New Horizons for Regional Geography

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Abstract: Two prominent U.S. geographers outline the framework and mandate of an emerging new regional geography as a tool for understanding rapid and profound changes in the contemporary world. In so doing, they differentiate this new approach to the geographic study of regions from both (a) the traditional practice of regional geography prevailing in the discipline from the mid-19th century and (b) accounts of geography’s role in contemporary affairs offered by non-specialists in the mass media (e.g., Kaplan’s “revenge of geography”). The authors provide recommendations for, and note the benefits of, a strengthening of regional research and training in geography, while mapping out an expanded role for Eurasian Geography and Economics in disseminating new regional research whose scope extends beyond disciplinary boundaries to embrace current public and political debate. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: O100, O180, P000, R110. 60 references. Key words: regional geography, Heartland, Mackinder, geopolitics, Eurasia, China, Russia, Europe, “revenge of geography,” geographical determinism, environmental determinism, historical determinism.

As we mark the twentieth anniversary of the unraveling of the post-World War II geopolitical order, post-1989 proclamations about the end of both history (Fukuyama, 1992) and geography (O’Brien, 1992) look increasingly misguided. Those proclamations were based on the assumption that the demise of the Soviet system and the emergence of a globalized, technologically interconnected globe heralded the triumph of a social order based on democracy and economic liberalism that would rapidly diffuse throughout a world characterized by diminishing interregional differences. This is hardly the world of 2009. Instead, the contemporary international scene is dominated by major fault lines along political, cultural, and economic divides, with high-stakes struggles being waged among and between traditional states, between state and extra-state interests, and between different social and ethnic groups. Even though the participants in these struggles are necessarily confronting many developments with a global reach (an extraordinarily high level of global economic interpenetration, the expanding reach of information technologies, etc.), their activities and goals reflect great differences from place to place and region to region in politics, ideology, and socio-economic circumstance. As geographers have insisted (e.g., the essays in Cox, 1997), global developments take on a different, highly variable character in local settings.

Against the backdrop, it is imperative that geographers, economists, and other social scientists deepen their understanding and appreciation of the forces at play in different world regions. This has long been the task of “regional geography,” as that term came to be used in

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the North American context. But the regional geography that is needed today is different from mid-20th-century regional geography, and it is not the regional geography that one finds in popular accounts of the role of geography in contemporary affairs (e.g., Kaplan, 2009). Instead it is a regional geography that is concerned with explanation, not just description; that treats regions as constantly shifting products of social and economic relations, not simply as units that need to be understood; and that does not look at regions in isolation, but instead sees them in relation to developments unfolding both above and below the scale of the region (see generally Thrift, 1994; Passi, 2002; Murphy, 2006a).

MOVING BEYOND CONVENTIONAL AND POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY

Within the discipline of geography, until the last two decades of the 20th century, much regional geography had an encyclopedic cast, with an emphasis on cataloging major physical, economic, demographic, and social characteristics of different parts of the world (Gilbert, 1988; Pudup, 1988; Murphy, 1991; Thrift, 1994; Holmén, 2005). Studies conducted in this vein could provide useful background information, but they too often failed to provide much analysis of how geographic arrangements shaped political and social developments, nor did they offer concepts and ideas that could advance more general understandings of how geography reflects and shapes the changing character of the planet. Not surprisingly, then, many geographers turned their attention away from regional geography and instead focused on systematic studies concerned with the role of individual geographic phenomena in human affairs. This shift left somewhat of a void, however, with relatively few analytically sophisticated geographic studies being produced that addressed the role of geographic context in the evolution of regions.

Popular commentators on world affairs have at times stepped into this void, but typically with little awareness of the ideas and concepts coming out of the discipline of geography. The latest example is Robert Kaplan (2009), who, in response to the recent upsurge in intra-state violence and the appearance of numerous groups capable of implementing violent campaigns simultaneously in many countries, has re-engineered Fukuyama’s aphorism about the “end of history,” and instead proposed that the present era is one characterized by “the revenge of geography.” Presenting his thesis as a return to realism in international relations (IR), Kaplan asserts that “of all the unsavory truths in which realism is rooted, the bluntest, most uncomfortable, and most deterministic of all is geography. Indeed, what is at work in the recent return of realism is the revenge of geography in the most old-fashioned sense” (p. 98). Kaplan is returning to a theme that he introduced in the 1990s when local conflicts and attendant social dislocations in the former Soviet Union (Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Georgia, Tajikistan), Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone), the Balkans (Croatia-Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo), Indonesia, Afghanistan, etc. provided him with material for his books *Balkan Ghosts* (Kaplan, 1993) and *The Ends of the Earth* (Kaplan, 1996), with respective subtitles “a journey through history” and “a journey to the frontiers of anarchy.”

Some aspects of Kaplan’s “revenge of geography” can be welcomed, including his reassertion of the role of location in foreign policy and global affairs and his recognition that geopolitical theses and foreign policies cannot be uniformly applied, as was attempted by U.S. administrations in the 1980s and again from 2001 through 2008.² He also correctly notes that

²For background, see O’Loughlin and Grant (1990).
U.S. foreign policy is dominated by political scientists without much of a sense of geography or locational relations, especially the spillover effects of events in one country to adjoining states. This abrogation of “geography” occurred after 1945, and was reinforced during the Cold War by both U.S. and Soviet administrations engaged in a direct, confrontational global competition in which their respective ideologies and strengths were seen as being much more important than the contexts of their regional alliance patterns. In decrying the dominance of political science and the neglect of geography in U.S. foreign policy, Kaplan is indirectly addressing the traditional divide in US geopolitics between “globalist” and “regionalist” perspectives (Gaddis, 2004). Political science/IR perspectives tend to examine direct relations between superpowers and, as a perusal of any IR textbook indicates, rarely pay attention to the contextual settings of indirect conflicts between major power states or of the relations between smaller states. Because Kaplan adopts the “regionalist” paradigm in this divide, he shares generally the same perspective as Saul Cohen, the doyen of U.S. geographers writing in a geopolitical vein, who has long advocated more attention in U.S. foreign policy circles to regional conditions (e.g., Cohen, 2005).3

Despite these positives, Kaplan’s approach is fundamentally problematic for those of us who promote contemporary regional geography. To support his thesis, Kaplan turns to those geographers who wrote during the heyday of imperial geopolitics—from 1890 to 1945. He correctly notes that there was a strong influence of geopolitical research in foreign policy-making in the United States (citing Nicholas Spykman [1942] and Alfred Thayer Mahan [1890], although neglecting Isaiah Bowman) and the United Kingdom (Halford J. Mackinder [1904]), but he pays no heed to the analytical limitations of these geopolitical theorists—limitations that have been discussed in detail in the more recent geographic literature (e.g., see Dodds and Atkinson, 2000). Moreover, he conveniently ignores the most influential geopolitical theorist of them all: Karl Haushofer, whose ideas shaped German policy in the lead-up to World War II.4 Instead he quotes liberally from Anglo-American geopolitical authors, particularly praising the ideas of Mackinder about environmental influences on political affairs: “Man and not nature initiates, but nature in large measure controls” (p. 99). Kaplan also quotes extensively from Mackinder on the climate, terrain, and economic activities of peoples on the margins of the Heartland of Eurasia, what Mackinder called “the inner crescent.”

Kaplan’s “revenge of geography” is open to criticism on five academic grounds (we are not engaging with Kaplan’s ideological preferences and policy proposals for the American administration and its military strategists). First, Kaplan is avowedly a geographic determinist. He writes that “The wisdom of geographical determinism endures across the chasm of a century because it recognizes that the most profound struggles of humanity are not about ideas but about control over territory, specifically the heartland and rimlands of Eurasia” (p. 100). Kaplan’s environmental determinist approach resonates with others popularizing “geography” from outside the discipline, such as development economist Jeffrey Sachs (2005) and economic historian David Landes (1998). Both privilege climatic factors as important for understanding the scale of poverty and the economic prospects of nations. In a similar vein, Jared Diamond has been critiqued by Blaut (1999) for the environmentalist emphasis in his popular book Guns, Germs, and Steel (Diamond, 1997). While Kaplan’s lack of knowledge of contemporary geographic scholarship pervades his piece, it is perhaps most evident in his adherence to the hoary shibboleth of environmental determinism.

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3For an overview of this argument from a strategic studies outlook, see the essays in Sloan and Gray (1999).
4Haushofer’s writings were voluminous, and most of the widely quoted works are collected in Jacobsen (1979).
Showing his further neglect of contemporary geographic work, Kaplan makes extensive use of “shatter zones,” which he defines as “[like] rifts in the Earth’s crust that produce physical instability, there are areas in Eurasia that are more prone to conflict than others (and) . . . threaten to implode, explode, or maintain a fragile equilibrium” (p. 102). For the past 35 years, Saul Cohen has developed the concept of “shatterbelts” as places that are not part of geostrategic regions and are fragmented, being characterized by a lack of political unity. With complex ethnic mosaics, their internal hostilities tend to draw global alliances so that local animosities develop global implications. Cohen (1982, 2005) traces the evolution of these shatterbelts, thus working in the tradition of James Fairgrieve (1941), who first identified a “crush zone” between the Eurasian land power and the western seapowers in east-central Europe from the Baltic to the Balkans. While Cohen correctly envisages shatterbelts as complex regions across the globe that are characterized by intense relations, both conflictual and cooperative (Middle East since 1945, Southeast Asia from 1945 to the 1970s, Africa during the Cold War, and an emerging shatterbelt in the Caucasus–Caspian–Central Asia zone after 1991), Kaplan’s shatter zones (Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula, Indian subcontinent, the Fertile Crescent from the Mediterranean to Iran) are smaller, seemingly more insular, and confined to the southern margins of the Eurasian landmass.

A third critique of Kaplan is that while location and geographic proximity are important factors in international relations, they are highly variable in effect. Like modern international relations theories, Kaplan’s consideration of the locational factor is akin to a “geometric” approach, rather than a geographic one (see O’Loughlin, 2000). He relies too much on simple contiguity in his consideration of the effects of local political and social developments on adjoining states. For example, Kaplan (p. 104) writes that “the future of teeming, tribal Yemen will go a long way to determining the future of Saudi Arabia. And geography, not ideas, has everything to do with it.” The diffusion of apocalyptic scenarios from chaotic countries has permeated Kaplan’s writing since his article some 15 years ago in *The Atlantic Monthly* entitled “The Coming Anarchy” (Kaplan, 1994).

Fourthly, Kaplan falls definitely into the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994)—the tendency to treat the map of states as an unproblematic framework for examining the world. This approach is somewhat understandable in the context of foreign policy analysis with an American focus, but thinking geographically means examining other geographical frameworks, including extra-state and intra-state arrangements. Though at first blush Kaplan seems well aware of the importance of intra-country differences (cultural, religious, political, historical), in the end he reverts to a country by country analysis.

Finally, while adopting the paradigms of classic geopolitical authors such as Mackinder and his later imitators, Kaplan has fallen into the trap of historical determinism. The world has changed dramatically since 1904, the year of Mackinder’s “The Geographic Pivot of History,” not least in the technologies of communications, transportation, military weapons and tactics, and in the nature of the world political map. Mackinder’s regional analysis was made against the backdrop of declining British hegemony in the “inner crescent” and amidst concerns for the development of a land power that could gain control over the Eurasian landmass. Contemporary critics of Mackinder questioned his lack of attention to new technologies of the day (air power) and the reliance of his analysis on a world of nomads on horses, merchants on sailing ships, and long-distance land transport by railways. A return to Mackinderian analysis, despite genuflections in the direction of a rediscovery of “geography,” disregards a century of changing regional and global circumstances. We thus reject Kaplan’s advice to “think like Victorians” (p. 105) and his reassertion of Mackinder’s axiom, that “man will initiate, but nature will control” (ibid.). Instead, what is needed is a
contemporary regional geographic perspective of the sort that is represented in the papers of this journal, which covers areas of the globe containing no less than 70 percent of its population (e.g., PRB, 2008).

STRENGTHENING REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY

Strengthening regional research and training is arguably one of the most important tasks facing the discipline of geography today. The profound geographical differences that divide the contemporary world mean that global processes necessarily play out differently in some parts of the world than in others—and as those differences unfold, they shape what is happening at the global scale. Such a statement could be made about geographical difference at various scales, including that of cities, towns, and neighborhoods; hence, in-depth analyses of localized events and processes will always have an important role to play in geographical analysis. Ó Tuathail (2008) emphasizes the point that local contextual and historical conditions were ignored in the “great power” foreign policy debate that took place in the media and in the international relations literature at the time of the August 2008 war in South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia. Localized specifics matter—and are needed both to elucidate and shape the public debate.

But the meso-scale is important as well. Economic blocs and other types of large-scale economic zones are an increasingly influential part of the global economic picture. The common tendency to divide the world into swaths of territory based on conceptions of shared history and culture affects geopolitical understandings and patterns of interaction. The large-scale socio-economic patterns that emerged out of long-standing political and economic connections influence what happens where, and why. It follows that geographical study cannot ignore the meso-scale—i.e., that of major “world regions,” however difficult it is to define those regions and however much they are contested (see, e.g., Cartier, 2002; Cohen, 2005; Murphy, 2006b).

The foregoing statement might seem self-evident, but the retreat from larger-scale studies in the discipline of geography that followed the critiques of the more nomothetically oriented geographical research projects of the 1960s and 1970s (whether positivist or structuralist) meant that regional geography lost ground. But it is increasingly clear that a grounding in regional geography is essential to addressing some of the bigger-order questions the world is facing (Murphy, 2006a). As we write this piece, the headlines are dominated by stories on the growing role of the Taliban in parts of Southwest Asia, piracy off the coast of East Africa and in the Gulf of Aden, and tensions within the European Union over responses to the contemporary economic crisis, showing a fissure between the newer (since 2004) and more established members. These are all stories with a fundamentally geographical dimension, but scholars without a serious grounding in the history and geography of different regions of the world are in a poor position to address the nature and implications of these issues.

Recognition of the foregoing has led to a modest revival of interest in regional geography, as reflected in expanded regional offerings at some universities (Murphy, 2007) and an increasingly rich array of research coming from scholars who have immersed themselves in the language, history, culture, politics, and economics of different parts of the world (e.g., Meinig, 1986–2004; Rigg, 2003; Heffernan, 2007) and other studies that have appeared recently on the pages of this journal (Chan, 2007; He and Wang, 2007; Ma, 2007; Sagers, 2007; Yeung, 2007; Fan and Mingjie, 2008; Pannell, 2008; Yeung and Liu, 2008). Building on this momentum can help ensure that geographical perspectives and ideas are brought to
bear on some of the most critical issues of the day. It can also help position modern geography as a discipline fundamentally concerned with promoting understanding of the environmental, economic, geopolitical, and social changes unfolding in different parts of the globe, and strengthen the institutional position of a discipline that has faced considerable marginalization during the 20th century—at least in the United States.

The importance of thinking geographically about issues that play out across substantial areas of the globe lies in the insights that can be gained into the spatial structures and relationships that influence those issues and into the ways in which those issues are framed geographically. A few geographical questions that are pertinent to the previously enumerated headline stories serve to make the point. How are political, cultural, and environmental patterns shaping the conflict between the Taliban and other peoples in Southwest Asia? How are changing climatic circumstances affecting livelihood patterns in South Asia? How important are Cold War divisions in Europe to the divide that has developed during the current financial crisis? To what extent are growing Chinese economic links with Southeast Asia producing geopolitical realignments in the region? Questions such as these are certainly not the only ones of importance, but answering them is vital.

Beyond the insights that can come from geographical assessments of regional-scale developments, a strengthened regional geography offers the prospect of overcoming a certain parochialism that took hold in some corners of the Anglo-American geographical establishment in the late 20th century (Bonnet, 2003, pp. 55–56). That parochialism took the form of a significant decline in teaching and research on foreign areas as attention turned increasingly toward developments in Britain and North America. There were some good reasons for this decline, including the recognition that questions of difference do not simply lie “over there” and the desire to distance the discipline from its past connections with colonialism and imperialism (Heffernan, 2007). But in the deeply interconnected world of the 21st century, a preoccupation with developments at home can easily be perceived as insular (Thrift and Walling, 2000, p. 106).

Robust teaching and research programs focused on developments in other parts of the world can serve as potent antidotes to this state of affairs. They can also help move the discipline of geography beyond its past associations with efforts to control distant lands and peoples. Widespread support for imperialistic ambitions often requires acceptance of the kind of caricatures or superficial generalizations about peoples and places that regional geography is well positioned to combat. An all-too-frequently employed example of these caricatures is the use of the “Islamic world” moniker in the popular media, which ignores the enormous diversity masked by this “chaotic conception.” By offering critical assessments of how issues and problems are framed geographically and by promoting understanding of different parts of the world and the ideas and circumstances that unite and divide people, regional geography can challenge the kinds of essentialized understandings that are often precursors to reckless foreign interventions.

A revived regional geography is also important to the future of geography itself. At least in the United States, few people have a good grasp of what most geographers do, but the majority of people have a hazy sense that the discipline is concerned with trying to make sense of how the world is organized and how and why places are different. The existence of broad-based support for efforts to promote geography in the schools and the general openness to geographical ideas suggest that there is a remarkable degree of acceptance of the importance of geography—at least as generally understood (de Blij, 2005). While geography can and should encompass a diverse array of approaches and methods, the branch of the discipline that most closely conforms to this general understanding is regional geography. This
does not mean that the ambitions of regional geography should be confined to what the public expects of it, but the discipline loses a major opportunity to leverage public understandings to its benefit if it ignores programmatic approaches that resonate with wider communities.

All of this points to the importance of continuing to promote the revival of a robust, broad-ranging, but analytically sophisticated regional geography. Geography departments have an important role to play in this regard, as they are in a position to develop pedagogic programs with regional depth and to encourage students to pursue the range of extradisciplinary study—including language study—that is often necessary to provide the breadth and depth needed to engage in serious research and teaching about different parts of the world. Geography departments can also take advantage of the interests of many undergraduates in different regions of the world by developing broad-ranging courses that help them understand what it means to think about those regions geographically.

Outlets for scholarship have a role to play as well. Since its founding in 1959 under the title *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, this journal has sought to advance the cause of regional understanding (Harris, 1998). Its earlier geographical focus on the Soviet Union and its allied neighbors gave way to a broader regional remit—a reflection of the dynamism of regions and the disappearance of some of the harder lines that segmented Eurasia a generation ago. The journal now encompasses a realm extending from the Atlantic Ocean eastward to the Pacific and from the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean in the south to the Arctic Ocean in the north. Its topical focus has also evolved. From its roots as a journal that provided geographers in the West with access to the writings of Soviet geographers, the journal went on provide a wealth of empirically grounded geographical and economic assessments first of the Soviet realm, then of the post-Soviet realm, and then of Eurasia’s “transition economies” (i.e., communist or formerly communist states that were embracing some form of capitalism, including China). More recently, as the transition economy concept has become increasingly dated and regional geography itself has become more conceptually sophisticated, *Eurasian Geography and Economics* has broadened further—both to encompass the portion of Eurasia that lies beyond its traditional geographical mandate and to embrace studies that speak to some of the imperatives of the new regional geography.

The repositioning of the journal in recent years has met with considerable success. While the 10 most-cited articles from the journal over the past decade are economic in nature, reporting *inter alia* on contemporary developments in the Russian oil and gas industry, urban growth and regional economic inequalities in China, and Moscow as a ethnically diverse world city and Russia’s economic transformation, the list of most-accessed papers for research and classroom use evidences a growing interest in topics of migration, ethnic segregation, political transitions and electoral trends, emerging geopolitical relations between Russia and its neighbors, the changing faces of the post-socialist cities of Europe and Asia, and the dislocations and new realities resulting from military conflicts.

We have no intention of simply resting on recent successes, however. Instead, we aim to make *Eurasian Geography and Economics* a showcase both for research on Eurasia and for what contemporary regional geography has to offer. We noted above that regional geography must seek to explain, it must treat regions as shifting and contingent, and it must see

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5 And recognizing the importance to a strengthened regional geography of its linkages with related disciplines that contribute to geographers’ enhanced understanding of the world, the journal continues to publish the work of economists and other social scientists on such topics of general interest as macroeconomic performance, natural resource development, patterns of trade and migration, and ongoing efforts at economic integration.
individual regions in relation to developments in other places and at other scales. Each of these imperatives is becoming increasingly significant for the journal. The concern with explanation is leading toward a growing emphasis on analytically and conceptually grounded pieces, even as we maintain a concern with articles that have a footing in primary empirical data. As we take this emphasis forward, we look to embrace not just informative up-to-date data of a quantitative nature that has been traditionally represented in the journal, but data generated from other approaches as well.

The relatively broad spatial reach of the journal makes it easy to address the dynamic nature of regions, as Eurasia can and should be seen as encompassing an array of shifting regional structures and relations. With that in mind, we are increasingly inclined to publish studies that do not simply look at individual states or traditional regions, but that explore regional divisions within the Eurasian realm or between parts of Eurasia and neighboring realms, such as the recent paper by Pannell (2008) on Chinese investments in Africa.

Our concern with treating developments in Eurasia within a broader context has found expression in a set of mini-symposia we have begun to publish that begin with a lead article focused on a major global issue that has some resonance for Eurasia, followed by commentaries that look at the issue through a more specifically Eurasian lens. We have already published several of these, focused on the changing landscapes of megacities (Ford, 2008; with Adams, 2008 and Smith, 2008), the global energy picture (Wilbanks, 2008; with Sagers and Pannell, 2008), and geography and terrorism (Flint and Radil, 2009; with Clem, 2009 and Russell, 2009). In the coming years we look to expand on this model so that *Eurasian Geography and Economics* can serve as a forum that highlights the importance of viewing developments in individual regions within the context of broader social, political, economic, and environmental trends.

**CONCLUSIONS**

In this paper, we have advocated a regional geography that builds on the recent re-thinking of the field within academic geography but is also one that reaches into the realm of public and political debate. It is a geography that is both accessible to regional specialists and non-specialists such as students and the interested public. A good example of a paper that fits these characteristics is the article in this journal by Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Carl Dahlmann (2004) on the “limits to return” in the aftermath of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina that resulted in an invitation to testify on the Dayton Peace Accords to the House Committee on International Relations of the U.S. Congress.

Ideally, *Eurasian Geography and Economics* will also be a home for geographers and other social scientists who may not self-classify as regional specialists but whose work, like regional geographers, marries a contemporary problem-focus with a sophisticated geographic understanding of the topic and which at the same time makes a contribution to the broader literature on different regions and concepts. Thus, a paper on the critical geopolitics of U.S. military and political engagement in Afghanistan-Pakistan would be a contribution to the theories and methods of critical geopolitics. There are no shortages of important subjects from the Eurasian realm, including the escalating conflict in Afghanistan-Pakistan with links to global terrorism, the origins and diffusion of emergent infectious diseases such as drug-resistant TB or avian flu, the fragility of states in many parts of the Eurasian landmass in the face of internal separatist and economic challenges, the effects of climate change on migration and the resulting competition for scarce resources, especially in South Asia, the continued food insecurity crisis as a result of world price increases, the appearances of new state
forms variously called quasi-or pseudo-states on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and the new geopolitics of northeast Asia resulting from growing Chinese power. Relying on the increasing inflow of papers blending contemporary regional geography with events of worldwide significance, the journal will intensify its focus on these and comparable topics, attracting not only teachers seeking material for classroom use but also appealing to a large pool of readers drawn to the power of new approaches to the study of regions.

REFERENCES


