and other fun options for guests visiting the site. Another additional option could be to develop a system where website visitors can locate the nearest Crest retailer to their location.

Television commercials are another option for Crest. Since Hindi Cinema, better known as Bollywood, is such a popular phenomenon within India, Crest should consider approaching famous stars to represent the company, both in commercials as well as in other forms of promotion like on displays and on our website. For example, Pepsodent has paired with the famous actor Shahrukh Khan to endorse children and fathers spending time brushing together. Since Crest if focusing on fighting the effects of betel nut, bidi, and tobacco use, we could adopt a similar strategy where our company is represented by a star who promotes our message. If possible, Crest might even be able to work some product placement into films which feature our spokesperson, or create short educational videos to be played in theaters in between movie showings.

As discussed earlier, video vans are another great way to reach rural populations on the go, and their collection of televisions, computers with internet access, and personalized assistance by the van operator can be adjusted to fit the needs of each village we enter. These vans will be utilized as both a tool to spread information and awareness of Crest’s products, as well as a mobile store where customers can purchase our merchandise.

Crest’s message would greatly benefit from working through local schools to teach children about proper oral care, as well as the negative effects of oral stimulants on the teeth and gums. Children will absorb this information faster than adults, which will play a part in developing their lifestyle habits over the years. Children also bring home the things they have learned and share their knowledge with family members, thus spreading
our message further along household lines. Crest should set up presentations in schools to teach children about our products and how to properly use them, while utilizing over-sized models of teeth and toothbrushes to demonstrate. Games and other fun activities will aid in driving home the lessons we hope to spread, and little competitions such as to see how many people the kids can spread the message to can prompt children to tell others about what they've learned. Crest can donate free toothbrushes and small amounts of toothpaste to these events so that children can earn a prize for winning the competition and try out the products firsthand.

**Distribution**

Like Project Shakti, it appears to be profitable for Crest to work along similar lines to empower rural entrepreneurs to open their own shops and earn money by selling our product. Yet unlike Colgate and Hindustan Lever, Crest does not have the budget nor the vast product lines to facilitate setting up these businesses by ourself. Instead, we suggest that Crest work to utilize both existing shops, like those started under Project Shakti but not associated with the Hindustan Lever company, as well as local governments, to spread not only our products into the vast rural marketplace, but also the proper knowledge on how each product works, how to use them, and the importance of dental hygiene.

Under Project Shakti, as mentioned earlier, rural women were given training on running their own business and then given the choice to work either as a partner with Hindustan Lever or to open their own shops and sell multiple different brands. Crest, then, can approach these unaffiliated women to see if any are interested in carrying our products. We will provide the shops with eye-catching displays, training for the owners on our products, and offer to add their shop to our online database which will compile all locations where rural customers can find Crest merchandise.

One concern with utilizing different women to sell our products to other townspeople deals with caste, as discussed earlier. A way to avoid any conflict or discord among these markets is to approach women from multiple different caste backgrounds who already have shops, and rely on their knowledge of the local area and customs as the best tool for avoiding such tensions. Since castes usually associate with similar castes, Crest will still need to study just how many possible consumers are in the area for each woman, but we can also rely on the positive results of the Project Shakti program and the successes these entrepreneurial ladies have already seen.

A hub and spoke distribution channel will be used to move the goods from our warehouses in larger districts down the line to small shops. Crest can help bring more money into local areas by hiring individuals from poorer families as transports for carrying small shipments of our products to each private store or other sales location. In order to maintain fluidity and organization of these deliveries, Crest will need to utilize mobile phone services to provide each delivery person with a cell phone, so that our company may stay in contact with them. Furthermore, Crest will also need to decide whether to solely hire delivery people who already own their own vehicles, be it cars, bikes, motorcycles, or any relatively speedy form of transportation, or if the company will also hire those without vehicles and then provide them with scooters.

Since Crest is focusing on being an ethically responsible company and aiding in both the oral health and economic prosperity of the regions we enter, the suggestion then is to hire both individuals who own their own forms of transportation as well as those who do not. By opting for this strategy, our company can show the people of the areas we operate in that Crest is concerned with making a positive difference in the lives of our customers, and that we are willing to pay more to purchase motorbikes for our employees to use so that underprivileged families can find a new source of income through our programs. Local governments too should look upon this favorably, as the earning power for their region will increase with the growth of the job market.

**Kirana** are one of the most important outlets for selling our products in rural markets. There are three key advantages to utilizing kirana stores. Firstly, local shopkeepers have the loyalty and trust of their neighbors, and so can help in the establishment of familiarity between our company and our customers. Secondly, these salespeople
heavily influence the shopping experience and purchase decision-making process of their customers by introducing new products and explaining their features and application, which will aid in spreading information about the proper use of Crest's products. Lastly, shopkeepers aid in brand promotion by “talking up” brands they prefer, which would give Crest an extra boost of promotion in rural markets.

The main issue will be to prove to the shopkeepers how trustworthy and beneficial our brand is both for them and the consumer. Crest will have to send representatives to each kirana in order to market our products to the owner and convince them that selling our merchandise will not only bring them profits, but also please their customers and bring return business. Another important point will be to teach the shopkeepers about the proper use and beneficial properties of Crest’s products, in respect to both regular oral care as well as the prevention of future dental diseases brought on by use of betel nut, bidis, and other orally ingested stimulants.

Vans equipped with televisions, computers, and displays of our products are another distribution choice of which Crest should take advantage. These vehicles are wonderful for reaching populations quickly and without much effort, as the entire shop can be packed up and moved in a moment’s notice. Vans also provide a great educational opportunity as Crest can display videos of our products and their proper use on the televisions, allow access to our website and other learning programs on the computers, and rely on the van operator to provide further information to customers.

Lastly, haats offer a multi-pronged opportunity for Crest to not only sell our products through these weekly marketplaces, but also the spread knowledge about our company and merchandise and thus build a trusting relationship between our consumers and the corporation. Crest should consider putting on mini performances at haats which entertain the villagers while at the same time provide them with information about product use and benefits. This exposure on a regular basis will help to cement our brand into the mind of the consumer, and should also increase the word-of-mouth promotion relied on so heavily by rural customers.

**Pricing Strategy**

Due to the rural nature of our target market, many of our customers cannot afford to make high denomination purchases. Hence it is very important that prices be kept low enough for individuals and households to have the funds to obtain the oral care products they need to keep their teeth healthy, while at the same time earning a profit for our company. Crest must also make sure to price competitively against Colgate and Hindustan Lever, so as to garner some of their marketshare.

A common practice for new companies entering a market is to copy what the competition is doing pricewise. For Crest this is a good option, because both of our largest competitors have roughly the same pricing strategy as each other, and since our products are by nature rather homogenous commodities, it is difficult for customers to differentiate between them. If we choose to offer our products at a lower price than our competition, we may be able to lure customers from them based solely on price. However, because the rural Indian marketplace is based on loyalty to brands the consumer is familiar with and trusts, and villagers tend to remain fiercely loyal to a product once they have come to rely on it, Crest cannot enter the market assuming that customers will switch over from Colgate or Hindustan Lever without any incentive. Our company, then, should price along the same guidelines as the competition and seek to obtain new customers though our outreach programs and advertising and promotion campaigns, as discussed above.

The price breakdown then should start with small single-serve packets of toothpaste starting at 10 grams for Rs 1.5 (a little less than 2 cents), followed by a larger packet of 15 grams for Rs 2.5. The next size up will be the same as what is sold in America as travel-sized toothpaste tubes, which will be 25 grams for Rs 4. Larger tubes will also be available, starting at 3 ounces (roughly 85 grams) for Rs 12, followed by a 4 ounce at Rs 16, and our largest size of 6 ounces for Rs 25. Crest should not consider introducing any other sizes into the market until we have established our brand as trustworthy among rural consumers.

For the Oral-B CrossAction Pro-Health Toothbrush, Crest should price it at around Rs 18, as this price fits well with that of our competitor's
toothbrushes. The Pro-Health Multi-Protection Rinse mouthwash comes in several sizes, and will be priced accordingly: the 36 milliliter bottle will sell for Rs 6 and the one liter bottle will sell for Rs 55. Our Oral-B Glide Pro-Health Deep Clean Floss will be priced at Rs 15 for four meters of floss and Rs 4 for five single-serve 18-inch floss packets. These are priced to meet the competition as well as fit in with the budgets of households who can only afford to spend a few rupees per month on oral care products.

Crest’s profits per tube or packet sold after taking out fixed costs and variable costs will only be a very small percentage of the selling price. However, as opposed to here in the US where markup plays an important role in the pricing structure due to a requirement for making a small gross profit off of each item, in rural Indian markets our focus will be on selling vast quantities of our products and therefore earning a profit off of the large amount sold rather than high prices. This constitutes a better strategy for entering rural markets, and is supported by the data found through our cultural analysis.

Cooperation with the Government
Crest’s goal of spreading awareness of our products, their proper use, and the benefits they can provide makes the option of working closely with local and national governments a win-win situation for all involved. The government can benefit from a decrease in medical incidents related to oral care, while our company makes profits and the local populations have healthier dentition. Due to our positioning as a preventative tool against diseases caused by oral stimulant consumption, Crest should be able to get the attention and support of local leaders in promoting our brand. Through this pairing, Crest can set up presentations at schools, at village fairs and festivals, and at any other appropriate venue, so as to teach the population about good oral hygiene and which products are available on the market.

The panchayat is the main system of government Crest should pair up with in this venture. Our company will need to send representatives to each local council to present our business plan to them. We must be sure to reiterate that Crest is not looking for donations but rather we will provide all of the materials, people, and free products needed to spread our company’s message to each village. Crest is new to the Indian market, and so is looking for guidance and advice on what methods of reaching the population are most practical. Cooperating with local governments also ensures that Crest will have built an important relationship within each market which can be relied on for further assistance in developing proper programs and marketing campaigns for the future introduction of new products.

It is also important that Crest collaborate with the national government of India, as it is their laws and policies which our foreign company must obey when operating within the nation’s borders. However, due to the vast size of such an administrative body, it is unreasonable for Crest to assume that we can develop as close a relationship with the national government as we can with the panchayat. Our best option, then, is to cooperate with the Indian government and gather advice from them when we can, but otherwise rely on the local councils for the majority of partnerships.

A final option is to approach NGOs and other human development groups in hopes of pairing with them to spread our message and products throughout rural India. This offers a great way to get volunteers to help us teach proper oral hygiene in schools and at other venues, without requiring Crest to spend all of the profits we’ve earned. By all means, Crest wants to help our customers live healthy lives and provide them with the tools and knowledge to do so, but first and foremost we are a for-profit company and must earn positive revenues if we are to continue to operate in India.

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Swinging for the Kaki: Major League Baseball and Japan

JONATHAN CAMPBELL

On a midsummer evening, two crowds of baseball fans begin to gather, separated by an ocean. The rubber game of the series is about to begin. One crowd files into AT&T Park, navigating past vendors selling hot dogs, peanuts, and Bud Light. The breeze off the bay is cool and refreshing in the summer. Thousands of miles away, the other crowd enters Koshien Stadium. To combat the sticky heat, they carry foldable fans and wash down zarusoba noodles with cold Asahi beer. In this age of modern global consumerism, the Giants can play the Tigers in Kobe and San Francisco on the same night. That is to say, the Yomiuri Giants and Hanshin Tigers of Nihon Professional Baseball can face off on the same night as the San Francisco Giants and Detroit Tigers of Major League Baseball.

Watching from afar, the mechanics of both games will look the same. The bases are 90 feet apart in both ballparks. Each team gets three outs per inning, and there are nine players on both fields. The fans at both games will be immensely passionate. Even the uniforms will look similar; both Giants teams wear black and orange, and both Tigers teams sport blue and white. But a closer look at what is happening will reveal major differences between the American style of baseball and the Japanese style. The language is different, the play is different, the organizations are different and the entire culture surrounding both games is different. When it comes to baseball, Japan and the United States are an ocean apart in both the literal and the figurative sense.

Japan and the U.S. have a long baseball history together. The Japanese first encountered modern sports like baseball in the late 19th century, during the Meiji Restoration (Kusaka 20). In an aim to learn the conventions of the Western world, the Meiji government sent Japan’s brightest minds out to study the militaries, economies, infrastructures, and educational systems of the world’s most industrialized nations. The government also called for foreign academics from the West, called oyatoi, to come to Japan as educators and consultants (Diplomatic History 642). It was only natural for the American teachers to bring their favorite sport along with them. Ever since, baseball has played an important role in perpetuating a link between the two nations.

Baseball historian Joseph A. Reaves describes Japan as the “unquestioned powerhouse and paladin of baseball” in Asia, the hub through which the game has entered the rest of the continent (2). Baseball in China, Taiwan, and Korea is based off of the Japanese style of baseball, which has spread through both trade and invasion. Reaves further explains, “a baseball game in Kwangju looks and feels more like a game in Kamakura than one in Kansas City” (6). This Asian baseball, wholly based on the Japanized style, deviates dramatically from its American origins. The approach to nearly every aspect of the game is different. Japanese baseball reflects the ethics and values of Japanese society --- it implements major tenets of Asian philosophy and religion that were never a factor when baseball was developed in the United States, like Buddhism, Shintoism, and Confucianism (Reaves 8). There is a greater emphasis on discipline and duty to the team over duty to the self. Sacrifice and supreme effort are everything. The Japanese are proud of their version of baseball in the same way that Americans are proud of their national pastime. Both styles of baseball are so internalized to their respective cultures that when they meet, they tend to clash.

There are innumerable reasons for the less than synergistic dynamics that have long existed between American and Japanese baseball. The earliest evidence that Japanese baseball would be subservient to its American counterpart came from the oyatoi who consulted the Meiji government as they began to pursue their own industrialization for the first time (Diplomatic History 642). While working in Japan, they established private clubs like the Yokohama Country Athletic Club and brought their national pastime with them. No Japanese were allowed to play at or even enter the private clubs (Reaves 50). The American visitors immediately established that they were superior to their hosts. The game of baseball was instead
spread to Japan through the students who learned from the oyatoi. The Japanese learned baseball together, forging the beginnings of the unified team spirit that still proliferates Japanese baseball.

All early baseball competition in Japan was organized around schools, rather than clubs. This elite school baseball was the norm for Japan for a long time, and professional competition took far longer to emerge (Kusaka 22). When it comes to professional ball, the relationship has also been historically dominated by Major League Baseball’s agenda. As Alan Klein notes in his book Growing the Game: The Globalization of Major League Baseball, "MLB clearly has the authority to press its agenda in international dealings" (164). The Japanized version of baseball still struggles with the Japanese tradition of protectionism, constantly strong-armed and coerced by Major League Baseball in one way or another.

Both Japan and the United States continued playing and watching professional baseball throughout the “dark valley” of international relations in the 1930s and 1940s, and into the new age of “transpacific baseball business” that still exists today (Transpacific 141, 228). Nihon Professional Baseball was organized in 1938. As Japan grew into more of an industrial world power, professional baseball became a major spectator sport. Railroad companies started professional teams and built the ballparks along their railroads as a means to attract more ridership (Kelly 25). This is still the basic structure of NPB today. Each team is set up as a subsidiary of a larger ownership corporation. The teams are utilized as a marketing tool for their parent companies, and very rarely turn a profit. In a sense, every professional player in the history of NPB can be thought of as a company employee, no different from the average Japanese salary man.

World War II was another major event in shaping the identities of both Japanese and American baseball, as the two most prominent members of the “nationally unbounded community” of baseball found themselves fighting on opposite sides (Transpacific 6). There were professional ballplayers in both the Japanese and the American military. Both sides used baseball as a tool to boost morale and foster national pride, meaning the two baseball ideologies had to grow farther apart. Japanese baseball language changed. The Japanese switched from using sutoraiku ("strike") and boru ("ball"), to using yoshi ("okay") and dame ("no good") in their games. For the first time, they began to call the game yakyu, or “field ball” instead of besuboru (Reaves 78). The United States Department of War provided baseball equipment to American soldiers, encouraged them to play, and kept them up to date on what was going on with Major League Baseball back at home. The owners of the MLB franchises made financial contributions to the war effort (Transpacific 184). The extended period of time that Japanese and American baseball spent apart helped to further solidify each ideology as an independent entity. Each side now saw baseball as their sport.

After Japan’s defeat in the war, the two versions of baseball came back together again. General Douglas MacArthur allowed baseballs to be categorized as an emergency priority item, helping to ensure that the occupied Japanese always had an adequate supply to play with. The thought was to encourage the Japanese population to choose Western sports over traditional Japanese sports like kendo and judo, and to help emphasize the importance of the “democratic citizenry” that they would face once Japan was rebuilt (Transpacific 202). Nearly everything about Japan was about to change, from the government, to infrastructures, to the economy.

The American occupation of Japan officially ended 1952 with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In the same year, MLB and NPB struck an agreement to have Japanese players begin visiting MLB Spring Training camps (Transpacific 228). The reformed Japanese economy surpassed pre-war levels in 1955. Increases in disposable incomes and consumerism helped in reaffirming baseball’s status as a major spectator sport for Japan (Nakayama 61). Players were finally moving back and forth between Japan and the United States again. The business of baseball was growing like never before, but the American way was soon prove to reign supreme again.

The first professional Japanese player to wear an MLB uniform was Masanori Murakami, a relief pitcher who the Nankai Hawks sold to the San Francisco Giants in 1964. As Robert Whiting recounts, the consensus across NPB before the 1990’s was that Japanese players would never approach the talent level of American Major
Leaguers (*Samurai* 104). The Hawks thought that Murakami would never succeed in San Francisco, so they could just use him to make some quick money off of a rich MLB team. When the Giants called Murakami up to the Major League club in September, though, he was a very effective reliever. A good pitcher is a hard commodity to come by in any era and style of baseball, so it was only natural that the Hawks wanted Murakami back under their control for the 1965 season. As has been the case time and time again throughout the history of U.S.-Japan baseball relations, the Hawks and NPB league offices had neither the resources nor the legal expertise necessary to compete with Major League Baseball. They could not win.

When the Hawks claimed control over Murakami’s contract and demanded that the Giants return him for 1965, MLB commissioner Ford Frick called for the Pittsburgh Pirates to cancel their scheduled tour of Japan, effectively cutting off all MLB dealings with Japan until a decision could be reached on Murakami (*Samurai* 78). There was a long standoff, which Alan Klein calls the “baseball equivalent of the Cold War” (132). The Nihon Pro Baseball league offices could do nothing but try and reach a compromise, which is what ultimately transpired. The San Francisco Giants were allowed to retain Murakami’s services for 1965, but also agreed to send Murakami back to Japan after the season. This whole ordeal help to set a long-standing precedent; NPB teams would not allow their athletes to leave and play in the United States.

Until the official creation of the NPB Posting System in the 1990s, player movement between MLB and NPB remained an entirely one-way transaction. Player contracts in Japan restrict a player’s rights far more than in the United States, making it almost impossible for Japanese players to leave the league. The advent of true free agency in Major League Baseball in 1975 wrested a great deal of power out of the hands of team owners, and player salaries have increased ever since. In the case of NPB, the corporate owners of each team still hold power over their players. The Japanese Player’s Association was not legally allowed to go on strike until 1985, and free agency did not arise in Japan until 1993 (*Samurai* 88). NPB league rules also mandate that a player needs ten full years of first-squad service to file for free agency, as opposed to only six years in MLB. After filing for free agency, Japanese players are also only allowed to sign a contract that pays 150% of their previous annual salary (*Samurai* 88-93). The service time and salary rules leave most NPB free agents past their prime career years, and at a great economic disadvantage, such that many simply re-sign with their original team. These organizational differences have kept player wealth relatively low in Japan, certainly nowhere near the level of salary absurdity that abounds in Major League Baseball.

Because of the corporate nature of the owner-player relationship in Japan, there is also a greater sense of pride and honor that goes along with remaining with one’s team for an entire career. The same can be said about a select few MLB players, but it is extremely evident that since free agency was first implemented, self-interest, materialism, and wealth are the basic tenets of most MLB player behavior. Every year, newly eligible MLB players leave their old teams for more money, more playing time, or a better shot at winning. From the viewpoint of the MLB athlete, personal benefit is paramount.

Players who have made the switch from Major League Baseball to NPB have been met with lots of difficulty and controversy though, because of the innumerable socio-cultural divides between Japanese and American life, as well as the differences in play that they encountered. Foreign players are so alienated in Japanese professional baseball that they are not even truly referred to as foreigner. The Japanese word for foreigner, *gaijin*, is normally written 外人, or “outside person.” In the context of baseball, though, *gaijin* is written 彊人, which can be translated as “harmful person” (*Wa* 97). There are far fewer stories of success than stories of failure, making *gaijin* historically “unanimous in their dislike” of the Japanese baseball experience (*Wa* 97). As long as foreign players are regarded as a threat to the harmony of Japanese baseball, they will continue to face the same issues.

One prominent player who made the jump from Major League baseball to the Japanese leagues was Warren Cromartie, an outfielder and first baseman who joined the Yomiuri Giants in 1984. Cromartie’s six years patrolling center for the Giants are uniquely representative of the American Major Leaguer’s experience in Japan because he truly ran the gamut from hated
outside to bona fide star. In the beginning, Cromartie faced prejudice from nearly every angle — coaches, fellow players, baseball fans, and even the average Japanese citizen. He was hit by pitches, walked intentionally, and mistreated by league officials. But as time went on, Cromartie became used to living and playing professional baseball in Japan. He left NPB on top, as a validated Most Valuable Player award winner.

One of the main reasons that gaijin players like Warren Cromartie have had issues with teammates, coaches, and fans is their insistence on receiving special treatment. Few American players ever make an effort to learn the Japanese language, which only exacerbates these problems (Wa 137). Teammates who cannot communicate with each other are bound by the economic and cultural fraternity of professional baseball, but little else. The language gap can lead to problems with the media, as well. Numerous American players have complained of major discrepancies between what they meant to say in post-game interviews and what was relayed to the media. In the ongoing effort to protect both team and societal harmony, team-appointed translators often take it upon themselves to bend an athlete’s words to make them more culturally appropriate for Japanese. The Yomiuri Giants media coordinator once even apologized on behalf of Cromartie when he was hit by a pitch and got into a fistfight with the opposing pitcher (Cromartie 146).

The other main issue that has historically drawn ire from all of Japan is the level of pay that gaijin receive. During Cromartie’s time with Yomiuri, Japan was quickly growing into an economic threat to the United States. The overall foreign population in Japan tripled to 1.5 million, as Tokyo became the financial capital of the world (Samurai 121). Business was booming for most of the owner corporations, and gaijin were commanding salaries of over a million dollars by 1980. Conversely, about three-fourths of Japanese professional players were earning a salary worth less than fifty thousand dollars (Cromartie 83). Because of the corporate ownership structure in NPB, professional Japanese players can be thought of as company employees. The average Japanese worker was obviously bringing home much less money than either group, breeding a deep-seeded resentment against gaijin athletes amongst all strata of Japanese society.

Warren Cromartie had a decent career with Montreal, but found himself more than disappointed with the offers he received from San Francisco and Montreal in his first trip to free agency. The Tokyo Giants offered him the most for his services, so he made the difficult decision to leave his family and friends behind. Historically, Robert Whiting finds that NPB teams have recruited and signed former Major Leaguers based on their reputation as a player (Wa 224). The same was true for Cromartie, and the Giants immediately introduced him to the rabid Japanese baseball media as their “messiah” (Cromartie 1). Although Cromartie was a reliable middle-of-the-order hitter throughout his NPB career, the expectations from all of Japan were always beyond what he could meet.

Cromartie faced an extra level of cultural stigma in Japan for being not only gaijin, but also kokujin (“black person”). He found that the Japanese simply did not know what to expect from black players. During Cromartie’s time with the Giants, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said in a speech that the influx of blacks and Hispanics had lowered the overall intelligence of American society (Cromartie 129). Japanese culture, ever laced with elements of protectionism and isolationism, is hardly multicultural, let alone multiracial.

Cromartie’s predecessor, Reggie Smith, was the first chance the Yomiuri Giants took with a black player. Yomiuri signed Smith for the 1983 season for more than he had earned with the New York Yankees, plus three new cars, largely based on his performance during his prime MLB years (Wa 224). Smith immediately emerged as a threat to the complacency and normality of Giants baseball when he showed up for spring training sporting an Afro haircut and a mustache. Facial hair is still strictly against the Giants’ dress code. Whiting describes Smith’s introduction to his new team and home as yet “another crack in the temple of purity” that was professional Japanese baseball (Wa 178). Reggie Smith was certainly making no headway toward garnering the respect and acceptance he wanted from Japan.

By the time Cromartie arrived in Tokyo, Reggie Smith had grown sick of his situation with the
Giants. Ever the subject of scrutiny on the field and in the media, Smith lamented in an interview that his treatment was not his fault, and not the Giants’ fault, but instead, Japan’s fault on the whole (Wa 184). Cromartie was so troubled by Smith’s struggles with the media that he had a clause written into his own deal with the Giants that allowed him to speak openly to any media personnel he wanted. The Giants were happy to include these contract details though, as the Yomiuri Shimbun had enough media clout across Japan to effectively blacklist any reporters who would try talk to Cromartie and keep away them from the team (Wa 199). There was immediately a disconnect between the goals of the player and owners.

After the initial difficulties and cultural shock of uprooting and moving to Japan, Cromartie was eager to find some semblance of normalcy in preparing for his first season. Aside from his wife and children, Cromartie recalls that his “social life was almost zero” (25). Unfortunately for Cromartie, and nearly all gaijin alike, practicing and spending time with teammates proved to be nothing like it was at home. Most Giants players reported to Korakuen Stadium just after the New Year to start their “voluntary” training programs, which Cromartie describes as “excruciating stuff that didn’t have anything to do with baseball” (6). Infielders fielded hundreds of groundballs each day, outfielders chased down fly balls until they could barely stand, and every pitcher threw over 100 pitches per day. Whiting asserts that the main objective of practice in Japan is “maximum use of time and space” (Wa 324). Of course, while Cromartie practiced more than he ever would have as a Major Leaguer, the special treatment he got as a gaijin gave him the ability to shirk out of mandatory team practices when he wanted.

The Japanese insistence on over-practicing is grounded in a belief that practice is more essential to success than talent is. Granted, Japanese baseball players display tremendous mechanics and a built up “common cognition” for what to do in every possible situation on the field (Nishimura 148). Those instincts are helpful in making routine plays and getting base hits, but Cromartie found them to be pointless. Going by his notions of baseball practice, striving for perfection was a waste when even the best players would still fail 70 percent of the time (Cromartie 110). By the end of his second year with the Giants, Cromartie had been both fined and benched on several different occasions for unorthodox fielding, base running, or hitting. He found that the Giants coaches and fans were much quicker to forgive his Japanese teammates for their missteps (Cromartie 109). No matter how he performed normally, the slightest slip-up was a catastrophe.

With constant practice and the brutal humidity of the Japanese summer, Cromartie found most of his teammates driven past exhaustion by August, especially the pitchers. By forgoing a great deal of menial practice, Cromartie and other gaijin were able to conserve stamina and play better longer into each season (Cromartie 114). Prolonged performance was one of the reasons that Cromartie was continually offered more and more money to return to the Giants whenever his contract was up. He had a great year with the bat in 1986 and signed a new contract worth $3 million to stay two more years in Tokyo; the money was simply too good to pass up. The Giants’ investment worked out well, as Cromartie helped lead the team to the Central League pennant the following year (Cromartie 187).

No matter what kind of offense and defense Warren Cromartie produced, the Giants continually fell short of the illusive Japan Series title until 1989. Being a member of the Giants came with an enormous amount of pressure to win. It has been estimated that at least 60% of the Japanese populous considers themselves to be Giants fans. The franchise can be most closely compared to the New York Yankees in Major League Baseball, with an extensive history of championships and some of the best players to ever step onto a baseball field (Wa 161). Cromartie was sometimes followed home from the ballpark by paparazzi, eager female fans, and even Giants officials who wanted to keep an eye on his behavior outside of the ballpark (Cromartie 168). Most of Japanese society is so homogeneous that all gaijin, be they professional athletes or not, are regarded with a certain degree of novelty and curiosity. Being a Giant certainly amplified Cromartie’s struggles with the spotlight, but the impact that celebrity status has on gaijin in NPB cannot be denied.

The pressure for Cromartie and the Giants to win was probably greatest in 1988, as they
sanctified the Tokyo Dome, which is still home to the Giants and the NPB Hall of Fame to this day (Cromartie 192). From the moment that Japan’s economy surpassed pre-World War II in 1955, the main aim had been to dominate the world economy. Symbols of prosperity were becoming more valuable to Japan than symbols of freedom (Nakayama 61). The new Dome was a symbol of all the economic and industrial progress Japan had made up through the 1980s. The Giants threw a lavish banquet just before Opening Day, and required all the players to attend in formal wear, much to Cromartie’s chagrin (Cromartie 189). But for all the fanfare of opening the new stadium, it was glaringly apparent that more changes would be in order if the Giants failed to win. Legendary manager and former Giants player Sadaharu Oh was almost guaranteed to lose his job, and a new scrum with the Giants ownership had Cromartie once again threatening to leave at season’s end (Cromartie 207).

Cromartie had grown tired of the economics of NPB baseball, as he discovered that player contracts, including his own, did not contain any language regarding merchandising rights. The Giants were using his likeness and name in advertisements without his knowledge, and without providing any type of compensation (Cromartie 199). Cromartie felt used, and he still did not have any Japanese commercial offers of his own to fall back on. Commercial deals are much more common for native Japanese athletes than gaijin, though Cromartie did eventually sign his first commercial deal a few months into the season (Cromartie 218). Time shows that no matter what they do, it has always been much harder for gaijin to get ahead under the NPB system.

Other foreigners could relate well to Warren Cromartie’s experiences, so they often became friends. Two of Cromartie’s closer friends in Japan, Randy Bass and Dick Davis, were both run out of Japan in 1988. Bass left his team, the Hanshin Tigers, without permission to take care of his ailing son and was released two months later. Hanshin, like most Japanese companies, thought it was completely unacceptable for an employee to leave work without permission, regardless of the reason. Bass was released, and other NPB teams refused to sign him, effectively ending his baseball career (Cromartie 214). Dick Davis, another close friend of Cromartie’s, was arrested for possession of marijuana, interrogated for 20 straight days, and then deported. Members of the Japanese media went crazy, trying to use the story to claim that all gaijin were using illegal drugs (Cromartie 212). The fact that Davis was black only made the situation worse. Warren Cromartie felt as alone as he had back in 1984. In fact, he only decided to sign with the Giants again so he could afford to make alimony payments to his ex-wife (226). Money was and is the ultimate deciding factor for American ballplayers.

The Giants did not win the Japan Series in 1988, meaning that Sadaharu Oh was out as manager, and Motoshi Fujita was in. With a new manager and coaching staff, the Giants got off to a tremendous start in 1989 (Cromartie 232). Fujita changed the culture of the Yomiuri clubhouse, making the mood looser and more akin to an MLB clubhouse, but he also hired a slew of coaches who believed in traditionally strict practice. By summer 1989, the Giants’ disabled list was “as long as the trade demands being submitted by the U.S. government to Japan” (Cromartie 243). In the short run, the managerial change did not appear to change anything for the Giants or their players, but a return to the most important Yomiuri Giant tradition of all was on the way.

Cromartie’s story of struggles and triumphs in Japan began approaching its storybook ending in the 1989 season. The Giants ultimately overcame the injury-filled summer, and went on to secure another Central League pennant. They faced the Kintetsu Buffaloes in the 1989 Japan Series, which lasted the full seven games (Cromartie 256). Any time the Giants are in the Japan Series constitutes a national event for Japan, but this one was even more important, because of the dramatic. The Giants lost the first three games of the series, and it appeared that the team was destined to fall short again until the series came to the Tokyo Dome. Yomiuri staged a tremendous comeback, and won four games in a row to claim their first NPB championship in eight years. Cromartie recalls shedding tears of joy on the field with his Giants teammates as one of the highlights of his entire career (Cromartie 259). The national celebration was unbridled.

After the confetti settled, much like with Major League Baseball, attention quickly turned to the
postseason awards. At last, Cromartie’s journey to the top was complete: he was the Most Valuable Player in Nihon Professional Baseball. He had some of the lowest power numbers of his career, instead acting as more of a contact hitter lower in the batting order, but he had plenty of runs batted in to satisfy the Japanese need to help team harmony. Of course, Yomiuri’s board chairman refused to acknowledge a gaijin’s accomplishments when addressing the Giants fans. It seemed an appropriately Japanese response to the “harmful person” who had now played NPB for six seasons. Even as an MVP, nothing could make the Japanese fully accept a gaijin as one of their own. The fact that a foreigner was the best player in the league is a tough thing to admit.

While the competition between MLB and NPB has leveled out over time, the American model still dominates. The physical differences between Caucasians and Asians have become less pronounced as the Japanese diet has become more and more westernized (Reaves 4). It stands to reason that the Japanese tendency of playing “small ball,” more focused on using base hits, bunts, and sacrifices to win games, would fade out as Japanese players on the whole grew in size and strength. In this case, power hitters would not have to be imported from the United States at such a high rate. This phenomenon has yet to be fully observed, though, as the traditional Japanese ways still remain. Self-sacrifice and group think are still the cultural norm for most of NPB: in 2003, when Tokyo Giants infielder Masahiro Kawai broke the single-season record for sacrifice bunts, he was lauded throughout NPB in the same way that Albert Pujols was for batting .359 on the season and Alex Rodriguez was for swatting 47 home runs back in the United States (Samurai 67). The fact that Kawai was a Giant definitely made his accomplishment more visible, because of the huge sector of the Japanese population who consider themselves Giants fans, but a New York Yankee achieving the same thing would not draw the attention of Major League Baseball fans (Wa 161).

Where conformity and team harmony remain the norm for many through the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st, a distinct Japanese social class called the New Breed emerged, embracing more American ideals, like individualism and materialism (Wa 211). This phenomenon was across all of Japanese society, but naturally, some ballplayers also came to live by these traits. The 1990s and 2000s saw two such Japanese players abandon NPB altogether: Hideo Nomo and Ichiro Suzuki. Both Nomo and Ichiro exhibited physical and mental quirks that drew plenty of distaste while playing in Japan. Successful or not, their individual styles of play were unacceptable in the world of Japanese baseball. Conversely, MLB fans and organizations alike welcomed Japanese imports like Nomo and Ichiro precisely because their playing styles made them so successful in American baseball.

Hideo Nomo never believed in all of the traditional training to which he was exposed in Japan. As a top pitching prospect, he signed with the Kintetsu Buffaloes in 1989, less than a year after his silver medal finish in the Olympics in Seoul, South Korea. Nomo stood out as a rebel almost immediately, as he had a clause written into his contract with the Buffaloes stating that his coaches would not attempt to change the mechanics of his strange and controversial windup and delivery (Samurai 99). Nomo would generate more velocity and movement on his pitches by twisting his body almost 180 degrees and releasing each pitch in a violent motion. He ascribed to the pitching philosophies of his idol, Major League great Nolan Ryan, and wanted to be able to lift weights and rest between his starts, rather than the traditional Japanese system of throwing every day (Samurai 101). Considering the resentment that gaijin players often encountered for demanding special treatment, Nomo was a big shock to the NPB system because he had learned to play through the Japanized baseball system.

Even though Nomo was unorthodox and at odds with the physical conditioning that was expected of him, his talent could not be denied. He was Rookie of the Year, Most Valuable Player, and the Sawamura Award winner in his first full year with the Buffaloes in 1990 (Samurai 99). The Sawamura Award is similar to the Cy Young in Major League Baseball, but is awarded to the best pitcher in all of NPB, rather than either league. This makes Nomo’s accomplishments all the more impressive. The problem with such a successful season was that Nomo was heavily overused, so much so that he needed shoulder surgery (Samurai 102). There are few better examples of a
ballplayer who simply did not fit the Japanese mold; it was time for Nomo to go.

Nomo’s case is important because he was the first Japanese player to leave NPB after the Murakami incident in 1965. The league had never developed rules and procedures for players to leave for the US, so Nomo had to get exceedingly creative with the interpretation of the NPB rules. After much consideration, agent Don Nomura found a “voluntary retirement” clause that allowed NPB athletes to return from retirement to play for any team of their choice, varying from the MLB rule that only allows players to return to their former team (Samurai 107). Even today, it is very common for athletes in NPB to not use an agent at all, but here was Hideo Nomo hiring one to try to get out of his contract and pursue his own individualistic terms and money with a Major League Baseball team. With all the leverage he knew he had, Nomo got very bold. He signed his own promotional contract with Nike, in flagrant violation of the Kintetsu team policy that required players to use Mizuno products. He then asked the Buffaloes for a new contract he knew they could not hope to afford: the equivalent of $9 million over the course of three years. He retired and signed with the Los Angeles Dodgers, and the Buffaloes could do nothing to prevent it (Samurai 103). Major League Baseball gained a hugely talented player. Once again, the American system had prevailed.

The individualism and quirky physical mechanics that made Nomo a terrible fit in Osaka made him a star in Los Angeles. His “corkscrew” windup was tremendously effective against MLB hitters, who had never seen anything like it. Nomo being the first Japanese player in decades no doubt contributed to the phenomenon known as “Nomomania.” Attendance at Dodger Stadium was 4% higher in games he started. Nomo started the 1995 MLB All-Star game for the National League, and as he had no previous MLB service time, he was also named National League Rookie of the Year (Samurai 108). There was a measurable novelty attached to the brand new Japanese player, but it was also his tremendous success that helped solidify Nomo as a huge marketing force for the consumption of baseball. Nomo threw no-hitters for two big-market clubs, the LA Dodgers and Boston Red Sox, and stayed in the league until 2008. Where he had been troublesome in NPB, he was a rock star for MLB.

Even though he had left under ugly circumstances, Nomo still also remained a popular figure back in Japan. He charged enormous fees for interviews with Japanese news outlets and answered questions he did not like with curt and cocky responses. He violated every conception of selflessness and harmony that was thought to be ubiquitous across Japanese ballplayers (Samurai 109). Of course, the Major League Baseball offices also figured out how to profit from Japanese demand for Nomo: in order to get media rights to Dodger games, Japan Broadcasting Corporation was forced to agree to also carry other teams’ games (Schoenberger). There was little to be done to oppose this. MLB is ever focused on perpetuating its own brand of baseball to the world; even as mass media consumption was growing with Japanese professional ball, they were subservient to American influence.

Nomo’s departure signaled changing times for NPB. Economically, owners could not allow their star players to retire and depart for real money in the U.S. without any kind of compensation. The gaijin butai rule, a limit on the number of foreigners allowed on a team, also prevented team owners from replacing their departed stars with expensive, but hated foreigners. NPB eliminated the voluntary retirement clause in 1996, but it was not until the end of 1998 that the owners settled on a way to allow the occasional star player to leave with compensation to their teams (Samurai 145). The posting system was born out of the inherent need to prevent another Nomo from happening.

The controversial posting system is a “stopgap measure” to help NPB clubs to sell their players to MLB clubs (Kelly 39). It is truly the embodiment of power imbalance between the players and owners in NPB. The NPB Players’ Association was never consulted on the rules, and even declined help from the MLB Players’ Association in fighting the decision in court (Samurai 147). Under the posting system, players have three ways to reach MLB: they can be outright released by their respective teams; they can accrue nine years of service time; or they can be posted. When an NPB organization posts a player, all 30 MLB clubs enter a four-day auction to buy the right to negotiate exclusively
with the player on a new contract. Being posted severely limits the athlete’s rights, because his team unilaterally decides where he may go. Don Nomura calls the process “a slave auction” and Ichiro’s agent Tony Attanasio says, “The player literally gets zero advantage from it…. The Japanese teams benefit by holding the players hostage” (Samurai 146). In the end, one of the most controversial aspects of contracting NPB came out of the owners’ desire to keep another Nomo-type loss from happening.

The next case of a widely notable and successful player leaving NPB happened under the rules of the new posting system. Ichiro Suzuki further “proved the high level of baseball in Japan” when he came to the Seattle Mariners from the Orix BlueWave for the 2001 season (Samurai 46). Ichiro was a more harmonious athlete and teammate during his NPB tenure than Hideo Nomo, but also possessed his own style of play that instantly made him a superstar, MVP-type player for Seattle. From a young age Ichiro subscribed to the heavy training regimen commonplace in Japanese baseball, and trained daily with his father. He worked on hitting wiffle balls with a shovel in high school and swung golf clubs to develop a unique batting stance. The golf elements of Ichiro’s swing made him shift his weight differently from a typical batter and allowed him to get out of the batter’s box just a little bit quicker than his counterparts (Samurai 5). Ichiro was turning baseball heads all over the world, and Orix knew they could make more money by posting their right fielder for sale to an MLB team.

The Seattle Mariners ultimately won the rights to negotiate a contract with Ichiro and paid the Orix BlueWave $13 million after the 2000 season concluded. The investment paid dividends immediately: MLB pitchers did not know how to approach facing Ichiro, whose insane batting regimen helped him only miss on 6% of his swings as a Major League rookie in 2001 (Samurai 28-33). This tremendous metric was one of the factors that helped Ichiro break the Major League record for All-Star Game votes and garner both Rookie of the Year and American League MVP honors in his first season in the United States. Ichiro was a celebrated member of that Seattle team, and finally regarded as a star back at home. This superstardom also cemented some of the work that Major League Baseball had done to market American baseball to NPB with Nomo a few years prior. Japanese consumers had become more aware of MLB as a whole, and sales of all MLB merchandise increased 60% during the 2001 season (Schoenberger). Ichiro had become a global commodity after leaving Japan for Seattle.

Ichiro Suzuki and Hideo Nomo help to expose the strong dichotomy that still exists regarding Japanese and American attitudes toward their foreign baseball players. The novelty of a new player, when combined with their enormous, immediate performances is what made both Ichiro and Nomo so warmly welcomed in MLB. The American baseball system today accepts players of all origins, so long as they play well. The player’s attitude and practice regimen do not really matter, so long as they perform well and the team wins. This is all in stark contrast to gaijin transplanted from the U.S. into NPB. No matter how well they did, players like Warren Cromartie, Randy Bass, and Dick Davis were never as accepted in Japan as Nomo and Ichiro were as MLB players. Gaijin have often been seen as problems to be managed or ignored, no matter their statistics and contributions. As long as these attitudes exist, the Japanese system cannot really hope to be seen as equal to its American counterpart. MLB dominates NPB economically, athletically, and culturally, because everything else is second to performance and success.

Going forward, there is plenty of room for NPB and MLB to grow together, as international marketing and influence spread baseball deeper into Asia and around the rest of the globe, as well. “New global capitalism” is the dominant economic force on the planet, and baseball continues to grow as a transpacific industry (Diplomatic History 638). It remains obvious, however, that the true goal of baseball globalization is to diversify Major League Baseball, so many are hesitant to call this amazing spectacle a truly global sport (Global Networks 190). Major League Baseball is the chief driver in spreading the gospel of baseball because of an increasing need for multi-ethnic rosters; MLB teams continually take the best players from Asian and Latin American baseball markets in order to improve. This self-reinforcing effect makes MLB more talented and more appealing worldwide.
In other sectors, the Japanese have exerted world dominance by fully embracing global capitalism, but the NPB rules are crippling the league's ability to follow suit. For Japanese pro ball to move up in the global baseball hierarchy, the rules need to change. With the *gaijin butai* rules still in place, NPB teams cannot truly pursue the best players available on the market. The Warren Cromarties and Randy Basses of the world proved that they were highly valuable to their teams, but NPB still bars more of them from entering the league. Major League Baseball is better in this respect because teams are freer to pursue and/or develop the best players, like Hideo Nomo and Ichiro Suzuki, regardless of where these players come from. Easier movement into MLB fosters more athleticism and talent. Better players garner more money and prestige as a result.

NPB could also stand to make a more conscious effort to ease the process of switching leagues from a cultural standpoint. Transplanting from the United States to a homogeneous society like that of Japan can be a scary undertaking. Most *gaijin* athletes have never been able to assimilate into the Japanese way of life; these are professional ballplayers, not exchange students. As long as hints of xenophobia linger, foreign players will never be quite as comfortable playing in Japan as they would be at home. A friendlier welcoming committee could be another factor in *gaijin* deciding to give NPB a try, on top of just offering a higher salary. Trying to soften the culture shock would prove to be a tremendously difficult proposition.

In baseball, like in many other ways of life, change is slow to come. Aside from its value as an entertainment product, baseball also derives value from its scope of tradition. NPB and MLB have the potential to lead the baseball world together, but only if both leagues truly want that to happen. The cultural, organizational, and economic differences between Japanese and American baseball are part of what gives each style its charm and personality. The corporate world of Nihon Pro Baseball is almost reflexive of Japan before the Meiji era, tautly focused on preserving its Japanese values. The "old boy network" of Major League Baseball is a band of ruthless baseball tycoons who want to stay that way (*Transpacific* 149). Major League Baseball has every reason to go forward with its global plans, developing players in every baseball market while still affording to buy top talent from NPB clubs. Both systems work in their own way; Major League Baseball simply works better for now.

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Breaking Out of the Single Story: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute from a Transnational, Multilateral Perspective

ELIZABETH CHAVEZ

Taking a transnational approach to any subject that has been explained through the lens of bilateralism or even unilateralism is very difficult. But rarely are good things ever easy, and if global international relations, especially in regards to international incidents, are going to improve, the global community who takes on these issues daily needs to start approaching their subjects with a transnational vision of the story in mind. This case in point is the recent hot-button issue of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands that has been flooding news media outlets for the past few months. This issue is not as recent as it appears to be, and the story is often much, much more complex than any one news story can convey. My hopes are that this examination of the Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict will demonstrate how important it is that not only policy-makers and world leaders approach issues with a transnational vision of the world, but also that ordinary citizens are given a more comprehensive view of a situation, rather than focusing on any single bilateral, very polar dynamic. The majority of international relational issues tend to focus on the most prominent and immediate bilateral relationship. This new multilateral and transnational approach allows for the full web of stories to be told, since so often it is not only two nations’ politics and histories that are involved. This approach avoids the paradigm of the single story.

On September 18th of this year, headlines were being flooded with some very interesting, yet disturbing news. It was not the raiding of United States’ embassies in the Middle East that caught the attention of my Chinese history professor, but the anti-Japan protests that had turned violent in China. The situation in the Middle East, while also concerning, did not give me the same feeling of dread that this news delivered to my gut. What would the next few months have in store for Japan, China, Taiwan, and the United States? The events surrounding a small set of islands out in the South China Sea may very well characterize Japan-China-Taiwan-U.S. relations for years to come.

The subject of these protests is an archipelago consisting “of five islands and three reefs” (BBC, Q&A) called the Senkaku Islands [尖閣諸島] by the Japanese, the Diaoyu Islands [钓鱼岛] by the Chinese, the Tiaoyutai Islands [釣魚台列嶼] by the Taiwanese, and the Pinnacle Islands by the Americans. The largest of these islands, called Uotsuri-jima [釣魚] by the Japanese, is a mere 4.32 square kilometers in area. The rest of the islands and reefs are either one or less than one square kilometer in area. Geographically, these tiny islands are located “southwest of Japan’s southern-most prefecture, Okinawa” (BBC, Q&A), but closest to Taiwan’s northeastern coast. For the sake of remaining in as partial a position as one can on this issue, I will be referring to these islands as the Pinnacle Islands from here on.

Historically the islands have been owned for the longest time by China. The name of the archipelago used by the Chinese (diàoyú) means “fishing.” It is able to claim that these islands have “been part of its territory since ancient times, serving as important fishing grounds administered by the province of Taiwan” (BBC Q&A)—a statement that has been backed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Taiwan having been a part of China at this time. The history of these islands are tied just as much to Taiwan as either Japan or China, but Taiwan’s claim so often seems to get lost in the struggle between the two super-contenders—Taiwan having been itself passed between China and Japan during the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century.

This transnational and very complex story of ownership really begins after the First Sino-Japanese War, during which an internally conflicted China was battling with modernity, European imperialism, and a sputtering emperor-guided governmental system. After losing, the Chinese were forced to cede Taiwan and most of its
surrounding islands to Japan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. After comparing dates, it appears Japan had an interest in these islands well before the First Sino-Japanese War occurred from 1894-1895. Japan had conducted surveys for 10 years before the war—determining there were no inhabitants on these islands—but unwilling to place a sovereignty marker on them for fear of sparking a conflict with the Qing empire. The conflict happened anyway, and so after winning the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan gained control of Taiwan and its surrounding islands. Then on January 14, 1895, Japan “erected a sovereignty marker that formally incorporated the islands into Japanese territory” (BBC Q&A), even before the Treaty of Shimonoseki had been signed on April 17, 1895.

It is important to note that during this period of Japanese ownership, Taiwan was treated like a colony. It was, in fact, Japan’s first overseas colony, and its economy, industry, and public infrastructure were developed through Japan’s modernization techniques. Many Taiwanese people adopted Japanese culture and became used to their Japanese overlords (Weston).

The history of the Pinnacle Islands, however, then becomes a bit vague. But it is known that a Japanese entrepreneur from Fukuoka prefecture by the name Tatsushiro Koga “made an application for the lease of the islands, and approval was granted by the Meiji Government in 1896” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). After receiving approval he then employed around 200 workers in the industries of collecting bird feathers, the manufacture of dried bonito (for which he had a processing plant built on the islands), collecting coral, raising cattle, manufacturing canned goods, and collecting mineral phosphate guano. In 1932 “the four islets were officially sold to his son, Zenji” along with Zenji’s wife Hanako (Ito- Owner), but Tatsushiro maintained his business until around 1940 when it finally failed. World War II was in full swing by this time, and so not much else is mentioned about the islands until after the war.

In 1951 under the Treaty of San Francisco, Taiwan was officially returned to Chinese ownership—this was the ownership of the Chinese Nationalist Party, though, not the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that had just taken control of Mainland China. This was possible because during the second Sino-Japanese War, in the midst of World War II, the Chinese Nationalist Party, also known as the Kuomintang (KMT), took back control of Taiwan from the Japanese. Simultaneously, the KMT and the CCP had been fighting an internal civil war for the control of Mainland China—happening intermittently from 1927-1949. The KMT leadership fled to Taiwan after they lost the civil war with the CCP, and their territory had been reduced to include Taiwan, Matsu, Wuchiu, Jinmen, and Penghu. This was the new Republic of China (RoC), and the mainland became the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both governments claimed to be the legitimate rulers of the Chinese people.

However, the Treaty of San Francisco also stipulated that, “the Nansei Shoto islands [which includes the Pinnacle Islands] came under US trusteeship and were then returned to Japan in 1971, under the Okinawa reversion deal” (BBC Q&A). Neither the RoC nor the PRC recognized this treaty between Japan and the United States as legitimate. This was viewed as an act of undue imperialism in complete disregard to the islands’ previous Chinese ownership, and both the RoC and the PRC still view the Pinnacle Islands as a part of their inherent territory. The PRC’s claim to these islands is also justified by their view of ownership over the RoC—present day Taiwan—since the islands used to be a part of the Taiwan prefecture. This view is referred to as China’s “One-Nation Policy” which is, in fact, officially recognized by the United States. Both the KMT and China agree that their nations should be reunited, but they disagree over how this should be implemented.

In 1951, however, the United States and Japan viewed Taiwan and the Pinnacle Islands as having been officially separated, and China and Taiwan were busy with their own internal issues. Civic authority over the islands was granted to the Pinnacle’s neighboring inhabited island Ishigaki. The Koga family never lost the land, though, even after the war, during the U.S. trusteeship, and then when the islands were returned to Japan. They

*The KMT is in support of a reunited Taiwan and China, however certain groups within Taiwanese politics support an independent Taiwan—the primary one being the Democratic Progressive Party.
managed the islands until the early 1970s. Around this time, the Kurihara family “bought the four islets from family friends Zenji and Hanako Koga...[since they] had no children and they were especially fond of the oldest Kurihara brother, Kunioki” (Ito-Owner). Ever since then the Kurihara family has had ownership of the islands, at least up until the recent events of this year.

Around the 1970s, in addition to its already controversial history, these islands become a hot topic for Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese people. The reason for the escalated territorial disputes being a United Nations report in 1969 that claimed a large oil and gas field may lie under the seabed near both Okinawa and these islands (Jones). Following right on the heels of this discovery “China and Taiwan officially began to declare ownership” (Ito-Owner) of the islands in 1971. A surveying team including academics and officials from the Foreign and Transport Ministries were sent to the islands in 1979 for two weeks—primarily to see if the islands could support human habitation—but nothing beyond that initial survey has happened since (Ito-Owner). Japan has never been able to explore the possibility of using these natural resources because of the political explosiveness that emerged due to the discovered resources. The central Japanese government as well as the Ishigaki local government have become increasingly limited in their options when it comes to the islands. In fact recently “the central government has prevented the municipal government...from directly inspecting the islands for property tax assessment or research on ecosystems” (Kaneko), afraid of what sort of reaction displays of ownership may spark. The islands have never been able to be equipped with port facilities for fishermen in the area either, even though it is a prime spot to catch red snappers.

During the islands’ more recent history of ownership, starting in 2002 the Japanese government has been renting three of the five islands—Uotsuri-jima, Kita-Ko-jima, and Minami-Ko-jima—for ¥25 million per year from the official owner of the three. The official owner in the Kurihara family is Kunioki Kurihara (BBC, Deal to Buy). One of the Kurihara sisters owns the island of Kuba. She leases the island to the Defense Ministry for an undisclosed amount that in turn permits the U.S. military to use it as a bombing exercise site (Ito-Owner).

Groups of Chinese and Taiwanese activists have staged protests in 1996, 2004, and 2006 on and around the islands (Associated Press & BBC, Q&A), but it was not until 2010, however, that the first major diplomatic incident took place. In September of 2010, a Chinese trawler smashed into a Japanese patrol boat. The Chinese people in the boat were arrested. After some serious diplomatic debates, the crew members were released several days later (AFP).

In April of 2012, Shintaro Ishihara—the rather candid governor of Tokyo who has been described as being “a hawkish nationalist who doesn’t hide his hostility toward China” (Ito-Owner)—proclaimed that he would use ¥1.4 billion that he had raised through public donations to purchase the Pinnacle Islands. This is not the first time Ishihara has approached the Kurihara family with a deal to buy the islands. According to the family’s spokesman and brother to Kunioki, Hiroyuki Kurihara, he has been attempting to purchase the islands since the mid-1970s but had never amassed such a large sum of public money before now. The family was receptive to his offer this time around, and began bargaining by the end of April 2012. Hiroyuki says that “he is not a right-winger and he and his siblings are merely following the wishes of his father’s good friend” (Ito-Owner)—Tatsushiro Koga. These wishes were to make sure the islands’ Japanese history, effective and economic, was never erased. The Kurihara family seemed confident that Ishihara would help them achieve this by placing the islands under the protection of Tokyo.

The brewing animosity from both China and Taiwan over this economic move by Ishihara was becoming difficult to ignore, and the Japanese central government had to try and implement some damage control. At the beginning of September 2012, the government decided to intervene and officially purchase the islands in the name of the national government. In response Ishihara struck a new bargain, this time with the Japanese government. In a meeting with Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, Ishihara told Noda “that constructing a harbor for fishing boats, potentially establishing a Japanese economic presence on islands claimed by China and Taiwan, is one
condition for his withdrawing a bid to buy the islands on behalf of the Tokyo metropolitan government" (Asahi Shimbun). Ishihara believes that if a port is established on the islands, Japan’s control over them will tighten. He stated that if the Japanese government purchases and also develops the islands, he would offer them the ¥1.4 billion he had raised.

Shintaro Ishihara was once again baiting his fellow politicians in Japan, as well as the central governments in China and Taiwan. Bitter about never becoming Prime Minister, Ishihara, at 80 years old, has never been afraid of asserting himself on matters he believes are of utmost importance to the nationalistic hard line in Japan. Ishihara’s demands are a complete “disregard of efforts by the Japanese and Chinese governments to calm tensions over the disputed territory” (Asahi Shimbun). This goes along with Chinese policies established by former leader of China, Deng Xiaoping, “who urged the two sides to shelve the issue in order to build their economic partnership” (Craft). The general populations of Japan and China never wanted this conflict, even if some extremists are in support of it.

The Japanese government eventually ignored Ishihara’s demands and decided to move forward with a purchase of the islands themselves. A formal purchasing contract was drafted during the month of September. The bargained and approved selling price for the islands was ¥2.05 billion, or approximately $26 million (BBC, Deal to Buy). After catching wind of this contract, tensions in China and Taiwan escalated. Activists were the first to respond, largely in retort to comments that had been made by Ishihara. On September 4th, two men dismantled the Japanese flag from a Japanese ambassador’s car in Beijing, apparently in protest. Then on September 11th the government sealed the deal, officially acquiring the islands. Small protests began cropping up in cities all over China the next day, but they were very small in comparison to what happened about one week later (Daily Yomiuri).

At this point, there is very little mention of what happened in Taiwan at this time in the media. Instead, main media outlets in China, Japan, and the United States focused primarily on what was happening in China, and Japan’s reaction to it. The main reason for this being the demonstrations in Taiwan were not nearly as violent as the Chinese demonstrations. The lack of coverage based on the amount of violence is unfortunate, but in the spirit of transnational story telling, I have attempted to incorporate what I can about what took place in Taiwan. Much of the sentiment that came from Taiwan was synonymous to Beijing’s opinion, but it is still worth mentioning.

The peak of anti-Japanese sentiment in China and Taiwan centered on the Pinnacle Islands came on September 18th. Protestors filled the streets by the hundreds in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenyang, and Taipei, just to name a few of the major cities. Anti-Japan demonstrations in China and Taiwan have not happened on this scale in years. The last demonstration in China happened in 2005 in reaction to Japan’s bid for a United Nations Security Council seat, and the Japanese government’s green lit textbooks that did not properly address Japan’s wartime atrocities (Jakobson). The demonstrations then, however, were relatively peaceful compared to the recent nationalist fever pitch. In China it was a day filled with “thousands of angry citizens hurling bottles and eggs at the Japanese [embassies],” and “Japanese-brand cars...[were] torched” (Beech). One protestor outside the embassy in Beijing had even decided to throw a sword. Japanese business owners also suffered from the wrath of the protesters: smashed windows, stolen merchandise, arson, etc. The crowds were filled with posters of Mao Zedong, and some of the protestors were carrying images of desecrated bodies from the Second Sino-Japanese War (Dayhoff)—I will be explaining the importance of this war shortly. Some of Japan’s largest companies were forced to shut down production at some of their factories in China as well, including: Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mazda, Panasonic, and Canon (Ogura and Mullen). And just to add to the madness, in what many suspect was “an officially coordinated maneuver” (Beech), 1,000 Chinese fishing boats rushed to waters near the islands.

Violent anti-Japanese protests transpiring on the 18th day of September in China was not a random occurrence. This day is known in China as National Humiliation Day, guóchǐ rì [国耻日]. The Chinese characters used for this transliterate very well into English, and the only real discrepancy—albeit a tiny one—lies in the character that stands
for “Humiliation,” which can also be translated as “shame” or “disgrace” (Peterson).

On this day in 1931, the Mukden Incident occurred in northern China during which “imperial Japan used a railway bomb its soldiers planted in Manchuria to stage an invasion” (Beech). According to China’s political-minded intellectuals, “the aggression had begun in 1931 in Manchuria” (Esherick, 192), which marked, in their minds, the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. This incident is not considered to be the official starting point of the Second Sino-Japanese War since the fighting was intermittent, but armed conflict and terrorism on the part of the Japanese occurred from 1931-1937. The official beginning of the war is the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7th 1937, during which the Japanese invaded and took over Beijing and the port city of Tianjin (Schoppa, 99).

Other events of note during this war were massacres and battles such as the Nanjing Massacre, the Battle of Tai’erzhuang, and the Fall of Wuhan. An academic study conducted and published in the United States in 1959 estimated military casualties of 1.5 million killed in battle, 750,000 missing in action, 1.5 million deaths due to disease and 3 million wounded; and civilian casualties due to military activity at 1,073,496 killed and 237,319 wounded; also 335,934 people were killed and 426,249 wounded in Japanese air attacks (Ho). When added all up, the number of people who were deceased, wounded, or missing equals 8,822,998. The number of Japanese killed during the war is difficult to estimate—the Empire of Japan at that time often concealed the actual numbers of the estimated casualties in order to appear stronger and less defeated. Contemporary studies from the Beijing Central Compilation and Translation Press, based on Japanese statistics, estimate the Japanese deaths at 2,227,200 casualties, including 1,055,000 dead and 1,172,000 injured (柳风著).

In light of these events, and the bad press that not only Japan but also the United States received later from the Chinese Communist Party’s news agencies domestically in China, it is not much of a surprise that China’s people would hold a grudge. After the Chinese Communist Party took control of China in 1949, and the subsequent spread of Communism and the Cold War, the United States was demonized in the eyes of the Chinese people. According to the rhetoric expounded by the CCP, “the United States [was] a rapacious predator and quintessential representative of the twin evils of capitalism and imperialism” (Hung, 159). They were the new Imperialists, and the Japanese were their East Asian puppets.

Although most children and those who are without much education are not quite so apt to pick up on the more refined points of satirical cartoons, political propagandist cartoons “often produced direct, simple, and easily recognizable images that make this art form ideally suited for conveying a compelling viewpoint” (Hung, 156). Children understand that the “American soldier driving the [swastika emblazoned] chariot and holding an atomic bomb” (Hung, 169) is not a good image. The primary message these cartoonists wished to convey was that of an epic struggle between the forces of good and evil. The good being the benevolent and socially-minded CCP, and the evil being the American Imperialists and their Asian allies. The CCP and their media mouthpieces were skilled at using mass-media devices in order to drive the points they wanted the Chinese people to perceive deep into their hearts and minds.

This sort of image and narrative manipulation is still carried out by the Party today, and it may give us some insight into how the tiny Pinnacle Islands caused such a violent reaction amongst the Chinese public. History does have a part to play, but it is largely being used as a tool by the CCP. There are very few people alive who remember the atrocities of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Rather brilliantly, though in 1985 after Mao’s death “a Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall opened in Nanjing” (Link). Before this, the massacre had been largely kept from the public’s knowledge. But from 1985 onward, the government “began to use the issue as a way to stimulate nationalism and draw support to itself” (Link). Remember that protestors during the September 18th demonstrations were carrying images from the Nanjing Massacre, in addition to other war horrors. I am not suggesting that the Party made up these horrific events in order to have a good story to tell, but rather that their manipulation of when and how these stories are told is particularly cunning.

The Party does not always have the support of its people, and it fears this fact. Protests happen in
China on a daily basis, and are generally about “corruption, pollution, land annexation, special privilege, and abuse of power” (Link); these protests are typically aimed at Chinese government officials. "The Chinese police handle, on average, two hundred or more ‘mass incidents’...every day" (Link). These types of protests are recurrent, but not well covered by the media—domestic and foreign. The anti-Japan protests by comparison are unusual. But what makes these protests even more unusual is that they are seemingly egged on by China’s own government—“often after government prodding but always under government monitoring and control” (Link). So why would the CCP stoke the fire under a decades old and seemingly unrelated issue instead of addressing any of the problems being voiced by the public?

One of the best theories being offered by East Asian specialists and Chinese bloggers is the government’s “need for a distraction.” The CCP is in the middle of a huge power exchange that only happens once every 10 years, and civil unrest is on the rise over issues concerning the environment, political transparency, corruption, justice, human rights, and freedom of speech. Channeling the population’s anger in to something that is not aimed directly at the government’s weaknesses could help distract any potential dissidents from organizing unwanted demonstrations at a sensitive time.

On November 8th the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China convened in Beijing. During this congress there was a changing of the guard, and the new Politburo Standing Committee members—“the elite group that makes crucial decisions on the economy, foreign policy and other major issues” (NY Times-Congress)—were announced publicly. The number of people on the Committee has been reduced from nine to seven this time around "in order to simplify the decision making process and to limit power given to certain departments" (Badkar). And also for the first time since 1976, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping, who is a part of the “red nobility,” or “princelings” generation, is inheriting the title not only of head of the party, but also the civilian chairman of the military at the same time. Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was one of the founders of the Communist guerilla movement in Shaanxi as well as a former Vice-Premier. Being a “princeling”—tài zǐ dāng [太子党]—refers to the privileged birth status of being the son of a previously successful top Party official whom many of the new leaders hail from. And now that China has become a major world player in the field of economics and politics, there is even more pressure being placed on them to have a smooth transition in to power (Link).

Many people are speculative of how this change in leadership will affect China’s current politics and policies, and many elites call for "greater openness in China’s economic and political systems" (NY Times-Congress) are growing. Some pro-reform critics are predicting that these “princelings” that are coming in to power will not be highly motivated to change the system and will only seek political growth toward the socialist capitalism system that already exists, since they benefitted from the system. An economist named Mao Yushi said, “China is a country under dictatorship. But the new leadership group I don’t think will take active measures to change the situation. It’s too difficult” (Richburg). One thing is certain about Xi’s approach to his newfound power: caution. Xi has been “keeping with protocol, [he] has said little during the past months or years that would reveal even the slimmest hint of his intentions” (Richburg). Secrecy has been a key ingredient for decades to the Party’s omnipotent control, and the Party has been very careful to carry the power exchange delicately.

However, recently there was a very large bump in the road to smooth transition. A CCP official named Bo Xilai who, along with his wife Gu Kailai—a lawyer and a businesswoman—were arrested. Bo Xilai was not just any Party official, though. He was the party boss of the sprawling metropolis of Chongqing, and slated to become one of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, one of the seven most powerful men in the country. Bo Xilai is also one of China’s “princelings” (son of legendary party revolutionary Bo Yibo), and so this scandal has placed serious doubt in the minds of many Chinese about the accountability of this new royalty. It has become clear to the public that the top tier lives in lavish luxury due to their involvement in “offshore banking and money laundering and will literally go over dead bodies if they have to, as...Gu Kailai has
proven” (Von Hein). Gu was arrested on April 10th, 2012 for the murder of a British national—and suspected British intelligence agent as well as international money launderer—named Neil Heywood. Bo had already been placed under house arrest for his abuses of power while trying to cover up the murder. Bo’s former police chief of Chongqing, Wang Lijun, had also been sacked, even though he had been the first one to come forward with information regarding the case. Very little information, other than the suspended death sentence Gu received for the murder on July 26th and her husband’s expulsion from the Party on November 4th, has been released to the public (Von Hein). If this case were properly covered, “[it] would reveal a great deal about corruption, special privilege, abuse of power, wealth inequality, and all those other issues that Chinese people...protest” (Link). As it is with many criminal cases involving upper-tier CCP officials though, there has not been a great amount of transparency in this criminal case.

In addition to these shady events Xi Jinping disappeared for nearly three weeks during the month of September 2012. During these weeks there was absolute silence on the part of the CCP. Xi Jinping even stood up Hilary Clinton when she made a diplomatic visit to China, a visit that “may be her final trip to China as America’s top-diplomat” (Moore). This hiatus still has yet to be explained three months later, and it probably never will be explained. The CCP is very fond of its secrecy; something it has used to its advantage skillfully over the past half century since coming to power. Secrecy is a very large part of the Party’s defense mechanisms. By never revealing more than is necessary, it can keep others guessing about the Party’s true capabilities, or handicaps. However useful this is though, I would argue that this is not the sign of a government confident in the support of its citizens, the rest of the world’s nations, or even itself.

In light of that, the likelihood that the Chinese Communist Party would manipulate the attentions and anger of its people in order to draw attention away from their own difficulties is extremely likely. It is entirely reasonable to suspect that the Party had a significant part in stoking the fires of anti-Japanese sentiment on September 18th. This is not the first time the CCP has done this, and they are quite experienced at devising a narrative to feed to their citizens. In support of this, hundreds of bloggers within the Chinese blog-sphere during the September 18th Anti-Japanese protests reported seeing “what they say are plainclothes police instigating and leading the protest activity. (In one photo a man appears to have a policeman’s bullet-proof vest under his commoner’s T-shirt)” (Link). The bloggers say that their suspicions of police involvement in the protests will be confirmed if none of the looters are properly punished. So far, their suspicions have been proven correctly. The China Daily reported only 5 people wanted on vandalism charges from the protests in Guangdong province, despite there having been hundreds of protestors out in force that day.

This provides an excellent case in point of how the Party, despite some of the cracks that are beginning to show in the upper rungs of its leadership, can still harness the emotions and fears of its citizenry. These recent events could be seen as China flexing its relatively new “world power” status muscles. China is feeling stronger than ever in light of recent world events. The crash of Western banking systems beginning in 2008 “when the credit crunch hit the global economy...China was better equipped than just about anywhere in the world to handle the sudden downturn” (McGregor, 28). Because the banks in China must ultimately answer to the central Politburo, they had no choice but to increase their lending in 2009 when they were instructed to do so, even though the global trend was a downturn in lending (McGregor, 68). China’s consistent upward climb while the rest of the world seems to be facing a downward trend has boosted, not only the government, but also the Chinese people’s confidence in their own system. From the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of the reform period, China looked to outside sources for economic and business models. Only in the past two decades has China really gone their own way in these realms, and with dogged determination at that. China’s economic and business methods have been largely ignored by the West until recently; until the Chinese system has proven that there is more than one way to go about running a country successfully.

Now that China commands a more central position on the world stage, the Chinese military is
commanding more respect as well, and "has made the question of its military trajectory salient" (Erickson, 94). China’s Central Military Commission has been shifting its focus recently to the surrounding seas as opposed to the standing military. This modernization of the military is in line with a plan former leader Deng Xiaoping had proposed in 1979. This strategy is called the “Near Seas Defense,” which Admiral Liu Huaqing defined “as covering the Yellow, East, and South China Seas” (Erickson, 95). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is known to be territorially aggressive—a string of maritime incidents beginning in November 2004 support this claim (Erickson, 97-98).

Related to China’s expanding military assertiveness is their growing need for fuel sources. China’s “gross domestic product has continued to grow at the phenomenal rate of between 9 and 10 percent annually” (Weston, 134)—a pace that they have kept up for two decades, and the government has no intentions of slowing down. Since the Pinnacle Islands are suspected of having a vast wealth of energy resources in its waters, it makes sense that China continues to assert itself in this issue. Even two months after the protests over the Pinnacle Islands took place on September 18th, “the head of China’s Oceanic administration stated [on November 11th] that there was ‘no time limit’ for how long they would have their patrol ships” (Westlake) sailing in the disputed waters around the islands. This statement was likely in response to an internationally reported video released by the BBC that same day. In this video one of the BBC’s correspondents had gone “fishing” around the Pinnacle Islands in order to capture the “slow-motion game of chase” (Wingfield-Hayes) that was going on between the Chinese ships and the Japanese ships.

Much like the slow-motion game of chase that happens around the islands each day, Japan too has very complex reasons behind their interest in the ownership of the Pinnacle Islands. Previously, in my discussion of the history of the islands, it is clear that Japan has a fairly lengthy historical affiliation with them. It is not much in comparison to the ages-old ancient Chinese and Taiwanese history the islands also possess, but it is also suitable to argue that the most recent history should be the more valid history. This is often the argument that Japan takes when confronted with the historical issue, quoting Meiji-era surveying documents that confirm the islands were uninhabited, unowned and not administered by any other country—at least to their knowledge at the time (Shaw). However, Japanese general public knowledge about the island’s history is not widely spread, and they are often ignorant of the breadth of these islands’ history and their relation to Chinese and Taiwanese politics. Many of Japan’s nationalist politicians, including Shintaro Ishihara, use ignorance to “flame public sentiments under the name of national interests [and it is these politicians] who pose the greatest risk, not the islands themselves” (Shaw). Extremist opinions make for dramatic television, after all.

During a press conference with Shintaro Ishihara in April of 2012, he announced that because “China declared openly its intention to break Japan’s control of the islands” (The Real News), he felt threatened. This was, of course, hyperbole on the Tokyo governor’s part, but China’s growing military is indeed causing worry in its bordering neighbors. The surrounding nations are usually quite unsure of China’s true motives due to its Party’s characteristic secrecy. Japan’s anxieties are well founded since it has its hands tied militarily due to its non-aggression treaty with the United States. This has begun to worry Japan, owing to the United States’ recently friendlier attitude toward China—further complicating this multilateral relationship. Also, recent protests from Japan’s citizens over the U.S. Marine presence in Okinawa due to sexual assaults, air traffic and deafening noise (Tritten) have weighed in on Japan’s decision to rely less heavily on U.S. military protection. During the first week of November 2012, “the U.S. military restarted efforts...to build up Guam for the planned relocation of about 5,000 Okinawa Marines” (Tritten). Since the U.S.’s military presence in Okinawa and the Pacific is still being debated, in a move to protect their interests militarily, Japan solved the Pinnacle Islands issue using their current economic advantage rather than through a display of brute force.

According to author and historian of international issues as well as U.S. – East Asian relations, Akira Iriye, this was an appropriate use of soft power well in-line with his theory about the
world’s current economically driven international relations. Iriye expounds that the Japan-China relationship (of course within the context of transnational affairs) has gone through three different phases: first one of power during the 1800s and early 1900s until 1914, then one of culture during the 1920s and 1930s, and last and most recently one of economics. Iriye argues that Japan and China no longer need to rely on methods of brute militarized force to have successful exchanges. There still is an element of power to their relationship, however it is not the most prominent facet of their complex connection.

In light of China’s recent aggression, even if it may be small by comparison to past Japanese aggression, it is certainly possible to surmise that power may once again become a more prominent element in Japan-China relations—thus making power a more prominent element in U.S.-China, U.S.-Japan, Japan-Taiwan, Taiwan-China and U.S.-Taiwan relations as well. Short of a Third World War erupting, power will never play quite the same role it did on the world stage during the previous century; however, I do believe it is possible for a resurgence of aggression to take place. If economies suffer further from the current recession, this could present an opportunity for xenophobic trends to arise, especially if another nation appears to be a threat to the nation-in-question’s economic well-being. An economic recession cannot singlehandedly bring about xenophobia, but if blame can be placed on the “other,” then this could cause feelings of aggression and xenophobia to emerge.

This sort of economics related to aggression and xenophobia is known as “economic nationalism” to political psychologists. Economic nationalism “is a function of the perceived economic threat posed by foreign competition” and “this perceived threat appears to be related to one’s own level of job insecurity” (Baughn & Yaprak, 772-773). It occurs not only when a person’s job security is threatened but also when a person is unfamiliar with their country’s global economic partners. If they do not understand how the system operates, they will be more likely to distrust another country; while “openness to, and familiarity with, other nations may serve to obviate support for economic nationalism, as this provides a broader perspective and understanding of the costs involved in such policies” (Baughn & Yaprak, 773). If mutual economic understanding is not achieved, it is possible to collapse back in to an era of paranoia and economic isolation (i.e. the Cold War). It is also interesting to note that authoritarian governments are more likely to become xenophobic (and homophobic) if there is an economic down turn (Rickert, 717). I believe it is safe to label the Chinese leadership as authoritarian, being the sole outlet for government administration in China (this is not to be confused with totalitarianism, which the CCP is no longer).

Recently, nationalist sentiment in Japan has been on the rise, perhaps due to some of the reasons I just mentioned. Japan certainly is not an authoritarian style government, but an increase in tensions is trending all over the world. An unfortunate side effect of this “is that despite Japan’s democratic and pluralist society, rising nationalist sentiments are sideling moderate views and preventing rational dialogue” (Shaw) in a time when it is needed more than ever. In fact six months ago, around the time the debates about the Pinnacle Islands really started to heat up, Niwa Uichiro, the Japanese ambassador to China, had warned the Japanese government that purchasing the islands could spark an “extremely grave crisis.” In response “Ishihara Shintaro slammed Niwa as an unqualified ambassador, who ‘needs to learn more about the history of his own country’” (Shaw). Niwa later apologized for his remarks (despite being perfectly sane advice) and was recently replaced.

Among Japanese nationalists, and those who are swayed by them, their belief is that “these islands are Japanese territories... [it] is 100% certain” (The Real News). Also China is being viewed as a violent threat, and I quote from a Tokyo Arakawa Ward Assemblyman, Eiji Kosaka, that “China has been, as usual, attacking the Senkaku Islands...And these attacks from China have just been getting worse and worse” (The Real News). Although Kosaka used the term “attack,” no real acts of violence have yet to be committed on the Pinnacle Islands.

As I mentioned previously, the United States does also have a stake in China-Japan-Taiwan diplomatic relations. Not only because of the long-standing alliance with Japan since the end of WWII, but the U.S.’s tremendously co-dependant
trade relations with China and also the U.S.’s historical ties to Taiwan as its protector against PRC territorial aggression. Experts on China report that China now “holds the greatest share followed by Japan and the United Kingdom” (Jensen & Weston, 11) of the United States’ national deficit that is owned by a foreign entity. This willingness to buy up millions of the U.S.’s debt is reciprocated by the United States’ continual patronage of Chinese exported goods. However, there are institutions in the United States that would also benefit from heightened tensions between Japan, China, and Taiwan, including arms dealers and manufacturers (The Real News).

Ultimately, though, the position of the United States in this conflict will be largely affected by what both Japan, China, and Taiwan feel is the appropriate stance the U.S. should take on this issue, not necessarily what the United States feels is best for its own interests. The United States is slowly becoming less hegemonic as we enter the 21st century, or at least finding itself less able to be; the days when power was once the most valued function of the state are seemingly in retrograde. The expectations of Japan, China, and Taiwan—though at odds—are far more important to try and balance than the U.S.’s own interests in the South China Sea.

Beijing leadership expects the U.S. to take a stance of neutrality, as it has in the past. About 16 years prior a State Department spokesman stated that the U.S. was “neutral” on this issue, and this same sentiment has been echoed many times since (Leupps). And depending on who is ask, the U.S. has retained its neutrality in this issue, even if it is not to the satisfaction of Beijing. On December 5th, the U.S. Senate “approved a key defense bill stipulating that the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty” (NHK). Now, while this sounds like the U.S. government is siding with the Japanese on this issue, there was “an amendment to the bill [that] states that while the US takes no official position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, it acknowledges that Japan has administration over them” (NHK). Beijing has been labeling this bill as a “product of the Cold War,” clearly irked by the long-standing U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security that has characterized their relationship for, in Beijing’s opinion, too long.

Wars seem to be a sore subject with China’s government, and an incident involving the Pinnacle Islands brought forth some of China’s old resentment just a couple days ago. On December 13th, almost as punctuation to China’s “no time limit” stance on their handling of the dispute, a Chinese government aircraft intruded in to Japanese airspace near the archipelago. The plane belonged to China’s State Oceanic Administration, “a state body tasked with law enforcement in Chinese waters” (BBC – Airspace). This was reportedly the first time ever that a Chinese government aircraft intruded on Japan’s air space. Japan’s defense ministry was furious. When asked to hear a formal Japanese protest, the Chinese ambassador in Tokyo responded that the flight was “completely normal.” He went on to state that “the Diaoyu islands and affiliated islands are part of China’s inherent territory...The Chinese side calls on Japan to halt all entries into water and airspace around the islands” (BBC – Airspace). This event may appear to be a random incident, but in fact, it seems to have been well calculated.

On December 13th, 1937 during the Second Sino-Japanese War, one of the greatest atrocities of that war, the Nanjing Massacre (or the Rape of Nanjing) took place. This was the Chinese government sending a very clear message to Japan—a message it has been pushing for decades. China, and often times China’s citizens (as was demonstrated by the Nanjing-Massacre-poster-toting protestors on September 18th), believe that Japan is still not sorry enough for its wartime atrocities.

This problem stems from the attitude with which both sides are approaching the issue. Even if the government does officially apologize, “apologies tend to be given when there is a belief that those apologies will be accepted, at least in part, and that dialogue between the two sides will be advanced” (Spitzer). Japan’s leadership understands that any dialogue that is opened up with China could become a PR disaster quickly. Even if the Japanese really are sincere in their apologies—and recent polls of Japanese citizens suggest that most Japanese feel their country still have something to apologize for—it may fall on deaf ears. No one is really certain if “the Chinese
really want or care about reconciliation” (Spitzer) since Chinese leadership has typically preferred to take a hard line stance when it comes to dealing with Japan.

The flight into Japan’s territory could be interpreted as China taking a very hard line against past Japanese aggression. But what does meeting past aggression with aggression solve for China? I would argue that it does not solve much at all. In fact, it only complicates the issue. If China and Japan were to actually engage in a conflict, the United States as well as Taiwan would inevitably be towed along for the ensuing war. China and Japan’s conflicted relationship directly affects U.S.-China as well as U.S.-Taiwan bilateral relations. This is not something that any of the nations involved can afford.

Of course, if a conflict were to arise, Japan wishes the U.S. to help them militarily, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The treaty states, “each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes” (Harner). The treaty also stipulates that reporting attacks to the United Nations Security Council is a necessary part of this agreement, and the agreement will only end once the Security Council has the means itself to prevent an international conflict from arising. And a bill that was passed recently by the U.S. Congress serves to reinforce the treaty. However, the U.S. still may not take immediate action in the event of an armed conflict due to the complicated nature of the U.S.’s position and expectations being placed on it from both sides. Retaliation in case of an armed conflict would also need to be approved through Congress first (Ito- Jurisdiction). But as I previously stated, I do believe U.S. action on behalf of Japan would be inevitable.

Taiwan’s role to play in the future of the Pinnacle Islands is hazy, since it is simultaneously friendly with the U.S. as well as China on certain fronts. Its future role will largely depend on which party is in control of the government. Currently, the KMT leadership sides with the PRC in this issue, but Taiwan’s possible actions in the case of a military conflict are difficult to decipher—especially if the Democratic Progressive Party wrestles control from the KMT in the next election cycle. Taiwan then may want the islands for themselves, but not as a part of the “One-Nation China”Beijing envisions.

China and the United States are both in the midst of a change of leadership, and Japan is still struggling between appeasing the right-wing military hardliners and the generally pacifistic population. Economic upheavals and troubles in all four countries have not helped ease the stress, either. My personal view is that the United States distancing itself from Japan militarily may actually benefit everyone in the long term. If the United States pulls out some of its forces from Japan, and both Japan and the U.S. agree to amend the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty in order to grant Japan expanded military capabilities, there would certainly be a decrease in tensions created by U.S. soldiers being posted in Japan. There are new reports every day about sexual assaults, brawls, and complaints from the communities surrounding U.S. military bases. These certainly do not help the current stance of continued U.S. military presence in Japan. In addition to these tensions, “when Japan cedes overseas defense responsibilities to the United States, it reduces the scope of Japan’s foreign policy accordingly” (Mizokami). If the U.S. were no longer the primary defense caretaker, Japan would gain greater autonomy for itself, and the U.S. would gain a lighter defense budget. China would then gain the neutrality it so much desires from the United States. This is all largely theory, and any number of outcomes could proceed from this situation. However, it is clear that something needs to be done about the web of tension that has colored the whole Pinnacle Island dispute. Rupert Wingfield-Hayes said it right that, “This crisis is clearly not over.” The events that have unfolded over the past few months will come back in to play in China, Japan, Taiwan and the United States’ relationships with each other.

This issue is clearly much more complicated than the single story we usually receive from the talking heads on television. Hopefully this insane web of politics, history, and policy has demonstrated how dangerous it can be to consider a transnational issue only from a bilateral, or even simply a unilateral perspective. This new approach to international debacles via the use of
transnational story telling as well as political multilateralism will be the face of 21st century politics. Gone are the days of a single story and bilateralism. I have realized the complexity of these issues, and attempted to reconcile the bilateralism I primarily discovered in media reports and histories about the Pinnacle Islands dispute. The crisis over the way in which we have been approaching international relations is clearly not over. Along with the changing circumstances, our approach to these issues, as well as the language implemented in our approach to these issues, must change. The single story is the easy story, and rarely are good things ever easy.

REFERENCES


**Village Elections in the People’s Republic of China**

Dashielh H Nathanson

*This thesis is a study of villagers’ committees in the People’s Republic of China. Based on a large body of research, I present and review the wealth of information regarding reform in rural China since the 1980s. My paper encompasses the history, procedure, and provides a modern overview of Chinese village electoral democracy. The objective is to inform the reader about how these rural elections have contributed to the monumental change that has taken place in and continues to impact China. Understanding the unique history and importance of villager democracy is essential to grasping the multi-faceted aspects of the modern day Chinese Communist Party and Chinese society as a whole. Through information, opinions and observations, I aim to provide a rounded view of modern day China.*

**INTRODUCTION**

Conventionally, the power of congresses, parliaments, presidents, supreme courts, and bilateral international agreements is perceived as the forces that drive political change. In the last century, China’s experience of political change has consistently been driven at the village level, in the provinces, and rural communities. The drive to democracy is a groundswell of involvement and ingenuity at the local community level and with only limited direction from the cabals of power in the glittering skyscrapers of Beijing and Shanghai. The word “change” is relentlessly being associated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). China has indeed been anything but torpid in the last hundred and fifty years. China has experienced a range of political styles of rule: from dynastic rule, to pseudo-democracy, to becoming a republic, and finally to communism. Even during this last stage of governance that continues through to today, China has seen changes within the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) policy and style of leadership. The primary change came after Mao Zedong died and Deng Xiaoping ascended to the position of General Secretary, proceeding to rapidly and radically change economic policy and allow the flow of capitalist, market-driven ideology and forces to impact and change Chinese society.

This paper examines the post-Mao period and China’s political transition towards democracy. While describing broad trends in recent history, many of which continue to evolve, I focus primarily on village elections and how this grassroots movement is causing a bottom up drive towards democratization. Since the change of leadership in the late 1970s, China’s political sphere has shifted due to economic growth and modernity. The result has been that village elections have become one of the driving forces of democracy in modern China. Rural China has emerged as the testing ground; it continues to play a significant role in the transformation of government and paving the path for China’s future change.

The topic of grassroots elections and villagers’ committees has created significant political and academic interest. Both Western and Eastern political scientists have been intrigued by the change taking place in small town China. Since the 1980’s, considerable fieldwork and analysis has produced a wave of information requiring further research. As a university student writing this thesis in the United States, my individual fieldwork is limited and includes a limited amount of firsthand sources. Given these limitations, the evidence emerging from multiple sources paints a compelling picture and provides sufficient evidence of the mechanism driving and the resulting critical importance of grassroots democracy. Through the evaluation and analysis of interviews and published fieldwork, this paper will cover the history and current state of villagers’ committees. It will also speculate on the future of Chinese democracy.

This paper is structured in four sections. In order to understand the current situation in China, it is essential to examine recent history and how the forces of democratic changes have emerged. The first section examines the Chinese official, Peng Zhen. As a higher-level cadre, based in
Beijing, Peng does not play a direct role in grassroots elections. Without his assistance, however, villagers’ committees and the original notion of electoral democracy in rural China may never have occurred. This historical outlook continues by examining the original example of elections in China’s Guangxi Province. The natural development of democracy in Guangxi, and the events that proceeded it, are elemental to understanding the foundation of villagers’ committees. These original years, from 1980-1981, were monumental years of political change within China.

The first section also examines the policies and reaction to the Guangxi example in Beijing. The pockets of autonomy in Yishan and Luocheng counties, in Guangxi Province, were quite radical in relation to the surrounding provinces. The transition that began in Guangxi Province caused significant controversy from 1983 to 1987. I examine the heated debates and different points of view to portray the opinions motivated behind China’s senior leaders to continue this “experiment.” The development of Organic Law, which resulted from the controversy, is another very important component of rural electoral democracy. I detail this law because it played the largest role in organizing and facilitating villagers’ committees throughout China. While the focus of this paper examines the bottom-up trends of democracy, it is necessary to examine and understand the policies and processes in Beijing that have and continue to enable the growth of democracy. While the historical aspect of this thesis does not bring any new material to the table, it is a critical component to understanding the status of democracy in China today. By looking at the origins of villagers’ committees, the ingenuity of villagers’ creativity, disputes in Beijing, as well as the key figures within the process, we are able to see the development of democratic practice and more fully comprehend the true nature of elections in China today.

The second section is an analysis of the election system and how it is conducted. Organic Law, while changing the power structure of villages and towns across China, does not define how nomination or election procedure should be carried out. This leaves considerable opportunity for variation. Each province not only differs in voting methods, but also in the processes that lead up to the election and how votes are counted. In this section, I provide detailed examples of these bureaucratic disparities. I also offer examples of voting ballots from specific villages that demonstrate how these elections differ.

I follow this examination of electoral procedure by examining case studies undertaken in China in the third section of this paper. In order to provide a comprehensive picture, I focus on Yusheng Yao’s fieldwork in, what he calls, “West Village.” The study of West Village provides an unvarnished view of the processes and daily life in a village that has developed and structured villagers’ committees. The success of grassroots democracy emerges from the analysis of the issues and accomplishments of two elections in one village. While the voting process and dynamics in each village differ, I take the example of West Village as a symbolic indication of the problems that many other villages face. The second case study, conducted by Melanie Manion, analyzes statistics from many villages and highlights commonalities between them. The information provides a strong basis to support our knowledge and inform our opinion. Manion’s study does not compile data from every village in China. However, the sample size of data is large and geographically diverse, allowing us to develop reasonable assumptions.

In 2012, I lived and studied for a semester in Southwest China. It allowed me to network and develop strong friendships within the local community. In the fourth section, I have taken data from email-conducted interviews with several of these acquaintances. Compiling the data from these interviews illustrates the varying opinions that locals have on village elections. In these interviews, I asked questions about how elections were conducted in the village, where they grew up, and how they felt about this limited form of democracy. Democratization in China is a sensitive issue for the CCP; it was therefore necessary to formulate interview questions that the interviewee and any official would perceive as neutral. In addition, I provided the means for my interviewees to give their answers anonymously, i.e., removing their names. For the purpose of this study, I have changed their names (if given) and altered the names of the towns where they grew up. I took these precautions to ensure the safety of my
friends and interviewees. Many of the people interviewed now live in larger cities where there are no comparative villagers’ committees; I ask them to make comparisons on politics by comparing these two environments. This section provides a firsthand source of life and democracy in rural China.

To conclude this thesis, I cycle through the key elements of my analysis and argument in order to underscore the evolution in villagers’ election policy, how decisions have been executed, results achieved since the 1980s, and the continued influence of China’s democratic progress on the world stage. In recent years countries around the world have been undergoing a process of governance transformation and democratization. During this assessment, I will contrast China’s experience and approach to other countries. In comparing the evolution of democracies in other parts of the world, I illustrate China’s progress since the autocratic communist regime under Mao. To demonstrate the range of opinions on the topic of villagers’ committees, I include two scholars’ estimations on the legitimacy of villagers’ elections. I finish by giving my own judgment, as well as postulating how China might evolve in the coming years. While no one can predict with certainty how and what will emerge in China, the information and analysis I have presented in this paper show a trend that is likely to continue.

The research and works of several notable scholars in the field of Chinese politics have informed and provided the critical evidence for this study. For the historical section and conclusion I site three academics and their works. Kevin J. O’Brien and Lianjiang Li’s article, “Accommodating Democracy” in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China,” focuses heavily on the original development of villagers’ committees in Guanxi and the other areas. The paper also briefly touches on the life and contribution of Peng Zhen to democracy’s development. To supplement Li and O’Brien’s work I incorporate Tianjian Shi’s paper, “Village Committee Elections In China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy,” to add a different perspective of historical growth. His work discusses the mid-level officials who are the real cause of villagers’ election’s reform. I also use Emerson Niou’s “An Introduction to the electoral systems used in Chinese Villages.” This paper provides a succinct look at the history leading up to and the development of villagers’ committees. However, I primarily use this article as the base for the next section regarding election processes. Niou has clearly laid out distinctions in the voting procedures as well as provided pictures of actual ballots.

The second section is based on two articles. Yusheng Yao’s “Village Elections and Redistribution of Political Power and Collective Property,” is an in-depth study of a single village over a significant period of time, and it provides a detailed look at democracy’s development. I also draw from Melanie Manion’s article, “Democracy, Community, Trust: The Impact of Elections in Rural China.”

In addition to reviewing the above-mentioned source material in the conclusion, I leverage a range of readings to contrast Chinese and emerging policies in other parts of the world. In the Journal of Democracy, Larry Diamond’s article, “The Coming Wave,” discusses the state of democracy in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and China. In the final section, I draw from Francis Fukuyama’s work, “The Patterns of History.” I also bring into play Bruce Gilley’s book, China’s Democratic Future. This book reviews Chinese modern political history and closely examines the process in which democracy has been evolving. I have also turned to other scholars to supplement my own analysis on the elections in rural China. In a lecture titled “How Democratic are Village Elections in China?” Professor Baogang He gives his opinion on the democratic changes seen in the Chinese countryside. Besides He’s assessment, I draw from a portion of Jean C. Oi’s paper, “Two Decades of Rural Reform in China: An Overview and Assessment.” I base much of my writing in this thesis on the articles previously sited by these acclaimed scholars; their collective writings help to enrich my own personal research.

In this introduction I have laid out the structure and approach for this thesis. I draw extensively on the works of renowned scholars in the field of Chinese politics to examine the current state of governance Chinese villages. My personal research includes my time living in rural China, which resulted in direct access to Chinese people who have witnessed these changes first hand. I have included these interviews to build a rounded
observation and analysis of recent, rural, and Chinese democracy. My objective with this paper is to provide my reader with up-to-date information and impartial analysis of Chinese politics, and to illustrate China’s experience while providing insight into the likely future of Chinese political practices.

**HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

**Peng Zhen**

Prior to the Communist Revolution of 1949, Peng Zhen had begun to demonstrate his political activism. Born soon after the turn of the century in Shanxi province, Peng joined The Communist Youth League while in middle school; his continued devotion to Communist ideology was proven when he joined the Communist Party in 1923. During the second Sino-Japanese war, Peng led guerilla forces in the north, where he eventually joined Mao Zedong in Yan'an and was given the formal title of the Organization Department Director of the North Bureau of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (PZRA 1). From this point forward he rose quickly within the CCP. He had considerable influence over the takeover of Beijing, was the first Party Chief of Beijing, and soon became the Mayor or Beijing. Peng's position remained high until he criticized Mao for causing mass famine during the Great Leap Forward. Peng was the first high official to be purged and sent to the countryside. After his return, Peng’s influence quickly rose again until he was appointed Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC). With this title, Peng Zhen had considerable influence over the development of Organic Law in China. I include Peng in this paper, as he is a critical actor in the development of grassroots elections.

Peng Zhen’s affiliation with grassroots democracy began much earlier than the 1980s. While Peng was stationed in northern China he administered the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) border region. This was an area that bordered the Chinese communist capital in Yan’an. His reports indicate his interest in the form of democracy that he found:

In a report delivered to the Politburo in 1941, Peng explained why and how local elections had been held and suggested establishing ‘district and village assemblies' (qu cun dai biao hui) to oversee elected, village cadres. In Peng's view, elections were not only compatible with Party rule; they were the right instrument for tightening the Party’s grip in areas where its dominance was still uncertain (O’Brien 469).

He saw this method as a good means of providing sufficient freedom to allow and foster support in uncontrolled regions. Peng showed sustained interest in democratic means in the years after the CCP took power. In the early 1950s, he proposed the idea of “residents’ committees” to Mao as a solution to organizing urban communities into work units; he suggested that these committees be considered non-political “mass autonomous organizations” that were to be elected. After the Party’s Central Committee (PCC) accepted this plan, residents’ committees became a normal aspect of the Beijing cityscape (469).

I pause the story of Peng Zhen to maintain the chronological order of this section. Peng will return as a decisive figure in the progress of village elections.

**Historical Development**

During the Mao era, village power was organized into three levels; the production team was at the lowest rank, answering to the brigade committee, which in turn answered to the commune committee. This hierarchy managed almost everything at the local level. As Niou observes, this began to change after 1978: “After the collapse of the People's Commune system in rural China, the adoption of the household-based responsibility system in the late 1970s helped peasants regain autonomy of production and distribution of goods” (Niou 3). After this system collapsed and these three levels of organizational units no longer controlled production, villages began to find new ways of functioning.

The most unique change began in two counties in Guangxi Province in 1980. This province was not more ripe for villagers’ elections than others; however, in Yishan and Luocheng counties, the village leaders, elders, and cadres created the unique concept of, “leadership groups for village public security” (O'Brien 465); no officials were involved throughout this process and local authorities were unaware of the development. As a solution to the collapse of the People’s Commune...
system, and as production brigades became less functional, these leadership groups’ were a way to promote social order (Niou 3). By the middle of 1981 the name had been changed to “villagers’ committee” (cunmin weiyuanhui). Soon after the change in name, the county administrators found out about the development of the elections that had occurred without official help or contribution. The news quickly reached the officials of Hechi Prefecture, where it was accepted as a beneficial way to improve social order and staunch the problems in the commune system. The result was that this method of elections was instituted throughout the region. At this stage, the somewhat autonomous means of electoral procedures remained informal:

VCs at this point were free-standing and relatively autonomous non-governmental bodies that did not take part in the allocation of state recourses...typical undertakings included enacting codes of conduct banning gambling and theft, maintaining irrigation ditches, paving roads and repairing bridges, and mediating disputes. VCs might also raise funds and mobilize labor to rebuild schools, run day-care centers, and look after the poor, the elderly and relatives of soldiers (O’Brien 466).

This early form of the Villagers’ Committee had simple procedures, however, it was less corrupted and controlled than later versions. Once these processes were institutionalized, their functions began to transform.

News of this grassroots development quickly reached Beijing. At this time Peng Zhen was the Vice Chairman of the NPC. When he heard the reports about villagers’ committees he was excited by this new and spontaneous form of democratic progress. After praising these committees, he sent investigators from the NPC and the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) to understand how these developments emerged as well as to observe their process of governance. News of villagers’ committees quickly spread across China, and provinces such as Beijing, Gansu, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangsu, Shandong, Sichuan, and Hebei began adopting the new concept of governance (467).

Before 1982, township officials appointed village leaders. This often led to village corruption and sometimes even autocratic leadership. However, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China included article 111, which was an attempt to solve these issues and to institutionalize villagers’ committees. Article 111 states that “village committees are the basic-level governments in villages...the village committees are self-governing bodies and that the chairman, vice chairman, and commissioners of the village committees are to be elected by local residents” (Niou 3). While this article is a clear pointer towards autonomous elections, it was not a complete law. At this point villagers’ committees were more a title than a governmental organization.

**Controversy of 1983-1987**

After the inclusion of article 111, debates began at the township level, as well as between high-ranking officials in Beijing. These debates argued about the role of villagers’ committees and how to properly link them with the CCP. Many high-ranking officials voiced their concerns on how autonomous these governmental committees would become; others thought that the Party should approve every action that was conducted; while some opined that the Party should maintain consistent overview of the committees’ decisions. Everyone agreed, however, that the Party must lead these villagers’ committees (O’Brien 470). The township officials voiced the highest concern, as they were directly superior to villagers’ committees and would be responsible if problems should surface.

Zhao Ziyang, the then premier of the CCP, was conservative in his stated opinions, demanding that villagers’ committees should not take the place of village brigades. Zhao’s ideal scenario was that villagers’ committees only be used as experimental institutions in smaller villages. By 1984, however, approximately 700,000 village brigades were transformed into more than 950,000 villagers’ committees (472). This massive transformation happened so quickly because villagers’ committees were at first just a change in name, and not yet a change in governance: “Constitutional provisions notwithstanding, most committees were still appointed rather than popularly elected. Prior to 1987, although villagers’ committees were called ‘mass autonomous organizations,’ they were effectively extensions of township government” (472). The MCA continued going around the
country and collecting data, while trying to write rules to give villagers’ committees structure.

By 1987 the debate turned fierce when the MCA submitted the 13th draft of Rules to the NPC (473). The reformers and the opponents of reform became even more polarized in their opposition to the draft. Those arguing for a halt in the reform process voiced extremely conservative opinions. For example, they stated that, “the time was not ‘ripe’ for a full-fledged law to be passed...Chinese villagers lacked the ‘democratic consciousness’ to govern themselves,” and that “the bill did not clarify (or even mention) the relationship between Party branches and villagers’ committees” (473). In opposition to the anti-draft officials, Reformer’s arguments became ever more extreme as voices for development. They described how “the bill did not go far enough in empowering village cadres against the encroachments of township officials...and wanted to add a provision stipulating the right of village cadres to turn down any assignment not covered in the bill” (473). The contrary opinions, held by frustrated opposing sides, prolonged the debates for months.

Eventually the debate reached a climax. Premier Zhao Ziyang sided with the conservatives. However, Peng Zhen’s perseverance proved the decisive factor in passing the bill. Peng was only months away from his retirement as Chairman of the NPC and saw this as his most important task before he ended his career. The Standing Committee of the NPC rejected Peng Zhen’s bill, which promoted direct elections for village committees. Peng re-wrote the bill and feverishly fought for its passage (Niou 4). Within a two-day period, Peng gave three speeches to drum up the support of the NPC leaders. His speeches included themes such as: recollections of times before the Communist Revolution, when the Party and the masses were bound in a strong relationship. Peng continued by emphasizing that, “village democracy was a matter of ‘life and death’ for the Party...Peng went on to lament how relations between cadres and villagers had deteriorated”... and that rural cadres had become “local emperors” (O’Brien 474). The NPC Presidium opted not to take a decisive decision and instead passed the responsibility to the Standing Committee. Eight months later, in November of 1987, a trial Organic Law was passed (475). This was a tentative decision so that the new Law could be put into practice, but observed for flaws. The new law stated that the chairman, vice-chairmen, and members of village committees were to be elected by members of villages (Shi 385).

**Organic Law**

Even though it was in a trial format, change occurred quickly after Organic Law was passed. Continued reform and indecision was evident during the early stages of implementation. The forces of change, however, impacted different levels of society and political positions. Mid-level officials, in conjunction with peasants, were the driving forces of reform during this period. While key senior officials played a role in transforming the outlook of villagers’ committees, the driving force of change continued to be bottom-up. The only senior, highly visible political figure I, therefore, include in this section of political change is Peng Zhen

After the suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen-Square protests, the new law was subjected to its most stringent scrutiny. The CCP was deeply concerned that instability in the countryside would lead to mass unrest and possibly revolt. Adversaries of Organic Law seized this opportunity to criticize it, voicing the opinion that China, in its current state, was not ready for it; “some even alleged that the Organic Law was an example of ‘bourgeois liberalization’” (O’Brien 477). During this frenzied time and questioning about villagers’ committees, Wang Zhenyao, a recent graduate of East China Normal University’s Law program, emerged as a key player on the side of the reformers. Wang emphasized that village elections were a crucial element of keeping Party control in areas of unrest. His arguments stated that, “introducing elections into rural China could diffuse peasant dissatisfaction and head off local rebellion...reform was an application of socialist principles” (Shi 399). Reformers of this time used the phrase “socialist democracy.” Coined by Peng Zhen, the idea of socialist democracy was a strategic means for autonomous reforms to appear less westernized to the opposition. These reformers focused less on improving the procedure of village elections (to make them less corrupt and more autonomous), instead, directing their attention to persuading the majority of Beijing’s
high-ranking officials to approve villagers' committees. Tianjin Shi describes how reform was enacted in two stages: pre-1993, the primary goal of "incremental policy implementation: stage one," was to pass Peng's bill as well as to make sure that the results of the elections in the countryside were honored (corrupt or not) (Shi 399). Stage 2 entailed increasing the equality and democratic procedures of the elections.

The NPC, the MCA, the Ministry of Personnel, and the Central Organization Department sent a team of investigators to inspect the functionality of the new Organic Law in villages around China (O'Brien 477). This team could not come to a common evaluation of the reforms. However, since the MCA held significant sway within the government on the topic of villagers' committees, they wrote a list of recommendations for improvements that underscored their observations that "VCs were operating quite well." The investigators concluded that introducing village elections was the best way to reduce tensions between cadre and villagers, and overall, prevent an even larger crisis (477). The recently retired Peng Zhen hosted not only Minister Cui Naifu (O'Brien 477), but also the director of the Organizational Department of the CCP, Song Ping (Niou 5), at his home. There, both Peng Zhen and Bo Yipo convinced them to support Organic Law to the fullest. Cui reported that in terms of Organic Law, his attitude had profoundly changed, and stated that he was "absolutely committed to grassroots democracy" (O'Brien 477). Bo also confirmed that he wholeheartedly approved of the MCA reforms and that the setting was now ripe for implementing autonomy in the rural regions of China. The decisive voice, however, was Song Ping's agreement. Due to Bo Yipo and Peng Zhen's convincing argument, "document No. 19 also accepted the MCA's interpretation that popular elections were a key link in realizing self government" (478). Organic Law was not fully adopted until 1998, but in convincing Song and Cui, it began to thrive after 1989.

During the early stages of this process many in the township, county and provincial levels opposed such reform. Officials thought that granting power to the masses would lead to unrest and chaos (luan). Organic Law also concerned village cadres on the security of their positions. However, the wave of change was unstoppable: "In the face of the ongoing economic and political reform, some gradually realized that they could no longer rely on the traditional way of governing. Although elections may not have been their preferred choice, many came to see them as the only way to cope with new problems arising in the villages" (Shi 393). Even peasants were at first skeptical of the new changes, suspecting them as a political policy to weed out people who did not support the party.

In some villages, however, peasants enthusiastically supported the new reform, and used democracy to oust corrupt village chairmen and officials. The true power embedded in voting quickly spread across the Chinese countryside. Once Organic Law was implemented, it involved "approximately 3.2 million village leaders in more than 734,000 villages. These elections represent a key development in the Chinese political system" (He 1). One aspect that must be understood is how elections were perceived by the masses at this time. This form of democracy was still far from the liberal democratic rights that we accept as the norm in today's Western countries. Dr. Baogang He describes how, "in the early 1990s, an election was considered good if there was no violent confrontation, disturbance, or kinship fighting" (1). Another aspect that hindered the progress of elections during the early stages was "non-competitive" elections. This term describes how some elections had the same number of candidates as seats available, rendering voting procedures futile. He added that these elections began to run in a better fashion; soon they began following a set of sound procedures (1).

We observe a change in the statistics presented in 1990 from those in the subsequent years. During the early stage after the new reforms, a countrywide survey lists, "74.6 percent of rural residents reported that village committee elections had been held in their village and 37.1 percent said the elections were semi-competitive." only three years later, however, the semi-competitiveness of these statistics rose to 51.6 percent (Shi 386). The principal way that officials continued to hold sway over elections was to rig the nomination process. County, township, and village officials recognized the threat to their positions:

Administrators, for their part, often took advantage of the Law's vagueness concerning
election procedures to restrict voters’ freedom of choice. Among other tactics, they monopolized nominations, conducted snap elections, demanded that Party members vote for hand-picked nominees, banned unapproved candidates from making campaign speeches, annulled elections if the ‘wrong’ candidates won, and insisted that voting be conducted by a show of hands (O’Brien 479).

All this changed when villagers began to truly understand the power of elections and became more outspoken about honorable procedure. At this time, the MCA recognized the problem of electoral fraud and began a campaign to end its injustice; the reasoning presented to Beijing was that this fraud leads to unrest among villagers. The MCA-led campaigns attempted to make electoral fraud a criminal offense and to reform the procedures for nominating candidates. The endorsement of MCA officials was very important to the development of the electoral process. Including local authorities in overseeing elections turned the corner against election fraud. Certain provinces became models of proper elections. Fujian Province was “considered a national leader in implementing self government, also the first province to require secret balloting, primaries and open nomination for all VC posts” (481). As other provinces began to see the praise that Fujian officials received for conducting fair elections, they began to follow this model.

The taste of democracy was sweet in the mouths of villagers across China. They began to enact “rightful” resistance based on the new reforms. As the demand for fair elections became ubiquitous, they began to override village officials and submit complaints about fraud. There were cases of villagers who made pilgrimages to Beijing to discuss the problems they were experiencing. The township in Liaoning, for example, prohibited several candidates from running and did not permit secret balloting. After traveling to speak with county-level officials, they went to Beijing and listed complaints citing the entirety of Organic Law from memorization (482). Along with bureaus like the MCA, the actions of spirited villagers such as these were the strongest means of enabling elections to function properly.

Organic Law statistics show continued upward growth throughout the 1990s. However, the topic of democratic development is sensitive since it leads Communist leaders to lose face. While we know that the number of villages holding competitive elections has been increasing, the percentage of this increase varies considerably. In 1997, an editor of a Chinese magazine claimed that only 10 percent of Chinese villages held properly run elections; another source said that one-third of Chinese villages participated in Organic Law; in 1998, the Minister of Civil affairs reported that the number was around 60 percent (485). This number varies considerably not only because of the tension surrounding this issue, but also because election procedures are conducted differently in most provinces (as well as villages).

Since the turn of the century, villagers’ committees have been somewhat stagnant. While the number has grown, and efficiency increased, the breakthroughs in autonomy have been limited compared to those of the 1980s, and ‘90s. This is not to say that these elections have been pushed to the margins of Chinese politics; villagers’ committees play a large role in governing society in the countryside, and even more in larger towns. Besides embodying democratic reform through election, these committees serve many functions. They were responsible for, “the planning village economic and social development, collecting taxes and fees, managing village budget, allocating collective natural resources such as land, ponds, forests within the administrative boundary of the village, enforcing birth control policies” (Niou 1). It is evident that the responsibility of villagers’ committees is not small. Thus, elections are not only a symbol of China’s democratic change, but also play a significant role in on the resource distribution and development of Chinese villages.

**International Role**

Without international support and influence, villagers’ committees and Organic Law would either never have developed, or come about at a much slower pace. Neither the MCA nor the CCP provided money to implement Organic Law. During the early development of village elections, money was only acquired through provincial budgets (Shi 406). However, the MCA used strategic tactics to bring in foreign investment. After the Tiananmen Protests, the MCA founded a Research Society of Basic-Level Governance. The Ford Foundation, at
the time one of the most influential foundations in the world regarding education and the arts, made the first effort to aid Organic Law. Their initial grant opened the door for many foreign journalists and scholars to begin investigating the new phenomenon. Starting in 1993, the MCA began to seek serious financial support from different foreign foundations. It had begun trying to improve the flow of elections and increase the transparency under which they were conducted. It succeeded in obtaining support from the Asia Foundation, the United Nations Development Program, and the International Republican Institute (407). Other organizations that the MCA relied on were the United Nations Development Agency, the European Union, and the Carter Center (O’Brien 484).

Reformers saw the excitement in foreign democracies and used them as a means to overpower opponents of Organic Law. During debates between MCA officials and opponents of reform, they “cited the opinions of foreign experts to support their proposals of reform” (Shi 408). Scholars and experts such as Jonathan Hecht, Kevin O’Brien, and Lorraine Speiss influenced the wave of reform. An example of the weight ascribed to these experts is “O’Brien’s Law.” Kevin O’Brien (described in the introduction, above) suggested that the provincial people’s congress adopt a new policy changing the one vote per family to an individual vote for each person (408). The growing international awareness of these democratic elections cast a new light on China. In the late 1990s, both Presidents Clinton and Carter extolled the village elections during talks with senior Chinese officials (O’Brien 484). The original development of village elections came about naturally. Through the next three decades, however, forces both within China and beyond its borders helped further expand the process and the growth of villagers’ committees.

**ELECTORAL PROCEDURE**

I base my description of the electoral procedure on Emerson M. S. Niou’s work. Niou’s “An Introduction to the Electoral Systems Used in Chinese Villages” details the various electoral procedures that governed the electoral systems in villages; Niou’s paper focuses on the nomination of candidates as well as the final process of electing village leaders. It is important to understand that Organic Law requires that the “chairman, vice-chairman (or deputy chairman), and members of the village committees are to be elected directly by villages for a term of three years” (Niou 1). However, Organic Law does not stipulate the rules or procedures for electing officials, with the result that there is considerable variation in electoral methods both at the province and the village level. My description of the procedures conducted around Chinese villages is not intended to be all encompassing. Studies have not been conducted in every village; Niou’s research identifies common methods used in many villages in China. I include the sample ballots, which Niou provides in his essay, in the appendixes.

**Candidate Nomination**

Niou lists nine different methods of nominating village candidates (6). I limit my description to describe the five most common methods. More often than not, provincial governments define the method they use for village elections. Provinces across China have chosen different approaches to apply nomination procedure methods; some provinces use only one method, but the vast majority allow for a variety of different nomination methods. Fujian and Shaanxi provinces, for example, allow only the joint-nomination method (7). Other villages have methods that differ from these nine listed; some specify that county officials can veto nomination techniques.

The initial group of nominees is not immediately certified on the final ballot: “in most villages, the number of candidates nominated by people or organizations greatly exceeds the number of positions to be filled” (8). However, officials attempt to limit the number of nominees because Organic Law specifies that a candidate can only be elected to a position if he obtains more than half the total votes for that position. Niou describes four primary nomination methods that dictate how candidates ultimately appear on the ballot: the Nomination Vote Method, the Primary Election Method, the Consultative Method, and Village Party Determination. Niou clearly explains how the majority of Chinese provinces conduct this part of the process.
Nomination Vote Method
This method for electing officials is the most simple, as well as the most similar to a liberal form of a democratic election. This technique stipulates that the number of nomination votes that each candidate receives determines the final candidates (the top vote getter becomes the official candidate) (8). Both Jilin and Liaoning Provinces use this method. A modification of this method is used by Hequ County in Shanxi province. In this county the leading two nominees become the official candidates for the chairman position; the third and fourth are converted to official nominees of the vice-chairman position; the fourth and fifth become the final candidates for committee member positions (9). The Nomination Vote Method is simple and straightforward.

Primary Election Method
The election steering committee chooses a list of nominees; then the steering committee organizes a primary election among the voters or the village assembly members to choose the official candidates (9).

The Consultative Method
This method is procedurally more complicated. Based on its repetitive process of evaluation, it is called “three-ups and three-downs, and three announcements.” The candidates are initially nominated by the steering committee, which then gives this list of possible candidates to the village populace. The list of candidates is presented to the village groups to enable them to discuss and debate the best possibilities. A tentative list of choices is given back to the election committee, which, in turn, reviews this list and constructs a new tentative list. This step is again repeated before the village committee finally determines the list. This method is used in Jumadian, Henan Province. This method is a Chinese version of democratic centralism; while it does include villagers’ input, it is heavily manipulated (9).

Village Party Determination
This system is the least democratic of the four. It is similar to the third in procedure. However, instead of the steering committee interacting with village groups, it is now the village party branch that is the final evaluator (9).

Voting & Vote Counting Procedures
As described above, the election process determines three positions: chairman, vice-chairman, and committee members. Each position is given different voting procedures; Niou lists five methods to fill these positions.

Chairman Method
The first procedure, called the chairman method, allows voters to elect the chairman. This newly elected chairman then chooses his own vice-chairman and committee members. This method is very efficient and quick since it eliminates debates and extended ordeals in assigning the other positions. However, this committee can become far too powerful as this form of favoritism allows for an oligarchic reign; the power to elect his own officials allows the Chairman and his peers to control every aspect of village life, instead of having a government that is made up of elected officials, who hold varying opinions. Since the MCA does not enforce this method for such reasons, it is very seldom found in villages today (12).

Simultaneous Elections (One Candidate-One Position)
This system is similar to a liberal democratic voting procedure. In this method, candidates are separated into three different categories on the ballot; by rule, no candidate can run for more than one position. On election day, voters simultaneously choose who they want for each seat. However, many candidates who are running for the chairman position find this method too constricting; if they don’t win, they cannot run for the lower positions (13).

Sequential Voting
In this system, the Chairman is elected first. Following the primary phase, the vice-chairman and then the committee members are elected. The difference in this method is that a defeated member of one phase can run for the lower positions. For example, if a candidate for the chairman seat loses, he can run again for the vice-chairman seat. This also applies to the vice-chairman and committee members. This method of
voting creates many difficulties. One issue that villages who use this procedure face is the problem of re-printing the ballots after the chairman phase has been completed. These elections can take multiple days, sometimes even weeks. This process is also much more expensive than using just one ballot (13).

**Simultaneous Elections (Candidates for the Higher Positions are Also Candidates for the Lower Positions)**
The ballots for this method include the candidates running for chairman in the chairman section, and in the vice-chairman position. The candidates running for chairman and vice-chairman are both listed in the position under candidates running for committee members. Another factor included in this *Simultaneous Election* method is that if a candidate does win the chairman position, for example, then all of his votes are included in his votes for vice-chairman (and so forth to the committee member level of election). This method is problematic due to the Organic Law's requirement that a candidate must win more than fifty percent of the votes to take office; if the winner for the chairman position also wins many votes as the vice-chairman, then it is more than likely that no one in the vice-chairman position will receive fifty percent. Another loophole in this method is that placing each candidate on the ballot for each possible position limits the number of total candidates; thus, lowering competition.

**The Accumulative Vote Method (Simultaneous Elections, One Candidate-Multiple Positions)**
This unique and progressive method of election is only found in Liaoning Province. Ballots using the *Accumulative Vote Method* contain only candidates’ names, and do not include the position they are running for. Voters then write in the positions that they would like the candidates to be elected into. Similar to the *Sequential Method*, the losers in the race for the chairman position’s votes are counted toward the next position, and so on. This Chinese voting innovation permits candidates to compete concurrently for the same seat.

**CASE STUDIES**
I have set the stage for a more focused look at grassroots democracy by providing a brief examination of the villagers’ committees’ history and procedures in the section above. This section lays out two detailed observations of villagers’ committees. The previous sections built the foundation for my summarization and analysis of Yusheng Yao and Melanie Manion’s case studies. Their detailed fieldwork and reporting on villagers’ committees adds a new perspective to this thesis, as well as the means for us (as observers) to evaluate the claims of the progress of these organizations.

**West Village**
I begin by examining Yusheng Yao’s “Village Elections and Redistribution of Political Power and Collective Property.” This article, published in 2009, describes the transition in power during two elections in a village in northern China. Yao, for purposes of the villager’s safety, calls this village “West Village.” His study focuses on the corruption and poor governing techniques applied through elections, as well as on how new leadership fails to address village problems.

West Village, a large agrarian community, is located fifty miles northeast of Beijing. The two thousand residents of West village live on about 3,400 Mu (about .9 square miles) of cultivated land. The economy of West Village is built on household grain farming, private enterprises of book binding workshops, and garment shops; the rest of the village work comprises 24 grain processors, owners of convenience stores, restaurants, and other daily service shops (129). Yao introduces this village saying,

Before free elections, corruption and bad governance by the old leadership had seriously eroded and the collective property and harmed the villagers’ economic interests. Largely because of this poor state of affairs and active opposition by elite members, the last two elections in 2004 and 2007 were very competitive and resulted in a change of leadership (128).

The factionalism and competitiveness of the elections in West Village clearly shows issues of separation between different groups, as well as between the villagers and the elite. Yao’s paper
describes how the villagers of West Village see elections as a means to elect, “moral and capable leaders who will protect and enhance their interests;” whereas the elite only see elections as a tool to increase power and profit (128). Yao describes that the distaste for present members serving as village leaders and that it is a shared opinion of both the villagers and elites. Before telling the story of West village, it is important to look at the research questions that Yao’s analysis is based upon:

How did the competitive elections take place and what was their impact on village politics? What are the major problems in the village and what caused them? Why has the discontent of the villagers persisted and how can the problems concerning them be resolved? (130).

By keeping these questions in mind, we can understand the motivation behind this project and how the information has been analyzed.

Yao uses pseudonyms for the main characters who are the key protagonists in the evolution of West Village. “RW” was a party member who served in various posts; before the election of 2001, RW was temporarily in charge of agricultural production in the local villagers’ committee. RW regained this post in the 2004 election. “MB” was the village chief from 1990 until 2004. “CQ” was the party chief from 1990 until 2005. XM was an entrepreneur who played an interesting role in the development of West Village (130).

Organic Law was only instituted into West Village Politics in 2001. During the first election in the village, RW had a very strong lead in the election polls. However, fearing losing face and his title as leader, MB brought in XM to act as a broker of a secret deal. RW agreed to drop out of the race allowing MB to keep his title. The cause of this secret deal was that, come the second election of 2004, MB would not run again. RW saw this as a fair deal as he was certain to take leadership in 2004 (131).

Come the election of 2004, MB broke his promise and ran for office again. Factionalism formed due to this breach in trust. XM saw MB’s greed as a major flaw in leadership and sided with RW. CQ, MB’s friend of many years, sided with MB to support the continued corruption of leadership. In the 2004 primary elections, RW was ahead of MB by 150 votes. MB began to illegally buy votes. Inevitably, XM and RW accused MB of fraud. The confusion and anger of the villagers led to disarray in West Village. The buying of votes began to give MB the lead in the election; not wanting to unfairly lose, RW’s supporters blocked the polling station and sent a message to the township officials requesting a formal investigation (131).

The standoff between the factions lasted about four months. Such problems illustrate how election manipulation was (and still sometimes is) practiced in village elections. RW eventually won after ten attempted elections. However, the township investigation of the fraudulent behavior of CQ and MB did not take place and the villagers continued to protest: “by June 2005, nine months after the election, the leadership was in paralysis and villagers’ dissatisfaction was on the rise” (132). Villagers saw the old leadership as the origin of problems relating to poor governance and civil unrest. They blamed CQ as the core of their problems, not the former leader MB. The villagers ascribed the problems with MB and CQ as, “their problematic leadership and governing style; second their questionable financial transactions” (133). These leaders’ actions lacked transparency; villagers suspected that they used their power to extract large sums of money by using collective property as the source of individual construction projects.

CQ saw his political demise approaching, but before he left, recommended the new party chief be CF (a 40-year-old who had been the apprentice of CQ, the head of a construction team, and a Party member). By violating the correct procedural rules, CF was elected as Party Chief. CF partnered with the two ousted Party members and controlled the next election of 2007. They campaigned strongly for a new candidate named SL (a small business man, who was married to CQ’s niece and thus also owed his Party membership to him). SL was no threat to these Party members’ leadership, and would play a puppet role in the future. Since the tactics used by MB, SL, CQ, and CF had been so cunning in controlling the result of this election, the village had no credible evidence on which to base a protest (141). Yao’s conclusion of this study describes CF positioned as Party chief, MB as a member of the Party branch committee, and SL as the village chief. RW’s power was taken away, and
he was given a seat on the village committee (isolating him from the CP’s power).

The study of West Village illustrates the issues that continue to plague Organic Law. Yao lists, "poor governance, corruption, and misappropriation of collective property, which directly harmed villagers’ economic interests" (134) as the major problems that elections still face. The discontent of the villagers with the corruption and foul play led to political participation; the motivation of anger drove villagers not only to protest within the village, but to reach up to higher level authorities to step in with a decisive hand. CQ and MB both came from strong communist cadre backgrounds. By cultivating power through their family ties and personal connections, they were able to manipulate policies and live affluent lives based on corrupt actions.

Yao evaluates the situation in West Village by describing how, after the institution of Organic Law, politics within the village became much more complex. The positive outlook is that the will of the majority, whether persuaded through sly means or not, determines the outcome of the elections. However, factionalism and Party-dominated power plagues the honesty of these results. Yao asserts that the source of the problem lies in the divide of new and old officials. The example of West Villages also illustrates how corrupt Party members have benefited from unfair practices of collective ownership.

This system gives village cadres enormous power without effective institutional checks and balances. The power of village cadres had been reduced by Deng’s de-communization in the 1980s, and in most agrarian villages cadres’ power has been further eroded along with collective ownership in the accelerated commercialization and privatization since 1992. In better-off industrialized villages with collective enterprises, collective ownership and cadres’ power have been strengthened and enhanced. Either way, collective ownership still dominates the political economy of most villages. As long as it remains the major component of the village economy, it will inevitably lead to contradictions between cadres and villagers because cadres have opportunities and incentives to abuse their power (143).

While Organic Law has provided villagers with a voice in the electoral process, Yao believes that the village needs further democratization; villagers must play a role within village governance and not just election. Yao does not provide examples of how such participation would look. We can assume, however, that through ways such as voting for village policy changes, villagers would be more empowered and thus, play a more central role within village politics. Through the West Village example, we see how the villagers’ voting forced a change in power. The problems of corruption, land encroachment and redistribution of collective property and resources continue today (144). Organic Law has provided the basis for democratic change to curtail corruption and favor practices conducted in a fair manner, but Yao demonstrates how Chinese villagers still need to act in order to attain their individual rights.

57 Villages

The second paper I use to supplement this section is Manion’s “Democracy, Community, Trust: The Impact of Elections in Rural China.” This paper focuses on the impact that village elections have on the relationship of elite-official-villager trust (Manion 302). This dynamic is very important as it dictates development and stability. Manion’s study is comprised of data from 57 villages across China. The fieldwork, conducted from 1990 through 1996, adds on to where Yao left off by compiling data from a range of villages, and from it, Manion draws conclusions as to how perceptions of leaders within the village affect the dynamic of democratic development.

Manion begins by saying that is important to note that the corruption of village leaders is often exaggerated. That being said, the perception of corruption tells us a lot about the relationship between officials and citizens. These common views of corruption, which in many cases are groundless, reflect local practices. They also reflect the level of trust within the given community. One of the largest issues in China today is the income gap between the elite and the poor. Manion illustrates how the CCP saw village elections as a means to restrain local manipulation of power and villager inequality (304).

Manion illustrates how the introduction of democracy has either lessened corruption within
Chinese villages, or at least, “enhanced collective beliefs, accurate or not, that leaders are generally clean and not corrupt” (304). By definition, democratic elections empower voters to choose their own leaders; besides motivations of self-interest, voters look to the morality and integrity of these candidates to make their decisions. Besides the affect of elections, grassroots democratization is also based on financial transparency and villagers’ participation in village decision-making (304).

After Organic Law was instituted, democracy provided new implications for how village members recognize their direct leaders. As demonstrated by Yao, the factionalism that can develop from corrupt elections can quickly lead to villager unrest. Manion places a large emphasis on how lineage structure within the village elites or officials can dictate how the village trust dynamic appears. Enemies of reform (from high-ranking Beijing officials to township officials) stated that clan backing of candidates competing for power would cause extreme conflict between villagers. Analysis has shown that both clan and single surname dominated villages cause large internal distrust (307).

The main variable of electoral progress is trust. From the first gathering of data in 1990 to the second in 1996, statistics show a change in the direction of more expansive trust. Manion states that we must inspect these statistics more carefully, and not, without grounding, observe the increase in villager trust. One reason for her caution is that the first study was conducted after the Tiananmen crackdowns of 1989 (a year that also suffered economic slowdown), which caused her to tentatively word the interview questions. In 1996, however, an economic boom had buoyed the well-being of the villagers and questions could be asked more directly (307). While villagers’ perceptions of democracy definitely play a large role in their level of trust in their leaders, economic change also holds a lot of sway. Villagers tend to both credit and blame leaders for income change: “As to the change in income inequality, against an historical background of Maoist egalitarianism, many ordinary Chinese associate inequality with low moral scruples of those with wealth and power” (314).

Through communal economic success, leaders are often labeled as trustworthy. It is only when the general populace of a village is suffering economically that they complain about corruption. Through the scope of Manion’s study, it becomes clear that opinion about the effectiveness of villagers’ committees is based on more than just fair democratic practices.

Manion concludes by saying that the institution of formal democratic procedures is very important to increase the level of trust within villages. Both electoral contestation, and distrust in clan factions, are institutional and communal means of progressing democracy. Manion’s study argues that electoral democracy has progressed since its origin in the early 1980s. This example of improved autonomy is clearly identified at the village level, but very rarely higher up. Since data for this article was collected in 1990 and 1996, democratic transition has been seen at the township level. However, Manion shows that the electoral procedures of Chinese villages are scarcely used to govern at higher political levels of Chinese society.

Case Studies Analysis
The case studies presented above are examinations of villagers’ committees and electoral democracy in Chinese villages. Scholars Yusheng Yao and Melanie Manion’s extensive field research on this topic enables me to include detailed information about the procedure and perception of elections. The study of West Village clearly demonstrates that while Organic Law has empowered villagers, there are still many forms of corruption within society. On the other hand, Manion’s paper takes a broader understanding of trust between elected officials and villagers to illustrate that, while the issue of trust has many determining factors, electoral democracy and contestation have improved the villager-elite relationship in Chinese villages. In the next section, I present individual interviews that I conducted through email to give a first-person perspective to my research.

INTERVIEWS
In this section, I review and analyze six interviews I conducted through my connections in China. My intent is to add current voices, experiences and
opinions to the formal field research and academic writings on this subject; it is not intended to provide an all-encompassing overview of the modern opinions held by Chinese people on villagers’ committees. It is possible to derive assumptions from the information I obtained regarding the varying state of village elections as well as how opinions on this subject differ. The interviewees vary in age and where they live in China. To keep my interviewees safe, I kept my questions benign and succinct. I conducted these interviews by giving two friends in China copies of the questions I had written. Then they gave them to other friends or associates who I have never met. They were then returned to my original connections who sent the responses back to me. Not only do I not include the names of the interviewees for safety reasons, but I also have no direct connections to the interviewees either. I include my interview questions with their compiled answers in Appendix F.

My interview sources represent widely varied locations ranging from Yun County in Yunnan to Baimiao Village in Hubei. They also range in age from 22 to the oldest, who is 59. With the exception of interviewee D, who lived in Baimiao Village, all of my interviewees lived in villages or towns with villagers’ committees. Each answered my questions differently; some even appeared misinformed on the questions I asked. For example, interviewee A said that the elections began in her county in the 1950s. Another pattern that emerged in their answers was ambivalence. Interviewee B, who is 22 years old, seemed not care about these elections and thus did not know much about them. In addition, not all of my connections had participated in the elections that were held in their towns or villages. Only two of the five voted in their village elections.

All of the interviewees answered the question, “How did these elections impact the daily life of the town or village?” in essentially the same way. Interviewee B replied, “Yes. People like to talk about our new leaders and the new policies that will influence daily life.” Besides this slight affect, all answered that little was changed by the election in their personal or in the communal livelihood. An interesting difference in the responses confirms that the electoral process varies from place to place. In Yun County, interviewee A votes anonymously in his/her factory on a paper, which is in turn dropped into a box; interviewee B has not voted yet and does not know how it works (illustrating the lack of voting education in Chinese schools); in Sanming County, Fujian, interviewee C told me that for each election, the government informs them how, where and when to vote. Officials are present during the voting process in order to oversee and assist; in Beijing, interviewee E said that voting is conducted in private booths and anonymously; interviewee F of Luzhou county, Sichuan, had not yet voted but had been provided the county’s official regulation.

As discussed above, corruption is often the main cause of the degradation of these elections. This was clearly illustrated in the answers I received. Four of five interviewees who answered the question, “Did you ever have a sense that the elections were somewhat rigged in your town” (translated “rigged” into the Chinese form of fubai, which can be directly translated to corruption), stated that at least some parts of the election process were corrupted. Corruption varied from the issues of guanxi (Chinese word literally meaning relation; this word has strong connotations in China; in this case guanxi is exemplified as to how officials are elected by their relationship to the town or town elites through gifts or means of power) to interviewee B saying that the elections are so corrupt, “they only exist in name.” Interviewee C responded to the question with a resounding “no.” This reserved response allows the reader to draw their own conclusion.

Most of the individuals who were interviewed currently live in large cities. Through their responses, they appear content with their lives even though electoral procedures have changed from being more prominent in smaller cities, compared to their present day residences. In larger cities, these individuals are exposed to Western influences such as consumerism, mass media, and the means of acquiring information that is not censored by the CCP. It seems obvious that they have a larger wealth of knowledge of how politics works in Western democracies. That being said, these individuals do not answer the interview questions with strong opinions that the CCP should become more like a liberal democracy.

The last question of the interview asks about the future of Chinese politics. Only one answer
criticized the CCP, stating unequivocally that, “a democratic government is the most ideal.” Every interviewee, however, said that in the foreseeable future the CCP will continue to practice authoritarian rule. The greatest significance that the interview responses underlined is the disparities between people’s attitudes regarding village elections, and the procedural differences across China. After their taste of “democratic” processes, it amazes me (as an outside observer) that my interviewees have so much faith in the Communist Party. In the final section I introduce prominent scholars who not only criticize the CCP, but predict its imminent decline.

CONCLUSION

Since the late 1970s, China has been in a constant state of transformation. This paper has focused on a relatively small component of this change, one that most impacted rural communities and small towns. The evolution of villagers’ committees and Organic Law demonstrate that the force of change in Chinese society does not only lie within the CCP, but in its massive population. Chinese authoritarianism controls many of the actions that affect Chinese society; specifically, it attempts to hold back democratic progress, and the drive to evolve toward Western political models.

After the Mao period, China opened its doors to foreign markets and has grown its GDP exponentially year after year. There is no denying that China has become one of the largest economic superpowers of the 21st century. Larry Diamond argues that China’s economic growth and expansion inexorably primes it for a democratic transition. While China’s per capita income rate is currently less than Malaysia, in a short amount of time it will exceed the per capita income rate of South Korea, in 1987, when it turned to democracy (Diamond 10). The trend of contemporary political history links wealth and established democracy. This socioeconomic development concept of modernization theory explains how wealth, more often than not, prompts democracy; it further underscores the research that urban areas are the first locations to experience democratic change (Shi 387). China, however, bucks this trend in two respects: first, while China has propelled itself to emerge as one of the world’s economic powerhouses, it has remained a communist, authoritarian regime—while there are examples of democratic development (Organic Law), communist practices still control and direct the country; second, China’s deviation from this model is that the transitions made so far have been limited to village elections as opposed to city-centered elections.

Samuel P. Huntington, an American political scientist, coined the term “Democracy’s Third-Wave,” to define the process that began in the mid-1970s and ran through the late 1980s that saw countries such as the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Latin American countries, and Eastern Europe (after the collapse of the Soviet Union) progress to democratic forms of governance. This trend continues with events such as the Arab Spring and South East Asia’s development towards more liberal democratic governments. The recent transition is being labeled by some as “Democracy’s Fourth-Wave.” The biggest contribution to this growing phenomenon would be a democratic transition in the People’s Republic of China. To understand this possibility, we must first evaluate China’s state as an authoritarian regime, and examine how prone it is to forthcoming change.

Francis Fukuyama’s “The Patterns of History,” compares China’s highly institutionalized, centralized government to other authoritarian regimes, such as North Korea and Syria. China, in contrast, is a rule-bound state that enables more complex, coherent, adaptable, and autonomous development (Fukayama 20). Since the Mao era, Chinese leadership has given way to somewhat smooth transition and organized procedure:

The Party has developed a collective-leadership system that observes term limits and vests power in the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Leadership succession, one of the great weaknesses of many authoritarian regimes, is thus much less of a problem in China, nontransparent though the process is. Like all classic Leninist parties, the CCP has an elite structure that can transmit instructions from the hierarchy down to the neighborhood level. Its ability to enforce rules, from economic directives to control of political opposition, is much stronger than that of other authoritarian regimes (20).
Fukuyama continues by underscoring that adaptability is the CCP’s largest institutionalized problem. Its paranoid response to the Arab Spring demonstrates how the CCP struggles with a more liberalized form of dictatorship (20). China is considered one of the most controlled authoritarian regimes and contends with more problems than simply adaptability.

As illustrated in previous sections, corruption is one of China’s pervasive problems. Besides the issues of guanxi, the selection of political leaders is a nontransparent process. The majority of corruption accusations occur at the lower levels of the party. It is evident that the top leaders of China have the benefit of large perquisites, but Fukuyama speculates that they are not diverting large amounts of money to their own accounts like high-ranking Russian officials (21). That being said, the Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perception Index lists China as the 78th most corrupt of 178 countries. Corruption is one of the leading causes of citizen dissatisfaction, and may prove to be the leading reason for future unrest. Fukuyama illustrates how the CCP ignores the modern, political aspirations of Chinese citizens, which leads directly to violent social protests. From this perspective, it might appear that dissatisfaction with the CCP will be its downfall. Through economic gains, however, the CCP has been able to provide citizens with jobs, security, and better living standards (23); this fortification of citizen’s comfort is one of the main factors that are currently holding back the pent-up explosion of citizens’ outcries that could drive democratic transition.

China contends with significant, systemic issues such as the shift out of an export driven growth model, falling birthrates, and gender imbalance. These changes are large problems that China and other Asian countries will soon face. As economic prosperity increases, the Chinese middle class will continue to expand. Diamond observes that this will also prove to be one of the largest instigators of democratic change. As this new class emerges in China, they will demand democracy; if the CCP submits to this demand it will lose power, if it does not yield, then its undoing is also imminent (Diamond 12). These problems indicate that the CCP’s strength is being whittled away and may soon be more illusory than real.

This thesis’ analysis illustrates the development, procedure, examination, and personal voices of villagers’ elections in China. The slow moving democratic changes occurring in the Chinese countryside, and now moving into smaller cities, is a significant component of Chinese democratic transition. The growth of Organic Law, Villagers’ Committees, and electoral procedures are not the single driving force of Chinese political change. However, They do largely contribute in this evolution. Mao Zedong proved to the world that the power of change in China lies within the peasantry. Mao’s idea of continuous revolution has morphed from the anti-bourgeois and socialist ideals of the 1940s to the current popular demand for equality and freedom of speech.

The case study and interview sections of this paper demonstrate villagers’ committees’ electoral processes, which are by no means perfect. Corruption, procedural confusion, and lack of interest impede democratic practices. That being said, the modern Chinese countryside is unrecognizable compared to what it was just 25 years ago. The implementation of Organic Law is not the sole factor that has caused this change; modernization has played a large role in prompting the difference in the villages’ appearances and collective beliefs. Villagers’ elections, while not a seamless democratic institution, have planted a democratic seed in China’s countryside. The combination of these elections and the growing problems that China is now beginning to face are likely to be the cause of China’s political transition to democracy.

One hundred years ago, China held a free and fair election to determine the national government. That democracy failed due to competition for power and corruption (Gilley 3). At that time in history, the Chinese people were not ready for democratic transition; the country had only recently developed ideas of statehood and nationalism. Power-hungry individuals and factionalism held back the change and paved the way for decades of suffering and tyrannical rule. Looking at today’s situation, Diamond and Huntington’s ideas on how modernization and economic growth impact politics, illustrate that China is ripe for democratic change. The protests of 1989 demonstrated the Chinese people’s desire for freedom of speech and democracy, but the CCP
managed to hold back the social outrage and continued to contain the democratic groundswell with economic development. However, as the bubble rises again, and shows increasing signs of bursting, the CCP will have a much harder time containing the desires of the general populace.

When this change eventually occurs, it will be a monumental event, not only for China, but also for the balance of global political power. Bruce Gilley describes this event as being, “no less significant than the Russian Revolution of 1917 or the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989” (243). In terms of sheer numbers, this change means that the majority of the world’s population will live in a democracy. Indeed, China’s switch to democracy has even larger implications. Democracies in different countries are different and unique to each country. Gilley opines that Chinese democracy will have its own flavor. It is impossible to predict what precise form it will take, but one can imagine a mix of liberal and social democracy. China is the most populous country in the world and has a history and culture that is richer and extends longer than most; it will potentially develop a new, advanced form of democracy. This progressiveness could help influence other countries suffering under regressing democracies or authoritarian regimes. In describing this transition, Gilley writes, “Even without any major innovations in the practice of democracy emanating from China, the mere adoption of this long-evolving and never perfected system...will have a profound effect on deepening democracy” (248).

I agree with Diamond in that when this change occurs, China’s political power might not immediately evolve into democratic practice. A scramble might occur—similar to that which occurred one hundred years ago—for the leadership of China. But I believe that the changeover to democracy will occur. Similar to France and the United States, however, this democracy might require time to develop. Henry Rowen, an American politician, predicted that China would make this change by 2015, and a change to full liberal democracy by 2025; Diamond agrees with this estimate (Diamond 10). However, picking a distinct year seems like a random gamble, but all of the drivers for change illustrated in this paper suggest that change in China is imminent. Tianjian Shi describes how, “politics is an art rather than a set of rules to be applied mechanically” (Shi 411). The CCP has played the role of the “political artist” for more than half a century, but democracy’s-fourth-wave embodies a renaissance of political development.

Dr. Baogang He and Jean Oi give two polarized observations that sum up both positive and negative findings on villagers’ committees. Oi illustrates in her assessment of Chinese reform that since village elections have been pushed by the central state they are clearly part of an underlying policy agenda (Oi 626). The reasoning Oi gives for the implementation of Organic Law are, “not as an end in themselves but as a means to solve the problems of economic stagnation and cadre recruitment...village elections are a pressure valve to let peasants vent their dissatisfaction, but one meant to point the responsibility for continued poverty and poor leadership” (626). Oi’s criticisms are a necessary understanding to the Party’s motivation for the continued allowance of villagers’ elections. In 2003, however, Dr. Baogang He praised villagers’ elections as a means of empowering elected village officials to the point of surpassing the local party branch (He 2). He continues to describe how the process of villagers’ elections has reached beyond the arena of only villages:

Elections have been extended beyond the village-committee level. From 1999 to 2001, five experimental direct elections were conducted for township heads in Sichuan, Shanxi, Shenzhen, and Henan provinces, and although the CCP has since formally stopped the process, such elections continue to take place in provinces such as Yunnan and Hainan. In addition, elections for urban residential committees have taken place in Qingdao, Shanghai, and Beijing (He 2).

He’s argument confirms the leap that villagers’ committees have made since 1979. Both of these examinations depict how elections within China are a multi-faced organism. I look at He’s observation, however, as a more current and therefore an accurate portrayal of the evolution and possibilities that lie within villagers’ committees.

Citizens across China have now been exposed to some form of elections for more than thirty years. These elections have proved very successful in some locations, but stagnant in others. While
only a minute sample, the interviews that constitute my personal research for this thesis, illustrate that many of the citizens who participated in elections believe that corruption was present in some form in the electoral process. Regardless of the fact that feelings may differ on the effectiveness and significance of Chinese governance, it is clear that villagers’ elections have played a pivotal role in giving China’s populace a taste for democracy. This study has shown the different aspects that have continued to add and take away from villagers’ committees and elections, while also demonstrating the slow political transition that has been occurring. Organic Law may not be the single driving force of China’s evolution to democracy, but it has and continues to be a crucial factor in the change of beliefs, actions, and therefore involvement of the Chinese peasantry. Scholars might look back on China’s recent history and recognize that villagers’ elections were the initial spark that grew into an unstoppable conflagration that, once again in China’s long history, led the country into a new political direction.

REFERENCES

Births of a Nation: Liberation and the One-Child Policy for Women in Urban China

EMMA RAFAELOF

When Deng Xiaoping’s “opening up and reform” began in 1979, population control, known widely as the “one-child policy” was a priority for Chinese modernization. Now one of the largest economies in the world, China’s markets have been expanding along with the growth of its population of over 1.3 billion. The one-child policy has thus sought to limit women’s reproductive choices and capabilities in order to maintain stability. Official narratives would have it that the one-child policy subsequently empowers women in reducing reproductive burdens. Meanwhile, the foreign press has negatively publicized the one-child policy as a human rights violation that has resulted in worsening problems for modern Chinese women. As an analytical medium, this paper approaches the topic of the one-child policy through three distinct lenses: women’s status in the present (with a historical framework), changes in family construction, and trends in reproduction. I conclude with that the policy, though having proven beneficial in some of regards, has also worked to stymie the progress of women’s status by maintaining now-irrelevant patterns of reproduction and family planning. I thus suggest making women’s interests a priority, rather than positioning women’s interests as an auxiliary benefit, as the solution to current issues arising from and around the one-child policy.

Introduction: The Population Problem

The “one-child policy” came into effect in late 1979 under reformer Deng Xiaoping, who, after the Maoist period between 1949 and 1976, sought to modernize the country through a combination of economic, political, and social means. The introduction of market concepts and “socialism with Chinese characteristics” allowed for a more relaxed social setting that could accept outside, “Western” ideas, but ultimately re-utilize them for Chinese purposes. Of the numerous problems that faced administration and populace of the time, overpopulation was an imminent threat to not just progress, but also stability. The People’s Republic was still reeling from the agricultural and environmental devastation of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), making resources scarcer as the population grew larger. Deng incorporated population limitation in his “Four Modernizations” slogan, aiming to reduce the rate of growth by 1985 to 5 per 1000 to reach essentially zero population growth by the year 2000 (Greenhalgh, Just One-Child 234-235). Yet while one-child policy was push for modernization, it was also a bold response to the problems left behind by the Maoist campaigns (Milwertz 38). That boldness has since translated into what many view as a relentless pursuit of population control, from within Chinese borders and around the globe. The contemporary Chinese state suffers from some obvious consequences of the one-child policy that foreigners as well as native Chinese must recognize, but there are conflicting views within and between each of these groups on whether the policy was ultimately a good decision. The foreign press has been littered with stories of coerced abortions, forced sterilization, and high ratios of gender imbalance. Needless to say, this presents a rather damaging view of the one-child policy. With its intrusion into what is considered one of the most private spheres of life, the one-child policy has thus gained an international reputation as another egregious abuse of human rights perpetrated by the authoritarian Chinese government.

Some researchers and scholars, on the other hand, have been optimistic about the overall effect of the one-child policy. Because the start of the one-child policy was concurrent with that of
China's reform era, there has long been the hope that population stability, coupled with economic progress, would eventually lead to democratization. Those hoping for a Chinese democracy initially assumed that there would be a correlation between population stability, population equality, and the advance of the economy. On the contrary, a look at the current state of affairs points to increased inequalities among social classes and genders. The income gap has steadily expanded over the past three decades, creating a sharp contrast between the poverty of the countryside and the affluence of urban centers (Moore1). Gender inequality is highly variable between regions, classes, backgrounds, lifestyles, and the like. The one-child policy is similarly multivalent, and the economic vicissitudes of China in the past thirty-some years are inevitably the framework of its analysis. Gender inequality has existed in China throughout its history, long before the advent of the one-child policy or its accompanying reforms. Policy development and implementation thus retain aspects of that inequality such that family planning has evolved along gender discrepancies. At the same time, it has helped to shape gender differences alongside reforms of the 1980s. The subsequent impediment to women's advancement also undermines the progress of the nation as a whole. As women are disadvantaged, so too are certain economic opportunities lost and sociocultural developments hindered.

In combination with the problems of gender inequality, China is beginning to face significant difficulties with the amount of elderly and aging citizens as compared to its youth (Whyte & Xu 169). The task of caring for the disproportionately large population of seniors will be a burden for the state and the younger generations, a prospect that carries a number of daunting implications for Chinese economic, social, and political stability. In light of these problems, their potential future, and their origin from the one-child policy, Chinese officials must recognize the necessity of the policy's amendment, however, slight. For though there are very grave factors that demand the existence of a birth planning policy, there are obvious problems with the status quo that must be dealt with at the policy-making level as well as at the sociocultural level.

The Subjects of Chinese Population Policy

Notwithstanding the unhealthy reputation that it has accrued internationally, the one-child policy is harmful in ways to the party-state that it should see from an economic and social development perspective. A Western view will doubtless be critical of the authoritarian party-state's administrative methods, but even in light of that, one may at least have valid claims to make on the efficacy of such methods in that political context. More specifically, the ills of the one-child policy, its environment, and its origins are raised in this paper to suggest that even with its authoritarian hold on reproduction, the government has the power to take measures that would diminish the policy's negative effects on women while also maintaining its population goals. Social education and even the appearance of reform is helpful for forwarding women's interests, interest which the state can depict as being in line with its own, a strategy of promotion that it has utilized in the past and can very well do once again.

Ultimately, this paper also posits that any such proactivity would benefit the state in both the short and long term. Reforming approaches to education and policy implementation has benefits for the physical and psychological health of its citizens, particularly those female citizens whose childbearing the state relies on. The state stands to benefit from promoting women's rights and concerning itself more scrupulously with reproductive health. Prioritizing female health alongside population projections would involve tweaking the policy and its surrounding propaganda to effect both women's advancement and marital satisfaction. If women have access to reproductive healthcare that prioritizes their individual needs, they are less likely to feel undermined and pressured by family planning policies. That relief has the potential to positively affect their married lives, decreasing anxieties and tensions between spouses and subsequently

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making for lower rates of divorce. Social harmony is a constant priority for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the sole party in charge of operating the nation and thus highly concerned with maintaining some level of social stability, part of which is supplemented by individual and interpersonal satisfaction among its citizens.

On City vs. Countryside
From her time researching in Dalian, Vanessa Fong notes:

... the efforts of daughters born prior to the one-child policy were severely hindered by a patrilineal system that overwhelmingly favored sons at the expense of their sisters. In contrast, urban singleton daughters enjoy unprecedented support for their effort to challenge that work against them while utilizing those that work in their favor.

Fong’s observations from her case studies ring hopeful for the fate of young Chinese women, but even she acknowledges that there is a demographic specificity to female empowerment ("China’s One Child" 1105). It is urban-residing daughters who stand to benefit most from the changes set in motion by the one-child policy. The distinction of urban residence, among other distinguishers, is particularly important in light of the urban housing system, which provides few privileges to urban migrants, many of whom are female. Due to the demographic disparity and additional concerns with population growth and aging, this paper will, in disagreement with Fong, shed a slightly less optimistic light on the situation of urban Chinese women, the same subjects of Fong’s research.

The division between urban and rural Chinese women is foremost to the concerns of this paper, as there are sharp contrasts in their societies, struggles, and capacities for labor inside and outside the home. Standards of living vary significantly between women who conduct farming work and those who live in the cities. Though women dwelling in the cities have historically been relegated to the home, they now have the freedom to choose between a working life and a home life. The previously domestic-focused model of femininity excluded them from work while affording them other luxuries of lifestyle, establishing certain advantages that were (and, in some cases, remain) inaccessible to rural women. At the same time, urban women are more exposed to feminine stereotypes and are often disadvantaged from them (Fong, Only Hope 111-112). The expectations that accompany the dissemination and representation of these ideas in urban environments creates a contradictory narrative about the proper role of women, whether that means being an object, a worker, a producer, or something else entirely. Work and home life for rural women often overlaps due to the nature of farming communities. In other words, the production of agriculture and the production of children are somewhat mutually contingent upon each other. As such, rural women's obligations to the home are viewed as non-negotiable and essential (Hershatter 57). Clearly, societies of the urban and rural Chinese women vary to such extents based on socioeconomic advantages, freedom of choice in work or marriage, and environments that have more influence from traditional community ideals or newer individualist, consumerist ones. This kind of cultural contrast between urban and rural women poses pertinent differences between the execution and "official" legislation of birth planning policies.

Education is another influential factor of analyzing women under the one-child policy. This paper focuses on women who have completed at least junior or high school education, which constitutes the majority of urban resident women (Hall 32-41). A large number of urban women have either state-sponsored or more official jobs in some capacity that puts greater pressure on them to adhere to the policy. Moreover, Chinese women living in cities have higher rates of education, and thus also have greater participation within the professional world in addition some other advantages of urban society. The women encountered through my primary and secondary sources vary in levels of professional and academic achievement, though on average they have exceeded secondary or high school education. For young women who are approaching marriageable and childbearing ages, the case studies and research used for this paper concentrated on women who had already earned or were seeking tertiary degrees. I focus on this portion of the population with the assumption that this demographic composes the forefront of Chinese
women’s movements, and thus suggest that this position of importance will heavily influence the direction of the one-child policy’s future. This demographic selection is also of particular salience, as family planning measures are more frequently aimed at women in urban environments with more institutionalized occupations, and an increased dependence on the state for resources (Kane 196; Whyte & Parish 129).

Through the preparation and early stages of the birth planning policy, officials recognized the ease of applying such measures to urban couples in comparison to rural ones (Milwertz 90-93). The variance in implementation can be attributed to a variety of factors, the most obvious being differently structured relationships between citizens and their local administration. However, urban residents are influenced by the exercise of hard and soft power from the government. Economic stability and incentives for urban residents are generally contingent upon compliance with the policy. In the same vein, educational and other ideological persuasions can also influence those in urban communities to respect official wishes and more readily support government directives. Urban environments have a more easily observable government presence with greater exposure to state workers, state businesses, and mass media supported with government interests. Though the Maoist regime aimed for a close relationship to the rural peasantry, commitment to the Party and Party ideology from that population pales in comparison to the strength of kinship and other local networks.

Traditional beliefs and customs remain predominant in rural China, a fact that becomes all too obvious with regard to the one-child policy when surveying birth ratios and marriage practices. Agricultural communities also continue to build families around sons, relocating new couples and young families along the male line. Uxorilocal marriages, where sons-in-law relocate to the natal homes of their wives, are frowned upon as a shameful anomaly (Davis 66). The inherent preference for sons and the male line, stimulated by a need for farmhands, manifest in the relocation of new couples within the son’s natal home rather than the daughter’s. In addition to being accustomed to more conservative or traditional preferences, some in the countryside maintain these models of family construction as a means of economic security because they lack access to public services and goods (Whyte & Xu 166; Sicular 94). Consequently, a large portion of the "exceptions" in the single-child policy are attributed to a long-held attachment to these family constructions, where farmers and other rural workers are unwilling to stop at either one son or, especially, one daughter, and need the security of one or two children. The policy in rural areas even allows for the birth of a second child should the first be female, an allowance that was created with the potential to deter peasant women from infanticide and still allow a male-dominated workforce (White 167). Official directives are still weakened in the face of a potential shortage of workers as well as a difficulty in securing fines from peasant communities. With these difficulties at hand, the amount of extra children allowed is often a compromise between the power of local administration and the demands of the surrounding community (Kane 197).

**Holding Up Half of the Sky: Historical Constructs**

For the greater part of Chinese history, women's roles in society and their roles in the home were one in the same. Being a woman translated into being a productive member of the home as wife and mother rather than being a productive participant in the workforce. This is due largely to the predominance of Confucianism in society, combined with a cultural predisposition for the "three Ps:” patriarchy, patrilineality, and patrilocality; in other words, a male-dominant social hierarchy, a male-dependent genealogy, and a male-centric system of relocation and familial organization. In the more recent late twentieth century context, women were brought into the political scene via, first, socialist egalitarianism and, second, market participation, yet the shadow of Confucianism continues to influence gender dynamics and Chinese family construction. I will examine briefly the nature of marriages and family construction in pre-modern China so as to create a background for marriages and reproduction in the later twentieth century. Understanding marriage practices affords insight into the deeply
entrenched nature of Chinese patriarchy, attitudes surrounding women’s bodies, and the expectations regarding reproduction thereof.

From its beginnings in the Song dynasty, foot binding held an erotic significance that influenced mate choice and social mobility. The smaller a woman’s foot, the more attractive and amiable she was considered, thus giving her better options for marriage and social advancement (Blake 697-698). Foot binding is no longer an element of matrmony or contemporary culture, but it presents one of many historical ideals of femininity in China. Furthermore, it demonstrates a history of manipulating women’s bodies to achieve social and reproductive goals. In addition to foot binding, bride prices, dowries, and arranged marriages are, among others, some traditional matrimonial practices that are now banned in China. Each retains its own significance and symbolism to supplement an understanding of Chinese women, as well as concepts central to the construction of Chinese families.

As the unit of the family responsible for sustaining the existence of children (in other words, sons), women were primarily valued on their reproductive capacities and service to the male line, including husbands and in-laws. Because Chinese culture is traditionally patrilineal, daughters had no rights to inheritance and were considered a burden, destined to leave their natal families and instead serve their in-laws (Evans, *The Subject of Gender* 17-19). Service and filial piety for married women consisted of childbirth and childrearing; obedience to in-laws; management of household chores; and, naturally, service to husbands in body and behavior. Because women were commoditized as either something to be given away or as something to utilize, they often found refuge and security in the duty that they had been prescribed: childrearing. Such situations exemplify what Wolf terms “uterine” families, otherwise known as the “mother and child dyad” (9-12). The establishment of a uterine family was a path for a woman’s empowerment within her in-laws’ home, as bearing sons would make her an insider rather than an outsider. In such terms, it was a security measure that gave the woman some authority later on when her sons were grown and had to honor filial obligations. This also resulted in a continual struggle of daughters and mothers-in-law to influence sons. Consequently, women were the perpetrators and transmitters of practices that disempowered women. Uterine families nonetheless ensured a woman’s financial security while her husband was alive and while she could rely on her sons (Fong, *Only Hope* 137).

Family construction, uterine or otherwise, has thus always carried underlying economic motivations. Between region and socioeconomic position, women faced such consequences in vastly different manners: rural women, though already accountable for the domestic work of caretaking, cleaning, and cooking, were also conscripted to work in the fields. Their urban counterparts, meanwhile, were often secluded in the home, responsible for household chores and assisting their in-laws. It is once again important to emphasize the Confucian son preferences, as the labor division of agricultural, artisan, or otherwise economically advantageous work was attributed primarily to male members of the family and women were not active participants in the outside world. In Chinese, this division is referred to as *nei* and *wai*, inside and outside, respectively (Evans, *The Subject of Gender* 101-105). *Nei* and *wai* are sociological divisions that rest on binaries familiar to every culture: man/woman, active/passive, intelligence/intuition. The *nei/wai* divide manifests noticeably in the modern approach toward contraception and family planning, as well as in occupational segregation. *Nei/wai* is thus simply part of the cultural backdrop behind the one-child policy as it emerged in the 1980s.

**Encountering Revolution**

With the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912, attitudes toward family construction were changing, influenced by student activists on both Communist and Nationalist sides. This applied not only to matrimonial practices, but to mate choice itself and the formation of nuclear over stem families. Along with a flood of ideas from an array of foreign and domestic sources, there was some semblance of a women’s movement that came about in the 1920s and was incorporated into narratives of both the Nationalists and the Communists. In contrast with pre-modern times, however, the Chinese woman has emerged from what Jankowiak terms the “Three Obediences.” Specifically, an unmarried girl was obedient to her father, a married woman to
her husband, and a widow to her sons (2). When the CCP ascended to power in 1949, instead of being managed by her male relations, the Chinese woman was free from her former “feudal” obligations to pursue revolutionary work. The word “revolutionary” is key to developments of this period, as the year 1950 dawned with two important ordinances, the Land Reform Law and the Marriage Law. The Land Reform Law was part of the government’s push towards collectivization and eliminating the “landlords” who had previously controlled property for agriculture. As it released the ordinary citizen from tyrannical authority and exploitation, the Land Reform Law also gave women the right to own and inherit property, with the hope that rights to inheritance would eliminate attachments to patrilineality (Rai 182; Wolf 18-19).

The Marriage Law was in fact released one month prior to the Land Reform Law, establishing a number of drastic changes on the first of May. Composed of 27 articles on the nature of marriage and reproduction, it encompassed women’s issues, matrimonial struggles, and childbirth as subjects that needed government attention. Being part and parcel of socialist egalitarianism and the state feminist movement, the Marriage Law sought to eradicate a number of the aforementioned practices that were consistently harmful and dehumanizing for women. Dowries, bride price, concubinage, sexual slavery, and other such exchanges of money on the basis of matrimony were explicitly outlawed (Article 2). Article 8 of the Marriage Law states:

Husband and wife are in duty bound to love, respect, assist and look after each other, to live in harmony, to engage in productive work, to care for the children and to strive jointly for the welfare of the family and for the building up of the new society.

The Marriage Law thus acknowledged a need for marriages based on affection and individual choice, an idea that got attention most prominently during the May Fourth Movement (Wolf 17). As such, it was built into not just the Marriage Law, but also new images of youth and revolutionary figures: young couples plowing together in the fields, smiling over crops and satisfied with each other’s commitment to the Party and the nation as they “engage in productive work.” Article 8 further recognizes childcare as a necessary focus, and in incorporating these aspects of affection, does subtly recognize previously condoned acts of domestic violence. Wife beating was a fairly common, even accepted, practice in China prior to Liberation. Rates of reported domestic abuse were notably small after the establishment of this law, though by no means was it, or has it ever been, eradicated from society (Y. Sun 85). Monogamy also became the only permissible form of marriage, and further emphasis was placed on equality between partners such that the wife had comparable decision-making power with her husband. For the first time, marriage was posited as a choice for individuals rather than an arrangement made by parents or other outside entities (e.g., matchmakers, go-betweens) on their behalf (Article 10). Divorce also became accessible to women at this time, along with the right to property within the marriage. The Marriage Law was the first serious step to addressing women’s issues in the new People’s Republic, among which childbirth and childrearing were of particular import. In addition to its statements on the nature of the “new marriage,” the law also clearly opposed infanticide, child abuse or neglect, and protected the interests of mothers and children without fathers (Article 13, 15-16). According to the Marriage Law, a man could not divorce his wife if she was pregnant, and was further required to wait until the child was a year old to separate from his wife (Article 18).

By the same token, birth planning was incorporated into the Marriage Law, though the phrasing of the articles sounds uncannily like eugenics. Under the heading of marriage contracts, such a contract cannot be obtained in cases of incest (Article 5a), but also:

(b) Where one party, because of certain physical defects, is sexually impotent.

(c) Where one party is suffering from venereal disease, mental disorder, leprosy, or any other disease which is regarded by medical science as rendering a person unfit for marriage.

The underlying eugenic tone present in these two clauses is a noteworthy precursor to birth planning. The state assumes in the second clause (5b) that it can interfere with a supposedly “free” marriage on the basis of whether a couple can produce children. The state then prohibits births of
any "undesirable" citizens, those who cannot embody the ideal of the productive and healthy citizen, deeming people with such disadvantages as "unfit for marriage." Compared with the other articles of the Marriage Law, this one most exemplifies the disparity between government control and personal freedom. Appearing at such an early stage of the communist establishment, this disparity is a precursor to the narratives at hand surrounding women's reproductive autonomy. From 1950 and into today, the PRC has contradicted itself with the creation of revolutionary or modernizing goals followed by the use of policies that in some way hinder the achievement of those goals. In the case of the Marriage Law, though the government appeared to encourage freedom for its citizens, it is rather unsubtly pushed them toward the larger goals of the collective nation-state. This purpose of the "greater good" is a consistent theme in the discussion of reproduction, as no law ever granted a woman full autonomy over her own body, in much the same manner that people were not allowed to marry whomever they wished without some interference from the state. The Marriage Law was advocated with great fervor during the early 1950s, resulting in a number of divorces and "New Marriages," but there was little perseverance to revolutionize marriage beyond these initial efforts. Much of this change was effected in urban areas where revolutionary zeal could spread more easily among urban communities and parents supposedly had little influence on mate choice (Whyte & Parish 146-155; Hershatter 8-11).

The construction of families is one of the constants in rural areas that the communists did not seek to alter in any ardent fashion. This is somewhat ironic in the sense that rural practices of family construction, such as primary residence with the groom's family and the focus on male lineage, would be in line with what the Party deemed "feudal." Theoretically, marriages and childrearing practices would have been altered under the communist rise. Instead, dwellings were rearranged for eventual collectivization, maintaining the holistic elements of the family and community while also achieving revolutionary goals. Meanwhile, collectivization and a neutral stance on gender equality were being advocated by the CCP; that is to say, the CCP took neither a progressive nor hostile stance towards issues of gender inequality. It claimed to be working toward an egalitarian vision of men and women working together, and so introduced new regulations that would reduce cases of discrimination and other gendered conflicts. However, the CCP never fully acknowledged that it was women who were disadvantaged, women who needed more rights, and women who needed more encouragement and security to participate in the public sphere. Any specific acknowledgement of disenfranchisement based on gender would, in the eyes of the Party, distract too much from disenfranchisement based on class, thus constituting too far a step from its socialist agenda (Chow et al 173-179; Wolf 145).

In place of acknowledging the reality of women's issues, there was an assumption that simply granting rights via written law would inspire an instant change in conditions. It was mistakenly held that the *ability* to own property would automatically equate to the ownership of property for women, when in fact women were not quickly launched into owning property. Women still had fewer means by which to acquire property although there was a temporary surge in divorce rates. Divorce was in some ways easier to obtain, and whatever previous consequences of economy women feared in divorcing their husbands were mitigated by their participation in collective work. Still, obtaining a divorce was complicated by the need for empowerment within the home itself and access to reliable community or network outside of their kin (Hershatter 23-25). The expectation for instantaneous change based on written law rather than a consistent movement to alter a deeply ingrained social convention indicates some willful ignorance on the part of lawmakers. Much the same can be said of other aspects of the Marriage Law, such as Article 13 that specifies infanticide, one clause that has been violated egregiously with respect to the one-child policy. During the early 1950s, in the same period of revolutionary fervor that women were being encouraged to leave behind the role of the housewife, instead being urged to help reshape the country according to Mao's utopian vision through physical labor (Milwertz 154). The Party formed its own women's groups, making women's rights seem ever more a priority of the revolution. The empowerment of women was again a simple means to an end, just as
the Marriage Law introduced certain rights that were novel to citizens. Despite the sensitive nature of mate choice and reproductive patterns, the state undermines the rights it grants by divesting its citizens of autonomy.

In the highly politicized environment of the 1950s-60s, culturally embedded assumptions about self-sacrifice and service to the whole were ingrained in the Chinese mindset. There is a continued narrative throughout Chinese history to present an inherent lack of worth in women, and that this can only be obtained through service to others. This self-effacing attitude has clearly enabled the state to pressure women into desired patterns of reproduction. While it is inaccurate and highly problematic to think of Chinese women as merely passive objects dominated by either patriarchy or the state, their consistent disenfranchisement and their expected mere passive contribution to the “greater good” during the Mao era left them little room for autonomy (Evans, *The Subject of Gender* 191-192).

Collectives and compounds inspired a completely different environment for nurturing and raising children that relieved some, though certainly not all, pressures on women’s reproduction. Women were being pulled into the workforce along with men, making for a decline in uterine families that were entirely reliant on the mother-child connection. Without adequate time to develop close bonds with either parent, children were often left to play with each other in party-organized nurseries or crèches. The advent of external childcare was one small relief on the double burden placed on women, even if it did not remove responsibility for other household chores such as cooking and cleaning (Wolf 58; Evans, *The Subject of Gender* 107). Emphases on women’s participation between home and work clarify official attitudes and reaffirm that women had fewer advantages at this time in spite of purported egalitarian objectives. A woman’s commitments were never individualistic or allowed to go beyond what she could contribute outside of her productive and reproductive capabilities. “Liberation” transferred her value from one higher authority to another, utilizing very similar methods of self-sacrificial rhetoric that had the potential to become coercive.

Reproduction in Reform

Offically called the “planned birth policy” (*jihua shengyu zhengce*), the so-called “One-Child Policy” underwent a number of adjustments and regime-influenced evolutions before couples were restricted to just one child. In recognizing growing concerns over a booming population and a decreasing pool of resources, Mao Zedong was moved, if only slightly, to the calls of demographers for restraints on population growth (White 70). At the beginning of the 1950s, he was cognizant and public about the need for birth planning, though he was never very clear or transparent about what birth planning would entail. There was a concerning lack of specificity to which the cries of demographers and social scientists fell on deaf ears. The only clear directive was that the Chinese people must plan births to produce, in both the literal and figurative senses (Greenhalgh, *Just One Child* 56-57). Mao remained confident in the force of the population as a boon to the nation’s production and overall strength on the world stage. The Malthusian (and thus, reprehensibly Western) idea that agriculture could not satisfy the growing mass was inherently nonsensical and even offensive to Mao. On the contrary, he was confident that a Marxist approach would guarantee economic success: the greater a nation’s population, so too would its workforce be strengthened. Mao believed that this relationship between people, workers, and their productivity would continually project in a successful upward slope rather than diminish in its benefits (White 245). Until the 1970s, there was little done even in terms of research to determine the exact consequences of overpopulation. Population research was itself a highly sensitive topic, with numbers and figures being adjusted or neglected to suit party objectives and prevalent opinions within the hierarchy. As with everything in this period of “constant revolution,” science was a political topic, underscored by a history of Western imperialism and, consequently, a threat to the development of the Maoist utopia (19).

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2 English demographer Thomas Malthus was responsible for the theory in 1798 that population growth would outstrip production of the population that would lead to an overpopulation crisis.
The small circle of academics present in the early communist days laid the basic foundation for research efforts and policymaking. The most important of these figures was arguably Ma Yinchu, deemed “the father of the one-child policy” (Y. R. Wong 511). A prominent economist and demographic researcher, Ma Yinchu was an outspoken proponent of population control. His education in the United States, first at Yale and then at Columbia, was incremental in developing his interests and the frank manner with which he publicized his findings. Upon his return to China, Ma began his long academic career as a teacher and a prolific researcher, working as a professor for the prestigious Peking University3 in 1951 and eventually becoming president (“Former President”). By the 1950s, Ma was conducting field research in the Chinese countryside, still secure in his standing at the university. In spite of the politically tense environment, Ma used that security to its limits when he publicized his findings and analysis. Finally, he pushed too far when he released “The New Population Theory” (1957), a relatively short pamphlet detailing the readily oncoming threat of population growth supported by his observations from case studies and then-current patterns of family planning. Through his expertise as a demographer and an economist, the predictions were fairly precise, but the subsequent suggestions, although positioned from a supposedly Marxist-Leninist view, had Malthusian overtones and a thinly veiled criticism of the Party and its work up to date. Ma was dismissed from his post in 1960, singled out amongst academics over the next couple of decades for various punishments by the government. Yet despite his disappearance from the public eye, Ma’s ideas, research, and publications were key to the formation of the one-child policy (Greenhalgh, Just One Child 93).

Stirred however unwillingly by the public statements of Ma Yinchu, some small recognition of birth planning took place in the early 1950s. Contraception became widely available with state endorsement after 1956 and into the 1960s, though distribution was mostly limited to married couples (White 67; B. Wang et al. 63-64). Known methods at the time were diaphragms, IUDs (intrauterine devices), and birth control pills. Vasectomies, a surgical method of rendering male sterility, were also introduced around this time, albeit with a significantly smaller reception (Greenhalgh, “Fresh Winds” 870). Chinese medicine had traditionally prescribed a combination of such herbal and home remedies to prevent, stall or abort pregnancies. Condoms were also not entirely novel to China, from the use of animal skin to latex, though condoms themselves did not become commonly used until this mid-twentieth century campaign (Hesketh et al. 1171). Preventing excess births was a welcome change, for many women were already overtasked with their double burden of domestic and market labor. It is further important to note that contraception was spread to areas in the countryside as well as in the cities, with pills being a convenient, self-administered option (Greenhalgh, “Controlling Births” 8). However, the formal introduction of contraception was not without some degree of controversy. In being a main component of population technology, it possessed undesirable associations with science and the West. As a way to overcome these associations, the contraception was domestically manufactured, a fact that made for less than ideal efficiency. Lackluster performance, poor product quality, and an unaggressive campaign for birth control kept the use of 1960s-era contraceptive devices relatively low (Z. Yi 729).

Some further clarification is necessary in documenting contraception and its distribution in China, both during the 1950s and into today. Because there are obvious differences between Chinese and Western attitudes towards sex and discussion of it, the system and, for lack of a better word, “culture” of family planning contain notable differences. In the West, modern sex education and reproductive healthcare tends to come part in parcel with the introduction of contraception. At the very least, the contemporary expectation demands that these three things are introduced simultaneously in some form, an expectation that has existed since measures to create awareness of teenage pregnancy rose in the 1980s-90s (B. Wang et al 63; Nie 160). A similar timeline consisting of contraception, sex education, and reproductive health is not the case for China. This is an

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important distinction for understanding China’s specific problems with implementing the one-child policy while also trying to reduce ills like teen pregnancy and venereal diseases. Across cities and the countryside in China, contraception was distributed as an alternative to large families beginning in the 1950s-60s. As economic and administrative changes arose, use of contraception gradually became incentivized as a prelude to more extensive forms of family planning (White 30-31).

The “later-longer-fewer” policy (wanxishao) had considerable influence over the creation of the one-child policy. It may be more accurate to call it a guideline, as the one-child policy was the first fully official and legally valid measure composed by the Party (Milwertz 51). Conceived during the 1970s by then-Premier Zhou Enlai, the later-longer-fewer policy was the first official measure taken to seriously address population growth. Zhou had faced considerable difficulties in making population control a legitimate concern, struggling first with Mao himself and then the Gang of Four. The presumption that birth planning was inherently Malthusian, scientific, and Western were three major reasons for its resistance, reasons which were often thought of as one and the same. Running rampant without the supervision of Mao, the Gang of Four effectively removed a number of issues from the agenda that it considered “counterrevolutionary” during the Cultural Revolution (Greenhalgh, Just One Child 66-67). In collaboration with other moderates, Zhou finally pushed the later-longer-fewer policy through in 1973, just as Mao’s health and power were weakening (48-49). The marriageable age was suggested at 23 for women and 25 for men, and couples were directed only to have two children with at least four years between their births.

Though there were no specific timelines or goals set for the later-longer-fewer model, pushing for later marriages with longer spacing between fewer births was a technique that carried a number of social advantages. Restrictions on marriageable age delay those years spent childbearing and rearing, and mesh well with goals of modernization to this end. The implication is that delaying marriage and the establishment of a family creates a larger space of time young people to foster their education. The chief benefit of the later-longer-fewer method was to encourage better or higher levels or education for children that would push them to attain more skills without having to compete with siblings for resources. Better, more focused education was hoped to increase enrollment in secondary education and better skill acquisition for higher earnings. Assuming that the policy would be in place and the pattern encouraged by the first generation of small family children, the continuation of this pattern in the following generation would generate a similar pattern of intellectual and economic improvement, eventually making for a wholly improved workforce and nation. One might refer to this as the “quality over quantity” approach to family planning (Nie 45). Yet it is worthwhile to note that the family planning is once again being conducted on a state level rather than at the level of the family itself.

What began as an impediment to socialist advancement and a slight, but incomprehensible, worry to Mao Zedong was later recognized as a threat to the nation’s modernization. During the prime of his leadership, he had very few qualms about completely disregarding scientific evidence and rejecting it as a Western fallacy. Yet as his campaign-style leadership devolved between the 1960s-70s, the warnings became harder to ignore when realistic problems of famine produced other dire conditions. Mao slowly, albeit inconsistently, incorporated practices and slogans that encouraged birth control and family planning. This shift in attitude towards population control is ostensibly attributable to Mao’s eventual successor, Deng Xiaoping, who took power not long after Mao’s death in 1976. As the figurehead of the “Reform and Opening Up” (gaike kaifang), Deng is commonly acknowledged as the father of modern China and the figurehead of the nation’s current birth planning policy. Deng’s reformist predecessor, Premier Zhou Enlai, figures importantly as the leader of a small circle that convinced Mao, or at least circumvented him, to get family planning on the official agenda (White 52). Alongside Zhou Enlai, renowned economist Ma Yinchu was key to the initiation of a birth planning policy, roughly calculating figures during the 1950s as a way to push for more active policymaking (Greenhalgh, Just One Child 93). Zhou gathered
intellectuals and scientists like Ma together in the waning years of the Cultural Revolution. In 1973, just three years prior to his and Mao’s passing, and successfully implemented the later-longer-fewer guidelines (White 59).

With little progress being made beyond grumblings about overpopulation and some insistent anti-Malthusian attitudes, Deng Xiaoping was left with too many people and too few resources in too small of a time frame, a problem that the state has battled consistently since the 1960s baby boom. Scarcity of food and other harrowing economic factors spiked inflation rates while the lack of substantial industry in the previous decade made money scarce all around, especially under the collective system. Rations for agricultural communes were meager even when they produced healthy crops: the produce was distributed from agricultural to urban areas because the latter had no way of producing such resources on its own. From 1958 to 1962, the Great Leap Forward was a primary source of these straits. On top of famine and unequal distribution, the successful crops were also mismanaged, with a large portion going to waste in storage until it was too late to be sent off for human consumption. The Great Leap Forward ravaged the ecosystem and the economy, claiming the lives of at least 30-40 million people (Bouée 7; Nie 41). Unable to tolerate the severity of the conditions, a large number of notably female young children and elderly did not survive, either left to their own misfortunes or died at the hands of family members who could not take care of them. There were no drastic changes, least of all positive ones, in the availability of resources when the baby boom arrived post-1962 (Milwertz 43). It was difficult to maintain production of food with a devastated population and there were no available imports to compensate for it. Even if the CCP had been willing to import goods, they had nearly no infrastructure to do so at the time. The subsequent state of affairs exemplified a rather Malthusian situation, a fact that weighed heavily on officials in their discussion - or rather, lack of discussion- about birth planning (Greenhalgh, Just One Child 54).

Implementing effective family planning was a challenge from the start, not only due to struggles with the Gang of Four, who refused to acknowledge a potential population growth crisis, but also on account of a citizenry that had gradually lost its morale. The nearly decade-long “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” had exhausted the initial vigor of the Maoist movements from the 1950s. With none of the prosperity that Mao’s utopian vision had promised forthcoming, overall morale was low. At the dawn of late 1970s reforms, officials and policy makers in Beijing grappled with rapid changes in political order, economy, and popular social behavior. These developments were flourishing in the cities, where people were more exposed to economic change as it was occurring. In particular, the generation of Red Guard youths that had been sent to the countryside to “educate themselves” in the course of the Cultural Revolution now returned to urban areas and were able to witness the formation of a new culture firsthand (White 40-43). These “sent-down youth,” as well as the up and coming urban youth generation, were both of great concern to the modernizing administration. Paying close attention to the new culture and its subsequent effect on the youth was a substantial factor in creating policy based on observations (Nie 41). Yet in rural areas and even regionally, as any China researcher will know, observable conditions vary drastically among groups in various locations and socioeconomic positions. The government’s ability to impose any kind of unilateral policy in such areas remained untenable, and the resulting adjustments that were made to its population control policy were ultimately more pronounced in urban areas. Public goods and services are regulated in cities to a greater degree than in the countryside, benefits that become clear incentives for urban compliance with the policy (Siculcar 94).

Yet like the single-child policy, the age limitations on marriage often come with exceptions. Counter to the population misconception that Beijing administration can easily organize and assemble the entirety of its now-1.3 billion people, the central party state does in fact rely on strong local administrations. Digressing only slightly from the specific topic of marriage and childbearing, one must recognize the very expansive hierarchical structure of Chinese bureaucracy, going from smaller municipal cadres to provincial governments and with a host of state employees in between to carry out work on behalf of central as well as local party directives. One may
well conceive the system as top-down, but there remains the business of negotiating at the individual and local level in order to achieve goals. As with a number of other party directives, the birth planning policies have resulted in quotas for each municipality that mandate the number of birth allowed within a year.

Birth planning workers are hired for the specific purpose of surveying the locality and making sure that couples are fully compliant with the established policies. A source of good reputation for these workers and their superiors is the “one-child certificate” rate. Women who are still of childbearing age, already married, and with a child sign a pledge to stop giving birth. The total percentage of such women then makes up the one-child certificate rate, which has been projected at nearly 99 percent since 1982 (Milwertz 25). These workers and their corresponding administrative superiors, cadres and officials, are able to use the “success” of their enforcement as a boon to their promotion or good reputation (93-97). Because of such underlying advantages, incentivizing the system has proven somewhat effective. Nevertheless, there are cases in which state workers blindly follow directives and/or enforce rules, but inefficiently administer contraceptives, thus defeating the purpose.

“Modern” Social Constructs

The baby boomer generation from the 1960s was the first to grapple with the full reality of the single-child-with-exceptions policy, coming into the 1980s as young adults of marriageable or near-marriageable age (White 67). While the reproductive measures imposed by the state were already an onerous social experiment, the economic and ideological shifts taken to encourage modernization created further rifts in family construction from the previous (now grandparent) generation of revolutionaries. Facing a rapidly expanding economy, sprawling urbanization and a rise in consumerism, Chinese society was being pushed and pulled into a myriad of different directions. For women in the 1980s, the implication was clear: positions within the house and the market were changing, for better or for worse. Just as the new generation of young men and women were faced with marital expectations and a rapidly changing economy, the one-child policy was set down at the start of the 1980s. All of the changes occurring in this time worked in tandem to modernize China and, in doing so, unwittingly placed women in the awkward space of ever-evolving modernity grounded by an ever-present traditionalism.

Where Mao-era propaganda painted the ideal woman as the agrarian revolutionary supporter, the post-Mao era embraced images of the commercially appealing woman, one who gave up hard labor wore fashionable clothing. The one-child policy emerged in the same moment that femininity manifested again in the popular imagination and became circulated in state-regulated media (Evans, “Past, Perfect” 341). This resulted, on the whole, in a concentration on maternity and the importance of women in the home. This return to the domestic in the 1980s saw China’s break from earlier communist homogeneity, embracing increasingly gendered images while also allowing private life (specifically, private married life) to exist again (Jankowiak 365-367). These vicissitudes were nonetheless constrained by lingering authoritarian socialist goals, as the main objective changed from revolution to modernization. As in the Mao era, propaganda remained a prevalent tool of the CCP to approach and encourage certain ideological and political views. The coexistence of a government-controlled mass media and a new market for advertising resulted in the fusion of several modern objectives with traditional constructions.

Good Wife, Wise Mother

The model of the “good wife, wise mother” (xianqi liangmu) is predominant among many East Asian cultures, a proliferation that can be attributed to the Confucian and Neo-Confucian thought shared in this region. This model is built on pre-existing ideals of femininity, but rather than objectifying women, it serves to establish their centrality to the home. The “good wife, wise mother” is the emotional center of the household, making up for the usually stoic behavior of her husband, the dominant male figure in the house. Self-sacrifice is once again the chief principle of the female role: the good wife/wise mother is gentle and perpetually attentive, devoting all of her time to raising children, tending to the house, and finally,
keeping her husband satisfied with his household (Milwertz 151-152). Where before the good wife/wise mother had children to meet the needs of her husband’s lineage, changes in the political and social environment made it such that the good wife/wise mother had one child who would meet the needs of the state.

Chinese marriages and matrimonial practice began to take more traditional, “rightist” turns once the reform era began and people tried to move past the memories of the Cultural Revolution. From the 1950s to late 1970s, married couples were obligated first to fulfill duties of the Party rather than those of the family. Moreover, all domestic duties were inherently intended to serve the interests of the state, encourage national advancement, and maintain the spirit of the revolution. It is such that many attribute the reform era with the development of individualism and greater political freedoms in China. Yet the growth of consumer culture also led to a perceived selfishness among generations who were born late enough to be relatively unacquainted with the turmoil of the mass campaigns. The generations starting with the mid-1970s had only an impression of the loss and cultural depression that China suffered in movements like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, a distance of memory that has resulted in a marked generational gap; where the youth cannot remember, the old wish to forget. This marring and burying of memories has validity in various aspects of social change during the “Opening Up,” changes that are reflected in approaches to marriage and views on women. Older generations were content to leave behind revolutionary images of the sexes working together, for reasons which likely included a pre-existing, socially constructed bias towards women’s roles, but also would serve as a way to reject the associations of the “revolutionary.” The cultural shift (or rather, revisiting) can then be interpreted as a kind of escape, albeit a conservative one that held associations of stability and identity.

It is conceivable that discouraged attitudes following the failures of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were in large part responsible for the return of traditional preferences at the inception of the reform era. Embracing new opportunities for industrialization and economic development, Chinese society was pulling away from its previous focus on political and ideological cultivation. At the same time, weariness from the past decade inspired an attachment to more familiar (i.e., traditional) outlook on social mores and gender constructs. This is not to say, however, that binaries went through drastic changes during the Mao era. On the contrary, it would be more accurate to say that they disappeared altogether into a unisex citizenry that was meant to produce and reproduce for the good of the nation. Gender, though acknowledged, was neither expressed nor performed visibly for fear of labels like “bourgeoisie” and “counterrevolutionary” (Zheng 522). With the advent of reforms, the unisex model gave way to gender performativity that had two models, the first being pre-Liberation China, and the second being the West. What resulted was a mixture of Chinese aesthetics with Western fashions, brands, and consumer items.

In the same moment, the revised marriage law in 1980 raised the marriage age by two years. The revision permitted men to marry at the age of twenty-two and women at age twenty; at least, this was the official policy. The later-longer-fewer guidelines had in 1973 called for twenty-three and twenty-five for women and men, respectively. Later ages continue to be encouraged at markedly higher ages in urban areas through local propaganda and media. The average ages of marriage have subsequently risen for both females and males, particularly the educated urban elite. National averages are difficult to determine due to the misreporting of age at marriage on the local level. However, for educated women in the cities, the average age of marriage stands approximately at twenty-eight, where for men of equivalent socioeconomic positions the average is near thirty (Whyte & Parish 112-114). As predicted, the ages have risen with greater time invested in completion of higher education and establishment of a career. Worthy of note, however, is that the age for men is consistently higher than the age for women, a difference that can be attributed to the work environment and contemporary patterns of mate choice.

Between spouses, there is still an unequal distribution of household duties despite expectations of equal income contribution to
household expenses (Attané 4). As such, women receive little reprieve from the double burden of work and home, and are additionally subject to a wage gap of between 15 and 17 percent (Liu 841). It would be a mistake to suggest that there is a unilateral push for women to return to being housewives, for there is still encouragement for their participation in a number of industries and fields (Hall 29-31). At the same time, pressures from the family, a lack of incentives from the workplace, and limited involvement of husbands in managing household affairs continue to challenge women’s capacity to participate in the workforce. For those women who took on homemaking, much of the time this was due to conflicts of schedule that women the world round are familiar with. A desire to focus on raising their children was the chief reason for women to disengage from the workforce. This decision is generally met with approval from the women’s husbands and was shown to be a source of harmony within the family, a stabilizing force among what was normally three members: mother, father, and child. The resurgence of housewives and the “good wife, wise mother” model also brought about the reappearance of the uterine family, if only in the sense that fathers continued to have a conventionally stoic and impassive parenting style in contrast with the warm nurturing of their wives. Consequently, stronger bonds formed between women and their children, a factor that weighed heavily on later contributions to eldercare from children of working age (Jankowiak 374-377).

Modern family situations are neither so simple nor so harmonious. Instead, they can easily be riddled with tension over the unequal distribution of obligations inside and outside the home. Marital satisfaction is known to suffer as the wife is being restricted to a model that she may be striving for unwillingly or unwittingly. Women with higher education of at least a college degree are at the forefront of demanding divorces, being unsatisfied with housewife statuses as well as general inequality in their partnerships (Whyte & Parish 190; Pimentel 45). According to a 1995 study by a Wu Deqing, a Peking University population researcher, divorce rates from 1982-1990 steadily increased each year around various urban areas. Wu’s figures were taken from the number of legal cases filed within each area; Beijing, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Qinghai, and Xinjiang were provinces with the highest percentage of marriages that ended in divorce, exceeding ten percent (72-77). This means that the divorce rate in more urban as well as more northern areas is higher, a trend that can be correlated to the strict enforcement of the one-child policy. Interviews and case studies have suggested specific tensions regarding pregnancy, family planning, and division of childrearing in addition to household labor among families adherent to the one-child policy.

Daughters as the “Only Hope”

Parents living and working in cities, while not all necessarily eager to have a singleton daughter, will often have the security of a pension to make up for the previously conceived security of a male heir (Xie & Zhu 175-176). Fong and others have argued that this additional security has successfully undermined the son preference to benefit daughter with equal privileges and respect in the home. Though in some cases this has indeed held true, filial expectations for daughters have evolved in the renewed regard for female offspring (Croll 212-213). Where sons have always been held as dependable for one’s old age, daughters are now being overwhelmed by their elders for the procurement of multiple caregiving responsibilities in financial and physical terms, being seen now as capable of both emotional and financial support (Whyte 168-182). On account of more traditionally feminine stereotypes, daughters are obligated (and often fulfill expectations) to be more nurturing of their aged parents. While they still suffer from gender-biased wage gaps, daughters are now supplanting their retiree parents with the expectation that they do so more than sons.

The growing dependence on daughters as caretakers, though it recognizes the benefit of parents’ “investment” and re-values female children, nonetheless creates a new set of problems with regard to marriage practices. Where in the past women were commoditized as goods for another household, women are now considered assets for parents and attractors for spouses of equal socioeconomic and education status who can provide additional support. In other words, the woman is now valued, but the basis for such an evaluation is problematic and not necessarily to
division, where women are permitted primary control in the home due to its consideration as her "sphere" and hers alone.

**Family Construction and Tensions**

A consequence of the one-child policy that is gaining significant attention by officials and propagandists is commonly known as the “4-2-1 problem.” With a generation of singleton children, the only child a couple will produce must also be responsible for the care of two sets of grandparents in addition to his or her parents. Where the burden of parents, both one's own and one's in-laws, already weighs heavily on couples and nuclear families, improved quality of life and raising age expectations are only contributing to the stress of care for elderly family members. Similar to the Japanese problem of birth rates undercutting mortality rates, the Chinese public has a disconcerting amount of older rather than younger members. In addition to that, it is still primarily the role of women (i.e., wives and daughters) to attend to the needs of the elderly. This extra component to their “double burden” further affects their academic abilities and labor participation. Being responsible for care of the elderly, the very young, and their husbands, women face a slough of time constraints and constrictions that make the ability to work full-time or earn a higher degree ever more difficult. It is such that the one-child policy contributes to a depression or downward slope of women's participation in the workforce.

Given new perspectives on marriage, sex, and romance, the generations born at the time of the one-child policy are themselves coming across a far different experience of sexual exploration and openness. In the late 1990s to 2000s, China recognized AIDS as a leading cause of death by viral infection, leading to more aggressive sex education and movements to remove stigma around discussing sexual health issues (Z. Wu et al4). Merging sex education with messages about contraception, such changes in adolescent programming are reflective of a changed society. Premarital sex is no longer shockingly taboo, but it is still frowned upon even though it is in general

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widespread among youths since the 1980s (B. Wang 63; Whyte & Parish 130-131). In the same vein, venues and approaches to meeting other young people, dating, and intersex socialization have flourished in the past twenty-some years as well. Interaction between unmarried male and female youth is not uncommon, as schools or work units largely do not segregate by gender and social groups readily include members of both genders (119-121; Fong, Only Hope 39-41). However, exclusive, one-on-one friendships between young men and women may be viewed with suspicion, though these attitudes are not wholly unusual or unique to Chinese culture.

Not unusually, the first one-child generation seems to reflect upon its parent generation as a model for what to avoid in parenting. At the very least, this may be said for the current generation of mothers, whose struggles with sexual expression, individualism, and cultural vicissitudes were all in conflict with a far more conservative-leftist age of women. In particular, Evans’ results of interviewing mothers and daughters speak to daughters’ eagerness to brush over the mistakes of their mothers, to be more nurturing and better prepare their daughters for the challenges of being a woman (111). As values change, the pressures of marriage and reproduction are also transforming, with girls no longer responsible for the birth of large families and instead expected to achieve high grades and earn better wages for their parents. Families of their own will also benefit from increased education, more job skills, and the like. However, girls must be cautious in their pursuit of these advantages. The modern marriage market, and to some extent the job market, has a glass ceiling for women who might be aiming too high (Broaded & Liu 58-61). So-called nvqiangren, loosely translated as “successful career women,” are highly educated, dominant in the professional world, but often portrayed as tough, un-feminine spinsters\(^5\). The direct counterpart of the “successful career woman” is the “good wife, wise mother,” who, in spite of her education and her job capabilities, stays at home to nurture her child and support her husband. In examining the glass ceiling and the nature of the marriage market, there is an obvious correlation between marriage patterns and women’s advancement in academic and professional spheres.

**Academic Success**

In accordance with Fong, female children have encountered some academic advantages with the advent of the one-child policy: with the absence of extra children, particularly boys, upon which they may lavish attention and money, parents are more likely to focus all of their attentions upon single daughters (Evans, The Subject of Gender 71). Through a combination of stereotypes, daughters have a historical reputation for diligence, obedience, and better temperaments. Many parents, particularly many mothers, tend to believe that daughters can be cleverer and are also easier to raise than sons (Fong, Only Hope 135-138). Regardless, daughters have been historically disadvantaged, as their male siblings have been prioritized to receive education and the younger female siblings were often the responsibility of elder female siblings. Now in the absence of both, singleton daughters receive all of the educational resources and will attend school at least as long as is mandatory in their local district (Gui-ying 4-7). Contingent on the parents’ background, aspirations of higher education for urban daughters will be relatively high, though statistically this has been shown to be lower still than the aspirations of boys. One possible reason is a lower degree of confidence than boys seem to be instilled with, but there is also a weak sense of job security for female students whose academics are sufficient for top universities. Further significant are the potential gains made from education in mate choice; for men, more education proves to be a positive factor that increases their eligibility and potential earnings; for women, higher education can be a good thing, but their marriage prospects narrow as their level of education exceeds a potential male partner’s.

Women thus appear to be battling with a kind of internalized misogyny: in order to marry, they must hold themselves back or undervalue their achievements relative to potential male partners. Neither option holds any long-term benefits and both are unfortunate in sight of the intense pressure put on young urbanites of both genders to succeed academically and professionally. The potential of women who hold themselves back can

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\(^5\) [http://baike.baidu.com/view/247238.htm](http://baike.baidu.com/view/247238.htm)
thus be interpreted as a “negative return” on the investment of their parents, the state, and their own efforts. In particular, parents aspire to similar heights for their children regardless of their gender, as Tsui and Rich found in the late 1990s (85). Women today hold extremely competitive rates of academic performance and enrollment, overall with 117 males per 100 females enrolled in tertiary education overall. The highest concentration of female enrollment lies among urbanite females attending local universities, colleges, and pre-professional schools (Attané 7).

The Working Woman
The introduction of private enterprise and removal of state control over business in the late 1970s-80s allowed for successful industrialization, urbanization, and rapid economic growth. At the same time, removal of state control and the gradual reduction of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) meant that organizations could lift some former constraints of the socialist model. Stated simply, factories and a number of other labor-oriented jobs were free to let go of female employees who the factory owners viewed as physically inappropriate for tasks in the workplace. Numerous women were shut out of the formerly “egalitarian” workforce, and consequently returned to their homes to raise families and attend to household duties. The idea of equal work for equal pay was integral to the ardent state-sponsored feminism of the 1950s and the establishment of the All-China Women’s Federation in 1949. Essential to socialist egalitarianism, the concept itself has suffered some neglect since the reform era of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The incentives to employing female workers were significantly reduced with the wave of economic reforms. Long-standing assumptions about gendered labor allowed non-state employers to turn away female workers based on gender, as labor regulations were flexible in the transitional economy (Maurer-Fazio et al 2-4). It is important to define “labor” here in the sense that it incorporates or relies on some physical component or vocational skill, otherwise categorized as blue collar.

Social and economic trends worked in tandem to reduce the participation of both men and women, but the decrease in female labor is significantly disproportionate to its male counterpart. For urban residents, the disparity in labor force participation was not apparent until the 1990s, with many of the reforms affecting rural areas first (Maurer-Fazio et al 21-22). Decreases in labor force participation for both sexes can be attributed to a rise in educational, particularly for women. Instead of entering into the workforce immediately, young women who completed compulsory education at the ages of 14 or 15 were engaging in higher education or pre-professional programs to gain skills (6-11). This also skews the type of work that women began to engage in, with physical labor gradually being dominated by men and thus reinstating the divisions that had been cast aside in the Mao era. At the same, women were training for jobs on a professional scale, delaying their participation and thus also influencing the rate to be much lower for the younger age bracket. Educational, service, and industry work (not involving hard labor)⁶ are typical expectations for the female labor force. Despite their educations and advantage within cities, these stereotypically female jobs are lower paying than jobs generally allocated to men of similar socioeconomic backgrounds (Hall 18-28).

Nevertheless, Chinese women today face higher rates of unemployment, earlier retirement, and longer periods between jobs when they are still in the workforce. The government has set down unusual retirement age policies that differ by both class and gender; white-collar female workers retire at 55, blue collar ones at 50; men retire at 60 and 55, respectively (Du 5). Skill retention, physical capability, and placement between the public and private sectors have a hand in determining retirement age. The logic behind the white- and blue- collar distinction is based on skill retention, physical capabilities, and a differentiation between private and public sectors. Yet the gendered difference among both statistics makes notably less sense, representative of the social, systematically reinforced biases that women must face in the workforce. Article 26 of the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests puts in details some other standards for women in the workplace:

(a) All units shall, in line with women’s characteristics and according to law, protect

⁶http://data.worldbank.org/country/china
women's safety and health during their work or physical labor, and shall not assign them any work of physical labor not suitable to women.

(b) Women shall be under special protection during menstrual period, pregnancy, obstetrical period, and nursing period.

This often translates into a kind of resented “special treatment” of women that makes employers less willing to hire them. It is because these kinds of exceptions compound the already damaging assumption that women are weaker and less capable than men. Allowing absences and accommodations for female workers is a pertinent factor that contributes to a higher rate of unemployment for Chinese women. Employers are less willing to retain workers it views as being a hassle or in need of special attention, not to mention the reticence towards providing maternity leave. The specter of pregnancy makes it equally hard for young women to find jobs that will lead to career growth (Rai 188).

Even with the advantages that they possess through their increased education and socioeconomic status, professional urban women still must tackle cultural expectations of marriage and procreation. These expectations are instilled in the culture through Confucianism, but more importantly, reproduction for many in the current environment also serves as an investment for an individual’s future. A child well-raised and nurtured will not only be successful, but also later possess the means to take care of his or her own parents. This cycle of care is not a new idea by any means, but with respect to professional urban women, who have either less inclination or eligibility to find mates, it magnifies the pressure of fulfilling so-called reproductive “obligations.”

**Striving for the Perfect Child**

The one-child policy has resulted in a variety of aftereffects upon the upbringing of the singleton generation. In view of social and economic changes, approaches to childrearing have been further distanced from their parents’ style by mere changes in family living arrangements and construction. Historically speaking, extended families have always been prominent and of the most use in rural areas, whereas urban residents were more likely to maintain nuclear families due to allocation of space and a reduced need for such a closely situated kinship network (Croll 213). Extended families include multiple generations, embodying the typically Chinese “large family” of a couple, their sons, their sons’ wives, and the children who inevitably follow. Stem families are composed of parents, their unwed children, and then a married child along with his/her spouse and children. Nuclear families are smaller, with just a couple and their unmarried children (Tsui 738). In comparison to the nuclear household, the three generational one from grandparents to grandchildren has grown out of being the standard due to changes in urbanization, the boomer generation's need for more housing, and to some extent, the influence population policy. Urban singletons will live apart from parents who have enough in pension funds such that they do not need to rely on their children, meaning that upon marriage the singletons will establish nuclear families (742-743) For economic reasons as well as cultural ones, extended and three-generational families persist among groups with a lower income Housing prices thus become less burdensome; the care of children and the elderly also is more cost-effective and convenient when they are all residing in the same space (Whyte & Parish 158).

The formation of Chinese families has indeed changed with political shifts over the past sixty years, and it has changed even more drastically over the past thirty-some years due to reproductive policies and the state-imposed limitations thereof. Along with such changes, women’s conditions in education, labor, and society at large have also fluctuated. Though their lives are profoundly affected by these regulations, there has been little regard at any official level to register their personal desires for family construction despite their principal role as mothers and caretakers. Regardless, this does not speak to the desires of urban women in the present, and neither can these aspirations be examined universally. Researchers have carefully probed into this question via surveys and cautiously worded interviews. While there can be no absolute consensus, Chinese people certainly recognize the need for population control, especially urbanites, who experience the overpopulation problem firsthand most vividly.
Overcrowded streets, increasingly smaller yet more expensive living spaces, and competition for inner-city resources are enough evidence that the population is straining the economy and the future of for them and their children. At the same time, parents and parents-to-be are concerned for their singletons. Between mothers and fathers, there is a keen realization of the loneliness the child may experience as a singleton and other negative impacts to his or her socialization later on in life. Parents of sons are also concerned with the ever-worsening gender imbalance, worried that their sons will not be able to find a suitable partner in later life, resulting in a lack of grandchildren, least of all a disheartened and lonely son (Lim).

There is an interesting trend among Chinese women and their contraceptive practices that harks back to concepts of self-sacrifice for the nation. Birth planning workers who are naturally employed by the state are responsible for monitoring women, particularly those who are married and of childbearing age. A majority of the workers are female, a fact that lends to the comfort of women who are under the scrutiny of the workers. At the same time, the female-on-female interaction creates a condoning environment around the often intrusive monitoring. Women are required to report the times of their menstruation to these workers and risk open criticism should their periods arrive late. This has repercussions beyond social humiliation, however, and can result in the deduction of a woman’s salary or other work-associated benefits (Nie 192-193). Other sensitive, invasive measures might generally occur within an inspection from a birth planning worker, such as a check on the placement of women’s IUDs. This is a chief detail of the birth planning worker’s job, to ensure that contraception is being adequately used and maintained. While this all seems as a matter of course, it should be noted that the birth planning workers have significantly fewer interactions with men than they do women (Shalev 133-134; Nie 48). There is an unprecedented focus on women to prevent children as much as it is to raise them, despite the fact that their male partners have equitable roles and responsibilities for both.

*The 4-2-1 Problem, an Equation for Trouble*

Single children are born into much larger pools of resources than previous generations, receiving attention from up to four grandparents and two parents, each making up the so-called “4-2-1” dilemma. Eventually, the responsibilities of care will trickle down to the “one,” pressure that the government will have to face in addition to singleton children (Hesketh 1174). Yet even before that, parents are facing significant problems with this structure in terms of childcare. Being responsible for child raising as well as childbearing, urban women are also adapting to specific parenting styles with their singletons. The phenomenon that has come to unfortunate prevalence in the past twenty-some years is that of the “little emperors and empresses” (Lim7). These children, being the sole object of their parents’ affections and finances, are pampered and spoiled to varying degrees of extremity. Where children in the traditional Confucian system were meant to defer to their parents, serving and doing as obediently as possible, singleton children are exempt from chores and other basic duties, theoretically such that they may focus on academics, extracurricular activities, and in general take advantage of opportunities their parents did not have. Given the 4-2-1 structure, urban women continue with professional life or advancement and thus give their children to their parents and/or in-laws to look after (Wolf 209).

This option presents benefits for all of the parties involved: in the first, the mother can focus again on her career and thus prolong or improve her contribution to the family income; her parents or in-laws will, in either retirement or engaged in part-time work, have some occupation; and, the child will be taken care of in a nurturing environment, albeit one where both parents are conspicuously absent. This manner of consolidating work and family is common among many urban Chinese families that either reside in the cities or migrate, though its effect on rural children and grandparents can prove highly disparate from the occasionally negative effect upon city-dwelling children. City-dwelling singletons under the care of their grandparents are more likely to evolve into this pattern of the “little emperor/empress” as they receive care from two

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sets of grandparents and one set of parents (Gates 270). Grandparents on both sides are inclined to lavish money and attention on their grandsires, but less inclined to enforce discipline in the same way they might have done with their own children. For urban mothers, this can result in a number of damaging consequences after their children come out of her parents’ or in-laws’ care. One obvious issue is an emotional disconnect between mother and child, where prolonged substitution of parental care has a negative effect on their relationship: the child may likely resent the absence of the parents, especially the mother, or feel a need to maintain distance due to a lack of familiarity. Either case creates additional stress for the mother who, regardless of her career and economic contribution, may be perceived either by herself and/or the surrounding community as having failed in her maternal duties because of the parent-child tension (Wolf 206-207).

“The Single Child Policy with Exceptions”
Contrary to widespread belief, the CCP upholds abortion as a last resort method of compliance with the single-child policy. Contraception has instead been encouraged through other routes, the most prominent being the IUD and sterilization of either or both partners. Again, the sterilization of women is standard practice in comparison to sterilization of men. If a woman is not sterilized, she is generally required to have an IUD inserted, a method which, much like sterilization, necessitates a single procedure and is comparatively inexpensive. Unlike the pill, IUDs are also easy to monitor and much harder for the woman or couple to sabotage in order to conceive another child. Contraception outside of IUDs and sterilization occurs only in situations with special medical circumstances that would make IUD insertion otherwise detrimental to a woman’s health. In spite of the financial and legal repercussions, some couples do persist in the birth of a second child and may be fully prepared to pay fines for the second child. On occasion, this can be an acceptable alternative, but there are a plethora of cases in which a couple has attempted to sabotage the contraception with fatal results. In looking at coercive practices as a result of the one-child policy, Wasserstrom details the story of a woman whose husband was determined to have a second child. To subvert the contraceptive measures of the birth planning workers, the husband took his wife to an unlicensed medical and paid to have the IUD removed. Excessive bleeding and tearing of the uterine area followed, eventually resulting in the woman’s death (355). Other stories abound of women who were successful, either by mistake or design, in becoming pregnant again, only to be tracked by authorities and subjected to punishment in the form of abortion or deprivation of benefits.

Forced abortions are often late-term, being the result of the one-child policy that entertains the widest amount of foreign outcry. These abortions are often late-term second (and occasionally third) children and done at the behest of local administration (Shalev 135-136). Women have failed time and again to flout the limitations of the one-child policy, in some cases carrying them to term and suffering the devastating consequences of fines or infanticide of their children. There is also evidence pointing to a rise in undocumented births among people in the countryside (Kane 201). Children not registered under the household registration (hukou) system are more likely to crop up in rural areas where communities can more easily conceal them. Due to the structure of resources and employment in the cities, not even additional pregnancies are overlooked by birth planning workers. Women who become pregnant via contraceptive malfunctions or manipulation of contraceptives are normally forced to terminate the pregnancy as soon as it is discovered. Their salaries and jobs are subsequently jeopardized, with a record of the error and thus subjecting them to fines or similar penalties. Such threats can also extend to her husband depending on the number of previous offenses and whether the pregnancy can be attributed to a natural failure of the contraception rather than the woman’s manipulation of it (Nie 45-48; Milwertz 194-195). A second pregnancy often results in a percentage of a woman’s salary being docked or deducted, a negative change that might also be imposed upon her husband. Should the situation be more suspicious on her part, she could be fired; such stipulations apply even to women who have jobs that are not under the direct purview of the state (179). On average, harsher penalties face women or couples who have encountered multiples cases
of extra pregnancies, punishments that can be further exacerbated by the length of the illicit pregnancy. Having to terminate a late-term fetus is usually the result of the mother’s reticence to come forward earlier, pointing to somewhat dissident behavior that tramples on rules and national obligations. As with feminist movements in the early days of communist rule, the control over a woman’s womb is ultimately not hers to be concerned with; if she pursues any such control, she is viewed as selfish by not only birth planning workers, but by the general populace. Chinese people can so easily recognize their own population problems, and read the Chinese newspaper so diligently, that a large portion of the educated urban “elites” are committed to the idea of its maintenance in accordance with standing policy. While there is a common acknowledgment of its imperfections, there is nonetheless an observable widespread acceptance and tepidness towards the policy. Many in China reply that it is because there is no better alternative, yet even this seems to be changing gradually (Nie 115; White 14)

In the same vein, abortions based on gender are illegal in China. Article 13 of the Marriage Law explicitly states:

Parents have the duty to rear and to educate their children; the children have a duty to support ant to assist their parents. Neither the parents nor the children shall desert one another. The foregoing provision also applies to foster parents and foster children. Infanticide by drowning and similar criminal acts are strictly prohibited.

Infanticide did disappear across the nation from the time of the Marriage Law’s inception up until the early 1980s. Hall observes that the resurgence was due to some relaxation of government interference in people’s private lives. Regardless of environmental factors that have likely played a role in the return of infanticide, son preference is ultimately the culprit for many of these problems. As infanticide visibly reappeared in the countryside via worsening birth ratios, the government recognized a need to address discriminatory practices and attitudes. The seventh National People’s Congress adopted the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests in 1992, and the tenth National People’s Congress amended the law in 2005. It addressed the issue of infanticide that was predominant in rural areas, but it moved further to eradicate cultural assumptions that disadvantaged women of all areas, establishing firmly all their right to education, employment, and political participation (Articles 9-12; 15-28). Despite prohibitions on many discriminatory practices, son preference exists in urban areas, though it is by no means as extreme as it is in rural areas. Though son preference creates more exacerbated issues in the countryside, there are some apparent pressures upon married women in cities to bear sons. This Confucian ideal is prompted by husbands, in-laws, the woman’s own parents, and even the woman’s social circles of neighbors, friends, or coworkers (Y.R. Wong 517-518). Shame over the birth of a daughter is less prevalent, but there were initially a large number of women who encountered discrimination and cruelty both inside and outside the home for bearing daughters. Extreme cases included domestic abuse and emotional neglect from husbands, while disappointed or unenthusiastic reception from a woman’s parents, in-laws, and other community members was the more commonly encountered situation (519; Nie 168). In recognition of the gender discrimination that is rampant across the nation, the government has taken measures to encourage the birth and rearing of female children. As propaganda for equality of the sexes has proliferated cities and even been pushed in rural areas, the government has also worked to promote daughters in family planning materials (Wasserstrom 352).

There are nonetheless a variety of exceptions that still enable gender discriminative family planning, both under the policy and through certain loopholes. Since its inception, the one-child policy has allowed exceptions for rural couples whose first child is a girl, permitting the birth of a second child such that they might produce a son to help with agricultural labor. Autonomous regions and minority groups are allowed two to three children, though cases of even four children have been found. Urban exceptions to the policy more often are a result of bribery, but at the same time, far more benefits and securities are contingent on birthing only one child. Notwithstanding the ubiquity of bribery in Chinese administration, bribery is a much less viable option for young couples with modest means. Fines for having
excess children can be exorbitant, equivalent to a month’s salary or more each year for parents. Given the penalties and expenditures of having several children, some couples, both rural and urban turn to more convenient yet extreme measures to ensure that they have a son (Y.R. Wong 522; Nie 156).

Alternative methods to abortions and infanticide lie with infertile or otherwise childless couples who will adopt the extra children into their families. Gates postulates that domestic adoption of abandoned or otherwise unwanted baby girls was common in China. This was for reasons of raising a future daughter-in-law, getting additional household laborers, and simply for the presence of children in the case of infertile couples (269). Such reasons may still easily apply today and likely account for what small percentage of orphans is adopted domestically. Domestic adoptions are not heavily promoted by the state, while economic and cultural influences can make international adoption particularly beneficial for orphanages (Johnson 380). Since the 1990s, there has been a rise in international adoptions to Western countries such as the United States and New Zealand, along with 15 other countries currently in cooperation with China\(^\text{a}\) (387). International adoptions are seen as a healthy alternative in consideration of the surplus of infants, particularly female ones, left in orphanages. The psychological impacts of the gender bias thus extend beyond the borders of the Chinese nation, extending the Chinese diaspora with a uniquely non-immigrant population of girls. Regardless of their adoption into stable, nurturing homes, the adoptees are challenged in their establishment of an ethnic and cultural identity (Rojewski 159-160). The legacy of the one-child policy, its concurrent son preference, and commonly observed feelings of familial disorientation further complicate the formation of individual identity for adoptees. Moreover, women who have aborted pregnancies, birthed children to adoption, or engaged in infanticide ostensibly have some emotional struggles with those memories. This is made clear by the fact that China has one of the highest rates of female suicide in the world (Kane and Choi 993). While the previous discussion Chinese women’s challenges must also be taken into account for suicide factors, reproduction is perhaps the most emotionally distressing element of a Chinese woman’s life.

**Looking Back on 30 Years**

Writing now from the year 2013, the one-child policy has been in place just over three decades. China has surpassed its ambitious goals to limit the population to only 1.2 billion by 2000 (Rai 191). With the current estimation of the Chinese population standing at a little over 1.3 billion, future projections give numbers of just over 1.45 billion by 2045 (Wei & J. Liu 10; Gui-ying 30). Put in perspective, China nearly compose a sixth of the world’s population, meaning that Chinese women compose almost a twelfth. These numbers impress the sheer impact of the one-child policy not just upon the population that it was designed for, but ultimately upon the globe. In consideration of this great impression upon global affairs − allocation of resources,

Sex-selective abortions, female infanticide, and allowances for second children are drastically distorting the Chinese sex ratio, which currently stands between 107 to 120 male births per 100 female births (Hudson & Boer 6-12). The abandonment and adoption of female children is also taking a toll on the population numbers, where the amount of girls being born does not equate the amount of girls actually living in the country. This leaves large numbers of men unmarried, a situation that has two distinct results. The first outcome is in accordance with Fong’s predictions: daughters will have more say in choosing their partners because they are, as ever, the keys to continuing the bloodline. Having higher levels of education also puts them at an advantage to choose their partners, and all of these factors combined enable them to exercise their rights within the home and in the workforce. For those men who do not or cannot marry such women, other alternatives are foreign brides and sex trafficking, the latter of which is predicted to be a very grave problem in the coming years (Shalev 120). Already, there are high figures of women being taken from Southeast Asian countries and

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\(^{\text{a}}\) [http://www.china-ccaa.org/site/infocontent/SWSY_20080827102804406.htm](http://www.china-ccaa.org/site/infocontent/SWSY_20080827102804406.htm)
married off to men in the countryside (Attané 14). This has social and cultural repercussions, not just in terms of the women who have been taken out of their native lands and thrown into virtual slavery, but for the children of such unions who will likely need to cope with cultural illegitimacy and issues of racial identification. The phenomenon of missing or invisible people is not just a problem for the sexually trafficked. Within China, unreported births and children who are brought up without registration portend yet more issues of population stability. Such children are institutionally nonexistent, unable to receive a formal education, apply for jobs, get married, own property, or even to engage in public life at the risk of incriminating themselves and their parents for violating the one-child policy.

When the People Speak

“The Catastrophic One-Child Policy!” is the title of one entry on the popular Baidu.com’s chat room. The author of the post is identified by only an IP address for reasons unknown, but the post stands at a few exclamatory sentences decrying the terrible effects of the one-child policy upon society. The author cites the group “Starry Harbor” (xingxing gang)9, an organization of commiserating parents who have lost their only children.

I really feel sorry for these parents’ suffering; they are at the point where they detest society now. [It is] all thanks to this wretched policy! [I] would really like to kill the children of those policymakers and make them experience [such] feelings of hopelessness and futility!10

The rather impassioned post has two responses, one concurring and the other simply responding with: “If we didn’t have the policy, [then] that would certainly be a catastrophe.” While Starry Harbor is dominated by couples who have recently lost their child, there is a needy population of elderly couples whose children have died11 either in youth or later on in life, leaving them bereft of both child and caretaker in their old age (“Monks Without a Temple”). Much like foreign observers in either academia or the news, Chinese citizens can and certainly are passionate and vocal about this topic. It is significant that such discussions are now taking place at all; in decades prior, birth planning was a forbidden subject for fear of criticism and over-speculation. In today’s ever-modernizing climate, the safety of open political discussion and government criticism fluctuates constantly with state tolerance and popular awareness. Social media and access to a plethora of communication outlets has given people, especially the young, a space to question predominant ideas and policy, if only within limits. Cases of forced abortions and other localized atrocities are easily uploaded and made viral on the Internet, a crisis that government censors can control only so well. Concerned citizens who witness the material will not only pass it on, but may contribute additional comments and outrage to its spread. When facing the soft power strikes of internet users, it seems that the party-state is more lenient about allowing polite discussion of it rather than adding fuel to the fire, though even that can only sate outraged web members for so long.

There is hope that such attention will push the government to move for greater measures to protect women and improve birth planning policy in order to “save face” for its administration. For some, the administration under the freshly appointed Xi Jinping looks promising. While nothing from the People’s Republic can ever truly be guaranteed, the allowance of public discussion for problems that are in close relation to the one-child policy are a source of hope. Government officials have recognized the statistics (whether they admit it or not) that show population growth going under replacement rate. China could easily follow the path of Japan, acquiring a stagnating economy and population that can only get older as its birth planning policies remain outdated (Lehmann12).

Conclusions

9 http://baike.baidu.com/view/5322526.htm
10 Self-translated. See: http://www.tieba.baidu.com/p/688643426
The one-child policy was always intended to have a finite life, and the variety in its application across regions has made many question its overall efficacy. A consensus among many inside and outside of China is that the policy will be changing, noting the gradual changes that have been put into effect as a new administration under Xi Jinping comes into its own. As the policy receives greater attention, more and more people are speculating on a “two-child policy” for the vast majority of couples who are singletons themselves. Alterations like these would placate some and present a potential solution to the 4-2-1 problem, though the exact statistics on the upcoming birth rates are vague. A complete elimination of the one-child policy is inevitable, though some predict that the end will be sooner rather than later.

Regardless of how many clauses are changed and which five year space they take place in, there remains the question of how China will deal with birth rates and family planning at the local and individual levels. At the local level, birth planning workers will have to adapt their practices to curb population growth, but perhaps will be more lenient based on their jurisdiction’s size, projected growth, and other pertinent factors. To be certain, the population problem will continue to exist for some time and will have undisputable reverberating effects on the next few generations, if not more. Responsibility to mitigate the effects of the population problem remains with officials at all levels of administration, granted that the balancing act between social harmony and population control will grow increasingly difficult. In terms of the individual citizen, there is little worry that China will suddenly experience a surge in births in the event that the one-child policy is lifted. At the very least, urban residents on average have expressed desires to limit their births two a maximum of two alongside preferences for later marriage. This trend, following in the trends of many other urban and/or educated populations, should continue to spread as China continues to develop in the coming decades. For rural families with more than one child who have incurred no penalties, it also appears that a limitation of two or three children is preferred due to the ever-rising costs of caring for children (L. T. Chang).

Attention should instead be trained on the problems of family construction within China, specifically those problems as they affect women. This paper has attempted to probe into the structure and context of the one-child policy as it stands today, with the assumption that it has had a negative impact on women’s advancement in society. The paper has simultaneously sought to reach a middle ground between foreign sensationalism and relentless domestic commitments to population control. That middle ground has been tempered by a particular examination of urban Chinese women, a distinct portion that is affected by the one-child policy. These women carry some of the most interesting histories of personal sacrifice and achievement along with a unique relationship to the Chinese state. In theory, the one-child policy assists their independence and development beyond gender biases. Yet in execution, the policy does in fact compound the effect of gender bias and further complicate the expectations of family creation and professional accomplishment. As disadvantageous models of femininity persist in society, women are challenged to comply with the policy while they must also satisfy filial obligations, support their parents in old age, and tend to their children’s growth. The one-child policy and its implementation thus create a distinct tension between fulfilling the economic and emotional needs of their households. This tension could be resolved with a more concerted effort on the part of the Chinese government to promote the feminist-egalitarian values in currently standing law. Given the contributions that women have, continue to, and can make in the future to the Chinese nation, to hinder their choices and suppress their opinions is a disadvantage to the nation as a whole. With that in mind, the real challenge for Chinese administration is to fuse women’s interests with national ones when

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14 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/08/us-china-onechild-insight-idUSBRE93714520130408
15 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/world/asia/12iht-letter12.html?_r=0
16 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/729956.shtml
approaching a revision of its family planning policies.

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