

The *general* idea of *substance*

“Something I know not what” that is supposed to “stand under” or “support” collections of qualities that go together in experience. (pp. 52-3/#1-#2)

Locke appears to be assuming that for any property, there must be an answer to the question, *What is it that has that property?* It’s natural to answer by mentioning some other properties that the thing has. But Locke sees that this will only lead us to ask the same question again and again. So he terminates the regress by saying, “something I know not what.”

Does Locke believe in *bare particulars*?

Two kinds of substance distinguished (60/#22)

*Material*: Extended, solid, capable of receiving and communicating motion by impulse.

*Spiritual*: Thinks, has the power of exciting motion in the body by willing.

Our idea of material substance is no clearer than our idea of spiritual substance. (pp. 54-5/#5, 59/#15)

Our idea of the way bodies move each other is no clearer than our idea of the way in which a volition excites motion in a body. (pp. 60-1/#28)

Question for Locke: Why think that there are two kinds of substance here at all?

Not entirely clear what Locke’s answer is.

See his comments on “whether a material being can think or no.” (pp. 84-5/#6).