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The picture Berkeley rejects

Locke: Material substances exist outside the mind. They cause ideas in the mind, many of which do not resemble them.

Berkeley's view:

There are spiritual substances (minds), but no material substances.

- Agrees with “common sense” that sensible things really exist and are *immediately perceived*.

(There is a bit of an argument to the effect that *mediate* perception presupposes *immediate* perception. (248ff))

- But insists that sensible things they are wholly mind-dependent. For them, *to be is to be perceived*.

Philonous (mind-lover) and Hylas (matter)

Hylas: To exist is one thing, to be perceived another. (221)

In Berkeley's ontology, everything is either a spiritual substance or a modification of a spiritual substance. God creates minds, and gives them ideas of sensible things.

Part I of the *Dialogues* is devoted to arguing:

- That the sensible qualities of things are perceiver-dependent.
- That there is no unthinking material substance external to all minds.
- That the distinction between primary/secondary qualities should be abandoned.

Important lines of argument

- The pain argument. (221-224)
- The argument from *perceptual relativity*

A long series of arguments concerning different sensible qualities, including the so-called “primary” ones. In each case, Hylas is forced to admit that no object existing outside the mind could have both of a pair of seemingly incompatible properties (hot and cold, sweet and sour, large and small, swift and slow). The

conclusion is that sensible qualities exist only as ideas in the mind of the perceiver.

From this, Berkeley thinks it follows that there is no material substance outside the mind – or rather that we have no intelligible concept of any material substance outside the mind. The reason is that if we abstract from all the sensible qualities, there is nothing left to discuss or consider. (221 -)

Nor is there any intelligible concept of the way in which the material substratum is related to the qualities. “Spread under?” “Stands under?” These relations presuppose extension. But extension has already been shown to be nothing but an idea within the mind. (242-4)

- Primary and secondary qualities are *inseparable*. (238-9)
 - Another line of argument that keeps on cropping up.
 1. Sensible things are immediately perceived. (common sense premise)
 2. Only ideas are immediately perceived. (presupposes rejection of the sensation/object distinction – see 248ff)
 3. So sensible things are ideas.
 4. But ideas exist only in a mind.
 5. Therefore, sensible things exist only in a mind.
 - The *Master Argument* (pp. 245-6)
 1. You can't perceive any sensible thing without perceiving it.
 2. Therefore, sensible things cannot exist unperceived. For them, *to be is to be perceived*.
- (Note: This argument also presupposes rejection of the “sensation / object” distinction.)
- Against the representative theory of perception: The visible cannot *resemble* the invisible, the audible cannot be resemble the inaudible. (251)