I. Hume!
--Lockean vs. Humean Empiricism: metaphys. realism + epistem. realism vs. 'mental geography"=pure phenomenology+empiricist criterion of meaningfulness+anti-realism.
--Memory and the Correspondence Principle (CP): The "xerox" theory of mental content.
--Imagination and the Association Principle (AP): resemblance, contiguity, cause & effect; the 'bundle' theory of the ego.
--2 new kinds of \textit{a priori} knowledge?
--the missing shade of blue → CP*="impure a priori"

II. H's theory of causation, phase I
1st Hume Handout
--relations of ideas \implies 7+5=12
\implies Bs are UMs.
vs.
--matters of fact: \implies Socrates is married

--matters of fact and causation
--Rationalism and m-realism about causation=PSR (known \textit{a priori}):
\[ \forall x \exists y \text{ (EVENT}_x \text{ or THING}_x) \rightarrow \exists \text{CAUSE}_y \text{iff EFFECT}_x \]
--H's 2-part attack on rationalism about causation:
\begin{enumerate}
\item logical independence of exp'd events (billiard balls)
\item no original impression of causal power
\end{enumerate}

--the "secret causes" and non-agnosticism about causation
--conclusion: m-real causation is not K

III. H's theory of causation, phase II
2nd Hume Handout
--the problem of induction: appeal to unity of nature?
--H's "skeptical solution" to the problem=\
--H's analysis
I. Hume's theory of knowledge

--Lockean vs. Humean empiricism: 1) metaphys. realism + epistem. realism vs. "mental geography"=pure phenomenology+empiricist criterion of meaningfulness+anti-realism. Hume is inclined to think that psychological reflection is as far as we get in philosophy. What grounded JL's belief in MR and ER? Belief in reality of primary qualities and our reliable access to them.

--Hume's anti-realism: DH is a metaphysical agnostic and an epistemological idealist (all the objects of my knowledge are ideas; that's all we can know). Thinks we lack decisive evidence for MR+ER theses, and hence cannot be sure we are getting info directly from EWOs (ext. world objects). DH was a kind of pure phenomenologist. Being a consistent empiricist gives you a way of being critical of all philosophers in the rationalist/realist tradition. DH offers here a test of meaningfulness for ideational content: can you find phenomenal ground for any candidate idea? If you cannot, the idea is empty.

--DH focuses on Perceptions of the Mind: original impressions (3 kinds--sensory, emotional, volitional) vs. ideas. Impressions are notable for having 'force and vivacity'. The basic contents of the mind are these. ('I emote/sense/want therefore I am'). Ideas are copies of impressions made possible by a faculty--memory. Contrast 'Force and Vivacity' and D's "Clarity and Distinctness". DH's criterion of what counts as a mental content is "force and vivacity", rather than clarity and distinctness. If it has force and vivacity, it cannot be doubted as a phenomenal impression.

--Memory and the Correspondence Principle (CP). The "xerox" theory. Life is built up out of copies of impressions, copies of copies, copies of copies of copies, etc. This is what a personal life is (see "bundle" theory of the ego below). CP is the idea that memories are just copies, and hence there is a correspondence (literal, it seems) betw copy and the memorized/copied thing (the impression).

--imagination and the Association Principle: resemblance, contiguity, cause & effect. The "bundle" theory of the ego. Imagination is the second mental faculty (besides memory)--the capacity to associate impressions or their copies with each other is this mental power. With these two powers, all mental contents can be generated. Association Principle: all the connections between impressions are generated by the imagination, either by habit or by invention. Habit is a psychological urge/inclination to suppose the way things have been among impressions will continue on into the future. The mind here is, in DH's words, "spreading" over the world of phenomena, lending it the mind's structure. Ways that association works: resemblance betw impressions suggests an association to the mind; contiguity betw them suggests this, too; the appearance of cause and effect relations. Since this is all the mind has to work with for combining impressions in an orderly way, The self reduces to that bundle of impressions which are coagulated through memory and their contiguity/resemblance, etc.

Idea of God is just an inappropriately inflated version of the idea of an individual man. Fails to meet the correspondence principle, since there are no impressions which correspond to the idea of God.

--2 modes of imagination: 1) habitual 2) inventive

--reason/understanding and "relations of ideas" vs. "matters of fact"

--2 apparent violations of CP: (1) the missing shade of blue; (2) truths of math, logic, definition. The Correspondence Principle is absolutely key for Hume. Ideas always correspond to impressions. But what about the idea of the 'missing shade of blue'? Interestingly, DH offers this counterexample to the CP, then just moves on. It seems plausible that one could get this idea. It looks like the imagination provides this idea. This is not, for JP, an obvious violation of
CP bec needed a whole range of experiences in order to generate the idea.

HUME was the inventor of the imagination AS WE KNOW IT!!! So it is worth looking at what the imagination is capable of.

--2 new kinds of a priori knowledge?

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thesis of metaphysical realism: things (ext. world objects [EOWs]) exist independent of consciousness.
thesis of epistemic realism: our true ideas accurately reflect the real-world, mind-independent EOWs about which they make claims.
Locke held both of these theses.

Hume's Strong empiricism; Corresp.Princ.; Assoc.Princ.; missing shade of blue -- CP*="impure a priori"

II. H's theory of causation, phase I

7+5=12.
--relations of ideas vs. matters of fact: Bs are UMs.
--matters of fact and causation
--Rationalism and m-realism about causation=PSR (known a priori):
  (∀x)[EVENTx or THINGx) → (∃y)Nec (CAUSEy iff EFFECTx)]
--H's 2-part attack on rationalism about causation:
  (1) logical independence of exp'd events (billiard balls)
      inner
  (2) no original impression of causal power
      outer
--the "secret causes" and non-agnosticism about causation
--conclusion: metaphysically-real causation is not knowable

III. H's theory of causation, phase II

--the problem of induction: appeal to unity of nature?
--H's "skeptical solution" to the problem=??
--H's analysis
  Elements: (1) succession (2) contiguity (3) constant conjunction (4) custom or habit
  (C): x causes y iff (i) I have seen impressions of type A followed successively and contiguously by impressions of type B, and (ii) by sheer habit of association I expect and believe that x, an instance of type A, will be followed necessarily and successively and contiguously by y, an instance of type B, and also that if no impression of type A occurs, then no impression of type B will occur.
--Upshots: (1) Concept-psychologism (2) C-beliefs: sufficient PsychMotiv. w/o suff. Rat'Justif.!!!

Hume has an a priori, but it is an impure a priori (empiricist version). Mind can, by the
imagination's capacity for invention, take contents acquired thru experience and generate new contents (e.g., missing shade of blue).

DH thought $7+5=12$ & Bs are UM are true by virtue of the intrinsic relations of the ideas involved. "Soc was married" is true by virtue of a fact. Matters of fact yield one set of truths, relations of ideas another. The former are contingent, depend on the way the world was. Now, where do rels of ideas come from, on empiricist acct? For "Bs are UM", it is a result of applying our imagination to connect Bs and UM, and then deciding to attach the two (sounds like conventionalism--clearly this is association-of-ideas-via-stipulation).

Concept of causation permits us to understand and predict (i.e., explain) the world and its events and members. So, matters of fact are centrally concerned with causality (for us, at least).

There is neither an inner nor outer experience of causation via impressions. Thus, for DH, meta. real causation is unknowable, though possible.

Note that DH's arg. on causation has a neg. part (ph. I) and a pos. part (ph. II).

Phase II
Given that scientific work goes on independent of sceptical worries, how do we justify the appeal to unity in nature which is contained in our inductive practices? Hume's explanation is a sceptic's solution, and is empiricist (relied solely on what is contained in putative experiences of causation). See outline above.