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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

Each year, the Center for Asian Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder highlights one or two themes in its sponsored programs. In 2011-2012, the themes were “Visualizing Asia” and “Asia on Edge.” It is fitting that in this inaugural issue of *Colorado Journal of Asian Studies*, all four articles touch on these themes. The honors thesis by Patricia Helfenbein—the first ever to be done in the Asian Studies Program—examines the discourse among Chinese and Indian intellectuals over the place of the nation (i.e., China and India) on an international level (i.e., Asia). Jay Hendren’s thesis examines the practice of gongfu cha. With a large Chinese diaspora, the practice of gongfu cha has spread far beyond the geographical borders of just China. While Jay’s thesis focuses on how diaspora networks have pushed Chinese boundaries *out*, Kevin Peter’s thesis looks at the role of the Uyghur diaspora in pushing Chinese boundaries *in*. The tensions between the Han Chinese and the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang have escalated both in frequency and intensity in recent years. We can also imagine Asia and its edges in the fourth article. Dan Ryan’s thesis focuses on the extent of anti-Americanism in Korean films, highlighting clearly the boundaries between Asia and non-Asia.

Constructing Global Space: The Modern, the Nation, and the Transnational in Early Twentieth Century Indian and Chinese Intellectual Discourses

PATRICIA HELFENBEIN

The latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century saw the full development of the nation-state as the only legitimate political unit though which a society could claim legitimacy and an entitlement to equal treatment, becoming the central organizing feature of the modern world. At the same time, international structures, most notably capitalism, developed during this time, giving rise to the first truly global world system. Putting aside these structures, this study seeks to examine the relationship between the national and the international through exploring the use of transnational discourses in conjunction with discourses of pursuing modernity and building the nation in Chinese and Indian intellectual thought. Focusing on one aspect of these discourses, I argue that intellectuals used discourses of the self and the other in such a way as to create a central, and therefore legitimizing, space for their society in global and regional narratives.

INTRODUCTION

On 13 March 2012, British Prime Minister David Cameron and his wife, Samantha, arrived in the United States for a two-day visit and reaffirmation of close diplomatic ties. Described by the United States press simply as a “special relationship” and touted by the British press as a Special Relationship, it was a move by Prime Minister Cameron to ensure that the United States and Great Britain would continue to value what are seen as the unique and mutually-beneficial ties between Great Britain and the United States.¹ As described in a jointly-written Washington Post editorial by United States President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Cameron and published on 12 March,

The alliance between the United States and Great Britain is a partnership of the heart, bound by the history, traditions and values we share. But what makes our relationship special – a unique and essential asset – is that we join hands across so many endeavors. Put simply, we count on each other and the world counts on our alliance.²

What is noteworthy about this visit is not the actual ties between the United States and Great Britain. Certainly, the timetable for the war in Afghanistan and the sanctions placed on Iran occupied a central place in the meetings between these two leaders. The remarkable element here is the meaning invested in this relationship by both sides, and particularly by the British government. Far more than a simple meeting between allies, this was an effort by the British government to secure its place in the world and to do so by explicitly naming the United States as a country that it regards to be closer to it than most, if not any other. For the United States, it was an

¹ For an example of this in British press, see Nick Robinson, “David Cameron, Barack Obama and the Special Relationship,” *BBC News*, 13 March 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17350091>. For an example of this in the United States press, see Anthony Faiola, “British Leader David Cameron Heads to Washington to Cement Ties,” *The Washington Post*, 12 March 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/british-leader-david-cameron-heads-to-washington-to-cement-ties/2012/03/12/gIQAV5UW7R_story.html.

² Barack Obama and David Cameron, “An Alliance the World can Count On,” *The Washington Post*, 12 March 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-and-david-cameron-the-us-and-britain-still-enjoy-special-relationship/2012/03/12/gIQABH1G8R_story.html.

opportunity to curry the favor of their British allies, particularly in light of their mutual interests further abroad.

In this statement in the editorial, President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron appeal to a shared history and heritage as a factor in their relationship that will continue into the future and, most importantly, be beneficial to the world. Although it is not mentioned in the articles, this relationship in fact reflects more the individual nation's understandings of the self than it does the regional relationship. This visit occurred at a moment when both countries faced problems both domestically and in global space. As the BBC noted, President Obama is facing a reelection year in which a meeting with conservative Prime Minister David Cameron could improve his popularity among American conservatives.³ Additionally, as tensions in Afghanistan have increased recently, the United States finds its situation there more precarious than it has been in recent years and might therefore feel a need to work with allies to continue to best pursue American interests there. Great Britain is not only facing the same problem in Afghanistan but is also currently dealing with the European Union financial crisis. It is in the context of an increasingly insecure relationship with the other countries of Europe that the Prime Minister visited the United States, an event that was widely announced by the British press in contrast to the more subdued reporting in the United States. In other words, both leaders, but especially Prime Minister Cameron, used regional ties to speak to matters concerning the nation. For neither country was this event about the regional partner but rather how positioning that partner closer to the self could address problems faced by the nation. In doing so, both nations placed themselves on a course that would affect both global events and would, in turn, influence how the individual nation defined itself in global space and to its citizens.

This type of international event is hardly unique in the contemporary world. Indeed, such relationships are a *sine qua non* of the modern world, marked as it is by inter-societal interaction that is unprecedented both in scope and intensity.

³ Robinson, "David Cameron, Barack Obama and the Special Relationship."

The seemingly unremarkable nature of these relationships is reflected in their marginalization in academic literature, giving way to other topics such as nationalism and the structures of global interconnectedness. The recent meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron, however, demonstrates a larger element of the nation and the global world, namely that one aspect of nation-building occurs beyond the borders of individual societies. The modern world, including what it means to be modern, the nation, and the multiple discourses of the international and transnational are indivisibly related. In this study, I examine the works of Chinese and Indian intellectuals from the end of the nineteenth century through the middle of the twentieth century to better understand how the relationship between the modern, the nation, and the international and transnational are used for the ultimate goal of defining the self and assuming a beneficial position for that self in the modern world. I also suggest that the interconnectedness of these three discourses serves as a way to better understand the global world and the role of the nation therein.

Rethinking the Nation in the Global World

History as an academic profession was born from the nation, and, when it emerged, it did so as a thoroughly modern discipline. In fact, history as a modern field of study emerged in order to write nationalist histories, and from this, coupled with a philosophy that subordinated all phenomena to scientific laws, historians increasingly placed their national narratives within a narrative of the evolution of humanity in history.⁴ History at once belonged to the nation and to the world. This resulted in a body of historiography that, until the beginning of the twentieth century, both took the

⁴ On the development of the profession of history because of the need for nationalist narratives, see Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 21; and Paul Lawrence, *Nationalism: History and Theory* (New York: Pearson Education, 2005), 20.

nation as the central, but monolithic, subject and attempted to understand human history in terms of so-called laws of history.⁵ Around the turn of the century, however, this method of writing history came under serious critique, and the idea of history as an evolutionary process was increasingly discredited. This impacted the field of the history of the nation in two significant ways. First, the nation was no longer taken for granted and it was seen as a product of historical development rather than an inevitable outcome of historical evolution.⁶ Because its origins could no longer be attributed to a natural process, the specific reasons for its emergence during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and in particular societies became a matter of inquiry. Second, the nation was no longer taken to be a homogenous subject. As a result, historians gradually shifted their focus from large-scale analyses that attempted to describe, as earlier theories had, human history as part of a single process. Instead, historians began to focus more and more on the development of individual societies, taking society itself as a subject for inquiry.⁷ Additionally, the earlier dominance of examining the development of a nation or society with the larger goal of understanding historical trends that could speak to human development overall largely, though not entirely, gave way to studies on individual societal units.⁸

⁵ In this historiography, the most prominent contributors are Karl Marx and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, but, in reality, most history was written in this way either explicitly or by taking this premise for granted.

⁶ For examples of early critiques of the idea of a timeless nation and the shift to a focus on the development of the nation as a heterogeneous but, in rhetoric homogenous, society, see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966); and Harold J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917).

⁷ See Herbert Spencer, *On Social Evolution*, ed. J. D. Y. Peel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

⁸ The earlier trend of examining history for the purpose of understanding larger trends beyond those in the development of individual societies did not completely disappear, as is evidenced by Arendt's work. During this time and continuing to the present, however, emerged the trend of studying a society simply for the

More recently, there has been a shift back to the theoretical within the writing of history in which historians, far from ascribing to an evolutionary perspective, understand that there are ways in which the development of different societies can be discussed as part of similar historical processes.⁹ Despite this development, the writing of histories of the nation is still largely confined to singular societies. Most scholarship tends to focus on the great diversity within the "homogenous" nation or on the ways in which theoretical perspectives can be seen through the historical development of individual societies.¹⁰

sake of better understanding that society, its development, and its characteristics. An example of this shift is in the case of Chinese historiography. Among the most prominent histories on China in the nineteenth century were Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's *Philosophy of History* and Max Weber's *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*. Both of these works, and especially that by Hegel, attempt to study China in order to develop larger theories on history in general. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956); and Max Weber, *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, trans. and ed. Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951). Especially by the middle of the twentieth century, however, most works on Chinese history focus on China without conspicuously adding any element of speaking to a larger human history. For an example of the continuation into the present of this scholarship that examines the inner dynamics of nation-building without speaking directly to a larger narrative of human history, see Yeh, Wen-Hsin, ed., *Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

⁹ As in the earlier shift in historiography, the earlier trend of focusing on the nation has not disappeared, but increasing numbers of scholars are placing their work in a larger theoretical framework. For recent examples of this type of work, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); and Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*.

¹⁰ For scholarship that reflects recent efforts to complicate the idea of the nation and expose the diversity that exists therein, see Timothy Brook and Andre Schmid, ed., *Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000); and Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*. For scholarship that focuses on applying a theoretical perspective to India as an individual society,

Although this scholarship represents a rich and valuable field of research, the discussion of the nation has not moved to the international and transnational to the extent that the sources merit.

Although there are many notable developments within the field of international studies, one that stands out because of its engagement with the long-term historical development of the modern world is that of the world-systems theory, whose most prominent contributor is Immanuel Wallerstein.¹¹ In this theory, the modern world is marked by the integration of the world into a single system that developed because of capitalism and continues to be marked largely by capitalism. This is a model that predominantly uses an analysis of structures to narrate a history of the modern period. Although it has a number of merits, the exclusive focus on structural analysis detracts from the equally long-term use of discourse and a perception of the other to construct global space. The construction of global space in this way is fundamentally connected to the creation of nation-states, which necessarily occurs in a global framework and uses the perceptions of the other to

see Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed Books, 1986); and Mithi Mukherjee, *India in the Shadows of Empire: a Legal and Political History, 1774-1950* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010). For scholarship that focuses on applying a theoretical perspective to China as an individual society, see Edmund S.K. Fung, *The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Political Thought in the Republican Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Wang Hui, "How to Explain 'China' and its 'Modernity': Rethinking *The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought*," in *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, ed. Theodore Hutters, trans. Wang Yang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 63-94.

¹¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, vol. 1-3 (New York: Academic Press, 1974). The world-systems theory is certainly not the only approach to international studies, and many other models incorporate perceptions of the other in an analysis of the world as an interconnected global space, but most of the scholarship on the international deals primarily with the contemporary period or the very recent past. The world-systems theory is notable because it constructs a narrative of interconnectedness that begins in the 1600s.

define itself.¹² What is needed, then, is an increased understanding of the role of discourses of the international and the transnational in the development of nation-states.

Most recently, the field has begun to turn in this direction, and it is primarily in this body of scholarship rather than the individual histories of China and India with which this study seeks to be in dialogue. Two works stand out within this literature that are related to the subject at hand. In *The Wilsonian Moment*, Erez Manela investigates the emergence of anticolonial nationalist movements at the end of the Paris Peace Conference from the perspective of the international community.¹³ He argues that these nationalist movements developed in Egypt, India, China, and Korea as a direct result of the failure of diplomats, primarily United States President Woodrow Wilson, at the conference to fulfill what had been seen as their commitment to world-wide self-determination. Additionally, he argues that this took place in an international community comprised of intellectuals in those societies that were victims of imperialism. These intellectuals, rather than working with simply their own society in mind, actively participated in what they considered a world-wide movement.

The second work is Prasenjit Duara's *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, primarily a section entitled "Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization."¹⁴ Whereas Manela focused on the

¹² These perceptions, both in the fact that they were possible and in the ways they influenced the nature of interaction between different societies, are very closely tied to capitalist structures, but the world-systems model as it is presently constructed excludes all but these structures. Although the relationship between these capitalist structures and perceptions of the other is an important one and deserves detailed examination, this study is limited to transnational imaginings with only a brief analysis at the end of Section One of their relationship with the modern world as created through the pursuit of capitalist structures.

¹³ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹⁴ Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 89-129.

perceptions of the historical actors concerning their relationship to the larger world, their rightful place therein, and the historical developments resulting from that imagining, Duara is concerned primarily with discourse. In investigating the transformation of the puppet state of Manchukuo into a nation by the Japanese, in this section Duara focuses on the legitimizing power of the discourse of civilization. In a statement that identifies the core of his argument, he writes, "As the masthead in the regime of authenticity where the noble virtues of civilization identify the abiding subject of a changing national history, civilization becomes the means of exercising national hegemony both within and without."¹⁵ His central argument, then, is that civilization served as the necessary discourse to legitimize the nation because the nation was authorized through the process of identifying with a discourse that extended beyond the boundaries of the nation. Although Duara's argument is convincing insofar as it speaks to the role of civilization in building the nation, his analysis excludes the larger role of transnational discourses in building a nation, of which the discourse of civilization is one part.

It is not my purpose here to contend with either of these works but rather to put their arguments about international and transnational space into a larger theoretical argument. I argue that the formation of an international intellectual community and the use of civilization as a legitimizing discourse is part of the larger phenomenon of what I term "transnational imagining," namely using perceptions of the relationship of the transnational to the national self to build the nation, which manifests itself in numerous ways. These can be seen through examining the intertwining discourses of the modern, the nation, and the transnational, which work in concert in intellectual discourses to produce a meaningful understanding of the self. In this study, I focus on the way that these transnational discourses fall into two broad categories of using the transnational to center the nation, which itself is simply one use of the transnational. First, there is the discourse that concerns the whole world and that is usually accompanied by a discourse of humanity; in both of

these discourses, the national self occupies a central role in the future of humanity. In this way, the self is defined by the unique contribution it makes to the world. Second is the creation of regional identities. This is a process in which the self is seen in gradated relationships with other societies that produces a type of global space that, from the perspective of the individual society, is defined by varying degrees of the self and the other. In both of these cases, the use of the transnational is fundamentally about centering the self in global space. The transnational works in this way in order to overcome the tension between the need of the nation to center the self and the reality of the truly marginal position of each national entity in the global world. In this way, nations can work within the global world and still secure for itself a rhetorical role as the center.¹⁶

Paradoxically, it was the creation of a modern world of objectively equal states that has given rise to a most extreme self-centrism that is enabled by the discourses of multiple others and their unequal relationship to the society, which occupies the center. It allows for the preservation of the self as a meaningful entity while allowing it to engage in a global world in which, objectively, it comprises only a small part. A result of this transnational imagining is a dynamic relationship between the self and the constructed global world in which these imaginings shape international events and the structure of the global world, and they, in turn, inform the actions of the nation and its perceptions of itself. This study is not interested in demonstrating the fact that the world is comprised of international and transnational relations that are revealed in the discourses of individuals. Rather, by examining global space from the perspective of the individual society, I aim to explore how the process of creating the modern world through these discourses was a fundamental part of building the nation and was not only

¹⁵ Ibid., 95.

¹⁶ Societies that do not successfully create these transnational narratives in which the society has a central, beneficial role to humanity as well as an international community that is perceived to focus on that society's interests tend to be aggressor states. In this situation, the nation is still central, but most, if not all, other societies are perceived as enemies, the negative other.

enabled by modern developments but was inscribed with the language of modernity.

In this study, I focus on the transnational, rather than international, aspect of the global world. The term international is generally used for relations between governments that are marked by diplomacy, which “embraces all international intercourse.”¹⁷ In other words, the international refers to competition and cooperation between states on the world stage for the obtainment of individual or mutual goals, or both. These relations certainly influence and are informed by the imaginative aspect of inter-societal relationships in that international relations influence these imaginings, which, in turn, help shape later relations. Not only does the term international not reflect these imaginings, however, but it also excludes all but diplomatic policies and their related state actions, which reflect the thoughts of only a few leaders. In fact, the whole population, to the extent that they are familiar with the larger world, engage in the modern world not only through interactions with other societies on a transnational level but also in this imagining of the other. “Transnational” usually refers to relations between people of different societies that take place beyond the purview of the state.¹⁸ My use of the term as a type of imagining in this study is a derivative of this meaning. It is an understanding of a relationship with another society that takes place on an individual level that, depending on the role of the individual in his or her society, can shape through discourse the perceptions of the entire society and influence the actions of the state.

¹⁷ Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions*, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (New York: Holmes and Meier for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), 137

¹⁸ My discussion of the international and the transnational here derive largely from Erez Manela’s distinction between them in *The Wilsonian Moment*. Although it is a brief and somewhat simplistic summary of both terms, it highlights the important difference that has informed this study. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 13.

Structure of the Study

The primary focus of this study is on the transnational imaginings in the discourses of Chinese and Indian intellectuals. Underlying these discourses of the transnational, however, is a complex relationship with modernity and the nation. In Section One, therefore, I primarily examine the ideas of modernity and nationalism by reviewing scholarship in these fields and exploring the theoretical relationship between these and the international and the transnational. I begin by approaching the question of modernity because this was the central driving force behind both the nation and the need for transnational imaginings. This concept is largely seen as a specific product of the West that, through imperialism, was exported and universalized. In contrast to much of the literature on this subject but in agreement with recent scholarship, I argue that modernity is a way of thinking and organizing society that recognizes the inherent agency of humans and that seeks to maximize the possibilities for that agency within society. Modernity as a specific time period, then, is not marked by the development of modernity as a concept but rather the large-scale organization of society around that concept in the West that develops as a result of global interaction, and because of the hegemony of the West, becomes a precondition for full and equal participation in that world. I then turn to the nation and argue that it developed because of the structures brought by the pursuit of modernity in order to most effectively continue to pursue modernity. Because this form of organization emerged in the hegemonic West, it became the sole form of political organization for full participation in the modernity world. Without developing a nation or effectively challenging the hegemony of the West to establish normative standards for interaction on the global stage, a society could not fully participate in the modern world to pursue wealth and power. I then examine the specific role of the transnational in both the modern and the nation. In this section, I develop my argument for the transnational as a centering mechanism that legitimizes the nation and allows it to be integrated into the modern world.

In Sections Two and Three, I turn almost exclusively to the transnational and examine the discourses of Chinese and Indian intellectuals from

the turn of the century until the middle of the twentieth century to understand how the nation was built through the centering force of transnational imaginings. In Section Two, after providing the historical context in which these intellectuals developed their discourses, I focus on the writings of Kang Youwei, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and, to a lesser extent, Liang Qichao. In this section, I focus on the first aspect of transnational imaginings, namely seeing the nation as a central part of a global narrative to the benefit of humanity, though not at the exclusion of the importance of building regional relationships. In Section Three, I conduct a similar study on Indian intellectual thought, focusing on the writings of Sir Surendranath Banerjea, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and Rabindranath Tagore. Because of the fact that India was a colonized society, the importance of regional relationships is especially evident in these discourses. Even though these men do not speak for the entirety of Chinese or Indian intellectual thought during this period, a study of their writings indicates the ways in which intellectuals developed their arguments through the use of these three discourses and their orientation to the larger world. By focusing on intellectuals of China and India, two countries with different histories, and in particular their mutual understanding of Asia, this study proposes that the use of the discourse of the transnational and its relationship with the modern, the nation, was and continues to be a phenomenon implicit in the very process of pursuing modernity.

This study is limited to intellectual discourses. Although images of transnational relationships among the wider population, the relationship between these images and intellectual discourses, and the mechanisms behind the possible transmission of these discourses would be a fascinating study, it is not within the scope of this study. Also notably absent is any analysis of the role of communism and its internationalism, which, especially after World War I and the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, was very important in both of these societies. Because of the importance of internationalism in communist philosophy and the complicated relationship between communism and nationalism, particularly in Asia, such an analysis merits a separate discussion and exceeds the scope of the present study. The decision to focus on the writings of a few intellectuals necessarily limits

this study to simply suggesting the importance of these discourses in modern intellectual thought as a whole, but it offers a deeper understanding of the construction of these discourses both within texts and over time that a more thematic analysis that draws from the writings of many intellectuals cannot in this space.

The limited nature of this study means that I can only propose a few preliminary arguments about the relationship between the modern, the nation, and the transnational and its importance in understanding the structure and development of the global world. Indeed, it necessarily raises more questions than it answers. Yet, it suggests that narratives of building the self in the modern world beyond the borders of the individual society add a layer of understanding to the contemporary world that is missing when understanding it simply as a network of relations. By understanding that the structure of the modern world is built on constructed transnational relationships that are charged with meaning and are important in building narratives of the self that have a significant impact in world affairs, we gain a more complicated understanding of both modern history and contemporary events

1. A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

*Therefore you cannot with a light heart accept the modern civilization with all its tendencies, methods and structures, and dream that they are inevitable. You must apply your Eastern mind, your spiritual strength, our love of simplicity, your recognition of social obligation, in order to cut out a new path for this great unwieldy car of progress... All of this you must apply to the present situation, and out of it will arise a new creation and not a mere repetition, a creation which the soul of your people will own for itself and proudly offer to the world as its tribute to the welfare of man.*¹⁹

Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism*, 1924

Rabindranath Tagore, an Indian poet and intellectual, charged Japan with this monumental task after presenting a scathing critique of the

¹⁹ Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism*, Indian Edition (London: Macmillan and Co., 1924), 57.

Western nation-state, disparaging it as an evil creation that reduced its people to mere mechanical cogs and preyed on nations throughout the world to sate its greed.²⁰ He entreated Japan, a newly-formed nation-state, to carve a “new path” to modern civilization, one that would foster progress while promoting harmony between and within societies. Although he focuses on the nation-state, he presents a commentary on modernity throughout the work as well. A well-traveled man who visited societies across the world, Tagore was acquainted with modernity and nationalism and, like many other intellectuals, did not accept either as represented by the West at face value. Instead, he envisioned a world in which modernity, represented by the boundless materialism of the West, could be reconciled with spiritual civilization, the gift of the East to the modern world.

At the center of this work lies Tagore’s denunciation of the Western nation-state and the modern civilization associated therewith as well as his suggestion for a world order based on the cultivation of humanity rather than greed-driven competition. Together, these represent a critique not of modernity but of the modern world as it existed at that time – one in which non-Western societies faced degradation and subjugation by Western imperialists in the name of nationalism. Despite it being written during a period in which nationalism was under severe attack throughout the world, this work is rarely mentioned in studies of nationalism or modernity.²¹ In attempting to

²⁰ In his text Tagore distinguishes nation-states from stateless nations by capitalizing the former, so that it reads the “Nation.” This distinction reflects the general understanding that continued until the middle of the twentieth century that all peoples belong to nations, which predate the modern period. As Tagore notes, he is “against the general idea of all nations,” but he reserved special condemnation for the Nation. *Ibid.*, 110.

²¹ For instance, in Paul Lawrence’s in-depth study of the historiography of nationalism, the only works he examines before World War II are those of Western intellectuals. Tagore’s *Nationalism* is cited but only appears in the study at the beginning of the Conclusion in which part of his poem entitled “The Sunset of the Century” included in *Nationalism* is quoted but not given any consideration in the text. Lawrence, *Nationalism*, 219. In discussing the works in the immediate post-war

develop a comprehensive theory of modernity, scholars tend to focus on its construction in the West, creating standards of modernity and the nation-state that are defined as Western by nature. Indeed, nationalism and modernity are still largely seen as the conceptual preserve of the West, allowing the perception to persist that non-Western societies were merely grateful recipients of these ideas rather than active creators and critics. Differences in the implementations of these ideas between Western and non-Western societies are viewed as the failure of the latter to properly follow their Western counterparts, creating the appearance that their attempts at modernity are incomplete.²² Both in popular perception and in academic circles, this has resulted in the essentialization of modernity and the nation based on a “Western European” model. As Partha Chatterjee notes, “History, it would seem, has decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only be perpetual consumers of modernity,” if the only possible expressions of the nation, and by extension modernity, were preordained by the West.²³ This is objectionable because, as he notes, it runs contrary to the historical evidence, which indicates that non-Westerners were indeed creators of their own nationalisms and, as I contend, their own expressions of modernity.

Although this study as a whole is primarily concerned with the transnational, in this section I engage in an extended discussion of modernity and the nation because they form the background against which the discourses of the transnational are created. Therefore, in order to fully appreciate context of the transnational discourses, the modern and the nation must also be understood. I begin with modernity because, even though modernity is not always explicitly referenced by the intellectuals on whom this study focuses, modernity is the central organizing force that a

period, Lawrence mentions numerous Western thinkers who advocated internationalism as an alternative to nationalism, but similar critiques of non-Western intellectuals are absent.

²² For a discussion of this characterization of Indian modernity, see Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity*, 28.

²³ Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5.

society must adopt in order to have a viable future in the modern world. In this section, I examine modernity as both an objective world view and as an idea that has created and shaped the modern world. I argue that modernity must be understood objectively as a way of understanding and interacting with one's society and environment and also as a novel way of organizing the world, creating for the first time a truly global order that, at least to the present, has largely been determined by Western society because of its hegemonic role and monopoly of the idea of modernity. I also argue that the process of understanding and pursuing a place in the global order of the modern world involved a complex relationship between modernity, the nation, and the transnational. This took place in a particular historical context in which Western colonialism and imperialism had, to varying degrees, subjugated the non-Western world, which was thereby thrust into the modern world and forced to secure a place therein according to the conditions established by the hegemonic West. I will first explore the meaning of modernity and will then examine the relationships between modernity and the nation. Finally, I will arrive at the core theoretical argument of this study by exploring the relationship between modernity, the nation, and the transnational and the fundamental role that imperialism played in the particular global order that took shape.

Modernity, the Nation, and the Transnational

Modernity: the Universal and the Particular

Modernity is an elusive concept that, though constantly being attributed numerous meanings, escapes concrete definition. Indeed, it acquires different meanings and implications depending on the specific historical context and, frequently, the individual scholar. To take the great variety in the uses of the idea of modernity as evidence for it being an all-encompassing term that can be used for any phenomena in the modern era, however, is to render it both meaningless and useless. Despite this variety, modernity has a specific meaning as a universal concept that, over time, has obtained secondary meanings that have frequently been

taken to represent the concept itself. I will first examine the root meaning of modernity as it is discussed in academic literature and will then discuss the importance of distinguishing between this and the different manifestations of modernity. All of the meanings I discuss are emphasized to different degrees by different scholars, but they all have some bearing on the meaning of modernity and are, in fact, interrelated.

I take as the central elements of modernity the ideas of self-consciousness, rationality, and human agency. Edmund S.K. Fung asserts that "philosophical interpretations of modernity are grounded in conceptions of self and society [and are associated with] self-consciousness, self-assertion, self-gratification, and aesthetic self-expression."²⁴ These are all closely related to the idea of rationality. Discussing the origins of modernity, David E. Apter writes, "In my view, modernization as a non-economic process originates when a culture embodies an attitude of inquiry and questioning about how men make choices...To be modern means to see life as alternatives, preferences, and choices."²⁵ He continues with the argument that rationality lies at the center of this ability to make a "[s]elf-conscious choice." Rationality as a conscious frame of mind has its roots in the European Enlightenment.²⁶ In his response to Immanuel Kant's article, "What is Enlightenment?" Michel Foucault defines modernity as a "mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents

²⁴ Fung, *The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity*, 7-8.

²⁵ David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 9-10.

²⁶ This is not to say that the modern began to be expressed only in the Enlightenment nor that modernity relies on the development of rationality as a conscious perspective. This is simply one aspect of modernity, and it is one that Apter finds to be central. As I discuss later, modernity can exist even in the absence of a philosophical understanding of the modern, but it is fully expressed when a modern approach to the organization of society is coupled with a philosophical understanding of the modern.

itself a task.”²⁷ According to Foucault, this is a mode of thinking that was first reflected in Kant’s article on the Enlightenment as it both engaged the question of what enlightenment is and, in its response, for the first time reflected a true enlightenment. Another meaning of rationality that is equally relevant here is articulated by Ernest Gellner in his work on nationalism. He writes that it is “a common measure of fact, a universal conceptual currency...for the general characterization of things.”²⁸ A modern frame of mind, then, takes all phenomena to be subject to inquiry and, ultimately, human understanding, this being an understanding on which people, as self-conscious beings, can choose to act. Modernity is an understanding of the organization of human society; one’s place in that society and, on both an individual and societal level, in the larger world; and a belief in one’s own ability to change that position. It also includes the belief in the ability of humans to understand the physical realm in terms of natural phenomena and, upon this understanding, to change the world around them – they design their own environment and future. By extension, modernity expresses itself in a society marked by fluidity, the presence of structures that facilitate agency, and activities that seek to shape its environment in accord with its own values. Though this is commonly associated with industrialism and capitalism, which themselves are necessarily modern, it does not preclude other systems that are based on the premise of nationality and agency.

Implicit in and necessary to the idea of human agency is the idea that humans are naturally free beings. This connection was articulated by Immanuel Kant in his 1784 article, “An Answer to the Questions: What is Enlightenment?”²⁹ Speaking in this article primarily about spiritual matters and the relationship between the individual and the church, Kant argues that enlightenment occurs when the individual emerges

from a state of “self-imposed immaturity” and realizes he can think for himself and no longer has to rely on the pastor exclusively for spiritual direction. He considers the freedom of man to be a principal good that will allow him to “learn to walk” and interact in and understand the world on the basis of his own reason. Although, as Foucault notes, Kant is concerned primarily with the present, this is inextricably bound to the future and man’s ability to act in such a way as to change that future.³⁰ As seen above, Foucault posits modernity as an attitude that both understands one’s relation to the present and “presents itself a task,” which must necessarily be completed in the future. By realizing one’s present state, understanding the fundamental relationship between the state of the self and the passage of time as one that is marked by temporality and thus potentially subject to change, and acknowledging the self as a free being, he can take it upon himself to work to change that state in the future. Man is both the cause of his entrapment as it is a self-imposed condition, and he holds the power to realize his freedom and, by doing so, can chart the course for his future. Extending Kant’s argument, in a modern frame of mind, man realizes his potential as a free being that does not by nature exist in a hierarchy determined by exclusionary knowledge and opportunity. Upon realizing this, society is organized in such a way that men can most effectively pursue their own interest and shape their future. By harnessing this natural inclination as free beings, a society can direct its productive action towards acquiring wealth through the creation of capitalist structures and, by extending them throughout the globe, can obtain unprecedented wealth and power.

It is important to consider self-consciousness, rationality, and human agency as central features of modernity because a modern society is one that is organized in such a way as to maximally facilitate these, especially agency. This allows for the possibility that modernity can express itself through structures or philosophy, or both. This separates the European Enlightenment from the

²⁷ Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 39.

²⁸ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 21.

²⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Writings*, ed. Ernst Behler (New York: Continuum, 1986), 263-269.

³⁰ On Kant’s concern with the present, see Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 34. Foucault considers Kant’s article to mark the beginning of a truly modern frame of mind because of his understanding of the self in relation to “contemporary reality.”

“rise of modernity,” a necessary separation that has only recently begun to emerge in academic literature. Speaking to the contradiction that arises when imperialism is criticized on the premise of rationalism and yet the idea of the Enlightenment as the moment in which modernity developed is maintained, Dipesh Chakrabarty remarks, “Frankly, if Enlightenment rationalism is the only way in which human societies can humanize themselves, then we ought to be grateful that the Europeans set out to dominate the world and spread its message.”³¹ Disassociating the Enlightenment from modernity itself and acknowledging that it is simply one manifestation of modernity allows it to be seen as a crucial moment in the West when modernity as a way of organizing society was developed as a system of thought. This perspective and the realization that modernity expresses itself in structures as well as philosophy has allowed scholars to discuss the early modern periods of non-Western countries and, indeed, the early modern period of societies in the West that predate the development of the modern as a way of thinking.³² Rationalization and the organization of structures to facilitate human agency need not be accompanied by a corpus of knowledge such as the works of the Enlightenment in order for their role in society to be considered and the manifestation of modernity to be recognized.

Another important aspect of modernity that in fact underlies the development of these structures but expresses itself most fully through the philosophical development of modernity is that of the linear concept of time and, thus, the possibility for progress. According to Wang Hui, modernity “contains only one ambiguously clear feature, which is that modernity is principally a conception of time, or, perhaps better to say, a conception of historical time that moves linearly forward and

cannot be repeated.”³³ The full development of capitalist structures depends on this concept of time, rationality, and agency because it is only by understanding the future as an unknown quantity that is determined by the individual that the investments and risk inherent in a capitalist system will be undertaken. Also closely associated with this is the idea of progress. Because the relationship between humans and their environment can be understood and shaped by human actions for their benefit, and the outcome of the future is contingent on human decisions, human-determined progress is possible. In the West, the idea of progress acquired a positive value, which set off the large-scale pursuit of modern structures and development.³⁴ From this idea of progress developed the concept of the modern as something new. This laid the basis for the popular understanding of a dichotomy between the modern and the traditional, with a decidedly negative implication attached to the latter. The extent to which a society had abandoned tradition and adopted the new, which in the non-West was largely defined by Western features, became a measure for that society’s modernity and potential for full participation in the modern world. The importance of the new is readily seen in early twentieth century China in which publications such as *New Youth*, *New Guangdong*, and *New Hunan* demonstrated a rhetorical shift to a focus on the future of Chinese society that was new and modern.³⁵ As Xiaobing Tang notes, “the ‘precarious Confucian-Western structure’ that Liang [Qichao] had achieved in the 1890’s [*sic*] readily gave way to a history-oriented belief in progress and nationalism, with the result that the binary opposition was no longer constructed between West and China but between the ‘new’ and the

³¹ Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity*, 32. In his work, Chakrabarty is in dialogue with post-modernist thinkers such as Michel Foucault.

³² For example, the idea of early modern Japan is based on the emergence of capitalist structures there in the seventeenth century.

³³ Wang, “Weber and the Question of Chinese Modernity,” in *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, trans. Theodore Hutters, 266.

³⁴ Progress also gained a positive value in other societies, but some intellectuals, such as Rabindranath Tagore, accepted the basic precepts of modernity and acknowledged its possibility, but refuted its value because of the destruction brought by the pursuit of progress in the name of national self-interest.

³⁵ For a discussion of *New Guangdong* and *New Hunan*, see Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 181-2.

'old.'"³⁶ The new emerged as a way of understanding the modern, and it was under this banner of the new that many intellectuals articulated the position of their society in the global order and prescribed actions that would improve that position.

It is in this concept of time that a tension in modern philosophy developed between rationality and human agency. According to the idea of rationality, humans as well as the environment could be understood to act in accordance with laws. Science and scientific laws dominated intellectual thought during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries throughout the world. The idea of linear time combined with this belief in the quantification of the human experience to produce an evolutionary mode of understanding history. This is clearly evident in the writings of Karl Marx and Georg Wilhelm Hegel, to name the most prominent, but in fact it was the premise upon which history was almost ubiquitously understood. This idea was so pervasive that Kang Youwei reversed the Confucian model of history as a narrative of degeneration from an ideal past to one of progression towards that same perfect world order that exists in the future, the Age of Complete Peace-and-Equality.³⁷ As will be discussed in Section Two, he used this model to place China within a narrative of world history in which humanity was reaching for a brighter future, one to which China offered an important contribution. The view of history as an evolutionary process also provided a basis for understanding the present world as a product of evolution and as merely a stage in humanity's progress. In this very modern conception of time and history arose a tension with the equally modern concept of human agency. Certainly in these models of evolution, humans play a supportive role. For instance, in Marx's model of

evolution towards communism, humans were active participants, an idea that Lenin developed by arguing that the vanguard is necessary to make this evolution occur. Yet in the very idea of evolution as an unavoidable process with a definite, foreseeable endpoint, the agency of humanity in determining its own future is marginalized. Humans can only hope to realize the truth of history's evolution so as to conform to and participate in its inevitable outcome. As David E. Apter noted in commenting on Marxism, the "material plane of reality...involves the unfolding of historical necessity and the obliteration of the idea of freedom..."³⁸ Despite this tension, the idea of history as an evolutionary process was central to the idea of modern through the middle of the twentieth century. The relative evolution of a particular society was the basis for its place in the hierarchy of the global order. The colonized societies needed the colonial system in order to evolve and come to join the West at a higher level of history. It was their relative backwardness in the evolution of history that legitimized Western imperialism. Through this discourse developed the hegemony of the West and the direct association between the modern and the nation as the sole legitimate political organization for full participation in the world.

It is this evolutionary mode of history and an understanding of the modern as an advanced stage in this evolution that laid the foundation for the idea that the Western form of modernity represents the very nature of modernity. It is inaccurate, however, to view any particular expression of modernity as a self-defining and immutable phenomenon whose fundamental features are to be understood by studying Western societies.³⁹ This perspective has two central fallacies. First, it supports the notion of the modern period as part of the natural evolution of human history whose central actor is Western Europe. As a self-defined phenomenon, modernity is unaffected by human actors and is merely the product of societal development. Because

³⁶Xiaobing Tang, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: the Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 16. For a discussion of the earlier model of China versus the West, see Chapter Three.

³⁷ For a complete analysis of this age and the necessary steps to achieve it, see Kang Youwei, *Ta T'ong Shu: the One-World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei*, trans. Laurence, G. Thompson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958).

³⁸ Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, 6.

³⁹ Recent scholarship by and large argues against the idea of modernity as essentialized, yet these assumptions persist in the language used and the approach taken to understand modernity.

modernity exists, then, it is necessarily part of the natural process of a society's evolution; because it supposedly expressed itself first in Europe, Western societies hold a monopoly on its defining characteristics – other societies can strive to merely emulate in the process of consciously accelerating their own “evolution.”

Implicit in this argument is that “modernized” societies exist naturally in the West and “modernizing” societies exist elsewhere. In this view, the relationship between tradition and modernity is relevant only to non-Western societies. In the West, tradition is promoted from its hindering role in other societies to a distinguishing characteristic of the modern Western nation. This conceit secures the West's conceptual monopoly on modernity, leaving the rest of the world to either imitate the West or consign itself to never achieving modernity.

Central to this is the second fallacy of treating modernity as a self-defined subject: substituting the products of modernity for its nature. As discussed, modernity certainly has a specific meaning and the modern period its distinct characteristics, but, as I contend, the ways in which these are expressed should not be mistaken for its true meanings. Dipesh Chakrabarty demonstrates this clearly in his work, *Habitations of Modernity*.⁴⁰ Beginning with an analysis of the development of the field of subaltern history in which the illiterate peasant is seen as a modern, political actor even though he has not been given a “modern” education, he then examines a number of cases in India that would, from the perspective of a Western gaze, appear to be nonmodern, and he demonstrates how the modern is expressed in each of them.⁴¹ In his introduction, he poses a number of questions including, “How do we envision or document ways of being modern that will speak to that which is shared across the world as well as to that which belongs to human cultural diversity?”⁴² Implicit in this question and demonstrated throughout his book is the idea that the modern can, and does, take numerous forms. To look

simply for what is Western and consign the rest to the nonmodern is to deny non-Western actors agency in their own modernity and to overlook the historical evidence that refutes the conceit that modernity belongs to the West. Therefore, although the root characteristics of modernity must be considered universal if they are to have any meaning at all, the idea of universality should not be extended to its manifestations, which are in fact particular to different times and places.

Notions of universality are crucial, however, when considering the pursuit of modernity in particular historical circumstances, which resulted in modern Western society becoming the paradigm for modernity. Because the Western expression of modernity was taken to be its nature by non-Western societies thrust into the modern world by the West, this idea of the universality of “Western modernity” played a central role in the ideas and decisions of many non-Western individuals.⁴³ Therefore, when considering modernity as a historical phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the perspectives of those who sought to interact with the modern world while approaching the expression of modernity as a process whose form varies temporarily and spatially as it is given meaning not by virtue of its nature but rather by the historical actors themselves. This necessitates that the universal characteristics, those that represent a particular

⁴³Another mistake in making modernity synonymous with the last four centuries of Western society is that it ignores the changes that took place within the West as “modern” took on different meanings over time as it did in non-Western society. My use of “Western society” is not an attempt to reduce the West to a single society or the West's experiences with modernity to a single phenomenon but rather serves to emphasize that what is generally accepted as modernity is in fact the perception of a unified West that represents modern throughout the modern period despite the changes and diversity it experiences. It is also important to note that the modern period for non-Western societies did not begin with contact with the West and resulting changes. As will be discussed in greater detail, what is generally accepted as the beginning of the modern period for some other societies in fact predated the contact with the West. What is important here, however, is the creation of the modern world with a global order based on societies' relative acceptance of Western norms of modernity.

⁴⁰ Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity*.

⁴¹ Chakrabarty uses the term “nonmodern” in order to avoid implications of chronological progression. I prefer to use “nonmodern” for this reason.

⁴² *Ibid.*, xxi.

world view that are theoretically accessible to anyone at any time or location, be distinguished from the particular characteristics of “modernity,” namely the system that came to define the modern world that was rooted in the universal aspects of modernity but expressed itself in the form that developed out of particular historical circumstances in the West. Both the universal and the particular aspects of modernity are embedded in the term “modern,” but it is the particular aspect, here the manifestation of modernity that developed in the West, that has the most direct relevance to the development of the modern world. In conclusion of this examination of modernity, I now turn to the particular understanding of modernity.

Modernity represents a universal mode of thinking that, because of particular historical circumstances in the West, came to define Western society as a whole, and it was then universalized as a particular expression of modernity. Because of its role in producing the modern world, theory on modernity tends to focus on the understanding of modernity as a product of the West that developed there beginning in the sixteenth century and was universalized through imperialism. As S.N. Eisenstadt argues, “Instead of perceiving modernization as the final stage in the fulfillment of the evolutionary potential common to all societies – of which the European experience was the most important and succinct manifestation and paradigm – modernization (or modernity) should be viewed as one specific civilization or phenomenon” originating in Europe and from there spreading throughout the world.⁴⁴ Eisenstadt is correct in arguing that modernity should not be viewed as part of an evolutionary process, but his argument assumes the only other alternative is that modernity is by its nature particular to Europe. His view accounts for the globalization of modernity and explains how the universal characteristics of modernity and its particular expression in the modern West came to be viewed as synonymous, but it does little to comment on the actual nature of modernity. Instead, it replaces modernity with the modern age

and the modern world. As indicated earlier, the modern age does not reflect a specific way of viewing man’s relationship to the world that is unique to a particular time period or society but, because of the West’s large-scale acceptance and implementation of a modern way of thinking, is rather indicative of the creation of the modern world that is marked by a global order that is built on the understanding of man’s linear progression through time and on the premise of modernity as the best way to organize society so as to maximize that progress.⁴⁵ The modern world is therefore marked by the globalization of Western modernity and its role as dictating the only legitimate way of organizing society and interacting in the global order.

Beyond the meanings of modernity discussed earlier, there are two other features that are central to this study but that reflect the particular expression of modernity in the modern world rather than modernity itself. First is the importance of inter-societal interactions. As the modern world took shape through market-driven interaction with other societies, it came to be marked by internationalism and transnationalism.⁴⁶ Certainly these are not unique

⁴⁵ I therefore find more convincing the premise of Jonathan Spence’s statement that he understands “a ‘modern’ nation to be one that is both integrated and receptive, fairly sure of its own identity yet able to join others on equal terms in the quest for new markets, new technologies, new ideas.” He then asserts that the modern is “a concept that shifts with the times as human life unfolds...there were modern counties—in the above sense—in A.D. 1600 or earlier, as at any moment in the centuries thereafter.” In other words, it is a way to describe a certain approach to man, society, and the environment that is not constrained to a particular time and place. I disagree with Spence’s use of the term nation, which, as discussed later, is particular to the modern period. I also find his definition of “modern” to not fully reflect the complexities of the term, but I accept his premise of modernity as a world view that must be seen as detached from a particular time and place. Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), xxiv.

⁴⁶ The dates for when modernity emerged in the West as a way of organizing society on a large scale depends largely on what one takes to be the necessary elements of modernity. If capitalist structures are the key factors,

⁴⁴ R.N. Eisenstadt, ed. *Patterns of Modernity: Volume II – Beyond the West* (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1987), v.

to the modern world as few societies have ever existed in true isolation. In the modern period, though, this shifts from interactions between neighboring societies to understanding and working within a global order that is governed by contemporary standards of modernity. Whereas in the nonmodern world, a state's legitimacy generally is derived from divine authorization, in the modern world, other human societies determine a state's legitimacy and the value, both financial and moral, of the activities of other societies. Although to be modern in the universal sense of the term is not contingent on international authorization, the modern world and therefore the idea of modernity was produced by and depends on the international community.⁴⁷ This is closely connected to the other aspect of "being modern" that is relevant here – accepting a normalized role in the modern world. A central part of the perception of a society's modernity is how it takes part in the contemporary global order.⁴⁸ As noted,

then the roots of this modernity lay in the ports of Italy during the Renaissance and took full shape in the trading companies of the Western imperial powers. If philosophy is taken as the necessary factor that distinguishes the fully modern from the early modern and it is on that basis that the roots of Western modernity are determined, then the "beginning of modernity" did not occur until the Protestant Reformation, and from that point it developed into body of thought during the Enlightenment.

⁴⁷ The idea of an international community has its roots in the Peace of Westphalia that marked the end of the Thirty Years War. On the Peace of Westphalia as creating a forum for international agreement and submission to a standard for international action beyond the individual society, see Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 51-70. This peace also laid the foundation for excluding the non-West from the international community because they could not claim the same historical legacy of civilization that the Peace of Westphalia had provided the countries of Western Europe.

⁴⁸ For instance, at the turn of the century, a society's modernity was determined by its having formed a nation-state and, more importantly, its ability to be an imperial power. Japan began to construct a modern nation-state with Western institutions after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, but it was not until she defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and,

there are two levels on which modernity must be understood: its actual nature and its role as an idea. From the universal perspective of modernity, only the first matters – the only question that has any bearing is the extent to which the society has organized society along the lines of modernity as a world view as discussed earlier.⁴⁹ Such objectivity rarely determines discourse, however, so the latter is in fact more relevant to how the international community determines who is modern, which shapes international relations and therefore, as noted, the global order itself. Central to this is hegemony – to be considered modern, then, requires that a society acquire the characteristics determined by the hegemonic powers as modern, which explains how the Western model came to establish the standards of modernity, at least until the present. At the same time, the objective nature of modernity means that alternative and valid models of modernity can be developed, and these must be considered when examining a society's process of modernization. Even though in discourse and the global order the Western model has determined the acceptable form of modernity and thus played an important role in non-Western societies' evaluation of modernity, it faced critique by the very people who accepted the fundamental nature of modernity.

Modernity and the Nation

Modernity and the nation cannot be discussed apart from one another. Although it cannot be persuasively argued that one is the inevitable product of the other, and it is unlikely that such a close causal relationship exists between the two, it

as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, acquired Taiwan as a colony that Japan was counted among the world's powers and was allowed to play a greater role in global affairs.

⁴⁹ Of course, because of the multifaceted nature of modernity, this is not a simple evaluation. The point here is that, if we accept that there modernity is indeed a real world view that is not simply a product of the West but rather can theoretically be implemented by any individual at any point in time, then we must also accept that a society's "modernity" depends not on its acceptance of Western modernity but on the universal principles of modernity.

is evident that they developed historically as closely related phenomena. In other words, one did not *necessarily* emerge as a result of the other, but the particular development modernity and the nation in Western Europe and the universalization of that society as the model for full participation in the modern global order demonstrates the close historical relationship between the two. The nature of this relationship is still a subject of debate. Before discussing this debate, I will first briefly examine current scholarship on and understandings of the nation, which, like modernity, is a subject that continues to evade agreement on more than the most general definitions. Although an in-depth study of the transformation of the ideas of the nation and of nationalism offers valuable insight into its nature as a malleable idea, my focus here is on the current scholarship on these topics as it provides what I believe to be the most complete approach to these subjects to date.⁵⁰

The word and use of “nation” has undergone significant transformations over the last two millennia. As Liah Greenfield shows, the word has its roots in the Latin *natio* and was used as a derogatory reference to foreigners; it was then variously used to refer to university students who originated in the same region, to the elite, and, ultimately, to a sovereign people and a unique people.⁵¹ Greenfield’s understanding of the nation can be seen through his articulation of nationalism, a phenomenon that “locates the source of individual identity within a “people,” which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity.”⁵² Based on his distinction between “sovereign people” and a “unique people,” he seems to view the nation as a group of people whose distinguishing characteristic is their identification with one another on the basis of political or

cultural solidarity, or both. In this way, his understanding of the nation bears remarkable similarity to Benedict Anderson’s well-known argument that the nation is “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”⁵³ Greenfield’s analysis of the etymology of the “nation” lends support to the common perception that three basic nationalisms exist.⁵⁴ The first, based on the idea of a “sovereign people,” locates the source of sovereignty in the individuals within a society and is typified by civic nationalism. The second, based on the idea of the nation as a “unique people,” understands sovereignty in terms of the people and expresses ethnic nationalism. The third also locates the source of sovereignty in the society as a whole, but holds to civic nationalism. As Greenfield notes, these do not represent rigid divisions as different nations draw on civic and ethnic nationalism to different extents. Although his analysis appears simplistic as it reduces the nations of the world into three categories, it points to a central aspect of nation-building throughout the world – using discourses of ethnicity and civil rights within the context of the indigenous society in order to create a national identity that the populace can choose to embrace as part of a larger attempt to secure the legitimacy of the particular nation and its need for a state in order to take part in the global order of modern nation-states.

The works of Anderson and Greenfield represent the dominant present understanding of the nation, namely that it is a creation of the modern period that organizes society based on the

⁵³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 3rd ed. (New York: Verso, 2006), 6.

⁵⁴ Greenfield, *Nationalism*, 9-11. Anthony D. Smith takes this argument further and argues for distinctive Western, or civic, nationalisms, and Eastern, ethnic, nationalisms. Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1991). Greenfield does not explicitly advocate a clear East-West division, but he does note that particularistic nationalism in the eighteenth century emerged in Europe, “whence it started to spread all over the world,” indicating that civic nationalism is primarily the preserve of England, the United States, and, in a more complicated combination of collective and civic nationalism, France. Greenfield, *Nationalism*, 14.

⁵⁰ For a detailed study of the development of the field from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present, see Lawrence, *Nationalism*. As noted, his work is incomplete because it includes only the perspectives of Western scholars, but it offers a thorough and valuable analysis of Western scholarship in this field.

⁵¹Liah Greenfield, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 4-9.

⁵²Ibid., 3.

natural rights and sovereignty of the people who are united by political allegiances and cultural similarities, or the perception thereof. As scholars have more recently come to understand, even though nations are a distinctly modern phenomenon, they cannot be understood apart from the histories of their societies prior to the modern period. Indeed, as R. Bin Wong remarks, two distinct and legitimate academic understandings of nation-building are, first, the nation as a product of the “twin processes of state-making and the formation of industrial capitalism,” and, second, nations as entities that “can have long histories as long as groups of people have been able to label themselves in ways distinct from others.”⁵⁵ As he claims, “[e]ach more successful accounts for some features of certain cases than the other,” indicating that all features of the nation do not necessarily exist exclusively in the modern period. Therefore, when examining the nation, even though it is a term that is correctly reserved for the political and cultural identities of the modern period, continuities with the past must be considered as they play an important historical and rhetorical role in the process of nation-building.

Both modernity and the nation have come to exemplify the modern period. Modernity because it forms the basis of our understandings of man’s relationship to his environment and therefore the ways in which he interacts with that environment, and the nation because it has emerged during this period as the sole legitimate way of organizing human society. Despite this close relationship, its nature, namely which one produced the other, continues to be a matter of debate among scholars. The works of two leading scholars published within a decade of each other exemplify the uncertainty of the field as a whole towards this question. Gellner argues that “the age of transition to industrialism was bound, according to our model, also to be an age of nationalism...nationalism is indeed an effect of industrial social organization.”⁵⁶ In this work, Gellner does not closely examine the idea of modernity, basing his model instead on modes of

production and the progression from an agrarian society, which he argues cannot give rise to nations, to an industrial society, which must result in the formation of nations. In contrast, Greenfield seeks to reverse the typical causal relationship of modernity producing nations and asserts, “Rather than define nationalism by its modernity, I see modernity as defined by nationalism.”⁵⁷ He later argues that, “Historically, the emergence of nationalism predated the development of every significant component of modernization.”⁵⁸

Although I find Gellner’s argument that modernity predates and produces the nation more persuasive, I also contend that the nation in turn produces a society based on modernity and that it emerged as a form of political organization because it facilitated the pursuit of progress. Connected to this, I also suggest that the nation is a form of social organization that is more intimately connected to the West than is modernity. Earlier, I argued that modernity is, at its most basic level, a way of viewing the world rationally with the understanding that people are moving forward through time and have the ability to shape their future, making progress a possibility. As such, it does not in its nature belong to any particular society or historical situation. The nation, in contrast, emerged as way of organizing society rationally so as to collectively compete with other European societies as effectively as possible and to exclude other societies, those that did not possess a nation-state, on whose resources Europe’s material development depended. As such, the nation was born out of the particular international situation of Western Europe. This is not to say that Europe was the only place in which the nation could have emerged but rather to suggest that it is not the only form of rational social organization and that it is part of the Western expression of modernity. Other societies can build on the Western model of the nation and, if they chose to refute the global order as defined by the hegemonic West, develop another way of rational social organization without repudiating modernity. Therefore, other societies could develop modern rationality independently, but the nation was necessarily created in reference to the West. Historically, the relationship between

⁵⁵ R. Bin Wong, “Two Kinds of Nation, What Kind of State?” in *Nation Work*, ed. Timothy Brook and Andre Schmid, 110.

⁵⁶Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 39.

⁵⁷ Greenfield, *Nationalism*, 18.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 21.

modernity and the nation in societies outside of the West, is one in which entrance into the modern world was the chief object, and the nation was pursued only when it appeared that it was a precondition for acceptance in the global order and the most effective way of pursuing wealth and power. In this way, the nation-state was not the ultimate goal but was instead viewed as the primary subject of history through which a population would progress through time and therefore came to occupy a central role in the modern world, both in discourse and in actual international relations.

The nation was made possible only by modern structures, prominent among these the print capitalism that Benedict Anderson argued was a principal force behind the imagining of nations.⁵⁹ In other words, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a nation, or a collective imagining of sovereignty and solidarity among the citizens of a society, can emerge without such structures as widespread education and the homogenization of that society through a shared written, if not spoken, language that facilitates an understanding of the coexistence of the members of that society and a perception of similar experiences. In societies outside of the West, the role of the modern in the creation of the nation is even more evident. Through imperialism, Western governments brought modern structures to the subjugated peoples, giving them partial access to the modern world but denying them full entrance as equal participants in the global order.⁶⁰ It was only through these modern structures and the denial of the subjugated peoples from access to the modern world that the nation became seen as a desirable means to escaping Western imperialism

and allowing the society to increase their access in the modern world.

*Modernity, the Nation,
the International, and the Transnational*

The relationship between modernity, the nation, the international, and the transnational cannot be described in simple chronological, causal, or geographical terms. In fact, all four were central and interrelated forces in the creation of the modern world that involved the decisions of individuals and states throughout the world. Therefore, the modern world was in the process of being created even as entrance into that world was seen as the primary object. It is indeed true that the characteristics of what has come to be associated with modernity were first expressed in the West, which is why it can be termed "Western modernity." To end the analysis here and assume, then, that the modern world as marked by Western modernity was a product of the West that was then exported to the rest of the world is to deprive one's understanding of the modern world of its truly integrated nature that reveals that modernity in the West arose out of a specific set of global processes, which demonstrate a measure of continuity in modern history between the international relations of the modern age and previous eras. Because this is a topic that in this space and within the scope of this study cannot be given full consideration, I will offer only a few observations in order to suggest the importance of understanding the modern and the nation in a transnational context.

My central contention is that transnational imaginings were brought about because of the unprecedented contact with distant peoples that were, in fact, a precondition of the expression of modernity that came to be associated with the modern world and its structures. The fact of the modern world as a global world required that the idea of the self be redefined in terms of a world full of other peoples, giving rise to one type of transnational imagining that creates the nation in reference to the world at large and often legitimizes it through an appeal to its contribution to humanity. This contact was shaped fundamentally through imperialism. Hannah

⁵⁹Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

⁶⁰ These modern structures include railways, print media, modern maps, and modern education. Each of these allows for a deeper understanding of one's own society and, more importantly of the modern global order. The fact that modern international relations and the structures that facilitated these predated the formation of nations in the non-Western parts of the world meant that role and the imaginings of the regional and the global were arguably more deeply involved in the pursuit of modernity and the nation in these parts of the world than in the West.

Arendt describes the “imperialist attempt” as one that sought “to divide mankind into master races and slave races, into higher and lower breeds, into colored peoples and white men, all of which were attempts to unify the people on the basis of the mob.”⁶¹ In other words, it both created the basis for the nation as a unified body and created a permanent mark of difference between the national self and the other, the society that suffered from imperialism. As Arendt continues to argue, “The truth was that only far from home could a citizen of England, Germany, or France be nothing but an Englishman or German or Frenchman [because of divisions that existed within each society.] Expansion gave nationalism a new lease on life...”⁶² Imperialism functioned to solidify the need for the nation-state and to make possible its realization. Imperialism also required the creation of a new schema through which to understand the world and one’s place therein that was intimately connected to one’s identity not just as a society but as a group of societies that find more in common with one another than with the new “others.” Therefore, imperialism gave rise not only the nation-state but also to a new transnational imagining, namely the discourse of civilization in which the West was collectively the bearer of civilization, placing it in a rhetorically superior position vis-à-vis the non-Western world and thereby excluding the rest of the world from full access to the international community on the basis of them not having obtained this civilization. Therefore, the discourse of civilization, as one form of transnational imagining, emerged in order to fulfill the needs of the national self. Both nationalism and imperialism worked together to facilitate the expansion and further development of capitalist structures in order to obtain maximum financial gain, creating the world system described by Immanuel Wallerstein. This was accompanied by the reorganization of the world along the lines of not just nation-states but as nation-states with transnational identities that are subject to change based on the contemporary situation but that are legitimized through a sense of uniquely shared qualities. These imaginings occasionally result in a condemnation of the nation and national

boundaries in an effort to create a united world civilization, but even these frequently involve an element of centering the self in regional and global narratives that at once legitimize the existence of the self as an equal member in the modern world and secures for that society a unique role in the world’s progress through time.⁶³ Contributing to the creation of the modern world and the international relations that became a key feature of its structures, these imaginings in turn shaped the conceptual form of the world in such a way that inform the way nations act on the international stage and understand their identity as a nation in a world that, ostensibly, is simply a world of nation-states.

Prior to the modern period, international relations on a global scale were marked by indirect contact that was defined more by regional networks that connected at a few points with other regional networks rather than by direct relations with societies around the world. These regional networks were integrated into this transregional trade, but it is unlikely that individual participants were aware of the scale of these networks or of the world economic community to which they belonged. It was the obstruction of the Islamic Ottoman empire along all land routes except one through Egypt, however, that precipitated European sea exploration and, thus, the drive for technological progress.⁶⁴ Furthermore, it was the participation of other societies in the direct trade routes that developed that provided the capital for European structural modernity and revealed the potential for wealth that further drove Europeans to pursue capitalism and engage their entire communities to do so. This gave rise to the need

⁶³ For an example of attempting to write into the future a united world civilization, see Kang Youwei, *Ta Tung Shu: the One-World Philosophy of K’ang Yu-wei*, trans. Laurence G. Thompson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958). This was in the context of China’s defeats at the hands of the imperialists and the suffering that resulted. Kang viewed the nation as a divisive factor whose elimination was necessary for complete peace.

⁶⁴ On the role of the Ottoman Empire in creating a need for European sea exploration, see Robert B. Marks, *The Origins of the Modern World: a Global and Ecological Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 60-61.

⁶¹ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 152.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 154.

for a political organization that, as Tagore correctly notes, mobilizes the entire citizenry in the drive for more wealth, allowing for the rise of the nation-state. Both capitalist structures and the nation developed within the framework of imperialism. Western societies were the dominant trading partners, and the pursuit of greater wealth and control over trade networks gave rise to imperialism and, ultimately, colonialism. Colonialism was maintained through discourse on the basis of difference and inferiority of the colonized society. This discourse of difference and superiority of the self gave further legitimacy to the Western nation, and the hegemony attained by the West through unequal trading relationships between Western nations and non-Western “non-nations” established the primacy of the nation as the legitimate political entity through which a group of people could be fully represented on the world stage. Nationhood became a prerequisite for wealth and power.

Although this is a brief and oversimplified explanation of the relationship between the modern and the nation, it demonstrates that both were a result of global processes, and it provides an initial explanation for the importance of the transnational in the modern world. In Europe, the fact that capitalism was most efficiently pursued through colonial relationships abroad and the creation of an integrated and willing work force at home allowed the “otherness” of non-Western people to be translated into a mark of inferiority so that they needed to be guided to civilization. This was the gift of “the West,” itself a novel concept, to humanity. At the same time, the foreignness of the new trading partners gave rise to a reevaluation of Europe that, in contrast to the new “others” were familiar, creating the possibility for a regional identity based on the idea of civilization, which, as Duara argues, further legitimizes the nation. From this arose the contrast between the Orient and the Occident in which the East forms the ultimate negative “other” to the West and, as Edward Said demonstrated in his work, *Orientalism*, served more to define the West than to reflect any reality of the East.⁶⁵ In the process of shaping an integrated global world based on capitalism, views

⁶⁵ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

of the “other,” and, more to the point, multiple “others” that lie at different distances from the center, served to create an understanding of the world at the center of which lay the nation, thereby legitimizing the national self and creating a framework through which to understand the larger world and the relative importance of other societies to the nation.⁶⁶

This lends understanding to the creation of the West as a transnational discourse central to the creation of modern structures and the nation. In Asia, the transnational similarly worked to center the self in the world, but the context in which these discourses arose was decidedly different. The initiators of this direct contact and thus of the beginnings of an integrated global world were Western explorers. Worldwide capitalist structures, though they certainly arose in a global context and required the participation of people throughout the globe were, again, initiated and pursued most vigorously by Westerners. Closely related to this is the fact that the notions of the East and the West were a Western invention.⁶⁷ Ideas of the East in Asia, then, should be understood at least in part as a Western influence through Orientalist writings. As Wang Hui notes, “Historically speaking, the idea of Asia is not Asian but, rather, European.”⁶⁸ Thus, a regional identity was, because of European transnational imaginings, thrust on inhabitants of the Asian continent. The role of Asian societies in creating the modern world was, from early on, reflected in discourses of Asia as a region rather than of

⁶⁶ An interesting tension is created between Western societies and their colonies. The colonized peoples are simultaneously a distant other in terms of shared characteristics but they are vitally important to the economy of the colonizers. The discourse of colonialism, then, also works to ease this tension by keeping the colonized as a distant but dependent other.

⁶⁷ One obvious reason for this is that it was Westerners who, as the traveling trade partners, witnessed the larger world. Also, because it was Western societies that most fervently pursued these relationships and built capitalist structures to acquire wealth, there was a greater need to understand and categorize the world in a way that would legitimize the self.

⁶⁸ Wang, “The Politics of Imagining Asia,” in *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, trans. Matthew H. Hale, 12.

individual societies. As victims of imperialism, intellectuals in Asia also took a decidedly different approach to creating a global narrative that revolved around the national self. It was Asian nations and, ultimately, Asian civilization that would rescue the Western world from the materialism that had robbed it of its humanity. Finding in their individual traditions elements of benevolence, peace, and harmony, Asian intellectuals took the notion of the East and gave it meaning with which they could identify as part of their efforts to escape the oppression of imperialism and establish themselves at the center of their own progress.⁶⁹ At the same time that they established a regional identity with Asia, they also designated the West as the ultimate other, creating graduated levels of the other that surrounded the self, with the West existing at the furthest distance from the center. Having the shared experience as victims of imperialism and therefore comrades in opposition to the West created another discourse of regional and civilizational legitimacy in which the nation would play a central role.

It was through these varied discourses of the other that the national self was centered and legitimized in the modern world. Leaving behind detailed discussions of the modern and the nation, I now turn to the discourses of Chinese and Indian intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century to examine in greater detail the function of transnational imaginings in discourse. The modern and the nation form the necessary background to these discourses, however, and they must all be seen as part of the same narrative. As noted, the object here is not to offer a comprehensive analysis of these discourses but instead begin to explore the many ways they were expressed and their importance in building the self, and to suggest the need for a better understanding of how nations are built beyond their borders.

⁶⁹ This is not a defense of the Asian values argument, but it does explain how this argument emerged and acquired meaning. These types of narratives, as well as those of greed and materialism, can be found in nearly every culture. These were chosen and mobilized by Asian intellectuals because of their experiences as victims of Western imperialism.

2. CHINESE INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSES OF THE TRANSNATIONAL

*Such facts [the independence movements in various Asian societies] are concrete proofs of the progress of the nationalist idea in Asia. Until this idea reaches its full maturity, no unification or independence movement of the Asiatic peoples as a whole is possible. In East Asia, China and Japan are the two greatest peoples. China and Japan are the driving force of this nationalist movement. What will be the consequences of this driving force still remains to be seen. The present tide of events seems to indicate that not only China and Japan but all the peoples in East Asia will unite together to restore the former status of Asia.*⁷⁰

Sun Yat-sen, "Pan-Asianism," 1924

On 28 November 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen included this statement in an address given in Kobe, Japan entitled "*Dayaxiyazhuyi*," [大亞西亞主義], "Pan-Asianism" or "Greater Asianism." Although it differs considerably from Tagore's writings on nationalism and Asia in that Tagore did not advocate the creation of nation-states or the use of Western science to build the nation as did Sun, both his and Tagore's understanding of Asia demonstrate a strong belief in the unity, or potential unity, of Asia and its moral and civilizational superiority to the West. Because of the particular importance of Japan in the development of the modern Chinese intellectual, more scholarship has been written on the importance of the international in the development of Chinese nationalism than in scholarship on India. Yet, with the exception of Duara's *Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*, little has been written on the role of intellectuals' understandings of the relationship of other societies to China and the implications for the Chinese nation, which I term "transnational imaginings." As discussed earlier, Duara focuses on pan-Asianism and presents it as a tool for creating civilizational legitimacy for the nation. As

⁷⁰ Sun Yat-sen, "Pan-Asianism," in *China and Japan, Natural Friends – Unnatural Enemies: A Guide for China's Foreign Policy*, ed. T'ang Leang-Li (Shanghai: China United Press, 1941), 144.

I argue, pan-Asianism is one manifestation of transnational imaginings, and it was the precedent of using these imaginings to build the nation that enabled later discourses such as pan-Asianism in Japan's wartime "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" to have currency in societies throughout Asia. In order to fully understand and appreciate the significance of pan-Asianism, it must be viewed in the context of earlier discourses of the other and in their relationship to the modern and the self.

In this section, I trace the transnational imaginings of three Chinese scholars who were prominent from the turn of the nineteenth century until the early 1920s – Kang Youwei, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and, to a lesser extent, Liang Qichao. I argue that gradated views of the other and, to a lesser extent, the formation of regional connections and identities were prominent in the writings of intellectuals who sought to secure a place for China in the modern world. China's particular historical situation of being the victim of Western imperialism rather than of colonialism, however, set the stage for a different primary use of the transnational than occurred in India.⁷¹ In China, the nation-state was given a positive value much earlier than India because, as I argue in Section Three, during the first part of colonial rule Indian intellectuals used the connection with Great Britain to build a place for India in the modern world. Without a connection readily available for such a close regional relationship, China turned to the nation-state. Because of the indigenous philosophies of the Chinese state and canonical texts that placed China at the center of the world, there was a greater emphasis in China to reorient global space and either to reconcile the modern world with this philosophy or to completely reevaluate the understanding of the Chinese self vis-à-vis other societies. Although regional identities were not part of transnational imaginings in China until much later in the development of the nation-state, it is apparent that these identities began to be formed as part of the

⁷¹ In both China and India, seeing the nation as an integral part of a global narrative and building regional relationships through gradated images of multiple others were part of transnational imaginings, but the former was more prominent in China and the latter more prominent in India.

process of building the nation and pursuing modernity. Even though China was de-centered in the process of understanding the modern world, in the process of building the nation, it was necessarily re-centered through transnational imaginings and the creation of transnational relationships, which, as in the case of other nations, allowed for a narrative of the self to have special significance in a modern world of objectively equal nation-states.

I will begin with a brief examination of the Chinese encounter with and response to the West from the seventeenth century until the 1920s. In this section, I will focus on understandings of the West, the changes eventually made to be able to compete against the West, and the tenuous relationship that developed with Japan as a result of Japan's modernization and westernization. I will then turn to a study of the writings of Kang Youwei, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and, to a lesser extent, Liang Qichao as they reflect discourses of the transnational in particular as well as those of the modern and the nation in which I examine how they contributed to reorienting global space, developed the ideas of the East and the West, and, ultimately, created the region of Asia as a meaningful construct. As this study focuses on these three writers and the ways in which their writings reflect the dialogue between these three discourses, it does not claim to represent the totality or complexity of Chinese thought during this time. What it does suggest, however, is that transnational imaginings were certainly important to the creation of the national self, and it suggests that more consideration should be given to these discourses when considering the development of the nation.

Facing a Global World

Like India, China's participation in the modern world was brought about by Western lust for foreign markets. Unlike India, China was never fully colonized to this end. An unwilling trading partner, the powerful Chinese state restricted Western access to Chinese markets to a few port cities. There were two primary factors that influenced this attitude towards the West. The first, and most relevant to this study, is the concept

of *tianxia* [天下]. In the indigenous Chinese world view, the world, *tianxia*, was ruled by one emperor, the Chinese emperor. Although different peoples occupied this space and other leaders could be called kings, there could only be one emperor because, ultimately, China was suzerain over all.⁷² China lay at the center of this world and was surrounded conceptually by different peoples whose distance from the center was a measure of their relative civility or, contrarily, barbarity. This conception was reinforced within the East and South Asian system by the establishment of the tribute system. In this system, other states would demonstrate their recognition of the superiority of the Chinese state and their loyalty to the Chinese emperor. In return, the emperor would bestow gifts and titles to other rulers. Even though each tribute mission was accompanied with gifts, the Chinese state would offer more gifts in return, indicating the importance of these relationships to the state.⁷³ Within this world view, there was no room for another sovereign who was equal to the Chinese emperor, meaning that, from the point of view of the Chinese state, other states would have to interact with China on the basis of this understanding and not presume equal interstate relations, but rather submit to the tribute system.

The importance of this system in early Chinese interactions with Western powers is demonstrated in an imperial edict sent by the Qianlong emperor to King George III in 1793 after the failure of the Macartney mission to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese state on the basis of equality.⁷⁴ After thanking King George III for his

thoughtfulness concerning sending the envoy to celebrate the emperor's birthday, he proceeded to deny the British their primary requests. On not allowing a British diplomat to represent British interests in Beijing, he wrote,

Traditionally people of the European nations who wished to render some service under the Celestial Court have been permitted to come to the capital. But after their arrival they are obliged to wear Chinese court costumes, are placed in a certain residence, and are never allowed to return to their own countries. This is the established rule of the Celestial Dynasty with which presumably you, O King, are familiar...[Concerning your wanting a European to come to the capital but not live in this way, this] is indeed a useless undertaking.⁷⁵

All of the elements of China as comprising *tianxia* and the emperor as supreme ruler over the whole earth are present here. He begins with the "rule" of Europeans living in the capital – they must assume a Chinese identity and abandon their native identity. This is in accordance with the model that other people can become Sinicized, but it does not allow for the coexistence with the Chinese on the basis of equality in spite of difference. The only way a European could claim the appearance of being equal with the Chinese through residence in the capital would be to essentially become Chinese through the adoption of certain Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the Qianlong emperor reminded King George III of their relative positions in *tianxia*, of which the king should have been well aware because of the fact that, as an inhabitant of the earth, he resided in *tianxia*. With this rebuke in hand, the Macartney mission was sent back to London. At this point, European states would have to come to terms with the Chinese world view in which all lands and kings were ultimately under the rule of the Chinese

⁷² On the impossibility of there being multiple emperors, see Andre Schmid, "Decentering the 'Middle Kingdom': the Problem of China in Korean Nationalist Thought, 1895-1910," in *Nation Work*, ed. Brook and Schmid, 95-7.

⁷³ On the economically unequal aspect of the tribute system, see Warren I. Cohen, *East Asia at the Center: Four Thousand Years of Engagement with the World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 25.

⁷⁴ In 1793, Lord George Macartney led an expedition to Beijing ostensibly to celebrate the Qianlong emperor's eightieth birthday but, in reality, in an effort to establish a British diplomatic residence in Beijing, end the "Canton System," open new ports for trade, and establishing fair tariffs. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 122. As a testament to the continued power of the

Chinese state, the mission was a complete failure. Fifty years later, the tides will have turned, but at this point, the Chinese state maintained the dominant actor in its relationship with Western countries and could thus continue to act on the basis of *tianxia*.

⁷⁵ Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839-1923* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 19.

emperor and equality in relations between China and the vassal states was unthinkable.

The other significant factor that shaped early Sino-Western contacts was the Confucian distaste for merchants. Merchants were considered to occupy the lowest rungs of Chinese society because their occupation was seen as a type of parasitic activity – they did not produce their own goods but instead used the labor of other people to acquire wealth. Even though there had been some contact with Westerners, most notably the Jesuit missionaries who went to China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the first Westerners whose presence alarmed the Chinese state were the merchants who went to China in search of markets to integrate into the developing European capitalist system. As Henrietta Harrison notes, “The threat to the Confucian system was not from Jesuit Christianity but from the European and American traders who began to arrive in the southern city of Guangzhou.”⁷⁶ Quickly integrated into the Chinese world view as barbarians, they were kept as far away as possible from the Chinese capital in Beijing. The activities of the British, to the extent that they were tolerated, were limited to the south and controlled through the “Canton System,” which permitted them to trade in Zhoushan, Xiamen, and Guangzhou (Canton).⁷⁷ The ability of the Chinese state to effectively control this trade at first and the fact that there were Chinese merchants willing to trade with the Europeans have two important implications for Sino-Western interactions at this time. First, it demonstrates the existence of a large, centralized bureaucracy that was able to monitor these ports despite the fact that the center of power lay north in Beijing. Second, it shows that, despite the notion of a “Confucian China,” Confucian values were most strongly held by participants in the state bureaucracy rather than ordinary people, many of

⁷⁶ Henrietta Harrison, *China, Inventing the Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 58.

⁷⁷ On the “Canton System,” see Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 120. Other Europeans traded with the Chinese through tributary relations, but the British refused to submit to this system, necessitating the establishment of this system. Zhoushan is an island off the coast of China near Shanghai; Xiamen is in the southern province of Fujian; Guangzhou is further south in Guangdong province.

whom were completely willing to work with the Europeans in an effort to acquire wealth. Members of the bureaucracy held this view towards merchants because the mechanism by which they obtained office, namely the Confucian-based imperial examination system, instilled in scholars a thorough understanding of Confucian texts and a firm belief in their applicability to state affairs. Additionally, it was the imperial examination system and the Confucian texts that they studied in preparation that legitimized their rule vis-à-vis the rest of the population. Therefore, a system was in place in which interaction with the West was interpreted as between a civilized self and a distant, barbaric other, and the primary occupation of initial Western travelers was considered among the basest of activities. This explains, then, why the Chinese state during this early period of contact was unwilling to meet with Europeans on equal terms as in the inter-state relations of Western Europe and why the Europeans were not effective in establishing thriving trading relations with China nor given the opportunity to establish colonies. Modern structures had yet to find a Chinese audience in the government, but capitalist structures nevertheless developed because of the participation of members of the Chinese population.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, European military technology and lust for Chinese markets had developed to the point that direct confrontation with China was both possible and desirable. The pretext came in 1839 when an official in Guangzhou, Lin Zexu, destroyed 20,000 chests of opium.⁷⁸ Unable to find any British product that the Chinese wanted so they could obtain silk and tea, traders found a consumer market in opium. The Chinese state, realizing that the price of silver was increasing, blamed the opium trade for its currency problems. In response to Lin’s actions, the British government sent in troops. Britain’s quick victory in the Opium War of 1839-1842 set in motion a number of changes in Chinese foreign policy that would directly impact China for the next century and, arguably, still influence Chinese policy today. China was subjected to an “unequal treaty system” in which the state was required to give up land

⁷⁸ Harrison, *China*, 59-61.

over time; open new ports, known as “treaty ports;” and relinquish some measure of sovereignty over Chinese territory, seen most clearly in the extraterritorial status of foreigners that protected them from punishment for crimes under Chinese law. A stipulation, known as the “Most Favored Nation Clause,” was added that allowed the conditions of one treaty to apply to all interested Western powers, and, eventually, Japan, causing China to suffer at the hands of all the imperialist powers. This unequal treaty system ultimately reduced China to semi-colonial status, and caused many intellectuals to examine seriously the nature of difference between China and the Western powers that could explain the West’s dominance in world affairs. *Tianxia* could no longer function as a framework through which to understand the world, which had become decidedly a world of separate states in which China now had an inferior status and would have to conform to the Western standards of state-to-state relations.

In response to this string of defeats, increasing numbers of intellectuals began to advocate that China, for the sake of defense, take superficial steps towards structural modernization by acquiring Western technology, particularly in the military, but maintaining the core of Chinese tradition, which gave rise to the *ti-yong* debate, which I will discuss in detail when examining discourses of East and West. This period of advocacy for reforms is known as the self-strengthening movement. Largely because of a lack of widespread or imperial commitment to the project as well as increasing decentralization that prevented coordination among the various movements throughout China, this movement was, by most counts, a failure. This was demonstrated in China’s defeat by Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Already outmatched by Japan’s modernized navy, the Chinese military, which had developed regionally during the self-strengthening movement, was particularly ineffective because some military leaders simply did not send forces to the war.⁷⁹ Japan enjoyed a quick victory, and the intervention

of Western powers was required to limit the concessions demanded of China.⁸⁰

China’s defeat by Japan marks a major turning point in modern Chinese history. Prior military defeats had been to the West and could therefore be somewhat dismissed on the grounds that, materially, the West was superior to the East. The war against Japan, however, was a conflict between two Asian countries, and China had lost not just to another Asian nation but one that, throughout their past relations, was considered to be far inferior to China. At this point, Japan began to join the ranks of the modern powers. As a result of its victory, Japan gained Taiwan as a colony, and it joined the Western powers in laying claim to the Most-Favored Nation Clause of the unequal treaty system. Japan, an Asian nation, became an imperial power within East Asia. In response, Chinese intellectuals and the Chinese state began to adopt a more serious attitude towards modernization, and advocates for reform were no longer in the minority. Perhaps the most famous of these movements was the Hundred Days Reform. In 1898, the Guangxu emperor undertook a number of reforms as prescribed by scholars such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao to modernize China while still maintaining the *ti-yong* distinction – adopting the utility of Western artifacts while maintaining the essence of China.⁸¹ Even though these reforms were intended to be permanent, the Empress Dowager Cixi halted the reforms, banished the emperor to the Summer Palace, and executed some reformers, causing Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao to escape to Japan.

Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were among numerous Chinese who went to Japan during this period. The proximity of Japan as well as the fact that, unlike China, it had instituted a modern education system that taught Western subjects

⁸⁰ In addition to requiring of China to pay a large indemnity of 200 million taels, to open four new treaty ports, to give to Japan Taiwan and the Pescadores, Japan also wanted the Liaodong region in southern Manchuria. Western powers intervened and forced Japan to accept 30 million taels more rather than obtain the Liaodong region, not for the sake of China but in order to prevent Japan from gaining too much strategic territory. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 222.

⁸¹ On the Hundred Days Reform, see Harrison, *China*, 76.

⁷⁹ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 221-222.

made it a favorable destination for students who wished to receive a Western education. While in Japan, many students gained an appreciation for the reforms that Japan had introduced, and were infused with a vigor to renew China along similar lines. During this period, a tenuous relationship developed between China and Japan. On the one hand, for many young Chinese, Japan was the intellectual gateway to the West and to the modern structures that were governing global affairs. At the same time, however, Japan represented a superior military force that, in 1894, had shown itself to be a potential aggressor. Finally, Japan was Asian *and* modern. Because they had elements of a shared heritage as well as a history of interaction, the Chinese could identify with the Japanese much more readily than with Western nations, but the disparity that had emerged between them as a result of Japan's modernization after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 demonstrated the depths to which China had fallen in the hierarchy of states. Particularly after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 in which Japan defeated Russia in the first instance of a non-Western state militarily defeating a Western state in the modern period, the possibility of identifying with Japan as members of the same East Asian region and using that identity to provide impetus for domestic modernization became an increasingly popular understanding of the relationship between China and Japan.

By the early 1900s, it became clear that China needed to reform, and this time it was the empress dowager who led the movement. It was a move to preserve the monarchy, but enough opposition to the entire imperial structure had developed so that the reforms were ineffective to this end. In 1911, the Qing dynasty fell to rebel forces and a republican government was established with Yuan Shikai as the president.⁸² Yuan eventually tried to reestablish the monarchy with himself as the emperor, and after his death in 1916, the country fragmented into a state of regional warlord rule. Prior to this, in January 1915, Japan issued China the Twenty-One Demands, which essentially required that the Chinese state lose even more

⁸² Yuan Shikai was the general who helped negotiate the abdication of the throne and the end of Qing Dynasty rule in return for gaining political power under the new government.

sovereignty over its territory.⁸³ Though facing domestic opposition, Yuan agreed to a modified version of these demands. Then, during World War I China decided to support the Entente Powers in the hope that, in the event of Germany's defeat, their holdings in Shandong Province would be returned to China. Also, American President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points that seemingly included as a goal of the war self-determination for those societies that were victims of imperialism inspired hope among many Chinese that Western imperialism in China was near an end. At the conclusion of the war, Germany's possessions in Shandong were given to Japan as part of an agreement between Japan and Britain for protecting British ships. Additionally, self-determination proved to be an ideal that the imperial powers were unwilling to fulfill. In an effort to protest the Treaty of Versailles, students gathered in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on 4 May 1919. This sparked a modernization and nationalist movement that was unprecedented in China in both scope and impact. At this time, faith in Western civilization was on the decline and it was replaced by the construction of an Asian civilization that represented the spiritual and benevolent aspects of humanity.⁸⁴

Rejection of *Tianxia*, Centering the Modern Nation-State

Reorienting Global Space

Even though China had played a significant role in the shaping of the modern world from the

⁸³ On the Twenty-One Demands, see Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 281. These demands included, in part, more economic rights for Japanese in Manchuria, the "stationing of Japanese police and economic advisers in north China," and other concessions that would give Japan a more secure position in China than the other powers.

⁸⁴ Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 91. At this time, communism also became an increasingly popular ideology, especially because of the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and Lenin's denouncement of imperialism. As noted in the Introduction, however, a further examination of the influence of communism lies outside the scope of this study.

beginning of European exploration as access to Chinese goods was among the principal factors that drove overseas travel, from the point of view of China, its incorporation into the modern world required a fundamental reevaluation of China's place in the world. This required that the notion of China as the ruler of *tianxia* be discarded in favor of a world view that reflected the existence of a global world that was comprised of competing interests represented through the nation-state and regulated by a set of standards that required the acknowledgement of other nations as equal participants. This deconstruction of *tianxia* and construction of modern global space can be seen in Chinese discourses about the transnational. Accompanied by this is a process of recentering the Chinese state in a narrative of global history and humanity that, rather than a reduplication of *tianxia*, in fact reflects the role of the transnational in the process of creating and legitimizing a nation-state. One Chinese intellectual whose work exemplifies the importance of global space in creating the nation and the modern is Liang Qichao. In his work, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourses of Modernity*, Xiaobing Tang examines the role of the idea of global space in the development of Liang Qichao's understanding and construction of the nation and modernity.⁸⁵ Because of the thoroughness with which he examines this topic, my observations concerning Liang Qichao will be drawn largely from this work as I integrate Tang's study into the larger narrative of transnational discourses as a feature of modernity and nation-building.

Liang Qichao was born in 1873 in Guangdong. One of his first encounters with the global world seems to have been through a map. Tang remarks that, "The world as a mappable totality, or rather the concept of a whole world, introduced a sudden spatiotemporal reorientation. It forcibly revealed a limitedness or parochialism in the traditional cosmological order, by which Liang, like generations of Chinese had organized his daily life and sense of identity."⁸⁶ For Liang, the world could no longer be understood through the idea of *tianxia*. The world, far from being represented

entirely by China and its vassal states, in fact was comprised of many other peoples and lands that needed to be incorporated into his world view.⁸⁷ Liang belonged to a generation that grew up entirely in the post-Opium War period in which China's technological deficiencies in relation to the West was laid bare. Previous categories of knowledge were insufficient to understand the changes the rise of the West had brought. The map of the world, then, represents not only a realization of a larger world but a need to find new ways of understanding China's place in that world. The particular organization of the global world around the nation-state meant that, in order to participate in that world, China needed to build a nation-state. Tang goes on to observe that, "It [the map of nation-states] visually demonstrated a new world order. To have access to the modern world, therefore, one had both to accept a new global, universal time and to claim a stable and coherent self-identity as a means of a territorial nation." From Liang's perspective, then, the fact of the existence of global space necessitated the creation of a nation-state and the acceptance of a modern understanding of time in order for one's society to thrive in the new order. The conception of an empire that extended to "all under heaven" was irreconcilable with the fact of a global world, and the nation-state was the normalized political order through which to represent the interests of the self in that world.

The centrality of the global in Liang's discourses on nationalism is made more apparent as he developed his philosophy as a historian. In 1901, Liang offered a preliminary periodization of Chinese history in the European fashion of ancient, medieval, and modern.⁸⁸ The first period, from the legendary Yellow Emperor, who lived in approximately 2600 B.C.E., to the unification of China and the creation of the Qin Dynasty in 213 B.C.E., was marked by development within the Chinese race. During the second period, from the Qin Dynasty to the end of the Qianlong period in 1876 C.E., "the Chinese nation established

⁸⁵ Tang, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity*.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁸⁷ This was no doubt reinforced by the fact that, as a resident of Guangdong, he likely observed, if not interacted with, the multitudes of foreigners who came to trade.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 43-44.

continual contacts and had intense competition with various other Asian nations.”⁸⁹ In the final period, the modern period, Chinese history was defined by interaction with the world in that, during this period, “the Chinese nation, together with all other Asia nations, relates itself to and competes with the Western nations.”⁹⁰ In this conception, Chinese history is a function of the extent to which China and the larger world interact. Also present here are the beginnings of a reorganization of global space. The world is not only comprised of numerous societies of which China is one, but it also can be understood in terms of different levels of similarity and difference. In Liang’s understanding of the medieval period of Chinese history, China competes with other societies in Asia, but in the modern period when societies outside of Asia enter the relationship, namely the “West,” Asian societies are in fact united. It is only when an “other” that is more distant appears, most importantly in terms of its relationship to China, that Asia’s close relationship to China is understood and is given meaning.

The same type of reorientation of China in global space is evident in Kang Youwei’s work. Kang, born in 1858, was a mentor to Liang and a prominent leader in the reform movements. In one of his works, *Datong shu* [大同書], or “The Great Unity,” Kang works from the premise of the world as a global space of which China comprised only one part.⁹¹ He uses this space to construct a global narrative of the future. As was common during this period, he perceived history as an evolutionary process, and he used Confucian philosophy to inform his understanding of that evolution. In the Confucian concept of history, humanity has been in a state of decline from the period of *Taiping* [太平], or as translator Laurence G. Thompson has rendered it, Complete Peace-and-Equality. Kang

argued that, rather than represent a utopia of the past, this period lay in the future and was in fact the necessary culmination of human development. His use of Confucianism to remark on the development of the whole world reflects what Wang Hui calls “Confucian universalism.” Wang notes, “the birth of this new type of Confucian universalism took place at the same time as the birth of China as a sovereign state in a new world system.”⁹² In other words, this writing of a global narrative was part of the process of becoming a nation-state. In *Datong shu*, he outlines the necessary steps of human development that will occur in order to reach this utopia. In this work, Kang creates a global narrative in which China plays an integral part, not only implicitly as the place in which the philosophy that guides human evolution was first understood and articulated but also explicitly as an important actor in the realization of Complete Peace-and-Equality.

Early in this work, Kang takes as a point of departure the fact that, “Today the globe is completely known, and when we look at that which was called ‘The Central Nation’ (i.e. China) and the four barbarian [territories], [we see that they] are then just one corner or Asia, and only one-eightieth part of the world.”⁹³ He continues, “If the world were already united and joined into a single state, how would it not be the greatest possible!” This uniting of states forms the central thesis of his work, namely that it is already apparent that the world will result in the amalgamation of all territory into one state, the Great Unity, through which humans will continue to develop through the most beneficent and efficient structures guided by the central state, and they will no longer be in conflict with one another because all difference between them will be erased. This is a statement that recognizes China’s truly marginal position in the world. The rest of the text, in addition to outlining the structures of the Great Unity and

⁸⁹ Qtd. in *Ibid.*, 43.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁹¹ Kang Youwei, *Ta T’ung Shu*. This work was published in Chinese in 1935, but Thompson notes in the bibliography, this is simply the first edition with the complete text. The first draft was written in 1884 and 1885, which was around the time when Kang began to engage in Western fields of study and participate in reform movements. The work was completed in 1902. *Ibid.*, 281-2, 13, 19.

⁹² Wang Hui, “How to Explain ‘China’ and its ‘Modernity’: Rethinking *The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought*,” in *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, ed. Theodore Hutters, trans. Wang Yang, 90.

⁹³ Kang, *Ta T’ong Shu*, 80. In this translation, the text is preceded by a significant amount of editorial discussion. All additions to the text in this selection are in the original English translation.

setting forth the path by which to get there, serves to recenter China in a number of crucial ways. Unlike Liang's text in which global interaction is the basis of Chinese history in which China is necessarily the central subject, Kang narrates global history in such a way that China is given a central role. First, when discussing the language of this world, he argues that a alphabetized version of Chinese will be used because, having "one term for one thing, one character for one term, and one sound for one character," it is the easiest of all languages.⁹⁴ The only languages he offers as possible contenders, however, are those of Europe, America, and India, namely those places he lived while escaping the Chinese government with the exception of Japan.⁹⁵ Already limiting the global world and its diversity to what he sees are the relevant peoples and places, he quickly secures for the Chinese language an important role in the age of Complete Peace-and-Equality. This is one of China's many contributions to this world. Later, in his chapter concerning abolishing racial boundaries, the yellow race to which the Chinese belong, though not quite equal to the white race, stand far above the brown and black races.⁹⁶ In fact, although "[t]he strength of the white race is assuredly superior...the yellow race is more numerous and also wiser."⁹⁷ In this narrative, he is careful to not allow his overriding thesis of eventual unity and erasure of difference detract from the idea of China as a special people. In addition to asserting the racial superiority of the Chinese as a member of the yellow races in comparison to the brown and black races, Kang argues that, unlike those races, the yellow race has the potential to join with the white race through migration and different diets and lifestyles.⁹⁸ Concerning the other races, however, they must be exterminated through migration and intermarriage. He says that, "Reckoning a thousand and several hundred years hence, there will not be many brown and black people left. Throughout the world there will only be the yellow

and white peoples."⁹⁹ Again, Kang is creating an important role for the Chinese in this global narrative. The other people that must be reckoned with, the Europeans and Americans, are also given a role in this world, but everyone else, to the extent that they are even discussed, are completely marginalized or, in the case of the "inferior" races, exterminated. Despite only occupying "one-eightieth" of the world, in Kang's conceptual map of the world, most of that space is irrelevant and placed at the margins of global space, which, to a large degree, is rhetorically centered around China.

To some extent, this can be explained by Kang's own bias as a Chinese in that, when describing the evolution of human history, he necessarily draws the most evidence from the society with which he is most familiar. I argue, however, that another process is occurring as well, that of giving China a central role in this global narrative and, as the ultimate goal is utopia, it is one that is necessarily beneficial to humanity. To the extent that the influences of individual societies are acknowledged in the text, the influence of China is consistently given a prominent role in the Great Unity. Even though Kang proposes the creation of a place without national boundaries, in the present time national boundaries exist. As a reformer, Kang took an active role trying to strengthen the nation in the face of Western imperialism. Therefore, one reading of *Datong shu* is that this global narrative and China's central role therein is an effort by Kang to legitimize the Chinese nation in the modern world in which, to this point, China had been facing decline and marginalization. By making the existence of China important for the future of mankind, Kang makes national strength in the present a historical necessity and thereby centers the nation through a global narrative even while he is predicting the eventual amalgamation of all peoples into one society that has no potential for division.

Because of China's indigenous philosophy of *tianxia* in which China was the ultimate suzerain over the entire world, reorienting global space was particularly necessary for China to begin to participate in the modern world. China needed to be seen as one member of a large expanse of global space in which other societies were entirely

⁹⁴ Ibid., 101.

⁹⁵ On Kang's travels, see Ibid., 19.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 145-6.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 141.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 145-6.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 147.

sovereign and, in theory, entitled to treatment as equals. This change in world view was occasioned by China's defeats and increasing loss of sovereignty during the latter half of the nineteenth century. China could no longer be the center of the world in terms of governance, but as a nation-state, she needed to possess a narrative of centrality in terms of relationships with other nations. The use of global space was not limited to acknowledging this space or even to securing China's place at the center of a narrative. This reorienting enabled later developments in which, as seen in Liang's conception of Chinese history as one of different types of international relationships, images of global space as a series of differentiated relationships were further developed as narratives of similarity and difference emerged in the ideas of race and of the East and the West.

Discourses of East and West

Perhaps the most ubiquitous and consistent use of the transnational to inform the nation throughout Eurasia was in the creation of the dichotomy between East and West. Indeed, it is impossible to discuss intellectual contributions to modernity and nation-building in China without understanding the prominence of the idea among intellectuals that these two civilizations are fundamentally disparate. This concept was fraught with tension as Chinese intellectuals sought to emulate the West in their search for wealth and power through the normative institution as determined by the West for this purpose during this period – a strong modern nation-state. At the same time, however, the values of the West were to be best kept at a distance, first because of the classically-educated intellectuals' belief in the value of their traditions and philosophies, which was later supplemented by a belief in the poverty of Western values. That the security of China's future relied on its ability to become a functioning member of the modern world along the lines set forth by the hegemonic West although the West did not represent an ideal civilization, gave rise to an ambiguous relationship with the West in which the West could be used both positively and negatively to inform Chinese intellectuals' perceptions of their history and future. Because of the scholarly

attention already given to the subject of the East and West in modern Chinese thought, my purpose here is not to give a comprehensive analysis nor to add a layer of complexity to the subject, but rather to understand how this dichotomy was used in the writings of individual intellectuals and how it contributes to our understanding of the use of the transnational in building the nation and pursuing modernity.

By the mid-nineteenth century, earlier Chinese disregard for Western artifacts had given way to anxiety over their potential to subjugate China and a fervent desire to capture and utilize the source of Western material strength. This lay at the center of the famous *ti-yong* model.¹⁰⁰ This concept dominated the self-strengthening movements of the latter part of the nineteenth century and determined that the values of Chinese indigenous tradition would be maintained at the same time that Western technology and material development would be utilized for the strengthening of China in the face of Western imperialism. According to Jonathan D. Spence, this model "affirmed that there was indeed a fundamental structure of Chinese moral and philosophical values that gave continuity and meaning to the civilization," which then allowed for the acquisition of the material features of Western civilization.¹⁰¹ Most closely associated with Kang Youwei, who based his 1895 reform proposal on this philosophy, this movement needs to be understood in its historical context. One of the only avenues of becoming an influential intellectual in China was through the imperial exam system, which, as noted, required not only the study of the canonical texts of Chinese philosophy but, ultimately, its internalization within the student. The intellectuals who articulated this philosophy had built their lives on an understanding of the ability of this body of Chinese philosophy to most effectively order society. The men who advocated the idea of *ti-yong*, such as Kang, were the innovators of their time as they attempted to seek an appropriate, effective response to the crisis of Western imperialism even at the cost of traditional

¹⁰⁰ In this concept, *ti* [體] invokes the idea of the form or system of traditional Chinese values and *yong* [用] indicates the utility of Western material achievements.

¹⁰¹ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 224.

structures. Yet, this movement was also conservative to some extent in that it sought to preserve the most basic values of traditional society. As Prasenjit Duara notes, however, this is not representative of a lack of modernity.¹⁰² Indeed, this philosophy was based on an analysis that demonstrated a true understanding of China's place in the world and recognized the ability of the Chinese to take actions to improve its status in the future. What is more, it attached a positive value to progress. Modernity is not a rejection of "traditional" thought, and in Asia as well as in Europe, indigenous philosophy was the lens through which intellectuals understood the changes brought by a society's wholesale transition to modernity and formulated an appropriate response for their societies.¹⁰³ From the beginning of modernization in China, then, the West's monopolistic claim to modernity was refuted and replaced by a synthesis that itself could be entirely modern.¹⁰⁴

As seen in the *ti-yong* model, early transnational understandings of China's position in the world were centered on China in a tenuous relationship with and against the West. The notion of a united "East" was largely absent, but the basic element of this concept, namely the value of indigenous Chinese thought that was incompatible with Western values, informed later conceptions of the East in distinction from the West. The "East" as a geographical concept with which Chinese intellectuals identified seems to have emerged in the context of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. When Kang presented his prescription for reform to the Guangxu emperor in 1895, it was in direct response to the Japanese victory over China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. As discussed earlier, the primary impetus for these

reforms was not the fact that China lost another war but that Japan, despite being an Asian nation, defeated China because it successfully adopted Western technology. This therefore reflects a tacit understanding of the East and West as distinct entities. Any evidence of identity with the East was limited to a recognition that Japan had modernized and China had not despite both being an Asian society, and the philosophy behind the proposals was, as noted, still based on Chinese, rather than the idea of "Eastern," traditions. This early period involved a conception of global space that was primarily China in relationship to the West.

This changed in 1904 with the Russo-Japanese War, and it was precisely because the war was fought and won against a white (Western) country that identification with the East began to be central to Chinese intellectual approaches to modernity and the nation. The journal *Dongfang zazhi* [東方雜誌], or *Eastern Miscellany*, is prefaced with pictures of, first, the Japanese emperor, then Russian notables, and, finally Japanese buildings.¹⁰⁵ First published in 1904 and continuing as a popular journal in China until 1935, this journal appears to have been initiated in direct response to changing world affairs, namely the Japanese war against the Russians. Significantly, it is a journal that in fact comments primarily on China's development, but in its name and objectives, it connects China directly with the East. The first statute of the journal states, "One, this miscellany takes awakening and leading the people of the country and contacting East Asia as the objective."¹⁰⁶ Here, the publishers establish a direct connection between the development of China's citizenry and a relationship with the larger region of East Asia. Sun Yat-sen, speaking in Kobe, Japan in 1924, placed this war at the center of Asia's liberation struggle. He credits it for being the catalyst for Asian nationalist movements and claims it specifically as an Asian victory. He remarked, "We regarded that Russian defeat by Japan as the defeat of the West by the East. We regarded the Japanese victory as our own victory."

¹⁰² Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 207.

¹⁰³ As noted in Section One, "modernity" as an idea is not limited to the modern period, but this period is distinguished by the large-scale organization of society around modern principles and structures that facilitate human agency.

¹⁰⁴ By the May Fourth Movement, the *ti-yong* model had been abandoned in pursuit of complete Westernization by many intellectuals, particularly educated urban youth. This later development should not detract from this early synthesis of another model of modernity.

¹⁰⁵ *Dongfang zazhi* 東方雜誌 [*Eastern Miscellany*], vol. 1, March 1904 (Shanghai: Shang Wu Yin Shu Guan, 19??), 1-16 in preface.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 1 in text. Original text reads, "一本雜誌以啟導國民聯絡東亞為宗旨。"

It was indeed a happy event. Did not therefore this news of Russia's defeat by Japan affect the peoples of the whole of Asia? Was not its effect tremendous?"¹⁰⁷ The effect of the Japanese victory was that it "gave rise to a great hope for the independence of Asia," a hope that was considered "impossible" before the war.¹⁰⁸ It was this war that gave birth to the possibility of Asian unity in the face of Western imperialism. The credit Sun gives to this war as a turning point in Asian history is well-placed – the East as a place not simply by merit of geography and close historical connections in contrast with the West but as a region with which one could identify in an effort to create a space for oneself in the modern world was rooted in this war and its symbolism as a conflict between East and West. The East won, and it suddenly became a place in which to invest hope for the nation.

Despite the title of *Dongfang zazhi*, early identification with the East was largely in name only – the Chinese nation was still the primary subject. By the early 1920s, the idea of the East had developed into a philosophy of fundamental differences not between China and the West but between the East and the West. The East truly became a source of identity. I will discuss the implications for this shift in the creation of Asia as a region in the next section. Here, the discussion will center on the perceived core values of the East and the West. There are numerous similarities between Sun's speech, "*Dayaxiyazhuyi*," or "Greater Asianism," and Tagore's understandings of the East as will be examined in Section Three, the most significant being the spiritual superiority of the East over the West and the East's role as a world leader in creating a brighter future for humanity.

The perception of the difference between the East and the West revolves around two central issues – race and values. As was the case with intellectuals in the West at this time, race was not only an important marker of difference that was taken to be a principal organizing factor in human affairs, but it was also the pinnacle of modern science – it was seen as a way to categorize and understand humans from an objective,

quintessentially scientific perspective. The primacy of race during this period is reflected in Kang Youwei's *Datong shu*, and his use of race compared with Sun's use thereof demonstrates the development of the idea of regional identification over time. Kang Youwei recognized four races in the world – white, yellow, brown, and black, in order of his perception of superiority, but he remarks very little on the ideas of East and West.¹⁰⁹ Because these ideas were already prominent throughout Eurasia among intellectuals, the exclusion of region was likely not due to the possibility that understanding inter-societal relations as a function of region simply did not occur to him. For him, race rather than region was the primary factor in relations between the peoples of the world. For instance, as a black race, the Indians were on a historical path towards racial elimination while the Chinese, as a yellow race, would not need to undergo racial transformation or elimination before the creation of the Great Unity. Although he refers to Asia as a geographical place, he does not address specifically the region of Asia in relation to race, it is clear that the Indians and the Chinese as members of different and inherently unequal races are, in the present, irreconcilable.¹¹⁰ In Sun's speech, however, the question of racial differences within Asia is given only passing notice. Even though he frequently refers to the *races* of Asia, he does not discuss his views on any particular races. The only point at which he mentions the "Yellow Race" or the "colored races" is when he is referring to the

¹⁰⁹ Kang, *Ta T'ong Shu*, 141-148. Kang was extremely racist and spared no words in describing the superiority of the white race, the ability of the yellow race to coexist and eventually merge with the white race and, quite frankly, the need to erase the brown and black races as a prerequisite for the creation of Complete Peace-and-Equality.

¹¹⁰ Of course, the idea of white and yellow races would bring to the reader's mind the geographic regions of Europe and the temperate zones of Asia and, as discussed earlier, the white and yellow races served humanity in different ways. Therefore is some element of East and West in this work that is tied to both race and values, but in Kang's description, there is overall unity between the West and part of the East, which will together prevail in contrast to the other two races of the world.

¹⁰⁷ Sun, "Pan-Asianism," in *China and Japan, Natural Friends – Unnatural Enemies*, ed. T'ang Leang-Li, 143.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 143-4.

Western response to the Japanese victory as being a case of the yellow races rising against the white races, the yellow peril in contemporary usage.¹¹¹ What is instead emphasized is the need and potential for unity between the peoples of Asia. Sun certainly does not elide the great diversity of Asia, but this is secondary. Racial identity is subordinate to regional identity because the peoples of Asia can lay claim to an ancient civilization; a morally-superior value system; and a bright, common future free from Western imperialism. In Sun's speech, race is still referenced as a way to distinguish the East from the West, but it is no longer a divisive element within the East.

The second theme that is prominent in writings on the East and the West is that of values, which were ubiquitously portrayed as fundamentally different. In the West, this contributed to a view of its apparent superiority and justified imperialism. In Asia, this allowed for an understanding and acceptance of the self to be reconciled with the ability of Western powers to so handily dominate their world. As Partha Chatterjee has argued, this process of conceding the material superiority of the West while claiming for itself superiority in spiritual matters was a crucial step in defining the self and pursuing the nation.¹¹² As in the *ti-yong* concept, this was initially limited to the individual society as a way for intellectuals to overcome the apparent disparity between their own culture on which they based their identities and their ineffectiveness against the imperialist designs of Western powers. Over time, however, and particularly after World War I and the growing perception of the bankruptcy of Western civilization, the values argument began to be framed as distinctly regional. Sun Yat-sen describes the conflict between the East and the West as one between fundamentally opposed values of the rule of Might and the rule of Right:

¹¹¹ Sun, "Pan-Asianism," in *China and Japan, Natural Friends – Unnatural Enemies*, ed. T'ang Leang-Li, 144-5. He does not use the term "yellow peril" to describe this view, but this is clearly the content of the Western response.

¹¹² Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, 51.

*Therefore, European civilization is nothing but the rule of Might. The rule of Might has always been looked down upon by the Orient. There is another kind of civilization superior to the rule of Might. The fundamental characteristics of this civilization are benevolence, justice, and morality. This civilization makes people respect, not fear, it. Such a civilization is, in the language of the Ancients, the rule of Right or the Kingly Way. One may say, therefore, that Oriental civilization is one of the rule of Right. Since the development of European materialistic civilization and the cult of Might, the morality of the world has been on the decline. Even in Asia, morality in several countries has degenerated. Of late, a number of European and American scholars have begun to study Oriental civilization and to realize that, while materially the Orient is far behind the Occident, morally the Orient is superior to the Occident.*¹¹³

Even though Sun does not comment in detail on the sustainability of the rule by the West by force, his use of the distinction between the rule of right and the rule of might is an unmistakable allusion to one of the dominant themes in traditional Chinese political thought on principles of governance in which, even though the rule of might can lay claim to a territory, only the rule of right can actually rule in the truest sense of the word. Sun therefore uses a political philosophy that was specific to China and extends it to all of Asia, making what was, objectively, a society-specific narrative into a regional narrative and formulating it in terms of the East, which is therefore in collective opposition to the West. As if in response to the claim that Western civilization is the apex of human development, the very essence of modernity, Sun offers his own analysis of world history and development. Taking Western civilization as the embodiment of the rule of might and no more, he asserts that,

[Because some in the West 'advocate the principles of benevolence and justice] we realize that the Western civilization of utilitarianism is submitting to the influence of Oriental civilization of benevolence and justice. That is to say the rule of

¹¹³ Sun, "Pan-Asianism," in *China and Japan, Natural Friends – Unnatural Enemies*, ed. T'ang Leang-Li, 145-6.

*Might gives way to the rule of Right, presaging a bright future for world civilization.*¹¹⁴

Here, the East, the bearer of the only just and sustainable form of governance, takes its rightful place as the dominant civilization in the world. Indeed, the East and the West cannot co-exist. Sun remarks that Russia has “join[ed] the Orient and [been separated] from the West.”¹¹⁵ Japan is exhorted to choose between the East and the West.¹¹⁶ There is certainly possibility for the co-existence of Western artifacts such as science, industry, and armaments, but the East and the West as they represent civilizational values are mutually exclusive, and the East, by virtue of the “Kingly Way,” will ultimately prevail.¹¹⁷

Taken by itself, the use of ideas of the East and the West in the writings of Chinese intellectuals during the first part of the twentieth century can be seen as another vestige of the effects of Orientalism on the development of a civilizational philosophy that justifies the nation. Certainly, each of these reflects the historical situation to a degree. When considered in conjunction with other discourses of the transnational, however, it becomes part of a larger narrative of building the nation beyond the borders of the society. In China, the notion of the East as a space with meaning developed out of earlier discourses of reorienting global space. The earlier trend of using the transnational as a space of comparison in the process of de-centering China gave way to discourses of re-centering, of creating a narrative in which the nation is viewed as a key player in world affairs. In this narrative, other societies are directly benefited by the nation, and a relationship is established in which the nation is the center of not only its own narrative but also the narratives of other societies. This is supplemented by an imagined reordering of global space around the nation in which some societies are seen to have a closer relationship to the center than others. From this, a global order emerges that is defined not by nation-states that have a distinct boundary between the self and the other, but by nation-states

that create narratives of the self that position other societies around them in varying degrees of otherness and identification with the self. In the development of this narrative, the West in its entirety was the ultimate, irreconcilable other. The East, however, was a space with which China could create an identity that both asserted its centrality and lent meaning to the region as a whole as an actor in world history, both the past and, most importantly as it concerns the modern, the future.

The Creation of Asia

As in India, the understanding of a fundamental difference between the East and the West was the basis for later imaginings of Asia as a meaningful region. In China, the development of this idea signals a complete transformation of the indigenous philosophy of China as the center of and ruler over *tianxia*. The Chinese phrases for Asia, “*Yaxiya*” [亞西亞] and “*Yazhou*” [亞洲], are imported terms. Prior to contact with the West, there was no Chinese word for the region of contemporary Asia. This is not only a reflection of the fact that Asia, the geographical region, was not known in its entirety, but more importantly because, as noted, the world was organized around China, which could not belong to any region within the world – its ultimate domain was the totality of the world. Societies that did not pay tribute simply did not yet recognize that the Chinese emperor was their true suzerain. This is most clearly seen in the letter from the Qianlong emperor to King George III about the absurd notion that the British could maintain an embassy in Beijing. The creation of the Chinese nation-state within the context of an Asian region indicates the separation of the world into nations as part of discrete regions, over all of which no society can claim complete sovereignty but that must be reckoned with on the basis of equality and, in the case of the nation, mutual adherence to an international law whose basis possibly derives from the values of another society. It was anything but a unified world under a superior Chinese civilization. Yet, the creation of the nation necessitates a process of centering the self – the global world may be comprised of multiple entities, but creating a nation and nationalism requires that the self take a central

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 150

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 151.

¹¹⁷ On these useful aspects of the West, see Ibid., 148.

role in narratives of historical and contemporary events that, though they extend beyond the nation in their implications, secure an important role for the self.

In his book, *Datong shu*, Kang Youwei considered the form of the contemporary world and the way it would be transformed while outlining the process of unifying the world and the structures of that future world. Kang sees the formation of regions through imperialism and at the expense of national boundaries as a fundamental part of the creation of the world of Complete Peace-and-Equality. When discussing the future of the peoples of Asia, he notes that eastern Europe, possibly Russia, and “Asia’s Afghanistan, Korea, Siam, Egypt, and Morocco” will be united with Germany and some of the small states in Europe.¹¹⁸ He then goes on to surmise that China might be united with Japan and India. Beyond forecasting the future of the world as one of regional rather than national development, there are two noteworthy features in these predictions. First, his understanding of Asia includes societies that are no longer considered part of Asia, namely Egypt and Morocco.¹¹⁹ Second, he implies that it is more likely that China and Japan would be united with India than Korea.¹²⁰ This is surprising in light of the fact that Korea was indisputably part of the East Asian order before the coming of the West. China, Japan, and Korea were united by a history of cultural exchange, a written language (classical Chinese), and similar philosophical traditions. There were of course important differences, but there was a close relationship between these three societies. Therefore, the idea of what societies constituted Asia and the organization of Asia were notably different in 1884 when Kang wrote this than 1924 when Sun considered Japan and Turkey to be the “Eastern and Western barricades of

Asia.”¹²¹ It is equally important to note, however, that even though Asia was not portrayed as a unified region with a common future but was in fact divided so that their future lay in the creation of the Great Unity, Asia still existed as a concrete geographical space.¹²²

Therefore, Asia as an entity was already present in the discourses of Chinese intellectuals, and it was on this pre-existing foundation of the idea of Asia that pan-Asianism developed. As in India, this was primarily a post-World War I phenomenon and it was largely based on the idea that Asia was qualitatively different from Europe in terms of culture, values, and moral worth. Sun Yat-sen’s discourses of the modern, the nation, and the transnational in “*Dayaxiyazhuyi*” exemplify the interconnected relationship of these discourses more than any work examined in this study. While the others certainly suggest such a relationship, this speech demonstrates the importance of studying these discourses together and using their relationship to improve our understanding of the nation and the modern world.

In writings on Asia in China, the importance of China is clearly evident. As seen in Sun’s statement at the beginning of this section, China is a “driving force,” a key element in the creation of nationalism in Asia, which will secure the future status of Asia in the world. If Sun’s speech is taken to be representative, any understanding of the development of pan-Asianism in a particular society must be accompanied by the possibility that the society is performing a fundamental role in

¹¹⁸ Kang Youwei, *Ta T’ung Shu*, 89-90.

¹¹⁹ Sun actually does include Egypt when listing independence movements in Asia, but by making Turkey the Westernmost society of Asia, he excludes Morocco. The idea of Asia has since come to exclude Egypt as well. Sun, “Pan-Asianism,” in *China and Japan, Natural Friends – Unnatural Enemies*, ed. T’ang Leang-Li, 144.

¹²⁰ Even though the book was published 1935, Kang notes in the text that his prediction about Korea was written in 1884. Kang, 89.

¹²¹ Sun, “Pan-Asianism,” in *China and Japan, Natural Friends – Unnatural Enemies*, ed. T’ang Leang-Li, 149.

¹²² The division within Asia is even more evident when Kang argues that before the Great Unity the world will be divided into ten continents, four of which are East Asia, North Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia. Interestingly, here Korea is part of East Asia. This could indicate that he thinks the division of the continents will be based on geography rather than imperialism, or it reflects the possibility that this part was written at a later time. He does not comment directly on the reasons for the possible inconsistency, but I suspect that it is due to the former – the formation of geographical as a premeditated part of the process of creating the Great Unity rather than a result of imperialist actions. Kang, *Ta T’ung Shu*, 99.

Asia.¹²³ In this imagination of Asia, Asia is not possible without the individual Asian nations because the imagining of Asia is predicated on the role of the self therein. It is also not possible without an “other,” a society or group of societies that are notably more distant from the self than the nations that are included in Asia. This is true of any region, as is evident in Sun’s distinction between East Asia and Asia. In his address, Sun notes that Japan is a country of East Asia, yet it offered hope to all of Asia.¹²⁴ East Asia, in which China and Japan are both central actors, is a fundamental part of Asia and its development but comprise a distinct, and more closely related, region than Asia as a whole.¹²⁵ The result of this transnational imagining is an understanding of the world in which the self plays a central role and is surrounded in discourse by other societies whose distance from and significance to the center is predicated by the closeness of the relationship in the context of the larger world. Although pan-Asianism is the most conspicuous development of the idea of Asia, it has its roots in earlier writings that do not promote a union of Asian peoples in the face of Western imperialism but recognize and base their analyses on the existence of Asia as a distinct region. Through these discourses, the multiple meanings of Asia and their transformations over time can be seen.

In his own words, Sun argues that pan-Asianism “represents the cause of the oppressed Asiatic peoples.”¹²⁶ On the basis of “[b]enevolence and virtue,” pan-Asianism is seen as a means to

“restore the status of Asia.”¹²⁷ It is an idea that is born out of the conflict between the Eastern and Western civilizations.¹²⁸ At its heart, it is a philosophy that seeks to cast off oppression of centuries of Western imperialism in Asia in order to liberate the peoples of Asia. It is based on the idea of a fundamental difference between the East and the West, and it seeks to change the world order so that Asia is governed by the Eastern rule of Right rather than the Western rule of Might.¹²⁹

By advocating pan-Asianism, Sun is certainly calling for the unity of Asian peoples. He asserts, “Only by the unification of all the peoples in Asia on the foundation of benevolence and virtue can they become strong and powerful.”¹³⁰ This unity between the peoples of Asia, however, is preconditioned by the existence of nationalism. In the statement quoted at the beginning of this section, Sun argues, “Until this [nationalist] idea reaches its full maturity, no unification or independence movement of the Asiatic peoples as a whole is possible.” Indeed, the region of Asia exists for the nations of Asia, for the peoples of Asia. Unlike Kang, regionalism is not a step towards the complete erasure of nationalism. Asia is not an alternative to the nation-state. For Sun, the two are inseparable. In order for the peoples of Asia to be free from Western imperialism, they must unite under the banner of Asia. In order for this to be possible, they must pursue nationalism and continue in their independence movements.¹³¹

Even though the idea of pan-Asianism was later used by the Japanese state to justify the extension of its rule over the other peoples of Asia against Western imperialism, in its early stages it was a more of an imagined unity. Sun never presents any mechanism by which to unify the peoples of Asia or indicates a course of action by which they should rise up against the West. He argues that force should be used in a united front, but is no more

¹²³ As will be seen in the discussion of Tagore’s pan-Asianism in Section Three, this is not the only way that the region of Asia was built, but this is certainly not limited to Sun or to Chinese intellectuals. For instance, in Japan’s conception of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, which drove her war goals during the Second World War, Japan fashioned itself as the leader of Asia that would help drive out the imperialists. Despite the rhetoric of a united East Asia that existed for the sake of East Asia, the discourses surrounding the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was arguably more concerned with Japan than with East Asia.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 141-2.

¹²⁵ On China and Japan as central to East Asia, see Ibid., 144.

¹²⁶ Sun, “Pan-Asianism,” in *China and Japan, Natural Friends – Unnatural Enemies*, ed. T’ang Leang-Li, 151.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 149-150.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 148.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 149.

¹³¹ Although contemporary scholars do not readily consider independence movements to necessarily stem from nationalism, in Sun’s usage, they are closely related. He asserts that the independence movements “are concrete proofs of the progress of the nationalist idea in Asia.” Ibid., 144.

specific than that.¹³² Instead, he focuses on the actions of individual societies, noting China's potential for military development and victory over Western powers and praising the accomplishment of the Japanese in this area. Pan-Asianism, then, comes from the idea of a shared heritage of the peoples of Asia and a common future that is based on a type of unified action in the present, but its primary purpose is to secure a better future for the peoples of Asia as they develop as distinct nations in an imagined community.¹³³

Even though it is a speech on pan-Asianism and includes references to peoples throughout the region, clearly occupying the center stage are China and Japan. The focus on China and Japan is no doubt partly explained by the fact that Sun, as a Chinese, is more deeply aware of China's potential to rise up against Western imperialism, and by the fact that he is speaking to a Japanese audience. Additionally, this speech is also a call to Japan to decide if she is going to follow Eastern or Western civilization.¹³⁴ This emphasis, however, points to a more fundamental process that is occurring – the centering of China through a regional narrative and the development of different relationships based on the perception of their distance from the center. This is not a reduplication of the philosophy of China at the center of *tianxia* but, as noted, is a universal centering in which the modern nation is legitimized by placing itself at the center of larger narratives in which other societies play either a supporting or antagonistic role.

Sun places China with Japan at the center of the East Asian narrative of development and liberation. As seen in Sun's statement at the beginning of this section, China and Japan will lead East Asia; the peoples of East Asia will in turn lead Asia to a future free of Western imperialism. Additionally, his defense of the idea of Asia as a land of benevolence and virtue comes directly from China's tribute system in which other countries brought tribute to China and recognized the emperor as the ultimate sovereign. Sun argues that this tribute system was maintained not

through Might, which is ultimately unsustainable, but through Right, the moral power of China. China is thus at the center of Asia's history, Asian civilization, and Asia's future. Moreover, Sun includes a closer relationship between China and Japan as part of East Asia than between China and the rest of Asia. It is with Japan that China will be leading Asia to a brighter future. When he comments on Japan's independence from Western imperialism, he says that Japan is specifically part of East Asia but then continues to say that it was an occurrence that had implications for all Asian peoples, indicating that he sees Japan as belonging first to East Asia, which includes China, and then Asia.

As represented by Sun's speech on pan-Asianism, the idea of Asia was and is much more than simply an import of the Western discourses of Orientalism. Although this body of literature certainly influenced the initial formation of ideas among Asian intellectuals of the oppositional civilizations of the East and the West and their associated values, it was used and infused with meaning by these intellectuals as they sought a place for their societies in the modern world. Asia as a region and a source of identity was created in order to create a narrative in which the individual society could play a central role in the global world in which it, as one of many members, could objectively only be a marginal actor. Additionally, it served to create solidarity among numerous societies whose relationships could be justified by historical connections or by a shared interest in present affairs, or both, that would potentially support the individual nation in its chosen courses of action. As Duara argues, this eventually acquired the discourse of civilization that legitimized the nation, but this was just one manifestation of the region whose utility lies in the larger purpose of securing a role in the modern world for a society and helps build the framework for discourses of national legitimacy and centrality in the world.

Discussion

Chinese intellectuals' engagement with the modern world was predicated on their rejection of the indigenous philosophy of *tianxia* and acceptance of

¹³² Ibid., 149.

¹³³ For Sun's comments on the shared heritage of Asia, see Ibid., 141.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 151.

a modern global world in which multiple societies could claim sovereignty and, on that basis, be entitled to equal treatment in international relations. In China, the dominant discourse of the transnational was that of finding a space in the larger world in which China could claim a central role. This expressed itself in Kang Youwei and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's writings in the creation of a global narrative in which China played an important and beneficial role in the future of humanity. Especially in Sun's writings can be seen the second use of the transnational to center the nation, namely the creation of regional relationships that center on the nation in which, again, the nation makes a significant contribution. In this regional relationship, Asia, initially a creation of Western Orientalists, was given meaning by Chinese intellectuals as a space through which they could perceive themselves to be interacting with the larger world and, as such, became a space with which one could identify and see oneself in a larger community beyond the nation.

Although the discussion here has focused primarily on the role of the transnational in the discourses of these Chinese intellectuals, the modern and the nation are thoroughly intertwined therein. These intellectuals offered little direct commentary on the modern, but the importance of both modern thought and pursuing the modern are evident throughout. All of these discourses are invariably focused on the future and are based on a belief that Chinese and world history can be influenced by the conscious actions of individuals. Additionally, the central issue at stake is China's defeats at the hands of Western and, in 1895, Japanese powers. All three of these intellectuals worked for the progress of Chinese society so that she could become a great nation. At the center of these intellectuals' writings and objectives was the goal of creating a nation-state that could serve as the subject of history, centering that state through regional relationships, and giving the nation-state a fundamental role in human history and progress, all of which served to resurrect China from the depths to which it had fallen during the nineteenth century and put it on a trajectory for future greatness.

Despite a considerably different situation in India during this period, the transnational also played a significant role in the creation of the

modern Indian self. In these discourses, regional relationships were far more prominent than the creation of a global narrative, and they suggest the importance of developing relationships with and against other societies when narrating the self. It is with these Indian intellectual discourses that I conclude this study of the discourses of the modern, the nation, and the transnational.

3. INDIAN INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSES OF THE TRANSNATIONAL

Due largely to the prominence of South Asia in the British Empire, the world-wide fame of the independence movement led by Gandhi, and the formation of a democracy in post-independence India that contrasts with the military-dominated government in Pakistan, British colonial India has occupied a central role in colonial and post-colonial studies, and has recently given rise to an entirely new area of study – subaltern studies. Within this body of literature is a great diversity of scholarship that covers a wide range of topics from individuals to large-scale movements, cultural and political developments, and the contributions of intellectuals as well as the masses. Laying aside the blatantly polemical works, the central themes that arise from this literature are the importance of the empire in shaping discourses and political developments, the central role of religion and caste in colonial and post-independence South Asia, and the need to understand modernity as a project that does not involve only a select few Westernized intellectuals. Even though colonialism in other areas of the world is certainly the subject of excellent scholarship, South Asia has emerged as the primary site for colonial studies and has given rise to arguably the most innovative approaches to colonialism and the origins of the modern world.

This brief section does not seek to challenge this scholarship but rather to add another layer of complexity. Except for studies on the cosmopolitanism of Rabindranath Tagore, the role of transnational relationships in intellectual discourses concerning the Indian and Pakistani self as they sought to create a space for their societies in the modern world has largely been absent from

scholarship on South Asia.¹³⁵ Yet, other societies feature prominently in the writings of many intellectuals who engage in the discourses of modernity and the nation. In this section, I seek to understand the role of intellectual discourses of the transnational and how they relate to the modern and the nation by examining how these discourses shaped the views of individual intellectuals on India's place in the modern world and reflect larger developments in Indian politics. To do so, I will center the narrative on the works of three intellectuals, Sir Surendranath Banerjee, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and Rabindranath Tagore. Their works show the individual and societal processes of confronting the modern world and offer insight into the particular historical development of South Asia and the modern world system. This study does not attempt to offer a comprehensive representation of the variety of discourses on the Indian and Pakistani self but rather to identify these intertwining discourses, demonstrate how they develop over time based on historical circumstances and an individual's identity, and offer preliminary conclusions concerning their relevance to the particular development of South Asia and the contemporary world.

In this section, I argue that discourses concerning South Asia's particular position in the world reflected the conception of the self, suggesting that the organization of space beyond the borders of the society being built played a central role in defining the self. More than confirming the obvious reality that nation-states knowingly interact in a world of nation-states, this suggests that, as part of the nation-building process, a particular space is created for the nation around which other societies are given unequal

¹³⁵ Throughout this section, I will primarily use the term "self" rather than "nation" to refer to the construction of an Indian or Pakistani identity. Although I seek to examine discourses about the nation, and it is evident that the South Asian intellectuals were directly addressing the nation, this did not always result in an embrace of the nation. On the contrary, many intellectuals, such as Tagore and Gandhi, refuted the nation, but their work is largely premised on the idea that India is a distinct entity and they sought to create an identity, though not necessarily national, for that entity.

positions relative to the center that, as I explore in the Conclusion, shape a society's actions in that world. Even though not all intellectuals were thoroughly nationalist, they engaged the modern world and built perceptions of their own society on its relationship to the outside world. This was not done through a simple construction of the self versus the other but rather in the creation of transnational relationships that reflect a world system comprised not only of nation-states but of nation-states that exist within constructed yet fluid networks of similarity and difference. The contemporary world system, rather than a product solely of Western modernization and subsequent conquest, is the result of the constructions of societies throughout the world that engaged with the modern world through the discourses of the modern, the nation, and the transnational. In doing so, they carved and shaped a space in the world for themselves, creating the foundation for contemporary international relations and transnational relationships. To fully appreciate the development and importance of these discourses and their relationship to one another, they must be understood in the particular historical context in which they took shape, to which I now turn.

A Brief History of Colonialism in India

Around the turn of the seventeenth century, the British East India Company, eager to establish a lucrative trade of Indian goods and armed with the blessings of the British crown and a legally-endowed monopoly over East Indian trade, competed with the Dutch over control of the trade routes. By 1640, the company had established a foothold in the area of Bengal, including the construction of a number of factories and a fort, and it was from this position that the company gradually extended its military and economic control over the subcontinent.¹³⁶ It was not until 1858 that the British government directly ruled India. In May 1857, a mutiny broke out among the ranks of Hindu and Muslim sepoys as a result of rumors that their bullets had been greased in cow

¹³⁶ Burton Stein, *A History of India* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998), 205-206.

and pig fat, the touch of which would defile them according to the standards of their respective religious beliefs.¹³⁷ This contributed to the tension that had developed between the British and the Indians as a result of missionary activities and other Westernizing projects that had disrupted Indian society, and the sepoys took up arms to eradicate the foreign rulers and their ideas. Although it hardly resembled an organized revolution, the Revolt of 1857 soon engulfed the entire northern region of the subcontinent and continued through the summer. In their efforts to preserve their identities, the mutineers and a considerable portion of the civilian population attacked Europeans, Indian Christians, and institutional symbols of British control. Upon reaching Delhi, they called upon the Mughal emperor, under whom the East India Company had ostensibly established their trading operations and political control, to reestablish his rule and lead the war to drive out the British.¹³⁸ After suppressing the rebellion with the help of other Indians, the British used to the revolt as a pretext to dismantle the Mughal Empire.¹³⁹ In 1858, India became a formal colony of Great Britain, and in 1876 Queen Victoria was established as the Empress of India.

As is evidenced by the Revolt of 1857, British rule over India was hardly a peaceful endeavor. Yet, despite the fact that both sides incited conflict, the Indian response to British rule until World War I, to the extent that it can be discussed in the singular, was largely marked by acceptance and even invitation.¹⁴⁰ This can at least in part be

explained by the particular colonial policies pursued by the British. When India became a colony of Great Britain, the queen proclaimed that all the subjects of the empire would be treated equally, providing a discourse to which the Indians could appeal while maintaining their loyalty to the crown.¹⁴¹ In fact, the possibility of equality was conditioned on their being subjects of the British Empire. As Mithi Mukherjee argues, the British Empire in India was established by two discourses that justified and preserved their rule: the discourses of justice as equity and justice as liberty.¹⁴² In the discourse of justice as equity, rule by the British was necessary because Indian society was so fragmented along religious and caste lines that in order for any individual to be justly treated by the state and society, the British were a necessary third party. In the discourse of justice as liberty, the British were schoolmasters to teach the Indians the path to modernity and democracy so as to prepare them for self-government. In this way, the Indians were dependent on and indebted to British rule. The importance of the discourse of justice as liberty is evident in the life of the renowned "Father of Modern India," Rammohun Roy (1772-1833). At age sixteen, he claimed to have a "feeling of great aversion to the establishment of the British power in India."¹⁴³ Later in life, however, he seems to have accepted British rule because of its civilizing mission.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, attraction to British rule and the types of changes it brought to Indian society, along with the positive value ascribed to those changes by the British, largely explains the early acceptance of British rule.

Another important element in the relationship between the British and the Indians is the willingness, even enthusiasm, of many Indian elites

¹³⁷ Jim Masselos, *Indian Nationalism: a History*, 5th ed. (New Delhi: New Dawn Press, Inc., 2005), 13-18.

¹³⁸ Mukherjee, *India in the Shadows of Empire*, 77.

¹³⁹ On the Indian efforts to quell the rebellion, see Stein, *A History of India*, 226. As is customary, I will refer to the empire in South Asia simply as "India," but in fact the British crown directly ruled only about half of the territory of the Mughal Empire. It compromised with a number of smaller states run by princes that were integrated with the Indian state only after independence in 1947.

¹⁴⁰ The Indians discussed here primarily refer to intellectuals, though not necessarily to the exclusion of other individuals throughout the population. It was the intellectuals who had the most direct contact with the British and engaged the most with colonial discourses.

As noted in the Introduction, this study does not attempt to examine the role of the subaltern.

¹⁴¹ On the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, see S.K. Bose, *Surendranath Banerjea* (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1968), 3.

¹⁴² Mukherjee, *India in the Shadows of Empire*, xv-xviii.

¹⁴³ Qtd. in Asok Sen, "The Bengal Economy and Rammohun Roy," in *Rammohun Roy and the Process of Modernization in India*, ed. V.C. Joshi (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1975), 104.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

to assimilate British customs and, in some cases, to try to become British. Even though the British did not pursue a colonial policy of assimilation as did the French, many Indians, particularly Bengali Brahmins, actively chose to be assimilated into the British Empire. There seems to have been a fervent desire by some to identify as British that goes beyond simply accepting British rule as a transitory step towards "civilization." Some scholars attribute this to the attraction of English technology, the quintessential symbol of modernity at that time.¹⁴⁵ Although this certainly played an important role in the decisions of many Indians, it does not go far enough in explaining the dedication to the British crown and to India's inclusion in the empire demonstrated by many intellectuals. Two other factors were significant in this alliance: identity negotiation and the importance of schema. Identity negotiation is the process by which individuals assume identities in order to obtain the best position that seems to be available to them in their society as shaped by the historical circumstances and their personal history, including their conscience and value system. In this model, assuming a British identity was perceived to be beneficial in that it secured a position of power in their society and offered such opportunities as receiving an English education, which was necessary to engage in the community of the British Empire.

The reason for the prevalence of willing assimilation during this period is related to the element of personal history and points at the importance of pre-existing cultural schema in how individuals perceive particular states of affairs. The contrast with colonial Taiwan under the Japanese from 1895-1945 is illustrative. Although collaboration with the Japanese existed throughout the colonial period, it arguably did not approach the fervor demonstrated by Indian intellectuals in the early colonial period. It was not until the initial island-wide armed rebellion was suppressed that simply accepting Japanese rule was common. There are no doubt many reasons for the difference between the Taiwan and Indian cases, but one seems to be the role of schema in shaping

how the native population viewed foreign rule. The Chinese have a very long history of viewing the Japanese with contempt and consigning them to the realm of the barbaric. As Chinese, the Han Taiwanese therefore had a pre-existing cultural framework in which to understand the Japanese and through which they perceived the Japanese acquisition of Taiwan. In India, the dominating schema used to understand rule by the British was based not on race but on previous experiences of multi-racial empire. Because the Indians had not previously had any direct contact with the West that existed in their cultural memory, they were able to approach the British with the same attitude as they had previous empires. British rule was no less foreign for this, but it was viewed through a framework in which foreign rule, though not ideal, was not only acceptable but also brought social changes that, if individuals made the correct decisions concerning their relationship to the ruling power, could benefit the individual. Once individuals began collaborating with and assimilating to British rule, their positions and identity became tied to the British Empire so that it would take a dramatic change in circumstances for them to sever ties and pursue independence.

India and England thus became part of the same region, based not only on a political relationship but also on a sense of common interests and a shared future – an imagined community that tied distinct societies together in the same narrative. This relationship is best described as regional because, despite all the efforts to include India in the narrative of the British Empire, intellectuals stopped short of considering them an indistinguishable entity. Indeed, in accordance with the common understanding of the nation at the time as a distinct historical society, Indian intellectuals, at the same time that they declared India to belong to the British Empire, distinguished between the Indian nation(s) and the British nation. For instance, in summary of a speech Sir Surendranath Banerjea gave on 16 April 1890 at Northampton, the reporters wrote, "England has done great things for India; that he would freely admit; and among them had infused into the *nations of India*

¹⁴⁵ See Ian Talbot, *India and Pakistan, Inventing the Nation Series*, ed. Keith Robbins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 25-26.

new-born sentiments of nationality."¹⁴⁶ Indian identification with England therefore does not indicate a retreat from an Indian identity and the pursuit of a national relationship, but rather that they, as distinct groups of people, formed a special interest in the larger world and sought a common future. Because of India's political integration into the British Empire, this was a closer regional relationship than those developed in later discourses in that it centered on the nature of the inclusion of the Indians in the empire. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the prominence early in the definition of the modern self of integrating one's society into the world by defining its relationships to other societies and differentiating those from one another. Additionally, it demonstrates that it is only during the period when nation-states dominated that multiple collective identities are seen as conflicting. In other words, it was not considered a contradiction to see oneself as fully Indian and British or to pursue that identity. Although the nation began to be integrated into British colonial discourse after the suppression of the Revolt of 1857 as the British attempted to legitimize its rule over the subcontinent by refusing the Indians an identity as a unified nation, it was only after World War I that nation-state ideology fully dominated political affairs.¹⁴⁷ At this point, the realization that the British would not fulfill their commitment to India concerning their obtaining full citizenship converged with the complete emergence of the nation-state. Based on the new circumstances, Indian intellectuals assumed different identities from before that drove them to struggle for independence.¹⁴⁸ At the same time, they reconceived South Asia's place in the modern

world. As long as it was the colonial rulers with whom the Indians identified in a regional relationship, they continued to seek citizenship in the British Empire. When this relationship changed so, too, did their transnational discourses and the regional frameworks in which they imagined their society.

World War I and the Paris Peace Conference proved to be a major turning point in modern history as it ushered in the reign of the nation-state and the realization among the world's colonized peoples that the attainment of a nation-state was a precondition for the full attainment of modernity as defined by the conditions for the expression of human agency and engagement with the modern world. As Erez Manela demonstrates, anticolonial nationalist movements emerged on an international scale as a result of the failure of the Western powers to fulfill their apparent promises for world-wide self-determination.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, the carnage of World War I and the utter destruction the European war wrought belied the Western claim to civilization in opposition to a backwards world of barbarism. The non-Western world was no longer trapped in the discourses of Western civilization as the final stage of teleological evolution, and a space was opened for other discourses that could equally lay claim to modernity without using the West as a model.¹⁵⁰ In India, the truth behind the discourses that justified British rule was exposed and India's future was by and large no longer conceived in terms of its relationship to the British Empire.¹⁵¹ The inability to continue to identify with the British Empire because of its refusal to grant the Indians full political rights and its failure to exclusively represent civilization and modernity gave rise to the need to reimagine South Asia's place in the modern world. For some intellectuals,

¹⁴⁶ Raj Jogeshur Mitter, ed., *1886-90*, vol. 3, *Speeches by Babu Surendra Nath Banerjea* (Calcutta: K.N. Mitra, 1890), 136. Emphasis added.

¹⁴⁷ On the change in colonial discourse after the Revolt of 1857, see Mukherjee, *In the Shadows of Empire*, 91.

¹⁴⁸ Even though a nation-state was a common object, Indian society was divided the pursuit of a unified nation because of a central policy of the British colonial government that denied the Indians the possibility of a national identity, which implies a level of homogeneity that, according to British policy, the nationalities of India could not have.

¹⁴⁹ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*.

¹⁵⁰ On the shift in the discourses of civilization as a result of World War I, see Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 91-96.

¹⁵¹ Interestingly, in the Home Rule Movement, which is inherently not a nationalist movement, the relationship with the British was sustained by some members of the Indian National Congress, indicating the strength of those discourses and the identities that formed as a result of colonial rule. Mukherjee, *India in the Shadows of Empire*, 135-136.

such as Hindu and Muslim nationalists, including Mohammad Ali Jinnah, this meant the formation of a nation. For others, most notably M.K. Gandhi, this resulted in the renunciation of identity.¹⁵² Another discourse that emerged was the rejection of the idea of nations, though not necessarily distinct societies, and the promotion of unity among humankind, which is best represented by the work of Rabindranath Tagore.

Creating a Space for South Asia in the Modern World

Identifying with Another

On a basic level, transnational discourses involve identifying a relationship with another society marked by similarity or difference, or both, that creates a place for the self in the modern world and shapes both its actions in that world and the discourses created about the self. From this perspective, the world is not comprised of one self that is surrounded by many others, but in fact one self, which often takes the form of the nation, that perceives other societies in gradated relationships with that self. These relationships, which, as noted in the Introduction, are informed by international relations, and, in turn, shape subsequent relations, with important implications for the particular development of the global world and its history. In colonial India, this process of identifying with another was initially a process of identifying with Great Britain in a regional relationship so that Indian society could pursue what was understood to be modernity at that time to many Indian intellectuals, namely the institutions of the British. This must be understood in the colonial context. The fact of the colonial relationship and its discourses of equity and justice placed Indian intellectuals on a trajectory in which it was likely they would identify the British as the most civilized nation and would identify with the British in order to obtain that civilization, at least until the changes brought by World War I. In order to demonstrate that this identifying with another was not conditioned only by the colonial relationship but in

¹⁵² On Gandhi and the renunciation of identity, see *Ibid.*, 150-180.

fact has important implications for the processes of nation-building, I will end this discussion with Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the discourses of the pursuit of a separate Muslim nation.

Sir Surendranath Banerjea was born in 1848 in Bengal to a family of the Kulin Brahmin caste. His grandfather was thoroughly engaged in indigenous discourses but had chosen to give an English education to his son.¹⁵³ In a statement that reflects India at the turn of the century, he notes, "Thus, in our home, the two conflicting forces of those times met, but in no spirit of antagonism," but that "[i]t was amid this conflict of opposing forces that my earliest years were spent, and what was happening in my family was symbolical of the strife and contention between Eastern orthodoxy and Western culture that was going on in every educated home in Bengal." Banerjea received both a Brahmin and English education, and in 1868 left for England to continue his education and prepare for the civil service exams. After having passed the exams and taken up an appointment to an office in Calcutta, he was dismissed from the civil service ostensibly on account of a small matter of negligence. This became a point of contention in the community due to the conviction among the Indians and certain Englishmen that, had Banerjea not been an Indian, he would have not been dismissed.¹⁵⁴ In 1874, he returned to England to train to be a lawyer, but his dismissal from the service left a mark on his record that prevented him from taking the bar. This was a watershed moment in his life as he reflected in 1925,

Were others to suffer in the future as I had suffered in the past? They must, I thought to myself; unless we were capable as a community of redressing our wrongs and protecting our rights personal and collective. In the midst of impending ruin and dark, frowning misfortune, I formed the determination of

¹⁵³ Sir Surendranath Banerjea, *A Nation in Making: Being the Reminiscences of Fifty Years in Public Life* (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1925), 1-4.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 29. One Englishman, Allen Hume, later the founder of the Indian National Congress, wrote an article in *India* about the injustice of Banerjea's dismissal and the racial element of the decisions. *Ibid.*, 407-410.

*addressing myself to the task of helping our helpless people in this direction.*¹⁵⁵

After a year of personal study in England in preparation for this task, Banerjea returned to India where, somewhat by accident, he began to give speeches and soon grew to be a renowned orator. In 1876, he was instrumental in the founding of the predecessor of the Indian National Congress, the Indian Association, an organization that sought to “represent the views of the educated middle-class community and inspire them with a living interest in public affairs.”¹⁵⁶ By this point a prominent public figure, Banerjea did not limit his message to the middle class but continued his life’s work and lobbied on behalf of the entire Indian population for improved rights as British citizens. Despite his early prominence in the first enunciations of an Indian self, by his death in 1925, he was no longer an influential figure as the discourses of the Indian self had moved towards the Indian nation and independence while he continued to support the British Empire.¹⁵⁷

Banerjea is a representative figure of Indian intellectuals of the first part of colonial rule. As noted earlier, this period was dominated by intellectuals who sought to work within the empire for Indian rights based on the principles of modern governance as demonstrated and promised to the Indians by the British.¹⁵⁸ In his work, it is evident that he considered India to be a separate entity and he actively worked to shape that Indian self. Even though he earlier referred to India as being comprised of nations during the meeting in Northampton, in a later speech on 24 April in Exeter as he continued his circuit around England that year he responded to the idea that India was simply a “congeries of nations,” declaring that, due to the influence of British rule, “A common system

of education, a common government, common institutions and a common language—their own beautiful language—were fast destroying all traces of separate races and separate groups, and welding into one compact mass the hitherto discordant elements of Indian society.”¹⁵⁹ He also actively worked to unite the Indian people as a distinct self. In an early speech in 1878 entitled “Indian Unity” given in the Medical College Theatre in Calcutta, Banerjea concluded by saying, “In the name then of a common country, let us all, Hindoos, Musulmans, Christians, Parsees, members of the great Indian community,...embracing one another in fraternal love and affection, live and work for the benefit of a beloved fatherland. Under English auspices there is a [sic] indeed a great future for India.”¹⁶⁰ Banerjea not only defended the idea of India in the present, but, as is common in nationalist narratives, constructed a historical narrative of India that placed it on the same level as other civilizations of renown. At a meeting in Finsbury on 14 April, the first meeting of his tour around England, Banerjea remarked, “Long before the fame of Rome had been heard of, before Alexander had marched his armies to the banks of the Tigris and the Euphrates...our fathers had cultivated a language and had developed a system of morals and a system of religion...”¹⁶¹ Though hardly a true nationalist because he did not advocate the creation of a state to represent the interests of the Indian people, Banerjea played a significant role in defining and popularizing the idea of the Indian self.

This is important to note because he also sees India as part of a larger community with Great Britain, but this cannot be taken to mean that the Indian self becomes indistinguishable from this community but, rather, the Indian self is being built at the same time as it is being integrated into the modern world through a relationship with another society. Therefore, rather than advocate the creation of an Indian nation-state, Banerjea instead envisioned the full expression of the Indian self in

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 33. Emphasis in original.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

¹⁵⁷ On his no longer being influential in Indian politics, see Bose, *Surendranath Banerjea*, 1.

¹⁵⁸ In addition to the moderates, who dominated politics during this period, there were also extremists who developed a Hindu nationalism that was more critical of British rule but did not advocate independence. Steven Hay, ed., *Modern India and Pakistan*, vol. 2, *Sources of Indian Tradition*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 128-130.

¹⁵⁹ Mitter, *1886-90*, vol. 3, *Speeches by Babu Surendra Nath Banerjea*, 165.

¹⁶⁰ Palit, *1876-1884*, vol. 1, *Speeches by Babu Surendra Nath Banerjea*, 122.

¹⁶¹ Mitter, *1886-90*, vol. 3, *Speeches by Babu Surendra Nath Banerjea*, 121.

the polity of the British Empire. Throughout his writings, he demonstrates a grateful attitude towards the British and their civilizing mission in India. In an 1888 speech entitled "The Present Political Situation," Banerjea commented, "For my own part, I have a high sense of the mission of England in this country. I regard the connection between England and India as providential...[the mission of England is] to regenerate and elevate a great and ancient people, and to bring back to them their long-lost glories."¹⁶² His personal understanding of the relationship between India and England was no doubt influenced by his time spent there as a young man. Remarking on his experiences in a statement that reflects the experiences of many other young men who studied in England, he writes, "I freely confess that I have a genuine admiration for those great institutions which have helped to build up English life and the fabric of British constitutional freedom."¹⁶³ His attitude towards England was built entirely on his perception of the modern and modern institutions of governance. The central theme of his message to England was that India is a rightful part of the empire and her people should be fully represented as British citizens. At the meeting in Exeter, the reporters wrote that Banerjea commented, "They [the Indians] wanted the connection with England to subsist, to become stronger, and perhaps to become permanent. But there was one condition on which such a connection was possible. The Government must be liberalized must be conducted [*sic*] on popular principles and from national aspirations."¹⁶⁴ On behalf of the Indian population, Banerjea demanded that Indians be fully included in modern institutions. As "children of that [august] mother [of free nations],...[Indians] claimed their birthright, they claimed to be admitted into the rights of British citizens and British fellow subjects."¹⁶⁵ Banerjea consistently demonstrated his commitment to the British crown but unequivocally demands that India be

granted full admission into modern civilization through the institutions of political representation and citizenship.

Although his perspectives concerning India and the British Empire should not be taken to represent the entirety of Indian political thought at this time, it is evident that he speaks for a considerable portion of the population. This is clear not only from numerous studies that consistently point to the moderate nature of political movements during this time and widespread acceptance of British rule but also from responses to Banerjea's speeches. In a speech that he gave at the Third National Congress in December 1887, the reporters wrote that he declared, "We are neither Italians nor Greeks. We are something better. We are British subjects (*hear, hear and applause*)."¹⁶⁶ In the laudatory introduction to an 1890 collection of his speeches, the editor writes that audiences of up to two- to three-thousand people have attended his speeches

*...to hear the enthusiastic political missionary preaching everywhere a deep and unshaken loyalty to the British Government, which has already imparted to India Peace, Civilization, and a feeling of National Unity, but preaching also a steady constitutional agitation on the part of the people to secure those rights which no civilized Government, and least of all the English Government, can deny to a people who have learnt to demand them.*¹⁶⁷

His message therefore had a wide audience and, if the response of this editor and the responses of audience members at his speeches are any indication, represented a considerable portion of the politically-engaged population. In the pre-World War I period, it is reasonable to conclude that association with England dominated Indian discourses of the self and modernity. India's place in the modern world and its development was determined in discourse by its relationship to the British Empire, a regional relationship that had significant implications for the meaning of the Indian self and the perception of India's place in

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 65.

¹⁶³ Banerjea, *A Nation in Making*, 21.

¹⁶⁴ Mitter, *1886-90*, vol. 3, *Speeches by Babu Surendra Nath Banerjea*, 164.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 182-183. This was part of a speech given at the Oxford Union on 22 May 1890 as part of Banerjea's tour of England.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 41. Emphasis added.

¹⁶⁷ Ram Chandra Palit, ed., *1876-84*, vol. 1, *Speeches by Babu Surendra Nath Banerjea* 2nd ed. (Calcutta: S.K. Lahiri & Co., 1891), i.

the modern world.¹⁶⁸ As long as it was the colonial rulers with whom the Indians primarily identified in a transnational relationship, they continued to seek full citizenship in the British Empire. These discourses changed along with the aftermath of World War I as Indians re-imagined their own community and their relationship with other societies beyond their borders.

In the time between the end of World War I and independence in 1947, other societies were certainly invoked in discussions of the Indian, and eventually Pakistani, self. From the evidence, this seems to have mostly taken the form of the Indian self in opposition to the British colonizers rather than regional identification with other societies. In creating the national self, then, the transnational was used to create a distant other from which the Indian self necessarily needed to be separate in governance as well as discourse. Rather than examine the use of the transnational in discourses that support the Indian self, I will instead turn to the creation of the Pakistani self. To examine how shifting transnational discourses reflect different conceptions of the nation and how regional relationships are constructed as part of the process of building the nation, I will examine Muhammad Ali Jinnah's shift from being an Indian nationalist who represented Muslim rights in the name of the Muslim nation to advocating the creation of Pakistan on the basis of democracy. This was accompanied by a change in discourse that aligned the Pakistani nation-state in a regional relationship with India and explicitly distanced Pakistan from the pan-Islamic movements of the Arab world but not from the idea of an overarching Muslim identity, placing Pakistan at the center of a global arrangement in which India was to form the closest relationship to Pakistan and other Muslim communities slightly further from the center,

¹⁶⁸ I distinguish here between "regional relationship" and "transnational relationship" because the transnational implies the national. Indian intellectuals at this time were building the Indian self, not the Indian nation, so to use transnational would be to subscribe to the idea that the nation is somehow primordial rather than constructed. Here, transnational is an anachronistic term. In terms of their function in representing a community beyond the society, "regional relationship" and "transnational relationship" are essentially the same.

indicating that other societies were not seen as monolithic "others" but rather as societies that have meaning to the center and its conception of itself in global space.

The idea of a distinct Muslim identity, far from a timeless civilizational ideal, had its roots in the modern period. Cemil Aydin argues that Muslim identity began in the Ottoman Empire in the 1880s in response to an image of Europe as exclusionist with regards to religion and race.¹⁶⁹ Prior to this, the Ottomans had attempted to conform to European civilization in an effort to turn from their "backwardness."¹⁷⁰ Even though Muslim identity is framed in terms of a timeless civilizational quality, it formed in the context of the creation of the nation in Europe and the idea of a distinct, superior European civilization that necessitated the creation of alternate identities in the non-West. In South Asia, this idea that Muslims formed a distinct civilization became an important factor in Hindu-Muslim relations during the first part of the twentieth century and played a central role in the movement first for the protection of Muslim representation in a free India and, later, for the creation of Pakistan.

Even though Jinnah was the most vocal and effective promoter of Muslim nationalism and the creation of a Pakistani nation-state, the roots of the idea that Indian Muslims formed their own nation in fact lie in an earlier movement of Muslim nationalism that demarcated the differences between the Hindus and Muslims along both civilizational and political lines. One of the men most closely associated with this movement was Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), who is best known for the two-nation theory of Muslims and Hindus. Similar to Jinnah when he began to promote the

¹⁶⁹ Cemil Aydin, "The Question of Orientalism in Pan-Islamic Thought: the Origins, Content and Legacy of Transnational Identities," in *From Orientalism to Postcolonialism: Asia, Europe and the Lineages of Difference*, ed. Sucheta Mazumdar, Vasant Kaiwar, and Thierry Labica (London: Routledge, 2009), 112. The fact that the Ottomans felt this exclusion at this point is the direct result of the continued development of the nation in Europe; this period is the beginning of the furthest development of the nation in Europe that lasts until the end of World War I, when it begins to decline in primacy.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 107.

idea of a separate Muslim nation, Iqbal appealed to a larger Islamic identity. In a portion of his 1918 [?] work, *The Mysteries of Selflessness*, entitled "Muslims Profess no Fatherland," he wrote, "Our Essence is not bound to any place/...Nor any fatherland do we profess/Except Islam."¹⁷¹ Yet, he did not advocate the abolition of all national boundaries in areas inhabited by Muslims. To the contrary, he in fact initially supported the inclusion of the Muslims as a well-represented minority in the same state with the Indian Hindus and, later, the creation of a Pakistani nation-state.¹⁷² From his perspective, then, it seems that Muslims, belonging to different societies, comprised a larger community that transcended national boundaries, a regional community based on a religious identity that, rather than being bound by a geographic space, was defined instead by a sense of civilizational distinctiveness.

Jinnah identified Iqbal as a mentor, and, especially during the 1930s until Iqbal's death, they had a close relationship.¹⁷³ Although Jinnah was certainly a representative of Muslim interests from early in his career, Iqbal influenced Jinnah's decision to promote the Pakistani nation-state, and his philosophy certainly had a significant impact on Jinnah's own. Until 1940, Jinnah, the head of the All-India Muslim League, attempted reconciliation with the Hindus in the creation of an Indian nation-state.¹⁷⁴ As it became apparent to him, however, that Muslim interests could not be protected in a state wherein three-quarters of the population was Hindu, he began to advocate the creation of

Pakistan. The decision to create Pakistan as a separate nation-state was thoroughly modern in that it was based on the idea that, politically, the Muslims would be limited by the Hindus and denied full representation, and thus justice, in a single Indian nation-state.

When Jinnah began demanding that an independent nation-state of Pakistan be formed in those areas that had a Muslim majority, his discourses concerning the nation's transnational relationships also changed. This is seen in the ways he discussed the larger Muslim world and, most importantly, the relationship he built between what he called Muslim India and Hindu India. In his writings prior to 1940 when he began supporting the creation of Pakistan, the Muslim world certainly existed, but it lay far from the matter at hand. He rarely mentioned the larger Muslim world, but when he did, his writings indicate a distant identification with that world. When remarking on Britain's plan to partition of Palestine to create a nation-state for the Jews, he expressed a degree of solidarity with them when saying, "I know how deeply Muslim feelings have stirred over the issue of Palestine. I know Muslims will not shirk from any sacrifice if required to help the Arabs who are engaged in the fight for their national freedom."¹⁷⁵ In his presidential address at the Lahore session of the All-India Muslim League, the same session at which it was first explicitly stated that Indian Muslims needed their own homeland, Jinnah said in reference to an earlier resolution given to the British government, "What we wanted the British Government to give us assurance of was that Indian troops should not be sent against any Muslim country or any Muslim power."¹⁷⁶ Despite this identification with the larger Muslim world, Jinnah did not place Indian Muslims in the discourse of pan-Islamism that existed in the Middle East nor did he explicitly

¹⁷¹ Muhammad Iqbal, "The Mysteries of Selflessness," in *Modern India and Pakistan*, vol. 2, *Sources of Indian Tradition*, ed. Hay, 211.

¹⁷² Hay, *Modern India and Pakistan*, vol. 2, *Sources of Indian Tradition*, 175-6.

¹⁷³ Akbar S. Ahmed. *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: the Search for Saladin* (London: Routledge, 1997), 73-4.

¹⁷⁴ During 1939, Jinnah was clearly moving in the direction of the creation of a separate nation-state for Indian Muslims, but it was not until the Lahore session in March 1940 that a distinct state for Indian Muslims was promoted. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, "Presidential Address at the All-India Muslim League, Lahore Session, March 1940," *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. 1, 5th ed., ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad (Lahore, Pakistan: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1960), 162.

¹⁷⁵ Jinnah, "Full text of the Presidential Address delivered extempore at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League held at Patna, on 26th—29th December, 1938," *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. 1, 5th ed., ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, 75.

¹⁷⁶ Jinnah, "Presidential Address at the All-India Muslim League, Lahore Session, March 1940," *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. 1, 5th ed., ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, 155.

create a close regional relationship with other Muslim societies, indicating either that he sought to keep the Middle East at a distance from the idea of a South Asian self or that he considered the relationship with Indian Hindus to be a more pressing matter, or both.

Even though Jinnah did not define Muslim India's relationships with the larger world in terms of a strong relationship with other Muslim societies, he legitimized the existence of Muslim India as a nation rather than just a minority by invoking the idea earlier discussed of Islam as a distinct civilization, and he used this idea to delineate what he considered the more important relationship, that between the two nations of Muslim India and Hindu India. Prior to the 1940 decision to partition India upon independence, Jinnah pursued a regional relationship with Hindu India that was not dissimilar to earlier movements to include India in the British Empire. He consistently refuted the idea that Muslims and Hindus could ever be part of the same nation. Writing on 19 January 1940, he remarked, "The British people must realise [*sic*] that Hinduism and Islam represent two distinct and separate civilisations [*sic*] and, moreover, are as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are nations of Europe."¹⁷⁷ Yet, he does not seek to create two separate states. For instance, in a letter he wrote in response to Sir Hugh O'Neill, he concludes by saying, "It is not a question of Muslims cutting away from their Hindu and Christian brethren. It is a problem of making our Hindu and Christian brethren understand that we are entitled to our place in the Indian sun."¹⁷⁸ The possibility of a united sub-continent was

¹⁷⁷ Jinnah, "Article on the Constitutional Maladies of India sent at special request of 'Time and Tide,' London, on 19th January, 1940," *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. 1, 5th ed., ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, 116.

¹⁷⁸ Jinnah, "Reply to Sir Hugh O'Neill," *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. 1, 5th ed., ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, 114. Unfortunately, the text does not give the date, but as the collection is organized chronologically and given the dates of surrounding writings, it was written in December 1939 or January 1940. There is a hint earlier in the letter that, although Muslims are still considered part of the future Indian nation-state, this has the potential to change if Muslims continue to be marginalized politically.

contingent on the fulfillment of one demand – that the Muslims be represented as fully in India as were the Hindus. This could not be done in a democracy, however, because such a system would favor the "major nation," the Hindus.¹⁷⁹ Even though he did not offer an alternative form of government for post-independence India, it is evident that, until it became clear that no agreement could be reached between the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, Jinnah promoted a united free India in which all groups would be allowed full expression rather than face domination by the majority faction.

After the decision in March 1940 to instead partition India so as to create politically independent homelands for Indian Muslims and Indian Hindus, Jinnah's discourses concerning the spaces beyond the borders of the nation that he was building necessarily changed. The fact that these discourses changed is not noteworthy but rather that, even in the early stages of creating a nation-state, the relationship of the nation with other societies was discussed. Building the nation is inseparable from building images of the transnational. In addition to changing the physical map of the region, this change involved changing the conceptual map in which the national self, Pakistan, would be at the center. Rather than comment on the change in discourses, I will focus instead on the way this space was rearranged to create a spatial order in which other societies are placed in gradated relationships from the center. In Jinnah's writings, the two relationships on which he comments are India and the Muslim world, and he discusses them in such a way as to indicate that Pakistan would identify with both but considered the relationship with India to be the closer of the two.

Jinnah avoided creating a close relationship with other nations in the Muslim world, and in fact explicitly denied such a relationship when it was suggested. In a 1943 interview with the foreign press, it must have been indicated that others were considering that the creation of Pakistan would

¹⁷⁹ Jinnah, "Article on the Constitutional Maladies of India sent at special request of 'Time and Tide,' London, on 19th January, 1940," *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. 1, 5th ed., ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, 117.

lead to weakness on the subcontinent or that it meant a close relationship with the Middle East would develop. In response, Jinnah “did not agree that this division of India would lead to weakness or would mean that the Muslims of the North would look to the Arabian States of the West while the Hindu State would turn to China and the East.”¹⁸⁰ In that same interview, however, in response to a question concerning the creation of a pan-Arab Federation, Jinnah did not express an opinion but sent this message: “We take the deepest interest in the welfare of our brothers in the Middle East. We wish them Godspeed and we pray for their success in their aims and aspirations.”¹⁸¹ That Jinnah would not identify directly with the larger Muslim world in a close relationship cannot be taken as evidence that he viewed them with an indifferent attitude. Jinnah identifies them as “brothers” and expressed a concern for their affairs, but it is apparent that, regardless of how close their relationship to Pakistan was, Pakistan’s relationship with India was more important to Jinnah. He proposed that “the Hindus and Musalmans should be provided with their homelands which will enable them to live side by side as two honourable nations, and as good neighbours...”¹⁸² Moreover, in response to the accusation that a Muslim nation would pose a danger to Hindu India, Jinnah said, “[O]n the contrary, I am sure that Hindu India will find Muslim India not only a friendly neighbour but will defend India against foreign invasion and in that case, so to say, Monroe Doctrine will come into action in the interests of both Hindu India and Muslim India.”¹⁸³ Both in the frequency with which Jinnah remarks on the relationship between India’s Muslims and Hindus in contrast to the considerably less attention he gives to the

relationship between Muslim India and other Muslim societies as well as in the rhetoric he uses to comment on those relationships, it is evident that Jinnah, in the process of building the Pakistani nation, actively pursued a closer relationship with Hindu India, locating it closer to the Pakistani center, than the larger Muslim world. Both relationships were important to the Pakistani self, however, in that they located Pakistan in global space. The rhetoric of centering that was evident in the discourses of Kang Youwei and Dr. Sun Yat-sen is not as explicit in Jinnah’s writings, but it is evident that creating these transnational relationships was part of the process of building the nation in that they centered the national self in the modern world and built a framework of relationships through which to understand contemporary events and on which to shape national action in that world.

In the final section of this study, I will turn away from creating the national through the transnational to the use of the transnational in envisioning a new modernity that expressly refutes the development of the nation. Unlike the intellectuals examined previously, Rabindranath Tagore invoked the modern and the transnational to offer a possible future in which the world is not organized by nations, which, from his perspective, are inherently self-serving at the expense of other peoples. Far from denying the existence of individual societies, Tagore imagines a future in which those societies express themselves through benevolence rather than competition. He appeals to the idea of an Eastern civilization that will, because of its cultivation of humanity rather than machinery, rescue the world from the evils of Western materialism. His vision of the modern is therefore one in which a regional community, the East, is given a central role as a benefactor to humanity in the narrative of global history. He does not give India a central role, however, indicating a new use of the transnational that is divorced from the individual societal self and itself made the subject of a modern narrative.

Eastern Civilization and a New World Order

“The revelation of spirit in man is truly modern: I am on its side, for I am modern,” Rabindranath

¹⁸⁰ Jinnah, “Interview to the Foreign Press, Bombay, September 24, 1943,” *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. 1, 5th ed., ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, 527.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 528.

¹⁸² Jinnah, “Message to the Bombay Presidency Provincial Muslim League Conference held at Hubli on 26th and 27th May, 1940,” *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. 1, 5th ed., ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, 172.

¹⁸³ Jinnah, “Statement to the press regarding interview with Dr. Mukherjee, 2nd January 1941,” *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. 1, 5th ed., ed. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, 219.

Tagore declared to his Chinese audience in 1924.¹⁸⁴ Tagore's views on modernity, as discussed in Section One, are significantly different from Western manifestations thereof. Yet, as he correctly notes, in his dialogue with the Western form of modernity his perspective is thoroughly modern. As the headmaster of a school that resembles a hermitage and philosopher who takes a spiritual perspective as a primary reference for understanding the world and the relationship of man one to another, he hardly fits the common conception of the "modern man." That he does not conform to the typical image of "modernity," and yet demonstrates a thoroughly modern perspective reveals that the modern must be understood as a universal set of understandings of the relationship between man and his environment rather than any particular manifestation of modernity in a specific society. In a telling remark he wrote in his diary while traveling by sea on 24 September 1924, he commented on the bad weather saying, "Such a stormy weather at the time of departure makes one depressed as it is supposed to be a bad omen. Our intellect is hardened, it does not recognize omens as good or bad in these modern days..."¹⁸⁵ Here, it is evident that, to him, omens are meaningless to a modern man – they signify a world beyond man's understanding and control, which does not exist. At the same time, however, he rationally invokes the religious in his philosophy. His religious engagement with the world, which is evident throughout his works, is not a sign of tradition that tarnishes the record of an otherwise modern person but rather an expression of modernity that is in productive dialogue with tradition.¹⁸⁶ Throughout his

writings, he engages the modern world, the convergence of all societies on a single global stage on which is enacted the struggle for resources in pursuit of wealth and power. He understands clearly this world and India's position therein as, at the time, a subordinate member of the hierarchy. He also understands the hierarchy to be fluid, and demonstrates that each society determines its own position in the hierarchy of nations and can change that position as it proceeds forward through time. Therefore, by a philosophical understanding of modernity as a perspective that is self-conscious and understands and acts on the role of human agency in the development of human affairs, Tagore is undoubtedly modern. His own reason for describing himself as modern is based not on an acceptance of the current global order and an attempt to work for India's benefit therein but, conversely, on his rational understanding of the spirit of humanity and, by extension, his rejection of the global order as dominated by material progress and lust for power. Tagore's work, then, is marked by a modern rejection of Western modernity and a modern suggestion for a new global order.

Although he rarely comments directly on modernity, Tagore's writings are dominated by an understanding of the spirit of man – for him, a necessary precondition of modernity. Therefore, when considering discourses of modernity in his works, the human spirit and the evaluation of an understanding of that spirit in various societies must be considered. Despite the scarcity of direct references to modernity, his arguments rest on the discourses of his understanding of modernity and seek to modernize his audience by illuminating the truths of humanity and his vision for a new modern global order. His writings must be understood in their historical context. Prior to World War I, Tagore seems to have taken a more conciliatory approach to the West. Although he consistently took understanding the spirit of man as the basis for modernity, he was willing to include the West at that time as representative of that spirit. In 1912 as he was leaving Bengal, he asserted that, "Whatever may be the outward aspect of Europe's

¹⁸⁴ Rabindranath Tagore, "My Life," in *Lectures & Addresses by Rabindranath Tagore: Selected from the Speeches of the Poet*, Anthony X. Soares (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1924), 6.

¹⁸⁵ Rabindranath Tagore, *The Diary of a Westward Voyage*, trans. Indu Dutt (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), 3.

¹⁸⁶ In fact, an objective examination of any expression of modernity reveals that the modern and the traditional are not conflicting categories but rather that tradition informs the modern in fundamental ways. In this way, the modern period is not a dramatic break from the past but in fact part of a narrative that incorporates continuity and change. For a discussion of

how the modern nation demonstrates that the modern is not a complete break from the past, see Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 53-56.

power, I have no doubt that at its core is the power of the spirit.”¹⁸⁷ In 1924, six years after Europe’s potential for carnage was exposed to the world, Tagore could no longer accept the Western claim to civilization. The West had forsaken the spirit of man and replaced it with a machine – it could no longer legitimately represent modernity.

Tagore’s rejection of the Western manifestation of modernity was accompanied by his vision of a new, equally modern world order based on the cultivation of the human spirit, and it is with this world order and Tagore’s efforts to realize it that I conclude my study of the discourses of the transnational. Prior to this, my focus has been on the use of the transnational to build the national. Tagore offers another glimpse into the transnational that is purposefully disassociated from the national. His intention in creating a model based on a rational understanding and cultivation of the human spirit explicitly rejects the national, offering a new modern in which the self-interested modern nation-state is antiquated. Although he did not propose the abolition of distinction between societies, he places India and other Asian societies within a regional discourse in an effort not to center and legitimize the national self but to realize a world beyond nationalities. Whereas in other discourses the regional was used rhetorically for the good of the national, in this case, the individual society ought to work for the benefit of Asia and the world. This is another form of transnational imagining that, though considerably rarer, is important because of the particular meaning it invested in the region of Asia. Although other intellectuals were not so willing to abandon their nationalist aspirations, they looked to Tagore and his writings in addition to their own global constructions, allowing for the development of multiple regional narratives to which a society could appeal depending on the contemporary circumstance. In this brief study of Tagore’s conception of a new world order based on his belief in the particular qualities of the East, I will focus on the re-conceptualized relationship between the individual society and humanity in this new vision of a modern world.

¹⁸⁷ Qtd. in Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore: the Myriad-Minded Man* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 1.

The dominant theme in Tagore’s writings is the possibility of a future different from the one created by the materialism of Western civilization. To do this, he must first have disassociated Europe’s exclusive claim to modernity and its monopoly over the future from modernity itself.¹⁸⁸ This process is explicitly expressed in a lecture entitled, “Nationalism in Japan,” given in Japan around 1924 when he said, “These [artifacts of Europe that he discussed immediately previous to this] are not modern, but merely European. True modernism is freedom of mind, not slavery of taste. It is independence of thought and action, not tutelage under European schoolmasters. It is science, but not its wrong application in life...”¹⁸⁹ In other words, some elements of European civilization are indeed modern, but this civilization itself does not embody the modern. This separation of European civilization from the modern enables Tagore to see a different potential future. In this future, self-interested pursuit of material goods is replaced by a recognition of the mutual interest of humanity and therefore creates cooperation rather than competition among humanity. The civilizational basis for this future is found in the East. Earlier in the speech given in Japan, he remarks, “Eastern Asia has been pursuing its own path, evolving its own civilization, which was not political but social, not predatory and mechanically efficient but spiritual and based upon all the varied and deeper relations of humanity.”¹⁹⁰ The East, then, rather than an individual society functions as the savior of humanity – as a region, it occupies the central role in history. In concluding his speech in Japan, he declared, “And I offer, as did my ancestor rishis, my salutation to that sunrise of the East [an allusion to Japan, which represents the reemergence of the East as a whole], which is destined once again to illuminate the world.”¹⁹¹ In a speech given in America entitled, “Nationalism in India,” he asserted, “We must recognize that it is

¹⁸⁸ Without this separation, any prescription for the future would have been nonmodern because Western modernity was claimed to be the future for all humanity; to deny this and not the Western claim to modernity would be to take a non-rational approach to the future.

¹⁸⁹ Tagore, *Nationalism*, 75.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 92.

providential that the West has come to India. And yet some one [*sic*] must show the East to the West, and convince the West that the East has her contribution to make to the history of civilization."¹⁹² The rhetoric behind this narrative is exactly the same as was seen in both Kang Youwei and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's vision of the future, except that instead of an individual nation leading the world to a brighter future, it is the East. This use of the transnational is a dramatic departure from earlier conceptions of modernity, signaling a new conception of the modern in which the nation does not exist and individual societies work in concert for the benefit of humanity.

Tagore consistently denounced the nation in his writings, and in its place he promoted the idea that true civilization is realized not in the cultivation of the self but in the pursuit of the greater good for humanity. In another speech in Japan, likely also given in 1924, entitled "International Relations," Tagore condemned the nation saying, "Whenever the spirit of the Nation has come it has destroyed sympathy and beauty, and driven out the generous obligations of human relationship from the hearts of men."¹⁹³ Indeed, he proclaimed that he is "not against one nation in particular but against the general idea of all nations."¹⁹⁴ For the self-interest of the nation, he substitutes the ideals of humanity, and in doing so erases the nation and in essence envisions a future in which individual societies, while certainly retaining their internal cohesiveness, work for the benefit of mankind. After giving up the idea of nationalism, which had been taught to him as a young boy, Tagore realized that India would benefit "by fighting against the education which teaches them that a country is greater than the ideals of humanity."¹⁹⁵ While speaking on nationalism in Japan, he reflected that "The moral law, which is the greatest discovery of man, is the discovery of this wonderful truth, that man becomes all the truer the more he realizes himself in others."¹⁹⁶ In this model of the role of the

society in the future of humanity unlike those examined earlier, the narrative operates to place humanity at the center for which the individual society has purpose rather than placing the society at the center around which a narrative of humanity is constructed. This is indeed a new model of modernity in which the national is replaced by a fuller vision of the transnational in which all mankind seeks mutual benefit rather than self-interest.

Discussion

Transnational discourses in India during the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century largely concerned the relationship of India to other societies rather than India as part of a global narrative. During the first part of British colonial rule when the rhetoric of the benevolence of colonialism allowed individuals to identify with the British Empire, a close relationship with Britain was cultivated for the express purpose of achieving modernity as exemplified by British institutions. When the vacancy of this rhetoric was revealed, especially after World War I, this relationship with Britain transformed into one of difference and was accompanied by a call for immediate independence – India was no longer in need of the British to pursue modernity, she could obtain it on her own through the nation-state. The idea that, as understandings of the self shift so, too, do transnational discourses, was exemplified by the discourses surrounding the creation of Pakistan. Hindu-Muslim unity within the same state was the objective until the nation eventually to be known as Pakistan was imagined, at which point Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the spokesman for Indian Muslims, began constructing global space around Pakistan with Hindu India located closer to the center than the Arab Muslim community.

Although transnational imaginings by and large served to center and thereby build the nation, Rabindranath Tagore challenged this model of modernity and substituted his own that itself was modern. The nation was to be superseded by a more developed transnationalism in which the cultivation of humanity, the product of Eastern civilization, would triumph over the materialism of the West that was in the process of destroying man

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 109.

¹⁹³ Tagore, "International Relations," *Lectures & Addresses by Rabindranath Tagore*, 135.

¹⁹⁴ Tagore, *Nationalism*, 110.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 106.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 78.

and replacing him with a machine. In this way, the transnational became the center of the global narrative of humanity and the subject of a new model of modernity.

4. CONCLUSION

The modern world is comprised of nation-states as the fundamental political unit and the collective body through which a society interacts in that world, but it is because of these interactions that the modern world is also constructed as more than just a world of nation-states. These interactions comprise the international realm of inter-societal relations, which are enabled by modern structures and have come to be a defining feature of the modern world. In order to better understand the relationship between the national and the international from the perspective of the nation, I have examined the discourses of Chinese and Indian intellectuals as they concern the modern, the nation, and the transnational because of the centrality of these in the formation of the modern world. Focusing primarily on transnational imaginings, namely the perception of the relationships between the self and the larger world represented by either global space or discrete societies, of six intellectuals, I sought to propose a relationship between these discourses and an understanding of the transnational that would increase our understanding of the development and actions of nation-states.

One function of the transnational that I have studied is that of centering the national self. The reality of a vast global world is such that, from an objective perspective, it marginalizes individual societies. Therefore, in order for the nation to claim legitimacy, the national self needs to be moved from its marginal position in the world and claim a central role in a larger narrative than that of solely the self. This largely takes two forms. One is to create a global narrative in which the self plays a central role in global history and, in line with the importance of progress in the modern, offers a beneficial service to humanity and its future. Another centering narrative is building regional relationships in which the self is surrounded by other societies that exist at different distances from the center based on

narratives of similarity and difference as well as mutual cooperation or antagonism. Through these transnational discourses, global space was fundamentally changed from the perspective of the nation as well as in the course of subsequent international relations. Of course, this space was informed by more than just these discourses, but they played a role by defining the self in global space and assigning space to other societies based on their relationship to the self. This formed one framework for understanding contemporary events and informing appropriate action that, rather than only reflect the organization of global space from the perspective of each society, in fact contributed to the outcome of later events and the actual structural arrangement of this space.

Beyond serving to center and therefore legitimize the nation-state, transnational discourses also work to shape a nation's actions on the global stage by informing international relations. Mohammad Ali Jinnah presaged this outcome when he remarked that, upon independence, Pakistan and India would form a type of mutual defense that would parallel the Monroe Doctrine of the United States towards the American continents. This relationship between transnational imaginings and international relations is evident throughout modern history as well as in the contemporary world. Notions of Western superiority became central in the narratives of nations in the West, and they in turn provided a foundation for Western imperialism and colonialism. Within Asia, the basis of Japan's Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere lay precisely in its function of providing Japan a central role in the narrative of the struggle between the East and the West and in the regional construction of a united Asia. The success of this program among other intellectuals was arguably in part the result of earlier transnational imaginings that had first allowed the nation to be built on the premise of a regional relationship and, in the process, created the region of Asia as a meaningful place with which people could identify. In contemporary history, the regional alliances between South Asia, China, and what came to be known as the Third World were also built on the foundation of these earlier transnational discourses and continued to play a role in the on-going process of nation-building.

This centering element of transnational discourses is just one function of these discourses, but it is the only one that this study sought to understand. Additionally, because of the method I chose of examining the discourses of only six intellectuals, the study is also limited in the extent to which it can speak to the historical situation. Despite this study's limitations, it does suggest that these transnational discourses are both present and that they function as an element of nation-building and pursuing the modern, and it offers areas for more research that can potentially deepen our understanding of the transnational and the international as well as point to different ways to understand the dynamics of the national. One issue that this study immediately raises is the question of the variety of the discourse of the transnational within a society between intellectuals who are in dialogue with one another. Although each intellectual cast himself as speaking for the nation when defining the national self, all of these intellectuals in fact worked in a pluralistic intellectual environment in which all played a part but none could speak for the whole because there was no unanimous consensus as to what constituted the nation or the nation's transnational relationships. Another area for future inquiry is that of the emergence of an intellectual community in Asia during this period and the ways in which these discourses contributed to, or possibly detracted from this community. This in turn raises questions as to the structures through which these intellectuals were able to build this community as well as the ways individual intellectuals saw their Asian intellectual community in relationship with other intellectuals throughout the world. This latter question comes to the final area of potential study that bears mentioning here, which is the dynamics between the intellectual and the social in imagining the relationship of the other to the self. To what extent did the rest of the population know of the world beyond the borders of their society (or, indeed, the whole of their own society)? To what extent did the perspectives of intellectuals speak for those of the population at large who were aware of the modern world? Through what, if any, channels did the general population become aware of intellectual discourses of the nation? And, finally, how do the transnational discourses of the past relate to the idea of a shared Asian community

among the general population that is increasingly popular today? Further study into these questions can offer a fuller picture of the transnational and complicate the argument that I have presented here by demonstrating more uses of this discourse. Additionally, by using discourses of the transnational to examine the connection between a society's intellectual and social history, one can better understand the dynamic and the structures by which it is enabled between these two often disparate narratives of history. Finally, examining these discourses further offers a way to better understand the relationship between societies and their peoples today so that our principal explanations for cooperation and mutual identity are not only globalization or the possibility of a long history of interaction but also a recent development that took part because of the seemingly divisive force of nation-states.

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Gongfu Cha: A New American Luxury

JAY HENDREN



When Roy Fong emigrated from Hong Kong to America in 1970, he did not imagine that he would one day be at the forefront of a tea revival. But he longed for the rich *gongfu* tea of his hometown which he could not find in California in the early '90s. Fong set up an importing business to bring in his and his friends' favorite teas from China. Though a money losing endeavor at first, Fong's hobby blossomed into the Imperial Tea Court, one of the most successful Chinese-style teahouses in the United States. Fong, and many others like him, are responsible for introducing the practice of *gongfu cha* to an American audience.

The dissemination of the southern Chinese practice of *gongfu cha* among a wider American audience follows along with the recent tea boom in America. Although tea has a long tradition in the West, *gongfu* tea, being a recent introduction to

America, falls outside the normal Western associations with the "tea". As a result, media searches for new ways to discuss this phenomenon, since *gongfu* tea doesn't mesh with normal America tea habits. As a result, media has crafted the image of *gongfu* into a culture of connoisseurship, where *gongfu* tea is a luxury item and those who enjoy it are experts in their craft.

1. WHAT IS GONGFU CHA?

Ostensibly, *gongfu cha*, simply means "tea made with skill." In practice, the term refers to a Chinese style of brewing tea using small brewing vessels and cups and short steeping times, resulting in a rich, dynamic flavor that changes over the course

of many steepings.¹ Gongfu brewing is almost always practiced with Chinese or Taiwanese teas, in particular oolongs² and pu'er³, and less frequently with green or black⁴ teas.⁵

Gongfu cha is sometimes referred to as the “Chinese tea ceremony,” but this is in fact a misnomer, possibly stemming from confusion with *chanoyu*, the Japanese tea ceremony. Chanoyu, also called *chado*, is in fact a formal ceremony with codes of conduct and rules that hosts and guests are expected to know and follow. For centuries, chanoyu has also fulfilled the role of enforcing social hierarchy, since only those who could afford to build a tea room and hire a tea master could invite guests to participate. However, gongfu is not a formal ceremony but rather a style of brewing and serving tea, even though the elaborate setup may suggest otherwise to non-Chinese.

2. THE ORIGIN OF GONGFU CHA

Although tea has a long history in China,⁶ gongfu is only a relatively recent development. The bitter flavor and its energizing effects were first discovered thousands of years ago, before historical records began. Tea was originally considered a medicinal drink, employed to ward off sleepiness and cure hangovers. In the Tang dynasty, tea was pressed into bricks or cakes and boiled in cauldrons. The compressed shape

facilitated transportation across the rugged mountainous regions of southern China, and even today most pu'er tea is compressed into a cake or brick shape. It was during this time that Buddhist monks began disseminating tea throughout East Asia, since tea helped keep the monks awake during long meditation sessions. Later, during the Song dynasty, tea was ground into powder, then mixed with hot water and whisked to a froth. This style of serving tea was introduced to Japan and preserved as the *matcha* used in chanoyu. It wasn't until the Ming dynasty that brewing loose-leaf tea in hot water, the style of tea popular throughout the world today, came into common practice. The tradition of using small pots to brew tea gongfu-style wouldn't come until the Qing dynasty.

Historical records are not definitive, but gongfu likely developed in the 18th century in or near Chaozhou, a city in Guangdong province.⁷ The use of the term “gongfu” to refer to this style dates from around the same period and region.⁸ “Gongfu” means time or effort expended on some task, workmanship, skill, or artistry. To many tea drinkers, this term appears to refer to the skill and effort expended by the person who brews and serves tea; however, it is also possible that the term refers to the skill of the tea master who produced the tea by withering, rolling, and roasting it. Pointing towards this interpretation is the fact that the British term “congou,” a rough transliteration of “gongfu” as spoken in the Chaozhou (Teochew) dialect, is used to refer to a black tea which was not likely used in gongfu-style tea preparation when the British first came across it. Many similar black teas are still called “gongfu” today, even though they are not popular choices for preparation in the gongfu style. Regardless of the particular origins of the term, “gongfu” is used unambiguously in modern Chinese to refer to this specific practice of brewing tea. Today, gongfu has spread far beyond its origin in Fujian and Guangdong provinces and has become popular in Beijing as well as among Chinese diaspora in Taiwan and Southeast Asia. However, gongfu

1 A thorough explanation of serving tea in the gongfu style can be found in Blofeld, pp. 133-140.

2 “Oolong tea” 烏龍茶, literally “black dragon tea”, is “in between” green and black teas in the sense that the leaves of oolong tea are allowed to oxidize (unlike green tea), but not allowed to oxidize fully (unlike black tea), before being roasted.

3 Pu'er is a kind of tea from Yunnan province. It is made from green tea, but allowed to ferment, either naturally or in an accelerated, artificial process.

4 “Black” teas are called *hongcha* 紅茶 in Chinese, which means “red tea”. The English term refers to the color of the leaves, while the Chinese term refers to the color of the brewed liquor.

5 For fuller explanations on how tea is harvested and processed, see pages 503-570 of Joseph Needham's *Science and Civilization in China*, Volume 6, Part 5

6 For an introduction to the history of tea in China, see Evans, John C. *Tea in China: The History of China's National Drink*, Greenwood Press, New York 1992.

7 Huang 561

8 For a thorough discussion on the etymology of gongfu as it refers to tea, see the blog post by Victor H. Mair, the renowned sinologist, on the Language Log blog: <http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3282>

remains especially prevalent in places such as Hong Kong, close to the source of the practice.

There is some debate about the correct writing of “gongfu cha.” Both writings are pronounced “gōngfū” in Modern Standard Mandarin and carry a very similar set of connotations and denotations, except that one has also been appropriated in recent years to refer to “kung-fu” martial arts movies, the kind popular in Hong Kong cinema featuring actors such as Bruce Lee. However, gongfu tea has nothing to do with martial arts, excepting the possible similarities in terms of practice and skill required to master either.

There are other practices also called “gongfu cha” which are not the subject of this paper. For instance, the Tai Ji Teahouse in Hangzhou serves “gongfu” tea,⁹ although this use of “gongfu” refers to the acrobatic skill of the waiters who refill customers’ cups using long-spouted kettles. This teahouse doesn’t actually serve gongfu-style oolong or pu’er tea. Instead, it serves green tea in the style popular in teahouses in places like Hangzhou and Chengdu: served in a large gaiwan (lidded cup) and consumed directly from the same vessel, without the use of cups. This kind of “gongfu” tea attracts customers and tourists with showmanship and spectacle, but it is far less popular than the other kind, which is practiced in teahouses across the globe as well as in private gatherings.

3. GONGFU UTENSILS

Setup varies from teahouse to teahouse and tea drinker to tea drinker, but a typical gongfu setup consists of several basic parts. Traditionally, water is boiled in a stoneware kettle heated by a portable, charcoal-fueled stove, though modern technology has made glass kettles heated on stovetops or stainless steel kettles heated by induction popular. A tea tray, usually made from bamboo or wood, but sometimes from metal, often with a hidden basin for catching spilled water, forms the platform for brewing tea. Dry leaves are presented in a presentation vessel (*cha he*, literally “tea box”) to allow the appearance and aroma of the leaves to be examined. Tea is usually brewed in

a small porcelain gaiwan (literally “lidded bowl”, also called a *zhong* in older texts) or Yixing teapot (referring to the town where these teapots are made¹⁰) no larger than 200 milliliters in volume. Tea is decanted into a “faircup” or pitcher (*chahai*, literally “tea ocean”) and served in small cups, usually made of porcelain, which are large enough for two or three sips of tea. Aroma cups (*wenxiangbei*, literally “aroma sniffing cup”) are tall, cylindrical cups used to assess the aroma of a brewed tea. Various wooden or bamboo tea tools, often including a pick for breaking apart tea cakes, a pair of tongs for handling hot cups, and a teaspoon, are also present. Other vessels and tools are sometimes found as well. For instance, “tea pets” are small objects made from clay, often in the form of mythical creatures such as the three-legged money toad (*chanchu*) are commonly sold in teashops; such items are displayed for good luck or merely for aesthetics. The following picture, courtesy of Ku Cha Teahouse in Boulder, Colorado, depicts a typical gongfu setup, including, in addition to utensils mentioned above, a hot water thermos, a towel, and a stainless steel strainer.

Gongfu setups need not be complicated or involve many utensils. While a source for hot water, a brewing vessel such as a teapot, and cups for drinking are necessary, the rest can be included or left out as needed. For instance, tea trays are a relatively modern tool; other things can serve the same purpose of catching spilled water, such as one or two large bowls. Vessels such as the presentation vessel, faircup, and aroma cups can also be omitted. As gongfu tea is becoming more and more popular, various devices are being devised to allow for gongfu brewing in a variety of situations. “Gongfu” mugs, for instance, are devices that merge the brewing vessel and drinking vessel, making drinking gongfu tea easier on the go. However, gongfu cannot be reduced merely to a set of utensils. The term “gongfu” refers to a specific set of methods for brewing and appreciating tea which are possible to practice even with humble equipment.

¹⁰ Although not all teapots used in gongfu come from Yixing, the term “Yixing” has come to be a catch-all, referring to almost any Chinese stoneware teapot of a similar style, often made from brown, red, or purple clay.

⁹ Lee

4. BREWING GONGFU-STYLE

Tea is brewed in a variety of ways across the globe. Among these methods, gongfu style requires among the highest attention to detail. Specific techniques are used to ensure that the tea is brewed at the right temperature for the proper amount of time. As gongfu disseminates, these techniques are less frequently considered rigid procedure and more often taken as guidelines to discovering the best way to enjoy a tea in gongfu style. According to John Blofeld, author of "The Chinese Art of Tea," gongfu tea is served in the following fashion:

1. The empty teapot is scalded with hot water to heat it up and prevent it from cooling too rapidly during subsequent infusions. The hot water in the teapot is then discarded.
2. Tea is ladled into the teapot to fill about half of its volume with dry leaf.
3. Hot water is poured into the teapot, then immediately poured out, in order to rinse the leaves.
4. The pot is refilled with hot water, then the teacups are heated with hot water and immediately drained. By the time this is done, the tea will have steeped for thirty seconds.
5. The first infusion is decanted into cups for drinking, while leftover tea is discarded to prevent it from continuing to steep and become bitter.
6. Subsequent infusions should only be ten seconds long rather than thirty.

This procedure covers steps which are almost universal in the world of gongfu. Exact measurements of amount of tea leaf and time of steeping vary, but without exception, gongfu requires a relatively high proportion of tea leaves to water and very short steeping times. Ten seconds might not seem very long, especially to Westerners who are accustomed to the tea bag, but when a pot is filled half-full with high-quality tea leaves, long steepings are not necessary to extract a strong flavor. Naturally, since a high degree of temperature control is involved in brewing gongfu-style, and since steepings are quite short, margins of error are quite small, and it can be easy to

produce an unpalatable, bitter brew. Because of this, practice and skill are necessary to successfully brew gongfu tea, and the ability of tea connoisseurs to assess different teas and adjust brewing parameters based on the quality of the tea is both highly regarded by tea lovers and necessary for the highest level enjoyment of gongfu tea.

For this reason, gongfu tea is prepared usually by a tea master who works at a teashop rather than left to the customer. Gongfu tea tastings are enjoyable, but as a poor brewer can ruin a pot of tea by oversteeping it or by failing to keep the pot hot, experienced, trustworthy brewers are employed instead to prepare tea for customers. However, gongfu tea is becoming more and more popular, which means that teahouse customers are often familiar with gongfu. Because of this, it is becoming common for teahouses to leave customers with a pot of tea, a source of hot water, and perhaps a few suggestions (perhaps "this particular tea is sensitive to oversteeping, especially in later infusions"), and let the customer take care of practicing gongfu.

Teas Used in Gongfu

The kinds of teas available to Westerners have varied considerably since tea was first exported from China to the West. The amount of time spent in transport, the teas available in markets that Westerners can access, the marketing of different teas, and so on have all been changing, altering both Western categorical systems and Westerners' perceptions of Chinese tea.

Based on my experience in teahouses in America and in China, the teas used for gongfu can be categorized in a simple manner. Oolongs from both China and Taiwan as well as pu'er from China are the most popular choices for preparation in the gongfu manner. Chinese oolongs come in three main varieties:

- *Yancha* 岩茶, meaning "rock tea", noted for their mineral flavor derived from the rocky soil of the Wuyi mountains of Fujian province, the most famous tea of which is *dahongpao* 大紅袍, meaning "big red robe".
- Rolled oolongs from the Anxi mountains, also in Fujian province, which are rolled

into balls and noted for their light, floral, and sometimes spicy flavor, the most famous tea of which is *tieguanyin* 鐵觀音, usually translated as “iron goddess of mercy”.

- *Dancong* 單叢, “single bush”, teas from Fenghuang (“Phoenix”) mountains in Guangdong province, noted for their strong floral aroma and peachy taste, and often named for the particular aroma which they imitate, for instance *milan xiang* 蜜蘭香 or “honey orchid aroma”.

Taiwanese oolongs are usually rolled into balls and often have a flavor profile similar to Anxi oolongs. There are several famous varieties of Taiwanese oolong, such as *Alisha*, *dong ding*, and *bai hao* or “Oriental beauty”. Chinese pu'er is a unique kind of tea from Yunnan province. It is made from green tea, usually pressed into distinctive cake shapes about the size of a dinner plate, and allowed to ferment. *Sheng* pu'er is fermented naturally. Sharp and bitter when only aged a few years, sheng acquires a smooth, mellow taste as it ages. Sheng pu'er that has been aged for decades in proper environments is especially valued and expensive. *Shu* pu'er is also fermented, but the process is accelerated with some kind of catalyst. Shu is less valuable than sheng due to its inferior taste, though it can still be enjoyable. Most pu'er available on the Western market is shu rather than sheng.

Some teas commonly used in gongfu have escaped this categorical system. However, this system accounts for the most popular and widely available teas used for gongfu. Even stores that don't offer gongfu services sell many of these teas. For instance, some American grocery stores stock commercial-brand Wuyi rock tea or tieguanyin; however, these teas are usually not of particularly high quality, and likely not often used for gongfu brewing.

5. A CULTURE OF CONNOISSEURSHIP

With little doubt, gongfu has earned a reputation for being a sophisticated practice. Media consistently reports that gongfu requires skill, knowledge, and attention to detail. But in making

claims towards the sophistication of gongfu, critics cannot point towards an institution of gongfu. Unlike in Japan, there exists no formalized Chinese “tea ceremony,” meaning there are no schools of gongfu, there are no set rules or formal practices associated with gongfu, and gongfu serves no necessary social function the way Chanoyu does in Japan. Rather than being institutionalized, gongfu is rather a local custom which has spread across the Chinese world and now reaches America. Thus, gongfu must be studied at a different level, by examining individuals and their practices, rather than by appealing to a larger structure.

Despite the difficulty of giving structure and form to the world of gongfu tea, it is still not too difficult to study gongfu as a whole. The types of people and practices associated with gongfu fall into easy-to-recognize patterns, and media uses consistent vocabulary when discussing gongfu, making generalizations useful tools in examining the emergence of gongfu in America. However, the state of gongfu in America is evolving rapidly, partially due to the explosion of the tea industry in recent years and partially due to the efficacy of social media in spreading gongfu to tea lovers across the globe.

Although Chinese teas are now available in almost every corner of the globe, there seems to be a particular reason that gongfu is catching on in America. As part of the tea boom, gongfu appears to be filling some sort of niche which is available within American culture. By way of comparison, Britain, which has a long-standing tradition of tea, appears not to have the same sort of cultural room for gongfu as America does. A recent article in *The Daily Mail*¹¹ recounted the experience of a tea shop owner who tried to serve gongfu-style oolong tea to Londoners. Though most claimed to enjoy the drink, those who drank it felt it was difficult to mesh this new kind of tea with their daily cuppa routine. One construction worker said, “I know my tea – and that isn't it,” while another quipped, “Gimme a Tetley tea bag any day,” after spitting out the tea he had been served. Gongfu tea does not appear to be catching on with the British. However, there is something about America that makes gongfu more appealing to tea drinkers on this side of the pond.

11 Antonowicz

6. CONTEXTUALIZING THE ENTRANCE OF GONGFU INTO AMERICA

In the past forty years, the popularity of tea in America has exploded. When the United States lifted its trade embargo with China in 1972, Chinese tea manufacturers found a new export market, previously supplied by a limited number of Taiwanese tea producers.¹² Combined with the Reform & Opening Up policies beginning in 1979, China's tea market has been booming, the joint result of increasing affluence in China and the expanding American market for tea.

Today, tea is flooding the mainstream American marketplace. Demand for ready to drink iced teas is surging, and hot teas are finding homes everywhere from coffee houses to upscale restaurants.¹³ According to the Tea Association of the USA,¹⁴ the tea industry has exploded from a total wholesale value of \$1.8 billion in 1990 to \$7.8 billion in 2010, while the number of specialty tea stores across the US has gone from a couple hundred to a couple thousand in the same time period. There are many reasons for the surging demand for tea. Costs are decreasing due to improved manufacturing technology – tieguanyin oolongs are now rolled by machine, for instance, not by hand – and due to decreasing shipping costs. Tea is also become more and more ubiquitous, gaining momentum like a rolling snowball: bottled iced teas are becoming more popular as an alternative to carbonated sodas; coffee shops now offer hot tea as well. One of the underlying reasons for the increased demand for tea is its reputation for being healthier than coffee: the tea trend “began 20 years ago as Baby Boomers searched for a low- or non-caffeinated alternative to coffee. Reports about tea's possible health benefits also fueled the boom.”¹⁵

While the mainstream tea market is booming, it seems inevitable that interest in high-end tea will also increase. Wrote a journalist for the San Francisco Chronicle, “The current interest in premium tea, and teahouses, is just the latest

development in the growing mainstream appreciation of tea.”¹⁶ The rise of tea as a popular drink and the increasing availability of Chinese and Taiwanese luxury teas means an increase in the number of tea connoisseurs who are interested in practicing gongfu. “Connoisseurship is necessary to appreciate tea,” remarked one tea importer.¹⁷ But because the kind of Chinese oolongs and pu'ers typically associated with gongfu have only reached the American market in recent years, the tea cognoscenti of America is also in its first generation.

Although tea is not a brand new product in the West, the practice of gongfu tea might as well be. Large companies such as Lipton and Bigelow have been selling tea to America for decades. Though such companies may be deeply entrenched in the tea industry, they are not the avenues by which gongfu tea has come into the States. Michael Harney of Harney & Sons, a large tea importer, has been having trouble selling oolong to a mass audience for decades: “Tea people love oolongs. But most people don't understand them,” he remarked.¹⁸ Gongfu is still a niche practice, confined to small communities, and practiced in privately owned teahouses, rather than promoted through large, mainstream tea companies.

7. WHO PRACTICES GONGFU?

Those who are practicing gongfu in America, for the most part, fit into one of two categories. On the one hand, there are shop owners and merchants who sell Chinese tea and offer gongfu services to guests. On the other hand, there are hobbyists, connoisseurs who collect teas and teawares and practice gongfu brewing for themselves. But through both of these groups, the common thread is their background in East Asia.

Gongfu tea is spreading mainly through Chinese diaspora. The practitioners of gongfu are often those who were born and grew up in places like Hong Kong or Taiwan, longing to revive traditions they practiced in their homeland. They keep tradition alive by practicing gongfu at home

12 Harney; Black

13 Fabricant, “Evolution of Tea”

14 www.teausa.com

15 Wu

16 Wu

17 Fabricant, “Evolution of Tea”

18 Black

or else by selling the teas and teawares which are not as widely available in the United States as in the East.

One of the hot spots for gongfu is the West Coast, in cities such as Los Angeles and San Francisco, where Chinese immigrants have settled in large numbers. As the Los Angeles Times notes, Chinese teas and tea aficionados have mostly been members of the Chinese diaspora: "For generations, an elevated appreciation for tea was largely the domain of older Chinese immigrants who had grown up with fine teas. During the height of Chinese immigration into the San Gabriel Valley 20 years ago, the demand supported several high-end Chinese tea shops, including one run by the family of the oldest tea company in Taipei."¹⁹ As Americans begin to turn their interest towards gongfu tea, some of the attention is focused on the enigmatic figures who have spearheaded the importation of gongfu tea from China to the West Coast.

Indeed, many newspaper articles about gongfu tea revolve almost entirely around the sophisticates who are the main figures of gongfu tea in America. One article,²⁰ titled "At Tea Habitat, tea connoisseurship is taken to the extreme," showcases Imen Shan's tea business, including a small shop in Los Angeles and an online store. Shan moved from Canton²¹ at 15, and started her business out of pride for her heritage. As the title suggests, Shan's passionate devotion to gongfu tea propels her business. In fact, Shan does not focus on gongfu tea in general, but rather specializes in dan cong oolongs in particular. She is, perhaps, "America's only specialist in dan cong". Her niche-within-a-niche business model and her incredibly deep knowledge on a specific subject prove to be an irresistibly interesting combination.

Farther north, in the Bay area, there's Roy Fong, who operates the three Imperial Tea Court teahouses, and Winnie Yu, owner of Teance. Born in Hong Kong, Fong began a tea importing business when he wasn't able to find in Chinatown the high-quality teas used to practice gongfu in his native Hong Kong. Being one of the pioneers of the tea

movement in San Francisco, Fong is considered the "grandfather of the tea movement in the Bay Area."²² In fact, Fong has brought a love of high-quality tea to many other people. The American Tea Masters Association, an exclusive club of tea connoisseurs, was founded with the assistance of Fong.²³ Frank Murphy, known as "Mr. Tea" in his home state of New Mexico, studied under the tutelage of Fong after discovering pu'er.²⁴ Although she has not made such a large splash in the Bay Area tea community, Yu shares a story similar to Fong. She, too, was born in Hong Kong, and began her business by importing the teas of her home city. She considers preparing oolong tea gongfu-style to be "like listening to a great symphony,"²⁵ and her store, Teance, offers gongfu services to share the "music" with her customers.²⁶

And there are certainly countless others besides these. Fang Bai of Ohio, for instance, practices gongfu for herself, after picking up the hobby in Beijing.²⁷ A New York Times Article mentions a group of Chinese who gather in a lounge in Chinatown to play mahjong and brew tea gongfu style.²⁸

But as gongfu is spreading via Chinese diaspora, more and more Americans are coming into contact with the practice and adopting it as their own hobby. Gongfu is spreading both through teahouses that stock Chinese teas and practice gongfu as well as through social media. Blogs, forums, and other information available on the internet – such as bilingual Chinese-English tea dictionaries²⁹ – help indoctrinate non-Chinese into the cult of gongfu. Americans also learn about gongfu tea by visiting tea gardens and museums in China and Taiwan, and more and more specialty tea shops operated by Americans stock the oolongs and pu'ers used in gongfu and offer gongfu services. In fact, many tea Americans have started their own tea businesses upon being inspired by

19 Xia

20 Nguyen

21 Canton is called Guangzhou in modern romanization. It is a large city just inland of Hong Kong.

22 Wu

23 Berlin

24 Summar

25 Salat

26 Wu

27 Weber

28 Salat

29 Babelcarp, <http://www.panix.com/~perin/babelcarp.cgi> and wikiCHA, www.wikicha.com

Chinese teas. Austin Hodge founded Seven Cups, a Chinese tea store in Tuscon³⁰, after coming into contact with tea through a Chinese friend in grad school.³¹ Donald Wallis founded the American Tea Masters Association after meeting Roy Fong.³² Brian Wright founded Shan Shui Teas, an importer and online store, after learning about tea while studying abroad in Taiwan.³³

Those who practice gongfu as a hobby share similar stories. Ken Lo, a New Yorker, learned about tea while studying “with a Taiwanese-born tea master for the last dozen years.”³⁴ “Mr. Tea” learned about his passion through Roy Fong and Donald Wallis.³⁵ Will Yardley became interested in gongfu because of his Chinese inlaws; Jason Fasi found out about it in Chinatown.³⁶

What all these people share – hobbyists and professionals alike – is that they form the first generation of Americans who are experiencing gongfu for themselves. Unlike “high tea,” a habit which has been handed down for generations in Britain, gongfu tea is making its first rounds in America. As the Los Angeles Times noted, “Now a new generation of connoisseurs of Chinese tea is emerging. For many, the fascination with tea comes not from growing up with it. Rather, they are newcomers to the culture of the leaf, learning about it as outsiders.”³⁷ For these newfound practitioners of gongfu and lovers of Chinese teas, the fascination with tea lies partially in its novelty and exotic origins: “The new connoisseurs try to teach themselves about a culture they were not born into, learning Chinese and traveling to southern China’s ancient tea mountains, where they hunt for the best tea ware and perfectly aged *pu’er*, some centuries old.”³⁸ Although gongfu has not spread into popular culture, it has already taken a strong root among its early adopters. Those who have fallen in love with Chinese tea allow their passion to carry them abroad to the tea

gardens China and Taiwan, even learning Mandarin along the way, to learn more about the tea-producing regions which bear their favorite leaves. There are others who opt to study under “tea masters” instead, sometimes abroad, sometimes in the United States. Whether such pursuits are made for business or for pleasure, the catalyst is the same. Gongfu tea culture is taking hold for the first time among Americans.

8. DISCOURSE ABOUT GONGFU

Being relatively new to American society, gongfu’s image in popular consciousness is most likely to be shaped by the media’s portrayal of it. The kind of discourse and language that journalists use in describing the practice of gongfu is central to this image. Without a doubt, the media’s image of Chinese teas in general, and of gongfu in particular, is one of sophistication, complexity, and connoisseurship. Whether or not those who practice gongfu consider themselves to be connoisseurs, they cannot escape such a label, while tea vendors may have their own reasons for promoting Chinese teas as such, for instance, in order to justify high prices or create demand.

Naturally, the image of gongfu as sophisticated is not entirely unwarranted. Though there are many contributing factors, the most obvious is the fact that gongfu utilizes many specialized pieces of equipment, such as gaiwans and yixing pottery, that require some knowledge to use properly. Furthermore, Yixing teapots in particular have been exposed in America as being expensive, artisanal artifacts, since the most exposure Yixing has towards Americans is through museums, books, and specialized teashops. Oolong and pu’er have also gained a reputation as being rare and expensive, with some newspapers reporting on the exorbitant prices the highest quality teas can fetch. And less obviously, gongfu is also becoming slowly institutionalized. For instance, there now exists a college in Toronto that offers a “tea sommelier” program, meant to parallel wine sommelier programs,³⁹ while a hotel in New York hired a tea

30 Seven Cups also operated a Denver location which closed in February 2012.

31 Cook

32 Berlin

33 Black

34 Salat

35 Summar

36 Xia

37 Xia

38 Xia

39 “George brown college graduates first tea sommeliers”

sommelier to serve gongfu tea to its patrons.⁴⁰ Such moves associate gongfu with a sophisticated culinary culture. Despite these recent developments, gongfu remains largely an unorganized and informal practice.

But though gongfu-style tea is not highly institutionalized, discourse about it follows certain trends. The discussion of Chinese tea follows many different types of tea aficionados. On the one hand, there are marketers, who try to sell tea by advertising its health benefits, low price. There are journalists who try to frame gongfu tea as a kind of living cultural artifact and a domain of connoisseurs. There are collectors or investors, who focus on tea as a commodity. There are the consumers, who focus on the flavor and the experience of drinking tea. Interestingly, much of the discourse following these separate groups follows similar patterns, focusing on certain aspects of tea, and using similar vocabulary.

Taking a look at a few newspaper articles about gongfu and those who practice it, the language used in the headlines alone already convey an image about gongfu:

- Consumed by their passion for rare Chinese teas⁴¹
- Artisan teahouses offer tastes to rival the complexity of fine wine⁴²
- At Tea Habitat, tea connoisseurship is taken to the extreme⁴³
- Elite Teas⁴⁴
- Serious teapots for serious drinkers⁴⁵

The tone of these headlines is almost uniform. They convey tea as *rare*, *complex*, *elite*, and so on, while those who drink it are *serious*, *passionate*, *connoisseurs*. Of the kinds of journalistic pieces which introduce readers to the practice of gongfu and the teas, teawares, and tea lovers associated with it, there are several varieties. There are pieces that focus on teahouses that sell tea and there are pieces that focus on interesting personalities who

take gongfu tea as their hobby. Both of these pieces tend to occur in local, culinary, and cultural sections of newspapers. Then there are also pieces that focus on the prices of teas and teawares, and usually the high end of the marketplaces receive the most attention from media. Although there are several different journalistic approaches to studying gongfu, all convey a very similar image through similar vocabulary.

One of the most common images of gongfu is borne out of the analogy between gongfu tea and wine. This comparison is so ubiquitous, in fact, that it merits further study.

9. TEA ANALOGIES

In Western culture, tea does not compare with wine. Tea is a pick-me-up, often billed as an alternative to coffee⁴⁶, with teabags and tins of loose tea lining the aisles of grocery stores next to bags of ground coffee beans, while masala chai and iced tea are served alongside lattes and espressos at cafes and restaurants. Yet, as Westerners first come into contact with Chinese gongfu tea, analogies to wine are immediately formed; coffee is not an appropriate comparison for this kind of tea. Of course, tea is not an alcoholic beverage; like coffee, tea is caffeinated; in content, tea might be more similar to coffee than wine. Yet, wine and gongfu tea, according to Americans, are similar beverages. The reason is not because the beverages themselves taste similar or contain similar chemical compounds; instead, it is because tea and wine are similar in the way they are savored and in the culture and connoisseurship associated with them. Comparisons between tea and wine arise even within the established gongfu tea community. For instance, on the English-language TeaChat forum, pages of discussion and debate concerning the advantages and limitations of comparing tea to wine have emerged.⁴⁷ Though such discussions

⁴⁰ Fabricant, "Teatime enters international zone"

⁴¹ Xia

⁴² Wu

⁴³ Nguyen

⁴⁴ Berlin

⁴⁵ Kolesnikov-Jessop

⁴⁶ See Bierma, "Two for Tea," for two examples in Chicago. Fueled by the sales of Tazo teas at Starbucks, tea and herbal brews are quickly spreading to the coffee crowd.

⁴⁷ See TeaChat.com. TeaChat is a popular forum for tea drinkers both occasional and serious. It is hosted by the American tea distributor Adagio Teas (adagio.com). Searching for "wine" yields many posts comparing tea

demonstrate that tea and wine have many parallel features, merchants and journalists are not only motivated to liken gongfu tea to wine simply because the two share many features. Rather, this comparison has other advantages in introducing gongfu tea to a Western audience, for instance, it frames the discussion of gongfu cha in terms already familiar to Americans, who likely know at least a small amount about wine culture. Although gongfu tea is relatively new to American culture, the tea/wine comparison lends the culture of gongfu a similar reputation to the one the culture of wine has built up over centuries.

The following quotes are drawn from recent articles found in major American newspapers. They write about tea shops and tea lovers. Most of the following were written by the journalists themselves, rather than spoken by those whom the journalist was writing about.

*"The world of artisan teas in many ways parallels fine wines. The cognoscenti resemble wine connoisseurs, developing discriminating palates to appreciate the teas, and using a language that parallels wine appreciation -- vintages, single estates, harvest time and method, not to mention all the descriptors for the taste of tea, such as acid, tannins, weight, fruit, earth aromas and mineral characteristics."*⁴⁸

*"The aftertaste lingers like that of a wine."*⁴⁹

*"For Chinese tea, [gongfu] means knowing leaves the way a sommelier knows Bordeaux, mastering the subtle art of multiple steeps and appreciating the facets of flavor that result."*⁵⁰

*"If oolong were wine, it would be pinot noir, merlot and cabernet sauvignon rolled up into one. Premium oolongs are prepared whole leaf and parsed like a first growth by varietal, maker and terroir."*⁵¹

and wine. For a specific example of a discussion of tea and wine, see the middle and end of the thread "Good quality Yancha" here: <http://www.teachat.com/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=16636>

48 Wu

49 Berlin

50 Salat

51 Salat

*"With wine you want some acidity, you want some tannins in your mouth. Same idea with tea."*⁵²

*"...the bouquet and flavor of tea by the Gongfu method is savored in much the same manner as a vintage wine."*⁵³

*"We grew up with tea, just as Westerners grew up with wine..."*⁵⁴

*"...pu'er, the aged Chinese tea that, like wine, is often known by region and vintage."*⁵⁵

*"In China, the culture of tea is as multifarious, as serious and as discerning as European wine culture."*⁵⁶

*"A connoisseur is more of a personal thing. He may or may not have his palate trained. It's like wine tasting."*⁵⁷

*"This is the equivalent of having someone bring out a bottle of Dom Perignon."*⁵⁸

According to Kan Yang, there are tea drinkers and then there are those who practice Chinese tea culture. The first group simply consumes the beverage while the latter buys, brews, serves, and savors tea like connoisseurs of fine wine.⁵⁹

The intended audience for these articles, and these statements in particular, is the readership of the newspaper, that is to say, the general American populace. Since most of the articles are intended to introduce and educate the reader about gongfu, the shops that sell related teas and instruments, and the people who practice it, this implies that the reason for choosing to compare tea to wine is due to some particular efficacy in the comparison.

52 Salat. Speaker here is Sebastian Beckwith, "a founder of In Pursuit of Tea, an artisanal tea importer."

53 Pritchett

54 Black. Speaker here is Bum Shik Shin, a "tea sommelier" who was born in Korea.

55 Dicum

56 Fuchsia

57 Summar. Speaker here is Frank Murphy, mentioned in previous sections.

58 Summar. Speaker here is Frank Murphy.

59 Harris

Indeed, as these comparisons suggest, tea and wine do share much in common. From the vernacular of the tea literate to the practice of collecting and intentionally aging tea to the historical association of tea with religious institutions, tea shares many remarkable similarities with its distant cousin from the West. Of course, like any other analogy, there are limits to what can be gleaned from comparing tea to wine. However, as an introduction to nature of gongfu tea as well as the habits of its practitioners, wine can do a great deal of explanatory work.

Perspective: Tea Seller

For a tea merchant, there are more ways to sell a tea than with its flavor or aroma. For Americans, the allure of many exotic teas lies in its history and cultural importance. Over-the-top stories about the history of tea help not only to generate demand for the tea but also to entrench the tea within consumers' minds.

In terms of their actual history, however, tea and wine do share many common points. Both were discovered in the pre-historic era, and both were valued for their medicinal benefits. Most interestingly, both tea and wine began to serve important functions in institutional religion during the medieval period. Wine became part of the Eucharist in Catholic Mass, and abbeys and monasteries tended their own vineyards and supplied the wine for the service. During the Tang dynasty in China, tea was associated with Buddhism, especially the Chan (Zen) sect. Tea was valuable for its ability to keep monks awake during long periods of meditation. Because of this, the popularity of tea was disseminated throughout China by Buddhism,⁶⁰ giving rise to the phrase "Chan and tea have the same taste."⁶¹ Still today, wine plays a role in Catholic ceremony while cups of tea are popular offerings at temples in the East.

The power of a name alone can often be enough to sell a tea or wine. Many Chinese are familiar with the names Da Hong Pao or Tie Guanyin. Both of these teas have a reputation that

follows their name, opening the door for fakes and imitations. For instance, Da Hong Pao, being such a famous varietal, is frequently faked, similarly to how Lafite wines are faked in China.⁶² As one article in the Wall Street Journal noted, "As with many other coveted products in the freewheeling Chinese marketplace, however, there are now plenty of counterfeits swirling around. Unscrupulous suppliers have been packaging lower-quality oolong as Da Hong Pao, or enhancing low-quality leaves with chemical additives."⁶³ The appetite for specific types of teas and wines is enormous, leading producers to not only carefully label their product, whether to give it a famous name or to differentiate it from other products that might be mistaken for it. The result is a proliferation of names. The varieties of teas and wines are countless; despite this, certain varieties are well-known even outside of tea and wine circles, and quality products are never sold without listing their specific name or variety. To sell tea or wine, it is not enough to label the product as a "red wine from Napa Valley" or "Dan Cong from Guangdong": instead, these are sold as "Cabernet Sauvignon" or "Milan Xiang Dan Cong". Specific names carry much weight in tea and wine circles, and for this reason, it is imperative that tea and wine carry identifying names.

And like in the wine world, certain tea-growing regions are much more famous than others. Teas produced in Wuyi, for instance, command high prices due to the name "Wuyi", much in the same way that Bordeaux and Burgundy wines carry a reputation. Such reputations, naturally, are deserved – Wuyi tea is not famous for tasting poor. Famous tea- and wine-growing regions built up their reputations over centuries. Wuyi, for instance, is known for producing imperial tribute tea during the Ming dynasty. Well-known apocryphal stories also help lend extra mystique and allure to famous names. According to stories, in 1972, 200 grams of da hong pao – almost half of that year's harvest – Chairman Mao gifted to President Nixon, cementing its reputation in the modern age⁶⁴. Da hong pao is said to get its name

60 Benn, 214-215

61 Benn, 215. In Chinese, the phrase is *chán chá yī wèi* 禪茶一味.

62 Basteau

63 Sala

64 This story – and many other fictional ones of a similar nature – can be found floating around in the tea

from a scholar who clothed the namesake tea bush in his red robe after the tea cured his illness⁶⁵. Another story claims the name comes from a Ming dynasty emperor, who clothed the bushes in red scholar's robes when the tea cured his mother of high cholesterol.⁶⁶ These and other such stories build the image of certain teas and wines in the collective cultural consciousness, separating the famous teas and wines from the countless common varieties floating around in marketplaces.

Perspective: Tea Drinker

Wine and tea enthusiasts exhibit similar behavior. Just as wine enthusiasts can tour the vineyards of Napa Valley, tea tourism in China and Taiwan is also a budding industry. Tea plantations in Hangzhou and Wuyi are bona fide tourist attractions, complete with museums and gift shops. There are tea magazines and wine magazines; communities of bloggers discuss their hobbies on the internet and share tasting notes. The things that matter to enthusiasts of both ilks are surprisingly alike.

As one of the excerpts above suggests, the ways both tea and wine connoisseurs describe their respective beverages are quite similar. The same

community. For instance, a Google search for "Nixon Da Hong Pao" returns thousands of results, most of which are versions of this story; it also appears on the Da Hong Pao Wikipedia page (as of April 2012), in the documentary "Tea Culture in the Wuyi Mountains", and in two articles from the Wall Street Journal cited in this paper, "Anyone for \$2,160 Tea?" and "Selling Tea to China." However, this story is most likely a myth. Department of State records, news reports from 1972, scholarly and journalistic books about Nixon's trip to China, biographies of Nixon and other sources show no records of Mao's gift, and the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum has no record of this gift either, although there are records of Nixon receiving Long Jing (Dragonwell) and Jasmine green teas while in Hangzhou.

⁶⁵ Tea Culture in the Wuyi Mountains. This documentary, produced by CCTV, focuses on Da Hong Pao, the most famous tea produced in the Wuyi region. It's available as a four-part series narrated in Mandarin or a single abridged 23-minute documentary narrated in English.

⁶⁶ Sala

things are important: aroma, mouthfeel, thickness, taste, finish, aftertaste, and so on. To the uninitiated, such things may seem rather trivial, especially since flavor isn't always the strong point of an excellent tea or wine. For instance, tea lovers might praise the *qi* of a tea as being calming, soothing, or relaxing.

But when it does come to flavor, tea and wine enthusiasts look for similar characteristics. Flavor can be objective or scientific, such as tannin content or acidity. In tea, level of caffeination is important; for wine, alcohol content. And as noted above, more subjective things such as astringency or bitterness as well as mineral, fruit, floral, and woody flavors are something to take note of. Sometimes, tea and wine critics come across as enthusiastically silly in their descriptions. For example, the stereotypical wine bottle label seems rather cryptic and oddly specific: *notes of elderberries and walnut tree bark*. What in the world is an elderberry? Do people really taste the bark of walnut trees? But in the tea world, a similar phenomenon occurs. One tea enthusiast describes his pu'er as having "the burned onion on the bottom of a bagel taste."⁶⁷

Perspective: Tea Investor

Moving beyond the experience of drinking tea, there are many other factors that add value to both tea and wine. While on the one hand, there are enthusiasts who care most about subtle and complex flavors, on the other there are also communities of collectors and investors who buy and sell tea and wine of impossibly high prices. For such people, the world of tea and wine is far more complex than a few adjectives describing a beverage's sensory merit. In this domain, tea and wine are close cousins.

For instance, on a basic level, the same four pieces of information are used to describe and identify both tea and wine: vintage, location, and type. The fourth, the name of the producer, is only reserved for pu'er within the tea world; oolong teas are often grown and processed by small farmers and producers to be re-sold, and so their precise origins are usually not identified. All four of

⁶⁷ Xia

these pieces of information are important to identifying and legitimizing the beverage which bears their label. Missing information degrades the price of the tea and its reputation.

Like in the wine world, the vintage of tea is a major contributing factor to its desirability and price. For both, some growing seasons are better than others. 2011, for instance, has the reputation among tea-lovers as being a relatively poor year for Chinese tea, while 2009 was great for French wine. In Beijing, restaurants offer pu'er lists, "which display prized vintages like a wine list."⁶⁸ Furthermore, teas and wines of particularly old vintages are especially valued. Oolongs, and to a much greater degree, pu'ers, tend to improve with age – but only in proper storage conditions, again, like wine. Young sheng pu'er is often purchased by aficionados who do not intend to enjoy the tea right away, but instead to store it for five, ten, twenty or more years before pulling it out again and brewing. If the tea is drunk young, it is often only to judge its potential to age well. In the same way that aged wines go to the auction block at Sotheby's, well-stored old sheng pu'er can also command incredible prices in the marketplace. While young cakes less than a few years old sell for under \$100, hundred-year-old cakes can fetch prices above \$10,000, and older cakes even more.⁶⁹ Because of this, collecting tea to store is common practice in climates that are appropriate for aging tea, such as in Hong Kong.

And like wine, tea can come with more than one date. Though the year of harvest of grapes or tea leaves is more important, sometimes the time of production comes quite later and is also mentioned. For pu'er, this is especially true when a factory purchases maocha that has been sitting around for several years, waiting for a seller, and blends it into a new batch. However, oolongs, which must be processed in a certain amount of time after harvest, only carry the year of their harvest, and not the time of production, on their label.

The practice of combining grapes or tea leaves from different harvests is not unheard of either. While, in the wine world, this produces a non-vintage wine, in the pu'er world, this produces a

"blended recipe," which, like wine, is produced with a focus on the taste of the final product rather than on the pedigree of the source material.

But there is one piece of information related to vintage that tea carries that wine does not bear: the time of year of the harvest. In Southern China, there are three major tea-picking seasons, in order of their desirability: Spring, Autumn, and Summer. Material from the spring harvest is most valued. This is true not just for the oolongs and pu'ers used in gongfu practice but also for almost every type of tea, especially Japanese greens. However, when combined with the year of harvest, this bit of information serves the same purpose as vintage in wine.

Another important piece of information to both tea and wine is the location of the plant. In the wine world, the effect of the location of the vine, including the geography, climate, ecosystem, soil composition, and even the nuances of the local culture is referred to as *terroir*⁷⁰, and a similar concept applies to tea. The general idea is that plants from regions with different terroir will produce a beverage with different flavors, even if the varieties of the plant and the processing methods are the same. In a broad sense, terroir is very important to tea lovers. High mountain oolongs, such as those produced in Taiwan, are more valued than their lower-elevation counterparts. The oolongs produced in the Wuyi region of Fujian province are valued for the mineral taste imparted by the rocky soil in which the tea plants grow – which lends Wuyi teas their nickname of *yan cha*, meaning "rock tea". And in the pu'er producing region of Yunnan province, the so-called "six famous tea mountains" of Xishuangbanna prefecture each carry their own taste profile.

Because of the historical ties between certain types of wines and the regions which produced them, there are many types of wine which cannot be labelled as that type unless the wine was produced in the proper region. For instance, Bordeaux can only be called as such if it actually comes from the Bordeaux region in France, and similarly with Champagne, and so on. A similar phenomenon has occurred with tea. pu'er can only come from Yunnan, for instance. In fact, pu'er is

68 Kuo

69 Kuo

70 Unwin

named for the prefecture from which it originates. Proper Da Hong Pao can only be produced from the six “mother bushes” growing in the sides of a cliff in Wuyi. However, those bushes are now protected and no longer harvested, and instead, clone bushes made from clippings of the mother plants produce the closest thing to true Da Hong Pao. Despite this, there are many producers who sell their teas as “Da Hong Pao”, even if the tea does not come from a clone bush or even from the Wuyi area⁷¹. Like in France, Chinese producers will try to take advantage of the repute of famous growing regions to sell product from outside that region.

Likewise, bottles of wine and cakes of pu'er tea also bear labels of the vineyard or factory which produced them. Menghai, originally operated by the state during the era of hard-line communism in China, produced a distinctive label identifying its products. Today, there are countless producers large and small pressing cakes of pu'er and selling the product under their own label. Likewise, every bottler also affixes their own, distinctive label to the wine they sell.

These four pieces of information not only serve to identify products, but they also build reputation and prestige of specific kinds of tea and wine from certain locations. Thus, tea connoisseurs, like wine connoisseurs, use these pieces of information as their guide in their respective worlds, seeking out products from reputable places and varieties with famous names. This creates a burgeoning demand for wines and teas of specific varieties from specific places and times which drives up prices of a small number of specific products. As a result, a kind of speculative market emerges, in which collectors purchase young wines or teas, hoping that demand – and price – for that particular vintage will rise in the future, allowing an investor to turn a profit. This practice has been common in wine circles for some time; now, as gongfu tea enters the Western world, an increasing number of Westerners are importing cakes of pu'er for long-term storage.

However, as the Wall Street Journal has observed, the practice of purchasing tea as an investment is not only limited to Westerners. As China's economy has grown recently, private financial investors have begun purchasing reputable tea and wine, not for storage, but in lieu

of more traditional investments such as real estate or stocks. In three separate booms, demand for pu'er⁷², da hong pao⁷³, and Bordeaux⁷⁴ have surged. According to the Wall Street Journal, “The dahongpao phenomenon mirrors in exaggerated form the burgeoning demand in China for high-end French wines. In both cases, high prices suggest buyers aren't in it for the sipping pleasure but instead are purchasing the beverages as an investment.” In the same way that privately owned wine cellars store wine not meant to be drunk, but to be sold, so tea collectors are also building stores of pu'er and oolongs as investments.

That demand oolong and pu'er tea can rise so high that tea becomes a tradable commodity is testament to the perceived value of tea. In the eyes of tea collectors, tea is inherently valuable. Partially, this comes from the demand for high-quality tea. Of course, the most expensive and coveted of teas are not purchased to be consumed, so the value of these teas comes not from their flavor or their aroma or any other particular quality, but rather from their pedigree. Certain vintages are valuable because of particularly good harvests or exceptional age, but like in the wine world, some teas command higher prices than others simply because the name they bear carries more weight.

Wine/Tea Comparisons

In these terms, tea and wine make reasonable analogues. While one is a depressant and the other is a stimulant, it is the other aspects of these drinks that are much closer together. Gongfu tea and wine enthusiasts discuss their hobbies in very similar terms. On both sides, there are those who are interested in taste and other sensory aspects, and there are also collectors and investors who are concerned with things such as pedigree and history which influence prices of teas and wines. The vocabulary for these two types of enthusiasts are almost the same; categories such as “finish” and “vintage” are common to both the tea and wine worlds.

71 Chin

72 Kuo

73 Chin

74 Ma, Amy. “Why the Chinese Love Lafite.”

But besides the efficiency in explaining the nature of gongfu tea to an uninformed audience afforded by the comparison to wine, there are other reasons for using wine as a comparison. The danger of using the traditional counterpart to tea in America, coffee, is that this risks suggesting that gongfu tea is something like the coffee available in Starbucks on every street corner – popular, easy to obtain, common, trite. To be fair, there does exist a community of coffee connoisseurs who seek out uncommon products, but thanks to the explosion of cafes and coffee shops similar to Starbucks, this is not the image of coffee in the collective cultural consciousness. So instead of coffee, a different comparison is necessitated.

Wine fits the bill, not just for the reasons discussed above, but for several other reasons as well. Aside from the mere similarity between the two beverages, there appear to be several types of motivations for shifting discussion of tea away from coffee and towards wine, for instance:

- to provide American consumers with a familiar point of comparison to better understand gongfu tea
- to distinguish gongfu tea, a beverage similar to wine, from mainstream American tea, a beverage similar to coffee
- to establish gongfu tea as a complex and sophisticated beverage
- to demonstrate that there exists a culture of connoisseurship associated with gongfu tea

To American audiences, gongfu tea is totally unfamiliar. Though tea has been consumed in the Western world for hundreds of years, the culture of gongfu tea within America has mostly been confined to Chinese diaspora. In other places outside of China, such as Malaysia, tea is already an established business with mature markets for Chinese teas, especially pu'er, since Malaysia is not only a good place to store and age pu'er but also relatively close to southern Yunnan where most pu'er is manufactured.⁷⁵ On the other hand, gongfu tea has only reached Americans relatively recently. As merchants and vendors spread gongfu tea to a wider audience, the world of gongfu must be

introduced to those who are totally unfamiliar with it.

One way to accomplish this is by couching the unfamiliar in familiar terms. In this case, by talking about gongfu tea by using wine as a proxy, a new and strange drink can be explained as if it were already embedded in American culture. Wine is ubiquitous. It's sold in almost every liquor store; restaurants frequently offer wine lists; Napa Valley is a household name. As one tea expert explained, "Westerners grew up with wine."⁷⁶ To compare gongfu tea with a drink that is equally exotic, such as Japanese sake or South American maté, would be less than productive. Although there are cultures of connoisseurship associated with many beverages, alcoholic or otherwise, few other drinks seem so strongly associated with sophistication and cognoscenti. There are beer lovers who seek out high-quality microbrews, the light lagers produced by enormous breweries dominate the American market; ads for Budweiser and Coors are ubiquitous on television. But wine is different.

To Americans, wine conjures up many images – the seemingly endless variety of reds and whites at the liquor store, for instance, or the absurd prices some wines fetch. Furthermore, the people associated with wine culture tend not to be casual drinkers. Wine lovers tend to be yuppies or high society, well-versed in food and drink, and some even store wines in privately-owned wine cellars. Restaurants that cater to this kind of crowd hire their own private sommeliers, wine experts who spend years mastering the art of pairing wine with food. This is the sort of image which jumps to mind when Americans think of wine, and it's the same image that these comparisons are meant to invoke.

Because of this, comparing gongfu tea to fine wine promotes the image of gongfu tea as a connoisseur's beverage. Phrases such as "The cognoscenti resemble wine connoisseurs," "[gongfu] means knowing leaves the way a sommelier knows Bordeaux," and "the bouquet and flavor of tea by the Gongfu method is savored in much the same manner as a vintage wine" all suggest that practicing gongfu tea requires a great deal of skill and knowledge in the same way that sommeliers must spend years studying wine. Indeed, like connoisseurs of so many other foods

75 Tan

76 Black

and drinks, gongfu enthusiasts do spend time, money, and effort mastering the craft of brewing tea.⁷⁷ Gongfu is not the means to an end, for instance, a caffeine fix, nor is it a quick refreshment. For those who love and appreciate oolongs and pu'ers, tea is something worth studying and savoring in and of itself, since tea is complex and rewarding in the same way that every wine has a different personality. This aspect of gongfu tea is brought out by the analogies to wine.

The wine comparison is chosen in lieu of tea's usual counterpart in the United States, coffee. This is a "coffee nation"⁷⁸ fueled by powerhouse chains such as Starbucks. Coffee is strongly associated with the fast-paced urban corporate life, something that tea lovers tend to dissociate themselves from. Practicing the art of gongfu tea is "tea as meditation," as one journalist described it.⁷⁹ There are coffee lovers who likely treat their practice as meditation as well. Those who are enthusiastic about espresso, to pick one example, probably approach coffee like gongfu tea lovers approach tea. But for so many people, "espresso" is simply one of the options on Starbuck's menu, not a sophisticate's beverage. Unlike the coffee comparison, the wine comparison immediately suggests a different kind of approach to the beverage.

The appearance of gongfu tea in America in recent years is due to the rise of popularity of tea in general. But whereas some teas appear next to coffee on the menus of cafes and coffee shops, gongfu tea occupies a totally different market. It's enjoyed by those who go out to specialized teahouses, or else those who buy tea to drink by themselves or with friends at home. This is the reason that coffee drops out of favor when journalists describe gongfu tea. The wine analogy that takes its place is particularly telling. On one hand, tea and wine do share many remarkable similarities. They are parsed by vintage, growing location, and so on. They serve as investments and collectible goods in addition to serving as beverages. But the comparison between gongfu tea and wine is also very telling about the way in which tea lovers appreciate their drink of choice.

For those who practice gongfu tea, tea is "meditation," that is, an art or a practice.

As drinking too much wine causes drunkenness, so drinking too much tea can cause "tea drunkenness". There even exists an online multilingual forum called "TeaDrunk" especially dedicated to gongfu enthusiasts.⁸⁰ Perhaps this is the real reason tea and wine make for such an apt comparison.

10. YIXING POTTERY AND GONGFU TEA

Besides focusing on tea and tea drinkers, there are other aspects of gongfu tea that also carry images of connoisseurship in America. The utensils used in gongfu, for instance, being so different from Western tea utensils, are bound to draw attention. And when discussing Chinese tea, the small, unglazed stoneware teapots produced in Yixing, a town west of Shanghai, cannot be ignored. These pots have a long history, dating back to the Ming dynasty, and were some of the world's first teapots.

For practicing gongfu, a special kind of Yixing pot is often used: "The very tiny ones, being intended for *Kung-Fu* [gongfu] tea, look as though they have been made for doll's tea parties, for the principle is that the smaller the pot the less will the subtle aroma be dispersed; moreover, as large pots are not emptied by one pouring, the tea leaves tend to stew."⁸¹ These kinds of pots designed for gongfu, which can range from a thimble-sized 40 or 50 milliliters in volume to a much larger 200 milliliters for serving multiple people, are almost as important to gongfu as the tea itself, and certainly the prices these pots carry are reflective of that fact. To tea lovers, Yixing pots are valued not just for their small, practical size; a teapot made from quality clay can greatly enhance the flavor and aroma of a tea.

However, Yixing pots are not only tools for brewing teas, they are also a medium of art. Artists sculpt teapots to resemble a variety of things, from mythical creatures to tree trunks. Jiang Rong, a 20th century potter, was well-known for her teapots in

⁷⁷ More about this below.

⁷⁸ Bierma

⁷⁹ Salat

⁸⁰ teadrunk.org

⁸¹ Blofeld 180

the shapes of fruit such as melons and pumpkins. Other teapots, though sculpted in more traditional, practical shapes, gain reputation for being inscribed by famous calligraphers or carved by renowned artists. One such teapot, crafted by a master potter and featuring a famous poem inscribed by a master calligrapher and images of bamboo carved by a master painter, recently sold for almost \$2 million at an auction in Beijing.⁸² Such teapots, though they might modeled after classic shapes, are likely not used to brew tea, but rather serve as pieces of fine art. These teapots turn practical tool into medium for artistic expression.

Yixing Pottery in America

As with tea, Yixing pottery production was limited during the Cultural revolution. Combined with the Cold-War era trade embargo between China and the United States, Yixing pottery has been extremely difficult to come by in America until recent years. However, Yixing pottery is slowly starting to enter into American cultural awareness. For instance, large tea chains such as Adagio and Teavana now sell Yixing-esque or Yixing-inspired pottery. However, authentic Yixing teapots can still be hard to find, since some of the original mines near Yixing have run out of clay, and some of the factories that produced pottery twenty or thirty years ago have since shut down. Other areas, such as Chaozhou, have begun producing teapots made in a very similar style and out of a similar clay in order to meet demand. Although such pots are not from Yixing, due to their nearly identical form and function, they tend to be referred to as Yixing anyway. Thus, in America at least, “Yixing teapots” have come to refer to Chinese stoneware pots in general, the kind often used for gongfu brewing, since, far from the source as America is, the precise origins of these pots is not always easy to ascertain.

Since Yixing teapots can be either practical tea tool or work of art, so American exposure to Yixing pottery also comes through one of those two channels. On the one hand, teashops are beginning

to sell Yixing pots to accompany their growing selection of Chinese teas; on the other hand, museums also display Yixing pots as examples of authentic Chinese crafts. In both cases, American media portrays these teapots as objects of connoisseurship, in a similar vein to Chinese teas and the practice of gongfu. Unlike in Hong Kong, where street vendors peddle Yixing – or more likely, fake Yixing – along with miniature majiang sets and other bric-a-brac, Yixing is found mostly in more upscale stores and exhibits. One importer of Yixing explained, “We used to sell to a handful of large museum shops. In recent years our market has expanded to many tea shops, high-end department stores and catalogs.”⁸³ Yixing in America is still a luxury item, reserved for those who know where to look, but the appetite for Yixing is expanding. That availability of Yixing is relatively limited and that media imagines Yixing as a tool used only by connoisseurs are surely related; whether one is the genesis of the other is difficult to say.

Yixing as a Brewing Device

Because artistic Yixing pots are rarer and more expensive than their more practically-oriented siblings, it should make sense that the latter attracts less attention. And as the number of tea drinkers in America rises, the demand for practical pots that produce a good cup of tea is also increasing. For such people, Yixing is not an entry-level product, nor is it something for those who dabble in tea. Instead, Yixing is the domain of connoisseurs.

The value of Yixing for tea drinkers lies in the benefits it brings to the experience of drinking tea, rather than any merit the pots might have as historical, artistic, or cultural artifacts. According to the media, these benefits are only truly appreciated by those who are dedicated to their hobby. “When it comes to serious tea drinking, many connoisseurs swear by Yixing teapots: nothing else will do,” writes one journalist,⁸⁴ while another comments, “Yixing teapots are for

⁸² “How a Chinese Teapot Fetched \$2 Million”; also Kolesnikov-Jessop

⁸³ Pritchett, “Where to find Yixing teapots”

⁸⁴ Kolesnikov-Jessop

perfectionists.”⁸⁵ These pots are not for casual enthusiasts. One commonly cited reason for this is the special attention Yixing pots require to utilize their full potential. If one is to appreciate a variety of teas, for instance, only using one pot will not do: “A connoisseur will brew only one type of tea in each pot to avoid muddying the flavor.”⁸⁶ It takes a trained eye and palette to match different kinds of Yixing pots to the types of tea to which they are most suited, which could be off-putting for Westerners who are not familiar with the wide variety of Chinese teas at all. The right combination of tea and pot can enhance the flavors of the tea, especially as the pot is seasoned with use. It's for this reason that some claim that “Yixing teapots as superior to all other types for brewing [tea].” It's the particular clay from the Yixing area which helps these pots gain their unique status. Another journalist noted that “Connoisseurs think that the best cup of tea is brewed in a small Chinese teapot made from the “purple sand” found near the Yangzi River,”⁸⁷ referring to a kind of Yixing pot called “Zisha.” Beyond this, teapots must be kept clean carefully; like cast-iron cookware, they are not meant to be washed with soap and water, and teapot buyers must be careful to remove coatings, used to help sell pots by improving their appearance, before brewing tea in the pot.⁸⁸ Because of these factors, Westerners tend to view Yixing pots as pots for experienced and knowledgeable tea drinkers who are willing to spend the money and effort to acquire and properly take care of them.

There is also some sense in which using a Yixing teapot to brew tea is not just a method of tea brewing but also of tapping into an exotic and underappreciated culture. The town of Yixing is about as far from American teahouses, both in a spatial and cultural sense, as it is possible to get. The status of Yixing as representative of Chinese tea stems from its history and refinement: “The combination of refined workmanship and literati taste elevated a utilitarian pottery product into a cultural symbol,” remarked one Chinese Yixing

expert.⁸⁹ Thus, the use of Yixing to brew tea not only implies a sense of knowledge regarding the way tea interacts with the pottery, but also regarding the way these pots represent a foreign culture.

Yixing as Art Form

As a medium for art, Yixing has a long and rich history. During the Cultural Revolution, this art form, like so many others, was purged, while artists and potters were reassigned to production of the strikingly utilitarian pots that remain popular for gongfu practice today. However, Yixing as an artistic medium is making a resurgence in both the East and the West. The revival of this art brings both modern and classic pieces of Yixing art into the the awareness of Americans.

These pots attract attention both for the high prices they fetch at auction and also for exhibits in museums featuring new and old Yixing art. The sale of a modern pot for \$2 million at a Chinese auction drew attention to the world of collectible Yixing, and brought focus upon Yixing pots selling at Western auctions for prices in the tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, museum exhibitions educate Americans about a foreign art. One such exhibit in Manhattan focused on Qing-dynasty teapots as well as wine vessels.⁹¹ While the pieces themselves were examples of fine art, well-crafted and inscribed with calligraphy, the exhibit also introduced the use of Yixing in brewing gongfu-style tea. These exhibits introduce Yixing as an artistic form, suggesting that appreciation of Yixing pottery requires an art critic's discerning eye.

One modern potter responsible for bringing the medium of Yixing to the Western art world is Ah Leon, a native of Taiwan. Although his pots are far larger than the usual “hand-sized” teapots used for gongfu, the artistic realism of his pieces calls to mind the teapots of past artisans. Another potter, a Westerner named Richard Notkin, uses Yixing as an inspiration to craft small, intimate pots. These two are partially responsible for introducing the

85 Nguyen, “Magic Pots”

86 Kolsenikov-Jessop

87 Pritchett, “Yixing Teapots”

88 Stinchecum

89 Moonan

90 Kolesnikov-Jessop

91 Moonan

term "Yixing" to an American audience. Recently, these two potters took a small group of Western ceramicists on a visit to Yixing to learn the techniques of the potters there and to bridge the gap between Eastern and Western traditions of manufacturing teapots.⁹² This symposium, the first of its kind, is an important step towards bringing Yixing pottery into the cultural awareness of Westerners.

11. CONCLUSION

Gongfu tea, being relatively new to America, is an expanding market. It appears to follow along with other trends in America, including the recent health craze and the boom in the tea industry. In a social sense, gongfu tea fills some kind of niche which appears to be available in America, while following along with cultural dissemination between China and the United States. As gongfu spreads, it becomes a practice no longer limited to Chinese diaspora and Chinese teashops. The emergence of gongfu into a wider cultural awareness suggests that some recognize gongfu not as a strictly Chinese practice, but rather as a style of appreciating tea which can be adapted to different situations and adopted by tea lovers of different backgrounds.

While popularity of tea surges in the United States, gongfu is sure to follow along with it. However, for the time being, gongfu is still viewed as a relatively sophisticated approach to tea appreciation and tea consumption, as evidenced by the almost ubiquitous analogy between tea and wine. But since gongfu, as a method of drinking tea, does not mesh well with the high-paced, competitive, career-oriented lifestyle that seems to fuel the growth of coffee chains like Starbucks. Despite this, or perhaps because of this, there are also adopters of gongfu who view this method of brewing tea as a way to relax and dispel the pressures of modern life.

Gongfu is becoming more popular in China as well. Beijing, while not a traditional hub of tea culture, has established a massive tea mall at Maliandao, bringing gongfu into the eyes of mainstream northern Chinese culture.

Possibility for further research includes studying the emergence of gongfu as the de facto method of brewing Chinese tea, studying the different philosophies behind gongfu drinking in China and America, and linking the emergence of gongfu in America with other culinary trends such as beer, coffee, and chocolate connoisseurship.

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The Realities of Violence in Xinjiang

KEVIN PETERS

In the past decade, there has been much discussion about ethnic violence in Xinjiang. Headlines detail consistent episodes of ethnic violence between Uyghurs and Hans in the region. This thesis asks what are the realities of violence in Xinjiang? The PRC position is that terrorist organizations with connections to Central Asia are responsible for violence in Xinjiang. The PRC also argues that it faces a “long-term” terrorist threat in Xinjiang. In this thesis, I argue that perception of a long-term terrorist threat in Xinjiang has been taken beyond proportion. Instead, violence in Xinjiang has declined due to PRC policies promoting Han migration to the region. Using the Herfindahl index as a measure of ethnic diversity, I find a statistically significant relationship between ethnic diversity and violence in Xinjiang between 1998 and 2009. I also rely on the findings of other academics to justify my claims.

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government has been struggling to suppress ethnic violence in its furthest western province Xinjiang. This thesis asks what are the realities of violence in Xinjiang? Are reports of increasing violence real or imagined? PRC officials blame the violence on terrorist organizations with connections in Central Asia. They claim that China is faced with a “long-term” struggle against “terrorism” in Xinjiang (BBC News; 25 Oct, 2011). The present thesis analyzes the PRC’s position on violence in Xinjiang to present a more thorough and accurate explanation for the conflict.

In recent decades, the relationship between Beijing and the minorities in Xinjiang have been very tense. In July 2009, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) experienced a series of protests that resulted in fierce ethnic violence in its capital Urumqi. Prior to the protests, Beijing anticipated trouble in its western territories and had already moved an estimated 80,000 troops and People’s Armed Police (PAP) officers to Tibet and Xinjiang (O’Brien 2011; 391). Yet despite this massive security presence, on the evening of July 5th, 2009, Urumqi was the scene of the worst social unrest in China since the violent suppression of the 1989 student protests at Tiananmen Square (O’Brien 2011; 391).

When protests began on July 5th, the Chinese government responded by mobilizing paramilitary forces and police to end the protests (Bovingdon 2010; 168). The violence was triggered when

police attempted to disperse a large crowd, which had gathered in People’s Square to protest what they saw as the unsatisfactory handling of a violent row that had broken out thousands of miles away in a toy factory in Guangdong Province (O’Brien 2011; 391-392). As the military and the PAP patrolled the streets, what Uyghurs regarded as a “peaceful protest” quickly escalated into violence with final reports of 197 dead and 1,712 injured (Bovingdon 2010; 168).

Like the Tiananmen protests that had occurred twenty years earlier, international journalists on sight reported the crackdown and revealed graphic images in their broadcasts. The BBC reported that the XUAR government blamed separatist Uyghur activists abroad for orchestrating attacks on Han Chinese while the Uyghurs claimed that their protests were peaceful in nature and had “fallen victim to state violence with police firing indiscriminately on protestors in Urumqi (BBC News; 06 July, 2009). There has been considerable disagreement over what actually happened in July and both the Chinese government and the Uyghur diaspora have focused on representing biased accounts of the riots to appeal to an international audience (Bovingdon 2010; 170). Whether the Uyghur diaspora orchestrated attacks on Han Chinese or the Uyghur protests really were peaceful in nature does not necessarily matter except for the fact that the riots demonstrate that both groups continue to hold considerable animosity toward the other.

While the 2009 riots in Urumqi have been regarded as the worst incident of social unrest

since 1989, acts of “terrorism” and other forms of violence tend to be commonly reported in the media. The most recent of which took place on February 28th 2012. XUAR officials said that thirteen people were killed and many others wounded when nine attackers armed with knives stabbed people in a crowd in Yecheng (southwestern Xinjiang) (New York Times; 29 Feb, 2012). Afterwards, police shot dead seven attackers and captured another two (New York Times; 29 Feb, 2012). A local policeman told Agence France-Presse that most of the victims were ethnically Han, though there were some Uyghur victims as well, and that five of the attackers that were shot by police were Uyghurs (New York Times; 29 Feb, 2012).

Although tensions between Uyghurs and Hans are high and security continues to be strengthened across Xinjiang, it would be inappropriate to refer the region as a conflict zone. Yitzhak Shichor claims that while one can feel the tension between Uyghurs and Hans, “in sharp contrast to war zones of “real” separatist conflicts, such as the Palestinian West Bank, Kosovo, Sudan, and Chechnya, Xinjiang looks peaceful and quiet to the occasional visitor” (Shichor 2005; 124). James Millward also feels that the general impression of a threat escalating to crisis proportions is exaggerated as both the frequency and severity of violent activity associated with Uyghur separatism has declined since the late 1990s (Millward 2004; viii).

Nevertheless, as the 2009 riots have clearly demonstrated, the reduction of violence since 1999 is not reason enough to say that ethnic conflict in the XUAR has disappeared entirely. Though Millward may feel that the situation in Xinjiang has been inflated beyond proportion, he still mentions that there is no doubt that the Chinese government and Han citizens genuinely fear Uyghur separatist violence (Millward 2004; viii).

Xinjiang is home to thirteen major ethnic minorities, including 8.8 million Uyghurs, 7.7 million Han Chinese, 1.4 million Kazak, and 0.9 million Hui (Tsung 2009; 130). Termed “China’s Muslim Borderland” by Frederick Starr, the strong Muslim identity is apparent in Xinjiang’s landmarks and observers will see many mosques, women wearing kerchiefs, men wearing doppi, and Arabic script representing the names of shops and streets (Tsung 2009; 130). In such a diverse

region, the Chinese government has had a continuous headache in integrating the Uyghurs within the greater Chinese nation-state.

To combat separatism, the Chinese government has relied on two strategies in Xinjiang. While one strategy focuses on economic development, the other strategy focuses on increased security. In the present thesis, I argue that Beijing’s position that it faces a powerful terrorist threat with connections in Central Asia is false and lacks credibility. Analysis of the PRC’s policy toward violence in Xinjiang proves that violence in Xinjiang has gone down since the late 1990s. Therefore Beijing’s consensus that it faces a “long-term terrorist threat” in Xinjiang has been inflated beyond proportion. Because the majority of the literature written on this subject is out of date and focuses on qualitative methods, this thesis breaks new ground by employing quantitative measures to provide an updated answer to the state of violence in Xinjiang.

This thesis is organized as follows: Section 1 will address Beijing’s position that it faces terrorist opposition in Central Asia. I argue against Beijing’s stance by providing evidence that shows that the PRC has already eliminated direct opposition in Central Asia. In Section 2, I explore the realities of “terrorism” in Xinjiang. I question the validity of the PRC’s claims that violence in Xinjiang is terrorist activity with direct connections to al-Qaeda. In Section 3, I turn to ways in which the PRC has alleviated conflict in Xinjiang by discussing the Great Western Development. Section 4 introduces my research design and methods used to justify my argument that violence has gone down in Xinjiang. Section 5 examines how PRC policies have alleviated conflict through quantitative analysis. The final section concludes.

1. THE SILENCING OF THE DIASPORA

I will begin by analyzing the validity of the PRC’s claims that violent incidents in Xinjiang are terrorist attacks orchestrated by organizations in Central Asia. To the PRC’s credit, there are a number of Uyghur organizations based in Central Asia that have lobbied and received support for an independent East Turkestan (proposed Uyghur homeland) in the past. From the 1950s to the

1980s, the two main advocates for an independent Uyghur state were Muhammad Emin Bughra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin (Bovingdon 2010; 138). Together the pair popularized the cause of Uyghur independence, founded several organizations such as the National Center for the Liberation of Eastern Turkestan, and sought sympathy from many Islamic organizations across the globe (Bovingdon 2010; 138).

Having visited countries all across the globe, the two Uyghur advocates received various forms of international support. In 1972, Alptekin claimed that the Soviet Union offered him ten divisions of troops and tanks for a takeover of Xinjiang. However he declined the offer feeling that the Soviet Union was only interested because they were keen to detach Xinjiang from China (Tyler 2003; 225). Despite strong support from the Turkish government, postcolonial states, and Islamic organizations, Alptekin and Bughra (who passed away in 1965) had very little influence over China. "Until the 1970s, Beijing was relatively isolated and thus invulnerable to international sanctions, and the PRC itself had won wide support as a leader of anticolonial struggles in Asia and Africa in the 1960s, making the task of painting it as an imperialist more difficult" (Bovingdon 2010; 139).

Cross-border nationalism in Central Asia had not really become a strong force until the 1990s. This was mainly the result of the Sino-Soviet Split that occurred in 1962, whereby the Uyghur diaspora remained completely separated from Xinjiang until relations cooled between the Soviet Union and the PRC in the late 1980s (Kamalov 2009; 124). In the advent of *perestroika*, state borders became open and influenced a "shared trend within all Uyghur communities" where there was a restoration of ethnic links between the Central Asian Uyghurs and their ethnic relatives in Xinjiang (Kamalov 2009; 124).

A result of this restoration was the proliferation of many organizations with goals demanding for the establishment of an independent Uyghur state. Uyghur nationalists in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have published extensive information about the political activities of other Uyghur diaspora groups in Europe and Turkey and have worked to distribute this literature to Uyghurs from Xinjiang who visit

Central Asia to trade (Roberts 2004; 231). The Uyghur Liberation Organization in Kazakhstan registered itself as a political party in 1991 and the following year an International Uyghur Union was created, followed by a Free Uyghuristan party in Kyrgyzstan (Tyler 2003; 233). In 1998, refugee associations from Central Asia, Turkey, and Germany met in Kazakhstan and created the East Turkestan National Center (ETNC) and listed its principal aims as broadcasting the plight of Uyghurs in China, mobilizing world opinion and putting pressure on the Chinese leadership through multinational agencies such as the European Parliament, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference, and the United Nations (Tyler 2003; 233-234).

From the previous evidence, one cannot deny that the diaspora has been actively involved in the past to establish a Uyghur state. There is also evidence linking these organizations to violent activity. In April 1996, PRC reports indicate that members of the Eastern Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) were discovered smuggling weapons into Xinjiang. In September 2001, the ETLO was again discovered smuggling weapons into China. Only this time their efforts were focused on sneaking weapons into Tibet (Bovingdon 2009; 183, 188). However, PRC policies over the past decade have effectively silenced opposition in Central Asia.

Uyghur diaspora groups have been highly unsuccessful due to China's growing influence in Central Asia. Following the break up of the Soviet Union, Beijing quickly realized the importance of bringing diplomatic and other pressures to bear on Central Asia as Uyghur organizations there gathered strength and confidence (Bovingdon 2010; 145). In addition to the PRC, the Central Asian Republics also had reason to fear their own political security as well. Multiple bomb blasts occurred in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during 1998 and 1999, with the Kyrgyz government convicting three Uyghurs for blasts in Osh (Shieves 2006; 209-210).

To counter separatist movements outside its borders, in April 1996, China formed the mutual security alliance treaty with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan known as the Shanghai Five (Mackerras 2009; 135). As Uzbekistan began to see the strength of domestic and regional

extremist forces such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), it approached the member states of the Shanghai Five to apply for membership where it was subsequently accepted and listed as a cofounder of the newly established Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 (Shieves 2006; 210). Under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the PRC has worked tirelessly to suppress the Uyghur diaspora in Central Asia.

Following the global emphasis on terror after September 11th, 2001, the SCO asserted that the group is dedicated to the preservation of regional security and the crackdown of terrorism, separatism and extremism (Shieves 2006; 213). From August 4-6, 2003 the SCO conducted its first multilateral joint military exercise termed "Cooperation 2003" and in June 2004, the SCO opened a counterterrorist center in Tashkent to further the organization's focus on counterterrorism (Shieves 2006; 213).

Overall, the SCO has proven to be quite effective in checking the Uyghur diaspora in Central Asia. Under the SCO leadership, many Uyghur newspapers and political and cultural groups have been banned across Central Asia (Bovingdon 2010; 146). Additionally, as Islamist movements within Central Asia became more active, and in some cases more violent, Central Asian leaders began to acquiesce somewhat to Chinese demands to further restrict the rights of Uyghur émigrés (Shieves 2006; 209). Facilitated by extradition agreements signed by both Central Asian states and China, this acquiescence primarily took the form of deportations of suspected Uyghur separatists back to China (Shieves 2006; 209). It was reported in 1997 that even Pakistan, which is not a member of the SCO, had deported thirteen Uyghurs, who were studying at local madrassahs, back to China at the request of the Chinese government (Roberts 2004; 232).

A human rights worker in Kyrgyzstan said that since the SCO's founding, no fewer than 80,000 Uyghurs were arrested, of whom nearly three quarters were sent to prison camps (Tyler 2003; 240). This information was current as of 2003, so it can be speculated that this number is indeed much higher in 2012. In the latter half of the 1990s, "it had become increasingly clear that Beijing had made it impossible for an effective

movement to survive in Central Asia" (Bovingdon 2010; 146). With independence movements effectively suppressed in Central Asia, the PRC has little credibility in continuing to argue that recent events in Xinjiang are the works of diaspora organizations.

There are also considerable issues within the diaspora organizations themselves that serve to undermine Beijing's interpretation of violence in Xinjiang. Both Chinese officials and a number of Uyghur independence activists have greatly exaggerated the impact these organizations have on Xinjiang's daily politics (Bovingdon 2009; 136-137).

Bovingdon cites another issue with external Uyghur organizations like the ETNC that focus on propaganda aimed at promoting external support (Bovingdon 2010; 157). Investigators for bodies such as Amnesty International find the ETNC as "somewhat amateurish, careless of its own internal security, and not particularly reliable because of its lack of a proper network of informants inside China" (Tyler 2003; 236).

While this paper has already listed a considerable number of organizations that have lobbied for an independent East Turkestan, at this juncture, there is an absence of a united front among the multiple diaspora organizations. In 1999, Uyghurs from many transnational organizations met in Munich to establish the Eastern Turkestan National Congress (ETNC) hoping it would serve as a genuine umbrella organization to unite opposition against Beijing (Bovingdon 2009; 147). However, from the moment the congress began, there were serious disputes in how to lobby for Uyghur self-determination (Bovingdon 2009; 147). The European-based Uyghurs insisted that the organization embrace only non-violent methods whereas Central Asian representatives insisted only on violent means as a practical strategy (Bovingdon 2009; 147). Because the ETNC condemns terrorism and violent means to pursue independence in Xinjiang, many groups like the East Turkestan National Liberation front refused to join the organization (Tyler 2003; 234-235). Due to disagreements over political recourse, Uyghur diaspora organizations today remain fragmented across the globe.

There are also considerable issues in respect to leadership within the diaspora. Unlike the Tibetans who have the Dalai Lama to advocate for better rights, the Uyghurs have no such leader with diplomatic skills to speak for them (Tyler 2003; 234). After Isa Yusuf Alptekin died, there has been no obvious successor to carry on his legacy (Tyler 2003; 234). Some argue that the counterpart to the Dalai Lama is a Uyghur woman named Rabiya Qadir who is often referred to as the “mother of the Uyghurs” (Bovingdon 2009; 155). Rabiya Qadir is the serving president of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), which was founded in 2004 to replace the ETNC (Bovingdon 2009; 149). However, despite Rabiya Qadir’s reputation, she has yet to bring Beijing to the negotiation table. Beijing strongly insists that all Uyghur independence movement organizations abroad (and even some that do not advocate independence) are terrorist organizations and thus are not in the position to make compromises (Bovingdon 2009; 154).

The evidence above suggests that Uyghur diaspora organizations, both those who advocate peaceful or violent means to achieve political goals, have been largely ineffective. The Shanghai Cooperation organization has effectively wiped out organized resistance in the Central Asian Republics. As for the ETNC and WUC, they have been unsuccessful at unifying their co-ethnics under a common banner. Many Uyghurs refuse to become involved politically because there is a shared perception that the diaspora’s agenda for an independent Turkestan is not realistic after sixty years of “occupation” (Tyler 2003; 245). Because the Uyghur diaspora has proven itself to be largely ineffective, it is very unlikely that violent incidents in Xinjiang have direct links to diaspora organizations abroad.

2. THE REALITIES OF TERRORISM IN XINJIANG

Since al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on New York in September 2001, there has been much speculation about whether China also suffers from terrorism. Following the stance the PRC has taken in Xinjiang against “terrorism,” many assume that China is also an active participant in the global “War on Terror.”

In a recent Chinese state report, it claimed that since 1990, Xinjiang has witnessed “Eastern Turkestan Forces” engaging in at least two hundred violent terrorist attacks killing 162 people and wounding over 440” (Shichor 2005; 120-121). These numbers do not include the large numbers of those killed in July 2009. An important assertion to these claims, in the context of the post-9/11 international environment, is that Uyghur “separatists” or “terrorists” are intimately connected to al-Qaeda and other related movements in Afghanistan and the post-Soviet Central Asian states (Clark 2007; 337). The purpose of this section is to analyze whether Uyghurs in Xinjiang have close connections with terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda, in Central Asia.

It is impossible to deny that Uyghur separatists have trained alongside al-Qaeda and the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Early on in the U.S. led war in Afghanistan, the United States military apprehended twenty Uyghurs and subsequently had them sent to Guantanamo to be detained (Clark 2007; 338). However, the links between al-Qaeda and violence in Xinjiang have been blown beyond proportion. Although Uyghur revolutionaries established camps alongside al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the Taliban banned Uyghurs from attacking China from their territory (Fishman 2011; 48). The Taliban’s reasoning for prohibiting Uyghur revolutionaries from attacking China was because the Taliban wanted friendly relations with China as a way to counter the American threat (Fishman 2011; 49).

The PRC also advocates that “terrorists” in Xinjiang were under the direct support of Osama bin Laden. According to PRC state reports, the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), is a terrorist organization that “is supported and directed by bin Laden” (Clark 2007; 337). The report continues claiming that bin Laden has schemed with other Central Asian terrorist organizations to assist “East Turkestan” forces in Xinjiang to launch a “holy war” with the aim to set up an Islamic state (Clark 2007; 337-338). However, public statements from bin Laden reveal a different message in his views about the PRC. Rather than offering support to Uyghurs, instead he publicly bolstered his own case claiming that the United States was an “illegitimate and aggressive hegemon” and accused the United

States of preventing Beijing's global rise (Fishman 2011; 49). In 1997, after a series of bombings in Beijing where the culprits were suspected to be Uyghurs, bin Laden interpreted the blasts to be the work of the CIA (Fishman 2011; 49). Following the bombings Bin Laden said:

The United States wants to incite conflict between China and the Muslims. The Muslims of Xinjiang are being blamed for the bomb blasts in Beijing. But I think the American CIA sponsored these explosions. If Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and China get united, the United States and India will become ineffective (Fishman 2011; 49).

The above statement suggests that it is highly unlikely that bin Laden supported the ETIM in Xinjiang. Instead bin Laden appears to have viewed China as a strategic ally against the United States. The head of the ETIM, Hassan Mahsun, has also come forward claiming that the PRC's notion that bin Laden directed ETIM forces is false. In a 2002 interview with *Radio Free Asia* Mahsun said that the ETIM had "absolutely no relationship with Osama bin Laden, and we have never received any help from him. All our activities are directed at liberating East Turkestan territory from Chinese invaders." (Fishman 2011; 50).

From this evidence, it is highly unlikely that al-Qaeda had sponsored any terrorist activity in Xinjiang. Whether al-Qaeda will take a new approach in the future to China is unclear. Bin Laden's strategy was to use China's rise to assist in building a coalition against the United States. Now that bin Laden has been killed, al-Qaeda is likely to lose its global perspective and target local regimes for jihadi revolutions rather than the "next" superpower (Fishman 2011; 59). Whether al-Qaeda will take an interest in Xinjiang in the future remains to be seen. However, at the current juncture, al-Qaeda has had very little strategic interest in liberating Xinjiang.

Instead of explaining violence in Xinjiang, the PRC uses terrorism as a means to increase security in the province. Uyghur exiles have accused the Chinese leadership of using former President Bush's retaliatory 'war against terrorism' as a pretext for further repressing the Uyghurs inside Xinjiang (Tyler 2003; 243). After September 11th, 2001, thousands more people were reportedly detained and a number of them were either given

long jail sentences or executed (Tyler 2003; 243). All of a sudden, the United States, who had continuously criticized Beijing for its infringement of human rights, began to turn away from promoting better treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In 2002 after the U.S. announced it would freeze the financial assets of the ETIM, which was also subsequently added to the UN list of terrorist organizations (Tyler 2003; 244).

The PRC's policy of using terrorism to increase repression has proven to be very effective. With the announcement of the ETIM being labeled as a terrorist organization by the UN, it convinced many around the globe that China was fighting a dangerous adversary in Xinjiang (Tyler 2003; 244). In 2005, the XUAR party secretary, Wang Lequan, stated, "in Xinjiang the separatists, religious extremists and violent terrorists are all around us—they're very active" (Bovingdon 2009; 106). Simultaneously, Beijing's strategy of highlighting "terrorism" in Xinjiang has undermined the Uyghur diaspora's efforts to convince the world that violence in Xinjiang was rarely due to terrorism (Tyler 2003; 244).

What Beijing views as terrorism should also be interpreted with critical critique and caution. Since there is no UN designation for what constitutes terrorism, the Chinese are easily able to label Uyghurs in Xinjiang as terrorists. For example, in February 1999, there was a major robbery/murder case that suspected Uyghurs as the criminals responsible. By 2005, they had become "terrorists" (Bovingdon 2009; 186). Though definitions of terrorism can be arbitrary, there is a general consensus that terrorists target civilians in warfare. Analysis of the violence in Xinjiang demonstrates that a large proportion of the violence has been directed at government officials and police instead of civilians.

When debating whether terrorism is affluent in Xinjiang, it seems legitimate to question what makes violent acts "terrorist" as opposed to simply criminal (Millward 2004; 12). There is no doubt that Beijing has taken the idea of what constitutes an act of terrorism and blown it beyond proportion to eliminate all political opposition in Xinjiang.

Finally, responding to Beijing's position that all Uyghur activists are terrorists, the late Erkin Alptekin once said that if some Uyghurs in their desperation are using violence, that does not mean

that millions of Uyghurs are terrorists and the vast majority want to achieve their goals through peaceful means (Tyler 2003; 235). From the evidence presented above, there is not enough credibility in the PRC's claims that violence in Xinjiang is the result of terrorist organizations based in Central Asia. To seek a clearer assessment of violence in Xinjiang, it is far better to look within the province than to analyze it in an international context. The next section will analyze violence in Xinjiang from an internal perspective.

3. THE GREAT WESTERN DEVELOPMENT

To complement increased security measures in Xinjiang, the PRC believes that it can conquer its 'internal security dilemma' through economic development. Li Dezhu, the head of China's State Ethnic Affairs Commission laid out five major aspects in its handling of national relations in western China.⁹³ Altogether the five major aspects state that only by making minorities better off can the Chinese government persuade them to "follow the path of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and take initiative in resisting and combating national separatism" (Tyler 2003; 207). To enhance the livelihood of minority nationalities in western China, Jiang Zemin on June 17th, 1999


launched the Great Western Development (西部大开发).

A key aspect of the Great Western Development is the promotion of large-scale migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang. The policy alludes to Beijing's intention to provide assistance to the "traditional" and "backward" ethnic minority societies to become culturally modern in both appearance and character (Clark 2007; 327). Each day, thousands of peasants migrate to Xinjiang from some impoverished region of China in search of work and a more comfortable life (Tyler 2003; 200). Since 1949, the encouragement of Han migration into Xinjiang has altered the region's socio-ethnic composition on a tremendous scale. In 1949, the Uyghurs represented over 75% of the total population whereas Han Chinese only accounted for a total of seven percent.

According to census statistics, the Uyghurs continue to be the largest group in Xinjiang; however, they now only represent 46% of the total population. As for the Han Chinese population in Xinjiang, it has grown to encompass nearly 40% of the total population (China Statistics Press, 2010).⁹⁴ In terms of growth rate, since 1949, the Han Chinese population in Xinjiang has grown at an average rate of six percent while Uyghurs have grown at an average rate of close to two percent. Figure 1 demonstrates the growth in the population of Uyghurs and Han Chinese between 1949 and 2009.

93 "1) Historically, national relations in western China have been a sensitive one. There are historical factors influencing national relations in these areas; 2) There is heavy religious influence in these areas, thus national relations are very complicated; 3) There are always disputes about boundaries, water, grassland, frost and minerals in these areas. There will be similar disputes in developing western China; 4) Cultural traditions and lifestyles of nationalities need to adapt to new social and economic developments; 5) Due to cultural and religious factors national relations in these areas are subject to international influences...The final solution for these problems lies in developing social productivity in areas of minority nationalities. The strategy to promote social and economic development of western China is a fundamental way to speed up the development of minority nationalities, and a necessary choice to solve China's nationality problems under new historical circumstances" (Clark 2007; 328-329).

94 However, census reports do not count as residents "the million or so members of the armed forces, nor the 2.5 million Han Chinese living under the umbrella of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation" (Tyler 2003; 214). The statistics above also do not account for the substantial "floating population" of Han Chinese in Xinjiang, which is primarily composed of seasonal migrants for the energy and cotton industries in the region of whom total around 790,000 (Clark 2007; 332). With these numbers included, the number of resident Han is closer to 12 million, making them the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang (Tyler 2003; 214).

FIGURE 1: Han Chinese/Uyghur Population Growth in Xinjiang (1949-2009)

Source: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics, *Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 1949-2009* (China Statistics Press 2010).

The tremendous shift in demographics within Xinjiang is not an unintentional phenomenon. Beijing views the future of Xinjiang's stability depending on its ability to integrate Uyghurs within China's large family of nationalities. Integration implies a "political, cultural, social and economic structuring of a larger state that sees the minorities maintaining their own cultures and identities, but influenced by the majority and not seeking secession" (Clark 2007; 262).

Yet many academics view Beijing's policy of "integration" as cause for violence and insecurity. Bovingdon suggests in his latest book that Uyghurs are rapidly becoming "strangers in their own land" while Adila Erkin claims that the significant increase of Han Chinese population in Xinjiang is considered by Uyghurs as an encroaching threat of ethnic assimilation to mainstream Han culture (Bovingdon 2010 and Erkin 2009; 419). As the Great Western Development has facilitated a demographic increase of Han Chinese in Xinjiang, simultaneously, it has also caused a linguistic transformation within the province. Uyghurs have every reason to worry that Mandarin will somehow destroy their mother tongues (Schluessel 2007; 260).⁹⁵ In terms of language policy, the

promotion of Mandarin under the Great Western Development campaign appears to have contributed to elevated friction between Uyghurs and Hans. The following section will demonstrate that although controversial, PRC policies have alleviated conflict in the region.

4. RESEARCH DESIGN

Through data analysis, we can examine whether continued migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang has had a negative influence on violence. I argue that increased diversity from the Great Western Development has reduced violence in Xinjiang. I begin by describing the general characteristics of the data. The data utilized for this research was acquired from the *Xinjiang Statistical Yearbooks* and surveys the years 1998 through 2009, with exception to the year 2000 where data was unavailable. The State Statistical Bureau of China produces annual yearbooks for each of China's provincial units and according to Toops, "these are the best statistical resources available to the

⁹⁵ In an interview between NPR's London Bureau Chief Rob Gifford and a Uyghur named Murat, Murat

mentions that, "In twenty, thirty, fifty years, perhaps no one will be able to speak, read, or write Uyghur. Even now, many children can speak it but not write it" (Gifford 2007; 249).

researcher" (Toops 2004; 241). Because of the non-normal distributions, the majority of the variables were converted to logarithmic format.

Dependent Variables: Frequency and Intensity

The dependent variables in my analysis are frequency and intensity of violence. In the dataset, *Frequency* is delineated by a value of zero or one. A zero indicates that no violent incidents occurred in the given region during the given year. A one indicates a given region experienced anywhere from one to an infinite number of violent incidents.

Intensity has values of zero, one, or two. Similar to *Frequency*, a zero indicates that a particular region did not experience any violent incidents in that given year. A one indicates a low intensity of violence where a region only experienced one violent incident in that given year. A two indicates a high intensity of violence where a region experienced at least two violent incidents in that given year.

Key Explanatory Variable: Ethnic Fractionalization

In this paper, I created an index titled *Ethnic Fractionalization* from population data that describes the degree of ethnic fractionalization for each region in Xinjiang. The index is computed from taking one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic group shares. The index reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to two different ethnic groups (Alesina, et al. 2002; 4). The formula below illustrates the degree of fractionalization where (*s*) is the share of the group (*i*) in region (*j*).

$$FRAC_{j} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_{ij}^2$$

As for the value of the variable itself, it can fall anywhere on a scale from zero to one. If a region is identified with a zero, then the likelihood that a random individual will bump into a member of the same ethnic group is 100%. On the other hand, if a

region is identified with a one, then the likelihood that a random individual will bump into a member of a different ethnic group is 100%. The prediction between ethnic fractionalization and total average wages is as follows:

Prediction: greater ethnic diversity is negatively correlated violence.

Control Variables

Unsurprisingly, there may be other variables that can influence violence. To test for this, I control for several variables. The control variables were included on the basis that they could have a direct influence on violent incidents for each region. First, to control for temporal autocorrelation, I include two lagged dependent variables (*LAG Frequency* and *LAG Intensity*). The controls are as follows.

Wages. To determine whether socioeconomic status has an effect on violence in Xinjiang, I created a variable that records average income levels for each region. It is possible that violence may be more frequent in poorer areas. The regression analysis will determine whether this is true.

Enterprises. Enterprises are important because it allows us to account for economic disparities between the urban and rural areas. For example, poorer areas like Kashgar may have lower numbers of enterprises relative to richer areas like Urumqi. *Enterprises* will assist in determining whether violence is more prevalent in more commercial areas.

Investment. Including investment in the analysis will allow us to determine if conflict is more frequent in areas with lower investment. The variable includes investment in all goods and service industries for each region. The regression results will determine if violence results from lack of investment in regions across Xinjiang.

Urban Population. The urban population is a measure to see whether large urban localities have an effect on violence. Similar to *Enterprises*, this variable also allows us to account for economic disparities between urban and rural areas. This variable complements *Enterprises* in providing

additional evidence on whether violence is more prevalent in urban areas.

Uyghur. It is also important to control for increases in the Uyghur population. As the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang, an increase in the Uyghur population would assist in checking the influence of Han Chinese in the province. Although an increase in the Uyghur population would increase ethnic homogeneity in Xinjiang, I predict a negative relationship between the dependent variables and the Uyghur population.

Han. To complement the ethnic fractionalization variable, I control for the Han population to see the individual effects this particular nationality has on violence. Given the goals of the Great Western Development, I argue that the Han population has a negative influence on violence.

Han Outward Migration. In Xinjiang, many Han Chinese tend to leave the province to either pursue other opportunities or to return to their families in neighboring provinces. With this variable, we can determine if Han Chinese outward migration increases or reduces violence. Because Han outward migration collectively increases ethnic homogenization, I predict that this variable influences a positive trend in violence.

Year. In my analysis, I control for violence over the course of 1999-2008. The purpose is to determine whether violence has decreased or increased in Xinjiang. The result will allow us to also determine if the PRC has inflated the situation in Xinjiang beyond proportion.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is *region-year*. I survey multiple years in the analysis (1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009). For each year, I compiled statistics from each prefecture, county, and city in Xinjiang. The choices in the years included in the study are delineated from my argument that conflict has gone down in the past decade. The choices in years were also delineated from the availability of data.

Table 1 describes the data used in the following regression analyses. The table includes descriptive statistics for each variable and includes the number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation and its minimum and maximum value.

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Intensity	1147	.053	0.289	0	2
Frequency	1147	.036	0.187	0	1
Ethnic	1146	.404	0.203	0.010	0.870
Wages	1108	4.113	0.200	3.583	4.611
Investment	1106	4.634	0.745	2.225	7.361
Enterprises	1091	1.483	0.656	0	3.849
Urban	1145	2.226	2.014	-1.891	6.942
Uyghur	1147	10.556	2.212	4.276	16.120
Han	1147	10.830	1.664	6.909	15.945
Han Migration	738	7.084	1.861	0.693	13.216

Model Estimator

Recall that I am analyzing whether there is a direct relationship between violence and diversity. The model specification is as follows:

$$\text{Intensity or Violence} = f(\beta_1 x_1 (\text{Ethnic Fractionalization}) + \Gamma Z) + \varepsilon$$

In the equation, ΓZ is the set of control variables and ε is the constant. I predict the coefficient estimates for *Ethnic Fractionalization* to be negative ($\beta_1 < 0$). I estimate the sample using logistic and ordinal logistic regression analysis.

5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Baseline Logistic Regression

I begin by using the baseline logistic analysis for the dataset. The results are shown in Table 2. Again the intended goal is to see whether ethnic fractionalization has a positive effect on frequency of violence. In addition to *Ethnic Fractionalization*, I control for income levels, investment, enterprises, and the urban population in the analysis.

In Table 2, the coefficient values for each year represent the effect the independent variable has on the frequency of violence. A positive coefficient indicates a positive relationship on total average wages whereas a negative coefficient indicates a negative relationship.

Model 1 indicates that ethnic fractionalization matters and has a negative relationship with frequency of violence. Although the quantitative evidence reveals bad relations between Uyghurs and Hans, Model 1 shows that the frequency of violence will decrease as ethnic fractionalization increases. Therefore, from the analysis, increased Han migration to Xinjiang reduces conflict. Among the controls, both wages and investment have no effect on the frequency of violence. However, both enterprises and the urban population have a positive relationship with the dependent variable. From this result we can assert that most violent incidents occur in urban areas with higher levels of economic productivity.

Although we can conclude from Model 1 that ethnic fractionalization has a negative relationship with the frequency dependent variable, it is too

early to conclude that Han migration into Xinjiang does not increase violence. Model 2 demonstrates the effect ethnic fractionalization has on the intensity, rather than the frequency, of violence in Xinjiang. Note that the control variables are the same as those in Model 1.

The results from Model 2 are very identical to the results in Model 1 with minor differences in the coefficient values. There is a negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and intensity of violence. Therefore, in addition to violence frequency, increased ethnic diversity also reduces the intensity of violence in Xinjiang. Income levels and investment have no effect on the dependent variable in Model 2. The results also indicate that regions with a higher level of intensity are primarily urban environments with many businesses.

TABLE 2: Ethnic Fractionalization and Violence

	Model 1 Frequency	Model 2 Intensity
Ethnic	-2.512** (0.897)	-2.508** (0.940)
Wages	1.358 (1.754)	1.266 (1.738)
Investment	0.140 (0.3690)	0.186 (0.380)
Enterprises	1.479** (0.523)	1.605** (0.542)
Urban	0.264* (0.137)	0.251* (0.135)
Constant	-11.961* (6.726)	
Cut 1		11.993 (6.607)
Cut 2		12.904 (6.563)

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Time Series Regression

The previous regression analyses demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between conflict

and ethnic fractionalization. In Table 3, I take the results from Models 1 and 2 and subject them to additional tests. It is possible the conflict persists in some regions due to consistent violence over time. In other words, in each region, present conflict could be influenced by conflict in a previous year. To test for this, I include the two lagged dependent variables in the following analysis.

**TABLE 3:
Ethnic Fractionalization and Violence with Lag**

	Model 3 Frequency	Model 4 Intensity
Ethnic	-2.549*** (0.801)	-2.668*** (0.834)
Wages	2.780 (2.484)	2.726 (2.550)
Investment	-0.354 (0.426)	-0.340 (0.442)
Enterprises	0.833 (0.636)	0.839 (0.644)
Urban	0.335* (0.200)	0.334* (0.199)
Lagged DV	1.116* (0.618)	0.781** (0.386)
Constant	-14.803 (9.978)	
Cut 1		14.609 (10.216)
Cut 2		15.939 (10.081)

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model 3 indicates that the lagged frequency variable matters. From the results, we can predict that violent incidents are more likely to occur in regions that have experienced violent incidents in the past. Model 4 also reveals the same trend in respect to violence intensity. In this analysis, ethnic fractionalization continues to have a negative relationship with violence frequency after

controlling for the lagged variables. The remaining control variables (*Wages*, *Investment*, *Enterprises*, and *Urban*) all had very similar results with previous models. The one exception was *Enterprises*, which has no significant influence on the dependent variables in Models 3 and 4.

Alternative Measures of Ethnicity

In the previous regression analyses, the ethnic fractionalization variable does not measure the individual effects a particular nationality has on violence. Table 4 employs alternative measures of ethnicity by controlling for the Uyghur and Han nationalities. Since Hans also consistently leave Xinjiang, the analysis takes into consideration the outward migration of Han Chinese.

TABLE 4: Alternative Measures of Ethnicity

	Model 5 Frequency	Model 6 Intensity
Uyghur	0.256* (0.134)	0.262* (0.138)
Han	-0.127 (0.279)	-0.166 (0.319)
Han Migration	0.448*** (0.173)	0.458** (0.180)
Wages	2.111 (2.539)	1.926 (2.710)
Investment	-0.631 (0.733)	-0.594 (0.809)
Enterprises	0.281 (0.797)	0.294 (0.812)
Urban	0.207 (0.228)	0.208 (0.230)
Lagged DV	1.366* (0.665)	0.896** (0.439)
Constant	-15.460 (10.050)	
Cut 1		14.574 (10.691)
Cut 2		15.641 (10.542)

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Contrary to my prediction, Model 5 and 6 indicate that as the Uyghur population increases, violence increases. It is possible that repression may be higher in areas where more Uyghurs are concentrated but this would take further research to confirm. Both models also indicate that increases in the Han population have no significant effect on violence. However, when Hans leave the region, violence increases. Overall, the results correspond with previous models in demonstrating that heterogeneity reduces conflict.

Trends in Violence across Time

In continuing my analysis, I also want to address the PRC’s position that they are facing a “long-term terrorist threat” in Xinjiang. As Beijing continues to advocate this threat in Xinjiang, much of the scholarly community opposes this position by the Chinese government. Table 5 looks at the trend in both frequency and intensity of violence in Xinjiang from 1999 to 2008 with the exception of the year 2000, as data was not available for that year.

From the results, we can determine if the PRC is over exaggerating violence in Xinjiang. In Model 7, there are not enough significant coefficients to make a determination on violence in Xinjiang. In Model 8, however, we can make a comparison in violence in between the years 2002, 2006, and 2007. The coefficients for all three years reveal increasingly negative coefficients. This means that violence in Xinjiang has decreased in the past decade. Now that we have clarified that violence has gone down, we can argue that the PRC has inflated the “terrorist” situation in Xinjiang.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper has analyzed the realities of violence in Xinjiang. My analysis dictates that the PRC has no credibility in claiming that it faces a long-term terrorist threat in Xinjiang. The PRC has already eliminated direct opposition in Central Asia through increased security measures under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Simultaneously, the Uyghur diaspora have struggled to establish a united organization against

Beijing. It is very unlikely that the diaspora will pose much of a threat to Beijing in the future.

TABLE 5: Trends in Violence

	Model 7 Frequency	Model 8 Intensity
Ethnic	-2.297** (1.001)	-2.468** (1.036)
Wages	3.429 (2.971)	3.550 (3.138)
Investment	-0.731* (0.441)	-0.713 (0.450)
Enterprises	0.329 (0.931)	0.371 (0.977)
Urban	1.353* (0.696)	1.341* (0.716)
Lagged DV	0.917 (0.592)	0.639* (0.363)
1999	-4.475 (3.371)	-4.298 (3.476)
2001	-5.102 (3.312)	-5.040 (3.406)
2002	-5.804* (3.086)	-5.719* (3.160)
2003	-0.916 (1.263)	-0.887 1.235
2004	-1.606 (1.293)	-1.568 (1.264)
2005	-0.731 (1.486)	-0.675 (1.485)
2006		-16.986*** (1.083)
2007		-17.370*** (1.037)
2008	-0.734 (0.929)	-0.673 (0.905)
Constant	-14.934 (12.970)	
Cut 1		15.568 (13.670)
Cut 2		16.926 (13.610)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The regression analyses in the previous section reveal that increased ethnic diversity is proven to have a negative effect on violence in Xinjiang. In each model, *Ethnic Fractionalization* is statistically significant and is negatively correlated with the two dependent variables. Therefore, PRC policies that advocate increased migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang have proven to be quite effective in reducing violence. With exception to the lagged dependent variables, the control variables were often inconsistent and really only demonstrated that violence is mainly prevalent in urban areas. The analysis also demonstrated that there has been a negative trend in conflict since the late 1990s. This trend in violence supports the general consensus that the PRC inflates violence to defend its repressive policies in Xinjiang.

Although conflict has gone down in Xinjiang, it would be wrong to conclude that relations between Uyghurs and Hans are improving. Instead relations between Uyghurs and Hans continue to be very poor and possibly worsening. Amid the dangers of protesting or carrying out violence against the PRC, very few dare to engage in such political discourse (Bovingdon 2010; 84). As PRC policies have effectively suppressed violent resistance in Xinjiang, opposition to the Chinese government has now evolved into more passive and covert forms of resistance. It takes the form of stories, songs, and jokes, which can be transmitted and enjoyed beyond the reach of the disciplinary apparatus of the state (Bovingdon 2002; 43).

However, the Uyghurs' quiet struggles have had little perceptible impact on Beijing's policies in Xinjiang (Bovingdon 2010; 86). Contemporary passive resistance in Xinjiang is further evidence that the PRC over exaggerates its claims of facing a long-term terrorist threat in Xinjiang. Although this thesis has proven that conflict in Xinjiang has been suppressed by PRC policies, questions still remain as to what is the direct cause for violent resistance in Xinjiang. This issue could be a topic for future research.

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Anti-Americanism in Korean Films

DAN RYAN

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990's South Korea has produced a number of films portraying themes of anti-Americanism or criticism of American actions in South Korea. The 1990's were important in this development because it replaced a military led government with a civilian government and thus allowed for the expression of new themes in public discourse and cultural productions. Films with criticisms of America are now available because of this political development, "The election of Kim-Dae-jung and a greater tolerance for open discussion of Korean division doubtlessly played a role in waking a long-latent distrust of America and its intentions in Korea." (Tripp, *The DMZ: The Dynamics of Anti-Americanism and New Korean Cinema in Welcome to Dongmakgol* 2008) This sentiment is portrayed through themes in films that project a lack of faith and trust in the United States as an ally, view the presence of U.S. military as a deterrent to reunification of the peninsula, or as an imperial power without respect or empathy for South Korean citizens.

How can Americans get a better understanding of why South Koreans have an anti-American stance? Understanding anti-American sentiment in other countries can be difficult due to language barriers, biased news reporting, or detachment from those societies. Because films can provide insight into people's feelings and sentiments it makes sense to peruse films from countries that project anti-American sentiment. Films can offer a context from which to understand anti-Americanism. The goal of this thesis is to look at the South Korean films that portray anti-American sentiments and try to contextualize anti-Americanism in South Korea.

In an attempt to understand the reasons South Koreans accept the themes of anti-Americanism in the films they produce and watch, this paper will discuss three films and explain how their themes are a reflection of issues present in South Korean society. The first film, *Address Unknown (Suchwiin Bulmyeong)*, takes a sobering and graphic look at

the lives of people who live in proximity to a U.S. military base in South Korea. The second film is the highest ticket selling film in South Korean history, called *The Host (Gwoemul)*. The premise for *The Host* is a U.S. military doctor forcing his South Korean assistant to dump formaldehyde into the Han River, which results in the creation of a river monster that terrorizes Seoul. The third film, *Welcome to Dongmakgol*, set during the Korean War, is the story of North Korean and South Korean soldiers who, at the same time, separately happen upon a small remote village in Korea and how these enemy soldiers deal with the situation. Before the analysis of each of these films I will provide background information on the different parts of South Korean history that relate to the films. The connection between each film and its socio-historical inspiration will allow a better understanding for the foundation of these films' themes and how they represent ideas and concerns currently present in South Korea. Lee Hyangjin says in his introduction to the book *Contemporary Korean Cinema: Identity, Culture and Politics*, "Society portrayed in film is essentially a construct. It is not the existing society but a creation reflecting salient aspects of a prevailing ideology." (Lee 2000)

As Americans can accept the themes and characters from *Forrest Gump* because they represent their society and themselves, in the same way many films from South Korean cinema offer a glimpse into social and political realities. The film critic, Seo Bo-Myung, comments on the effect a film can have within a society saying, "tapping into the national ethos and aspirations can result in very popular and significant films." (Seo 2006) Moreover, Korean film scholar Darcy Paquet explains how a film can represent underlying nuances in a society by commenting on the blockbuster film *Sopyonje* by legendary Korean filmmaker Im Kwon-taek as the following,

"... resting beneath the surface of the narrative is a discourse on the concept of han . . . Han can be described as a deep-seated feeling of sorrow,

bitterness or despair that originates in oppression or injustice, accumulates over time and remains unexpressed in the heart. It is believed by some to be intrinsic to the Korean cultural experience.” (Paquet 2009, 32)

These nuances and intricacies offer insight into South Korean society, that which you cannot understand by just watching media headlines or listening to national rhetoric.

Any American knows that the U.S. Government is not universally loved and this sentiment must have roots somewhere. Since WWII the U.S. has flexed its muscle internationally as an imperial power. Aggressive actions justified by the U.S. government as peacekeeping are often insensitive to the culture they are dealing with and can lead to short-term bandages, failing to resolve the problem. Connor Boyack's blog presents an analogy to understand American foreign policy. In short, he says the U.S. is like a little child sticking his hand into a beehive (Boyack 2009). The bees react to protect themselves and this only enrages the child, which leads to more aggressive action from both parties. The child does not understand the inner workings of the beehive and doesn't contemplate the reactions of putting his hand in there. Numerous people from countries around the globe have professed their hate or grievances for the U.S. government. They are specifically agitated by the U.S. foreign policy. Recent events in Afghanistan- a friendly fire incident on Pakistan forces in November 2011, American soldiers burning Korans in Afghanistan this year in late February, a rogue American soldier killing seventeen Afghan civilians on March 10- are examples of American forces insensitivity (Thomas 2012). Also, not a few Japanese perceive American military bases on Japanese soil as an outdated legacy of the cold war and in desperate need of removal. Numerous anti-base protests in Okinawa and recently the documentary film *ANPO: Art X War* by Linda Hoaglund relay this sentiment to the public.

The grievances South Korean's have with the U.S. government are well documented in the media. But analyzing films that express these grievances is an effective way to explain why South Koreans accept these sentiments. These films provide a context to the anti-Americanism in South Korea.

The films analyzed in this paper not only question the role of the U.S. but also bring up questions considering the relationship of power between the U.S. and South Korea. These films do not directly display hatred for the United States, but they do question its intentions and effect on society.

2. HISTORY OF POLITICAL CONTROL OF FILM INDUSTRY IN SOUTH KOREA

Before getting into film analysis it is important to provide some historical information about South Korean governments and their control of the film industry since WWII. This will give readers a sense of the oppressive regimes that ran the country prior to political restructuring in the 1990's. Political power transfers during since WWII until the 1990's were brought on by massive public demonstrations calling for democratic reform but then were followed by military coups that shut down democratic voice. These governments were more interested in economic advancement than providing democratic liberties. The societies of repression that these governments favored were instrumental not only in quieting domestic opposition, but also important in quieting the sentiments of public criticisms of the United States. This oppression played a large role in the themes films are allowed and not allowed to have at the time. Control of the film industry allowed the government to promote anti-communism, erase negative portrayal of the U.S., and limit comments on dark social realities. Film is a tool of the powerful to promote ideology to the people, because "it could reach a mass audience . . ." (Min 2003) When Kim Young-sam ascended to the presidency in 1993 the reign of military governments ended, and with changes made by his and the following Kim Jae-dung administration the film industry slowly began to incorporate new themes that previous governments did not allow. In combination with these policies, the film industry began to produce films that re-invigorated the interest of the South Korean public in domestic films. Subsequently films with once taboo themes have become some of the highest attended films in South Korean film history. The knowledge of this history is crucial for understanding why anti-

American themes came to have a place in contemporary South Korean films.

The leader of Korea's first republic, coming directly after WWII, Syngman Rhee, was formally educated in the United States and spent almost thirty years of his life in America. Despite this experience with a democratically ruled nation built on the necessity of opposition, Rhee was not in favor of anybody opposing him. As Bruce Cumings remarks, "President Rhee had continued to rule as an autocrat after the war, and was at his absolute worst in 1960, when he was eighty-five years old." (Cumings, p.345) Rhee did not tolerate opposition to his power of any sort, in the government and society, and increasingly concentrated control of the government into his hands. After declaring martial law in 1952, Rhee pushed through presidential elections that assured his nomination. Rhee then made amendments to the National Security Law which allowed the government increased discretion on who they could accuse of being dissidents. Despite his political and social controls, Rhee was relatively relaxed toward film industry controls, hence the 1950's is called the Golden Age of Korean cinema. Melodrama was highly popular, and many of the films made during this time contained themes concerning the introduction of western habits into a traditionally Confucian society, especially in their effects on women. Viewership during this era was huge, as about 1 in 3 people went to see films on a weekly basis. However the political turmoil that arrived the following decade nearly destroyed the film industry

In 1960 a massive civilian uprising led by students and scholars managed to force Rhee to step down. Rhee's abdication was secured by American Ambassador McConaughy and General Magruder, after they witnessed nearly 50,000 demonstrators gather in the streets of Seoul requesting Rhee's resignation. The short-lived parliamentary government that followed, led by Chang Myon, was cut short in May 1961 by a coup led by military General, Park Chung-hee. Park's policies during his 18-year reign increasingly favored economic growth and repressed opposition and social expression. Shortly after his successful coup Park and his colonels began to solidify his control,

"Park ran Korea for the next two years under an emergency junta . . . Within a week the junta had arrested more than 2,000 politicians, including Chang Myon, and within a few more weeks had arrested or purged some 13,300 civil servants and military officers. A "political purification law" in March 1962 banned 4,367 politicians from politicking for six years. Forty-nine of the sixty-four daily newspapers in Seoul were closed, and nearly 14,000 people were arrested under the catch-all category of "hooligans." (Cumings, p.355-56)

Park's government set up extreme controls on the film industry. Kai Hong posits that "No country has a stricter code of film censorship than South Korea-- with the possible exception of the North Koreans and some other Communist bloc countries" (Kai, p.214). The Motion Picture Laws, first established in 1963 and a revision in 1973 allowed the government to censor any film they felt was pro-communist or in any way subversive. It also set up a film quota, which in a year reduced the number of films produced from 71 in 1963 to 16 in 1964 (KOFIC). These laws enacted strict censorship that rid films produced in the Park era of any themes raising issues of dissent or disagreement with government policies, encouraged the production of "wholesome films" which were to promote anti-communism. It also enacted quotas on import of foreign film and screening limits, and requires that anyone wanting to produce movies must acquire a license to do so. The quota system stated that a production company must produce a certain amount of domestic films before it is able to import any foreign films. Because foreign films were more lucrative than domestic films, most companies didn't concentrate on the content of their domestic films, but made them as quick as possible so they could hit the quota and start importing. Acquisition of the production license was very expensive and therefore limited competition to those few companies that could afford it.

Park was assassinated in 1979 and this led to the takeover of the government by another military regime led by Chun Doo-hwan. Shortly after this, in early 1980, Chun enforced martial law in response to an alleged North Korean infiltration of the south. Citizens in the city of Gwangju did not accept the military presence and took to the street

to protest. Chun violently squashed this uprising by sending in military troops, who killed and arrested many citizens. Ahn Jong-cheol comments on this incident by saying, "The new junta's plot to usurp power and maintain the Yusin regime began with the December 12 coup in 1979 and realized its short-term goal by killing thousands of civilians in Gwangju in May 1980." (Ahn 2002) The repression of this uprising is significant because much of the public believes the U.S. troops should have been used in defense of the democratic uprising. But Chun's brutal actions received no attention or support from these troops or the Carter administration. Essentially, the U.S., who were the promoters of democracy and liberty, stood by while people were arrested and killed by a blatantly autocratic military leadership. This is a major incident that went a long way in eroding public sentiment towards the U.S., Gweon writes on the matter saying that anti-Americanism "grew out of a disappointment and disillusionment with America when the Korean people realized that the United States government, contrary to their expectations supported singularly repressive regimes." (Gweon 2004) From this event South Korean's began to look at the U.S. government differently. Its image of liberator was irreparably tainted due to its perceived lack of care for the public and seeming support of Chun's militaristic methods.

In the years that passed after the Gwangju uprising, Chun's main goal was to get people to forget the Gwangju incident. He abolished the nightly curfew, Korea's first pro baseball league was launched, the rights to the 1988 Olympics were granted to South Korea, and an event called Gukpoong, dubbed "the greatest cultural playground since the beginning of mankind" was held. However, few changes to the film industry took place, except for allowing more risqué themes and visuals. Kang So-hwan says the film *The Ae-ma Woman*, about a licentious married woman and her affairs, was the symbolic expression of the 80's, while posing, "few films offered questionable views on the realities of that period." (Kwang 2006, 52) 1972 to 1986 are considered the dark ages for Korean cinema, as Park Seung-Hyun says it was a time of stagnant, sleazy, formulaic plots that over time significantly reduced the number of theatergoers. (Park, Korean Cinema After Liberation

2007) The excitement of going to see a film at the theater dwindled during this era and would only begin to grow after the civilian government took power in 1993.

In 1987 Chun named Roh Tae-woo as his successor, which sparked a revival of protests against the military regime. From June 10-20, massive protests in favor of democracy took place in all urban areas with students, workers and members of the middle class that brought a democratic breakthrough in Korea (Cumings 2005, 392). Roh, in response to these protests, relaxed from the hard-line approach to rule the governments of the previous four decades had imposed. With this relaxation, Roh's first action was to implement public presidential elections, which he subsequently won. His approach to politics fittingly also transferred over to the film industry and "as a result censorship was also loosened and the film industry received room for free expression." (Min 2003, 115-16) A political opening up in 1987 did not instantly lead to films that portrayed criticisms of America, as the idea was still taboo, or a renewal of excitement for domestic films. But the film industry did change in a way that would provide a seed for domestic films to gain popularity, which would lead to more introspective films containing anti-Americanism to come later. In 1984 a Fifth Revision to the Motion Picture Law entitled anyone could apply for a license to become a registered film company. In 1987 a trade agreement with the United States invalidated the import quota system, allowing for a massive growth in Hollywood imported films. From 1984 to 1991 the number of production companies grew from 20 to 113. In 1985 Korean theaters showed 25 foreign films, by 1996 that number grew to 405 (KOFIC). These two changes allowed the film industry itself to grow, but in favor of Hollywood films. The popularity of going to the theater had returned, but these changes did not help the growth of domestic filmmaking.

The election of Kim Young-sam in 1993 put a civilian led government in control of the country, and in 1994 he indicted both Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo on charges related to the Gwangju incident. This was a great victory for South Koreans who had fought for democracy for so many years, however the National Security Law was still active and this definitely played a part in

limiting social expression. During his presidency Kim revamped film policies, mostly because he saw how lucrative the film industry could be, and not for liberal purposes. He established the Film Promotion Fund and Policy to provide marketing money and ease of promotion for domestic films, the completion of the Seoul Studio Complex and introduction of a Basic Promotion Policy for the Audio-Visual Industry provided a cultural center and a chance to establish the legitimacy and quality of domestic film in the eyes of South Koreans.

But changes to somewhat small rules played the most significant part in helping domestic films skyrocket in local popularity: 1) abolishing a limit on the number of prints per film allowed many more theaters access to a film at the same time. This effectively turned movie releases into nationwide events. 2) pre-screening, a method of censorship, was declared unconstitutional in 1996. This got rid of government intervention between the filmmaker and the theater, meaning filmmakers could make the films they wanted and theaters could show the films they wanted. Over time these changes to the film industry along with imported films losing their novelty allowed Korean directors more room to concentrate on making domestic films. These changes were important in establishing Korean New Wave Park Seung-hyun says, "The formation of the New Wave was related to several factors: the transformation of the Korean Film Industry, the alleviation of political censorship, and the emergence of young directors." (Park, *Korean Cinema After Liberation* 2007, 16)

Kim Jae-dong's election in 1998 provided the film industry with the ideological changes that are so important in explaining the inclusion of films containing anti-American themes. One of the groundbreaking changes Kim made was to uproot the Agency for National Security Planning that operated under the policies of the National Security Law. The government was now less concerned with arbitrarily rooting out opposition elements and more concerned with foreign threats to domestic security. This allowed for more free expression and a release of themes in films once deemed subversive. This is a watershed event in the inclusion of anti-Americanism in public discourse, "The election of Kim Dae-jung and a greater tolerance for open discussion of Korean division doubtlessly played a role in waking a long-

latent distrust of America and its intentions in Korea." (Tripp, *The DMZ: The Dynamics of Anti-Americanism and New Korean Cinema in Welcome to Dongmakgol* 2008)

The New Wave is significant because filmmakers began to make films that involved the realities of Korean society and its history. "The so-called "Korean New Wave" vividly depicted Korean reality from the people's perspective, using film as an archive for public memory and restoring the history that had been distorted by government-led ideology" (Sunah n.d.) Since that time a number of films considering themes and topics formerly censored have been made. For example *JSA* (2000) and *Shiri* (1999) bring up questions about the relationship between the two Korea's. The film *Silmido* (2003) is about a failed South Korean assassination attempt on North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung. *Taegukgi* (2004) is a tale about the Korean War's affect on two brothers. Two movies came have out in memory of the Gwangju uprising in 2007, *The Garden* and *May 18*. Renewed public interest in domestic films allowed for a growth in the film industry that is today one of the most vibrant in the world. In the late 90's and into the early 2000's domestic films actually pulled in more admission than Hollywood films. This is an important trend to understand because it shows that South Koreans came to have an interest in national storylines.

With the change in government control and renewed interest in domestic films since the 90's filmmakers now had the opportunity and audience to comment on the changing view of America in the public conscience. America was once seen as a country to emulate, but specific incidents over the years have changed this perception. For more than sixty years America has had a strong presence in South Korea, with more than 100 military bases or installations stationed around the peninsula, protecting South Korea from North Korean aggression and protecting its own geopolitical interests in East Asia. At the same time the image of America as a prosperous nation has had a strong influence in the way South Korea has developed socio-economically. "America" previous to the mid-80's was mythologized, the American system was the way in which to modernize, America was seen as ally and patron. (Gweon 2004). The incidents that have been the basis for the erosion

of this positive image have begun to be used by South Korean film directors. The effects of these events have more openly been part of public discourse since 1993.

3. DIVISION AND REUNIFICATION

The division of Korea in 1945 was perpetrated by external powers. Upon defeating Japan in WWII, the United States and the Soviet Union “liberated” Korea from Japanese occupation. General MacArthur’s decision to divide the country at its 38th parallel was quickly accepted by the Soviets and the peninsula was divided. The Korean War was an attempt to reunify the peninsula, but it only served to further polarize the division. This division highlights a conflict between the capitalists in the south and the communists in the north, which has developed over the years and to this day remains the context from which contemporary Korean politics is viewed. South Koreans hope for the end to this division and reunification. However the two Korea’s currently ideologies are very different and coming to agreement on how to reunify is not easy. Currently the U.S. military acts as a protector of the South and upholds an adversarial role in relation to the North.

The issue of reunification is not one that outsiders have the ability to solve, not Russia, China, or the United States. The Koreans must fix their problems internally. A few weeks before the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011 a delegation of 20-members flew in from Germany to hold conversations in Seoul. One member of the delegation, Lothar De Maziere, the last prime minister of the former East Germany was clear in his message of why they were there, saying, “I can only tell people what happened back in Germany. The Koreans have to make their own decisions.”(Gutsch 2012) Looking at reunification from this context, the United States must be ready to take the role of outsider, trying not to meddle in reunification effort.

Since the late 90’s movies have been made with themes contemplating the relationship between the North and South and the how to approach reunification. These films have involved themes of identity and trust issues but have also proposed

that if both sides can drop their adherence to rigid political doctrine there exists a possibility of peaceful reunification. *Shiri* (1999) is about a female North Korean secret agent who has infiltrated the South, lives there for many years and falls in love with a national security agent. One of the scenes proposes the possibility for her to reveal herself, but she cannot because she does not know how he will react. Once the male agent finds out who she is he is torn between his loyalty to her and loyalty towards his nation. The film *JSA* (2000) takes place at the demilitarized zone and involves a conversation between a soldier from the North and one from the South about an incident that occurred at the DMZ. The conversation starts seriously then once the soldiers become more comfortable they drop their guard and begin to converse as friends. These movies were both box office megahits and exemplify the attention that South Koreans give to films with these types of themes.

Opinions within South Korea surrounding the role the U.S. plays in reunification have developed in the years following the Korean War. One side views the U.S. presence as necessary to prevent a Northern invasion and this is the stance the U.S. takes. A 2004 report by the United States Congressional Budget Office said, “Very few defense analysts question the need to keep substantial U.S. forces based in South Korea to deter North Korea from invading or attacking its southern neighbor.” (Options for Changing the Army’s Overseas Basing 2004) Another stance on U.S. presence questions whether the protectorate role it plays is still necessary. This opinion holds that the South Korean military has developed enough to defend themselves and that the U.S. military agitates the North to continue its military first policy. They say that the U.S. presence in effect limits the possibility for reunification, because the North is continuously more concerned about the threat of the U.S.

The side that sees the U.S. presence as a deterrent to reunification thinks that the North uses the U.S. as a reason to continue its reclusive and military policies. Political Scientist Young Whan-kihl writes, “the U.S. intervention in the internal political development of the Korean people (is) acting to prevent the reunification of Korea.” (Young 1989). This adversarial approach to the North has more or less been the policy of the

United States since the armistice to end the fighting of the Korean War in 1953. The amount of tension between the two sides has fallen and risen over the years, but the approach of the U.S. has not helped the peninsula to successfully reunify. Such perception has led some in South Korea to question whether the U.S. should take part in the reunification.

Welcome to Dongmakgol

The 2005 film *Welcome to Dongmakgol* broaches the issue of reunification artistically and sympathetically. It sits at number five in the list of all-time admissions for South Korean films, which shows that its themes are attractive to a large portion of the South Korean public. Similar opinion has been accepted by historian Jeffrey A. Tripp, who writes, "The acceptance of Dongmakgol . . . reveals the public's interest in films that engage in issues once considered taboo." (Tripp, *The DMZ: The dynamics of Anti-Americanism and New Korean Cinema in Welcome to Dongmakgol 2008*) The main narrative of the film takes place in a village called Dongmakgol, in the mountains of North Korea, during the Korean War. A group of three North Korean soldiers, two South Korean soldiers, and a U.S. military pilot all happen upon the village after they get separated from their units. The soldiers are surprised to find the other soldiers in the village, and their initial encounter leads to a standoff. By the end of the film the soldiers bond and work together to defend the village from an indiscriminate U.S. bombing. While the film's main idea is to offer an approach to the possibility of reunification, it includes strong references to American involvement in the situation. It implies that Koreans from the north and south share a cultural tradition, breaks down the idea that North Koreans are just brutal robots on a mission to destroy the South, and exposes the United States as a power that misunderstands the situation. The film contends that ideology and politics are not important enough to keep up the division between the two sides, that a shared culture and tradition is much more important.

Four main entities are introduced in succession from the start of the film, the American, the North Koreans, the two South Koreans, and the

villagers from Dongmakgol. In the opening seconds the camera pulls away from a close-up of a girl from the village watching and waving at a 1950's edition United States fighter plane and its captain crash land in the countryside. The next scene shows a small band of North Korean troops assumingly coming from a battle. Bloodied and battered, many of them are having trouble walking and some are lying on the ground unable to get up. The two South Korean troops are introduced in a dark bamboo forest. One of them, a medic that is busy brushing himself off and drinking some water when he sees the other South Korean soldier, second lieutenant Pyo, who is sitting against a tree with the muzzle of his rifle under his chin. These four groups make up the core antagonists of the film, and their differences and similarities provide the basis for encountering the film's main themes.

The narrative of the film starts out by showing the South and North Korean troops coming out of bloody ground battles while the American pilot has been flying overhead. Each set of troops, without radio contact and separated from any larger force, does not know where they are going and happen to stumble upon a member of the village who ushers them back to the village. The villagers have nursed Captain Smith's injuries and he is waiting to be rescued. When the two opposing Korean forces recognize each other, they have a multi-day stand off with the villagers caught between them, standing on a low table. The North Koreans have guns but no ammo, and the South Koreans only have one gun. The North Koreans decide to ditch the guns and take out their grenades. Mutually assured destruction is the only thing that abates death of the characters and an end to the film at this point. Eventually the soldiers are overcome with exhaustion, which causes one of the North Korean troops to drop his armed grenade. While four of the soldiers disperse, 2nd Lieutenant Pyo attempts to sacrifice himself and pounces on the grenade. The grenade does not explode and is thought to be a dud, so Pyo picks it up and tosses it aside. Only when it rolls into the village potato shed does it explode, which destroys the supply of the villager's staple food. The soldiers subsequently promise to stick around long enough to help the villagers refill their stock of potatoes. At this point the soldiers have progressed beyond the desire to destroy the other side, they have put

down their defenses, which opens them up to begin to understand their enemies.

A series of events provides situations where the enemy soldiers begin to bond. One of these is when a small village boy is being chased by a wild boar. The North Koreans, South Koreans, and American all work together to save the boy and kill the beast. Afterwards they all come together around a fire and share in the feast that their collaboration has provided. In another scene all the troops are seen sliding on large leaves down a hill. They are playing together, laughing, and enjoying their time. But the most symbolic event is when the troops remove their military uniforms and are provided with traditional Korean clothing. This strips the soldiers of any affiliation and they are able to realize their shared identity, which is unchanging and similar. The exclusion of political affiliations allows the soldiers to overcome their differences while they begin to focus on the more important things in life, subsistence, friendship, and happiness.

The girl from the opening scene does not perceive any danger from the American aircraft heading straight towards her and offers her bright smile and friendly hand. This seems to be an analogy for the war in general, such that the general population is not involved in the war and are not involved in the politicization that has been the source for the peninsula's division. When the South Korean medic first comes to Dongmakgol he informs the villagers that a war is going on. When they ask him who is fighting he replies with a less than confident answer, "Well, it isn't another country that invaded . . . Wait a minute, is it another country?" The villagers have no knowledge of what a gun or grenade is or the harm it can inflict. When they are caught in the middle of the soldier's initial standoff, they do not realize they are in danger. This perspective is a unique aspect of the film, these villagers have better things to do than involve themselves in actions that would only serve to harm them and keep them from their daily lives. They need to tend to their farms and bee hives, and they have little interest in the violence and the toll it takes.

The U.S. pilot Smith plays a mostly symbolic role in the film. His character is used to differentiate U.S. military soldiers from the U.S. military as a whole. Smith is present in the village

and therefore has access to information that the U.S. military does not, and with this he is able to understand the situation and is included in the bonding that takes place among the North and South Korean soldiers. He befriends the Koreans and by the end of the film helps the unified Korean soldiers in defense of the village from indiscriminate U.S. aggression. The U.S. military is portrayed in a few short scenes removed from the action of war. These scenes are from a military base where U.S. commanders make decisions about which places need to be bombed. Because of their proximity they do not understand that they are planning to bomb a civilian village. This scene represents actual incidents of bombing raids on North Korea during the Korean War which caused massive casualties to many civilians. Some estimates have put the civilian casualties at or near one million.(White 2011) This large number of civilian casualties is huge and some experts argue that many of these civilians were victims of random and uninformed bombings by the U.S. military. The 2009 film *A Little Pond (Jaegeun yeonmot)* portrays one such incident where people from a village are made to move then acted upon as if they are military enemies. This is portrayed not only in the opening sequence of *Welcome to Dongmakgol*, but also in the decisions made by the U.S. military commanders. In one scene they decide that bombing Dongmakgol is a necessity, for they believe that communist soldiers are stationed there. When one of the South Korean officers questions this decision saying, "We need more time, we don't have definitive evidence," the American commander ignores this advice and orders the bombing. *Welcome to Dongmakgol* says that the divisions separating the North and South are minor. More important to reunification are brotherhood, culture, and peace. It seems to suggest that the U.S. does not belong in reunification negotiations, for they are an outside entity unable to understand the situation.

4. EVENTS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT

The U.S. military has stationed troops in South Korea for more than sixty years. In this time U.S. servicemen have committed crimes against South

Korean citizens or have been involved in incidents that are deemed unacceptable. These crimes have instigated large public anti-American demonstrations and representations of these crimes are used in a variety of popular culture productions. The continued occurrence of these crimes are one of the direct reasons for the erosion of the American image in South Korea. "According to the south Korean government's official statistics, 50,082 crimes were committed by US soldiers from 1967 to 1998 . . ." (Statistics on Crimes Committed by US Troops in South Korea n.d.) In addition to the crimes, the policy under which U.S. troops are punished for their digressions does not seem to be substantial enough to deter the crimes from continuing. Since 1954 the United States and South Korea have had an agreement concerning U.S. servicemen, called the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA from here on). Basically the SOFA maintains a neocolonial style of extraterritoriality that provides the U.S. jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S. soldiers in South Korea. Yonhap News, a Korean news agency reports, "Currently, South Korean police have the right to take custody of a U.S. service member only if the suspect is caught red handed in such heinous crimes as murder or rape." (Yonhap News 2011) The SOFA in theory protects U.S. servicemen from being unfairly tried or accused, but it is also a source of concern for South Korean victims and the public, due to soft sentencing. In addition, the U.S. military and South Korean government control and operate the sex worker industry in towns that are in close proximity to U.S. military bases. The overall effect of these crimes and punishments, and a perpetuation of government-sanctioned prostitution play a significant role in the growth of anti-Americanism.

U.S. soldiers stationed in South Korea have fluctuated over time, but a yearly average number of soldiers for the 67 years sits at around 30,000. (United States Department of Defense 2005) Most of these servicemen live and work in the some one hundred U.S. military bases around South Korea. These soldiers spend free time in towns and cities around the bases watching movies at local theaters, shopping for gifts and foods at local stores, traveling around the country, and engaging in all sorts of nighttime activities, like drinking and dancing in clubs. These activities have long

supported businesses in smaller towns and often are these towns' main source of income. The towns that are near or adjoined to military bases are called *kijichon*. While the bases provide a source of legitimate employment for its residents as translators, in labor positions, or in the tertiary business; much of resident's income is derived illegitimately, through smuggling, dealing, and prostitution. Political Scientist, Katherine H.S. Moon argues that *kijichon* residents' dependency on U.S. servicemen has developed a type of base hierarchy, or a base microcosm, where residents of *kijichon* fall into a category below the servicemen. Moon says, "The economic power that U.S. servicemen represented and wielded in the camptowns easily translated into social and sexual clout over Korean *kijichon's* residents." (Moon 1997) The hierarchy that has been formed and maintained over the years limits the agency for women involved in this profession and their ability to reject unwanted sexual advances. Women are also more willing to trade sex with a U.S. soldier in hopes that he will offer her a financial gift, marriage, or perhaps another form of payment that she could not otherwise receive from a South Korean male from the *kijichon*.

Oftentimes the prostitution business is ran through one of the nightclubs in the *kijichon*, which have special areas reserved for such activity (Moon 1997), or at the military base itself. These nightclubs make women available to U.S. servicemen by employing them as bar girls or hostesses. These girls will hang out at the nightclub, attracting customers from the street and getting them to buy drinks. Other times the military base itself caters to prostitution, such as American Town, a U.S. government subsidized rest and relaxation area that only allows service to U.S. military personnel. In regards to these base sanctioned activities Moon comments, "If the question is, was there active government complicity, support of such a town, prostitution, yes, by both the Korean government and the U.S. military." (Moon 1997).

Soldier Crimes

In the years since 1945 it has been alleged that U.S. soldiers have committed over 100,000 crimes

against Korean citizens (The National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea 2004). Many of the crimes have been in association with sexual activity and prostitution. I acquired information about most of the crimes mentioned below from the *The National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea* website, whereas incidents acquired elsewhere are cited. These crimes are brutal and the punishments for them are soft, involving rape and murder. These transgressions, both the incident and the result, exemplify why South Koreans have lost trust in the U.S. as an ally and oppose their presence. On October 27, 1992 Ms. Yeun Geumy was raped and murdered by U.S. private Kenneth Lee Markle. The report says that Ms. Yeun was a worker at an exclusive U.S. soldier club. A taskforce committee was formed to publicize the event, and as such, the Korean Supreme Court sentenced Mr. Merkle to fifteen years. This case became known nationwide and was a landmark case for popularizing the realities of the sex workers and the prevalence of these crimes. "Public perceptions became more critical of U.S. bases following the widely publicized brutal rape-murder case of Yoon Geumi in 1992." (Yeo 2010) On September 17, 1996 Ms. Lee Kee-soon was killed by private Eric Steven Munique. Private Munique went to Ms. Lee's private residence for sex but was turned away because he had no money. He proceeded to punch Ms. Lee then cut her throat with a pencil knife. Initially he was charged to fifteen years, but this sentence was later reduced to ten years in regards to the United States paying 78,000,000 won in compensation. On February 19th, 2000 Spc. Christopher K. McCarthy murdered Ms. Kim Oo. Ms. Kim was employed as a bar girl at New Amazon Club, a foreigners only bar, and was found dead in one of their backrooms, sprawled on the bed. The autopsy said the victim was violently strangled, which the suspect admitted. Spc. McCarthy fled custody and was absent from his first trial date, but eventually was found guilty and sentenced to six years. The ruling of the Supreme Court said, "The accused strangled the victim with force almost breaking her neck; hence it is highly unlikely that it was unintended murder." A sentence of six years considering a report like that is incredibly light compared to murder sentences of Americans who commit

murder domestically. These are just a few examples of cases of rape and murder, but plenty of other crimes are on file. In 1998 taxi driver Park Il-nam was assaulted by two U.S. soldiers inside of the U.S. 8th Army base.

These crimes have not been ignored by the South Korean public. An article posted in the Los Angeles Times talks about three violent attacks by off-duty servicemen, an assault of an elderly woman and the rapes of two other women. Commenting on South Korean attitudes towards U.S. presence in South Korea the article says, "Many residents call for the South Korean government to end its diplomatic agreement that allows for the U.S. troop presence, claiming that they're more afraid of the U.S. military peacekeepers than the North Korean regime they are supposed to be protected them from." (Glionna 2011) Yonhap News Agency on October 13th, 2011 reported the formation of a task force aimed at dealing with crimes committed by U.S. soldiers, "The move comes amid brewing public outrage after two U.S. soldiers were accused of raping teenage South Korean girls in separate cases in the past month." (Yonhap News 2011) These crimes have eroded public trust in the U.S. military and contributed to the decline of the image of America, "The blatant inequalities . . . that kijichon residents, especially the prostitutes, have experienced from the 1950's to the 1980's have increasingly become an emotional manifestation of the growing anti-Americanism among Koreans, especially the younger generations." (Moon 1997)

Base Action and Responses

In addition to crimes, more than a few incidents involving the U.S. military have occurred that have helped promote anti-Americanism. Three of these incidents became part of a larger movement, both in the media and in the form of public protests.

A 2000 incident, known as the Yongsan incident, involving a U.S. military mortician dumping formaldehyde into the Han River was a major part of the media and public outrage over the effects of the U.S. presence. This incident and the fervor it caused is a great example of how the Korean public reacts to any incident involving the U.S. Asia Times writer David Scofield says, "It is a

small, concrete example that illuminates the depth of resentment among South Koreans toward the continuing US military presence . . ." (Scofield 2004) This incident is the premise for the film that holds the South Korea's all-time highest box-office admissions record, called *The Host*, which will be discussed later in the paper. An article on the Green Korea United website condemns the incident and also say, "This case serves as an exemplar for how the US and US military is deceiving, purposefully or not, the Korea and its people." (The Eighth US Army Division Discharged Toxic Fluid (Formaldehyde) into the Han-River 2002) Although details vary depending on the source, the basic story says Mr. Albert McFarland, a mortician employed by United States Forces Korea working in Seoul, ordered his Korean assistant to dump a large amount of embalming fluid, or formaldehyde down the drain. After the subordinate refused, McFarland allegedly swore at him and reinforced his order. The assistant did eventually dump the fluids, reported the incident, and subsequently it became a major scandal, and also involved in a major blockbuster film.

Also in 2000, a U.S. Air Force plane accidentally dropped six large bombs in the town of Maehyangri. The bombs did not explode but it could have been a major disaster if they did. But this incident is part of a larger narrative of anti-base protests in Maehyangri, which initially started in 1988 when villagers demanded the Kooni firing range be located to another site. In February 1988, a noise pollution lawsuit against the U.S. military by fourteen residents of Maehyangri, which was followed that July when 612 residents signed and presented a petition to the Ministry of Defense to assess and eliminate noise damages. In response to being ignored, that December residents entered the firing range and set up a camp which effectively stopped range operations. They had three demands: 1. Move the firing range, 2. Prepare an official plan for the residents to move, and 3. Set up a joint body to prepare a reparation and compensation package (Yeo 2010). The firing range was not closed until 2004. "The Maehyangri incident added fuel to anti-USFK sentiment." (Yeo 2010) It reignited the protests originally started in 1988, and while doing this served to consolidate a local parties and national civic groups who took part in the protests (Yeo 2010). These "national

civic groups helped instill a sense of national consciousness that the government could not easily ignore." (Yeo 2010)

On June 13th 2002 a U.S. military vehicle ran down two junior high school girls, Shin Hyo-soon and Shim Mi-sun, while they were on their way to school. The girls were instantly killed and the vehicle operators were placed in U.S. custody to await a hearing. An article on the World Workers website said that members of the South Korean public assembled in response to the event and began to chant anti-American slogans, "On July 14, 1,000 activists and students rallied near the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division base in Uijongbu, on the northern outskirts of Seoul, chanting, "We oppose the U.S. military!" They burned a giant U.S. flag. Protesters called for withdrawal of Pentagon troops from south Korea and for President George W. Bush to apologize for the deaths." (Ayling 2002) Bush did not issue an apology until November, well after the incident, indirectly through the Korean ambassador Thomas Hubbard, and apparently in response to anti-American protest coming in the wake of the incident. In the subsequent trial the operators were acquitted and received no punishment. This case was a slap in the face to any Korean and an example of the value the U.S. military places on the lives of Koreans. "The case, and the acquittals, have caused angry protests in South Korea and fanned anti-American sentiment - with opposition growing to the presence of 37,000 US troops stationed in South Korea to counter threats from the Communist North." (BBC, Korean anger as US soldiers cleared 2002) After the trial, anti-American protests and demonstrations were taking place in response not only to this incident but also called for revisions to the SOFA, in opposition to South Korean troops being sent to Iraq, and in response to the U.S. pressuring North Korea on their nuclear weapons program. "Thousands of people have been taking part in an anti-American demonstration in the South Korean capital, Seoul." (BBC, US policy stokes South Korea anger 2002)

Address Unknown

A film released in 2001, named *Address Unknown*, presents the U.S. military presence in South Korea

and its subsequent effects on residents of *kijichon*. It introduces us to characters whose lives are developed in direct relation with the social and economic hierarchy that has been created in the shadow of U.S. base operations. The film is directed by one of the most well-known and controversial contemporary South Korean filmmakers, Kim Ki-duk. Kim's films deal with topics and characters that most people do not want to talk about let alone watch in a feature length film. But his films do so in a way that echo Kurosawa Akira's humanistic attention to detail and sympathy for society's downtrodden and neglected. Kim's films blend the ". . . use of both extreme violence and the sublime beauty of lyricism in coexistence." (2007244) His dedication to this type of filmmaking has brought him critical success, but popular success has been elusive, especially in South Korea.

The main story of *Address Unknown*, set in 1970, follows the lives of three young residents of a *kijichon*. It doesn't follow a typical Hollywood style narrative, instead it concentrates on the characters. Chang-gook is the son of a Korean woman and a black American soldier dealing with his identity and his mother's incessant attempt to contact his father. Eunok is a young girl whose eye was injured when she was little, and in the film she is tempted by the offer of a U.S. soldier to pay for an operation to fix the eye. Jihum, who works at a portrait shop catering to military men, is in love with Eunok, but cannot broach his feelings to her. Dog-eye is the local dog butcher, putting him in a social position where even the other residents of the other *kijichon* look down upon him. These characters, their social inadequacies and desires represent the lives of *kijichon* residents.

The two characters that most adequately represent the base hierarchy are Chang-gook's mother and Eunok. Chang-gook's mother is a western princess, which is a South Korean woman who provides sexual services to U.S. soldiers. She is constantly sending letters to Chang-gook's dad, but all her letters are returned with the stamp "Address Unknown". She fits a stereotypical example of the *kijichon* sex worker who has dreams of connecting with an American soldier and being taken away from her current situation. But the absence of Chang-gook's dad and his

neglect of her letters renders this dream impossible.

Eunok's brother shot out her eye by a gun fashioned from a U.S. military munitions crate. The scene takes place at the opening of the film, and provides the tone for the rest of the film. This tone suggests that without the U.S. military presence the lives of the *kijichon* residents would not be degraded to that of victim. Later in the movie Eunok meets, James, a U.S. soldier who takes advantage of this position by offering to pay for Eunok's eye surgery in exchange for her becoming his girlfriend. The relationship between Eunok and James represents the base hierarchy that has allowed for so many of the transgressions earlier stated.

In *Address Unknown* Kim presents the idea that ethical relationships between U.S. soldiers and South Korean citizens cannot be achieved (Choe, 72). The U.S. is theoretically positioned in South Korea to protect them from communist invasion, therefore the U.S. soldiers are essentially in a position of power. This position makes it difficult for them to realize a relationship beyond the base hierarchy explained by Moon above. This situation is perpetuated and enhanced by the actions of the U.S. military concerning the sex worker industry.

To fully expound this idea of impossibility of ethical relationships, Kim uses the relationship between Dog-eye and his dogs as a metaphor for the U.S. Army's relationship with the Koreans. Dog-eye is the local dog butcher and only has interest in his dogs to make money off of selling their meat. This makes him insensitive to the dogs themselves. Dog-eye's strength is portrayed through the treatment of his dogs. He handles them cruelly, keeping them locked on his property in small cages before hanging them or beating them to death. Dog-eye doesn't care about the dogs well being, their meat is just a commodity. In relation, the U.S. soldiers see the Koreans as socially subjective and only use them for entertainment. Likewise their strength is portrayed through the treatment of South Koreans, ie: rapes, murders. This arrangement explains why ethically they cannot exist as equals and how U.S. soldiers have become a source of pain and hatred. This base hierarchy represents a power relationship that favors the U.S. soldier. Because of the combined effect of this power structure and the

SOFA agreement soldiers feel a type of immunity by which they can take advantage of those people lower than them in the structure.

The Host

The last film I will discuss was so popular that over twenty percent of the South Korean population saw it in the theater. This film, *The Host* can be most generally described as a monster movie and it sold over 13 million tickets in its nine weeks in theaters (KOFIC). *The Host* uses as its premise the Yongsan base formaldehyde-dumping incident mentioned above, which is responsible for creating a river monster that terrorizes the residents of Seoul. The monster analogizes U.S. actions in the region and provides an enemy for a unified public to rally against. The pull of the film was not only its incredible use of special effects and cinematography, but also the story of the bonding of a South Korean family in response to the monster taking hostage their youngest member. Many facets of South Korean society are portrayed in the film through characters, themes, and occurrences and this allows the South Korean public to identify with the film.

The Host opens with a rendering of the Yongsan incident, and it leaves the viewer with a foul taste in his mouth. The U.S. mortician orders his assistant to dump the formaldehyde down the drain, saying that the Han River is broad and it won't have any adverse effects. Fast-forward six years and the introduction of the monster. The monster shows up on a Han River promenade, attacking and eating people. After he gets his fill he captures the young daughter of one of the film's main character and makes off with her to the river. The rest of the movie follows the family in their desperate attempt to rescue her.

Each one of the family characters fits a personage from South Korean society and this provides a reason for the popular success of the film. The father represents the older generation growing up in the aftermath of the Korean War. He did not have many opportunities to succeed and as a single father he works hard just to put his children through school. Gang-doo is Hyun-seo's father and is a bleach blond unambitious slacker son, who is happy to follow the coattails of his

father. Nam-joo, the sister, is competitive archer. She fits into the category of the nearly invincible South Korean archers. The brother Nam-il is a college educated unemployed drinker with a history of involvement in public protest. Nam-il's buddy is also a character familiar to South Korean's, he represents a person who participates heavily in social protest when he is young but then sells out to money and his job when he gets older.

In addition to dealing with the threat of the monster the family overcomes many barriers in the search for Hyun-seo. First the family must help Gang-doo escape from a government enforced quarantine. The quarantine is supposed to be in response to a virus threat from the monster's biological fluid and this brings to mind the SARS outbreak and mad-cow disease fears. But at the end of the film U.S. officials admit the threat was not real and attributed the quarantine to misinformation. After the appearance of the monster the military is highly present in the city, which is a reminder of the martial laws enforced by Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan. At the end of the film, the government announces they will attempt to kill the monster by dousing it with the biohazard "Agent Yellow", which can be associated with biological weapons used in U.S. military campaigns. A massive protest over this and Gang-doo's quarantine fills the streets of the city, which parallels protests that are a large part of South Korean history.

Underlying this monster movie label is a narrative that revolves around the family and their unity in overcoming hardship. Although the family is not tight knit unit at the beginning, they work together to achieve a common goal. But the film also draws many parallels to social realities and fears, most of which have association with the U.S. Through the shared experience of watching *The Host*, the combination of unifying the family while incorporating many facets of society amidst a national disaster has an effect of consolidating South Korean public on a large scale. This large scale consolidation can be interpreted to be in agreement with criticisms of the U.S.

5. CONCLUSION

The films reviewed in this paper use recreate actual events from South Korean history to comment on U.S. presence in South Korea. Discussing the hierarchy that exists in the U.S. military base, the issues of reunification, and other events that are critical of the U.S., these filmmakers have provided a context for South Koreans to discuss how they feel about these events. The acceptance of these films in South Korean public is a statement that they agree or at least can identify with the sentiments portrayed in the films. People have many methods to voice their opinions, for example through public demonstrations, the clothes they wear, and the music albums they buy. Another way people express their opinions is through buying a ticket to a film. These films have been attractive to South Koreans because their themes represent a reflection of their experiences, fears, and grievances. Incidents committed by the U.S. will inevitably continue and we will continue to see more films regarding the effects a U.S. military presence has on South Korean society.

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