

The topic: Identity across time

Two general principles: (63/#1)

- Two things *of the same kind* cannot occupy the same space at the same time.
- One thing can't have two beginnings in space and time, and two things can't have one beginning.

Identity for different types of substance (63-4/#2)

- Particles of matter
- Masses of particles
- God
- Finite intelligences or spirits

The analysis of identity across time depends on the *kind* of thing you are talking about.
(66-7/#8)

Organisms (65-6, #5, #6)

Identity of mass is not required.

Identity consists in the continued organization of parts, partaking of one common life.

Machines compared to organisms (66 top)

Theses about person, man, and substance

- A *man* is an animal, and its identity condition is the same as that for any organism. The same man exists as long as the same living body exists.
(67/#9)
- A *person* is “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...” (67/#11)
- Neither the man nor the person is to be identified with those *particles of matter* that compose the man's body. (69/#12)

- Neither the man nor the person is to be identified with whatever *spiritual substance* may be doing the person's thinking and willing. (69-70/#13,#14)
- A person's identity condition is *sameness of consciousness*, which Locke unpacks primarily in terms of *memory*. (67-8/#11, #10)

Some weird logical possibilities

Same man, different persons.

Socrates waking/Socrates sleeping (74/#19)

Same person, different men.

Prince and cobbler (p. 72/#15)

Socrates and the Mayor of Queinborough (74/#19)

Same soul, different persons.

The soul of Socrates, and the soul of an acquaintance of Locke's (71/#14)

Wouldn't be *the same person* even if it were *the same soul*.

Same person, different souls.

"If the same consciousness can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make one person." (70/#13 end)

To sum up: Self depends on consciousness, not on substance

The little finger (73/#17)

Locke's reply to two objections

What about things you *don't* remember? Didn't you do them?

Locke seems to think it is enough if you *can* remember doing it. (68/#10)

What about things you *can't* remember?

Locke says it might be the same man, but not the same person. (74/#20)