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The *Colorado Journal of Asian Studies* is an undergraduate journal published by the Center for Asian Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Each year we highlight outstanding theses from our graduating seniors in the Asian Studies major.

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

The Center for Asian Studies is pleased to publish four senior theses from the 2015-2016 academic year and one exceptional paper written by a high school senior, Carla Ho, as part of her work at the Stanford Humanities Institute. Each senior graduating with a degree in Asian Studies is required to complete a research project under the guidance of a faculty advisor on any topic related to Asia. Each year, students produce excellent work on a wide variety of topics, and this year was certainly no exception. In this issue, Carla Ho looks at cultural trauma during the Chinese Cultural Revolution and in the Cambodian Revolution; Monica Mikkelsen writes about the effects the internet is having on Korean families and individuals; Morgan Sweeney reports on her fieldwork on female renunciation in India; Jordan Witt examines the historical context of the different strands of feminism in Egypt; and Zesha Vang delves into the issue of international fandom in the K-Pop phenomenon.

Comparative Cultural Trauma: Post-Traumatic Processing of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Cambodian Revolution

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ABSTRACT

While revolutions have occurred throughout history, the cultural reactions to specific revolutions are often distinct. I argue that a central reason for these differences is that revolutions cause *cultural*—rather than *psychological*—trauma. What sets cultural trauma apart from psychological trauma is the scope: cultural trauma is experienced collectively, whereas psychological trauma is often an individual, isolated experience. Furthermore, given its inherent collective nature, cultural trauma often threatens the identity of the group. Thus, the cultural context in which a revolution occurs is critically important in shaping the downstream consequences of a revolution. These consequences can be accessed through an examination of core cultural products: literature, art, and academic theory.

Through this lens, I examine two contrasting revolutions of the latter half of the 20th century: China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (the "Cultural Revolution") and the Cambodian Revolution, both of which occurred in the 1970s. The Chinese cultivated a unique form of coping known as "scar literature" as a method of redefining Chinese identity through literary culture. Scar literature involved short stories detailing the mental and physical pain the Cultural Revolution caused, and many Chinese read and related to this prose. The spread of this new literary genre gave the Chinese people an outlet to come together and make sense of their pain. In contrast, Cambodians collectively revitalized Buddhism as a method of reclaiming Cambodian culture. They rebuilt pagodas the Khmer Rouge had burned down, ordained new monks, and revived Buddhist traditions previously banned. The contrasting reactions to these revolutions are grounded in the distinct cultural, geographic, and demographic factors that defined Chinese and Cambodian society at the onset of their revolutions.

When analyzed through an understanding of cultural trauma, revolutions can be understood as impacting both the individuals and the broader collective. Thus, inserting cultural trauma into discussions surrounding the Cultural Revolution and Cambodian Revolution allows for further study into not only these revolutions, but also other events, and how they affect the formation of modern identity and culture.

Introduction

Revolutions are often thought of only in terms of the political aftermath, and revolutionaries are the ones that go down in history. The impact of revolutions, however, goes beyond political differences, and there are many more people involved in revolutions than just the leaders. In this paper, I will examine the cultural aftermath of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Cambodian Revolution. The analysis will focus on the general population and society, not the few leaders whose stories are reiterated throughout most historical accounts. First, I will introduce the two revolutions and the arguments that this paper will make.

The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976, was an initiative by the Chinese Communist Party to purge all bourgeois influence from China and assert Mao Zedong's complete influence over the country. Adherents to the ideals of the Cultural Revolution did this by executing intellectuals, "revolutionaries," and anyone they saw as having the potential to betray. The Party mobilized youth by turning masses of them into Red Guards—pseudo-soldiers that would maintain the cult of personality that Mao was creating. Millions of people were sent to labor camps

where they encountered inhumane conditions and treatment. This revolution killed around 30-50 million people through executions, persecution, starvation, and other means, and it destroyed hundreds of millions of lives. The exact number of deaths is not known, as millions of bodies were neither found nor reported.

The Cambodian Revolution, 1975-1979, began when the Khmer Rouge overthrew the previous Cambodian government and took power. They then engineered a genocide that killed nearly 30% (between two and three million) of the Cambodian population. As in China, the total number of deaths is also unknown. The genocide was a result of famine, exhaustion, executions, and other methods of killing. Again, following the example of China, the Khmer Rouge also executed intellectuals, "revolutionaries," and other people that they felt threatened the regime's power. People were also sent to prison camps or agricultural fields for agrarian work.

Both revolutions caused mass trauma and had a lasting impact on the people and their culture. This paper will make a cross-cultural analysis of the post-revolutionary cultural trauma in China and Cambodia. I will argue that the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Cambodian Revolution led to cultural trauma that resulted in scar literature in China and a revival of Buddhism in Cambodia as methods of processing trauma.

Designation of Cultural Trauma

To begin, I will analyze the traumas created by the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Cambodian Genocide, both of which can both be considered cultural traumas, and which occurred along with individual psychological trauma. Cultural trauma can be distinguished from psychological trauma, as psychological trauma involves individuals in a state of distress and "emotional anguish"[1] caused by an event. Cultural trauma, on the other hand, refers to a specific form of trauma that occurs to not only the individual, but also a collective entity that has

"some degree of cohesion."[1] The entity suffers through an event that threatens and/or harms the group's cultural identity. Psychological trauma does not necessarily lead to in cultural trauma, but cultural trauma assumes forms of psychological trauma in both the individual and collective psyche.[2] The trauma of the revolutions goes beyond the personal parameters of psychological trauma, and is thus, cultural trauma.

The identification of trauma as cultural is significant as it acknowledges the collective impact. This paper will focus on how the culture itself rebounded from the events, rather than individuals. China and Cambodia both processed their respective traumas differently, and thus, through analyzing the trauma as cultural trauma we can explore how cultural variations can lead to different methods of processing trauma processing.

The Cultural Revolution led to cultural trauma for the Chinese because it seriously threatened Chinese culture and altered conceptions of Chinese identity. To begin with, the Cultural Revolution was intended to destroy traditional Chinese culture. The official statement of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declaring the Cultural Revolution stated that the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, was utilizing the Four Olds (old ideas, culture, customs, and habits) to try and stage a comeback. The Chinese people thus had to destroy the Four Olds and adopt "new ideas, culture, customs, and habits" to ensure that the bourgeoisie would never make a comeback.[3] This targeted attack on Chinese culture ultimately caused the destruction of Chinese artifacts, historical landmarks, and numerous other signifiers of culture.

The destruction of old ideas and culture involved turning the Chinese people against

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[1] Ron Eyerman, *Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: New York, 2001.

[2] Eyerman, 61.

[3] *Beijing Review*. "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." August 12, 1966., 6. Accessed July 1, 2016. https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1966/PR1966-33g.htm.

Confucianism, a system of teachings that had been a way of life in China over many centuries. Confucianism was the foundation for many Chinese ideas, culture, customs, and habits, and an attack on it was essentially an attack on what it meant to be Chinese. An example of the targeted destruction of Confucian values can be seen in the art of the period. This painting, "孔老二的罪恶的一生" shows three Chinese people with brushes, brushing away a miniature Confucius and a banner with the words "克己复礼" on it.[4] The woman on the left appears to be a peasant, based on her rough and unkempt clothing, while the man in the middle seems to be a worker, based on his heavy work jacket and hat with a tool for work on it. The man on the right seems to be a Communist soldier, as shown by his jacket and military gear. The hat with the one red star, a symbol of the Chinese Communist Party, and the flash of red on his uniform lend credence to the theory that he is a soldier. The characters on the banner translates to "restrain oneself and return to ethics," a saying at the heart of Confucian virtues. This painting was made by an art school in the Shandong province of China, and was most likely distributed across China to convince the people of the evils of Confucianism, as the title of the painting translates to "Confucius' Life of Crime." The symbolic sweeping away of both Confucius and Confucianism's core values by the common people adds to the impact of the painting, as it attempted to turn the common Chinese against the core of their traditional culture. The CCP's destruction of the Four Olds of identity thus renders the trauma of the Cultural Revolution into a form of cultural trauma.

Similarly, the trauma from the Cambodian Revolution is also cultural trauma. Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, targeted Cambodian culture as he launched the Khmer Rouge's campaign, "Year Zero," in which Cambodians were sent to the fields for intensive labor under horrific conditions. This campaign was Pol Pot's attempt to create a "new Cambodia" that required ending the history, culture, and identity of the old Cambodia.[5] In the camps, Cambodians were re-educated and indoctrinated with new ideas. Those that could not learn and change their identity to become new Cambodians were executed, leaving no room for the old Cambodian identity. For example, the destruction of the old culture involved teaching that family is unacceptable, thus betraying traditional values of family. In the labor camps, children were often separated from their families and indoctrinated with new ideas propagated by the Khmer Rouge. Families were commonly designated as bourgeois affairs – not communal. Families were broken up, and millions of children would grow up without a family, effectively erasing traditional familial values in the new Cambodia.

Furthermore, like the Chinese Cultural Revolution and its anti-Confucian views, the Khmer Rouge also outlawed Buddhism. Cambodia's population is approximately 96% religious, with almost 100% of those 96% of the people consisting of Buddhists.[6] Buddhism was seen to have "constituted the moral and ethical system of Cambodia and was extremely important for the preservation of the Khmer nation and culture."[7] One of the ways that the Khmer Rouge sought to eliminate Buddhist culture was by persecuting monks. The process "involved the intimidation and re-education of the laity (lay people)" and the "relocation of monks." This process led to large numbers of

[4]*Confucius' Life of Crime* Konglaoer de zui'e yisheng孔老二的罪恶一生. Shandong sheng "wu qi" yixiao meishudui bianhui 山东省"五七" 艺校美术队编绘. [Pictorial compilation by Shangdong Province's "Five Seven" Art School's Fine Arts Group.] July 1974. Accessed July 2nd, 2016. http://www.360doc.com/content/13/0217/13/1720781_266121152.shtml

[5] Thomas Clayton, "Building the New Cambodia: Educational Destruction and Construction under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979," *History of Education Society*, vol. 38, no. 1, 1998., p.1, accessed July 2, 2016, doi:10.2307/369662.

[6] Sue Downie and Damien Kingsbury. "Political Development and the Re-emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 23, No. 1, 2001., p. 59, accessed July 3, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798527.

[7] "Cambodia," *The World Factbook.* Central Intelligence Agency, 2016. Accessed July 01, 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html.

monks being forcibly disrobed and dying of exhaustion, starvation, and other causes. While exact numbers are unknown, "only a handful of monks survived the period."

The Khmer Rouge also demolished monasteries all over Cambodia. The burning of monasteries was a literal and symbolic destruction of Buddhism, and thus of traditional Cambodian culture and identity. While the persecution of Buddhism might not have affected everyone, the fact that 96% of Cambodians are Buddhist means that an attack on Buddhism is an attack on Cambodian identity. When the Khmer Rouge outlawed Buddhism, their action led to a "complete destruction of trust, human dignity, and perhaps moral values,"[8] as Cambodian sacred spaces were destroyed without any respect for trust, morality, and dignity. Monks, the people who are the pillars of the Buddhist communities and who signified morals and trust, were heavily persecuted. The attempt to take out the main value system of Cambodia led to a transformation of Cambodian identity. Therefore, the trauma sustained from the revolution was cultural, as Cambodians collectively felt a destruction of their culture. Both the Chinese and Cambodian revolutions attacked their respective cultures, making both traumas cultural.

China's Method of Processing Trauma

Both countries suffered violence and degradation, resulting in mass cultural trauma. This paper will attempt to analyze the different ways in which the Cambodians and the Chinese grappled with the traumatic legacies of the revolutions. While different, the two methods of processing still share some common aspects.

In China, the Cultural Revolution was a major event that ripped apart the gentle fabric of Chinese society and identity. The country was still reeling from the 1911 Nationalist Revolution that ended dynastic rule, as well as from the dramatic events of 1949 when the Communists took power and created the People's Republic of China. These changes were still settling when the Cultural Revolution occurred and left an imprint on the people. To deal with the cultural trauma from the revolution, the Chinese turned to a unique form of writing: scar literature.

Scar literature consists of writing that describes the painful and traumatic experiences suffered because of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese writers started writing these narratives after it ended, beginning with the 1978 short story "The Scar" (*shanghen* 伤痕) by Lu Xinhua卢新华which details a tragedy during the Cultural Revolution that mentally and/or physically scarred the protagonist. The effect of this short story was a proliferation of scar literature, the first confrontation of trauma.[9] Writers sought to make sense of their trauma from the Cultural Revolution by writing about the sorrows they experienced, while readers remembered their own traumatic experiences by reopening the wound of the Revolution.

"The Scar" is the story of a young woman whose mother was labeled a traitor by the Red Guards. To fit in with the atmosphere at the time, and energized by the fervor of Mao's cult of personality, the main character denounces her mother and leaves her hometown. This decision leaves her with mental scars, and she is racked with guilt and mental illness. Finally, years later, she decides to return to her hometown to see her mother. After she arrives, she learns that her mother has died.[10] This tragic story represented to the nation the scars that everyone has, physically and mentally. The cult of personality, political fervor, and widespread tragedy were things that everyone in China understood and likely dealt with. The main character's pain was deeply felt all around China; many readers also

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[8] Shireen Ebrahim, "Political Psychology, Identity Politics, and Social Reconciliation in Post-Genocidal Cambodia," *Global Societies Journal* 3 (2015): 62, accessed July 2, 2016, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/8s1938qf

[9] Min Yang, "Revolutionary Trauma and Reconfigured Identities Representing the Chinese Cultural Revolution in Scar Literature" (Master's thesis, University of Alberta, 2012), accessed July 1, 2016, https://era.library.ualberta.ca/downloads/w0892c13n

[10] Xinhua Lu卢新华, "Shang Hen" 伤痕 [The Scar]. http://oldkas.upol.cz/PDF/LuXinhua_Shanghen.pdf

had estranged family members due to the widespread persecution during the Cultural Revolution, and thus everyone felt the hurt from the Revolution.

The personal suffering that is shown in scar literature is heavily intertwined with the cultural trauma the country suffered. The personal experiences of trauma expressed in the stories inherently represent a universal experience, as similar stories were found around the country. Readers all over China used this literature as a vehicle to understand not only their personal trauma, but also the cultural trauma brought upon them by the Revolution. The loss of family members or other forms of personal trauma is relatable for many Chinese, which factored into the widespread appeal of this literature. Readers could read together and have a sense of community—one defined by trauma, but a community nonetheless. Communities were destroyed by the Cultural Revolution, and slowly, scar literature brought people back together.[11]

The scar that the individual writers or readers aimed to heal, or the trauma that they tried to grapple with, is symbolic of the scar on the national level, with Chinese identity and culture permanently altered due to the cultural trauma set off by the events of the revolution. The Cultural Revolution defaced what it meant to be Chinese, but scar literature sought to make sense of that pain and in doing so, defined a type of literature that is uniquely Chinese. "The Scar" was published on a bulletin board at a major Chinese university and spread around the nation. The diffusion of the literature connected the country and gave the nation an identity to understand and support. That function made the literature a means of identity formation and reclamation of the previous identity that had been threatened in the previous decade of suffering.

Cambodia's Method of Processing Trauma

After the widespread devastation caused by the Khmer Rouge, Cambodians were left with significant cultural trauma. The Khmer Rouge were deposed and replaced with a new government. Almost immediately, Buddhism was revived. The new government ended the ban on Buddhism and stopped persecuting its culture. Meanwhile, "seven hundred pagodas had been restored" and "new monks were ordained and temple festivals and Buddhist rituals began to be revived."[12]

Specifically, the restoration of pagodas was a form of processing the trauma. Historically, pagodas have served as centers of community life, and when the Khmer Rouge wrecked countless pagodas, Cambodian life was de-stabilized. Post-restoration pagodas "have once again become important centres of cultural activity" hosting cultural festivals, major events, and traditional Buddhist rituals.[13] During the Khmer Rouge regime, communities were torn apart by war and persecution. The government took children from their parents and taught them that families were bad. However, through the restoration of community centers, the communities were revived. The revival of festivals and traditions was emblematic, as those traditions had been banned under the Khmer Rouge, and by reclaiming their traditions, Cambodians also revived their identity.

More than that, however, pagodas served a unique function in the processing of cultural trauma. Pagodas served as "a backdrop for the ritual of remembrance" with some pagodas, such as Wat Kampong Thom, containing "remembrance paintings of the Pol Pot KR regime." The pagoda's position as a sacred space in Cambodian culture "is able to invoke tradition to offer a space that is socially memorable, spiritual" and create spaces of mourning to work

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[11] Min Yang, "Revolutionary Trauma and Reconfigured Identities Representing the Chinese Cultural Revolution in Scar Literature" (Master's thesis, University of Alberta, 2012), Fall 2012, 10, accessed July 1, 2016, https://era.library.ualberta.ca/downloads/w0892c13 n.

[12] Alexandra Kent, Recovery of the Collective Spirit: The Role of the Revival of Buddhism in Cambodia, Working Paper no. 8, Department of Social Anthropology, Goteborg University, June 2003, 8, accessed July 4, 2016, http://www.globalstudies.gu.se/digitalAssets/809/80 9980_WP8Kent .pdf.
[13] Kent, 11.

through the trauma.[14] In places like Wat Kampong Thom, people can collectively mourn their culture in a space that allows them to rebuild their spirituality. There can be community meetings and other gatherings designed to allow for memories to pass on and bonds to be strengthened. Wat Kampong Thom is just one of many examples of spiritual places in Cambodia that serve to rebuild Cambodian identity.

The revival of Buddhism was symbolic of the revival of Cambodia, as so much of the Cambodian identity was destroyed during the Pol Pot regime when Buddhism was heavily persecuted. Buddhism as a religion is not just personal to the Cambodians; it is a large part of what it means to be Cambodian. When Buddhism began its revival in Cambodia, it was a large part of the personal process of getting through the trauma of the experiences of the revolution, but the religion also played a major role in the Cambodian culture's overall process of dealing with cultural trauma. Many Cambodians "look earnestly towards Buddhism as a cherished storehouse of power to recreate order in their splintered, shared world."[15] The cultural revival of Buddhism supplemented the cultural revival of Cambodia, giving the people faith and helping them cope.

Comparison

A major difference between China and Cambodia in dealing with their post-cultural traumas is that China did not have a major religious revival. As noted above, China had not been a very religious country, and thus its

method of processing trauma did not have the focus on religion and pagodas that took place in Cambodia. China did have numerous cultural festivals and other customs that were gradually revived, but these were not primarily religious or spiritual in nature. Further, while Confucianism had a revival in China, this process is distinct from the revival of Buddhism in Cambodia because Confucianism is not truly a religion; rather, it is a philosophical system that deals with a way of life, virtue, and morality. Unlike Buddhism, it does not involve active worship or monks. Moreover, the revival of Buddhism was much more prominent in Cambodian culture than the revival of Confucianism in Chinese culture. Additionally, Cambodia lacked the focus on literature that occurred in China. This is not to say that Cambodia did not have any post-traumatic literature, but rather that it was not as prominent and unifying as Chinese scar literature was.

A final difference is that China's scar literature was preoccupied with creating a new identity rather than reestablishing an old one. It defined Chinese literature for the time period, and it created a completely new genre of writing. Scar literature was therefore both reclamation of identity and a formation of a new identity. Cambodians, on the other hand, focused more on regaining their old identity. They worked to revive Buddhism and its old traditions and Sangha (clergy): their identity from before the Revolution.

While both China and Cambodia coped with their respective cultural traumas in different ways, it is still noteworthy that both scar literature and religious revivals functioned on both the personal and cultural levels. Both forms were deeply personal, with individual trauma stories in China and individual spirituality in Cambodia, but also cultural, as both involved cultures dealing with trauma, reclamation of cultural identity, and building communities.

It is important to recognize that the claim that Chinese people dealt with the trauma through scar literature while Cambodians utilized religious functions is a generalization. Nevertheless, this generalization demonstrates that methods of processing trauma can vary based on cultural backgrounds.

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[14] Yoseph Yapi Taum, *Collective Cambodian Memories of the Pol Pot Khmer Rouge Regime*. 1-14. Proceedings, 9, accessed July 2, 2016, http://www.asianscholarship.org/asf/ejourn/articles/yoseph_yt.pdf

[15] Alexandra Kent, Recovery of the Collective Spirit: The Role of the Revival of Buddhism in Cambodia, working paper no. 8, Department of Social Anthropology, Goteborg University, June 2003, 11, accessed July 4, 2016, http://www.globalstudies.gu.se/digitalAssets/809/809980_WP8Kent .pdf.

Synthesis of the Comparison

One of the factors in the difference between the two countries' processing of trauma is their religious demographics. China did not experience the religious revival that Cambodia had because of a significant lack of Buddhists and, in general, observant believers in China. As stated previously, Cambodia is 96% Buddhist, while China is 18% Buddhist, and only about 48% of the population in China observe any sort of religion.[16] This difference would account for why China did not have the sort of religious reaction to the end of the Cultural Revolution that Cambodia had to its revolution.

Another factor explaining the differences in trauma processing is topological denial in which the lack of physical sites of mourning and remembrance leads to more emphasis being placed on symbolic memorials and literary works, which "often become the sole space left for paying tribute, providing testimony, remembering, and mourning" as there is no literal place for dealing with trauma, thus delegating all traumatic processing to the mind.[17] Cambodia's pagodas serve as important sites of remembrance and processing, but China lacks similar sites. The lack of pagoda-like locations becomes highlighted through topological denial, explaining why China had such an emphasis on literature, while Cambodia did not experience such a strong literary reaction.

The question of why China's scar literature created a new identity while Cambodia revived Buddhism and thus its old identity leads to a certain amount of speculation. One possible explanation is that China's government technically did not change after the Cultural Revolution, while Cambodia's government was replaced. In China, the people were not given the chance to have a whole new government, so as a

culture, they could not adopt a new political identity. Thus, without a political outlet, a natural development of new identity occurred in the cultural and literary realm. In contrast, Cambodia's government did change; Cambodians therefore had a political outlet in which to express a new identity. The people in Cambodia were able to revive their traditional identity by breaking from the government associated with the trauma. Whether the new governments did in fact change ideologically is not as significant as the perceived difference. China's political sphere did not allow for processing of the Cultural Revolution since the government did not change; thus, the Chinese retreated to the cultural sphere to process their trauma. Cambodia's political sphere allowed for processing of their revolution; the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge was a part of the Cambodian processing of the revolution, and the cultural sphere was not a main factor in the processing because political processing occurred instead. The new government's successes or failures were not as important as the symbolic fact that the Khmer Rouge were technically gone, giving the Cambodian people room to process. The Chinese Communist Party is still in power, occupying the space of the political sphere for processing of the Cultural Revolution.

Furthermore, the overarching theme of creating new identity versus the theme of restoring old identity in processing trauma can possibly be attributed to the fact that cultural trauma hits each culture differently, lending more plausibility to the idea that cultural factors play a key role in the way that societies regroup after a major event. However, it is necessary to note that these explanations for the differences in post-traumatic processes in China and Cambodia are speculative, due to the limitations on the scope of this research.

Conclusion

The devastation of the Cultural Revolution and the Cambodian Revolution resulted in cultural trauma in both China and Cambodia, but the Chinese used scar literature to work through their trauma while the Cambodians revived Buddhism. The CCP targeted China's Confucian

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[16] CIA. "The World Factbook: China," Central Intelligence Agency, June 17, 2016, accessed July 01, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.

[17] Michael Berry, *A History of Pain: Trauma in Modern Chinese Literature and Film* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 19-20.

values and old culture, and the Khmer Rouge persecuted Cambodia's core belief system, Buddhism, and its traditional culture. These revolutions threatened the identity of China and Cambodia, leaving traumatic legacies on their culture and being, thus defining the traumas as cultural traumas. The Chinese created a unique form of literature, scar literature, as a personal and cultural way of processing the trauma from their revolution, while in Cambodia, the revival of Buddhism played a large role in the Cambodian's post-cultural traumatic experience. The Chinese had less religious influence in their experience, while the Cambodian had a less literary-focused process. This difference can possibly be attributed to demographic differences in in each nation, topological denial of memorial sites, and cultural differences, broadly speaking.

In closing, this analysis of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Cambodian Revolution seeks to present a view of revolutions that showcases their effect on collective identity. Including collective culture in an analysis allows for a more in-depth examination of trauma and cultural responses. This examination, in turn, can help to develop better understanding of the trauma recovery process, enabling more effective support after traumatic events, as responding to events with a culture-blind approach may fail.

The violence of revolutions should not be reduced to numbers or statistics. The effect of revolutions extends beyond that, and involves a legacy of change. Identity and culture can be damaged and forever scarred, and different cultures respond to those scars in a variety of ways. Revolutions go beyond the personal and the individual; they are collective and cultural.

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Internet Culture in South Korea: Changes in Social Interactions and the Well-being of Citizens

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INTRODUCTION

AS industrialization and urbanization occur, populations shift and new social dynamics and values develop throughout society (Yoo 2006, 59). South Korea is a rapidly changing nation and is often labeled the most advanced in terms of Internet connectivity. Not only have these social transformations created the need for new means of socialization, but the Internet has also reciprocally impacted traditional forms of socialization. One major way Korean society has shifted is within the family structure and in particular, in terms of living situations. Traditionally Korea has been very a family-oriented society with multiple generations living together in one household, creating a culture of shared meals and limited solitude. However, as modernization has transformed society, people more frequently have to or choose to live alone.

The Internet has, as a result, become a tool to either recreate stronger social ties to one's friends or family, or to create new ties within the online community through social networking services (SNSs). Although in instances such as these the Internet may present as a positive tool, this dependency has also led to a rise in Internet addiction, especially among the youth. This study will focus mainly on some of the more negative aspects of Internet culture in light of the fact that addiction is on the rise and is a problem that the Korean government has labeled as a real social issue. Internet addiction boot camps and other programs of treatment have been established, as the government attempts to find a balance between encouraging Internet use for economic growth purposes and promoting healthy consumption patterns.

The first two sections of this paper will establish the traditional structures within society and then examine how these structures have specifically shifted in the face of modernity and globalization. This is important in order to lay the framework for why Korean society has seen such a rapid increase in Internet use. The subsequent sections will look at Internet usage in its various different forms within South Korea, first examining the positive aspects. Next, an in depth evaluation of Internet addiction and its consequences for individuals and society will be carried out. The studies connected to Internet addiction are numerous and this section will introduce a few of those. The conclusion will briefly evaluate how this study could be taken further and summarize the evidence and arguments made throughout the paper.

Traditional Korean Society

Due to value systems such as Confucianism, Korean society has traditionally placed a primary focus on the family unit and elders, rather than the individual. As Gyesook Yoo stated in a 2006 study titled "Changing Views on Family Diversity in Urban Korea," this includes "the subordination of the interests and personality of individual family members to the interests and welfare of the family group" (60). Harmony within the family is considered to be a reflection of the larger community as a whole. Society should also reflect the type of dynamic that is visible within the family structure (Yang 2003, 121). In this traditional setting the individual is not considered important, but rather, the family is seen as the most essential unit within society and has been so in an exclusively hierarchical manner (Yang, 122). This has meant elders are highly respected by the younger generations. Gender inequality has also been a factor more visible within traditional society, with decision-making mostly falling to the men of the family (Yang, 122).

In more recent times, Korea has seen an overall increase in the focus on the individual. Individualism is now very much a part of the family structure and ideology. This has therefore also changed the overall function of the family. Emotional aspects have gained more significance, as more weight is being placed on a caring,

supportive, and open family dynamic (Yang 2003, 122). Although there has been a shift away from gender inequality, the generational difference is still visible within the modern family unit (Yang, 122). Some view these changes in society as a negative development, due to the fact that more people are getting divorced and more are living alone, particularly within the elderly populations (Yang, 122-3).

As defined by the principle of filial piety, children are traditionally expected to look after their parents as they grow up. This is as a way for them to repay the sacrifices the parents made throughout their upbringing. In modern Korea parents go to great lengths to ensure that their children receive the best opportunities in education; in turn the children are expected to dedicate themselves to achieving success. This has fostered a system of extreme competition (Yoo 2006, 62).

South Korea places great emphasis on human capital which is visible through its intense education system. This is done in order to achieve national growth and is part of the influence of traditional Confucian values which uphold education as the best way to climb the social ladder within society (Shim 2014, 482). This has long been a prevalent feature within Korea and is still evident today with as many as 80% of high school students going on to college; in turn, this has led to job scarcity as there are too many college graduates for the jobs available. This has further reinforced the competitive and stressful aspects of the education system. However, the competition and striving for higher levels of education has also meant very impressive growth rates for both society and the economy (Shim 2014, 482).

Globalizing Korean Society

In the past few decades South Korea has seen immense economic growth which has greatly influenced social structures within the country. The rapid industrialization and urbanization within Korea have created a big shift in family structures, visible through trends such as fewer generations living within each household, a decline in marriage rates, and fewer children per family

(Yoo 2006, 59). As more variations such as these are becoming visible throughout the country, society is also seeing a move away from the focus on family and ancestors, and toward more individual attitudes and goals (Yoo, 60).

In recent times some of these changes have become visible through factors such as the size of the average household decreasing: it has went from 5.24 people in 1970 to 3.12 in 2000. Also, in 1970 about 23% of all households contained three or four generations, but this figure shrank to about 8% in 2000 (Yoo 2006, 60). Today, one-child families are on the rise, while the elderly are increasingly choosing to live alone rather than with their children, leading to smaller family households in the form of nuclear families (Yoo, 60). These factors have created a dynamic less focused on the connections between the various generations and greater importance on single generations, leading to the trend of individualism within today's society, as the traditional family roles are gradually declining (Yoo, 63). The central focus of Korean families now rests on the children and their futures, rather than on traditional practices (Yoo, 70).

One of the driving forces of Korea's accelerated economic growth has been economic nationalism, first as a response to foreign influences, and later as a means of economic survival. This type of nationalism has led to the implementation of modernization policies from a protectionist standpoint, targeting domestic growth in the form of development, productivity, and global competition (Lee and Lee 2015, 125-6). Policies have particularly focused on outward rather than inward foreign direct investment (FDI), limiting foreign influence within the country. High governmental interference in the globalization process has created a system that is very selective int terms of which global elements to introduce; cultural elements are often preserved, while economic growth is promoted. Through these efforts society has become centered around the top, with the *chaebol* (family-run conglomerates) dominating economic development and the technological sphere seeing high levels of growth (Lee and Lee 2015, 132-3).

As a result, Korea is one of the most technologically advanced countries, but it is rather low on the globalization scale. According to a

report by the KOF Index of Globalization, Korea is far down on the list as the sixtieth in the world. This index determines globalization based on global connectivity and economic interdependence, along with social, technological, and cultural features (Shim 2014, 497). Globalization plays a major role in the transformation of societies and people's own ideas about their society. Societies change as they are exposed to various types of new media content and cultures from around the world. As Shim points out, "…many scholars have moved away from cultural imperialism in favor of theories that emphasize adaptation within the roles played by active audiences as well as the development of SNS and other communication technologies" (Shim 2014, 482). Although Korea may not be very high on the globalization index, because of selective efforts to globalize, starting with president Kim Yong-sam's *segyehwa* (globalization) policy in 1994, Korea has achieved astonishing growth within modern factors of development such as Internet connectivity and is today one of the leading countries within the field (Shim 2014, 481).

Internet Culture in South Korean Society

These efforts began around the 1980s when Korea decided to concentrate on development through computer network technologies, making Korea one of the frontrunners in technological development. This stood in contrast to the developmental efforts of other developing nations at the time. As a result, Korea became one of the leading countries in fields such as broadband networking, wireless technologies, search engine development, online gaming, and SNSs (Chon et al. 2013, 14). In 1982 Korea entered the market as one of the first countries to launch Internet services, and in 1985 hosted one of the earliest Internet conferences (Chon et al. 2013, 10). Then in 1995 Korea kick-started its Information Infrastructure (KII) project. The first stage of this project spanned from 1995 to 1997, with networks being launched within 80 different urban areas. In 2000 this was expanded to include

144 regions of high-speed networks (Chon et al. 2013, 12).

In the late 1990s Internet service popularity grew, but Korean homes were initially unable to meet the high demand. In response, PC *bangs* (Internet cafes) began opening up and by 1999 there were a total of 15,150 PC *bangs* in the nation. This rise in PC bangs also led to the popularity of online gaming culture. Demand for Internet services continued to expand and broadband was expanded to include more homes as well (Chon et al. 2013, 13). By 2001 Korea's broadband penetration had grown so much that it was far ahead of any of the other OECD countries within the category. By 1999 there were 10 million homes with broadband capability and by 2002 this number had grown to 26 million, which is around half of the Korean population. In 2006 Korea reached its current status as one of the top Internet-connected countries in the world (Chon et al. 2013, 13).

In 2003 Korea expanded its Internet services to include cellphones. However, as the data services were very pricey, demand remained limited. It was not till 2008, when smartphones penetrated the market, that Wi-Fi for cellphones picked up in popularity and spread throughout the country. In 2011 LTE services further broadened this consumption (Chon et al. 2013, 13). This laid the foundation for the prominence of Internet culture in Korea's current day society. Today revenues from Internet services, including online shopping and advertising, total approximately 63 billion dollars and are a huge contributor to Korea's economy; they constitute around 6% of the nation's GDP (Chon et al. 2013, 14).

Current figures show that about 2.5 billion people in the world use the Internet (Mok et al. 2014, 817). According to a study by Namkee Park on causes of smartphone use and related dependencies, in 2011 approximately 40% of South Korea's population was connected by smartphones. Out of these figures more than 60% of the age group from twenty to thirty owned smartphones (Park et al. 2013, 1763). More recent statistics published in 2014 by the Korea Communications Commission (KCC), showed that wireless penetration was up to 114% in the country; 70% of this figure was made up of smartphone users alone (Lee and Shin 2016, 507).

To place some perspective on these numbers, 25 million people are economically active within the country and out of these, 20 million people own smartphones, which conveys the extent to which most Korean citizens keep up with technological trends. This is a significant rise, seeing as in 2009 the number was only at 470,000 (Lee 2013, 270).

As one of the world leaders within new technologies, Korea's population is heavily infiltrated by smartphone use, with wireless access available even on public transportation (Lee and Shin 2016, 514). As a result, smartphones today play a central role in most people's lives, both for communication purposes and also in order to access information (Park et al. 2013, 1764). This has led to concerns regarding the younger generations especially. Internet consumption by children from ages six to nine was at 13.2% in 1999 in comparison to 2005 where the number had shot up to 86.6%. The biggest cause for this was the high infiltration by the Internet gaming sector (K. Kim and K. Kim 2015, 366).

What makes smartphones so popular is their multipurpose functions. They are used for entertainment, accessing information and socializing (Kang and Jung 2014, 377). As Kang and Jung put it, "The smartphone not only meets a psychological need, but it also functions as a sensory part of the human body that meets fundamental human needs" (2014, 376). Maslow's theory from the 1940s lays out a hierarchical system of human needs that includes psychological, behavioral and physiological concerns. All of these categories can be met through media platforms and personal social interactions. Through media communication people can come to feel a sense of kinship and care for others, leading to both emotional and physical fulfillment and building up feelings of self-esteem and contentment (Kang and Jung 2014, 377).

In traditional Korean interactions, socialization has been largely dependent on school, regional proximity, and kinship. Today, personal relationships (termed *yeonjul*) play a central role in status, as well as "a group's solidarity and fraternity" (Lee 2013, 277). Through these interactions people are able to fulfill social needs by creating a sense of emotional connectedness and security through the structure of the group. As a result, people within Korean society place a great

deal of importance and effort in creating prominent *yeonjul* connections in order to create and maintain a "collective identity." This is done through social gatherings such as drinking with colleagues or friends from school. However, since these types of relations are built on trust and group support, certain barriers exist to outsiders, making it difficult to enter by means of non-traditional channels (Lee 2013, 277).

These types of relations can be challenging due to the rigid structure and efforts necessary to find and maintain these connections. As a result SNSs have come to provide an alternative to help individuals find social satisfaction through a new set of rules that are able to transcend the hierarchical social interactions of society. SNS platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Line, and KakaoTalk create an opportunity for people to reconnect with old friends, form new relations online, and provide a safe space for sharing ideas and opinions. SNSs differ from traditional media in regard to how instantly people are able to connect, although both are still dominant within modern societies and often overlap in purpose (Baek, Bae, and Jang 2013, 512). A study conducted on the experience of Twitter has shown through these type of social media people are able to transcend the limitations of social status, professions, and age, inventing an entirely new dynamic of socialization within Korea, that has previously not been possible (Lee 2013, 277).

The most popular social media platform in South Korea is KakaoTalk. KakaoTalk dominates the user market with a capture of 40 million users out of the nation's population of 50 million. To give some comparative figures, Facebook has approximately 16 million users in Korea. KakaoTalk is used for services such as chatting, taxi services, the transferring money, and gaming. The SNS has a large range of users, with government employees even using the chat rooms for communication with colleagues. In order to increase revenue and compete on the market, Kakao Game was released in 2012. With this service, users buy games, items, and invite their friends to play with them online. KakaoStory, a service much like Instagram, is another big success created by the application. Although KakaoStory was more popular than Facebook upon release, it

has slowed in popularity since (Lee and Kageyama 2016).

The use of SNSs has rapidly increased through the rise of smartphones, with smartphones being the main mode through which people access SNSs. Between 2009 and 2010 alone the number of Twitter users grew from approximately 606,887 to 4,342,569. Smartphones enable calls, text messages, and SNS access, making it possible for users to overcome the barriers of time and space that otherwise restrict social interactions (Lee 2013, 270). This means that people no longer need to be close in a physically sense in order to feel an intimate and direct connection. Through smartphones people are now able to stay connected to friends and family, retaining and building on existing bonds with various different forms of communication and entertainment options that are now available (Lee, 271).

On Twitter's online space people can easily create and expand social connections by freely sharing everyday life experiences and information with the people whom they network (Lee 2013, 272). This online forum also creates a more relaxed type of setting, rid of social pressures that are often present in the traditional type of interactions (Lee, 273). Socialization through SNSs creates a fun and affable environment where users often feel free to express themselves openly in a casual and reciprocal manner. It also enables people to expand their knowledge and broaden their network in a diverse pool of individuals, void of social pressures as barriers (Lee, 278). Some of these traditional social pressures include the hierarchical structures that are often found in common interactions, such as feeling pressured to drink by a superior when in social work settings. Through the online interactions, interviewees expressed that a sense of equality was felt, with social class or age playing decreased role, seeing as these friendships are formed in a different environment with different expectations and intentions in mind. Relations between these users even reach the level of comfort and closeness in which they refer to each other by the term brother or sister, but unlike traditional culture, these titles are used loosely without age or status in mind (Lee, 278).

SNS communication allows for people to achieve a higher sense of connectivity through smartphones, anytime and anywhere (Lee 2013, 273). When people are lonely or going through difficulties, this type of communication can be very fulfilling. People are able to turn to their online networks to receive comfort and support from their online "friends" (Lee, 280). As one Twitter user expressed,

> I became hooked to Twitter because there are always people who continue to look after me in real time and give mentions to me. When I post a photograph, there is someone who gives me a word. It is fun. I couldn't get out of it because there is always someone who gives me a mention (Hoon, male, office worker, age 36) (Lee, 276).

Twitter communication through reciprocal following allows for users to be able to create a unique, yet worthwhile and somewhat trusting experiences with other users (Lee, 276). Sometimes these special bonds may even lead to in-person social gatherings. Twitter users are able to identify people's locations and invite each other to meet up (Lee, 277). This suggests that not only do SNS users feel included in a social network online, but these connections can also lead to further social gratification and help people who struggle with normal forms of interaction.

Despite some of these positive gains from online networking, people can sometimes feel restricted in online settings, with concerns such as privacy or surface level communication. In this sense, the environment sets a private or reserved tone with identity sharing, yet an open and casual tone by breaking pre-existing social barriers to hierarchical structures. Some users also prefer to keep the online relations separate from their offline ones (Lee, 279). Another negative factor is that the extreme dependency on SNSs to fulfill social needs, particularly in the case of reciprocity where individuals place importance on keeping in touch. This can lead to Internet addiction as users may worry about deteriorating relationships if they decrease their online presence (Baek, Bae and Jang 2013, 513). These factors place a limit on the extent to which SNSs are currently able to alleviate issues of social interactions, but as is apparent, they provide for a new and interesting way to socialize that may be able to provide more positive experiences in the future if they are further developed.

The above examples are of reciprocal relations, but not all online interactions are reciprocal on platforms such as Twitter. Some relations involve users following celebrities or other popular members, without being followed in return (Baek, Bae, and Jang 2013, 513). These types of online socializations are termed "parasocial relationships." In these relations users often experienced a heighten sense of loneliness and isolation, a decrease in social capital, and an increase in time spent on social media, as they are unable to create real bonds with these popular users. This in turn often leads to greater chances of addiction. On the other hand, relationships that are reciprocated, as seen above from the study on Twitter and other studies on reciprocal relations through Facebook, have been shown to boost social capital, lowering factors such as loneliness, and reinforcing existing connections (Baek, Bae and Jang 2013, 513). Despite some negative components with both reciprocal and non-reciprocal relations online, it is clear that non-reciprocal relation offer few or no benefits to the users.

This study suggests that the issue is not whether or not SNSs are detrimental to the psychological well-being of users in general, but whether it is beneficial if reciprocated and what the results are when it is not experienced in a reciprocal manner. One study even suggests that SNSs, when reciprocated, have comparable results to in-person interactions, with positive and personal fulfillment being experienced. The benefits are visible in both mental health of the SNS users and "social cohesion." This places importance on the distinction between social interactions that are reciprocal and non-reciprocal when analyzing what the results are, rather than grouping everyone together (Baek, Bae and Jang 2013, 515).

A new interesting phenomenon in connection to social isolation is *meokbang,* which started in 2008 through an online site called Afreeca TV ("Eating Turns Into 'Meokbang' Peepshow" 2015; Rauhala 2014). *Meokbang* translates to "eating broadcast," and is when online users (VJs) sit and eat in front of online audiences, who can then interact with them through writing and pay them in online currencies that can be exchanged into real money. Today there are about 3,500 active VJs online ("Eating Turns Into 'Meokbang' Peepshow" 2015). This phenomenon expresses anything from the way an actor eats in a movie to how a food broadcaster eats. The manner in which these people eat makes the food appear tasty and desirable and viewers find this enjoyable for an array of different reasons ("'Meokbang' Dissected" 2013).

One of the most popular VJs is Park Seo-Yeon, also known as "The Diva." As she sits in front of the webcam and broadcasts herself she makes sure to look pretty, eat in an attractive manner, and to include a large and varied amount of delicious foods for each broadcast. Through this she has created a fan base with between 3000 to 4000 fans. The Diva has even been able to quit her office job as she earns about 9000 dollars a month from *meokbang*, which is more than she earned through her day job (Rauhala 2014).

In a society that is becoming exceedingly lonely, people struggle to find company and a lot of individuals are drawn to these types of broadcasts. The Diva's viewers are typically between twenty to thirty years of age. They often live alone and have to eat alone as a result, and find it comforting to watch The Diva eat and sometimes "share" a meal with her. The Diva has the ability to make her viewers feel like they are in the company of a close friend as she eats and shares her experience. Others are simply on diets and find fulfillment through watching her eat all the things they wish they could eat as well, as she vividly describes the flavors and experience of eating each of the foods she has prepared (Rauhala 2014). Sometime The Diva also includes her parents on the broadcast, creating a family environment and place of comfort to watch for all the people living alone, who are unable to eat with their own families. The irony of the Diva's experience is that because she has this type of livelihood, she spends so many hours a day eating and prepping for food on the broadcast, that she does not have the time to eat with her own social circles or find a boyfriend (Rauhala 2014).

In Korea's globalizing society a lot of people are feeling lonely and *meokbang* therefore offers an escape from this solitude. People have traditionally enjoyed large meals with their families or friends, but these days a lot of individuals are having to eat alone. This change is

due to the fact that Korea is such a fast-paced and busy society, with many people living alone and having limited time to share meals with others, some are only able to do so on special occasions (Kim S. 2014). In 2012, it was estimated that there were 25.3% single-person households and by 2030 this figure is expected to jump to 32.7%. According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, this is the highest increasing rate of single-person households among the world's developed nations (Rauhala 2014). As a result *meokbang* acts as a relief from this loneliness.

The Internet is however also used in many negative ways. One of the more negative uses of the Internet is cyber bullying. People have become so reliant on the Internet through its vast range of content with anything from sexual, to leisure, to political topics (Shim 2014, 480). Due to this dependency and reliance, some people have even started using it for bullying and policing society. "These groups would track down norm violators and criminals using their IT devices and the Internet" (Shim, 490). In this new trend users take it upon themselves to also relegate punishment to those they consider social criminals by putting their personal information up on the Internet so that the online community can shame and emotionally destroy those individuals. This online harassment has in extreme cases even lead to suicide (Shim, 480). Online users have come to place too much confidence on the validity of information shared online, which has lead to these actions and increased concerns by the authorities. Korea is already a country facing high rates of bullying, which has often led to suicide, meaning that these trends are fueling an existing problem within the country (Shim, 480, 490).

One example of this new cyber bullying trend is the case of the South Korean hip-hop artist Tablo. In 2010 he was accused of falsifying his BA and MA Stanford degrees that he achieved in just a matter of three-and-a-half years. Some Internet users deemed this impossible and formed an online group in order to expose his lies. To make matters worse, through his Canadian citizenship he was able to avoid the mandatory military service, which further fueled the online hate against him at the time (Shim 2014, 486-7). A Korean broadcasting channel MBC finally aired a documentary in which Tablo traveled to Stanford with a film crew, met up with faculty of Stanford, who then confirmed on camera that he in fact did receive his two degrees from the university. Tablo's career almost ended over this witch-hunt, but eventually the leaders of the online group were prosecuted for defaming him (Shim D. 2014, 495-6). Although this case was not the most extreme, seeing as some have led to suicide, it still expresses how severe an issue it is that netizens (online citizens) are trying to police society.

The strong reliance and dependency on Internet to fulfill social needs in this increasingly technologically driven society can also lead to Internet addiction, which is another serious and rising issue. Internet addiction is a concept first used in 1998 by Dr. Kimberly Young in her Internet Addiction Diagnostic Questionnaire. In a 2012 survey by Time Mobility Poll, eight different countries were included and out of those South Korea showed the highest dependency on smartphones (Lee and Shin 2016, 507). Factors such as parents working long hours, along with the competitive education system and lack of spaces for children to play in, all contribute to the negative trend of Internet addiction (Koo et al. 2011, 393). Internet addiction is relatively high in Korea and the government considers it a real threat to public health (Koo and Kwon 2014, 1691).

Internet addiction includes anything from activities such as shopping, searching for information, online gaming, and socializing through chatting (Koo and Kwon, 1693). When a person is addicted to these activities, they experience issues in controlling the use, which then in turn makes a person dysfunctional in normal day tasks such as offline relationships, sleep, work, and school. Some people even struggle with negative emotional tendencies such as anger, stress, and loneliness as they are unable to cope with life (Mok et al. 2014, 817).

There are several factors that are indicative of people who are more likely to become dependent and subsequently addicted to the Internet. People who face identity issues such as low confidence levels are more likely to become addicted as they attempt to use the Internet to make up for these issues (Koo and Kwon 2014, 1692). People who on a general basis struggle with anger, depression,

anxiety, and loneliness are also more likely to experience an Internet dependency. Other studies show that interpersonal issues can play a role in high addiction levels for people who are dissatisfied with their real-life relationships. The online forum can help these people feel a sense of belonging and acceptance in the diverse online environment (Koo and Kwon, 1692). People who are dependent on the Internet have also been shown to be doing poorly in terms of family life, once again emphasizing how the stressful dynamics of offline relations can push a person to seek out more successful means of socialization online. Young adults are particularly susceptible to these dependencies as they are still struggling to establish their identities in society (Koo and Kwon, 1692).

When discussing Internet culture and related addictions in Korea, gaming is a topic that cannot be left out, considering the magnitude of its popularity within South Korean modern society and economy. Online games alone make up 89% of South Korean exports. In South Korea, PC bangs are a big part of the online gaming culture, with game revenue in 2004 amounting to 1,398 million dollars (Chung 2008, 309). As a result, the Korean government has played an essential role in promoting gaming culture within Korea in order to increase the popularity of the e-sport and to also promote Korean culture abroad. "The e-sport culture is a local attempt to connect South Korea to the world through global media consumption of online games" (Chung 2008, 313-4). However, by encouraging Internet gaming to become so widespread within the country, addiction levels are also rising. It has become evident that though e-sports are beneficial for Korean economically and culturally abroad, they are a negative factor for the well-being of the Korean people through unhealthy consumption habits.

The huge gaming culture has naturally led to concerns regarding addiction, particularly in younger generations (K. Kim and K. Kim 2015, 370). The period of adolescence is particularly significant since this is the time in a young person's life where they start to discover and shape they will become (K. Kim and K. Kim, 369). Gaming addiction is more serious than most other Internet addictions, as the subjects become very immersed in and dependent on the virtual world.

This type of dependency can sometimes lead to behavioral issues comparable to addiction of substances. As with other Internet addictions, gaming addiction is also often a result of certain social deficiencies that make young adults especially vulnerable (K. Kim and K. Kim, 367).

However, not only children experience Internet addiction in Korea. In 2009 there were around 975,000 adult gaming addicts. Over the past few years the number of adult gamers around the age of twenty to thirty has increased. These are the generations that grew up during the rise of Internet gaming culture. One particular case highlights adult gaming addiction, along with how people can meet online and form strong ties. In 2008 two gamers from Suwon, South Korea met online on a chat forum for gamers. They started dating and later getting married. Both were heavily addicted to gaming and as a result neither were employed. Without intending to the women got pregnant, but was not aware of the fact till her water broke. After the child was born, they would both go off gaming for entire nights, leaving the baby home alone. When their daughter was three months old, they came home after a twelve-hour night of gaming to discover she had died of malnutrition. They both fled, but after six months they were caught and convicted of homicide. Gaming addiction is often associated with younger generations, but as this case points out, it is important to be aware that adults are part of the social issue as well (Choe 2010).

In Internet gaming addiction with children, studies have shown that the severity of addiction levels is related to gender, grades, how often and how much time is spent on gaming, and the young gamers' relations to their parents (K. Kim and K. Kim 2015, 370). A study by Kyunghee Kim and Kisook Kim on Internet game addiction in relation to the parental relationship to children revealed that 16.3% of Korean middle school and high school students showed signs of addiction (369-70). The study also showed that more junior high school students and boys become addicted compared to girls and high school students, suggesting that addiction happens at a very young age. The study found that children who have strong relationships with their parents also have better attitudes and higher levels of self-esteem, with lower levels of depression, anxiety, societal

alienation, and loneliness. This in turn leads to lower levels of gaming addictions. What this points to is the importance of treatment plans including parents as a main component in these treatments (K. Kim and K. Kim, 370). It is also essential that parents take action and foster an open and communicative dynamic with their children in order to avoid that them becoming isolated, which is a big factor in increasing the likelihood of addiction (Koo et al. 2011, 393).

One way that the Korean government has made efforts to overcome this growing issue of Internet addiction is through programs such as boot camps that attempt to rehabilitate the subjects and reintroduce them into society through various different exercises. One such camp, Jump Up Internet Rescue School, was started in 2007 and provides treatment to children for a duration of twelve days (Koo et al. 2011, 391-92). This camp teaches children to once again function within society, break their dependency on technology, and work on eliminating the different triggers to their addictions. The camps also provide family therapy so that the progress will not be lost once the child is sent home and is reintroduced back into the real world (Koo et al. 2011, 391).

In order to achieve these results, the program includes components such as mental training, education that focuses on the frontal lobe, and teaching the children to control their emotions. The program aims to break habitual behavior through these exercises and by weaning them off their electronics (Koo et al. 2011, 393). The brain exercises are focused on developing the children's cognitive skills. It is important to focus on such components so that the addict learns not to emotionally attach themselves to their games. The program also includes outdoor activities and sports, to get them acclimated to being away from their computers and online realities (Koo et al., 392).

Further actions that can be taken by the government include working with hospitals, and the individual families to increase awareness of these issues and make the public aware of the boot-camp programs. Another possibility may be for the government to implement changes within the education system. In Korea, where there is such a huge focus on education, it is imperative that schools play a vital role in teaching children

how to form healthier Internet habits (Koo et al. 2011, 393).

Due to these governmental efforts figures show that the number of Internet addicted children has fallen from over 1 million in 2007 to 938,000 in 2009. However, up until recently the issue of adult gaming addiction has gone largely unnoticed within society and therefore governmental efforts have not previously included adults. After cases such as the couple whose child died due to neglect, attention has been brought to the issue and the government has expanded its efforts to also create programs geared specifically towards adults. One of the disadvantages adults face is the lack of structure and support. Young gamers have parents who can provide supervision and support, making it a slightly easier to combat the issue (Choe 2010).

Conclusion

To further this study taking a more comparative approach in analyzing where Korea stands on these issues in relation to the rest of the world would be helpful. This could be a regional study or a study that compares Korea to other countries that are culturally different. The approach taken in this paper crosses many different disciplines, such as history, culture, psychology. Since studies carried out on this exact topic are limited, conducting fieldwork geared more towards these particular set of issues to better evaluate the overall well-being within the society and what changes can be expected in the future could be interesting.

The high dependency on SNSs and the Internet in general may be connected to the greater collective attitude found within Korean society. People in this type of community-based society often also feel more pressure to respond more quickly within their social circles, and since SNSs offer a way to do so, this may be a contributing factor to the high addiction levels. In order to actually know if this is the case, it would be necessary to conduct comparative studies between Korea and different cultures, such as the U.S., to see if they experience similar trends or if they vary significantly (Baek, Bae and Jang 2013, 516). This would be another compelling direction to further this study.

The globalization of Korea, which has brought with it rapid and widespread use of Internet services such as SNSs and online gaming, has played a significant role in altering Korean society. The Internet, and specifically smartphone use, has benefitted society, but has also created a larger social issue of Internet dependency on these mediums of socialization. In order to combat these types of issues, it is important that the Korean government, schools, and parents address the rising levels of addiction and foster healthy Internet habits. South Korea is a rapidly changing nation in terms of economic growth, but is by some standards not considered to be a fully globalized country, seeing as a lot of traditional structures and cultural values remain a part of the modern state. However, even these areas are slowly changing with new social tools infiltrating society and particularly altering the means of socializing. As in any other country, it is important to control this growth to ensure that modern factors of development, such as technology, can help society develop in a positive direction, and not create patterns of behavior detrimental to the overall well-being of the people.

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Relationality in Female Hindu Renunciation as told through the Life Story of Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī

MORGAN SWEENEY

Dādī Mā only let me photograph her once. Here she is pictured wearing her finest orange shawl, worn especially for this photograph, sitting on her bed amongst Mā Ānandamayī and other framed Hindu gods and deities.

Walking into the āshram, I was able to escape from the chaos of Vārānasī, India. Nestled against the banks of the Ganges, the Mātā Ānandamayī āshram and *Kanyapīth* (a religious school established by Mā Ānandamayī for young girls) glowed orange from the light of the rising sun on the opposite bank of the river. The terrace by which I entered the āshram was vacant. For the past two weeks, I had been visiting this āshram intermittently to discover the inner-workings of the lives of the children who had taken a vow of celibacy to become *brahmacāriṇīs* (celibate female students). Day after day, I persisted in having a presence at the āshram in hopes that with each subsequent visit the protective veil over the *Kanyapīth* would be lifted. On this particular morning, I waited on the steps with my one-subject composition notebook tucked safely in the crease of my left arm as the young *brahmacāriṇīs* peered curiously at me from the safety of their rooms on the second floor. A pen between the fingers of my right hand, I drifted the ballpoint tip across the blank page of my notebook, noting new observations in fresh black ink.

Just across from the steps stood a small, rectangular building, a *yajnyashālā*, where two men performed a special *pūjā* (devotional worship). The fiery nature of the offering caused smoke to billow out of the building's four barred windows. From behind the smoke, emerged an elderly woman, a *sannyāsī* (Hindu renunciant), who I would come to know as Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī, or more intimately, Dādī Mā, the Hindi translation of grandmother. Dressed differently than the other *sādhus* (holy persons) at the āshram, Dādī Mā wore a robe, not white, but saffron orange, and strands of *rudrākṣa mālās* (Hindu rosaries made up of dried brown berries) hung from around her neck. It was the first time that I had seen her; however, it was clear that she had been involved with the āshram for some time based on the ease with which she moved within the space. Her steps were short—the balls of her bare feet brushed the smooth stone ground with grace. She bent at the waist and picked up the small white flowers that had been released from the grips of the tree's branches above and delicately placed them in the metal bowl between her palms. Just before removing another flower from the cobblestone, she paused, lifting her gaze

two inches above the rim of her round, metal glasses and directing it toward me. Carefully assessing me, she released a laugh silent to my distant ears. The creases reaching from the corners of her eyes deepened as she smiled and warmly acknowledged my presence.

As she approached me, she remained silent. I had neither an idea of her given position within the āshram, where she lived, nor the role she played in the ascetic community; however, I surrendered to her will as she softly spoke, "Come," and turned to walk in the opposite direction with a confidence that I would follow. Awakening that morning, I had intended to observe the *brahmacāriṇīs* during their daily rituals as part of my research for an independent study under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin at Madison study abroad program. Feeling a sense of inexplicable trust in Dādī Mā, I chose to instead follow her, allowing my research to proceed down an alternate course, which only later, once I returned from India, expanded into this thesis.

Before meeting Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī, I had been formally introduced to female *sādhus* and *sannyāsīs* through well-respected individuals in the city of Banāras (the colloquial term for Vārānasī). Even with a personal connection and formal introduction, I still faced challenges in being accepted and trusted by women within the ascetic community. As a female researcher, I was able to gain more access than a male as *sādhus* are generally more receptive to members of their own sex; those of the opposite sex are considered to distract from their main objectives of celibacy and worldly separation. However, over the course of several visits to the Mātā Ānandamayī āshram, I was unable to move past an unspoken but very noticeable barrier upheld by the majority of female ascetics.

The community within the Mātā Ānandamayī āshram is characteristically closed off to outsiders due to the strict Brahmanical rules which the institution follows. This reserved nature is characteristic of *sādhus* and Indian women in general, so when combined, the result is amplified. The women of this ascetic community shield themselves from interviews, especially those of personal nature. If asked a question about their life as an ascetic, they would

visibly withdraw from the conversation and foist me on another informant, from whom I was then passed off, and so on. By the end, my efforts landed me at a website which the *sādhus* claimed would give me all the information I needed to know.

This was the nature of my research until I met Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī. The way in which Dādī Mā approached me and took me under her wing stood in stark contrast to my interactions with other female informants. In our collaboration, I was the one being led through the research. Dādī Mā directed our conversations, establishing herself as an active participant in the retelling of her life story and songs. Not only did Dādī Mā consent to the research, but she also reminded me to record our conversations; if I happened to miss any verses of a song she would cue me to record and start again from the beginning.

In the few hours following our introduction, Dādī Mā led me through the streets of Vārānasī. Just as my own grandmother had protected me when I was young, Dādī Mā firmly held my hand to ensure my safety as we crossed the busy streets. Each time we entered a new space, she would present me to others with a sense of assurance; as if we had known each other for years, she introduced me using the word *meri,* a possessive pronoun in Hindi meaning "my." Dādī Mā regarded me as a granddaughter. She ascribed to me a filial relation that mirrored her relations to the Hindu gods as children and her female guru as mother—a gendered characteristic of female renunciants. The closeness of our relationship surpassed the familiarity of mere acquaintances, allowing me access to personal information that had been largely withheld by other informants.

Over the course of two months, I came to know Dādī Mā through informal meetings in which I would sit at her feet and listen to her stories and songs. Dādī Mā was eighty years old when I first met her and had been living in Vārānasī as a *sannyāsī* for twelve years. She was born in Bengal and moved to Allahabad when she was forced into an unwanted marriage at the age of thirty-two. Enduring the abuses of the family into which she wed, Dādī Mā remained a devoted wife, undergoing the initiation for asceticism only after her husband's death.

Sannyāsīs are theoretically detached from gender norms due to the ideological separation of the spirit from the human body; however, because India is a patriarchal society and *sannyāsīs* embody either a male or female form, female *sannyāsīs* are quite different from their male counterparts. Most significantly, female *sannyāsīs* and *sādhus* are absent from the public sphere. It is typical for male *sannyāsīs* to take on the role of the wanderer, whereas women more often take up residence in a communal space such as an āshram. Dādī Mā began her journey as a *sannyāsī* more in line with the life of males, wandering the streets and begging for food; however, this was short-lived as she transitioned to living among a community of women within an āshram. Dādī Mā challenged and embraced her role as a woman in Indian society—she challenged it by becoming a *sannyāsī* rather than living the rest of her life defined by mourning her husband's death and she embraced her role through the exemplification of female characteristics of her devotion.

Though my experiential research narrowly focuses on the life of this one informant, Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī, broader claims can be made about female renunciants. Instead of focusing on breadth of research, I emphasize depth. This has allowed me to become familiar with the general concept of renunciation through an intimate understanding of the journey of one female renunciant. For a period of two and a half months, I met with Dādī Mā once or twice every week, totaling over thirty hours of ethnographic research. As I spent time with Dādī Mā, I learned that her delayed asceticism is one aspect of her life that reflects that of women *sādhus* and *sannyāsīs* more generally. Additionally, Dādī Mā's relationship with both her guru, Mā Ānandamayī, and the Hindu gods with whom she interacts daily in rites of veneration, reflects the nurturing female characteristics that naturally permeate filial relationships. This holistic retelling of Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī's life story as a poignant exemplar of female renunciation in Hinduism complicates the binary view which separates *sannyāsīs* from their householder counterparts*.* Through careful attention to the details of Dādī Mā's life story, I argue that due to the challenges of living in a patriarchal society, female *sannyāsīs*

retain gendered characteristics after their initiation, thus increasing their relationship to and decreasing their separation from the material world.

Scholarly and traditional literary accounts of renunciation, both from inside and outside Hinduism, tend to oversimplify its complex nature by discounting the individual life story; we risk losing the specificity of gendered renunciation unless we attend to the details of lived religion and everyday practices. To highlight this point, I have chosen to clearly include my own interactions with and impressions of Dādī Mā, rather than remain an "invisible" presence or "omniscient" narrator that the researcher can never be. The method of ethnography is relational at its basis and all knowledge is situated, thus taking myself out of the paper would be illusory. Much of the information in this honors thesis was gathered through my active participation with informants, so the way in which I make myself visible in my writing more accurately illustrates the lens through which my data is filtered.

This paper is organized into an introduction and then two major parts: an academic literature review and a narrative style ethnography. To provide context for my ethnographic findings, I will begin with a brief introduction both to the city of Vārānasī in which I completed my study, and to the terminology used in discussing Hindu asceticism. In the literature review, the findings of other academics will be discussed as well as the tensions between lived renunciation versus its textual ideals. The second part, composed of my ethnographic findings, is divided into three sections: "Mā Ānandamayī as Mother," "Dādī Mā's Delayed Asceticism," and "The Hindu Gods as Children". Organizing this thesis in this way will allow me to contextualize the phenomenon of renunciation in Hinduism, review the scholarly debates on this topic, and then add my original contribution to the scholarship based on my experiential research in the fall of 2014.

Kāshī: The City of Light

Though I traveled throughout northern India during my stay, the majority of my research was done in Vārānasī, a city rich in Hindu culture in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India. The fervent religious nature of Vārānasī almost overwhelms the senses. Ascetics wander through the city, wrapped from head to toe in orange cloth. This same cloth also covers their coarse wooden staff, a religious ornament that symbolizes their renunciation, thus becoming an essential part of their everyday dress. Cycle rickshaws carry householders and ascetics alike, auto rickshaws are adorned with *aum* and swastika stickers, and the free-roaming holy cows reside in the streets of Vārānasī: all of them swerve in and out of one another's path in a seemingly rehearsed dance. Smoke of sandalwood incense rises from the shrines and lingers in the thick air. Bells ring from homes and hymns sound from the loudspeakers along the *ghāṭs* to summon the sun each morning. On their return home from the riverbanks, Hindus meander through the characteristic narrow *galīs* of Vārānasī, holding a small metal brass vase filled with the holy water from the Ganges. Over the four-month period I resided in this city, these were some of the images through which I came know and understand Vārānasī—through its religious nature.

The city is widely known by different names— Vārānasī, Banāras, and Kāshī. Although Vārānasī became the official name of the city after India's independence, the name by which it is most commonly referred is Banāras or Benares in its Anglicized form. Its name is said to derive from the two rivers that define its eastern and western boundaries, Varanā and Asī, respectively. These rivers not only create a physical boundary by which Vārānasī is defined but also mark this enclosed space as a sacred zone and act as a barrier to evils in Hindu mythology (Eck 27). Chandramouli, the author of *Luminous Kashi to Vibrant Varanasi*, also suggests that these rivers are represented as internal rivers of the subtle body; Vārānasī is, therefore, located between the Varanā (the eyebrows) and Nāsī (the nose) (9). This esoteric interpretation of Vārānasī makes it homologous to the place of the third-eye center or the center of highest wisdom. Though its names can be used interchangeably and all refer to the same physical location, each particular name has its own significance. Government

officials and politicians commonly refer to the city as Vārānasī when discussing policy. Similarly, foreigners will generally only know the city by this official name now that the colonial legacy of British rule has faded and foreign travelers have adopted vernacular usage. However, many of the local people call their home or birthplace (*janmasthān*) Banāras, thus its residents are known as *banārasis*.

Its third name, Kāshī, means the "luminous one" or "city of light". As noted by Chandramouli, "...the *Skanda Purana* explains that Kāshī lights up the path of *mokṣa*" referring to liberation through its radiance (5). Diana Eck, a scholar of religious studies, attempts to generate an accurate representation of the city through the eyes of a Hindu in her book *Banāras: City of Light*:

> Kāshī is the whole world, they say. Everything on earth that is powerful and auspicious is here, in this microcosm. All of the sacred places of India and all of her sacred waters are here. All of the gods reside here, attracted by the brilliance of the City of Light. (23)

The sacredness of Kāshī is "derived from sets of triads," states Chandramouli, including "the trinity of Lord Śiva, Ma Ganga and the Mukti Kshetra Kāshī" and "the trinity of Varuna, Asi and Kāshī" (3). Similarly, Eck quotes from the Kāshī Khanda to exemplify the powerful nature of the congruence of "the city of Kāshī, the Lord Śiva Vishveshvara, and the River Ganges: *This we know for certain: Where the River of Heaven / Flows in the Forest of Bliss of Śiva, / There is* mokṣa *guaranteed*" (212). Here, *mokṣa* is the Hindi translation of liberation or the escape from *saṃsāra*, the continuous cycle of death and rebirth. Thought of as the center of the universe, Kāshī is one of the most important places for Hindu pilgrimage in all of India. It is thought to reside above the earth, atop the mythological trident of Śiva and is regarded as the city of Lord Śiva, the god of destruction. Though he is thought to reside everywhere and within everything, he is said to especially reside within the boundaries of the City of Light.

The sacredness of the land is further amplified by its proximity to the Ganges River, from which flights of long, steep steps or *ghāṭs* emerge, reaching towards the center of the city. The *ghāṭs* are filled with life; boatmen line the walkways awaiting new customers, washer men (*dhobī-wale)* do their work ankle-deep in the water, men gather around Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭ for chai as they watch the human cremations below, young boys grab the attention of tourists with their games of cricket, and women perform *pūjā* for their family's prosperity at the edge of the water. The Ganges is no ordinary river; its waters, originating from the River of Heaven, are believed to purify and heal both the physical and spiritual ailments of those with whom it comes in contact.

Additionally, Kāshī is regarded as a crossroads between this worldly life on earth and that of the transcendent *Brahman*. It is said that if one dies within its boundaries, between Assī Ghāṭ and Rāj Ghāṭ, then one is automatically released from the cycle of *saṃsāra,* the circle of life and death in which all beings who have not yet attained *mokṣa* reside*. Hindus make pilgrimages here both during their lifetime to receive the blessings of the city and at the time of death to be ceremoniously cremated and led to *mokṣa*, as one's ashes are dispersed in the waters of the Ganges River. This fervent religious nature eased my efforts in meeting holy women, especially when directed to the Mātā Ānandamayī āshram. While Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī lived adjacent to the āshram, her life was not bound up in the everyday workings of it, so I ended up doing most of my research outside of the āshram and in the city of Banāras itself.

Terminology

This paper aims to complicate the definition of lived renunciation and its relation to gender; to do so, I will first explain the terminology. Asceticism is defined by abstention from worldly pleasures, often in pursuit of a spiritual goal. Though this accurately represents Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī, it also can describe male and female householders, for many female householders in the city of Banāras undergo frequent ritual fasts for Hindu festivals, during which they undergo temporary asceticism—abstaining from the worldly indulgences of food in hopes of increasing good karma, generally for their husband or their family. That said, an

ascetic (m. *sādhu;* f. *sādvhī*) is a more clearly defined term for holy persons in India. "Renunciation (*sannyās)* is a specific type of asceticism and its initiates (m. *sannyāsī;* f. *sannyāsīnī*)" have renounced worldly pleasures as a permanent and central aspect of their religious vocation (Khandelwal 2). *Sannyāsīs* are distinguished from the more general *sādhu* through their *dīkṣā* (initiation) into a specific line of gurus, representing the death of their former householder life.

Though there are female terms for both a holy person (*sādhvī)* and a renunciant *(sannyāsīnī),* I found that most female ascetics, including Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī, would refer to themselves and other female ascetics using male-centric terms (*sādhu* and *sannyāsī).* Similarly, most persons outside the religious community would often refer to female ascetics by terms traditionally reserved for men (*sādhu* and *sannyāsī*). The term *sādhvī* (a female *sādhu)* was only used by academic scholars or field assistants who wanted to remain politically correct. The use of *sādhvī* posed an issue, for it refers to both a female ascetic as well as the wife of a male *sādhu* (Khandelwal 7). In acknowledgement of this ambiguity, many of the female ascetics within this community used the terms *sādhu,* occasionally marking it with the word 'female' or 'lady' to distinguish gender.

The process of creating a clear distinction between *sādhus and sannyāsīs* was particularly difficult considering that many of the informants with whom I spoke made no such distinction. They used the terms interchangeably, for Dādī Mā considered herself both a *sannyāsī* as well as a *sādhu.* Additionally, there were many women who had an outer appearance of either a *sādhu* or a *sannyāsī* but fit into neither category; they identified as widow, one who lived an ascetic life similar to a *sādhu* after her husband's death but did not necessarily have the aim of spiritual advancement. In order to formulate a clearer understanding of my informants and their community, I had to understand these traditional and textbook definitions as well as grasp the titles and definitions that the informants themselves used. Within this thesis, because I have opted to represent the informants as authentically as possible, I have chosen to refer to

the female ascetics using the same terminology by which they refer to themselves. This includes using the terms *sādhu* and *sannyāsī* for female ascetics regardless of their traditional identification for holy men or renunciants.

Lived Representations of Renunciation Versus Textual Ideals

The *Laws of Manu,* an ancient and well-studied text that outlines the laws of Hinduism, provides an exemplary description of the ideal life-style of a renouncer:

> Departing from his house...let him wander about absolutely silent, and caring nothing for enjoyments that may be offered. Let him always wander alone without any companion to attain (final liberation), fully understanding that the solitary (man, who) neither forsakes nor is forsaken, gains his end. He shall neither possess a fire nor a dwelling, he may go to a village for his food, (he shall be) indifferent to everything, firm of purpose, meditating (and) concentrating his mind on Brahman. A potsherd (instead of an almsbowl), the roots of trees (for a dwelling), coarse worn-out garments, life in solitude and indifference towards everything are the marks of one who has attained liberation. (Narayan 68)

Based on textual accounts like this which emphasize the isolated nature of *sannyāsīs,* early Indologists like the twentieth century, French structuralist Louis Dumont conceived of *sādhus* and *sannyāsīs* as lonesome wanderers. Dumont defines renouncers as individuals who pursue salvation rather an "explicitly societal aim" (Hausner 190).

Dumont further emphasizes renunciation as a separation from the world rather than a new mode of relationality within it. By determining that renouncers ideally live outside of structured society, thus separating themselves from the hierarchies of caste and worldly concerns, his findings reflect the textual ideals within the *Upanishads*. He discusses *sādhus* based upon their oppositional or dualistic relationships with Hindu

society. In his essay "World Renunciation in Indian Religions," he proposes a simple binary relationship that split Hindu thought and practice into two opposing categories: this-worldly householder and otherworldly renouncer (Hausner 196). As such a framework is overly simplistic and too static to accurately represent Hindu society, many succeeding scholars have challenged his work. Though the lived nature of Hindu practice is more complex than Dumont's proposed model of dualism, it is not, as Sondra Hausner mentions, a completely foreign concept to the renouncers themselves and remains relevant in cultural anthropological studies today.

Dumont's oppositional model of renunciation has recently been corrected with a more social integrative model that considers interactions and relations that *sādhus* have with householders as well as with their own itinerant communities. Hausner's research on how "…space, time, and matter are constructed, experienced, and understood by *sādhus*," complicates Dumont's dualistic model of this-worldly householder and otherworldly renouncer (2). Hausner instead views social and bodily practices through a religious lens, finding that "renouncers insist upon the split between soul and body because it is a powerful metaphor for the split they enact from householder society" (183). Thus, she claims, "…the ideological relationship that [Dumont] posited between householders and renouncers is consistent with renouncers' own views of their social relations" (197). Upon initiation, renunciants align themselves with the space and time of the divine, therefore inhabiting a position of marginality outside of the normative but in alignment with a transcendental realm. Hausner discusses tangible social advantages of such an alignment—transcendence of householder society ideally allows those of low status to translate their social weakness into social power by a physical and ideological separation from Brahmanical hegemony (184). She reinforces aspects of religious dualism as related to the gross body by stating that transcendence of the body acts as a "symbol of separation" between the "social, material world" inhabited by householders and the "transcendent plane" experienced by *sādhus* (187). Renunciants actually ascribe to dualism themselves upon their

initiation, *dīkṣā*, into *sādhuhood* through the symbolic death of their "this-worldly" life and body. Ascribing such an idealistic model of dualism to renunciation still fails to holistically define it.

Such textual ideals of solitude may disregard the communal aspects of ascetic life and are understood as more of an anomaly than a consistent reflection of ethnographic realities. Hausner asserts that renunciants, even those of wandering nature or in isolation, form a sense of community and that "renouncer life is actually a social experience;" induction into a populated lineage through the commitment to a guru and shared ideological views of *saṃsāra* as illusory are but two examples that shape renouncers into a "cultural unit" (190). This relational aspect of renunciation extends beyond the *sādhu* community and infiltrates that of householder society, such that the relationship between *sādhus* and householders has been viewed as one of mutual dependency. From her research on an individual holy man whom she referred to as *Swamiji,* Kirin Narayan claimed that "the act of renunciation may in fact push an ascetic into more extensive social involvement than if he or she remained a layperson" (79). This is particularly true in the case of female *sādhus* and *sannyāsīs* who have voluntarily left the role of female householder, which, due to social norms, is mainly lived within the private sphere. Based on the observations of *Swamiji* as a storyteller, Narayan gathered that a *sādhu's* attributes "emerge" through his or her own interaction with other characters (232). A story acts as a roundabout medium for the transmission of a moral and allows the listener to become caught up in its believability, thus it endows meaning to the listener's experience and creates a greater impact on his or her life (243). This not only required, but also invited social interaction between renunciants and householders.

Narayan's research on *Swamiji* as a prominent guru helps to shape our understanding of the relationship between a guru and a disciple. A guru is an enlightened being who "acts as a mediator between the world of illusions and the ultimate reality" for his or her disciples and, in return, disciples pay respect to their guru as they would to an image in a temple (Narayan 82).

Though viewed as divine by his or her disciples, a guru is not a fully perfected being; as quoted by Narayan, *Swamiji* says, "As long as a person eats, there are imperfections" (85). *Swamiji,* though a highly praised guru, remained inadvertently bound up in the material world through the retention of purity rituals from his earlier life as a Brahmin. Concerned with the cultural impurities associated with menstruation, he created a physical separation between women and himself, his food, and his altar.

In *The Graceful Guru,* Lisa Hallstrom, a leading scholar on the life and teachings of Mā Ānandamayī, discusses gender issues surrounding renunciation in terms of social behavior and guru-disciple relations. Through her investigation of Mā Ānandamayī's role as a female guru, Hallstrom found that Mā Ānandamayī's female devotees felt a greater sense of intimacy with Mā Ānandamayī than did their male counterparts (92). Though this exclusion of men lies in contrast to Narayan's research on the life of the male guru *Swamiji* in which women are pushed to the periphery, both are based upon the same cultural prohibitions that govern the relations between unrelated men and women in India. Gender, in and of itself, is a socially constructed concept, thus the issue of gender limitations within renunciation should be regarded in terms of relationality. Conceived as an avatar or perfected being, Mā Ānandamayī provided her female devotees with the opportunity "to swim with God, to sleep next to God, to feed God, or to comb God's hair" (Hallstrom 93). Such physical closeness and interaction with a guru instilled a great sense of empowerment and spiritual equality in Hallstrom's female informants.

In similar terms, DeNapoli insists on the importance of recognizing the gendered construction of female *sādhus*' narratives as an alternative to the textual traditional of their male counterparts. DeNapoli's research on female *sādhus* in Rajasthan illustrates elements of *bhakti,* "duty, destiny and devotion," as central to female *sādhus*' expression of *sannyās.* She claims that female *sādhus* both legitimize their practice of devotional asceticism and stand against the patriarchy of Brahmanical asceticism by aligning their practices with the larger, well-established lineage of *bhakti,* or "the sweeter mode of *sannyās*" (DeNapoli 17)*.* She states that in the performance of *bhajans*, or devotional song, "*sādhus* take the Brahmanical renunciant values of suffering, sacrifice, and struggle and selectively adjust their meanings in light of multifaceted *bhakti* frameworks to craft vernacular asceticism in Rajasthan," a life of singing that "enacts a divine call of duty and devotion to God, to one's spiritual community, or to one's guru" (DeNapoli, 34). In *Real Sadhus Sing to God,* DeNapoli states that "singing *bhajans* establishes a female way of being a *sādhu* in the world" and proposes this as a new model through which we can view and analyze Hindu renunciation in Northern India (2).

Findings from my experiential research with Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī similarly establish a particularly female way of being a *sannyāsī* within a highly patriarchal Indian society. I argue that female *sannyāsīs* retain gendered characteristics from their former householder life which are expressed through the relationships they form during renunciation. Renunciation, in general, is relational and expands beyond the binary model proposed by Dumont; however, this relationality is greatly magnified for female *sannyāsīs.* Leaving a society ruled by men and entering into a mode of renunciation defined for men, female *sannyāsīs* are a social anomaly in their minority as well as in their rebellion against the traditional female role as wife. As a way of justifying and authenticating their new role as *sannyāsī,* female ascetics center themselves within a supportive web of spiritual relationships that include female gurus, other female ascetics and Hindu gods.

Mā Ānandamayī as Mother

Upon her initiation into asceticism, Dādī Mā took up residence at the Mātā Ānandamayī āshram in Vārānasī, India, devoting herself entirely to her female guru, Mā Ānandamayī. Due to their roles as avatar and sannyāsī which are ideologically separated from gender, neither Mā Ānandamayī nor Dādī Mā, respectively, identified as female; however, both remained within a female body. Embodiment becomes a pivotal element in defining the relationship between guru and disciple. Due to

the social constructs of gender and its related regulations, as devotees, women cannot achieve the kind of closeness to male gurus that their male counterparts can. The reverse is true when the guru is a woman. Thus, the intimacy with which Dādī Mā could relate to Mā Ānandamayī as both mother and guru illustrates a female mode of renunciation.

*   *   *

As a female devotee, Dādī Mā achieved intimacies with and received both emotional and spiritual support from her female guru Mā Ānandamayī. Mā Ānandamayī, or Mother of Bliss, was born into a poor Brahmin family in Kheora, Bengal (Hallstrom, 86). At birth, she was given the name Nirmālā Sundari, meaning "the taintlessly beautiful one," a name that devotees later claimed to be well suited to her (Mukerji, 8). From a young age, even as a baby, Nirmālā was recognized as having divine-like characteristics and, according to the many biographies written about her, she engaged in behaviors that were considered odd for a child such as sitting and meditating for hours on end. Nirmālā was married at the age of twelve, however she did not adopt the traditional role of a housewife; instead of attending to her assigned household obligations, she continued to spend the majority of her time meditating and residing within a state of *samādhi* (Mukerji 46).

Those who knew Nirmālā, or Mā (Mother) as she came to be addressed by her devotees, were struck by her luminous spiritual state and, in a gesture of great humility, they would bow their heads and bodies in respect (Mukerji 48). Lisa Hallstrom reflects on the power of Mā Ānandamayī's presence in *The Graceful Guru*, stating that her devotees would commonly report that "…one glance from Mā [Ānandamayī] awakened in them a spiritual energy so powerful as to redirect their entire life" (86). My yoga guru in Vārānasī, Smritī Singh, who married into the family of Mā Ānandamayī, spoke of her as a saint, "My grandmother was very high. Mā Ānandamayī was a great soul, divine soul. That kind of soul is very few now in India, one who lives within their heart center and has full realization of it."

Though Mā Ānandamayī was born a woman, she was not subject to the social regulations by which many other Indian women are oppressed. She articulated this transcendence of gender roles through the rejection of her "dharma, or sacred duty, as a Hindu wife", which although it initially bewildered her husband, was later accepted by him due to the recognition of Nirmālā as an avatar, or manifestation of a Hindu god. Thus, Mā Ānandamayī was neither attributed gendered characteristics nor was she thought of as a saint or a guru; instead, she was recognized as an avatar, "as God who came in the form of a woman for the sake of her devotees" (Hallstrom 86). Hallstrom clarifies devotees' claim of Mā Ānandamayī as God, "There is a multiplicity of concepts reflected in that assertion: Ma is the incarnation of formless *Brahman*… Ma is the avatar of Vishnu, or simply Ma is my *ishta devata*, my chosen deity" (112). Mā Ānandamayī was worshipped by her devotees as a perfected human being, one who had already attained spiritual liberation upon birth. Still, due to her rebirth in the form of a female body, physical closeness to Mā Ānandamayī—and therefore, to *Brahmān*—was more accessible to women.

This privileged access to Mā Ānandamayī offered female devotees the spiritual opportunity to have a close relationship with *Brahmān*: however, Hallstrom notes that the act of caring for and being cared for by Mā Ānandamayī also offered them an emotional opportunity. Mā Ānandamayī fulfilled a motherly role that was lacking for married devotees. Hallstrom explains that when Hindu and Bengali women are married off and separated from their birth mothers, they are left to receive motherly attention from their mother-in-law, which may be little or none (95). Many of Hallstrom's informants mentioned that "the kind of intimacy that they enjoyed with Mā [Ānandamayī] mirrored their relationship with their biological Mā" (96). The level of emotional support that Mā Ānandamayī offered these women could even be regarded as higher than the nourishment they received from their own birth mothers and also reflects the gendered value of the guru-disciple relationship. Such was the case with Dādī Mā.

Over the course of my time with Dādī Mā, I came to know her life through her stories and, even more so, through her songs. From

interviews with other female *sādhus*, I had had become accustomed to not using a voice recorder so I followed suit during my initial visits with Dādī Mā. Since my Hindi was only conversational and Dādī Mā carried on garrulously, leaving neither time for translation nor space for questions, I determined that my research would be nearly impossible without a recorder. While seated in her room one day—she, on her blanketed plywood bed and I, at her feet on the floor—she interrupted herself mid-thought and broke into a devotional song about her yearning for Mā Ānandamayī which I recorded. Dadi Ma used the time during which I visited her as an opportunity to share her life story through the songs she had once written. Upon completion of one of her Bengali songs, she related her passion for singing back to her birth mother, "My mother sang very well. She knew singing and whenever I sang in front of her, she didn't like it and would tell me that I sing very badly. But Mā [Ānandamayī] liked my singing. She thought that I had my own voice and didn't copy anyone."

Although Dādī Mā spoke often and only highly of Mā Ānandamayī, in all of our conversations, this was one of the few times she ever mentioned her birth mother, and it was in a negative light. Her sullen tone was overcome by a beaming pride when she told us of Mā Ānandamayī's approval of her singing; in her eyes, the only approval that mattered was that of Mā Ānandamayī. Any discouragement Dādī Mā felt from the judgment of her birthmother was outweighed by Mā Ānandamayī's encouraging and loving words. This filial relation to Mā Ānandamayī is common of many female devotees, as is mentioned in Hallstrom's research on devotees' relation to Mā Ānandamayī during her lifetime.

Though my findings concentrated on Dādī Mā's relation to Mā Ānandamayī after her passing, Hallstrom's findings are still pertinent. In fact, the emotional support that Mā Ānandamayī provided for her female devotees becomes even more important following her death. Here, translated to English from Dādī Mā's Hindi translation, is one of Dādī Mā's Bengali songs in which the role of mother was clearly assigned to Mā Ānandamayī:

> *I want Mā, just like a small child always wants to be with his mother, I want to be with Mā all the time. There is nothing else that I yearn for.*

In this verse, Dādī Mā likens herself to a "small child" and, in doing so reveals a clear dependency on Mā Ānandamayī. It is not that she yearns for this emotional connection out of desire, but rather out of need. Dādī Mā's connection with Mā Ānandamayī is a living example of the intimacies that women often achieve with their female gurus. She had, in fact, redirected her life so that Mā Ānandamayī had become, not only an integral part of her life, but, the central driving force of her identity and religious practices. As a deceased guru, Mā Ānandamayī represented both a motherly figure as well as *Vaikuntha.* As exemplified below, many of Dādī Mā's conversations and devotional songs often led back to her persistent yearning to be reunited with Mā Ānandamayī in this spiritual realm outside of *saṃsāra*:

> *I feel turmoil inside my heart*
> *remembering your name (mother)*
> *As much as I say to my mind not to cry,*
> *Not to hurt, mother.*
> *My heart does not listen to any words*
> *It keeps on saying that thing*
> *Keeps on wanting mother.*
>
> *I cannot spare a day without mother.*
> *I cannot spare a night too without you mother.*
>
> *I feel turmoil inside my heart*
> *remembering your name (mother)*
> *As much as I say to my mind not to cry,*
> *Not to hurt, mother.*
> *My heart does not listen to any words*
> *It keeps on saying that thing*
> *Keeps on wanting mother.*
>
> *Who else has a beautiful smile like her?*
> *Who else has a beautiful speech like her?*
> *Who else has eyes full of love except her?*
>
> *I feel turmoil inside my heart*
> *remembering your name (mother)*
> *As much as I say to my mind not to cry,*

Not to hurt, mother.
My heart does not listen to any words
It keeps on saying that thing
Keeps on wanting mother.

I don't feel like this worldly game anymore.
I don't feel like this worldly game anymore.

"When I am singing these songs, I start crying," she told me. Dādī Mā explained that she does not necessarily cry out of a sadness, but instead, out of deep devotion. In this song, she expresses her deep love for Mā Ānandamayī, putting her above all else. Regardless of how Dādī Mā tries to resist her yearning for Mā Ānandamayī, her mind and her heart are not strong enough. "So I yearn for that Mā [Ānandamayī] all the time. I can't stay without her for even a bit. Who wants to play the games of this materialistic world? I don't want to be here. I would like to go to *Vaikuntha* to be with my Mā [Ānandamayī]. Definitely, definitely, definitely. It fills my eyes with tears when I think of my Mā [Ānandamayī]. I just keep praying for her to take me from here, to her." Aforementioned, Mā Ānandamayī does not only represent a motherly figure who provides love and comfort but is also a passageway to *Vaikuntha* (the home or realm within which Vishnu resides). Thus, over all desires, Dādī Mā yearns to be free and be reunited with Mā Ānandamayī outside of *saṃsāra*, the realm of death and rebirth.

Dādī Mā's fervent devotion to Mā Ānandamayī was regularly revealed to me during our visits together. One morning, as I sat with Dādī Mā and Pragya, my translator, our conversation was interrupted by a rustling in the stack of cardboard boxes lining the back wall of her room. I had become accustomed to hearing the chirps and squeals of mice during our visits, however I had not yet seen one. That morning, though, a small mouse managed to make its way onto a thin clothesline that spanned the width of the room. Dangling from the middle of the string just above my head, the mouse struggled to maintain its balance as it swayed side-to-side with the momentum of the wire. Pragya let out a shriek. Dādī Mā quickly but calmly lifted herself to her feet to loosen the mouse's tight hold from the

wire. As if consoling a small infant, she murmured to the mouse and cradled it to safety.

As the mouse scurried back to its hiding place, Dādī Mā motioned toward the half-eaten bowl of rice on the floor and explained, "I get five *rotī* and some rice and I eat only two *rotī*. I keep the rest for my children, for my mice." Living within the confines of an āshram, Dādī Mā neither had the means to buy herself food nor the space to prepare meals, so she received all of her meals from the resident cook of the Mātā Ānandamayī āshram. The food consumed by her mice, or children as she called them, was actually left as *prasād,* a religious offering of food, for Mā Ānandamayī. From each meal Dādī Mā was given, she left at least half of its contents as *prasād* for Mā Ānandamayī; however, Dādī Mā complained of the quality of the food as it was not up to her standards as this religious offering, "*Sādhūs* and *sannyāsīs* are not supposed to eat too much spice or salt. How am I supposed to eat this? How is my Mā [Ānandamayī] supposed to eat this?"

As is demonstrated through her actions and words, Dādī Mā prioritizes Mā Ānandamayī above all else, including herself. The quality of the food does not have significance for her own consumption but only as *prasād* for Mā Ānandamayī. Dādī Mā's tendency to address Mā Ānandamayī as "my" also exhibits an emotional and spiritual connection that extends beyond the typical relations between a guru and disciple. This expressed closeness to Mā Ānandamayī is characteristic of female devotees to their female gurus.

Her consistent offering of *prasād* legitimizes her role as a *sannyāsī*. The *dāl* and *rotī* left as *prasād* is not actually consumed by Mā Ānandamayī, thus it invites a community of mice to fill her home. The way in which Dādī Mā kindly welcomes and regards the mice also speaks to her authenticity as a *sannyāsī*, "These mice, they rule over my house. It is their kingdom. They play around and eat and play around without fearing anyone else in my room. Yesterday, I had this *dāl* and the mice just ran over it. Their little feet may be dirty but I still ate the *dāl*. I didn't mind because they are like my children. This is how my heart is." Mā Ānandamayī taught that "to see yourself in everyone and to realize that everyone is in you is the supreme aim of spiritual

knowledge" (Mukerji 43). Dādī Mā acknowledges Mā Ānandamayī within herself as well as within the mice, thus her embrace of the mice demonstrates her "supreme" attainment of spiritual knowledge in regards to Mā Ānandamayī's teachings.

During one of our impromptu visits, Dādī Mā introduced me to her *jāp* practice, to which she is so dedicated that she was referred to as *Jāpmālā* by the other *sādhūs* at the Mātā Ānandamayī āshram. It was late in the morning when Sundarji and I met outside of her room. Though we had made plans to meet with Dādī Mā, there was no assurance that she would actually be there as she followed no one's schedule but her own. We found signs that she was home for the door was slightly ajar and the exterior padlock unlocked, but the window remained closed and the room was dark. Sundarji knocked on the door, "Dādī Mā? Dādī Mā? It's Sundar and Morgan. We are here to see you."

We heard the rustling of fabric and a distant groan from behind the splintered wooden door, "One minute. I am coming." Dādī Mā had been out very early that morning and, exhausted from the morning activities, fell into a mid-morning slumber upon her arrival home. We were catching her at the tail end of her nap. She fabricated the saffron cloth above her head into a hood to cover her salt and pepper hair as she pushed open the screen door and greeted us with a warm smile. I was happy to see her; however, feeling disconcerted for disrupting Dādī Mā's rest, Sundarji murmured an apology on our behalf.

"Do not apologize," she interjected, waving her hands in the air in contempt. "It was a great thing that you came here, otherwise I could have slept the entire day. How am I supposed to do my spiritual duties if I am sleeping?" Sundarji and I took our respective seats as Dādī Mā accustomed herself with her awakened state. Instead of sitting on her bed, she sat on the short wooden stool that resembled something more like a crate and reached within her robe to reveal the three sets of *rudrākṣa mālās* that hung around her neck. She explained to us that she must perform her *jāp* every time she wakes to rid herself of the evil spirits that may have visited during her unconscious state and asked for our forgiveness for the delay. Before performing *jāp*, Dādī Mā

completed a purification ritual to cleanse both her *mālās* and herself—she dipped her fingers in the holy water from the Ganges river, flicked the droplets over her head and poured a small amount into her mouth after completely immersing each *mālā* in the purifying waters.

Dādī Mā lifted one of the *mālās* over her head and placed it in a piece of cloth into which she also slipped her right hand. She explained that while performing *jāp*, the *mālā* should always be hidden from sight due to the belief that surrounding spirits might appropriate the blessings from mantra recitation if they can see the *mālā* itself. Additionally, neither the forefinger nor the nails of your fingers should come in contact with the beads, for it takes away from the blessings that can be culminated through such a meditation. The method of physically moving the beads was very particular and Dādī Mā demonstrated how each should be moved between the thumb, middle and ring finger only.

Dādī Mā performed one round of *jāp* for each of her three *mālās* around her neck. A single knot disjointed the configuration of the 108 beads, signifying its beginning and end and, thus, the completion of one round of mantra meditation. Using the beads as a placeholder for one repetition of a mantra, Dādī Mā recited, silently, each of her three mantras 108 times. The mantras she was internally chanting were kept to herself due to the secretive nature of a received mantra from a guru. Her movements were quick and rehearsed, yet intentional. Her eyelids remained soft and heavy, lifting only slightly to guide her hands to her small container of holy water. She designated only one mantra per *mālā* so for each round of *jāp,* she changed *mālās.* During this time, she would also slowly and deliberately roll out her neck and shoulders, both clockwise and counterclockwise. She explained that this physical movement created a clear break between each *mantra*, allowing her the opportunity to reset her intentions as well as maintain an upright and straight posture.

"I always sit straight while doing *jāp* or meditation in the name of Mā [Ānandamayī]. The Lord *Sushumnā Nādi,* the center channel within your body, must be kept straight in order to allow the *Māhā Vāyu* or *amrit* (nectar) to flow freely.

While doing *jāp* or *dhyānā* (meditation), the nectar flows through your forehead and into your body. When you do *jāp* with single-minded concentration, the nectar flows through your body from your forehead, feeding the *kundalini* (energy) around around the *sushumnā.* What is that energy in the form of physically? It is in the form of *vāyu* (air). When the soul leaves the body, it reaches heaven through this *vāyu.*" Dādī Mā performed *jāp* everyday, multiple times a day, rising as early as two o'clock in the morning to perform her daily rituals with the single-minded concentration on Mā Ānandamayī. Such rituals consisted of *jāp* (mantra recitation with *mālās*), meditation and devotional singing in the name of Mā Ānandamayī.

Mā Ānandamayī not only provides the emotional support for Dādī Mā to persist on her spiritual journey, she *is* the purpose of her journey. Mā Ānandamayī represents the escape from saṃsāra, a *sannyāsī's* ultimate goal, as well as the role of mother. This is reflected in Dādī Mā's everyday life through her devotional songs, offerings and praise of Mā Ānandamayī. The intimacy that Dādī Mā shared with Mā Ānandamayī transcended the relationship of Mā Ānandamayī as a guru or a motherly figure—she so closely identified with Mā Ānandamayī that her identity became intimately bound up in her guru's identity.

*   *   *

Due to Mā Ānandamayī's rebirth as a woman, Dādī Mā was given the spiritual opportunity to have an intimate relationship with the gods, or Brahmān, that would not have been accessible to her with a male guru. Female gurus are less common than male gurus in India today; however, as is mentioned in The Graceful Guru, *they have recently emerged from the private sphere into that which is more public. Dādī Mā's devotion to her female guru only grew stronger following Mā Ānandamayī's death, for she represented Vaikuntha. Such devotion was expressed through Dādī Mā's daily repetition of mantras, offerings, and songs all in the name of Mā Ānandamayī. Dādī Mā's persistent yearning to be reunited with Mā Ānandamayī as mother within a transcendent*

realm speaks to a dependency that is illustrative of female devotees to their female gurus.

Dādī Mā's Delayed Asceticism

From childhood, Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī yearned to be close to the Hindu gods. Realizing that dedicated meditation was the only sustainable method by which she could reach this goal, Dādī Mā decided at a young age that she wanted to embark on the path of asceticism. This desire to become a renunciant was disregarded by Dādī Mā's Bengali family. Instead, they insisted upon her obligations as an Indian woman and eventually forced her into an arranged marriage. Thus, Dādī Mā's marital ties restrained her from becoming a sannyāsī until later in life by steering her through the stages of householder.

*   *   *

"I always wanted to become a *sannyāsī*. I loved the color of saffron that the *sādhūs* wear," Dādī Mā reflected. "My father didn't have a son that could become a *sannyāsī*, but he used to treat me like one, as I had big feet and legs. He would call me Arūn (a boy's name) rather than Arūnā (a girl's name)." She further explained that in the old tradition, one member of each generation in the family, generally a male, was chosen to become a *sādhū,* thus, influenced by her father's regard for her as Arūn, she decided she was best fit. Dādī Mā explained that one must bear a physical resemblance to the Hindu gods to become a *sannyāsī,* thus her small, button-like nose and her desire to become a *sannyāsī* made her the ideal candidate.

Dādī Mā's desire to become a *sannyāsī* persisted from her childhood through her marriage. She was not wed until the age of thirty-two, late within Indian standards, indicating that she intentionally put off the arrangement. Succumbing to family pressures to marry, Dādī Mā became a wholly dedicated wife, eventually loving her husband. Thus, it was not until her husband passed that she was able to embark on the path of renunciation. Both Dādī Mā and her husband were spiritually driven. They prayed and performed *jāp* together with the desire to attain *mokṣa* (liberation); however, since they

were living as a couple, they remained as lay persons and householders. Unable to further pursue their spirituality due to their being together, Dādī Mā and her husband agreed that only once one of them passed would the survivor transition into the life of renunciation. Dādī Mā reasoned that her husband's large nose, in comparison to her small nose that resembled the Hindu gods, would have been a big hindrance to his asceticism. Also, since Dādī Mā's husband was fourteen years older, she felt she was the best fit to become a *sannyāsī.* When Dādī Mā proposed that she should be the one to embark on the path of asceticism, her husband was initially bewildered because the role of renunciant is traditionally embraced by men; however, once she framed her asceticism for the liberation of them *both,* he consented.

"After my husband's death, I was so sad. He loved me so much," Dādī Mā recounted to me one day as she slowly sipped the steaming chai from her metal cup, careful not to burn her lips and tongue. "That is why I became a *sannyāsī* after he passed." As the steam from her chai reached around and caressed the edges of her face, she acknowledged her former life as a householder and reflected on the events that had brought her to the present. She revisited her past without becoming engulfed by her thoughts and emotions, maintaining the remoteness with which one scans the hazy horizon of the Ganges, where water and sky mingle into oneness. She spoke of grief, yet her disposition conveyed a calmness that reflected an acceptance of her husband's death, "Someone once told me that you should ask Mā [Ānandamayī] for your husband to always be with you and to have a long life. I told them, 'No. Why would I want to do that?' I want my husband to die before me because I want him to attain *mokṣa*. I put a garland on him when I married him. How could I put a noose around his neck now? I want him to be free. I want him to leave this world forever. He was not feeling very well. I would rather him leave and attain *mokṣa*."

By putting a garland around her husband's neck at their wedding, Dādī Mā made the decision to delay her asceticism and instead align herself with the social obligations of a female Indian householder. Following the textual ideals of *stridharma* (religious codification of women's

duties)*,* Indian women are conditioned to view their husband as a living Hindu god, "...taught that by worshipping their husbands they are fulfilling their duty toward the gods" (Gatwood 96). It is expected women ensure the well-being of their husbands and children, rather than pursue any personal religious endeavors. Dādī Mā acquiesced to the expectations of a female householder through her devotion to her husband, for, even despite physical abuse, she refused to question her husband's motives. Rather than denying her husband's abuse, Dādī Mā redefined it, "I used to tell people that my husband would beat me, not with a stick or anything, but with *love*." Instead of withdrawing from the relationship, she somehow endured the emotional and physical pain and persisted in her unwavering devotion to her husband even after his death.

Dādī Mā's decision to become a *sannyāsī* was not one of pure personal aim but due to the wifely obligations that emerged from her forced marriage, she also renounced for the liberation of her husband. This aspect of her renunciation is particularly gendered, for male renunciants have the opportunity, and can often be encouraged, to follow a lone spiritual path at a young age. Instead, Dādī Mā's renunciation was delayed by marriage, her wifely obligations carrying over past her husband's death. Traditionally, to help the deceased reach *pitṛloka,* the abode of the ancestors or "world of the fathers," the eldest son must perform funeral rites and help with the cremation. If one has no son, the duty is then passed to the grandson. With neither a son nor a grandson, Dādī Mā took this responsibility upon herself. With overwhelming strength, she maintained her composure, withholding all of her tears until the twelfth day after her husband's death—the moment when all of the rituals are commenced and her husband's soul is no longer lingering on this earth. It was at this moment, only, that she allowed herself to break down.

Though this was a past episode in her life, she spoke of it in the present, which demonstrated its lingering significance to her. "If I were to cry, then his soul would feel for me and he would wander back to this life. So to free him from all of the worldly ties, *sansarik bandhan*, I cannot show any affection. I cannot cry. If he came back into this

world, then I would also have to come back in this life again to be his wife." The strength that Dādī Mā was capable of manifesting at such a vulnerable moment in her life struck me as nothing less than remarkable, especially in contrast to the many funerals I had observed while living in Vārānasī.

There are two main *ghāṭs* on which funeral rites are typically performed in Vārānasī and out of the two, Maṇikarṇikā is the most frequently visited. Without pause, all through the night and day, men construct piles of wood onto which the recently deceased are placed and then cremated. It was not the putridity of burning flesh or the solid walls of smoke that rose from the pyres, slugging me with such force that I crumpled at the waist, breathless, and began tearing up uncontrollably, but the hysterics of the women at Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭ that was so emotionally striking. As processions marched through the narrow *galīs*, each member chanting the name of Rām in the hopes that it would further carry the soul of the deceased out of this world, shrieks bounced off the brick walls of the buildings and echoed into the city. I hardly noticed the composure of the men at the scene of the funeral as I walked past them along the top step of the *ghāṭ,* fifteen feet removed. As my feet moved forward, my head, tied to the scene by a string of curiosity, jerked back. I caught one final glimpse: a woman of small stature collapsed into the arms of another woman, relying entirely upon her strength. Her grief over her late husband was readily visible as she convulsed in synch with her sobs.

Like the woman I observed at Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭ, Dādī Mā grieved over her husband after his death, but only briefly and only after he reached *pitṛloka.* Her desire to attain *mukti* was so strong that she made valiant efforts to rid herself of all emotional ties. "After my husband's death, I was so sad. Sometimes when I would meditate for Mā [Ānandamayī], he would appear in front of her. I would ask Mā [Ānandamayī] to remove him from there, because if I think about my husband, I will not get *mukti* (salvation) and in the next life I will be born as a man. Whoever you think about at the time of death is who you become in your next life. I don't want to be back in this world. I have to go back to my Lord Kṛṣṇa."

By renouncing after her husband's death, Dādī Mā adhered to the life stages of a female householder; however, her acquired status as a *sannyāsī* distinguished her from other Indian widows. She reiterated her contentment as a *sannyāsī,* "Now I don't want anything. No ornaments, no long hair. I don't want anyone to see my physical beauty. There is no need. I am happier this way because I am with *Brahman* now and he is with me too. If I didn't tell people, no one would know that I was married. People would call me a widow and have pity on me. Why should they call me a widow? I'd rather be known as a *sannyāsī.*" As textually prescribed, women are not given an identity of their own and are only identified in relation to their husband, so when their husband passes, they are viewed as pitiful and alone (Leslie 194). Though Dādī Mā prescribed to *stridharma* during her marriage, she diverged from most widows by choosing the path of *sannyāsī,* one with the aim of liberation through religious practices, rather than that of a grieving widow.

Shortly after her husband's death, Dādī Mā underwent the transformation to become a *sannyāsī,* receiving her *dīkṣā* (initiation) from a male guru. "Becoming a *sannyāsī* is very difficult," she told me as she adjusted her saffron hood, pulling it forward and folding it with a fluency developed from repetition; I had seen her go through this motion of redressing her head already countless times. "I started by wearing a white robe for one year. Then I had to go to Kankhal to become a complete *sannyāsī.* This is where my guru, Swami Giridhar Narayan Puri Ji Maharaj, lived. He was the head of the Māhā Nirvani Akhara at the time." Dādī Mā exchanged her white robe for that of an ochre color, signifying her change in status from an ascetic widow to a *sannyāsī;* however, it was unclear into which order of renunciation Dādī Mā was initiated, a perception that was further convoluted through her variegated acts of piety. The monastic tradition of Shaiva, founded by Śaṅkara, worships Śiva, the destroyer, whereas Vaishnava is known for its worship of Vishnu, the preserver, or one of his incarnations such as Ram or Kṛṣṇa (Narayan 68). Dādī Mā's self-identification as a *sannyāsī* and the ochre-colored robes with which she was adorned during

initiation indicate her Shaiva renunciation, for Vaishnava ascetics will commonly identify as "bairagi" or "tyagi" and wear yellow or white robes (Khandelwal 28). Similarly, Dādī Mā wore three strands of rudrākṣa mālās; mantra repetition with rudrākṣa, meaning, literally, the "Eye of Śiva," situates Dādī Mā's ritual repetition of jāp within a Shaivite context (Eck 376). Conversely, Dādī Mā lived within the unaffiliated Mātā Ānandamayī āshram and was a clear devotee of Kṛṣṇa, an incarnation of Vishnu, thus her relation to the Hindu gods represented a divergence from Shaiva devotionalism. Highlighting that sannyāsa does not necessarily lie within the confines of monastic order, Khandelwal suggests that "sannyāsa as is practiced outside the monastic structures is an eclectic and dynamic contemporary practice" (28). Thus, Dādī Mā's mode of renunciation does not cleanly fit within the parameters of either Vaishnava or Shaiva.

Dādī Mā's inhabitance within an āshram does, however, align her with other female renunciants, illustrating the well-defined segregation of men and women within religious-centric Indian cities—like Banāras. Traveling to Banāras from Calcutta, a cosmopolitan city, I noticed a drastic decline in the visibility of women in the public sphere. In Calcutta, women moved as freely as men in the streets—the couple with which I was staying were professional salsa dancers and when I was with them I felt comfortable in leaving the house wearing a shirt that revealed my shoulders, something I had never done while living in Banāras. This sense of freedom was but an illusion back in Banāras—I returned to wearing three-quarter length sleeve kurtīs and wrapping my head in a thin scarf, regardless of the stifling heat. Even fully clothed, I received unwanted attention from every angle; much of this is likely because I was a white foreigner, but the sexual attention I received from strange men was also due to my gender. Every time I stepped out of my homestay or the study abroad program house, I felt myself, a female alone in the public sphere, inadvertently become the center of attention. Every man's gaze burned my skin with the strength of the sun beneath a magnifying glass.

Such attention is not limited to foreigners or householders, for Dādī Mā's initial struggle in becoming a sannyāsī reflects the challenges that come with renunciation while still living in a female body. Reflecting on her initiation in Kankhal, she explained that she had to stand naked in front of everyone at her initiation into sādhuhood and wait patiently to receive her saffron sannyāsī garments, "At the time when it happened to me, I joined my hands and remembered Ma and thought, 'Who made this body? Mā [Ānandamayī] only. So Mā [Ānandamayī], I am not ashamed. It is your body and all the shame I owe to you. I just have to follow my guru and have to go naked.'" In a society in which women are draped in clothing and protected from the male gaze, such an act of vulnerability is imaginably unbearable. In order to stand it, Dādī Mā drew strength from her intentions to become a sannyāsī—to renounce this worldly life along with its pleasures and possessions, including the human body. She explained that during initiation, there is a sacrificial fire that represents the sacrifice of the body and that from that moment onwards, sannyāsīs recognize themselves as only the five elements from which they believe everything is created: earth, air, fire, water and space. Though Dādī Mā could not physically renounce or sacrifice her body without actually dying, she did so by attributing the ownership of her body to Mā Ānandamayī, her guru who had already passed away and resided outside of saṃsāra.

The more frequently my translator, Sundarji, and I visited Dādī Mā, the more firmly he believed that she was a real sannyāsī, authentic and pure, and it was after she recounted such stories that I came to understand why it was so rare to come across such a person. Further to this, one of my informants discussed how there are many sannyāsīs nowadays, but not all of them follow the life of a sādhu—one of an entirely complacent nature, according to her. Initiation into asceticism is a symbolic death of one's human existence; however, it is common for a sannyāsī to endure the initiation yet still not be fully transformed due to their actual embodiment. Such paradoxical elements of Hindu renunciation are illuminated through Hausner's research in Wandering with Sadhus. Hindu renunciants are bound up in the

material world due to their emergence from and interaction with the community of householders. As defined by Hauser, the body acts as "both a tool of practice and a trap of worldliness" and goes on to state, "in ideal terms, being a renouncer mediates between these two poles; the renouncer's body is the link between the spatial-historical plane of social and material process and the transcendent, unified plane of knowledge" (188). Thus, it is understood that renunciants must remain both embedded in this spatial plane of social process as well as confined to an embodied experience regardless of their departure from social life or their efforts to transcend the constraints of the physical body.

Dādī Mā's eventual integration into the community at the Mātā Ānandamayī āshram illustrates a gendered aspect of Hindu asceticism. At first, Dādī Mā lived in line with textual ideals, wandering the streets and begging for food, but was quickly urged to move to Banāras to be with Mā Ānandamayī. Dādī Mā's return to Banāras was never fully explained, but it can be inferred that her guru suggested the move for the sake of her personal safety due to the dangers of being a lone female ascetic. India, Banāras especially, is full of wandering *sādhus*, but nearly all of them are men. Many banārasīs related to me that they had never even seen a lady *sādhu;* they had come in contact with many male *sādhus*, but never a female. I encountered a female *sādhu* in Banāras only once, kneeling on the *ghāṭs* outside of Kedār temple, performing a *pūjā*. The majority of female *sādhus* instead reside within the confines of an āshram—an enclosed space where, like at the Mātā Ānandamayī āshram, they are served warm meals, receive spiritual support from other women and are better shielded from the vulnerabilities of living as a woman in a patriarchal society. From within the āshram, female *sādhus* and *sannyāsīs* both interact with one another as well as with the householder community outside of the āshram.

This relation of *sannyāsīs* with what is assumed as a former householder life, is both intrinsic through embodiment and social through interaction; however, the authenticity of a *sannyāsī* is not dependent on his or her physical separation because renunciation is both lived and relational. Such social aspects of ascetic life can be found in other related ethnographies: female devotees find spiritual empowerment through their relations with Mā Ānandamayī. In Lisa Hallstrom's chapter in *The Graceful Guru,* Kirin Narayan's key informant uses storytelling as a way to communicate morals to his disciples, and in Antoine Elizabeth's *Real Sadhus Sing to God,* female Rajasthani engage in *bhakti* through singing *bhajans* within their spiritual community. Thus, authenticity is derived from a *sannyāsī's* personal motives and internal perceptions.

As someone who never wanted to wed and dreamt of becoming a *sannyāsī* from a young age, Dādī Mā conditioned herself for the arduous process of initiation. She refused the sexual attention she received from her initiation, preventing it from infiltrating her thoughts and altering her deeply rooted intentions to transcend *saṃsāra*, "I felt bad for a second when I saw some of the boys nearby staring, but in another second I was fine. When I was naked, I thought to look over myself but then a thought came into my mind, 'This very body that is standing is dead. Why would a dead body be ashamed of anything?'" Though initially challenged, Dādī Mā was unhindered by the difficulties of living in a patriarchal society because she already viewed herself as removed from the material world—her body was dead to her and her human form only temporary. This notion of death and the human body as illusory was reiterated during one of our visits, "Whenever I look at myself in the mirror, it's not me. This face, this belongs to this body but it's not mine. If it was me then why does the face change every time I look in the mirror? Sometimes I look completely black and I have a beautiful nose and big, beautiful eyes. And now look at me. I have such a small nose and such small eyes. Sometimes I become a girl. Sometimes I become a boy. Sometimes I become a cow. So, it changes. Why does it change? Why do I change forms every time I look in the mirror? Because it's not me. My face is something completely different from what I see in the mirror. My real face is very beautiful. That is me. That is me. This is not me." Such a declaration does not illustrate insanity or refusal to acknowledge her physical body, for Dādī Mā consciously coped with a swollen, injured knee about which she told me. Instead, Dādī Mā was

emphasizing the significance of her inner self over her physical body. *Sannyāsīs* regard the physical body as dead following their initiation into *sādhuhood*, thus all that ideally remains is the ethereal, spiritual body, what she remarks as her "real" and "beautiful" self.

As Dādī Mā had already undergone the funeral rites during her initiation into *sannyāsa* and considered herself dead, she explained that she would not be burned at Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭ, "A *sannyāsī*, like me, will be tied to a big stone after a shower and an orange-colored cloth will be put over me. I will be tied on a boat. All of my *rudrākṣa mālās* will be kept on me. People will take me on a boat to the middle of the Ganges and they will just throw me in the water. When a normal human being dies, if he is a Brahmin, then on the eleventh day and if he is not a Brahmin, then on the thirteenth day, *sādhus* are invited for *bhaṇḍāra* (religious feast). After one year of death, a ritual is then performed in Gaya. These people attain *mokṣa* only after this, but we *sannyāsīs* attain *mokṣa* just sixteen days after death when *bhaṇḍāra* is organized for *sādhus*. That's it. I'll leave this earth forever. There is nothing else to be done."

Death was a topic about which Dādī Mā spoke freely and frequently, for it represented not the end, but liberation, a freedom from the cycle of death and rebirth. Many of her devotional songs to Lord Kṛṣṇa were linked to this yearning to attain *mokṣa*:

> *How much further do I have to go, Lord?*
> *I want to get to you.*
> *How much further do I have to go, Lord?*
> *I want to get to you.*
> *You are full of bliss.*
> *You are full of bliss.*
> *You are not only bliss, oh Madhavam,*
> *You are supreme bliss*
> *Everywhere is just you.*

In this song, Dādī Mā calls out to Mādhavām (the sweet one), or Lord Kṛṣṇa in this case, in a representative manner of Vaishnava devotionalism as propagated by Caitanya. Thought to have developed in correspondence with the *bhakti* movement, Vaishava asceticism emphasizes connection to a personal deity (Narayan 69). Furthering this, Caitanya, who was

thought to be an incarnation of Kṛṣṇa himself, initiated the cultivation of emotional devotion through the "fervent singing of songs about the love of Kṛṣṇa" (Bhandarkar 83). As illustrated above, and in the following section, Dādī Mā equates Lord Kṛṣṇa to *Brahman* ("ultimate Reality which is the source of all being and knowing") (Eck 370). *Brahman* abides everywhere, without attributes or form, just as everywhere is Lord Kṛṣṇa in the above song (Khandelwal 27).

This song also speaks to Dādī Mā's yearning to escape the realm of *saṃsāra* and be reunited with the Lord Kṛṣṇa and Mā Ānandamayī in *vaikuntha*. "We don't want to live in this world anymore. We want Mā [Ānandamayī] to take us back," Dādī Mā stated. She addressed the act of dying as going *back*, as if returning to a familiar place, such as home. When regarding the Hindu gods as *Brahman,* Dādī Mā can then be defined in terms of *atma* (individual soul) which resides within each person: "...[*atma*] originates from and, eventually (at the time of liberation), merges back into *Brahman* as a drop of water merges into an ocean" (Khandelwal 27). When Dādī Mā refers to her return to Lord Kṛṣṇa, she refers to this remerging of *atma* with *Brahman.*

After the passing of her husband, Dādī Mā wanted to show her affection to no one other than Lord Kṛṣṇa, Mā Ānandamayī and other Hindu gods, for any other worldly connections would hinder her attainment of *mokṣa*. Since her life as a *sannyāsī* was still interwoven with that of householders, Dādī Mā redefined her relationships by claiming that she was disliked by other *sādhus.* "It's better that people don't like me, because it makes it easier for me to leave this world, never to come back. If people loved me then it would become difficult. Their love would keep pulling me back into this world, but I want to run away from everyone and all worldly ties and to never come back again." Though I never observed Dādī Mā with other *sannyāsīs,* it's unclear whether or not she was actually disliked. Regardless, Dādī Mā's perception of her relationships with other sādhus remains significant for it illustrates her active effort to remain engaged with *sannyāsī* values.

Retrospectively, Dādī Mā restructured her decisions from her former householder life to

align with her renunciation. "I chose this life because I never liked cooking and never wanted to do it. When my husband died, people told me to go and cook food in the Annapurna temple for the rest of my life. I thought, 'What am I to do? I don't know how to cook!' Liking plays an important role in your actions and I didn't like cooking, so how could I cook in the temple? I didn't want to do anything. I didn't like to socialize. That is why I chose the life of a *sannyāsī*." Dādī Mā's decision to renunciate was one that challenged the traditional role of women in Indian society, (*stridharma),* thus Dādī Mā retrospectively rewrote her life in terms of renunciation in an effort to validate her identity as a *sannyāsī*. In addition to aligning her dispositions with renunciant values, Dādī Mā further validated her decision to renunciate by attributing it to the well-being of both her father and her husband. She explains, "I'm happy that I became a *sādhu* for my father since he didn't have a son who could become one." Khandelwal states that "both Hindu sacred literature and scholarly studies typically defined women in relation with men, as daughters, wives, sisters, mothers, and widows," thus Dādī Mā's decision to renunciate was also an act of shedding these terms, pushing her to the periphery of social norms for women in India. Dādī Mā's marriage to her husband inherently delayed her asceticism; however, in her eyes, it also authenticated it because she was still able to fulfill her obligations as wife by taking *sannyāsa* for both her liberation as well as her husband's.

*   *   *

Dādī Mā's path to asceticism was one of deferral, as was the case of many female sannyāsīs who were forced to fulfill the traditional female role as wife. Since women are typically defined in relation to men, the act of female renunciation is seen as an act of defiance, by both society at large and the sannyāsīs themselves. Learned social behaviors and societal norms are not entirely forgotten with the initiation into asceticism, thus Dādī Mā's role as wife and daughter as well as the obligations of those roles were not left behind when she became a sannyāsī. Though Dādī Mā was delayed in her asceticism due to her role as wife, she still attributed her decision to do so to both her

father and her husband as a way of continuing the fulfillment of her householder roles. Such an integration of roles is not necessary for male sannyāsīs, as their decision to renunciate is not only welcomed but often encouraged.

The Hindu Gods as Children

In choosing to renunciate, Dādī Mā relinquished her ties to the material world, including familial relations. She verbally confirmed her disinterest in relating to others while she was still physically living on this earth, for it would act as an impediment to achieving mokṣa*. Instead, Dādī Mā filled the void of filial relations by imagining herself within a spiritual family of Hindu gods.*

*   *   *

Entering Dādī Mā's room was akin to visiting a shrine. Within a Hindu temple, the stimulation can seem overwhelming: the ringing of a bell reverberates within the space, denoting the entrance of another worshiper; hints of pollen, rich incense smoke and body odor waft together to form an offensive yet oddly sweet and comforting aroma; garlands draped over images of Hindu gods diminish petal by petal over time. While Dādī Mā's room lacked crowds and noise, it was rich in visual stimulation. Torn cardboard boxes covered in quilted blankets and broken vases lined the back wall of her room. Above these, an amalgamation of Hindu images formed a three-dimensional installation, the ripped edges of the incense-tinted pages curling in on themselves like the ends of a young fern. Having been exposed to Hinduism over my past few months in Vāranāsī, I was able to identify most of the sacred images—Hanumān the monkey god, Rām and Sītā, the elephant-headed Gaṇeśa, and the many armed goddess Durgā.

This confluence of sacred images in Dādī Mā's room allowed *darśana* with the gods, thus reinforcing her pursuit of *mokṣa. Darśana,* the receiving of blessings through sight, means, in a religious sense, "beholding the divine image and standing in the presence of God" as defined by Diana Eck in *Banāras: City of Light* (20). Eck's mention of "God" refers to *Bhāgvan* (the supreme transcendent and formless one) "who manifests

in the myriad forms" of Hindu deities, a pantheon made up of 330 million gods (Narayan 32). Eck further explains that, "for Hindus, the image is not an object at which one's vision halts, but rather a lens through which one's vision is directed" (20). Thus, Dādī Mā's act of *darśana* is not just the physical act of seeing a deity, but the receiving of blessings which fuel her spiritual path of asceticism.

One of the first times I entered her room, Dādī Mā caught me in a state of awe, my gaze swimming in the sea of colors. As I sat on a small stool just behind the door, eating biscuits and sipping on Indian *masālā chai* from a stainless-steel cup, she took the opportunity to introduce me to her carefully curated exhibit. "This is *my* Mā [Ānandamayī]," she said, smiling. As she lifted a picture frame from the left side of her bed, a cloud of dust fell into the stream of sunlight pouring into the center of the room. Dādī Mā swept her fingers across the photograph as a blind person traces the textured surface of brail. Raising the photograph, she pressed it against her forehead, the place of the third-eye center, and then, while making a long, drawn-out kissing noise, she brought it to meet her lips. She went through these same emotional gestures with each deity she introduced, kissing her fingertips and then extending her hand to touch the figure if it was out of reach.

Just in front of the framed photograph of Mā Ānandamayī was a small mound of fabric. Peeling the worn, sun-bleached blankets back revealed what appeared to be a child's collection of tattered stuffed animals. "See Mā [Ānandamayī] is the master of the universe so she must have a *hāthi* (elephant). Somebody just threw it outside," she explained, regarding the small toy elephant in her hand. "The stuffing from it had come out but it was still intact, so I brought it home and put it next to Mā [Ānandamayī]'s photo. Now it is one of my children." Sounding like a proud mother of a new-born child, Dādī Mā ushered us over to have a look at her "children," "Come have a *darśana* of them. They are inside the blanket sleeping. I will bring them out, love them a little bit."

Dādī Mā does not merely observe the deities thought to reside within her stuffed animals, the elephant-headed Gaṇeśa in this case, but interacts quite intimately with them. Cynthia

Packert, the author of *The Art of Loving Kṛṣṇa,* regards the act of *darśana* as dynamic, in which the receiver of the blessing becomes part of a theatrical platform: "...the ritual stage is set, and the gods as both subject and object becomes a device for focusing devotion and emotion" (11). Through the accumulation of sacred images and objects, Dādī Mā transformed her room into a ritual stage, in which she actively engaged with and expressed loving, motherly devotion for the Hindu gods.

Disregarding our presence in the room, Dādī Mā greeted her stuffed animal Gaṇeśa. She cooed and expressed her affection through a showering of kisses. Giving Gaṇeśa one final nuzzle, she pulled him in for a tight squeeze and let out a small yelp of joy, "Oh my dear children, it has been such a long time since you have slept. I am so sorry that your mom has kept you up for so long," she admitted regretfully. "Will you look at the time? It's nearly two o'clock, way past your bedtime." Dādī Mā then placed Gaṇeśa beside her bed and wrapped him in her cozy blankets and sweaters, as she regarded them, covering his face from the light to assure he would rest through the night. Simulating temple worship in which a Hindu god is considered an honored guest, Dādī Mā took on the role of host and enacted rituals to welcome and enliven Gaṇeśa. Packert describes this ritual attention, *sevā* (service), to Hindu deities within a *mandir* (temple) as the "caring, feeding, ongoing maintenance, and adornment of the deity and his temple environment" (11). Thus, as an act of *sevā,* Dādī Mā laid a *rudrākṣa mālā* and a lotus flower atop each of her stuffed animals to protect them from the evil spirits during their slumber. Furthering the intimacy between deity and devotee, Dādī Mā took on the protective role of mother, "I don't let anybody else touch them. They are my little children." Folding her hands in prayer to meet her forehead, she said, "After playing with them a little bit, I'll pay my respects, because they are actually Hindu gods."

Dādī Mā not only introduced the gods with a level of familiarity, but actually claimed a familial relation to them. Introducing me to her children, Dādī Mā said, "See, I have Gaṇeśa, the son of Śiva Pārvatī, who is the mother of all creatures. A Mā [Ānandamayī] and a Makradhwāja, who is the son

of the monkey god Hanumān, my brother. So, Makaradhwāja is my nephew." Gaṇeśa and Makaradhwāja were her two stuffed animals—Gaṇeśa, the elephant, and Makaradhwāja, the monkey. Both Hanumān and Mā Ānandamayī were represented in framed photographs on her wall and next to her bed, respectively. With Gaṇeśa as her child, Hanumān, her brother, and Makradhwāja, her nephew, Dādī Mā positioned herself in the otherworldly family tree of the Hindu gods, filling the void of an existing human family. With the death of her husband, she no longer had any familial obligations and was free to pursue the lone path of asceticism. Dādī Mā spoke to me of her brother and sister who also lived in Banāras but, just as she held the significance of Mā Ānandamayī over her own birth mother, she regarded the Hindu gods as a more intimate part of her family than her blood siblings. This directly relates to Dādī Mā's pursuit of *mokṣa*, because she has no interest in relating to other householders, even her birth family, as a relation such as this would hinder her renunciation, whereas a connection to a spiritual family comprised of Hanumān, Mā Ānandamayī, Makaradhwaj and Gaṇeśa supports an ascetic life.

Dādī Mā spoke of Hanumān with the regard that a sister idolizes her elder brother. "He is so powerful that he just gobbled up the sun, thinking it to be a ripe mango. Imagine putting the sun in your mouth; we can't go out when it becomes too hot and he took the sun in his *mouth*! The whole universe became dark. All of the gods pleaded him to take the sun out of his mouth, so he finally opened his mouth and released it. Imagine what powers he must have to keep the sun in his mouth for some time. That's why his mouth looks so swollen and red like a monkey. Imagine how powerful *Māhāvir* (Hanumān) is. He is a god who helps to keep evil spirits away. Whenever I feel fear, I call out to my brother." The evil spirits mentioned here are not defined; however, it can be inferred that they have the potential to steer Dādī Mā away from her spiritual path. Thus, through the retelling of this Hindu tale, Dādī Mā accentuates Hanumān's powerful nature, ensuring that through her filial connection to him she will remain on the path of asceticism and be safely led to *mokṣa.*

Dādī Mā further explained Hanumān's relation to *mokṣa,* introducing him as *vāyūputrā,* the son of *vāyu* (air). "When the soul leaves the body, it reaches *mokṣa* through *vāyū,* so only Hanumān is capable of reaching close to the Hindu gods. He, Hanumān, is with us and is responsible for bringing our soul to the Hindu gods. I pray to him, but I just pray to him as my brother." Hanumān's capability to reach the gods is a direct reference to the Rāmāyana, the Indian epic of Rām; when Sītā is held captive by Rāvana, Hanumān is the only one who is able to find and retrieve her safely. Dādī Mā called upon Hanumān for spiritual guidance just as she did with Mā Ānandamayī; however, she did so with him as a brother rather than a mother. As a female devotee of a male Hindu god, Dādī Mā does not relate to Hanumān as intimately as she does with Mā Ānandamayī due to social gender norms. Instead, she relies on Hanumān to safely reunite her with Mā Ānandamayī in *vaikuntha.*

Reflecting on Dādī Mā's relation to the gods, Sundarji asked, "Have the Hindu gods appeared in front of you, ever?" "Yes, so many times," she replied, her eyes lighting up. "Only for a moment and then he (Kṛṣṇa) would vanish. I wanted to see Kṛṣṇa ever since I was a child. I would pray to Kṛṣṇa to give me *darśana*. I would often cry for him. People would say that I would grow up, get married and forget him, but why would I ever leave Kṛṣṇa for anything? When I was in the second grade, I saw a boy enacting Kṛṣṇa on stage in a drama. I started crying, hiding my face in my little frock. 'Oh, he is my Kṛṣṇa. How do I touch him? How do I touch his feet?' I thought. Then, when I was thirty years old, one of my aunts brought me to Vārānasī to fix a match for me. I just happened to hear a Kṛṣṇa *kirtan* and I started crying, 'Oh my Kṛṣṇa, where is he? I want to see him. I have no one in this world—no father, no mother, nobody apart from Kṛṣṇa. Why doesn't he give me *darśana*?' I cried so hard that the women singing this song looked at me. My aunt told me that these women were probably thinking badly of me, that they would think nasty things about me, like I've born a child out of wedlock and that's why I was crying. I told her I didn't care. I would cry for Kṛṣṇa, to see him, to find him."

Dādī Mā explained this, illustrating the unquenchable yearning that came from just one glimpse of Lord Kṛṣṇa, the young *bansuri* (flute) player. Her yearning for Kṛṣṇa was so strong that it persisted from childhood and became a significant factor in her decision to become a *sannyāsī,* for her desire for liberation was seamlessly interwoven with her devotion for Kṛṣṇa. "The thirst for him would not quench and the whole body would feel on fire without him. So, I started meditating. I realized this was the only way to be close to Lord Kṛṣṇa." Dādī Mā's devotional practices fall within the parameters of Vaishnava devotionalism exhibited through her desire to have a personal connection with Lord Kṛṣṇa. Picking up the small book beside her, Dādī Mā leafed through it to find the song she had written about this feeling regarding Kṛṣṇa. Finding it, she cleared her throat, lifted her chin and sang, her eyes fluttering and her expression morphing as the emotion of the song surfaced from her heart.

> *Where have you hidden after giving darśana for a moment?*
> *Lord, where have you hidden after giving darśana for a moment?*
>
> *The thirst refuses to be quenched and the fire refuses to be doused.*
> *It keeps growing with each passing day*
> *The thirst refuses to be quenched and the fire refuses to be doused.*
> *It keeps growing with each passing day.*
>
> *Lord, please appear before me and take me in your embrace.*
> *Lord, please appear before me and take me in your embrace.*
> *Quench our thirst.*
> *Lord, please quench our thirst.*
>
> *Where have you hidden after giving darśana for a moment?*
> *Lord, where have you hidden after giving darśana for a moment?*

Dādī Mā exhibited a similar yearning to have a *darśana* of Kṛṣṇa as she did to be reunited with Mā Ānandamayī, one that extends beyond the act of wanting and into that of necessity. She explained that her need to connect with Lord Kṛṣṇa and express her devotion to him is as pertinent to her ascetic path as water is to life. As a sannyāsī, she has liberated herself from her ties to the material world, thus the only embrace in which she can engage is with the divine, those outside of *saṃsāra.* Dādī Mā's relation to the male Kṛṣṇa stands in contrast to her relation with Hanumān, another male Hindu god, for she yearns to achieve an intimacy with Kṛṣṇa that mirrors that of Mā Ānandamayī. Though Kṛṣṇa is a Hindu god, the social constructs that separate gender still apply, for he can be revered in ways considered unacceptable for married or widowed women. Kṛṣṇa is illustrated as being very humanistic: Packer explains he "is not a multi-armed, weapon-laden, goddess-partnered figure like Vishnu, but a chubby, playful, naughty baby who matures into a sexy adolescent and who literally and figuratively woos both male and female alike: no one is immune to his appeal" (8). Dādī Mā chooses to direct her devotion toward Kṛṣṇa as a "chubby baby" rather than a "sexy adolescent," and she does so through the act of *bhakti* (emotional devotion). Bhakti as related to Kṛṣṇa by Richard Davis in Packert's *The Art of Loving Krishna,* "a way of participating or sharing in divine being, however that is understood, of tasting and enjoying a god's presence, of serving and worshipping him, or being as intimate as possible, of being attached to him above all else" (7). Thus, Dādī Mā's fervent desire for an intimate and personal relationship with Kṛṣṇa is illustrative of his devotees in general.

From the *bhakti* movement rose the theory of *bhaktirasa* (sentiments of devotion) in which Rūpa Gosvāmī, a disciple of Caitanya, "delineates five primary modes (*bhāvas*) through which the devotee may relate to Kṛṣṇa: *śānta,* contemplative adoration of the transcendent Lord; *dāsya,* humble servitude to the divine master; *sakhya,* intimate companionship with the beloved friend; *vātsalya,* parental affection for the adorable child; and *mādhurya,* passionate love for the supreme lover" (Hawley and Wulff 28). Dādī Mā related that her husband was jealous of her unrelenting devotion to Lord Kṛṣṇa, concerned that she was engaging in *mādhurya* (erotic devotion) with Him. "I would never call my

husband with loving words, like *priyatam* (most beloved, dearest). This is how I would call Kṛṣṇa. My husband felt so jealous that I never called him by these names." She explained that her devotion to Kṛṣṇa was that of *vātsalya* (parental affection), "I am not seeking the young, marriageable Kṛṣṇa, but the child Kṛṣṇa. When my husband found out that I actually worshipped the child Kṛṣṇa, he felt better." The child Kṛṣṇa, to whom Dādī Mā devoted herself through *vātsalya,* is known as Gopal, or Gopal-ji as Dādī Mā referred to Him— the ending *-ji* reflecting a sign of respect. "Gopal is the form of Kṛṣṇa as a baby (Bal Kṛṣṇa), crawling on his hands and knees with one hand uplifted, playfully grasping the characteristic ball of butter" (Packert 178). To exemplify this devotion to Gopal-ji, the young version of Kṛṣṇa, Dādī Mā recited another song, this time from memory.

> *Oh my little son*
> *My little sweetheart*
> *Showing yourself from time to time*
> *Where are you hiding?*
>
> *You have a very beautiful way of walking*
> *The way you talk is just as beautiful.*
>
> *I feel pain inside my heart*
> *For you my Lord.*
> *My eyes cry endlessly for you Hari.*
>
> *How would I express my feelings through songs*
> *When you see me constantly without shutting your eyes?*
>
> *Oh my small boy, master of my heart,*
> *Where do you hide after appearing in front of me briefly?*

Dādī Mā's devotion to Kṛṣṇa as a young boy rather than a promising partner, reflects the gendered standards by which women are confined in their devotion to the Hindu gods. As both a wife and a widow, Dādī Mā is regulated in her devotion, for she is expected to view her husband above all else, as the ultimate "supreme;" in order to be regarded as ideal, she is expected to relate to the spiritual realm for the well-being of her household, her husband in this case, not for herself (Khandelwal 7). Dādī Mā

pushes the boundaries of acceptability by freely expressing her devotion to Kṛṣṇa as personal rather than shared—in the above song, she speaks directly to Kṛṣṇa, asking where he has hidden from her and makes no mention of her husband. Dādī Mā explains that this devotion to Kṛṣṇa as a child abated her husband's jealousies, "This song brought a smile to my husband's face. A small boy is the master of your heart, he is the master of everyone's heart, so it's not the marriageable Kṛṣṇa you yearn for, it is a child. I am not Rukmini or Satyabhama, Kṛṣṇa's wives, who seek him as a husband; I seek him as a little boy." Through her reference to Kṛṣṇa as her "small boy," her "little son," and "little sweetheart," Dādī Mā establishes her purity and devotion to her husband by fulfilling the natural role of mother rather than desiring another male.

Sannyāsa is an act of separation from the mundane householder activities; however, Dādī Mā assumed the role of nurturer for the Gods by relating to them as mother and devotee, thus assimilating herself both within the physical world as well as within that of the spiritual. Dādī Mā's life is inconsistent with that of most Indian women not only because she chose the path of asceticism toward the end of her life but also because she wed at the late age of thirty-two and never bore children. Since she did not have any children of her own, she was not able to fulfill the societal expectation of the Indian woman as mother, so her nurturing devotion to Kṛṣṇa, Gaṇeśa, and other Hindu gods simulates the role of mother and fills this void.

Dādī Mā claimed that, in light of her desire to become a *sannyāsī* she never wanted to have children; however, it was not by her own choice that she did not have offspring. However, it was actually due to the actions and ill-intentions of Dādī Mā's step-daughter from her husband's first marriage. This step-daughter did everything within her realm of capabilities to prevent their family from growing. She would sleep between Dādī Mā and Dādī Mā's husband most nights, acting as a physical barrier to their copulation. Such behavior was learned from Dādī Mā's sister-in-law, who poisoned Dādī Mā's husband's first wife due to her fertility. In patriarchal India, property is inherited by the male, so Dādī Mā and her husband's first wife both posed as a threat to

the family due to their inherent capability of giving birth to a boy. Regardless of the step-daughter's attempts, Dādī Mā became pregnant. Furious and desperate to remain as the heir to the family property, Dādī Mā's step-daughter jumped on her stomach, viciously aborting Dādī Mā's child. Dādī Mā reflects on her step-daughter's role in this tragic event in her life, "She was very conscious of the possibility of having a sibling. She didn't want to have a brother because she knew that if she had a brother then he would take all of the property from her. This is why she jumped on my stomach and aborted the child."

Dādī Mā spoke of the loss of her child in the same manner that she regarded the funeral of her husband—removed and complacent. As a way to cope with the emotional implications of this tragedy, she redefined the meaning of this event in terms of her ascetic life. "See, it is Mā [Ānandamayī]'s blessings that this child didn't come into this world, because I always wanted to become a *sādhu*. I never really wanted to be married, so I view this as a blessing from Mā [Ānandamayī]." Here, Dādī Mā implies that if she had given birth to any children, she would have retained the responsibility of being a mother after her husband's death, thus she would have been likely to remain within the life of a householder rather than transition into that of a *sannyāsī*. By reframing the loss of her child as a "blessing" from Mā Ānandamayī, Dādī Mā gives significance to a gruesome event that must have been devastating to her at the time.

The retelling of her life story as harmonious with an ideal *sannyāsī* is Dādī Mā's attempt to disregard the details of her former householder life that are incongruent to renunciation. Though Dādī Mā retrospectively situated the loss of her child in her path to asceticism, I would argue that the emotional ramifications spilled over from Dādī Mā's life as a householder into her life as a *sannyāsī*. Kirin Narayan similarly points out, "the indoctrination of upbringing does not altogether fade with initiation," thus a *sannyāsī's* life as a renunciant is highly interwoven with elements, such as caste hierarchies and gender inequalities, of their former householder life (77). The tragic event of losing a child is interwoven into Dādī Mā's life as a *sannyāsī*, causing her to assume the nurturing role of mother to the Hindu gods, as is

evident from the loving, nature with which she handled her stuffed animals, her children, and yearned for baby Lord Kṛṣṇa.

*   *   *

Having severed her familial ties upon renunciation, Dādī Mā creates a new spiritual family made up of Hindu gods. Such a connection and adoration for the gods within this spiritual family is deemed acceptable for it does not trap her within the material world as normal relationships do but actually supports her pursuit of mokṣa. The way in which Dādī Mā relates to the gods as nurturing mother is distinctive of female ascetics; however, her personal relation to the gods is unique in that their role as children functions as substitute for the child that was taken from her.

Conclusion

Relationality is deemed as a hindrance to a *sannyāsī's* goal of *mokṣa* as defined within by ancient Hindu texts as well as externally by the perceptions of foreign Indologists, such as Dumont's binary model of religiosity in which Indian religious practices are defined as either householder and otherworldly. However, in the field of anthropology and religious studies, it has been amply demonstrated that lived renunciation does not actually fall within the textual ideal definition of isolated, lone, male and wandering. Through participant observation of and intimate engagement with *sannyāsīs*, the complexities of lived renunciation are revealed.

Though *sannyāsīs* ideologically separate themselves from their body upon their initiation, regarding it as dead, they remain embodied in the human form. This physical embodiment involves relationality as a fundamental aspect of lived renunciation, a characteristic which becomes further magnified with regards to female ascetics. Leaving a society ruled by men and entering into a traditionally male-centric mode of religiosity, female *sannyāsīs* become a social anomaly within the householder community as well as within the ascetic community. Within the householder community, female *sannyāsīs* are distinct in that they have left behind their traditional female roles of mother and wife and have embarked

upon a spiritual path demarcated by personal liberation rather than the well-being of their husband and family.

Within the ascetic community, female *sannyāsīs* stand out as a gendered minority thus many situate themselves in a community of women within the confines of an āshram [diacritic] through which they are provided spiritual and emotional support. Since female ascetics do not neatly fit within the traditional modes of renunciation, they create their own unique ways of expressing devotion to the gods. Dādī Mā exemplifies a female way of living in the world as a *sannyāsī* through both her relation to her guru, Mā Ānandamayī, as mother and her nurturing devotion of the Hindu gods. While it is common for a female guru to be regarded as mother by disciples, Dādī Mā's relationship with the gods as children and her spiritual practice on behalf of her husband expands our understanding of relationality in female Hindu asceticism. Though Dādī Mā challenged her socially constructed role as a woman in Indian society by embarking on a path of asceticism, her lived devotional practices reveal that she retained female characteristics from her householder life. Dādī Mā situates herself within a religious family of transcendental beings through her relation to the Hindu gods as children and defines her motives of asceticism as shared, enabling her to authenticate her renunciation and justify her divergence from the traditional roles of Indian women. Such findings from my research of Swāmī Āmritanandā Gīdī cannot be assumed as typical for female *sannyāsīs*; however, with further research on the relationality of female renunciants, more generalized claims may be made.

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Operating in the Shadow of Nationalism: Egyptian Feminism in the Early Twentieth Century

JORDAN WITT

By the end of World War I, Britain had occupied Egypt for decades and nationalist sentiment in the nation was growing. In 1919, under the direction of revolutionary leader Sa'ad Zaghlul, Egyptians rose up against the British in an effort to achieve full independence. Although full independence was not achieved, the anti-colonial movement did not give in. "The period of 1919 to 1922, when Egypt was accorded a unilateral and, in effect, nominally independent status, was a period of intense political struggle when all forces in the country were consolidated for one purpose: the independence of Egypt from British control."[18] Britain maintained its colonial occupation of Egypt as a means to protect its assets in the region but also, as colonial administrators claimed, to help civilize the people of Egypt. "Lord Cromer, British consul general in Egypt from 1883 to 1907…was convinced of the inferiority of Islamic religion and society."[19] According to the British, the culture and customs surrounding Egyptian women were among the primary reasons for the weaknesses and ills of Egyptian society and the British vowed to be the force to change this.

Colonial feminism, or "feminism as used against other cultures in the service of colonialism," [20] emerged as a civilizing tool of the British. According to Leila Ahmed, "the Victorian colonial paternalistic establishment appropriated the language of feminism in the service of its assault on the religions and cultures of Other men, and in particular on Islam, in order to give an aura of moral justification to that assault at the very same time as it combated feminism within

its own society."[21] In other words, "Other men" or non-Western, non-white men supposedly needed the help of the British in order to learn how to behave and how to treat their women. As Ahmed mentions, the irony of colonial feminism is that it was used as a moral justification to condemn Egyptian cultural practices and was allegedly intended to help Egyptian women, yet Britain at the time was suppressing its *own* feminist movement.

This type of feminism, adopted by liberal reformers such as Qasim Amin, sought to teach the indigenous female population the proper way to raise children, maintain a marriage, and secure the household, among other things, based on a European model. "The habits and customs as well as the moral characteristics that were acquired in the [home] became more and more frequently attached to commentary about Egypt's public realm and its weaknesses. Victorian travelers to Egypt believed that upper-class and peasant homes produced unsound citizens."[22] In order to make women into good mothers and caretakers, they would need to abandon their "habits" and strive to learn the "proper" ways of being good homemakers. European travelers tended to sum up the skills of Egyptian women as "limited to sex, dancing, singing, smoking, and telling stories" and thus "it was thought unlikely that she would know how to be a good homemaker or a suitable role model for her children."[23] Changing the way Egyptian women were perceived by Westerners became a preoccupation of Egyptian nationalists in their mission of severing colonial ties with Britain and moving towards an independent nation.

Nationalists believed that "the colonial civilizing project… stood or fell with its ability to permeate and reconstruct the domain of

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[18] Soha Abdel Kader, *Egyptian Woman in a Changing Society, 1899-1987* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), 78.

[19] Katherine Viner, "Feminism as Imperialism," *The Guardian*, (Sept. 2002), 1.

[20] Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam,* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 151.

[21] Ahmed, *Women and Gender*, 152.

[22] Lisa Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*, (Berkeley: California University Press, 1998), 64.

[23] Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation,* 64

women,"[24] and once the domain of women was modernized fully, the British would have no basis for asserting dominance over Egyptian society thus leaving Egypt truly independent. Due to the urgency of the nationalist movement, feminism in the early 20th century was limited and manipulated by nationalists in their effort to establish independence. There was a lot of talk about liberating Egyptian women but often not for their own sake; the motive behind progressing women's rights and freedoms was fueled primarily by a desire to exemplify a British model of modernity and further the nationalist cause. Therefore, women were used by nationalists as pawns in a political strategy and granted only limited participation in a movement aimed, in theory, at improving their lives.

Liberating Egyptian Women

The British used the mission of liberating women as a reason to maintain their presence in Egypt while Egyptian nationalists used it as a means to prove their modernity and their capability for independent governance. From the end of the 19th century and into the early 20th century, Qasim Amin, an Egyptian jurist, emerged as an early advocate of women's liberation and modernization. He wrote two books dedicated to advancing this cause, *The Liberation of Women* and *The New Woman*. In these books, he covers a range of topics including women's education, the veil, the family, the nation and women's obligations.   He believed that "in order to improve the condition of the nation, it is imperative we improve the condition of women,"[25] which meant reforming "outdated" practices and providing them with the means to fulfil their various duties as wives, mothers, and citizens. He calls on men to treat women not like objects or lesser beings but to accept and welcome the fact that women are capable of contributing meaningfully in relationships and in

society more generally. On this note, he calls on men to make these realizations:

> A refined and sensitive man realizes that a woman is a human being too, with the same rights and obligations as he has …that secluding a woman is a form of execution…that his heart will not be at ease living with an ignorant woman…that the most beautiful thing he longs for is a love that binds him to a person of like mind in free choice and good taste [as opposed] to one based upon passionate inclinations and the craving of whims…[and that] a hatred of autocracy, a hostility toward subjugation, and a desire to direct human energy toward a specific goal are among the prevailing attitudes of our present era.[26]

Though he adds a caveat to this by noting that neither has rights over the other except where otherwise stated in Islamic law,[27] Amin recognizes the importance of appreciating women in society and in relationships. He sees the importance of liberating women from what he views as outdated and corrupted customs within the Islamic religion that seclude and demean women and deny them the opportunity to contribute meaningfully in society and in relationships. Moreover, despite the fact that he advocates for recognizing women's talents, Amin's perspective on women and what feminism in Egypt should look like is largely informed by British anti-feminist ideals. Rather than attempt to articulate feminism within the framework of Egyptian and Islamic culture, Amin essentially advocates for feminism based on the British agenda. Amin called for implanting an aspect of foreign culture into the fabric of Egyptian society and tried to justify it by advertising it as completely compatible with the existing culture. This proposal inaugurated the dangerous traditions of colonial feminism and did not represent the needs of Egyptian women. History has remembered Qasim Amin as the father of Egyptian feminism and thus legitimized his British-informed feminism as a starting place for authentic Egyptian feminism, making the actual

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[24] Shakry, 129

[25] Qasim Amin, *The Liberation of Women and The New Woman*, trans. by Samiha Sidhom Peterson (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2000), 75.

[26] Amin, *The Liberation of Women,* 59-60.

[27] Amin, *The Liberation of Women,* 60.

battle for women's rights even more difficult. In the early twentieth century, Egyptian women and feminist organizations fought against the colonial feminism introduced by the British, but also against the colonial feminism which many nationalists, and "feminists" like Qasim Amin, continued to reinforce.

In contrast to "feminists" like Qasim Amin, women feminists also arose in the same period, most prominent among them Huda Shaarawi. Born into a wealthy, elite, Egyptian family, she advocated for women's rights and access to education and politics. She was active with the revolutionary Wafd party[28] in the late 1910s and into the 1920s and, when the women of the Wafd were excluded from the peace conferences in London following World War I,[29] Shaarawi took it upon herself to make women's rights a priority. "Huda refused to sacrifice women's liberation for male political purposes."[30] She founded the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in 1923 to voice women's concerns, and also as a response to the manipulation of women as a tool in the nationalist effort.[31] The EFU, founded by and supported by elite Egyptian women, brought attention to the needs of women across classes and raised money that "supported two monthly journals (one in French and one in Arabic), a clinic and dispensary for poor women and children, craft workshops for poor girls, and childcare facilities for working mothers."[32] Shaarawi also helped fight for the legalization of a minimum marriage age, the rights of working class women in factories and retail shops, and for the expansion of women's access to professions in education, health and law.[33] In addition to the EFU, Shaarawi helped found social clubs for elite women, including the Intellectual Association of Egyptian Women and the Club of the Women's Union. Shaarawi explained that "The intellectual

[28] The Wafd was the nationalist party in Egypt and was prominent in the early 20th century, shortly after World War I and into the 1930s.

[29] Huda Shaarawi, *Harem Years,* trans. by Margot Badran (New York: The Feminist Press at The City University of New York, 1986), 122.

[30] Shaarawi, *Harem Years*, 129.

[31] Shaarawi, *Harem Years,* 129.

[32] Shaarawi, *Harem Years*, 134.

[33] Shaarawi, *Harem Years*, 134-135.

awakening of upper-class women that had been underway over the past years, stimulated and shaped in part by the women's salon and the lecture series, convinced me of the need for an association to bring women together for further intellectual, social and recreational pursuits."[34]

Huda Shaarawi advocated on behalf of women throughout the socio-economic classes of Egypt, but the fact that she was elite, petitioning on behalf of poor women, helped reinforce a secondary hierarchy within patriarchal Egypt. Elite men and women experienced a position of authority and influence over their peers under the colonial regime; a change in government could mean the loss of power and influence for elite Egyptians. Although many elite women spent their lives petitioning on behalf of their peers, aligning themselves with the power-to-be (i.e. the nationalists) meant ensuring a continued position of influence with the next regime. This influence was exerted over the lower socio-economic classes which meant the continuation of a social hierarchy among women in addition to the ever present patriarchy. The continuation of such a hierarchy was perhaps an unintended consequence of the nationalist movement but a consequence, nonetheless, which only further limited the reach and scope of many feminist efforts.

Class Consciousness and Egyptian Feminism

The public feminist movement in Egypt in the early 20th century was largely a political undertaking, led by the elite, intended to advance women's rights as a reflection of the advancement of the nation. According to Margot Badran, "The term 'feminist' is neither fixed nor easily definable. It is constructed (or emerges) out of experiences and perceptions, and is expressed both in voicings and in silences."[35] When considering the Egyptian feminist movements of the early 20th century, it is

[34] Shaarawi, *Harem Years*, 98.

[35] Margot Badran. *Feminists, Islam, and the Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 31.

imperative to consider which voices are being heard, and which are being silenced. Given the determination of Egyptian nationalists in securing an independent nation and using the modernization of women as a means of doing so, the voices that most publicly agreed with this cause were the voices that were heard. The voices that were concerned less fervently with independence and more with matters like broadening women's rights, access to education and career advancement opportunities, were stifled by nationalists.

Elite women, like Huda Shaarawi, had access to politics, were already educated enough to engage in political discussion and were wealthy and influential enough to start organizations of their own (i.e. the Egyptian Feminist Union). While elite feminists were invested in improving things like working conditions, marriage laws, and access to education for women of all classes, they were also conscious of their place within the societal hierarchy. Elite women who wanted to participate in politics, resist colonialism and improve women's rights had to align themselves with the nationalist rhetoric so as to avoid losing credibility and influence once Egypt severed its colonial ties. Elite Egyptian women who enjoyed influence under the colonial powers but failing to align with growing nationalist movement ran the risk of losing their elite status if the nationalists were successful. Therefore, in order to retain elite status once Egypt gained independence, elite women needed to align, more or less, with the nationalist movement and its version of feminism. Male nationalists tended to view the domain of women as encompassing of all economic classes which meant that reinforcing the male-dominated nationalist rhetoric could be harmful in some ways to women of lower economic classes.

This resulted in the continuation of a type of cultural feminism that reiterated the importance of women as housewives and mothers. "Cultural feminism, then, aided the extension of the process of housewifization that was occurring in the harem to the lower classes. Cultural feminists created and reified a construct of woman as housewife and mother through which they were

able to ensure the hegemonic control of civil society and state by their class."[36]

In keeping with the nationalist rhetoric and forcing the domain of the idealized housewife and mother onto the lower, working class women, elite women reinforced their position of authority and influence over their peers. For elite women who did not have to contribute to the economic well-being of their household, becoming the ideal mother and housewife was a luxury they could afford; the separation of men and women's spheres could remain clear and the elite women could focus all their efforts on their sphere. For working class wives and mothers, however, this was not the case. Gendered spheres were far less concrete amongst the lower classes given the necessity for women to work and contribute financially. Therefore, the "application of segregated spheres to lower-class women followed them into production and provided more work for those who had to perform as model professionals on the job and model wives at home."[37] Lower and working class women were told by elite women and by nationalists what it meant to be a woman and what it meant to be a good citizen, which implied that refusing to accept these dictations was practically an act of treason against the emerging nation. To compare resistance with treason is, of course, dramatic yet clearly illustrates the pressure that lower class women encountered in the face of elite and nationalist rhetoric regarding women's proper domain. It is also evident that feminism during this time was severely limited by the nationalist cause, which recognized the voices of only those who concurred with its rhetoric while silencing the voices of those who had objections.

Authenticity, Modernism, and Nationalism

Despite the different ways varying socio-economic classes experienced feminism, the nationalist movement insisted that an all-

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[36] Cathlyn Mariscotti, *Gender and Class in the Egyptian Women's Movement: 1925-1939.* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 65
[37] Mariscotti, *Gender and Class*, 64.

encompassing feminist movement needed to occur in order to secure an independent nation.[38] In order to achieve independence, Egyptian modernizers felt that Egyptian cultural practices and customs would need to undergo a modernization process, which lead to uneasiness among some Egyptian nationalists: "In Egypt ever since the late 19th century when reformers and nationalist modernizers took up the question of women's status and role in society, there has been a struggle between those who seek to locate women's emancipation, variously defined, at the heart of the development of the nation and of society and those who try to dislocate such a project as an alien Western import."[39] Compared to nationalization efforts in the West, nationalism in colonized parts of the world have not only faced a pressure to modernize, but also to maintain some sense of authenticity; they have been urged to adopt certain Western practices while refraining from complete imitation. As Partha Chatterjee writes:

> …what is distinctive here is that there is also a fundamental awareness that those standards [of modernization] have come from an alien culture, and that the inherited culture of the nation did not provide the necessary adaptive leverage to enable it to reach those standards of progress. The 'Eastern' type of nationalization, consequently, has been accompanied by an effort to 're-quip' the nation culturally, to transform it. But it could not do so simply by imitating the alien culture, for then the nation would lose its distinctive identity. The search therefore was for a regeneration of national culture, adapted to the requirements of progress, but retaining at the same time its distinctiveness.[40]

This is the problem that Egypt faced in the 20th century: the pressure to modernize and prove its capability to operate independently of the British, by adapting modes of progress that have worked for Western nations, but simultaneously maintaining what makes Egypt unique. The status of women during this time was highly contested due to the intersection of cultures and forces trying to dictate women's domain. According to Margot Badran, there were different frameworks which Egyptians were simultaneously operating within: "Under colonialism all Egyptians had been concerned about issues of identity, rights, and sovereignty. Under patriarchy women were concerned about issues of their identity and rights and how authority was shaped and exercised."[41] At this point in time, male Egyptian nationalists were trying to secure independence while maintaining patriarchy. As the nationalist struggle continued, nationalists grappled with how to "liberate" women in ways which satisfied colonial norms of modernity without submitting to a complete imitation of foreign culture, while simultaneously trying to stay aligned with Islamic law and cultural traditions. Feminists, too, struggled with how to maintain credibility by aligning their campaign with the nationalist agenda, and also advocate, genuinely, on behalf of women. This struggle between nationalists and feminists played out in the politics of the home, including the politics of marriage, women's domain, childrearing and women's education. Often, establishing the nation was the priority while feminism developed in the shadow of the nationalist movement.

Marital Politics and the Nation

During a period of foreign occupation and colonialism, Egyptian men were challenged to stand up to their oppressors and fight for the independence of their nation, but, in order to do this, historians have demonstrated that they needed to be supported by their wives and made to feel like men. Part of being a good housewife was submitting to one's husband and protecting his masculinity. As Kholoussy writes, "Authentic

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[38] Mariscotti, *Gender and Class,* 26.

[39] Lila Abu-Lughod, "The Marriage of Feminism and Islamism in Egypt: Selective Repudiation as a Dynamic of Postcolonial Cultural Practices." in *Remaking Women*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod, 126-170 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 243.

[40] Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, (London: Zed Books, 1993), 2.

[41] Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and the Nation,* 13.

Egyptian womanhood should not threaten Egyptian manhood, particularly during a turbulent period of British domination, economic crises, and a perceived erosion of Islamic traditions and values. A proper Egyptian woman was to be a virtuous and obedient wife…"[42] Part of doing their part as women and as wives included encouraging their husbands' egos and providing them the courage and strength necessary to remove the foreigners from their nation. The Egyptian press played a major role in depicting the ideal wife and in criticizing women who did not fit this depiction or who rejected it.

Many journals, including women's journals, devoted much of their energy to a discussion of the ideal housewife. Often, writers ignored the growing numbers of women in the workforce, as this did not fit with the nationalist rhetoric, and instead chose to focus on domesticity and improving the domestic domain of women. "Enhancing this sphere was seen as the best strategy for raising women's status, and the outpouring of domestic literature instructing the wife, mother, and 'mistress of the house' showed pursuit of this goal."[43]

In "From Husbands and Housewives to Suckers and Whores: Marital-Political Anxieties in the 'House of Egypt', 1919-1948," Lisa Pollard explores the different representations of women and marital politics in the press and how these representations changed depending on political and economic trends. As the hope of securing an independent nation waxed and waned throughout the early 20th century, so too did the representations and perceptions of women. Leading up to the Revolution of 1919, many representations of women in the press situated them as caretakers of the home, with the home serving as a metaphor for the modernizing nation. A woman who could maintain and strengthen her home could help maintain and strengthen the nation. "Cartoon images of a mother Egypt suggested the parallel reforms of home and nation, and it was through such images that ideal housewives and mothers were linked to

the emerging body politic." [44] Much of the domestic nationalism that arose around 1919 was based on the nationalist efforts of Sa'ad Zaghlul and the Wafd party. With Sa'ad Zaghlul at the head of the Wafd party and a key revolutionary in the nationalist movement, it was he and his wife, Safiyya, who became the symbols of the ideal domestic partnership. Safiyya came to represent Mother Egypt in media illustrations; she considered the nationalists her "devoted sons" and her house became known as the "House of the Nation" which served as a meeting place for the Wafd members.[45] Not only was she considered a symbolic mother to the nationalists, she was also symbolic of the ideal wife. She supported her husband in his political endeavors and stayed by his side through tough political times. When Sa'ad was arrested and deported, Safiyya insisted that Wafd meetings still happen at the house to ensure Sa'ad's centrality to the party. The symbol of the Zaghlul house as the house of the nation, "helped to instill a sense of national family"[46] which Safiyya recognized and strived to maintain. When the Wafd party experienced successes, it was often tied to the success of the party leader and his loyal wife: "revolutionary-era iconography and Egyptians' ideation of the Zaghlul couple suggested that political successes such as the Wafd's victory in securing a place for Egypt at the post-war negotiations was intertwined with marriage and correct domestic habits."[47]

While political successes were tied to domestic affairs, so too were political failures. While Sa'ad Zaghlul was considered the father of the emerging Egyptian nation, this title took a hit after he failed to secure the type of agreement he wanted with the British after the revolution of 1919. In 1922, Zaghlul only managed to secure a nominal independence for Egypt. Britain

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[42] Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse*, 65.

[43] Beth Baron. *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 155.

[44] Lisa Pollard, "From Husbands and Housewives to Suckers and Whores: Marital-Political Anxieties in the 'House of Egypt,' 1919-48," *Gender and History* 21, no. 3 (Nov. 2009), 650.

[45] Pollard, "From Husbands and Housewives," 652

[46] Beth Baron. *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalization, Gender, and Politics*. (University of California Press, 2005), 140.

[47] Pollard, "From Husbands and Housewives," 652

maintained its presence in the country in order to ensure the safety and maintenance of its assets while simultaneously continuing its civilizing mission. The result of the 1919 revolution was "thus an Egypt with a somewhat powerless representative government, an unpopular king, a disgraced symbolic father and a factionalized nationalist fraternity."[48] King Fa'ud, installed by the British, did not help further the nationalist cause. As king, he clearly wanted to maintain power and thus preserve the monarchy. The constitution of 1923, adopted after Egypt's declaration of independence the year prior, was established to bring about a representative government. King Fa'ud worked to suppress Article 23 "which claimed that 'all powers emanate from the nation,'"[49] a move which worked against all that the revolution had stood for and which further diminished the power and influence of the symbolic Egyptian family and nationalist unity.

Sa'ad's failure in addition to other political failures throughout the years, led to the crumbling representations of family in the press. Sa'ad as a paternal symbol fell apart and women were challenging the symbol of mother Egypt, refusing to play house, and thus, according to nationalists, not doing their part in the struggle for true independence. "In the stead of the gendered-female depictions of Egypt from the 1919 era, ugly, misogynistic depictions of the real women who made demands on the public realm were growing in number."[50] The women who were demanding more in terms of access to politics, jobs, education and more, were being villainized and portrayed as harmful to the nationalist effort. Furthermore, there arose an image of "The Skinny Lady," who was actually huge and who emasculated her husband, "Mighty Man," who was tiny, skinny, and dominated by his wife.[51] There also existed images of a chaotic household in which the middle-class man runs away from the chaos of home life.[52] All of these images served to critique home life but tended to

emphasize the failures of women as wives and mothers. Women were supposed to support their husband's masculinity and maintain good order and discipline in the home and if they sought more freedom and rights beyond these domains, they were villainized, their homes fell apart, and their husbands fled, or so that was what the press depicted. With regards to the political cartoons which emerged after the 1919 revolution, it is evident that the press wanted only to commend women who abided by the ideal family framework laid out by the nationalists, and criticized the women who did not follow this mold.

The press served a vital role in presenting the nationalists' goals to the public and spreading the word as to how average citizens could do their part. As mentioned above, marriage and the relationship between husband and wife was highly publicized; establishing and maintaining strong marriages was symbolic of establishing the nation and maintaining independence. Therefore, nationalists placed pressure on men and women to get married, and even more so, on women to make loyal, devoted nationalists out of their husbands, but first, they actually had to wed. In order to wed, nationalists demanded that women lower their standards, and perhaps risk their economic security, in order to make husbands out of bachelors and contribute to the modern, family-oriented image of society that nationalists hoped to make a reality. In placing this pressure on women, the nationalist movement manipulated them in order to achieve its own goals.

Settling for the Modern Bachelor

Following the revolution of 1919 and into the late 1920s, there was a perceived marriage crisis which the press reported on and exacerbated. Hanan Kholoussy thoroughly examines this perceived crisis in her book, *For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis That Made Modern Egypt*,[53] which discusses the different aspects that

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[48] Pollard, "From Husbands and Housewives," 652

[49] Pollard, "From Husbands and Housewives," 652

[50] Pollard, "Husbands and Housewives," 656.

[51] Pollard, "Husbands and Housewives," 662.

[52] Pollard, "Husbands and Housewives," 660.

[53] Hanan Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis That Made Modern Egypt*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010)

contributed to this crisis. The second chapter of the book, *The Grooming of Men*, specifically focuses on the circumstances of Egyptian men as well as their struggles and faults which may have contributed to the marriage crisis. For example, leading up to the revolution and during World War I, there was a world-wide economic crisis which caused economic strife for Britain and thus Egypt by default. Inflation was widespread while government salaries remained fixed and the private sector struggled. Before this period of economic crisis, any Egyptian man with a secondary education was essentially guaranteed a job in bureaucratic service which was seen as influential and prestigious. This would typically be a selling point when asking a father for a woman's hand in marriage, but as inflation rose and government salaries remained stagnant, a government employee could afford less and less and therefore was often not viewed, in the eyes of many fathers, as being financially capable of supporting their daughters. As the economy struggled, the government hired fewer and fewer young men which, in turn, created an unemployment problem. Since many fathers refused to marry their daughters to poor, college educated men, government employed or otherwise, a crisis of bachelorhood arose. This epidemic of bachelorhood was considered a peril to the modernization and nationalist efforts because these men "had neither jobs nor wives to discipline them into responsible citizens."[54] What is interesting about this bachelorhood problem, and the fact that these men could easily become corrupted, undisciplined foes to the nationalist effort, was that nationalists did not put the blame on men or even the economy, but on women for not sacrificing or doing what was necessary to keep the men from being corrupted.

In order to get bachelors to wed and keep them from wreaking havoc on the nation, the responsibility fell to women to lower their economic standards and think about the nation as opposed to their financial needs. Islamic tradition dictates that there shall be a dowry paid to the wife-to-be "to protect the wife's economic position in the marriage and to deter her husband

from divorcing her rashly."[55] The dowry (and the husband-to-be) is supposed to reflect the bride-to-be's existing social and economic status. A wife is not expected to sacrifice the standard of living which she is accustomed to in her father's household. Therefore, she is not expected to marry a man who cannot afford to provide in this way. Given the nationalist efforts and the economic crisis, women were charged with being greedy and selfish and their fathers completely irrational; men's poor economic circumstances were blamed on colonialism and the different factors affecting the economy while women's refusal to settle for less than they were accustomed to was blamed on their selfishness and disregard for the importance of the nationalizing effort.

The importance placed on marriage as a sign of modernity is a matter of establishing harmony between men's and women's roles. During a time of colonial oppression and political activism, men were expected to be morally sound and physically courageous, willing to exert maximum effort to secure the independence of their nation. They could not do this if they were bachelors, running around town to bars and brothels and engaging in corrupt behavior. Bachelors were reckless and threatening to the building of a strong national foundation. Single women were also dangerous to the founding of a strong nation. Women were expected to take care of the home, support and submit to their husbands and birth and raise the next generation of courageous, nationalist youth. A single woman was not raising children nor keeping bachelors off the street. A single woman might become too invested in her own pursuits such as seeking advanced education or career advancement, and not the pursuit of becoming the ideal lady and housewife. Given the perils of single young men and women, decreasing bachelorhood and encouraging the marriage of young people was a sign of the vested interest of all Egyptians in securing independence and building a nation.

While men were encouraged to get married to facilitate the modernization effort, the pressure was placed primarily on women. It was *their* responsibility to wed, their responsibility to do

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[54] Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse*, 27

[55] Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse,* 29

whatever it took to wed, including accepting unsatisfactory dowries (out of empathy and necessity), and to *stay* married. When it came to accepting small dowries, even wealthy women realized the symbolism associated with this act. "Both Huda [Shaarawi], the founder of the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU), and May Ziyada, another prominent women's activist, asserted that the middle class love of appearances, spending, and luxury which manifested in outrageous dower demands, deterred men from marriage."[56] Therefore, Shaarawi, although her family was wealthy and elite, agreed to a meager dowry of 25 piasters on behalf of her niece, Duriyya Shafiq.[57] While this was publicized and commended by the press, what was less well known was that the 25 piasters was only the advanced dower, which had to be paid prior to the wedding, and the deferred dower, which is paid in case of divorce, was 400 LE, or 1600 times the advanced dowry, and 50 times the monthly salary of a middle-class working man.[58] Duriyya's husband agreed to this deferred dower as a means to prove that he did not take lightly the tiny advanced dowry he was charged. The dower agreement in this case was clearly a political stunt, meant to back up the claims that the high demands of Egyptian women were out of date and counterproductive to the nationalist cause. The people involved could clearly afford to make such an argument whereas the middle-class could not necessarily afford to be so cavalier. It fell to the women of the middle-class, especially, to settle when they could and do their part in keeping men out of the bars and brothels, and at home, instead, with their wives, helping to build the nation.

At the same time that marriage was being pressed by nationalists as a societal priority, feminists were fighting to ensure protections for women and for wives. In Islamic law, there is an obedience clause which requires wives to submit to their husbands, *so long as* their husbands are providing financially for them. The obedience clause is negated if husbands do not provide independent homes for their wives, maintain their wife's allowances (as outlined in the marriage contract), if the husband is absent, forces his wife to move far away from her family, etc.[59] This obedience clause permitted the husband, legally, to exercise complete control over his wife so long as he was fulfilling his financial obligations to her. Oftentimes, this rule allowed for the abuse of wives by their husbands because proving abuse was difficult in court. Feminist writers like Sayza Nabarawi of the EFU spoke out against the abuse of tyrannical husbands and pressed the point that wives were not slaves and that while obedience itself is not an evil thing, the abuse of such obedience is.[60] Feminists encouraged women to document injustices done to them by their husbands and to manipulate the legal system when they could in order to protect themselves from abusive husbands and unjust marriages.

Although there was occasionally opportunity for women to seek justice in cases of unfair circumstances, the wants of women were largely ignored in favor of nationalist rhetoric. The nationalist cause, as reinforced by the press, the elite, and prominent nationalist leaders, outweighed even the legitimate concerns of women regarding marriage. Women were expected to settle for impoverished men and to sacrifice their own goals and rights in order to get married and represent the nation as respectable wives and home managers. The overbearing sentiment was that marriage was a necessity for the sake of the development of the nation and thus contestations were largely subdued; getting reckless single men and women off the street, and making loyal, devoted couples out of them was a sign of progress and thus modernity. Once the issue of marriage was addressed, the focus secular nationalists often shifted to the role of women as mothers.

Motherhood, Childrearing and Education

Not only were Egyptian women being targeted by the British and by nationalists as being bad

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[56] Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse,* 30.
[57] Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse,* 35.
[58] Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse,* 35.

[59] Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse, 65-74.*
[60] Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse,* 71

housewives, they were also targeted for their lack of motherhood and childrearing skills. Both British colonialists and Egyptian nationalists often claimed that there was a direct relationship between mothering and the strength and progress of a nation; it was the duty of women as mothers to raise strong, nationalist sons, prepared, mentally and morally to build and support the nation. "Within the Egyptian colonial setting, untutored 'ignorant' mothers were problematized by both colonial administrators and indigenous modernizing reformers as particularly unsuited for the preparation of a new generation."[61] It was not enough just to raise children as they had always been raised; there needed to be a specific focus on instilling in young children the need to support and contribute to the nation, and to be proper citizens.

With the rise of the nationalist movement, the responsibility of raising morally sound children shifted from the father to the mother. "Much of the medieval Islamic literature that dealt with issues of childhood was addressed to the father not the mother. As the primary parental authority, the father, and his relationship with his son, proved paramount."[62] The father, historically, had been the one primarily responsible for the development of his children after they were past the dependency stage. The mother was expected to allow this shift in responsibility once her children no longer physically depended on her nurturing. However, as men were called to support the emerging nation, it fell to women to take on more responsibility and to start the moral upbringing of their children as early as possible. In order to learn to be proper mothers and to aid in the formative years of their children's lives, women would need greater access to education.

In an effort to modernize yet avoid straying too far from Islamic law and tradition, Egyptian nationalists considered expanding women's access to education in order to improve their

parental skills. Traditionally, Egyptian women had been largely restricted from attending schools as it was not pertinent to their roles as wife, mother, or household manager. However, in order to ensure the proper development of their children, women were expected to be able to help their children in the early stages of their education. It was a primary objective of many feminists to encourage education of women, against tradition, yet even conservatives realized the necessity of providing women with an elementary education in order to modernize and strengthen the nation. "The notion that to educate a mother was to educate the nation was embedded in the nationalist discourse when Egypt was intent on revitalization to liberate itself from colonial domination."[63]

Operating under the watchful eyes of the nationalists, feminist writers, who strongly advocated for women's education, situated their demands within the agenda of the nationalist movement. "In order to legitimize the demand and give it greater appeal, [feminist] writers coupled the need for girls' education with the nationalist struggle. The argument was simple: Egypt could not develop the educated male population essential for its progress without educating those who cared for the infant and child in his first years."[64] Feminists genuinely interested in broadening women's horizons by granting them greater access to education, realized that they could manipulate the nationalist movement to support its cause, just like the nationalist movement had manipulated feminism. "Education had a special meaning for those trying to raise the status of women in Egyptian society. Many felt ignorance was women's basic problem, identified education as the cure, and attributed to it magical transforming powers…The public appeal of education could be widened, moreover, by linking it to the nationalist struggle."[65]

Feminists like Nabawiya Musa were especially vocal in petitioning for women's education, not merely as a means to raise intelligent youth and develop the nation, but to broaden women's

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[61] Omnia Shakry, "School Mothers and Structured Play," in *Remaking Women*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod, 126-170 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 127.

[62] Baron, *Women's Awakening*, 159.

[63] Hanan Kholoussy, *For Bette, For Worse,* 101.

[64] Baron, *Women's Awakening,* 125.

[65] Baron, *Women's Awakening,* 122.

opportunities in general. Musa came from a middle-class family of rural Egypt and received her secondary school certificate before Egypt achieved its independence.[66] She was a prominent member of the EFU, along with Huda Shaarawi, but unlike Shaarawi, parted with the nationalist rhetoric: "Perhaps her most defiant act of discontent with the patriarchal overtones of colonial Egypt was her choice not to marry and remain a single woman dedicated to her feminist advocacy."[67]

There existed a schism between many feminists of this period, particularly when it came to acting for the good of women, and acting for the good of women *with the nation in mind*; Musa very clearly parted with the nationalist rhetoric yet others promoted women's rights within the framework of the nationalist agenda. Qasim Amin (although not the women's champion that he has historically been posited as) was known as being among the prominent feminists of the time yet his brand of feminism was limited by patriarchal conceptions of women's domain and also by the nationalist rhetoric. "Amin insisted that equal education for women was unnecessary. Women merely needed primary schooling to bridge but not fully close the mental gap between them and their husbands, and they required domestic training to enable them to run households efficiently and provide a moral and educational upbringing for their children."[68] Unlike Musa, Amin was only interested in expanding women's access to education enough to allow them to be able to converse with their husbands, obtain knowledge on how to properly maintain a household, and support the educational foundation of their children. He was not interested in promoting women's access to education for the sake of equipping them with the skills necessary to enter and be successful in the working world.

Likewise, "Egyptian feminist union (EFU) members who had demanded equal education for

girls in the early 1920s were blaming it by the 1930s for the alleged failure in their duties toward their families."[69] This organization was intended to further advance women's demands when the patriarchal system failed to do so but was as ideologically diverse as any organization; there existed women like Huda Shaarawi and Nabawiya Musa, who acted with women in mind, but with different degrees of interest in amplifying the nationalist rhetoric. Shaarawi was from the elite ruling class and was active in the nationalist politics of the Wafd party while Musa was from the middle class and more focused on women's rights and less on perpetuating the limited feminism of the nationalist movement. This is not to say that the Musa was not invested in the development of the nation. She believed that part of developing a strong nation was developing both boys and girls intellectually and allowing them both the means to contribute meaningfully to society. "As an educator and the first female inspector in the Ministry of Education, Musa focuses her message on boys and girls alike. She sees reading as a first step to the liberation of Egyptian minds, particularly those of women."[70] The nationalist agenda was concerned with aligning Egyptian women's domain with that of European women and education had only a limited place in accomplishing this goal. Therefore, some feminists' views were accepted and relayed by the nationalists, so long as it fit within their own rhetoric, while the voices of other feminists, like Nabawiya Musa, were more stifled and relayed far less publicly. Feminism was thus used selectively by Egyptian nationalists, only when it furthered their cause.

Conclusion

From the revolution of 1919 into the 1920s and 1930s, the nationalist movement linked the development of the nation with the development of women as proper household managers, wives, and mothers and thus manipulated the feminist movement of the time to pursue its own anti-

[66] Mohamed Younis. "Daughters of the Nile: The Evolution of Feminism in Egypt." *Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice* 13.2 (2007): 469-470.

[67] Younis, "Daughters of the Nile," 470.

[68] Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse,* 60.

[69] Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse*, 64.

[70] Younis, "Daughters of the Nile," 470-471.

colonial goals. Although there were feminist organizations and movements which sought to genuinely advance women's rights and freedoms, those that did not operate strictly within the framework of the nationalist movement were limited in their publicity and influence. The sole political objective of this time period was to achieve independence and to sever, completely, colonial ties from the British. The nationalist movement struggled on for the next several decades following the revolution of 1919 until the revolution of 1952, during which, the Free Officers led a revolt against the British-backed monarchy. A few years later, in 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and effectively ended British occupation of Egypt. It was during this time that nationalism and feminism were once again intertwined as a means to firmly secure independence and to establish a strong sense of national unity.

Under Nasser, the idea of state feminism emerged "as a constellation of normalizing discourses, practices, legal measures, and state-building programs aimed at making women into modern political subjects."[71] Initially, the leaders of the new state rejected feminist goals but, just as in the early twentieth century, the new regime "quickly realized that the adoption of the general demand for increased public integration of women in the different arenas helped distinguish it from the *ancient regime.*"[72] Establishing Egypt as a modern nation was the goal in the early twentieth century and continued to be the goal that Nasser's regime strived for in the mid-twentieth century.

In the Egyptian Constitution of 1956, Nasser officially established a number of new rights for women. He gave women the right to vote, the right to work outside of the home and reaffirmed their rights to education while also providing paid maternity leave, protection against sexist treatment in the workplace and in the market,

and an official declaration of the legal equality of all Egyptians.[73] As Mervat Hatem writes, Nasser's "new welfare state offered explicit commitment to public equality for women. It contributed to the development of state feminism as a legal, economic, and ideological strategy to introduce changes to Egyptian society and its gender relations.

In turn, state feminism contributed to the political legitimacy of Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime and its progressive credentials."[74] While Nasser was celebrated as being a major advocate for women's rights, it is clear that he saw the political advantages to be gained in promoting women's rights and thus reaped the benefits of pushing a feminist agenda.

Following Nasser's regime and into the present, there has been increasing differentiation between secular feminists and Islamic feminists. In the early twentieth century, Egypt struggled to break colonial ties and bring about an era of cultural, technological, and political modernity; modernity was often associated with secularism therefore secularism was often intertwined with feminist rhetoric. After Nasser's secular era, there arose a concern that Egypt was on the verge of losing its Islamic heritage and national authenticity. It was at this time that Islamic feminism emerged. While secular feminism is often associated with Western culture and non-religious practices, Islamic feminism seeks to retain religious and cultural identity while reforming religious interpretation. [75] These two strands of feminism are evidence of an ongoing battle fought amongst Egyptian reformers and conservatives which was present in the early twentieth century and which continues today. The nationalist movement of semi-colonial Egypt roughly a century ago was concerned with finding the balance between modernity and

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[71] Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminism, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt,* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 7.

[72] Hatem, Mervat, "Privatization and the Demise of State Feminism in Egypt." In *Mortgaging Women's Lives,* ed. by Pamela Sparr, 40-60 (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1994), 41.

[73] Hatem, "Privatization," 42-43.

[74] Mervat Hatem. "Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992), 231.

[75] Margot Badran, "Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 1, no. 1 (2005), 8-9.

authenticity; this same struggle has created a complex landscape within which contemporary feminists, nationalists, and other reformers are forced to operate in pursuit of a greater Egyptian nation.

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The Appeal of K-pop: International Appeal and Online Fan Behavior

ZESHA VANG

ABSTRACT

Arguably one of (South) Korea's most lucrative exports, K-pop (Korean pop music) is becoming increasingly popular in non-Asian countries. Because of its successful globalization, K-pop has a large fan following both domestically and internationally. This paper argues that previous explanations for the global popularity of K-pop may account for what attracts fans to K-pop, but not for what keeps them invested. The reason that international fans continue to consume K-pop is because the K-pop industry, as well as the fan community, are highly interactive and inclusive. This social structure results in an extremely active fan community, which in turn, is one of K-pop's attractive points.

Korean artist PSY's hit song, "Gangnam Style," has recently brought much attention to K-pop in non-Asian countries, but K-pop was a thriving industry since long before the song's release in 2012. While K-pop is certainly successful domestically, its success is not limited to Korea. The Korean Wave, also known as *hallyu*[1], refers to the spread of Korean culture, usually in the form of Korean television dramas and K-pop. It is a well-known term in Asia where K-pop is the most successful outside of Korea. More recently, K-pop as a music genre has become increasingly popular in non-Asian countries. K-pop bands steal the hearts of youth, and sometimes even the elderly, all around the world, resulting in very large and very loyal fan bases and fandoms. International fans are generally unable to support the bands in person that they are fans of, however what they lack in physical support, they make up for through the internet. One question acts as the basis for this paper: why is K-pop appealing to international fans? I wanted to understand why international K-pop fans are interested in K-pop despite their physical distance from the source material, as well as possible language barriers.

The argument that K-pop appeals to Asians in non-Asian countries because of the similarity in culture, while probable, is generic and lacks depth; moreover, it fails to account for the significant number of non-Asian K-pop fans. Other arguments focus on the success of K-pop as a direct cause of its successful globalization. While both of these reasons certainly account for why some fans are attracted to K-pop, I believe that there is something more that keeps international fans involved in the K-pop fan community. In this paper, I argue that the way K-pop is marketed and the social structure it creates in fandom as a result is a distinguishing feature that is attractive to international fans. This is because the relationship between K-pop idol and fan is highly interactive and inclusive. This social structure results in an extremely active fan community and includes both domestic and international fans, which is arguably unique to K-pop.

There are two main sections in this paper. In the first section, I will discuss previous scholarship about the appeal and success of K-pop outside of Korea. Rather than disputing those findings, I will argue that there is more to the appeal of K-pop than what has been previously stated. In the second section, I will discuss the online consumption and social structure of the K-pop fandom according to survey responses, and use them to explain the appeal of K-pop to international fans.

Research Methods

I collected the majority of the data discussed in this paper from a survey I conducted using Google Forms. The survey consisted of 24 questions and was open for 4 days in late January, 2016. I distributed the survey through my Tumblr blog, private Twitter account, and Facebook account. In this paper, an international fan refers to any fan of K-pop that is not of Korean nationality regardless

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[1] *Hallyu* is "韩流," (hán liú) in Mandarin Chinese and "한류" in Korean. It literally translates to "Korean flow," but is often referred to as the "Korean wave."

of their current residence. Therefore, this survey was open to responses from K-pop fans around the world. As the survey was primarily shared among friends, the results may be skewed, particularly in the different types of people who responded. However, the survey responses allow for an analysis of the international appeal of K-pop that is more fan centered in comparison to previously made arguments.

The rest of the data discussed and analyzed in this paper, e.g. comments, blog posts, etc., were collected from social media sites such as Tumblr, Twitter, or YouTube. Because this paper is about the behaviors of international K-pop fans, I collected information from translated sources or sources originally written in English more often than those originally written in Korean. For example, because international fans are more likely to visit the English K-pop news website *allkpop*, I used similar sites or blogs rather than directly consulting Korean news articles online.

Previous Scholarship

Multiple scholars have offered explanations for the global success of *hallyu* and K-pop that focus on consumers, marketing, or technology. Hogarth (2013) attributes the global success of K-drama (Korean television dramas) and K-pop to cultural affinity, claiming that Asian morals and familiarity to Asian features are the main appealing factors of *hallyu* to Asian people. Park (2013) and Shibata (2015) also agree that cultural affinity has allowed *hallyu* and K-pop to flourish, but Park's article discusses the success of K-pop because of inter-Asian support, but through non-Asian pop culture systems, and Shibata's article focuses on the popularity of K-drama in Japan. As I stated earlier, this explanation is reasonable. A majority of K-pop fans, including the international fans who took part in my survey, are Asian, therefore cultural affinity is likely to be a factor in initial attraction to K-pop. However, cultural affinity does not explain the portion of *hallyu* fans that are non-Asian. Additionally, I do not believe that cultural affinity alone is reason enough for fans to continue to stay interested. Fans of K-drama and K-pop devote a large amount of time to their fan activities. On average, K-dramas contain upwards of 20 one

hour episodes, and K-pop fans are typically highly dedicated to their fan activities, as I will discuss in a later section of this paper.

Other scholars suggest that K-pop is successful globally because it is transnational and transcultural (Jung, 2011; Kim, A. E., Masayari, F., Oh, I., 2013; Ju, H., 2014). Jung (2011) uses the idea of *mugukjeok*[2] (무국적), and Ju (2014), the idea of glocalization, to describe K-pop as a type of pop culture that is not defined or influenced by only one culture. They claim that K-pop and *hallyu* incorporate global influences as well as other cultural and/or local influences, i.e. not only Korean-ness, to create a genre of pop culture that is attractive to global audiences as well as a domestic audience. While I agree that K-pop is transcultural and those who are not familiar with Korean culture can still enjoy it as a result, I do not think that this explanation accounts for international fans' long-term investment in the music genre. Transnationality and transculturality are surely factors that initially attract fans to K-pop, but they do not account for why fans continue to consume and continue to stay attracted.

Shin and Kim (2013) suggest that the above explanations, as well as the explanation of K-pop and *hallyu*'s success through various forms of technology (e.g. YouTube), are factors in the global success of K-pop, but these explanations discredit the work of Korean entertainment companies and the manufactured system of the K-pop industry. Ju and Lee (2015) also reject the above explanations. They claim that previous studies do not focus on the actual consumption patterns of fans nor do they consider why K-drama (the focus of their paper) is consumed outside of Korea. Their study used a relatively small sample size (in-depth interviews with 15 undergraduate students). Similar to Shin and Kim (2013) and Ju and Lee (2015), I agree that the above explanations are only partial contributors to the global success of K-pop and *hallyu*. This paper explores the aspects of K-pop that are appealing to international fans with

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[2] Jung's idea of *mugukjeok* was influenced by Iwabuchi Koichi's idea of *mukokuseki* (無国籍), which Jung summarizes as meaning "'culturally odorless,'" referring to Japanese products that are sold successfully to a global market because they are culturally odorless (p. 3).

the same intentions as Ju and Lee (2015), but with a larger sample size and focused on K-pop rather than K-drama.

The Online Consumption of K-pop

To better understand the international K-pop fan community, I created a survey (see Appendix A) that addressed three basic topics: general demographic information (Questions 1-5), general feelings towards K-pop (Questions 6-10, 24), and participation in fan activities (Questions 11-23). The survey results made it evident that international K-pop fans very actively consume K-pop through the internet despite the physical distance between them and the source material. They are active not only in the types of fan activities they participate in, but also the way they react to current events in the K-pop industry. In this section of this paper, I will first lay out the basic demographic information of the survey respondents. This will be followed by analysis of international fans' feelings towards the K-pop industry. The next subsection will describe fans as marketers, focusing on the different kinds of activities international fans partake in, and the last subsection will briefly discuss the way that the K-pop industry is marketed as interactive and inclusive and explain why this structure of K-pop prompts an active consumption pattern in international fans.

Survey Results

I received a total of 235 survey responses (for a chart of the following information see Appendix B). Roughly 90% of the respondents were female and 8.9% were male. The majority of respondents, 68.2%, reported to be of Asian race, which was followed by Whites at 20% and Blacks at 6.2%. Of the 68.2% Asians, the majority were ethnically Chinese, but many also reported as being Filipino, Vietnamese, Hmong, Korean, Indian, and others. About 67.3% of respondents reported being of Canadian nationality. The next highest reported nationality was American, at 18.2%, and French, at 3.2%.

There were two complications in the construction of the survey: asking two questions per one free form question, and the lack of a clear distinction between nationality and ethnicity. Had examples of nationality and ethnicity been provided, there may have been less confusion in the responses received. These were both potential causes for misunderstanding or misinterpretation.

Because of the format of the survey, some of the numbers and results shown in the graphs are not necessarily representative of one person per number. Multiple questions in the survey allowed for one person to choose multiple answers (e.g. question eight).

International Fans and Active Consumption

To understand why the international K-pop fan community behaves the way it does, I first analyzed fans' reasons for liking K-pop. Survey responses to question seven, "What do you like about K-pop? Is there anything you dislike about K-pop?" showed that fans' likes, and more importantly, dislikes, were a major driving factor behind their active consumption patterns. While assumptions exist that fans of pop culture mindlessly and passively consume it, the survey responses to question seven indicate that international fans are highly aware of ongoing ethical and societal problems within the K-pop industry, at least to the extent possible in these kinds of industries.

Survey respondents wrote about numerous aspects of K-pop that they like and dislike, but I narrowed these aspects to the top five most popularly mentioned: visual, fan culture, music and dance, ethics, and marketing. The visual aspect included any comments on appearance, presentation, music videos, or images of K-pop groups. The fan culture aspect included any comments on the behavior of fans, the toxicity of fandom, as well as friendships made through fandom. The music and dance aspect included comments on the music and dances of K-pop groups. The ethics aspect referred to topics such as treatment of idols, gender inequality, employment practices, and cultural appropriation. Lastly, the marketing aspect included any comments on the

marketing tactics of K-pop, or fan interaction with idols.

Above is a chart representing the different types of survey responses to question seven. In order to categorize the answers as positive or negative, I first outlined the criteria of a positive and negative answer. A positive answer needed to include things people stated that they enjoyed or liked and a negative answer needed to include things people stated that they disliked or that bothered them. This is an example of a response that included both a positive and negative comment: "I like the choreography. I dont [sic] like when the artist look so perfect that they look fake." Because I only recorded whether responses were positive or negative for these aspects, a handful of the responses were unaccounted for, as those responses did not mention any of the five aspects above. In addition, in cases such as those where the answer was "It depends," I was unable to determine whether they were positive or negative. As a result, not every single response of the 235 responses received were included in this graph.

Survey respondents commented on music and dance the most overall, but it is noteworthy that 100% of the 82 comments made about ethics and the social structure of K-pop were negative. It is a natural assumption that fans would comment positively on music and dance more than any other topic, however, it was unexpected that all of the comments about one particular topic would be negative. The amount of negative comments concerning fan culture were also quite high at 73.9%, but that will be discussed in a later

subsection. Although there were more responses overall about music and dance, I chose to focus on the aspects of K-pop that international fans had the most negative feelings about because of the content of the responses.

In regard to dislikes about K-pop, fans commented on their concerns about three ethical and/or societal problems in the K-pop industry: gender inequality, racism, and unfair employment practices. In order to analyze and discuss these responses in depth, I will use three examples to explain the three ethical problems listed above: (1) the sexy image of Hyuna, a member of girl group 4Minute, (2) blackface in K-pop, and (3) the conflict between powerhouse entertainment company, SM Entertainment, and idol group, JYJ.

Gender inequality in K-pop is a hot topic among international fans. This is especially clear in the reception of images of boy and girl bands. K-pop idol Hyuna is currently a member of girl group 4Minute, but often participates in solo promotions because of her explosive popularity. She is infamous for her sexy image and her songs and music videos are always topics of debate. Although idols and girl groups with sexy images similar to Hyuna's are a trend in K-pop, they have always been subject to criticism both domestically and internationally. On YouTube, Hyuna's "Bubble Pop" and "RED" music videos have 50,081 and 29,494 dislikes respectively, and although fans usually flood the comments section of videos, there was at least one negative comment each in the top comments sections (April 12, 2016). These comments were: "she is hot !!! not that guy is ugly that girl is a slut [sic][3]" posted by user Mythreial (2016) on the "Bubble Pop" music video, and "not my type of slut :/" posted by user Spiritu Sancti (2015) on Hyuna's "RED" music video. Both comments received fervent opposition or aggression from Hyuna fans.

It was also apparent in the survey responses that some international fans dislike when girl groups have sexy images. In response to question

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[3] I interpreted this comment to mean that the poster re~~Figure 2. Member of Idol group Beast (비스트) Lee~~ sta~~Kikwang dons blackface on a television program.~~ male ("that guy") shown in the music video "is ugly."

nine, "Do you dislike any specific concepts[4] girl groups have?" the majority of the respondents stated that they did not dislike any specific images, but 43 survey respondents reported that they dislike the sexy image (see Appendix G). On the other side, there are a high number of comments on social media and from the survey that oppose the criticism of girl groups with sexy images. For example, Twitter user newkpopstan (2016) tweeted, "you know someone's a new kpop stan when they hate on sexy ggroup concepts.[5]"

The problem of gender bias is more apparent through complaints about the lack of criticism of boy groups with sexy images. Whereas forty-three respondents stated that they dislike sexy images in girl groups, only eighteen respondents stated that they dislike sexy or beast-dol[6] image in boy groups. Even from a survey with a relatively small sample size, it is evident that there is more opposition towards sexy images in

girl groups compared to sexy images in boy groups. On a blog post from website *NetizenBuzz*,[7] reporting what Korean music programs plan to do about groups with sexy images, one of the comments from an international fan in reaction to the article was, "but what about boy groups? Why

are they only limiting girl groups? I guess it's ok if a guy shows off his abs or directly point at his crotch but god forbid it's a girl" (jay-why-pee, 2014). There were also comments from the survey on this gender bias. One respondent commented "I dont [sic] like how biased the categories are, like boys can do sexy dancing but girl groups get looked down (by fans)." Overall, 163 respondents answered that they do not dislike any specific images boy bands have, whereas 142 respondents answered the same about girl groups. It is important to note, however, that this gender bias seen from the survey results is likely a cause of the gender breakdown of the respondents. About 90% of survey respondents were female.

Another complaint international fans had about K-pop was racism. Survey respondents also commented on cultural appropriation in K-pop bands with a hip hop image, but one of the biggest concerns was blackface, traditionally a practice in which a performer playing the part of a black

person wears makeup in order to look black. In the Korean pop culture industry, not just K-pop, blackface seems to be used in an attempt to be humorous, as celebrities who have done it are typically not performing or playing the part of a black person. In the case of K-pop idols, blackface is usually done on television programs. Comments and concerns about racism came from respondents of all races, but they were especially common in respondents whose race is black. In this case, international fans are likely interpreting what they see in the context of their own culture. Korea does not have the same historical context that other non-Asian countries have to understand the offense of blackface and/or cultural appropriation. However, although this may explain why blackface might be used as a comical tool in

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[4] When used to describe K-pop groups, the Korean word "콘셉트," or "concept," in English, has the same meaning as "image."

[5] The word "stan" is a combination of the words "stalker" and "fan." Its use is not limited to the K-pop fandom. Among K-pop fans, it is not necessarily pejorative; it can be used as a noun or a verb to refer to someone who is a very passionate fan. The word "ggroup" means "girl group." I have interpreted his tweet to mean that it is easy to recognize K-pop fans (the majority of which are female) that are new because they do not (yet) appreciate girl groups with sexy images, which are quite common in K-pop, the way other fans have grown to.

[6] "짐승돌," is a mixture of the words "beast" ("짐승") and "idol" ("아이돌") in Korean. It is sometimes translated among K-pop fans as "beast-dol."

[7] A blog that translates popular (most "liked") comments on Korean entertainment articles for international fans. It should be noted that *NetizenBuzz* tends to purposefully translate articles with the most offensive comments.

Korean pop culture, it does not excuse the fact that it is offensive to international fans.

Unfair employment practices in the K-pop industry were mentioned with the highest frequency among survey respondents concerning fans' dislikes. SM Entertainment, although extremely successful in the K-pop industry, is notorious for their harsh contracts. Multiple idols have filed lawsuits against the company claiming that their contracts were unfair. Among one of the most well-known of these cases is the split of extremely popular boy band TVXQ. Three members of TVXQ (originally a five membered group) filed a lawsuit against SM Entertainment in 2009, claiming that their 13 year contracts were unfair (Sunwoo, 2012). Among K-pop fans, these kind of contracts are often referred to as slave contracts (노예 계약) for some of the following reasons: long duration periods, unequal or unfair payment distribution, extremely busy schedules (Williamson, 2011). In 2012, both sides withdrew and TVXQ officially split into TVXQ and JYJ (Sunwoo, 2012).

Lawsuits and controversy surrounding idol groups and their companies are highly publicized, so it is not uncommon for international fans to hear about them. What is notable is the amount of effort international fans put into learning about how their idol groups are being treated by their companies. About slave contracts, a survey respondent wrote, "After doing some research, I've learned about the difficult training the members endure to reach their idol status, as well as the unfair contracts instilled by their companies. Idols are often overworked and strained at the cost of their physical and mental health." This respondent explicitly states that they did extra research to learn more about idols and their contracts. This is only one among the many comments made concerning the employment practices in the K-pop industry.

In addition to international fans' concerns and dislikes about K-pop, I would also like to address how international fans feel about the language barrier that K-pop presents. This about it:

When people hear me playing KPop:

OTHER PERSON: Do you even understand what they are saying?

WHAT MY MIND TELLS ME TO SAY: Actually, thanks to the internet and the help of other bilingual people around the world, I do. I look up translations whenever I need to understand the lyrics to a song that I don't speak the language for. Also, I can tell by the instruments used, the tempo of the song, and the tone of the artist's voice that certain songs are party songs, sad songs, love songs, etc. Plus, I like to think that just because there is a language barrier, it doesn't mean that I can't appreciate a catchy hook, melody, or the flow of the song. Okay?

WHAT MY AWKWARD SELF ACTUALLY SAYS: Well..no.

The expectation that international fans can neither understand nor speak Korean is evident in (1) the attitudes of people who are not K-pop fans towards international K-pop fans as shown in the blog post above, and (2) the mixing of English words or phrases with Korean in song lyrics. The mixing of English in song lyrics is usually an attempt from entertainment companies to appeal to both domestic and international audiences (Jin & Ryoo, 2014, p. 128). However, because the English used in K-pop songs is sometimes poor, it is received negatively by international fans, as made evident through survey comments such as "I like K-pop for it's catchy tune, but I cringe whenever there is Engrish" or "too much nonsense English".

The blog post above describes an international fan that does not understand Korean, and while this is certainly the case for many fans, survey results show that there is also significant interest in learning the Korean language among international fans. In response to survey question 23, "Are you learning or have you learned Korean because of K-pop?" a little more than half of the respondents said that they were learning or had learned Korean because of K-pop, and 19.6% of participants responded that they were learning or had learned Korean, but not because of K-pop (see Appendix T). When asked whether or not they could read, speak, or understand Korean, 52.3% responded that they could read it, 33.2% responded that they could speak it, 10% responded that they could understand it, and 35.7% responded that they could not read, speak,

or understand Korean[8] (see Appendix S). These numbers alone show agency in K-pop fans' behaviors in what may have been assumed to be mindless consumption of pop culture. Despite language barriers international K-pop fans either strive to learn and understand Korean, or actively find translations of subtitled videos online.

Fans As Marketers

As made obvious from the survey responses to question 21, international fans are not only active in the ways they learn about and respond to K-pop, but also in the different types of fan activities they participate in and how much time they invest in these activities. In response to question 21, "On average, how much time would you say you spend online doing K-pop related things?" the majority of survey respondents replied that they spend three hours or less per day, followed closely by spending five or more hours per day (see Appendix R). International fans usually do not have the opportunity to be physically active in their consumption patterns, however there are a variety of activities they can partake in online. A few examples of these kinds of activities I will discuss in this section are fan participation in giveaways, voting online for K-pop bands to win awards, and translating news about K-pop bands.

U.S. television series *Frontline* describes fans as marketers in an episode titled "Generation Like" (2014), succinctly describing the structure of pop culture fandom. According to *Frontline*, through "likes" and "retweets" on various social media sites or applications, social media users online become marketers for the brands and artists, etc., that they are "liking" and "retweeting." The online consumption patterns of international K-pop fans model this idea of fans as marketers. Whether or not fans do these things with the same intentions as the entertainment companies that actually market these K-pop bands, in participating in online fan activities, they spread publicity and

ultimately advertise for the bands that they are fans of.

It is not uncommon for fans to participate in giveaways and sweepstakes organized by official companies, and in more recent times, giveaways hosted by other fans as well. About 53% of survey participants responded that they had participated in giveaways before, with about 5% responding that they had both participated in and hosted a giveaway before. Eighty percent of survey participants acknowledged that they had voted for a K-pop band to win an official award (e.g. weekly music shows such as *Inkigayo* [인기가요] or Music Bank, or end of the year award shows such as Mnet Music Asian Awards) in the past. Additionally, 45.5% of participants responded that they had voted for a K-pop band to win an unofficial or fan conducted online poll in the past. Although fans do not explicitly market bands in participating in these kinds of activities, they still spread awareness of said band. For example, everyone that watches music shows or award shows will see and hear the band that wins the award. Posting news or other translations about a K-pop band contributes to the marketing of that band more directly. In general, Korean entertainment companies do not have to worry about translating information themselves, as fans who understand both Korean and English will probably do the work for them.

Specific examples of fans as marketers can be seen through a small portion of the international fandom on Tumblr for boy band, EXO. Between the years 2012 and 2014, I personally interacted with and observed a small portion of EXO's international fandom on Tumblr. I worked with a few other fans to translate material (e.g. news articles, song lyrics, social media posts) about EXO or from members of EXO. In addition to translating information about the band, the blogs[9] that I worked with also hosted two giveaways. In both cases, the blogs gave away EXO's most recent album and usually a poster or other merchandise

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[8] The multiple answer choices for this question are a result of the nature of the Korean language, which is written phonetically. As a result, one may be able to read it if they learn the alphabet, but still not comprehend what they have read.

[9] EXO originally consisted of two subgroups, EXO-K and EXO-M (K for Korean and M for Mandarin). As a result, there were two corresponding translations blogs I worked with that translated in Korean and Mandarin Chinese respectively: exok-trans.tumblr.com and exom-trans.tumblr.com.

accompanying the album. The rules for the exom-trans (2014) giveaway were as follows:

    - you must be following both exom-trans AND exok-trans

          - you can reblog once, and like once, giving you a total of two entries (if you reblog more than once, you're disqualified)

          - no giveaway blogs[10]

These kinds of giveaway events promote both the band that the blog or site is dedicated to, as well as the blog or site itself. In the case of the exom-trans giveaway, the promotion of the band, in this case EXO, is obvious, as their album is what is being given away. There are two other indicators of exom-trans spreading awareness of their own blog: (1) stating that to be eligible one must follow both their blog as well as exok-trans, and (2) including reblogging as an entry option. Tumblr is a blogging site that allows bloggers to not only make blog posts, but also reblog posts from other blogs. All followers of a blog see original posts made from that blog as well as any posts it reblogs. In these ways, exom-trans promoted EXO at the same time that they promoted their own blog among international EXO fans on Tumblr. Translation blogs are certainly not the only kinds of blogs that host giveaways on Tumblr, as it is common to see anyone of any kind of fandom, i.e. not only K-pop blogs, host giveaways on their blog or other social media account.

    Besides translation blogs, another form of popular blog within fandoms on Tumblr is a type called a "Fuck Yeah" blog. In the case of the K-pop fandom, "Fuck Yeah" blogs post news about a specific K-pop band, official and fan taken pictures of that band's members, and other material such as schedule information for that band. In the case of EXO's international fandom on Tumblr, numerous "Fuck Yeah" blogs exist. One of the most popular is FY! EXO (fy-exo.com). Among fans and nonfans alike, it is generally assumed that any sort of fan work is done for free. While this is certainly true, as fans usually do not receive money to post any content about the band they like, two advertisement banners can be seen on FY! EXO's

blog page (April 12, 2016). Advertisements on websites are an easy way to make money, assuming that website receives a large number of unique views per day. If enough viewers click on advertisements on these kinds of websites, the owner of that website will earn money. "Fuck Yeah" blogs are immensely popular within the K-pop fandom, because they tend to both post pictures of the K-pop idols as well as translate news about them. In comparison, other blogs only post pictures or only post translations. The owners of FY! EXO post photos of and information about EXO for free, but the advertisements on their blog suggest that they may earn some money through other fans who visit their blog and click on the advertisements. I would like to note that this may be true for FY! EXO, but many other "Fuck Yeah" blogs in the K-pop fandom do not have advertisements on their blogs. However, through these kinds of interactions among fans, international K-pop fans use similar marketing techniques to those used by actual entertainment companies.

K-pop As Interactive and Inclusive

    The opportunity for fans to become marketers of bands they follow is directly correlated to the interactive and inclusive social structure of K-pop. For the K-pop industry, the relationship between idol and fan and the interactions between the two are paramount. One survey respondent wrote, "For a fan, it's easy to feel close to the idol (even tho [sic] it's not the case) as they promote so much on tv shows, music programs, social media, their own channels, fansigns, concerts, etc.," highlighting the importance of the close relationship between idol and fan through the many different methods of connection. In addition to the internet, which is an extremely important platform for interactions with international fans, television shows are a form of media through which K-pop idols are able to interact with their fans, domestic and international. Many survey respondents reported that one of the things they like about K-pop was the television shows, particularly variety shows. About reality shows, Jung (2011) writes "…appearing in reality shows is considered crucial

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[10] Sometimes people create giveaway blogs on Tumblr. The only use of these blogs is for reblogging giveaway posts.

for rookie idol groups because it enables them to reveal their seemingly genuine selves to the audiences, which greatly enhances the connections between the viewers and the idol groups" (p. 168). Both the above respondent and Jung are aware that although these kinds of television shows allow fans to see what kind of person an idol is, the image that they are shown is likely to be strategically constructed. Nonetheless, many other survey respondents stated that they enjoy watching shows their favorite idols appear on, whether they are talk shows, variety shows, or reality shows.

An example of one such show is *Jessica&Krystal* (제시카&크리스탈), a show that aired on Korean television channel OnStyle in the summer of 2014. It was about former Girls' Generation (소녀시대) member, Jessica, and her younger sister and member of girl group f(x) (에프엑스), Krystal. OnStyle's YouTube video (2014) advertising the airing of the first episode stated that *Jessica&Krystal* would show "The girls' honest and lively private life that has not been seen [before] on stage." It is not uncommon to see K-pop idols on these kinds of television shows as many variations of them exist.

Besides television shows, the easiest form of interaction or means of learning about K-pop idols are their social media accounts, since fan signing events[11] or fan meetings are typically held in Korea, which makes it difficult for international fans to attend. The number of idols with public social media accounts such as Twitter and Instagram are increasing and sometimes fans even receive acknowledgement from an idol through these social media accounts.

This interactive structure is not necessarily unique to K-pop, but the way that K-pop is marketed with a focus on both a domestic audience as well as an international audience is unique. Celebrities all around the world have social media accounts where they can share anything with their fans if they wish to do so. Reality and variety television shows also exist in non-Asian countries. The difference between the K-pop industry and other industries is the type of

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[11] At fan signing events, K-pop bands sign autographs for a certain number of fans, usually on the most current album the band is promoting.

people television shows feature. In America, for example, shows such as *Survivor* or *American Idol* feature non-celebrities. In Korea, many reality and variety shows feature idols or other celebrities. This pattern is not always the case, as popular American reality show, *Keeping Up with the Kardashians*, features the famous Kardashian family. However, on average, American celebrities appear more often on talk shows than they do on reality or variety shows.

Similar to K-pop, J-pop (Japanese popular music) also seems to have an interactive marketing structure. For example, the idol girl group, AKB48, was created by Akimoto Yasushi in 2005 with "…the concept 'meeting real idols daily,'" (Reuters, 2009). This idea that fans can actually meet idols, in this case, members of AKB48, suggests that the J-pop industry may be more interactive than the K-pop industry, in terms of the relationship between idol and fan. Other J-pop idol groups may not follow this exact model, but the majority of groups appear to function in the same ways as K-pop idol groups: idols appear on television shows and there is an interactive relationship between idol and fan. The difference between K-pop and J-pop music industries however, is that J-pop generally does not target a global audience in the same way that the K-pop industry does. For example, Jung (2011) defines her idea of "'manufactured versatile masculinity'" in relation to K-pop boy bands, as masculinity that is "multi-layered, culturally mixed, simultaneously contradictory, and most of all strategically manufactured" (p. 165). As discussed in an earlier section, many other scholars agree with the idea that K-pop is popular globally because it targets international fans in this way. Following Jung's model on boy bands, K-pop is marketed so that anyone can enjoy it regardless of their nationality or culture because K-pop is influenced by multiple cultures in order for it to appeal to multiple audiences.

Another indicator that the K-pop industry deliberately targets a global audience (at the same time they target domestic audiences) is the importance of the globally popular video streaming site YouTube to the K-pop industry. In response to survey question 12, "Where do you watch K-pop videos?" 97% of respondents replied that they use YouTube. Oh and Lee (2013) claim

that "K-pop producers...actively chose YouTube for its free music distribution, despite the low-profit margins from YouTube royalty fees," while "J-pop and American pop music distributors avoided YouTube, giving a niche market to K-pop, because the profit margin from YouTube was far lower than from traditional media..." (p. 38). Despite the low profits as a result of using YouTube, K-pop music producers and entertainment companies still see its importance. It is a platform that is free and easy to access for both domestic and international consumers. Additionally, Hong (2014) claims that the Korean government started to use K-pop as a pop culture export and has continued to since the Asian financial crisis (p. 97). Because of the governmental push for K-pop globalization, resulting in the use of sites like YouTube, K-pop is interactive for not only domestic fans, but also international fans.

The relationship between idol and fan is not only interactive, as described above, but also inclusive, and it is these two factors that keep international fans attracted to K-pop. Because one of K-pop's marketing points is the close relationship between idol and fan, private aspects of idols' lives are often exposed. There are times when this is deliberate, such as previously mentioned show *Jessica & Krystal*, although it should be noted that shows similar to these tend to be highly structured despite their claims. There are also times when it is not deliberate, e.g. dating scandals. There is an obvious demand to see into the everyday lives of K-pop idols, because fans want to feel close to their idols. As a result, the supply of information about idols private lives increases. When information is released that is deemed too private (by fans), fans rise to protect their idols, or at least criticize the mistreatment of their idols. This is evident in the survey responses to question seven concerning treatment of idols as well as employment practices. One respondent wrote "I dislike how overworked the idols seem and how their personal life is always made public (LET THEM LIVEEE) [sic]." Domestic and international fans feel the need and want to protect their idols, whether it be from public slander, unfair employment practices, or invasion of privacy.

Figure 1 (see p. 8) shows that fan culture gave rise to the most negative comments about K-pop

after ethic and societal problems. About 39% of the total comments were about fan culture and 73.9% of the comments were negative. Many commented on the toxicity of fandom culture. One respondent wrote, "I dislike obsessive *stan* cultures found with the different fandoms and the jealous [sic], competition, and misogyny that comes from it." In response to question 19, "Do you consider yourself to be part of a fandom?" 24.5% of respondents replied that they did not. A handful of the reasons why respondents did not consider themselves a part of fandom indicated that they dislike "fan wars" or "obsessive fangirling." In order for fans to protect their idols, it is inevitable that they learn about them. This is a normal fan activity and a large portion of respondents commented positively about the friendships that they make as they are introduced to different K-pop fandoms. This can be a difficult balance, however, as a fan that is unhealthily interested in an idol's private life is usually stigmatized and labeled a *sasaeng*[12] fan.

K-pop fan culture is inclusive because as fans learn about their favorite K-pop bands, making them feel closer to that band, they also feel closer to other fans. K-pop is interactive because fans feel that they need to learn about their favorite K-pop bands and those bands (and their entertainment companies) provide them with the information to do so. This then leads to fans' awareness of ethical and/or societal problems within the K-pop industry that they generally believe they should protect their idols from. According to the survey responses, international fans like these interactive and inclusive aspects of K-pop; they appreciate being able to get to "know" their favorite bands, and spend a lot of time doing fan activities that support them.

Conclusion

Although it is true that previous explanations such as cultural affinity or successful globalization are important factors that drive the international popularity of K-pop, I assert that the interactive and inclusive structure of K-pop is the driving

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[12] *Sasaeng* fan is derived from the Korean words "사생활" and "팬" meaning "private life," and "fan," respectively.

factor behind its success. Because K-pop targets both a domestic and global audience, international fans are still able to actively consume K-pop despite physical distance. K-pop is marketed in such a way that fans want to learn more about their favorite bands. Therefore, they become aware of ethical and societal problems within the K-pop industry. These ethical and societal problems are likely revealed and exposed as a result of the nature of fans wanting to know more about the bands they like. Fans then work together to protect their idols or make these problems known. It is the social structure of K-pop that entices fans and keeps them interested and invested after they are initially attracted to it, and without such dedicated fans, K-pop as a global music genre would cease to exist.

Appendix A

Survey Questions
* Required
1. What is your nationality? *
2. What is your ethnicity? *
3. How old are you? *
    younger than 10
    10-13
    14-16
    17-19
    20-25
    26-30
    Other :
4. What is your gender? *
    Female
    Male
    Other
5. How old were you when you became a fan of K-pop? *
    5 or younger
    6-10
    10-13
    14-16
    17-19
    20 or older
6. What initially attracted you to K-pop? What attracts you to K-pop now? *
7. What do you like about K-pop? Is there anything you dislike about K-pop? *
8. What do you listen to: *

    Boy bands
    Girl groups
    Soloists (i.e. IU, Jay Park)
    Other:
9. Do you dislike any specific concepts that girl groups have?
    Cute or innocent (i.e. Apink "Mr. Chu")
    Sexy (i.e. 4minute Hyuna "Red" or AOA "Miniskirt")
    Strong and/or independent (i.e. Miss A "I Don't Need a Man" or 2ne1 "I am the Best"
    No
    Other:
10. Do you dislike any specific concepts that boy bands have?
    Cute or boy-next-door (i.e. SHINee "Hello")
    Sexy or Beast-dol (i.e. 2PM)
    No
    Other:
11. Where do you get your K-pop news (articles, song translations etc.)? *
    Social media sites (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.)
    Tumblr translation group blogs or sites
    K-pop news sites for international fans (i.e. allkpop, Netizenbuzz, etc.)
    Fan forums
    Korean sites (i.e. Naver)
    Other:
12. Where do you watch K-pop videos? *
13. Have you ever been to a K-pop concert? *
    Yes, in Korea.
    Yes, outside of Korea (please specify where in the "other" section).
    No
    Other:
14. Do you buy K-pop merchandise or have you in the past? *
    Yes, online.
    Yes, I've bought some in Korea.
    Yes, I've bought some outside of Korea and not online.
    No
15. If you buy any, what kinds of K-pop merchandise do you buy? *
    Album CDs
    Concert DVDs
    Makeup endorsed by K-pop idols
    Clothes endorsed or worn by K-pop idols

Photobooks published by K-pop agencies/companies
Photobooks published and sold by other fans
I don't buy any merchandise
Other:

16. Have you ever voted for a K-pop group to win any sort of award?*
Yes, for an "official" award show (i.e. Mnet Asia Music Awards, MTV Europe Music Awards, MCoutdown, etc.)
Yes, for an "unofficial" or fan conducted online poll
No

17. Have you ever participated in any giveaways (whether hosted by other fans or by K-pop agencies/companies)? *
Yes
No
Yes, and I have hosted giveaways too.
No, but I have hosted giveaways.

18. Do you own a blog or social media account about or relating to K-pop, or visit and use blogs that are about or relate to K-pop? *
I own a blog.
I am active on fan forums.
I am active on social media such as Twitter, Tumblr, Facebook etc.
I visit blogs or other sites related to K-pop.
No
Other:

19. Do you consider yourself to be part of a fandom (i.e. Cassiopeia, DBSK's official fan club)? Please provide a brief explanation if not. *
Yes
No (Please specify why not in the "other" section)
Other:

20. Do you or have you ever done anything in your fandom (i.e. write fanfic, make edits, cover songs or dances, translate, blog about your favorite groups, etc.)? *
Write fanfiction
Make edits
Cover songs or dances
Translate
Make youtube videos
Blog about your favorite group(s)
I don't consider myself to be a part of a fandom.

Other:

21. On average, how much time would you say you spend online doing K-pop related things (i.e. listening to music or watching music videos, variety shows, dramas, etc.)? *
3 hours or less per day
3-5 hours per day
5+ hours per day
3 hours or less per week
Other :

22. Can you read/speak/understand Korean? *
Read
Speak
Understand
No

23. Are you learning or have you learned Korean because of K-pop?*
Yes
No
I am learning or have learned Korean, but not because of K-pop.
I am Korean and I can speak Korean.

24. Besides K-pop are there different types of music you listen to? If yes, can you list a few examples or genres (i.e. other Asian pop, rock, rap, etc.)? If you listen to K-pop exclusively, can you briefly explain why? *

Appendix B

Survey Demographics

		%
	Male	8.9
Gender	Female	90.2
	Other	0.9
	American	18.2
Nationality	Canadian	67.3
	French	3.2
	Other	11.4
	Asian	68.2
	Other	31.8
Race	White	20
	Black	6.2
	Other	5.6

Except for the nationalities shown on the above chart, none of the following survey takers' nationalities made up more than 1% of the total. Besides American, Canadian, and French, the other nationalities of survey takers included: Bangladeshi, British, Burmese, Chinese, Estonian, Filipino, German, Indian, Jamaican, Lebanese, Malaysian, Norwegian, Persian, Peruvian, Singaporean, Slovene, and Swedish.

Appendix C

Question 3: How old are you?

Appendix D

Question 4: What is your gender?

Appendix E

Question 5: How old were you when you became a fan of K-pop?

Appendix F

Question 8: What do you listen to?

Appendix G

Question 9: Do you dislike any specific concepts that girl groups have?

Appendix H

Question 10: Do you dislike any specific concepts that boy bands have?

Appendix I

Question 11: Where do you get your K-pop news (articles, song translations etc.)?

Appendix J

Question 13: Have you ever been to a K-pop concert?

Appendix K

Question 14: Do you buy K-pop merchandise or have you in the past?

Appendix L

Question 15: If you buy any, what kinds of K-pop merchandise do you buy?

## Appendix M

Question 16: Have you ever voted for a K-pop group to win any sort of award?

Appendix N

Question 17: Have you ever participated in any giveaways (whether hosted by other fans or by K-pop agencies/companies)?

Yes	125
No	108
Yes, and I have hosted giveaways too.	12
No, but I have hosted giveaways.	1

Appendix O

Question 18: Do you own a blog or social media account about or relating to K-pop, or visit and use blogs that are about or relate to K-pop?

Own a blog	73
Active on fan forums	18
Active on social media	131
Visit blogs or other sites	134
No	41
Other	14

Appendix P

Question 19: Do you consider yourself to be part of a fandom?

- Yes: 75.5%
- No: 24.5%

Appendix Q

Question 20: Do you or have you ever done anything in your fandom?

Write fanfiction	78
Make graphics	63
Cover songs or da...	88
Translate	25
Make YouTube vid...	26
Blog	105
I don't consider m...	41
Other	22

Appendix R

Question 21: On average, how much time would you say you spend online doing K-pop related things?

3 hours or less per day	70
3-5 hours per day	57
5+ hours per day	68
3 hours or less per week	26
Other	14

Appendix S

Question 22: Can you read/speak/understand Korean?

Read	123
Speak	78
Understand	94
No	84

Appendix T

Question 23: Are you learning or have you learned Korean because of K-pop?

- ● Yes
- ● No
- ● I am learning or have learned Korean, but not because of K-pop.
- ● I am Korean and I can speak Korean.

53.6%
22.1%
19.6%

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