The De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham

edited by T. Bruce Birch, Latin text and English Trans.: The Table of Titles and Chapters of the Tract of Venerable Ockham concerning the Body of Christ

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II. Whether a line and a surface are really distinguished from one another and from a body
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Probatur eadem conclusio, quae prius, per argumenta sumpta a dictis doctorum catholicorum.
De obiectionibus contra praedicta.
In quonamur respondiones ad praedictas obiectiones.
In quo ostenditur quod stant simul: aliqua quantitas non est alia res distincta realiter a substantia et quantitas est accidens.
Quomodo quantitas est accidentes declarat et quomodo cum hoc stat quod aliqua quantitas non est res distincta substantia.
In quomodo respondendum ad auctoritates Augustini supra capitolo XXX. inductae in quarto et quinto argumento.
Quomodo quantitas est distinctum praedicamentum a qualitate et substantia, non obstante quod nulla quantitas sit distincta a parte rei, a substantia et qualities, in quo respondet ad sextum ostendens quod praedicamenta sunt signa de rebus praedicabilia.
Quod non debet praedicta opinio abici tamquam haeretica, contra quodam opinionem illam tamquam haereticam condemnantes; et per hoc solvitur, VII. ratio supra capitolo XXX. adducta.

Concerning objections contrary to the previous statements.
In which replies are posited to the previous objections.
In which it is shown that both propositions stand at the same time; some quantity is not another thing really distinct from substance and quantity is an accident.
It declares how quantity is an accident, and how it obtains with this, that some quantity is not a thing distinct from substance.
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How quantity is a category distinct from quality and substance; notwithstanding that no quantity may be distinct from part of a thing, from substance and quality. In which there is a reply to the sixth argument showing that categories are signs predicable of things.
That the previous opinion ought not to be rejected as heretical, contrary to certain writers who condemn that opinion as heretical; and through this the seventh reason, adduced before in Chapter XXX, is explained.
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1 Seeberg, Hist. of Doctrines, trans. E. G. Hay, Vol. II, p. 191: "Subjective-substantively, or objectively; objective-imaginatively. The meaning of the terms is now just the reverse." Fleming, The Vocabulary of Philosophy, p. 354: "Subjective is used by W. of Ockham to denote that which exists independent of mind."

Burns, William of Ockham on Universa, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. XIV, 1913-1914, note p. 76: "It is sufficiently well known that what we call objective was in the mediavals philosophy called subjective."

2 Earle is sometimes translated reason or ground, as seems best, in order to convey a very definite meaning.
TRACTATUS VENERABILIS INCEPTORIS
GUILHELMI OCKHAM DE SACRAMENTO ALTARIS

THE TRACT OF THE VENERABLE INCEPTOR, WILLIAM OF OCKHAM,
CONCERNING THE SACRAMENT OF THE ALTAR
DE SACRAMENTO ALTARIS

Tractatus quam gloriosus de sacramento altaris, et in primis de puncti, lineae, superficie, corportis, quantitate, qualitate, et substantiae distinctione venerabilis Inceptoris Guilhelmi Ockham Anglici, sacrae theologiae magistri famosissimi, veritatum scrutatoris acerrimi, ordinis Fratrum Minorum. Incipit feliciter.

Circa conversionem panis in corpus Christi, sicut dicit glossa quaedam De Consecratione, Distinctione II., Capitulo 'In sacramentorum.' 'Variae sunt opiniones. Una asserit quod illa substantia, quae fuit panis primo, postea est caro et sanguis Christi. Infra est, 'Panis est in altari,' et Capitulo 'Quia corpus.' Secunda opinio tenet, quod substantia panis et vini ibi desinit esse, et manent accidentia tantum, scilicet, sapor, color, pondus, et similia; et sub illis accidentibus incipit ibi esse corpus Christi. Tertia tenet quod remanet ibi substantia panis et vini, et in eodem loco et sub eadem specie est corpus Christi. Argumentum infra est, 'Ego.' Quaelibet tamen opinio fatetur ibi esse corpus Christi. Secunda opinio verior est, ut extra De Summa Trinitate, Capitulo 'Firmiter,' Una.' Haec sunt verba glossae.

Ex qua appareit quod substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi, ita quod substantia panis non manet sed tantum accidentia, quae prius erant in substantia

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The very renowed tract of the Venerable Inceptor, William of Ockham, of England, a very famous teacher of sacred theology, a most discriminating investigator of realities, of the order of Friars Minor, concerning the sacrament of the altar and with special reference to the distinction of point, line, surface, body, quantity, quality, and substance. It begins auspiciously.

Concerning the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ, as says a certain gloss on the De Consecratione, Distinction II., Chapter, 'In sacramentorum.' 'There are various opinions. One opinion asserts that that substance, which was bread at first, afterwords is the flesh and the blood of Christ. It is argued later in the Chapter, 'Panis est in altari,' and in the Chapter, 'Quia corpus.' The second opinion holds that the substance of the bread and of the wine ceases to be there, and only the accidents remain; namely, taste, color, and weight, and similar accidents; and under those accidents the body of Christ begins to be there. The third opinion holds that the substance of the bread and of the wine remains there, and that the body of Christ is in the same place and under the same species. It is argued later in the Chapter, 'Ego.' Each opinion, however, acknowledges that the body of Christ is there. The second opinion is more true, as in the margin of the De Summa Trinitate, Chapter, 'Firmiter,' Una.' These are the words of the gloss.

From this it appears that the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, so that the substance of the bread does not remain but only the accidents remain which were before in the substance
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panis, manent. Et pro ista veritate dicitur extra De Summa Trinitate, 'Firmiter,' sicut allegat glossa praedicta: "Una est omnium fidelium universalis ecclesia, extra quam nullus omnino salvatur; in qua ipse idem sacerdos est et sacrificium Jesus Christus, cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continentur, transubstantiatis pane in corpus et vino in sanguinem potestate divina."

Ad istius veritatis declarationem circa duo principaliiter aliqua sunt quaerenda, ut patet; primo, circa illorum accidentium entitatem et distinctionem; secundo, circa ipsorum a subiecto separationem.

Quia autem communiter conceditur ab omnibus quod color, sapor, et huissumdi qualitates sensibiles inter se reafler distinguuntur et etiam a substantia; ideo hoc supposito quaerenda sunt aliqua circa distinctionem istorum qualitatum a quantitate, figura, rectitudine, et huissumdi, de quibus est magnum dubium, quomodo distinguantur.

Et quia non tantum ad theologiam sed etiam ad philosophiam pertinet ista consideratio, cum philosophiae sit rerum naturas et distinctiones earum cognoscere; ideo investigandum quid sensorunt philosophi, et praeципue princeps philosophorum, Aristoteles, de ista materia, et etiam quid dicant theologi. Ut autem ordinatus procedam, quae arc primo de distinctione puncti, linear, superficie, et corporis, et postea de aliis.

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of the bread. And in confirmation of this truth it is said in the margin of the De Summa Trinitate, 'Firmiter,' as the previous gloss asserts: "There is one universal church of all the faithful, outside of which no one at all is saved; in which the priest and the sacrifice are the very same, Jesus Christ, whose body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the species of bread and of wine, since the bread is transubstantiated into body and the wine into blood by divine power."

With a view to the exposition of this truth, some questions must be asked about two points principally, as is obvious; first, about the entity and the distinction of those accidents; secondly, concerning the separation of them from a subject.

Moreover, since it is commonly conceded by all that color, taste, and sensible qualities of such a kind, are really distinguished from each other and also from substance; therefore, since this is conceded, some questions must be raised about the distinction of these qualities from quantity, figure, rectitude, and the like; concerning which there is great doubt as to how they may be distinguished.

And because this consideration pertains not only to theology but also to philosophy, since it may be the province of philosophy to come to know the natures of things and their distinctions; therefore, it is necessary to investigate what the philosophers have thought of this matter; and especially the prince of philosophers, Aristotle, and also what the theologians may say. But that I may proceed with more regard for logical order, I shall inquire first concerning the distinction of point, line, surface, and body; and afterwards of other matters.
PRIMO IGITUR QUÆRO

Utrum punctus sit res absoluta distincta realiter a quantitate. Respondetur quod sic, quia terminus uniuscuiusque distinguitur ab illo cujus est terminus. Sed punctus est terminus lineae; ergo distinguitur realiter a linea, et per consequens eadem ratione a qualibet quantitate distinguitur realiter.

Contra omnis res positiva est substantia vel quantitas vel qualitas vel relatio, et sic de alii praedicamentis. Sed punctus non est substantia distincta a quantitate, nec qualitas distincta a quantitate, nec relatio distincta a quantitate, et sic de alii generibus respectivis; igitur punctus non est alia res a quantitate.

Pro ista quaestione et omnibus sequentibus de ista materia, praemitto unum, videlicet, quicquid dicam sub quacumque forma verborum, quod potest aliquo modo deduci contra quodcumque dictum in sacra scriptura vel sanctorum, vel contra determinationem et doctrinam Ecclesiae Romanae, vel contra sententiam doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum, non dicam asserendo, sed praecipue recitando in persona illorum qui etiam opinionem tractandam tenent, sive illa opinio sit vera sive falsa, sive catholica, sive haeretica vel erronea. Unde si dicam talia verba 'dico,' 'dicendum' et consimilia, non in persona mea sed in persona taliter opinantium velo illa intelligi.

QUESTION I

Therefore, I ask, first, whether a point is an absolute thing really distinct from quantity. Which is answered affirmatively; for the terminus of every single thing is distinguished from that of which it is a terminus. But a point is a terminus of a line; therefore, it is really distinguished from a line, and consequently it is for the same reason really distinguished from any quantity.

On the contrary, every positive thing is substance or quantity or quality or relation, and so of the other categories. But a point is not a substance distinct from quantity, nor a quality distinct from quantity, nor a relation distinct from quantity, and so of other respective genera; therefore, a point is not a thing other than quantity.

Before answering this question and all following concerning this matter, I make in advance one statement; namely, that whatever I shall say under whatever form of words, which can in any mode be regarded as contrary to whatever has been said in Sacred Scripture or in the writings of the Saints, or contrary to the determination and the doctrine of the Roman Church, or contrary to the opinion of the Doctors approved by the church, I shall not say by affirming but by quoting precisely in the person of those who also hold the opinion to be discussed; whether that opinion be true or false, or Catholic, or heretical, or erroneous. Whence, if I shall use such words as "I say," "It must be said," and the like; I desire those words to be understood not as used by me personally but as used by those who hold such opinions.
Hoc praemissio circa quaestionem propugnat sic procedam. Primo, ostendam quod punctum non est aliqua res positiva et absoluta distincta realiter a qualibet quantitate et maxime a linea. Secundo, ponam aliquas rationes et auctoritates ad probandum punctum esse aliam rem. Tertio, respondebo ad eas.

Primo, igitur probo quod punctum non est alia res a linea, qualibet quantitate; et primo, per rationes philosophicas; secundo, per auctoritates philosophorum; tertio, per rationes theologicas.

Iuxta primam viam arguo primo sic ostensive: si punctus sit alia res a quantitate, vel est substantia vel accidens; sed punctus non est substantia distincta a quantitate, nec accidens distinctum a quantitate; igitur punctus non est alia res a quantitate.

Maior est nota, minorem probo. Et primo primam partem; scilicet, quod punctus non est substantia distincta a quantitate, quia omnis substantia vel est materia vel forma vel compositum vel substantia abstracta a materia. Sed manifestum est quod punctus non est materia nec forma nec compositum; nec est forma abstracta a materia, si punctus sit indivisibili et nullo modo quantus, sicut ponitur ab adversariis; ergo et cetera.

Secundam partem probo sic; quod, scilicet, punctus non sit accidens indivisibile distinctum a quantitate. Primo sic: omne accidens absolutum positum est in aliquo subiecto sibi aequato, ita quod illud accidens vel est totum in toto subiecto et in qualibet parte vel totum in toto et pars in parte vel est accidens indi-
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visibile habens subiectum indivisible, sicut accidentis spiritualis est in anima intellectiva tamquam in subiecto suo primo et adaequato. Sed punctus nullus istorum trium modorum habet aut habere potest aliquod subiectum primum et adaequatum; ergo maior illius rationis per inductionem patet de omnium accidente absoluto.

Prima pars minoris, videlicet, quod punctus non habet aliquod subiectum adaequatum ita quod sit totus in toto et in qualibet parte, patet. Quia accipio punctum terminantem lineam A et vocetur ille B, et accipio alium punctum correspondentem et vocetur C; tum quoque aut B est in A tamquam in suo subiecto adaequato vel in subiecto ipsius, et sive sive sive sequitur, quod eadem ratione C erit in eodem subiecto adaequato.

Tunc arguo sic: quaecumque sunt in eodem subiecto adaequato, non differunt nec sit nec loco; sed B et C distinguuntur vel distant loco et situ, ergo non sunt in eodem subiecto adaequato. Si dicatur quod B non est in tota linea A nec in subiecto ipsius lineae A, sed in parte ipsius lineae vel in parte subiecti; contra, si B non sit tamquam in subiecto adaequato in tota linea, nec in toto subiecto ipsius lineae; igitur est in parte tamquam in subiecto adaequato. Sit ista pars D; tunc arguo, B est in D tamquam in subiecto adaequato; igitur eadem ratione alius punctus correspondens ipsi B, ad quem ex alia parte terminatur D, erit in ipso D tamquam in subiecto adaequato, et vocetur ille punctus

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or is an indivisible accident having an indivisible subject, as a spiritual accident is in the rational soul as if in its primary and adequate subject. But a point in none of these three modes has or can have any primary and adequate subject; therefore, the major premise of that syllogism is obvious through induction as regards any absolute accident.

The first part of the minor premise is obvious; namely, that a point does not have any adequate subject so that there may be a whole in a whole and in each part. For I take a point terminating the line A, and let that be called B; and I take another corresponding point, and let it be called C; then I ask whether B is in A, as if in its adequate subject or in the subject of itself; and it follows in either way, that C will be in the same adequate subject for the same reason.

Then I argue thus: whatever things are in the same adequate subject, they do not differ either in situation or in place; but B and C are distinguished or separate in place and in situation; therefore, they are not in the same adequate subject. If it be said that B is not in the whole line A, nor in the subject of the same line A, but in a part of the same line or in part of the subject (of the line); on the contrary, if B be not in the whole line as if in an adequate subject nor in the whole subject of the same line; then it is in a part as if in an adequate subject. Let that part be D; then I argue, B is in D as if in an adequate subject; therefore, for the same reason another point corresponding to the same B, at which D is terminated out of another part, will be in the same D as if in an adequate subject, and let that point be
E. Ex quo sequitur quod B et E sunt in eodem subiecto adaequato, et per consequens non distant loco et situ, quod est manifestissime falsum. Sic igitur non potest punctus aliquis esse in aliquo divisibili quanto et tamquam in suo subiecto adaequato, ita quod sit totus in toto et totus in qualibet parte; tum quia tunc duo puncta illius divisibili non distarent situ, quod est falsum; tum quia tunc punctus idem numero esset in alio et in alio situ, quod est falsum.

Si dicatur quod punctus est in aliqua parte divisibili sed illi parti non correspondet alius punctus in actu, nec potest sibi correspondere, quia illa pars non potest esse per se existens, sed tantum inexistens alteri. Contra; quacumque parte demonstrata Deus potest eam de potentia absoluta separare ab alia parte et conservare eam per se existentem; igitur istam partem, quae est primum subiectum et adaequatum puncti, Deus potest conservare sine alia. Ponatur igitur in esse, tunc habebit alium punctum in actu, qui eadem ratione erit in illo subiecto tamquam in suo subiecto primo; quia non est maior ratio quod unus punctus terminans lineam sit in illa tota linea vel in illo toti subiecto illius lineae, quam alius punctus terminans eadem lineam; et per consequens ista duo puncta non distabant situ; quia illa accidentia, quae sunt in eodem subiecto adaequato, non distant situ. Praeterea punctus correspondens non est tantum in potentia quomodo futurum est in potentia; igitur est in rerum natura et per consequens habet alium subiectum primum, et non potest dari called E. From which it follows that B and E are in the same adequate subject; and consequently they are not separate in place and in situation, which is most manifestly false. So, therefore, there can not be any point in any divisible quantum, and as if in its adequate subject, so that a whole may be in a whole and a whole in each part; not only because two points of that divisible would not then be separate in situation, which is false; but also because a point the same numerically would then be in two situations, which is false.

If it be said that a point is in some divisible part but another point does not correspond actually to that part, it can not correspond to it, because that part can not be existent per se, but only non-existent to another.

On the contrary; whatever part is designated, God can of His absolute power separate it from another part and can preserve it existent per se; therefore, this part, which is the primary and adequate subject of a point, God can preserve without another. Therefore, let it be posited in being, then it will actually have another point, which will be for the same reason in that subject as if in its primary subject; for there is no greater reason that one point terminating a line may be in that whole line or in that whole subject of that line than for another point terminating the same line; and consequently these two points will not be separate in situation; for those accidents, which are in the same adequate subject, are not separate in situation. Moreover, a corresponding point is not merely potentially in whatever way it is about to be potentially; therefore, it is in the nature of things and consequently has another primary subject, and this can not
be granted unless a line or a subject of a line terminating at another point; therefore, these two points are in the same primary subject and consequently are not separate in situation, which is false. Moreover, if it were in some divisible subject, as if in a primary subject, then they would not be separate in situation from another part, nor could it be more separate from one part than from another.

The second principal part of the minor premise is thus proved; namely, that a point is not a whole in a whole subject and a part in a part; for a point would then be a quantum, and the thesis is established.

The third part of that minor premise; namely, that it is not in some indivisible as if in its primary and adequate subject, is obvious; because that indivisible would be either substance or accident. It is not accident; for I ask in what genus? And it is obvious that it can not be conceded to be in a genus other than the genus 'substance'.

Similarly, inquiry must be made concerning the subject of that accident, as about the subject of the point. Nor is that indivisible a substance; for, if it be a substance, it is either matter or form or a composite or a substance abstracted from matter; but it is not matter, since all matter is divisible; nor is it form; for, if it be form, it is either form extended and consequently is divisible or it is form non-extended and consequently is a rational soul; for the rational soul alone is non-extended; but it is manifest that it is not a rational soul; therefore, it is manifest that it is not form which is one part of a composite, nor is it a composite; and it is manifest that it is not form abstracted from matter; therefore, it is not some in-
DE SACRAMENTO ALTARIS

stantia indivisibilis, quae possit esse primum subjectum et adequetum puncti.

Practerea, si in lapide sit aliqua substantia indivisibilis, quae possit esse primum subjectum et adequetum puncti; accipio tunc istam substantiam, et quaeo aut facit per se unum cum materia et forma lapidis aut non. Si sic, igitur esset aliqua substantia indivisibilis in lapide quae esset materia vel forma respectu materiae lapidis; quia quandocumque aliqua sunt diversarum rationum in genere 'substantiae' facientia per se unum; unum istorum est actus, reliquum vero potentia, et per consequens unum est materia et reliquum forma.

Sed impossible est quod illud indivisibile est materia prima, quia materia prima est extensa. Si autem ista substantia indivisibilis non facit per se unum cum materia et forma lapidis, immo nec est pars lapidis et per consequens non potest esse pars lapidis nec per consequens potest esse pars allicius substantiae.

Sed omnis substantia, quae non potest esse pars allicius substantiae, est per se subsistens et per se in genere et specie, et per consequens ista substantia esset per se subsistens et per se in genere et specie, quod est falsum; rei quod nulla est substantia in lapide nisi materia vel forma vel compositum; sed omne tale est divisibile et habens partes realiter distinctas; ergo nullum eorum est indivisibile. Sic igitur petet, quod nec aliquod indivisibile nec aliquod divisibile potest esse primum subjectum et adequetum ipsius puncti, si punctus sit quaedam res absoluta distincta realiter ab omni divisibili.

THE SACRAMENT OF THE ALTAR

divisible substance, which may be able to be the primary and adequate subject of a point.

Moreover, if there be in a stone some indivisible substance which may be able to be the primary and adequate subject of a point; then I take this substance, and I ask whether or not it makes one per se with the matter and the form of the stone. If so, there would, therefore, be some indivisible substance in a stone which would be matter or form with respect to the matter of the stone; for whenever some making one per se are of diverse grounds in the genus 'substance,' one of these is act, the rest indeed power; and consequently one is matter and the rest form.

But it is impossible that that indivisible is primary matter, for primary matter is extended. But if this indivisible substance does not make one per se with the matter and the form of the stone, it is surely not part of the stone and consequently can not be part of the stone; and consequently can not be part of any substance.

But every substance, which can not be part of some substance, is subsistent per se and per se in a genus and in a species; and consequently this substance would be subsistent per se and per se in a genus and in a species, which is false; therefore, it remains that there is no substance in a stone except matter or form or a composite; but every such is divisible and possessed of parts really distinct; therefore, none of them is indivisible. So, therefore, it is obvious that neither any indivisible nor any divisible can be a primary and adequate subject of the same point, if a point be a certain absolute thing really distinct from every divisible.
Si dicatur ad rationem principalem quod maior est falsa; nam multa sunt accidentia, quae non sunt tota in toto et in qualibet parte nec tota in totis et partes in partibus, nec sunt accidentia individivilia habentia subiecta individivilia sed accidentia individivilia habentia subiecta divisibilia, et tamen non sunt in aliqua parte sed totum in toto, sicut tempus est in toto motu totius caeli et tamen non est in aliqua parte motus aliquidus partis caeli. Similiter dupleitas est tota in toto duplo, et nec dupleitas nec aliqua pars eius est in parte dupli respectu eiusdem dimidii. Et ita videtur de multis alis accidentibus, quod sunt in toto, et tamen nec ipsa, nec pars eorum, sunt in aliqua parte totius.

Sed ista responsio non sufficit. Primo, quia accipit falsum quod sunt aliqua accidentia individivilia existentia primo in aliquo divisibili et tamen in nulla eius parte; unde tempus non est aliquod accidentis absolutum distinctum realiter a motu et a rebus permanentibus, existens subiective in toto motu et in nulla parte.

Secundo, non sufficit ista responsio, quia hoc dato adhuc stat argumentum, quia punctus non est tale accidentis. Primo, quia nullum accidentis existens in aliquo subiecto adaequato, sive sit totum in toto et totum in qualibet parte sive totum in toto et tamen in nulla parte, distat loco et situ ab aliquo accidente existente in codem subiecto adaequato sibi, patet; quia color non distat a colore eiusdem subjecti. Similiter tempus, si sit aliud accidentis, non distat situ ab aliquo accidente existente in codem subiecto adaequato sibi.

If it be said as regards the principle reason, that the major premise is false; now there are many accidents which are not wholes in a whole and in each part, nor wholes in wholes and parts in parts, nor are they indivisible accidents having indivisible subjects but indivisible accidents having divisible subjects; and yet they are not in any part but a whole in a whole, as time is in the whole movement of the whole heaven, and yet it is not any part of the movement of any part of heaven. Similarly, doubleness is a whole in a whole double, and neither doubleness nor any part of it is in a part of a double with respect to the same half. And it seems so of many other accidents, that they are in a whole; and yet neither they themselves nor a part of them are in any part of the whole.

But this reply does not suffice. First, because it accepts the fallacy that there are some indivisible accidents existing at first in some divisible and yet in no part of it; whence, time is not some absolute accident really distinct from motion and from permanent things, existing subjectively in a whole motion and in no part.

In the second place, this reply does not suffice; for, if this is granted, the argument still obtains; for a point is not such an accident. First; because it is obvious, that no accident existing in any adequate subject, whether it be a whole in a whole and a whole in each part or a whole in a whole and yet in no part, is separate in place and in situation from any accident existing in the same subject adequate to it; for color is not separate from the color of the same subject. Similarly, time, if it be another accident, is not separate in situation from some accident in the same
Similiter dupletas non distat situ ab aliquo accidente existente in eodem subiecto, tamquam sibi adeaequato; et ita universaliter de omni accidente. Patet quod non distat situ ab aliquo accidente existente in eodem subiecto sibi adeaequato. Sed punctus distat situ a qualibet puncto illius quanti, cuius est punctus; igitur duo puncta non possunt esse in eodem subiecto primo et adeaequato, quod tamen oportet si punctus esset accidens indivisible habens pro subiecto adeaequato ali- quod divisibile.

Tertio, nullum accidens distat situ a quacumque parte sui subiecti primi et adeaequati, sicut albedo illius partis A non distat situ a quacumque parte ipsius A, quamvis distat situ ab alia parte componente cum A. 

Similiter si tempus vel dupletas sit accidentis distinctum reales et duplo vel motu, manifestum est quod tempus non distat situ ab aliqua parte motus, nec dupletas distat situ ab aliqua parte dupli; et ita de omni alio accidente. Sed demonstrato quocumque divisibili quod debet ponsi subiectum primum illius puncti, manifestum est quod istud distat situ ab alia parte istius divisibilis; ergo illud divisibile non est primum subie- tum et adeaequatum ipsius puncti. 

Confirmatur ista ratio; quia, quando aliquod accidens est in aliquo subiecto primo et adeaequato, illud acci- dens non plus distat situ ab una parte istius subiecti quam ab alia, patet inductiv. Sed manifestum est subject adequate to it. Similarly, doubleness is not separate in situation from some accident existing in the same subject, as if adequate to it; and so in general of every accident. It is obvious, that it is not separate in situation from some accident existing in the same s subject adequate to it. But a point is separate in situation from each point of that quantum, of which it is a point; therefore, two points can not be in the same primary and adequate subject, which however would be necessary if a point were an indivisible acci- dent having some divisible for an adequate subject.

In the third place, no accident is separate in sit- uation from each part of its primary and adequate subject; as the whiteness of that part A is not sepa- rate in situation from each part of the same A, al- though it is separate in situation from another part joining with A.

Similarly, if time or doubleness be an accident re- ally distinct from a double or motion, it is manifest that time is not separate in situation from some part of motion, nor is doubleness separate in situation from some part of a double; and so of every other accident. But if each divisible is designated on the ground that it ought to be considered the primary subject of that point, it is manifest that this is separate in situation from another part of this divisible; therefore, that divisible is not the primary and adequate subject of the same point.

This reason is confirmed; for, when any accident is in some primary and adequate subject, it is obvious by induction that that accident is not more separate in situation from one part of this subject than from another. But it is manifest that that point is more
quod ille punctus plus distat situ ab una parte illius divisibilis, quocumque demonstrato, quam ab alia; igitur illud divisibile non est primum subiectum istius puncti.

5 Ex quo patet quod punctus non est aliquod accidentem absolutum distinctum realiter ab omni divisibili, habens pro subiecto primo et adaequato, quod scilicet est subiectum seipso sive per se et non per partem suam, aliquod divisibile.

Præterea punctus continuans duas medietates, in quo est subjective, non potest dari quod plus in una mediate quam in alia, vel igitur in utraque; et tunc idem accidentes numero esse in pluribus subjectis numero, quod est impossibile, vel in neutra; et per consequens in nullo subjective.

10 Si dicatur quod punctus sit in aliquo indivisibili subiecto sicut tacet est prius, hoc non valet sicut probatum est prius.

Et iterum probabo, quia esset aliquo indivisibile in divisibili subiecto, puta, in lapide. Dividatur ille lapis secundum illud indivisibile, et quaero, aut illud indivisibile manet aut non manet. Si sic; quaero ubi manet, aut cum utraque parte, aut in una et non in altera, aut separatin in utraque. Primum non potest dari quia tunc aliqua substantia una numero esse in distinctis locis non facientibus unum, quod est impossibile naturaliter. Secundum non potest dari quia non est maior ratio quod non sit in una parte quam in alia. Similiter tertium non potest dari, quia tunc nihil existens per se vel in aliquo alio faceret per se unum; quorum utrumque patet esse falsum et impossible.

separate in situation from one part of that divisible, whatever divisible is designated, than from another; therefore, that divisible is not the primary subject of this point.

From which it is obvious, that a point is not some absolute accident really distinct from every divisible, having some divisible for a primary and adequate subject; namely, that which is a subject in itself or per se and not through its own part.

Moreover, it can not be conceded that a point connecting two halves, in which it is subjectively, is in one half more than in the other, or, therefore, in both; and then an accident the same numerically would be in subjects several numerically, which is impossible, or in neither; and consequently in none subjectively.

If it be said that a point may be in some indivisible subject, as was mentioned before, this does not obtain, as was proved before.

And I shall prove it again; since some indivisible would be in a divisible subject, say, in a stone. Let that stone be divided in correspondence with that indivisible, and I ask, whether that indivisible remains or does not remain. If it remains; I ask, where it remains, whether with each part, or in one and not in the other, or separate from both. The first can not be conceded; for then some substance one numerically would be in distinct places which do not make one, which is impossible naturally. The second can not be conceded; for there is no greater reason that it be in one part than in another. Similarly, the third can not be conceded; since then nothing existing per se or in some other would make one per se; each of which is obviously false and impossible.
Secundo, principaliter arguo sic. Omnis res positiva et absoluta distincta realiter ab omni alia re non faciens per se unum, tamquam pars cum alia re, est per se in genere. Sed punctus, si sit talis res indivisibilis, non est pars aliquis divisibilis, nec faciens per se unum cum quocumque alio; igitur erit per se in aliquo praedicamento; sed hoc est falsum, quia tunc vel esset substantia vel quantitas vel qualitas, vel respectus, quorum quodlibet est falsum per ponentes talia indivisibilia.

Maiores illius rationis est manifesta; quia quando sunt aliquae res secundum se totas distinctae, quarum neutra est pars alterius, non est maior ratio quod una illarum sit per se in aliquo praedicamento quam alia, sicut patet inductive.

Sed illud dicitur, quod punctus non est per se in genere sed tantum per reductionem, quia non est nisi terminus quantitatis.

Sed illa responsio non valet; primo, quia tunc linea non esset per se in genere 'quantitatis,' cum non sit nisi terminus quantitatis. Si dicitur quod linea non tantum est terminus quantitatis sed etiam quantitas, ideo per se est in genere. Punctus autem non est per se quantitas; ideo non est per se in genere 'quantitatis' sed tantum per reductionem. Hoc non valet; quia, si punctus sit talis res indivisibilis, non tantum erit terminus quantitatis, sed erit una res absoluta distincta realiter secundum se totam ab omni alia re et per consequens erit per se in aliquo praedicamento.

Confirmitur; quia omnis res absoluta et permanens et per se una, non tantum una per aggregationem vel
ordinem, est per se in aliquo praedicamento vel est pars aliquius existentis per se in praedicamento. Patet illa inductive de omni re, nisi instes in proposito. Patet etiam quia, si illa maior negetur, perit omnis via ad probandum aliquam rem esse per se in genere; sic enim de aliis dicam quod aliquid non est per se in genere quia est terminus aliquius substantiae; sicut tu dicis, quod punctus non est per se in genere quia est terminus aliquius existentis per se in genere; patet igitur illa, quod omnis res per se una est per se in aliquo praedicamento vel pars aliquius existentis in praedicamento; sed punctus non est pars aliquius existentis per se in praedicamento, patet inductive; igitur punctus est per se in praedicamento, quod probatum est esse falsum. Ex quo sequitur quod punctus non est talis res indivisibilis.

Tertio arguo sic. Imposibile est quod sint infinitae res in actu secundum se totas distinctae, et quorum nullae sit pars alterius nec quae faciunt aliquod unum. Sed si punctus esset talis res indivisibilis, talia essent infinita in actu. Quia accipio lignum. Manifestum est secundum illos quod hic sunt infinitae lineae, quia non tot quin plures, et quaelibet illarum terminatur ad aliquem punctum in actu, quia alias nulla linea terminatur ad aliquem punctum in actu. Et manifestum est quod secundum se tota distinguuntur, si sint indivisibilis; nec faciunt per se unum, cum non sint partes aliquius; igitur talia infinita erunt in actu quod est impossibile et contra omnem philosophiam. Relinquitur gation or order, is per se in some category or is a part of something existing per se in a category. This is obvious by induction of every thing, unless you insist upon the proposition. It is also obvious; for, if that major premise be denied, every way of proving that some thing is per se in a genus is destroyed; for thus of other things I may say, that something is not per se in a genus because it is the terminus of any substance; as you say, that a point is not per se in a genus, for it is the terminus of something existing per se in a genus; therefore, this is obvious, that everything one per se is per se in some category or is part of something existing in a category; but it is obvious by induction that a point is not a part of something existing per se in a category; therefore, a point is per se in a category; which was proved to be false. From which it follows that a point is not such an indivisible thing.

In the third place, I argue thus. It is impossible that there may be things infinite actually, distinct as regards themselves as wholes, and of which none may be part of another, and which do not make some one. But if a point were such an indivisible thing, such would be infinite actually. For example, I take wood. It is manifest according to those writers that there are here infinite lines; for there are not just so many so that there could not be more, and each of them is terminated actually at some point; for otherwise no line could be terminated actually at some point. And it is manifest that they are distinguished as regards themselves as wholes, if they be indivisibles; nor do they make one per se, since they may not be parts of anything; therefore, such will be infinite actually, which is impossible and contrary to all philosophy. There-
igitur quod punctus non est talis res indivisibilis distincta realiter ab omni divisibili.

Quarto sic: per solam divisionem continui non causatur aliqua res positiva et absoluta. Dividitur igitur lignum, et quero de punctis terminantibus, aut prius fuerunt aut non. Si sic, certum est quod non distabunt siti; punctus ergo fuit immediatus puncto, quod falsum est etiam secundum eos. Si non erant prius et nunc sunt; igitur generantur de novo, et per consequens per solam divisionem necessario generaretur aliqua res absoluta, quod falsum est.

Quinto, quia per solam unionem partium aquae vel alterius, cuius partes prius separatae, possunt continuare, non generatur aliqua res nova absoluta, nec absoluta corrumpitur. Sed si punctus esset talis res indivisibilis, necessario, quandocumque tales partes continuarentur, aliqua res absoluta corrumpenteretur; puta, ista duo puncta, quae prius terminabant duas lineas, et generantur nova, scilicet, unus punctus continuans illas duas partes. Immo sequeretur quod infinitae res absolutae secundum se totas distinctas corrumpentur et infinitae generarentur, sicut deduci potest per tertiam rationem principalem prius factam; quae omnia sunt impossibilia, et per consequens punctus non est talis res indivisibilis.

Istam eandem conclusionem probo per rationes theologicas. Primo sic: omnem rem absolutam distinctam secundum se totam ab alia re absoluta, cuius non fore, it remains that a point is not any such indivisible thing really distinct from every divisible.

In the fourth place thus: some thing positive and absolute is not caused through division only of a continuum. Let, therefore, wood be divided; and I ask about the terminating points, whether they were before or not. If they were, it is certain that they will not be separate in situation; therefore, a point was immediate to a point; which is false even according to those writers. If they were not before and now are; they are, therefore, generated de novo, and consequently some absolute thing necessarily would be generated through division alone, which is false.

In the fifth place; since they can become continuous through the union only of parts of water or of another, whose parts were separate before, some new absolute thing is not generated nor is an absolute corrupted. But if a point were such an indivisible thing, whenever such parts would become continuous, of necessity some absolute thing would be corrupted; say, these two points which before terminated two lines, and a new thing would be generated; namely, one point connecting those two parts. Indeed, it would follow that infinite, absolute things distinct as regards themselves as wholes would be corrupted, and infinites would be generated; as can be deduced through the third principal reason previously stated; all of which are impossible, and consequently a point is not such an indivisible thing.

I prove this same conclusion through theological reasons. First thus: every absolute thing distinct as regards itself as a whole from another absolute thing,
est subiectum nec effectus nec eversus, potest Deus creare sine ea.

Sed si punctus sit talis res indivisibilis, linea secundum se totam distinguitur a puncto, manifestum est; quia lineam non est pars puncti, nec punctus est pars lineae, nec etiam linea est subiectum puncti, sicut probatum est prius, nec eversus punctus est subiectum lineae, manifestum est. Nec etiam linea est causa puncti nec eversus; sicut patet discurrendo per omnia genera causarum; igitur potest Deus de potentia sua absoluta facere lineam sine omni puncto.

Tunc quaero, aut illa linea est finita aut infinita. Si sit finita et sine omni puncto, per consequens frustra ponitur punctus ad terminandum lineam, et tamen non propter aliquid ponitur a sic ponentibus. Si autem linea 15 illa non sit terminata nec finita, et est in rerum natura per casum; igitur est infinita; quod patet esse manifeste falsum, quia non propter hoc erit illa linea maior et longior, quia illa punctus est separatus vel destructus; ergo nullo modo erit illa infinita quantumcumque omnia puncta des-truantur. Praeterea si des-truantur a Deo omnia puncta, conservata linea; quaero aut illa linea est continua, aut non. Si sic, et non per punctum quia non est per casum; igitur sine omni puncto 20 est linea continua, et per consequens frustra ponitur ibi punctus. Si non sit continua, quaero aut aliquay pars eius sit continua et redivit argumentum praece-dens aut nulla pars est continua; ex quo sequitur quod est aliqua linea quae non componitur ex continuis quod est impossible.

of which it is not subject nor effect, nor conversely, God can create without the second thing.

But if a point be such an indivisible thing, it is manifest that a line as regards itself as a whole is distinguished from a point; for it is manifest that a line is not a part of a point, nor is a point a part of a line, nor again is a line the subject of a point, as was proved before; and conversely a point is not the subject of a line. Moreover, a line is not the cause of a point, nor conversely; as is obvious by a survey of all classes of causes; therefore, God can of His absolute power make a line without any point.

Then I ask, whether that line is finite or infinite. If it be finite and without any point; it is consequently needless to posit a point to terminate a line, and yet it is not posited by virtue of another by those who thus posit it. If, however, that line be not terminated nor finite, and is in the nature of things per casum; it, therefore, is infinite, which obviously is manifestly false; for that line will not by virtue of this be greater, or longer because that point is separated or destroyed; therefore, in no mode will there be that infinite, no matter to what extent all the points may be destroyed. Moreover, if all the points be destroyed by God, and the line is saved; I ask whether or not that line is continuous. If it is, and not through a point, for it is not per casum; there is, therefore, a continuous line without any point, and consequently a point is needlessly posited there. If it be not continuous; I ask whether any part of it be continuous, in which case the preceding argument applies, or else no part is continuous; from which it follows that there is some line which is not composed of continua, which is impossible.
Similiter illa linea est continua vel discreta; si continua, habetur propositum; si discreta, ergo quaelibet pars est divisa in infinitum quantum ad omnes eius partes, quod est impossible. Ista autem ratio probat quod linea sufficienter est continua et finita per naturam propriae sine omni alia re addita sibi; et per consequens, cum non propter aliud debeat ponit punctus, frustra ponitur punctus esse talis res indivisibilis.

Si dicatur quod Deus de potentia sua absoluta non potest facere lineam sine puncto; contra, quando aliqua res absoluta potest per naturam fieri sine multis rebus divisim ita quod sine quacunque illarum sigillatiim illa res potest per divinam potentiam fieri sine omnibus illis coniunctis, ita quod nullum illorum sit cum eo; quod maxime est verum, quando istae res secundum se totas sunt distinctae realiter et neutra est effectus nec accidens alterius; sicut est de puncto et linea. Si punctus sit talis res indivisibilis, (sed haec linea per naturam potest esse sine hoc puncto et sine illo et sic de alius et sic de quaelibet); igitur potest Deus facere eam sine omni puncto; et ita habetur propositum.

Praeterea si illud, quod dependet essentialet ab aliquo tamquam effectus a causa et accidens a suo subjecto, potest per divinam potentiam separari ab illo; multo fortius id, quod non dependet ab alio nec tamquam totum a parte nec tamquam accidens a suo subjecto nec tamquam effectus ab alio potest Deus facere sine eo.

Sed accidens in sacramento altaris ante separazione nem dependet a substantia tamquam a causa et a suo
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subjecto, et tamen per divinam potentiam fit accidentis sine subjecto; igitur multo fortius linea quae non dependet a puncto nec tamquam a parte sua nec tamquam a subjecto nec tamquam a sua causa, potest fieri sine eo; et ita stat primum argumentum.

Confirmatur ratio illa, quia secundum Philosophum secundo Physicorum, "Quantitas est per se finita vel infinita." Sed si quantitas esset finita per rem aliam, sicut linea per puncta tamquam per rem aliam, ipsa non esset finita per se sed per alium. In sacramento altaris quantitas est separata ab omni substantia; igitur linea est separata ab omni subjecto. Tunc quaero de puncto terminante illam lineam, aut est separata ab omni subjecto aut non; si sic, igitur punctus ille et linea nullo modo faciunt unum quia nec unum per se nec unum per accidentem, cum neutrum sit receptivum alterius; et per consequens linea non potest aliter terminari per punctum nisi sicut aqua terminatur corpori solido, puta, terra vel consimili, quod non potest competere puncto.

Si autem punctus non sit sine subjecto, et manifestum est quod non est subjectiva in substantia, cum non sit ibi nisi corpus Christi, in quo non potest ponis punctum; igitur est subjectivum in linea, sed hoc est impossibile sicut probatum est prius; quia si esset subjectivum in linea vel in aliqua parte lineae, tamquam in subjecto primo et adequato, et non tantum per partem, sicut haec ab elo dicetur esse in Sorte, quia est in una parte Sortis, punctus a nulla parte subjici, puta, lineae cause and on its subject; and yet through divine power it becomes an accident without a subject; therefore, much more firmly can the line, which does not depend on the point either as if on its part or as if on a subject or as if on its cause, be made without it; and so the first argument obtains.

That reason is confirmed; for, according to the Philosopher in the second book of the Physics, "Quantity is per se finite or infinite." But if a quantity were finite through another thing, as a line is finite through points as if through another thing, it itself would not be finite per se but through another. In the sacrament of the altar a quantity is separated from every substance; therefore, a line is separated from every subject. Then I ask about the point terminating that line, whether or not it is separated from every subject; if so, then that point and the line do not in any mode make one, for they are neither one per se nor one through an accident, since neither may be receptive of the other; and consequently the line can not otherwise be terminated through a point, unless as water is terminated by a solid body; namely, earth or something similar, which can not correspond to a point.

But if a point may not be without a subject, and it is manifest that it is not subjectively in a substance; since it may not be there unless the body of Christ, in which a point can not be posited; that, therefore, is subjectively in a line, but this is impossible as was proved before; for if it were subjectively in a line or in some part of a line, as if in a primary and adequate subject and not only through a part, as this whiteness is said to be in Sortes; for it is in one part of Sortes, a point might be able to be separate in place and in situation.
vel partis lineae posset distare loco et situ, sicut argumentum est prius, quod est manifeste falsum sicut probatum est prius.

Propter praedicata et multa alia, quae possunt adduci, dicerent ponentes nihil esse simplectile indivisible in rebus per creationem omnium partium realiter distinctarum praeter substantias separatas a materia et principaliter animam intellectivam et accidentia sua, et quod punctus non est res indivisibilis positiva et absoluta distincta realiter a linea et omni quantitate. Sed dicerent quod quaelibet res divisibilis seipsa formaliter est finita et terminata et continua; si sit continua sine omni alia re addita sibi, causaliiter est terminata et finita et continua a Deo et aliis causis per se ponentibus eam in esse, quaecumque sint illae causae, unde haec linea sine omni alia re addita sibi. Immo, si quaelibet alia res destrueretur et haec linea conservaretur a Deo, vere esset finita, terminata et continua; et ideo cum talis res indivisibilis propter alia non ponatur, videtur tam impossibile quam superfluum ponere punctum esse talem rem indivisibilem.

Et si quae situr; quid est punctus? Aut est res divisibilis aut indivisibilis? Dicendum est quod sic dicendo, punctus est aliquid vel punctus est res vel huiusmodi. Si punctus supponatur pro aliquo ita quod habeat praecepe vim nominis et non includat aequivalenter unum complexum ex nomine et verbo vel aliquod consimile quod secundum proprietatem vocis potest reddere suppositionum verbo, debet concedi quod punctus est from no part of a subject, say, a line or a part of a line, as was affirmed before; which is manifestly false, as was proved before.

By virtue of the previous statements and many others, which can be adduced, those positing might say that nothing is simply indivisible in things through the creation of all parts really distinct except substances separate from matter and principally the rational soul and its accidents; and that a point is not a thing indivisible, positive and absolute, really distinct from a line and every quantity. But they might say that any thing divisible in itself is formally finite, terminated and continuous; if it be continuous without any other thing added to it, it is causally terminated, finite, and continuous by God and other causes per se placing it in being, whatever may be those causes; whence this line without any other thing added to it. Indeed, if any other thing were destroyed and this line were preserved by God, It would truly be finite, terminated and continuous; and, indeed, since such an indivisible thing may not be posited by virtue of others, it seems as impossible as superfluous to posit that a point is such an indivisible thing.

And if it is asked: What is a point? Whether it is a thing divisible or an indivisible? Which must be answered thus by saying, a point is something or a point is a thing or anything else of the kind. If a point stand for something so that it may have precisely the force of a name and may not embrace as an equivalent one compounded of a noun and a verb, or something very similar which can represent a supposition for a verb according to a property of speech; it ought to be conceded that a point is something and that a
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aliquid et quod punctus est res, et hoc quia debet concedi quod punctus est linea vel punctus est quantitas; quia tunc hoc nomen 'punctus' aequivalbit isti, 'linea tantae vel tantae longituninis,' sive 'linea non ulterior pel inensa vel extensa,' vel alci toti complexo ex nomine et verbo mediante conjunctione vel adverbio vel hoc pronomine 'qua,' secundum quod placet dare diversas diffinitiones exprimentes quid nominis illius nominis 'punctus.' Et ideo sicut hoc praedicatur 'res divisibilis' praedicatur de tali subjecto et per consequens de composito ex adiectivo et substantivo, ita praedicatur de puncto.

Unde sicut dicunt aliqui quod hoc nomen 'privatio' aequivalit in significando huic toti 'subjectum privatum'; et propter hoc, sicut concedunt istam, 'subjectum privatum' est materia, ita concedunt illam, 'privatio' est materia. Ita si hoc nomen 'punctus' in significando aequivalit isti toti, 'linea non ulterior potentissa' vel alci consimili, cuius una pars sit linea, et aliae partes sint aliqua adjectiva vel verbum conjunctum cum linea, mediante hoc pronomine 'qua' vel altero consimili. Siue haec conceditur, 'linea est divisibilis,' ita illa conceditur de virtute significationis, 'punctus est linea,' 'punctus est divisibilis.' Quicquid enim verificatur de hoc nomine 'linea' sumpto significative, verificatur de hoc nomine 'punctus' sumpto significative, et hoc de virtute significationis loquendo; hoc tamen non obstante, una propositio, in qua subichitur hoc nomen 'punctus,' poterit esse per se; et alia, in qua ponitur hoc nomen 'linea,' non erit per se et everso.

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point is a thing, and this because it ought to be conceded that a point is a line or a point is a quantity; for then this name 'point' will be equivalent to this 'a line of such or such length,' or 'a line not further lengthened or extended,' or to some whole compounded of a noun and a verb with an intervening conjunction or adverb or this pronoun 'qua'; according to which it is pleasing to give diverse definitions expressing some characteristic of that name 'point.' And indeed, as this predicate 'a divisible thing' is predicated of such a subject and consequently of a composite of an adjective and a substantive, so it is predicated of a point.

Whence, as some say that this name 'privation' is equivalent in significance to this whole 'subjectum privatum'; and by virtue of this, as they concede this, 'subjectum privatum' is matter; so they concede this, 'privation' is matter. So if this name 'point' is equivalent in significance to this whole, 'a line not farther lengthened' or to something similar; of which one part may be a line, and other parts may be some adjectives or a verb connected with line, this pronoun 'qua' intervening, or another similar. As this is conceded, 'a line is divisible,' so this is conceded according to the virtue of signification, 'a point is a line,' 'a point is divisible.' For whatever is true of this name 'line,' when used significatively, is true of this name 'point' when used significatively, and this by speaking according to the virtue of signification; yet this, notwithstanding that one proposition, in which this name 'point' is substituted, could be per se; and another, in which this name 'line' is posited, will not be per se, and conversely.
Sicut quicquid praedicatur de uno convertibilium sumpto significative, verificatur de reliquo sumpto significative, et tanum una illarum per se et non reliqua. Unde haec est per se primo modo, 'omnis homo est animal' et non illa, 'omne risibile est animal.' Si antem hoc nomen 'punctus' aequivalenti in signando alii composito ex nomine vel verbo vel conjunctione vel adverbio et hoc pronymine 'qui,' vel ex obliquo et verbo composito, quod secundum proprietatem sermone non potest reddere suppositum velbo loquendo grammaticè; et per consequens omnis oratio, in qua ponitur, non est secundum proprietatem, sed est figurativa locutio et potest reduci ad figuram quae vocatur a grammaticis 'hypallage' de qua dicunt, quod hypallage est conversio casuum vel constructionis vel aliquando totius sententiae.

Sic debet concedi quod 'punctus est res indivisibilis' et 'punctus non habet partes' et Huismodi. Sed illæ propositiones et consimiles non sunt concedendae secundum proprietatem sermonis, tamquam propriae non excusandae per aliquam figuram grammaticalem; et per consequens non est ex eis argumentum in investigacione veritatis, nisi ipsis acceptis secundum sensum quem habent ex intendione auctorum; sed concedendae sunt sub illo sensu, quem habent ex hoc quod per praedictam figuram excusantur; eo videlicet, quod una dicatio ponitur loco unius orationis vel compositi ex multis dictionibus, et simul eum hoc oportet convertere orationem transponendo et etiam mutando aliquando

Just as whatever is predicated of one of the convertibles, when used significatively, is true of the rest when used significatively, and yet one of them per se and not the rest. Whence this is per se in the first mode, 'every man is an animal,' and not this, 'every risible is an animal.' But if this name 'point' will be equivalent in signification to some composite of a noun or a verb or a conjunction or an adverb and this pronoun 'qui,' or of a composite of an oblique case and a verb, which according to a property of common speech can not express, speaking grammatically, a supposition for a verb; consequently, too, any language, in which it is posited, is not according to a property, but is figurative speech and can be reduced to a figure which is called by the grammarians 'hypallage,' of which they say that hypallage is the conversion of cases or of a construction or sometimes of a whole sentence.

So it ought to be conceded that 'a point is an indivisible thing' and that 'a point does not have parts,' and anything else of the kind. But those propositions and similar ones must not be conceded according to a property of common speech, as proper propositions must not be disposed of through any grammatical figure; and consequently in the investigation of reality it must not be argued from these, unless they are taken according to the sense which they have according to the intention of the authors; but they must be conceded under that sense, which they have from this, that they are disposed of through the aforesaid figure; for this reason, namely, that one expression is posited in place of one form of language or of a composite of many expressions, and at the same time with this it is necessary to convert the language by transposing and even by
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unam partem orationis in aliam, et aliquando unam
dictionem in aliam et casum in casum vel unum acci-
dens grammaticale in aliud vel consimili modo con-
vertendo; ut sensus illius propositionis, 'punctus est in-
divisibilis,' sit ille, 'linea ultra non pretenditur,' cuius
tamen quaelibet pars est divisibilis, vel alius consimilis
sensus secundum quod placet praedictam propositione-
num exponere. Sensus autem istius propositionis,
'punctus est divisibilis,' sit ille vel aliquid consimilis
sensus, quacumque parte lineae data adhuc conventit
accipere ulterioriorem.

Et sicut dicitur de istis propositionibus, ita dicendum
est de consimilibus; et non tantum est hoc verum de
hoc nomine 'punctus'; verum etiam de omnibus nomi-
nibus verbalibus et omnibus nominibus formatis ab ad-
verbiis, connunctionibus, pronominibus, praepositioni-
bus, et universali ab omnibus sincategorematicibus,
et universali ab omnibus, quae non sunt praecise
habentia virtutem nominis; ita quod sine omni figura
et proprietate sermonis non possunt esse extrema pro-
positionis distincta a copula. Et secundum hoc omnes
tales: 'actio est in passo,' 'matus est in mobili,' 'simi-
litudo est in simili,' 'albedo est terminus mutus,' 'omnis
res productur per productionem,' 'ignis calefacit cale-
factione,' et huiusmodi innumerabiles propositiones,
quae inveniuntur in dictis philosophorum et sanctorum
et etiam in scriptura sacra, sunt figurative per aliquam
figuran grammaticalem excusandae. Nec est inconve-
niens concedere, quod philosophi et sancti sic figurative
loquebantur, cum multa tulia in sacra scriptura reperi-

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changing sometimes one part of the language into an-
other, and sometimes one expression into another, and
a case into a case, or one grammatical accident into
another, or in a similar mode by conversion; that the
sense of this proposition, 'a point is indivisible,' may be
this, 'a line is not farther lengthened,' of which,
however, each part is divisible; or another similar
sense according as one is pleased to explain the pre-
vious proposition. But the sense of this proposition,
'a point is divisible,' may be that or some similar sense;
for whatever part of the line is taken, it is still proper
to take the more remote.

And as it is said of these propositions, so it must
be said of similar propositions; and not only is this
true of this name 'point'; but it is also true of all ver-
bal names and all names formed from adverbs, con-
junctions, pronouns, prepositions, and in general of all
synecogermatics, and in general of all, which do not
precisely have the virtue of a name; so that they can
not be the extremes of a proposition separated by a
copula without any figure and a property of common
speech. And according to this, all such: 'action is in
passion,' 'motion is in the mobile,' 'likeness is in the
similar,' 'whiteness is the terminus of motion,' 'every
thing is produced through production,' 'fire makes warm
by heating,' and innumerable propositions of a
similar kind, which are found in the statements of the
philosophers and of the Saints and even in Sacred
Scriptures, must be figuratively disposed of through
some grammatical figure. Nor is it inconsistent to
concede that the philosophers and the Saints spoke thus
figuratively, since many such may be found in Sacred
Scripture; not however by accepting the statements of
antur; non tamen accipiendo dicta sacrae scripturae in sensu spirituali sed etiam in sensu litterali.

Immo etiam frequenter vulgaris et communis modus loquendi talibus figurativis locutionibus utitur; sicut per dicta grammaticorum de talibus tractantium potest probari. Unde non tantum dictio potest transferri a propria significatione ad improprium, sed etiam aliquando dantur vocabula, quae nullam propriam significationem habent, qualem primo instituta habent. Et sicut translatio secundum grammaticos fit triplex de causa: quia aliquando causa metri sicut in poetis; aliquando causa ornatus sicut in rhetorica locutione, aliquando causa necessitatis sive brevitatis sive utilitatis sicut in philosophia; et omnibus istis modis fit translationis in theologiam. Ita impositio talium nominum sive sint abstracta sive concreta fit triplex de causa; scilicet, metri, ornatus, et utilitatis sive brevitatis. Quamvis ex praedictis causis occasionaliter multi errores proveniunt in simplicibus, qui omnia dicta philosophorum et sanctorum secundum proprietatem sermonis volunt accipere, cum tamen sint figurative sumendae.

Secundus articulus principalis. Sed contra praedicta arguit quidam doctor primo sic. Ex illa opinione sequitur quod generatio subita, quae non est per se terminus continuus, nihil erit vel saltum in nihil; quia non est ei alia alia mensura positiva, et ita est de illuminatione et de omnibus mutationibus subitis, quae non sunt per se termini motus. Et licet possunt evadere de mutationibus quae sunt termini motuum et

Sacred Scripture in a spiritual sense but even in a literal sense.

Indeed, even the popular and common mode of speaking frequently employs such figurative expressions; as can be proved through the statements of the grammarians treating of such. Whence, not only the expression can be transferred from a proper to an improper signification, but even sometimes terms are given which have no proper signification, such as they have when first instituted. And as a translation is made according to the grammarians for a threefold cause: sometimes for the sake of metre as in the poets; sometimes for the sake of ornament as in rhetorical speech; sometimes for the sake of necessity, either brevity or utility, as in philosophy; and in all of these ways a translation is made in theology. So the application of such names, whether they be abstract or concrete, is made for a three-fold cause; namely, for the sake of metre, ornament, and utility or brevity. Although from the previous causes many errors occasionally originate among the simple minded, who wish to accept all the statements of the philosophers and of the Saints according to a property of common speech, when they must be taken figuratively.

The second principal-division. But a certain Doctor argues first thus against the previous statements. It follows from that opinion that sudden generation, which is not per se the terminus of a continuum, will be nothing or at least in nothing; for it does not have any other positive measure, and so is it of illumination and of all sudden changes, which are not per se terminations of motion. And although they can escape from the changes, which are the terminations of mo-
fiunt in instanti sicut in nihil, vel privatio continuitatis in privatione continuitatis; tamen de istis videtur absurdum, quia non sunt termini continuitatis alicuius continui, quia nihil sunt alicuius continui nec positive nec privative.

Praeterea Primo Posterorum, ratio lineae est ex punctis, hoc est, in ratione essentiali lineae cadit punctus, quae ratio dicitur de linea in primo modo dicendi per se; nulla autem privatio per se pertinet ad rationem essentialem positivum.

Tertio, ex eodem sequitur, quod, si punctus tantum est privatio, linea tantum erit privatio et superficies et corpus; semper enim terminatum definitur per terminans et positivum non includit essentialiter privationem.

Quarto, contra illam opinionem videtur esse Aristoteles in Praedicamentis ubi dicit quod partes lineae terminantur ad punctum tamquam ad terminationem, sed terminus semper est alius ab illo quod terminatur ad ipsum; igitur, punctus est talis res indivisibilis.

Quinto, philosophus Primo Physicorum, 'terminus indivisibilis non infinitus est'; ex quo vult quod punctus, quia est indivisibilis, neque est finitus neque infinitus.

Sexto, philosophus Primo Physicorum, ubi probat quod locus non est corpus, dicit quod neque unam habemus puncti et loci differentiam; igitur secundum eum punctus est aliquid distinctum a rebus divisilibus.
Septimo, secundum philosophum Secundo Physicorum, "illa sunt quorum quinta sunt simul"; igitur duo ultima duarum linea tangitur quae sunt simul; sed nullae duae partes istarum linearum sunt simul, nec ipsae lineae sunt simul; igitur praeter lineas et partes earum sunt alia quae sunt simul quae non possunt esse nisi puncta indivisibilia.

Octavo, Quinto et Sexto Physicorum dicit quod continua sunt illa quorum ultima sunt unum; ergo duo ultima duarum medietatum in linea una sunt unum; sed manifestum est quod nec illae medietates nec aliae partes earum sunt unum; igitur praeter illa sunt aliqua quae sunt unum.

Nono, philosophus ibidem ponit, quod linea est divisibilis et punctum indivisible et hoc per hoc probatur quod linea non componitur ex punctis, nec aliquod continuum ex indivisibilibus, quod esset vanum nisi essent talia indivisibilia praeter continua.

Decimo, philosophus ibidem dicit quod, quoniam humem imparitabile indivisible est, necesse est totum tangere, et cetera; ex quo patet quod ponit aliquod tale indivisibile.

Talia innumerabilia possent adduci propter quod videtur quod de intentione philosophi sit ponere tales res indivisibiles distinctas realiter a rebus divisiibilibus.

Tertius articulus principalis respondet ad rationes; sed quia ex solutione praedictorum poterit patere via
solvendi alia; ideo illa obmitto causa brevitatis et respondeo ad ista.

Ad primum dico, quod instans non est talis res absoluta distincta realiter ab omni re divisibili, quod post probari multipliciter.

Primo, quia non habet aliquod subjunctum primum in quo possit esse primo et adaequato tamquam accidens in suo subjuncto sicut inductive patet.

Secundo, quia tunc Deus non posset facere tempus existere nisi necessario produceret res infinitas secundum se totas distinctas et corrupserit easdem.

Tertio, quia tales res productae non possint naturaliter destrui; quia nec per corruptionem sui subjecti nec per absentiam suae causae conservantis nec per inductionem sui contrarii.

Quarto, quia, si esset talis res, esset in genere per se, quod est manifeste falsum.

Quinto, quia omnes eiusdem rationis potest Deus conservare simul in rerum natura, cum non repugnet inter se; ergo posset Deus facere quod omnia instantia praeterita essent nunc, quae tamen sunt infinita.

Sexto, quia positis Deus instans facere ab omni subjecto suo, quod est impossibile.

Declarationem illarum rationum propter brevitatem the solution of the previous statements; I, therefore, omit those arguments for the sake of brevity, and I reply to these.

As regards the first; I say that an instant is not such an absolute thing really distinct from every divisible thing, which can be proved in various ways.

First; because it does not have any primary subject in which it may be able to be in a primary and adequate subject as if an accident in its subject, as is obvious inductively.

In the second place; because then God might not be able to make time to exist, unless he could necessarily produce infinite things as regards themselves distinct wholes and corrupt the same.

In the third place; because such things, when produced, would not be able naturally to be destroyed; for they could not be destroyed either through the corruption of their subject or through the absence of their preserving cause, or through the induction of their contrary.

In the fourth place; because, if there were such a thing, it could be in a genus per se, which is manifestly false.

In the fifth place; because God can preserve at the same time in the nature of things all things of the same ground, since they may not repel one another; therefore, God could bring it to pass that all past instants might be now, which however are infinite.

In the sixth place, because God may be able to make an instant apart from any subject of its own, which is impossible.  

For the sake of brevity I pass by the presentation
obmitto; sed dico quod nec mutatio nec generatio est
talis res indivisibilis. Et ideo consequenter ad prius
dicta quod omnes tales locutiones sunt figurativa et
tropicae: 'instans est indivisibile,' 'generatio est in in-
stante,' 'mutatio subita est in instante,' 'generatio est
subita,' 'forma substantialis est terminus generationis,'
'mutatum esse est terminus motus,' et huiusmodi; quia
in omnibus talibus orationibus pro altero extremo pro-
positionis ponitur unus nomen quod non habet tantum
vim nominis in significando, sed habet vim nominis et
verbi, vel habet vim aliquius compositi ex diversis vo-
cabilis, quod compositum secundum proprietatem ser-
monis non potest reddere suppositionem verbo, nec esse
extremum propositionis distinctum ab altero extremo
et a copula.

Unde quantum ad hoc simile est de talibus sicut es-
set si esset unus nomen impositum ad significandum
illud quod significat 'tunc bene,' puta A; secundum
proprietatem sermonis non esset bene dictum, 'tunc bene
est.' Ita nec esset bene dictum, 'A est aliquid'; posset
tamen talis locutio, 'A est aliquid' recipi tamquam lo-
cutio tropica et figurativa, ut aequivaleret isti, 'iste,
qui bene tunc est, est aliquid,' vel alteri huiusmodi. Ita
dico de talibus, 'generatio est subita' et huiusmodi,
quod non sunt propriae locutiones sed figurativaet;
et hoc est ex eo quod hoc nomen 'instans' et hoc nomen
'generatio' et huiusmodi non sunt nomina finita haben-
tia finitas significaciones, quasi significant praecise res
of those reasons; but I say that neither change nor
generation is such an indivisible thing. And conse-
sequently, therefore, as regards the previous statements
that all such expressions are figurative and metaphor-
ical: 'an instant is indivisible;' 'generation is in an in-
stant;' 'sudden change is in an instant;' 'generation is
sudden;' 'substantial form is a terminus of generation,'
'to have been changed is a terminus of motion,' and
any other of the kind; because in all such formal ex-
pressions in place of the other extreme of the proposi-
tion, one name is posited which has not only the force
of a name in signification, but has the force of a noun
and of a verb, or has the force of something composed
of diverse terms, which compounded according to
a property of common speech can not express a sup-
position for a verb, nor be the extreme of a proposition
distinct from the other extreme and a copula.

Whence, so far as this is concerned; it is similar
of such expressions, as it would be if there were one
name put in to signify that which signifies 'tunc bene'
say, A; according to a property of common speech
it would not be well said, 'tunc bene est.' So it would
not be well said, 'A is something'; yet there might be
such a saying, 'A is something' to be accepted, as if
a metaphorical and figurative expression that might be
equivalent to this, 'that, which is tunc bene, is some-
thing,' or any other of a like kind. So I say of such,
'generation is sudden,' and of any other of a like kind,
that they are not proper expressions but figurative;
and it is from this, that this name 'instant' and this
name 'generation,' and any other of a like kind, are
not finite names having finite signification, as if they
signify precisely certain things for which they may
have to substitute, according to the mode in which such names as 'angel,' 'whiteness,' 'blackness,' 'heat,' 'cold,' have finite significations; but there are certain derivatives from verbs or other parts of formal speech or similar to such, which are not instituted, unless for the sake of metre, or ornament, or for the sake of brevity of speech.

And, therefore, as many statements in poetry and in an ornate mode of speaking must not be quoted unless they be explained and interpreted; so many statements must not be accepted for the sake of brevity according to a property of common speech, but according to the intention of the authors saying these things, who spoke figuratively by virtue of the cause stated; and this, because such were sufficiently well known in their times, that they were not true according to a property of common speech, although some later writers have ignored this.

Whence, I say that this proposition, 'generation is in an instant,' must not be accepted under the meaning which it signifies, as if one thing may be in another; as through this proposition, 'water is in a vase,' it is denoted that one thing is in another in a distinct thing; whence, in distributing through all the modes in which this proposition 'in' is taken equivocally, of which the philosopher speaks in Book four of the Physics, it is obvious that according to none of those can it be said that generation is in an instant; but this proposition, 'generation is in an instant,' ought to be accepted under this meaning, 'when something is generated, a part is not generated before a part, but the whole is generated at the same time'; that this brief proposition, 'generation is in an instant,' may be posited for the
gae orationis: 'quando aliquid generatur, non generatur pars ante partem sed totum simul.'

Consimiliter illa propositio, 'motus est in tempore,' non debet recipi sub illo intellectu quem sonat secundum formam propositionis, scilicet, quod una res est in re alia distincta realiter ab ea, sed debet recipi sub illo intellectu, 'quando aliquid movetur, acquirit unum partem ante aliam, vel acquirit unum ante alium continue' vel sub tali 'quando aliquid movetur, acquirit vel deperdit unum post alium simul coeisentis mobili primo acquirenti unum post alium, vel alciui tali, ut illa oratio brevis, 'motus est in tempore,' ponitur loco orationis talis longae vel alciui consimilis. Et quando dicitur quod secundum praedicta 'generatio nihil esset,' dico quod 'generatio est aliquid' sub illo intellectu, 'quando aliquid generatur, una forma tota simul et non pars ante partem acquiritur materiae.' Et sub intellectu opposito isti, haec est falsa, 'generatio nihil est.' Et si dicatur, 'generatio non est per se terminus continui, nec est aliquod continuum; igitur nihil est. Quia omne, quod est in istis inferioribus, est continuum vel pars continui. Dicendum quod illa propositioni de virtute sermonis et secundum omnem proprietatem sermonis, 'omne, quod est in istis inferioribus, est per se unum et continuum vel continui terminus,' est vera; quia altera pars est vera, scilicet, 'omne per se

sake of brevity in place of that long formal expression, 'when something is generated, a part is not generated before a part but the whole at the same time.'

Similarly this proposition, 'motion is in time,' ought not to be accepted under that meaning which it signifies according to the form of the proposition; namely, that one thing is in another thing really distinct from it, but it ought to be accepted under this meaning, 'when something is moved, it acquires one part before another, or it requires one before another without interruption,' or under such a meaning, 'when something is moved, it acquires or loses one thing after another, co-existing at the same time with a movable first acquiring one after another,' or in some such meaning as that brief formal expression, 'motion is in time,' is posited in place of such a long formal expression or of some very similar expression. And when it is said that according to the preceding statements, 'generation would be nothing;' I say that 'generation is something' under this meaning, 'when something is generated, one whole form is acquired at the same time and not a part before a part is added to matter.' And under a meaning opposed to this, this is false, 'generation is nothing.' And if it be said, 'generation is not per se the terminus of a continuum, nor is it something continuous;' then it is nothing. For everything, which is in these inferiors, is a continuum or part of a continuum. It must be said that, according to the virtue of common speech and according to every property of common speech, that that proposition is true, 'everything, which is in these inferiors, is per se one and a continuum or the terminus of a continuum'; for the other part is true; namely, 'everything one per
unum in istis inferioribus est continuum,' quia nihil est in istis inferioribus nisi continuum, nisi forte cum istis inferioribus includatur anima intellectiva. Et ideo, si illa propositio, 'generatio est aliquid,' esset vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, illa esset vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, 'generatio est continua'; sed neutra est vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, et ratio quare secundum proprietatem sermonis haec non est vera, 'generatio est continua vel terminus continu.' Nec est vera secundum intellectum autorum, quia intelligunt illam, 'quando aliquid generatur, una pars formae acquiritur mediate ante aliam vel prius aliquid eiusdem rationis acquirebatur.' Et ideo non est imaginandum quod generatio sit aliquid positivum vel privativum distinctum realiter ab omni continuo et ab omni re permanente.

Immo secundum proprietatem sermonis, neutra illarum est vera, 'generatio est aliquid,' 'generatio est nihil,' sive generatio est negatio vel privatio; sicut nec aliqua illarum est vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, 'hominem esse aliquid,' 'hominem esse nihil' vel negatio seu privatio; et hoc accipiendo omnes terminos significative, quia secundum proprietatem sermonis non plus debet fingi tale abstractum 'generatio' ab hoc verbo 'generari' quam tale abstractum 'hominitas' ab illo accusativo casu 'hominem.' Et ideo per modum consimilem per quem responderes ad tales quæstiones factas de abstracto correspondentem praecise isti accu-

se in these inferiors is a continuum'; for there is nothing in these inferiors except a continuum, unless perchance the rational soul may be included with these inferiors. And, therefore, if this proposition, 'generation is something,' were true according to a property of common speech, this would be true according to a property of common speech, 'generation is continuous'; but neither is true according to a property of common speech, and there is a reason why this is not true according to a property of common speech, 'generation is continuous or the terminus of a continuum.' Nor is it true according to the meaning of the authors; for they understand this, 'when something is generated, one part of the form is acquired mediately before another or before something of the same ground was acquired.' And, therefore, it must not be imagined that generation may be something positive or privative really distinct from every continuum and from every permanent thing.

On the contrary, according to a property of common speech, neither of these is true, 'generation is something,' 'generation is nothing,' whether generation is negation or privation; as any one of these is not true according to a property of common speech, 'man is something,' 'man is nothing,' whether negation or privation; and this by accepting significatively all the terms; for according to a property of common speech such an abstract 'generatio' ought not any more to be formed from this verb 'generari,' than such an abstract 'hominitas' from this accusative case 'hominem.' And, therefore, through a similar mode through which you might reply to such questions raised about an abstract corresponding precisely to this accusative case 'homi-
sativus casu ‘hominem.’ Quid sit tale hominitas? Quid est hominitas? Aut hominitas est aliquid aut nihil, aut est res? Respondet ad tales quaestionis: aut generationis est aliquid aut nihil, et sic de aliis; quia sic etiam tales quaestiones non sunt propriae secundum proprietatem sermonis; sed si debent recipi, debent recipi secundum bonum sensum utentium. Ita dico de talibus, an ‘generation sit aliquid,’ et consimilibus.

Et universaliter dico proportionabiliter de omnibus abstractis, quae finguntur ex adverbis, praepositionibus, verbis, conjunctionibus, et universaliter sincategorematicis et de aliis abstractis pro quibus supponunt sua concreta nec pro illis pro quibus supponunt sua concreta, quasi possent supponere pro illis pro quibus supponunt sua concreta, nisi includant aequivalenter in significando aliquid sincategorematicum. Quicquid conceditur de concreto, debet concedi secundum proprietatem sermonis de abstracto.

Et ideo sicut Aristoteles concedit illam, ‘homo currit’; ita concederet istam, ‘humanitas currit,’ nisi humanitas praecise significet formam. Et sic dicatur quod quicquid praedicatur de aliquo abstracto, si vere praedicetur, praedicatur de illo per se primo modo. Dicendum quod illa propositione est simpliciter falsa. Si enim illa propositione sic accepta esset vera, omnes tales essent falsae: ‘deitas videtur a beatis,’ ‘deitas distinguitur realiter a creaturis,’ ‘deitas est omnipotens,’ ‘humanitas est in rerum natura,’ ‘humanitas est unibis supposito verbi,’ ‘humanitas distinguitur ab angelo,’ et

...
multae tales; cum non sint per se primo modo, et tamen manifestum est quod sint verae et multae carum cadunt sub fide, ita quod oppositae sunt haereticae.

Unde nec in philosophis nec antiquis sanctis vel aliis inventur, quod talem distinctionem posuerunt inter abstractum et concretum, sicut moderni faciunt. Sed apud antiquos multa fuerunt synonyma cum suis concretis et multa abstracta non debebant haberi secundum proprietatem sermonis; sed tamen furent flecta propter aliquam trium causarum dictarum prius. Et ideo non reprehendo antiquos, quia utiliter et causa metri vel ornatis sermonis vel brevitas talis abstracta fingebant. Et hoc erat eis satis conveniens, quia de re satis eis constabat, saltem sapientibus, principiis Aristotelis. Et ideo Aristoteles minus de modo loquendi curabat; ex quo res fuit nota sicut patet Primo Physicorum, quod modicam sollicitudinem habebat de nominibus. Et ideo multi propter hoc, quod recipiunt auctoritates antiquorum sicut sonant ad litteram et secundum proprietatem sermonis quod tamen intentum non habuerunt antiqui; in errores varios incidunt.

Consequenter ad praedicta debet dici, quod omnes tales propositiones sunt improprie: ‘aditas est ali- quid,’ ‘abieta est relatio,’ ‘aquietas est respectus;’ ‘haecitas est distincta a natura’ et sic de multis talibus quae recipiuntur a modernis. Nec plus sunt recipiendae secundum proprietatem sermonis, quam si ab
istis adverbiis: 'dum', 'cum', 'tunc', 'iam', et ab alis adverbiis; et a talibus coniunctionibus: 'si', 'et', 'vel', 'at', 'quia'; et ab alis fingantur talia abstracta: 'dummitas', 'cummitas', 'tunctitas', 'iammitas', 'siitas', 'attitas', 'etitas', 'quitas.' Et propter hoc formentur tales propositiones: 'dummitas est aliqüid,' 'siitas est aliqüid,' velitas est Deus, et sic de alis.

Ad secundum dico, quod philosophus non intendit quod punctus cadit in diffinitione lineae, tamquam aliqüid de essentia lineae, vel tamquam importans aliqüid de essentia lineae et distinctum a lineae. Sed intendit quod in diffinitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius lineae ponitur hoc nomen 'punctus,' et secundum famosam diffinitionem lineae, sive illa sit vera diffinitio lineae sive non, quae tamen non est vera diffinitio nisi secundum intentionem recte sentientem de puncto et linea. Nec est tamen intelligendum quod punctus sit aliqua privatio distincta totaliter a linea sicut homines communiter imaginatur; quod impossibile est imaginari, scilicet, quod punctus sit aliqüid vel privatum vel positivum secundum se totum distinctus vel non idem cum linea. Immo secundum proprietatem sermonis sive significantis nec est concedendum quod est positivum, nec quod est privativum.

Et si dicatur, illa sunt contradictoria, 'punctus est positivum,' 'punctus non est positivum'; igitur secundum proprietatem sermonis altera est vera et altera est falsa. Dico quod sicut secundum proprietatem illa non sunt contradictoria: 'videre hominem est aliqüid,' adverba: 'dum,' 'cum,' 'tunc,' 'iam,' et from other adverba; and from such conjunctions: 'si,' 'et,' 'vel,' 'at,' 'quia;' and from others such abstracts may be formed: 'dummitas,' 'cummitas,' 'tunctitas,' 'iammitas,' 'siitas,' 'attitas,' 'etitas,' 'quitas.' And by virtue of this, such propositions may be formed: 'dummitas is something,' 'siitas is something,' 'velitas is God,' and so of others.

As regards the second point, I say that the philosopher does not intend that a point falls within the definition of a line, as if something of the essence of a line, or as if signifying something of the essence of a line and distinct from a line. But he intends that in a definition expressing something characteristic of the same name 'line,' this name 'point' is posited, and accordingly to the famous definition of a line, whether or not that be a true definition of a line; which however is not a true definition except according to the intention of the one judging correctly of a point and a line. Nor is it, however, to be understood that a point may be any privation totally distinct from a line, as men commonly imagine; which it is impossible to imagine; namely, that a point may be something, either a private or a positive, distinct as regards itself as a whole, or not the same as a line. On the contrary, according to a property of common speech or of signification, it must not be conceded that it is a positive, nor that it is a privative.

And if it be said that these are contradictories: 'a point is a positive,' 'a point is not a positive'; then, according to a property of common speech, one is true and the other is false. I say that, as according to property, these are not contradictories: 'to see a man is
'videre hominem non est aliquid'; nec illa: 'non habet ulteriori extensionem est aliquid,' 'non habet ulteriori extensionem non est aliquid,' 'punctus est aliquid,' 'punctus non est aliquid,' et hoc accipiendo terminos omnes significative. Et propter haec neutra illarum est concedenda de virtute sermonis. Et istud cum praeecedentibus dictum sit secundum illum modum ponendi eorum, qui dicunt quod hoc nomen 'punctus' aequivale in significando uni aggregato ex multis dictionibus, quod secundum artem grammaticam non po-test reddere suppositum verbo; et ideo nulla oratio est propria in qua ponitur ut supponat respectu verbi grammatico loquendo. Si autem teneatur alius modus ponendi de quo dictum est prius, sic concedendum est quod punctus est aliquid positivum et punctus est quantus, et linea est divisibilis; quia aequivale isti: 'quantum tantum,' vel 'tantae extensionis est aliquid,' et 'quantum est divisibile' et sic de aliis.

Ad tertium; concedo proportionabilitate de linea et superficie sicut de puncto; unde sicut secundum unum modum loquendi haec est concedenda, 'punctus est divisibilis,' ita 15 20 ista, 'linea est corpus.' Secundum autem alium modum loquendi, sicut haec non est propria, 'punctus est aliquid,' ita nec illa, 'linea est aliquid,' nec illa, 'superficies est aliquid'; sed quaelibet illarum est figurative dicta et accipienda.

Et quando dicitur quod terminatum definitur per terminans, dicendum quod illa propositio, sicut est forma-ta, est falsa. Unde non est imaginandum quod sit something,' to see a man is not something'; nor these: 'it does not have further extension is something,' 'it does not have further lengthening is not something,' 'a point is something,' 'a point is not something'; and this by accepting all the terms significatively. And by virtue of these neither of them is to be conceded according to the virtue of common speech. And this with the preceding statements may be said according to that mode of positing of those who say that this name 'point' is equivalent in signification to one aggregate of many expressions, which can not express a supposition for a verb according to grammatical science; and, therefore, no language is proper, in which it is posited, that in speaking grammatically it may be substituted with respect to a verb. But if another mode of positing concerning that, which was stated before, be held; it must be so conceded that a point is something positive, and a point is a quantum, and a line is divisible; for it is equivalent to this: 'so much quantum,' or 'something is of so much extension,' and a quantum is divisible, and so of others.

As regards the third point, I concede proportionately of a line and of a surface as of a point; whence, as according to one mode of speaking this must be conceded, 'a point is divisible,' so this, 'a line is a body.' But according to another mode of speaking, as this is not proper, 'a point is something,' so neither this, 'a line is something,' nor this, 'a surface is something'; but each of them is stated figuratively and must be accepted.

And when it is said that a terminate is defined through a terminant, it must be said that that proposition, as it is formed, is false. Whence, it must not be
ibi aliquid terminatum, et praeter illud terminatum sit alius terminans distinctum a terminato, sive privativum sive positivum terminans illud terminatum; sed tantum est ibi dictio nominum importantium easdem res diversis modis grammaticalisbus, sicut iati duo obliqui 'hominis' et 'hominii' important easdem res omnino diversis tamen modis grammaticalisbus.

Et de talibus nominibus non est inconveniens, si unum cadit in definitione exprimente quid nominis alterius nominis. Sic enim hoc nomen 'ens' cadit in definitione exprimente quid illius nominis 'unum,' et illius nominis 'verum,' et illius nominis 'bonum'; et tamen nihil importatur per unum nomen quin importetur per reliquam, quamvis intelligitur per unum nomen tam in obliquo quam in recto, et per alium nomen non nisi in recto; unde intelligimus per hoc nomen 'verum,' importatur tam in obliquo quam in recto; pro eo quod intelligimus, 'est ens intelligibilis et ab intellectu intelligibilis.' Per hoc nomen autem 'ens' non importatur nisi in recto tantum, et ideo in proposito posset concedi vel proprie vel figurative secundum diversum modum ponendi illa nomina esse significativa 'terminans' et 'terminatum,' quod 'idem' est 'terminans' et 'idem' est 'terminatum,' et 'idem' terminaret se; sicut 'idem' intelligeret se, vel 'idem' quod est 'idem' sibi. Et quando dicitur quod positivum nunquam includit essentialiter priva-
tionem, palet; quia illa non est concedenda, 'punctus est privatio,' 'superficies est privatio' et hoc secundum proprietatem sermonis et secundum imaginationem illorum qui imaginatur quod privatio sit aliquid a parte rei quocumque modo distinctum a rebus positivis.

Unde argumenta illa sunt recitata sive facta contra illam imaginacionem quae imaginatur, quod punctus sit a parte rei, quaedam privatio distincta quocumque modo imaginabili secundum se totum a linea. Secundum quod intentum videtur ille doctor improbaret illam opinionem contra quam facit argumenta praetacta.

Sed sic non ponit illa opinio, nec magis ponit quod punctus est privatio quam positivum; quamvis in definitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius debet poni unum nomen 'negativum' vel conceptus 'negativus.'

Et ideo de virtute sermonis vel est concedendum quod punctus sit res absoluta, quanta et divisibilis, vel quod unum oratio est impropria in qua ponitur hoc nomen 'punctus' pro altero extremo distincto ab alio extremo et a copula; et nulla talis est recipienda secundum proprietatem, sed tamquam figurative dicta, et contra illum modum ponendi in nullo procedunt argumenta doctorum.

Ad quartum, quod tactum est post argumenta doctoris, potest dici multipliciter quod philosophus tam ibi quam in Libro Physicorum, quam etiam in aliis locis loquens de puncto loquebatur secundum opinionem famosam secundum consuetudinem suam; quia conformatione se modo loquiendi alieni quando materiam preceded, 'a point is privation,' 'a surface is privation,' and this according to a property of common speech and according to the fancy of those who imagine that privation may be something apart from a thing in any mode whatever distinct from positive things.

Whence, those arguments are cited or made contrary to that fancy which imagines, that a point may be apart from a thing, a certain privation distinct from a line as regards itself as a whole in every mode imaginable. According to which intent that Doctor seems to reject that opinion in opposition to which he offers the arguments touched upon before.

But that opinion does not thus posit, nor does it posit that a point is privation any more than that it is a positive; although in a definition expressing some characteristic of the same name, one name 'negative' or a concept 'negative' may necessarily be posited. And, therefore, according to the virtue of common speech either it must be conceded that a point may be an absolute thing, a quantum and divisible, or that every formal expression is improper in which this name 'point' is posited for one extreme distinct from the other extreme and from a copula; and no such expression ought to be accepted according to property but as if stated figuratively, and the arguments of the Doctors in no mode proceed contrary to that mode of positing.

As regards the fourth point, which was touched upon after the arguments of the Doctor, it can be said in various modes that the philosopher there as well as in the book of the Physics as also in other places where he speaks of a point, was speaking according to the famous opinion according to his custom; because he adapted himself to the mode of speaking of others,
non ex intentione tractabat. Unde de auctoritatibus suis tangentibus aliquam materiam quam non ex intentione tractavit, non videtur multum esse curandum, quia tunc frequentior loquatur ut pluris; et ideo ubi tales materias ex intentione tractavit, frequentior dixit oppositum, sicut in Libro Praedicamentorum dicit quod "genera et species sunt substantiae secundae." In Septimo autem Metaphysicis ubi ex intentione quaerit an 'genus' et 'species' universaliter universalis sint substantiae, ex intentione determinat quod nullum universalitatem est substantia; ita est in propositione.

Nusquam invenitur quod Aristoteles ex intentione pertractavit illum quaestionem an punctus sit res indivisibilis distincta realiter ab omni re divisibili. Ideo omnes auctoritates suae, quae sonant punctum esse talo aliam rem, sunt exponendae et glossandae, quia vel loquatur ut pluris vel secundum opinionem famosam vel gratia exempli vel figurativa, vel diversae sunt diversimode exponendae sicut de diversi patebit inferius.

Unde philosophus in Libro Praedicamentorum non intendit quod una res absoluta distincta realiter a partibus lineae copulet partes lineae ad invicem, et proprius hoc dicatur linea continua, tunc enim linea non esset continua per seipsam nec per aliquas partes suas, sed per unam rem distinctam totaliter a linea; et eadem facilitate dicetur quod duo ligna continuantur per unum lapidem. Nec potest plus dici quod punctus, si

when he was treating a matter not according to intention. Whence, concerning his passages touching upon any matter which he treated not according to intention, it does not seem that he exercised much care; for he then frequently spoke as many do; and, therefore, whether he treated such matters according to intention, he frequently said the opposite; as he says in the book of the Categories that "genera and species are secondary substances." But in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, where he inquires according to intention whether 'genus' and 'species,' generally universals, may be substances, he decides according to intention that no universal is a substance; so is it in the proposition.

Nowhere is it found that Aristotle according to intention thoroughly treated that question, whether a point may be an indivisible thing really distinct from every divisible thing. Therefore, all his passages, which affirm that a point is such another thing, must be explained and interpreted, because either he spoke as many do or according to that famous opinion or for the sake of an example or figuratively; or diverse passages must be explained in different ways, as will be obvious further on of diverse passages.

Whence, the philosopher in the book of the Categories does not intend that one absolute thing really distinct from parts of a line may mutually connect parts of a line, and by virtue of this a line may be called continuous; for then a line would not be continuous through itself or through some of its parts, but through one thing totally distinct from a line; and it might be said with the same facility that two pieces of wood are continuous through one stone. Nor can it any
sīt talis res, sit terminus lineae quam quod lapis est terminus lignī, cum tanta vel maiōr sit distinctio inter lineam et punctum quam inter lapidem et lignum.

Nec plus potest dici quod punctus sit accidentis substantiae existens in linea quam lapis est in ligno. Et ideo philosophus per illam propositionem, 'partes lineae copulatūr ad unum terminum communem,' intelligit illam propositionem, 'inter partes lineae nihil est medium et illae faciunt per se unum'; ita quod duo requiruntur ad hoc, quod 'linea sit continua,' videlicet, quod 'inter partes lineae nihil sit medium situaliter.' Et propter hoc, quando unum corpus est in uno situ et alius corpus in alio situ et inter illa corpora est alius medium situaliter, illa duo corpora non continuantur.

Secundum requiritur, videlicet, quod faciunt per se unum et propter hoc contigua non sunt continua, et ita per illam propositionem 'partes lineae copulatūr ad punctum tamquam ad terminum communem,' et per consimiles intelligit philosophus illam copulatūram: 'inter partes lineae nihil est medium et ipsae faciunt per se unam linea,' Et quando dicitur quod semper terminus distinguītur a terminato; dicendum est quod, si hoc nomen 'terminus' supponat praeceps pro alia re, ita quod praeceps hæabeat vim nominis 'categoriae' in significando ut non aequivalēt alciui alteri parti orationis nec alicui composito ex tali parte; et similiter hoc nomen 'terminatum'; tune posset con-

more be said that a point, if there be such a thing, may be the terminus of a line than that a stone is the terminus of wood, since the distinction between a line and a point may be as much or greater than the distinction between stone and wood.

Nor can it any more be said that a point may be an accident of a substance existing in a line than that a stone is in wood. And, therefore, the philosopher understands through this proposition, 'parts of a line are joined at one common terminus,' this proposition, 'nothing is intermediate between parts of a line and they make one per se'; so that two are required for this, that 'a line may be continuous'; namely, that 'nothing may be in situation intermediate between parts of a line.' And by virtue of this when one body is in one situation and another body is in another situation and between those bodies there is in situation another intermediate, those two bodies are not continuous.

A second statement is required; namely, that they make one per se, and by virtue of this the contiguous are not continuous; and so through this proposition, 'parts of a line are joined at a point as if at a common terminus,' and through similar propositions the philosopher understands that copulative, 'nothing is intermediate between parts of a line and they themselves make one line per se.' And when it is said that a terminus is always distinguished from a terminate; it must be said that, if this name 'terminus' is precisely substituted for another thing so that it may have precisely the force of the name 'category' in signification, that it may not be equivalent to any other part of language nor to any composite of such a part; and similarly this name 'terminate'; then it might be able to
cedi quod 'terminus' distinguitur realiter a 'terminato'
si alius sit 'terminus' et alius 'terminatum.' Sed sic su-
mendo; haec est falsa, 'punctus est terminus,' et 'linea
est terminata per punctum.' Si alter significat illa,
'terminans' et 'terminatum'; tune potest negari illa pro-
positio vel concedi secundum quod diversimode placet
exponere significa vocabulorum.

Hoc tamen dico, quod non est imaginandum quod
linea sit quaedam res distincta a re qua est terminus
vel quae sit terminus; sed ex hoc ipso quod 'linea est
talis res et non ulterius protensa,' dicitur ibi terminari.
Sicut quando dicimus quod albedo est terminus dealba-
tionis et forma substantialis est terminus generationis,
non est ibi imaginandum quod sit ubi una res, qua
sit dealbatio et generatio, et postea vel simul una res
alia qua sit albedo et forma; nulla enim appare c on-
tradictio quin Deus possit facere formam sine omni
re alia etiam in subiecto; nec videtur quare res illa de-
bet destrui si ponatur. Sed per istam propositionem,
'moda est terminus generationis,' debet intelligi illa,
'quando aliquid generatur, forma de novo acquiritur
materiae pre-existendi'; et sicut dicitur de ista, ita
dicendum est proportionabiliter de multis aliis con-
similibus.

Ad quintum et sequentem potest dici, quod philoso-
plus loquitur secundum opinionem famousam quae poi-
nit punctum esse talem aliam rem, non secundum opi-
inionem propria.

Ad septimum dico quod hoc vocabulum 'simul' mul-
tipliciter accepitur. Aliquo 'simul' aequivalet huic

be conceded that 'terminus' is really distinguished from
'terminate,' if one be a 'terminus' and another a 'ter-
minate.' But in taking them thus; this is false, 'a
point is a terminus,' and 'a line is terminated through
a point.' If those names 'terminant' and 'terminate'
signify differently; then that proposition can be de-

Yet I say this, that it must not be imagined that a
line may be a certain thing distinct from a thing which
is a terminus or which may be a terminus; but from
this itself, that 'a line is such a thing and is not farther
lengthened,' it is said to be terminated there. As when
we say that whiteness is the terminus of whitening
and substantial form is the terminus of generation, it
must not there be imagined that where there is one
thing which may be whitening and generation, and
afterwards or at the same time one other thing which
is whiteness and form; for no contradiction appears
but that God might be able to make form without any
other thing even in a subject; nor does it appear why
that thing ought to be destroyed if it be posited. But
through this proposition, 'form is the terminus of gen-
eration,' this ought to be understood, 'when something
is generated, form is added de novo to pre-existing
matter'; and as it is said of this, so it must be said
proportionately of many other similar propositions.

As regards the fifth and the following point, it can
be said that the philosopher speaks according to the
famous opinion which posits that a point is such an-
other thing, not according to a proper opinion.

As regards the seventh point, I say that this term
'simul' is accepted in various ways. Sometimes, 'simul'
toti 'nihil est medium,' ut sit sensus talis propositionis, 'ista sunt simul,' id est, 'inter illa nihil est medium.' Et sic est ista concedenda, 'illa tangunt se quorum ul-
tima sunt simul.' sub illo sensu, 'illa tangunt se inter quae nihil est medium.' Aliquando 'simul' nequivalat isti in significando, 'non distare sita'; et sic nullae duae res, quae sint quocunque modo se tangentes, sunt simul; nec hoc vult philosophus. Sed per illam pro-
positionem, 'illa tangunt se inter quae nihil est me-
dium,' intelligit istam sicut dictum est, 'ista tangunt se inter quae nihil est medium'; et si essent talia indivi-
visabilia in istis tangentibus, ista essent simul, et hoc secundo modo accipiendo hoc vocabulum, 'simul'; quia non distarent loco neque sita. Et quando dicitur quod
nullae partes duarum linearum sunt simul; dicendum est quod accipiendo 'simul' secundo modo verum est, nec hoc requiritur ad hoc quod aliqua tangant se; tamen accipiendo 'simul' primo modo partes lineae sunt simul, quia inter eas nihil est medium.

Ad octavum, quando dicitur quod continua sunt illa quorum ultima sunt unum, manifestum est quod illa propositionio debet exponi, quia falsa est de virtute sermonis includens contradictionem, sicut illa includit contra dictionem, 'plures homines sunt unus homo'; nam, si sunt ultima, sunt plura, et per consequens non sunt unum. Ideo dico, quod intellectus philosophi est

is equivalent to this whole, 'nothing is intermediate,' so that it may be the sense of such a proposition, 'these are at the same time'; that is, 'nothing is intermediate between them.' And so this must be conceded, 'those touch each other whose extremes are at the same time' under this sense, 'those touch each other between which nothing is intermediate.' Sometimes 'simul' is equivalent in signification to this, 'not to be separate in situation'; and so no two things, which may be touching each other in any mode whatever, are at the same time; nor does the philosopher wish this. But through this proposition, 'those touch each other between which nothing is intermediate,' he understands this, as was said, 'those touch each other between which nothing is intermediate,' and if there could be such indivisibles in these touching, these would be at the same time; and this by taking this term 'simul' in the second mode; for they would not be separate in place nor in situation. And when it is said that no parts of two lines are at the same time; it must be said that in accepting 'simul' in the second mode it is true, and this is not required for this, that some touch each other; yet in accepting 'simul' in the first mode parts of a line are at the same time, for nothing is intermediate be-
tween them.

As regards the eighth point; when it is said that those are continuous whose extremes are one, it is manifest that that proposition ought to be explained; for it is false according to the virtue of common speech since it involves a contradiction, as that involves a con-
tradiction, 'more men are one man'; for, if they are extremes, they are more, and consequently are not one. Therefore, I say that the understanding of the philos-
DE SACRAMENTO ALTARIS

ille, 'continua sunt illa quae faciunt per se unum,' id est, 'non distant,' sive 'inter quae nihil est medium.'

Ad nonum, quando dicitur quod punctum est indivisibile, dicendum est quod philosophus vel lequebatur secundum opinionem famosam vel exponenda est propositio sicut dictum est prius.

Ad confirmationem quando dicitur quod philosophus probat quod nullum quantum componitur ex indivisibilibus, dicendum quod verum est; et illa, cum sit negativa, non infert aliquam talem affirmativam, 'aliquod indivisibile est.'

Et quando dicitur quod vanum fuisset ita diffusae probare continuum non componi ex indivisibilibus nisi essent aliqua talia indivisibilia, decendum quod non est vanum probare unam conclusionem per diversa media, quamvis posset probari per unum medium sufficienter. Unde sufficiens medium fuit probare nullum indivisibile esse sed tamen alia non superfluent, et hoc specialiter in illo cau; nam probare quod nihil est indivisibile in istis inferioribus non potest fieri nisi per rationes subtiles, quas mathematici et alii minus exerci tati in metaphysica et logica non possunt comprehendere. Sed probare continuum non componi ex indivisibilibus per alia media, etiam si essent talia indivisibilia, potest fieri per rationes magis apparentes mathematicis et alis quibuscumque, sicut alias ostendetur; et ideo non sunt rationes superfluae.

THE SACRAMENT OF THE ALTAR

opher is this, 'those are continuous which make one per se,' that is, 'they are not separate,' or 'between which nothing is intermediate.'

As regards the ninth point; when it is said that a point is indivisible, it must be said that the philosopher either was speaking according to the famous opinion or the proposition must be explained, as was stated before.

When it is said for confirmation that the philosopher proves that no quantum is composed of indivisibles, it must be said that it is true; and that, since it may be negative, does not infer any such affirmative, 'something is indivisible.'

And when it is said that it would have been useless to prove so diffusely that a continuum is not composed of indivisibles unless there were some such indivisibles, it must be said that it is not useless to prove one conclusion through diverse intermediates, although it might be able to be proved sufficiently through one intermediate. Whence, an intermediate was sufficient to prove that there is no indivisible, but however others would no be superfluous, and this especially in that case; for to prove that nothing is indivisible in these inferiors can not be accomplished except through subtle reasons, which mathematicians and others less skilled in metaphysics and logic can not comprehend. But to prove that a continuum is not composed of indivisibles through other intermediates, even if there were such indivisibles, can be accomplished through reasons more apparent to mathematicians and to all others, as will be shown elsewhere; and therefore, the reasons are not superfluous.
Ad decimum, potest dici sicut ad praecedentia, quia loquebatur secundum famosam opinionem.
Ad argumentum principale patet quod illa, 'punctus est terminus lineae,' est falsa de virtute sermonis, et tamen vera secundum sensum quod praetendit sicut dictum est.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR

Utrum linea et superficies realiter distinguantur inter se et a corpore. Et videtur quod sic; quia secundum philosophum in 'Praedicamentis sunt distinctae species quantitatis, ergo distinguuntur realiter inter se et a corpore.

Ad oppositum; sicut punctus habet se ad lineam sic se habet linea ad superficiem, et superficies ad corpus; sed punctus non est realiter distinctus a linea sicut probatum est in 'Praedicamentibus,' igitur nec linea a superficie nec superficies a corpore, et per consequens linea et superficies non distinguuntur inter se nec a corpore.

Ad illam quaestionem dico quod linea et superficies non sunt res distinctae inter se et a corpore. Quod enim linea non sit distincta a superficie potest probari per primam rationem et tertiam et quartam, et per alias rationes theologicas per quas probatur quod punctus non est divisibilis distincta realiter a linea; nam si linea esset alia res, non esset in aliquo subiecto primo et aequato. Similiter essent infinitae lineae, quorum nulla esset pars alterius.

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As regards the tenth point; it can be said just as about the preceding; for he was speaking according to the famous opinion.
As regards the principal argument it is obvious, that this, 'a point is the terminus of a line,' is false according to the virtue of common speech, yet it is true according to the sense that it alleges, as has been said.

QUESTION II

In the second place it is asked, whether a line and a surface may really be distinguished from each other and from a body. And it seems that they are; for they are distinct species of quantity according to the philosopher in the Categories; therefore, they are really distinguished from each other and from a body.

As regards the opposite; as is the relation of a point to a line so is the relation of a line to a surface, and a surface to a body; but a point is not really distinct from a line, as was proved in the Categories; therefore, a line is not distinct from a surface nor a surface from a body, and consequently a line and a surface are not distinguished from each other or from a body.

With respect to that question, I say that a line and a surface are not things distinct from each other and from a body. For that a line may not be distinct from a surface can be proved through the first, third, and fourth reasons, and through other theological reasons through which it is proved that a point is not an indivisible thing really distinct from a line; for if a line were such another thing, it would be in some primary and adequate subject. Similarly, there would be infinite lines, none of which would be a part of another.
Similiter Deus non posset dividere unum continuum nisi causaret plures res absolutas, et destrueret aliquam rem absolutam; nec posset unire, nisi consimiliter corruptum produiceret et producearet res novas. Similiter tune non videtur contradictio quod esset superficies sine linea, et per consequens esset superficies non terminata, et tamen esset finitae latitudinis.

Quod autem superficies esset distincta a corpore potest probari per primam rationem theologiam, quia non potest sibi assignari aliud subiectum adaequatum et primum sicut evidenter appareat. Similiter potest hoc probari per tertiam rationem, nam essent infinitae superficies in actu sed in potentia tantum finitae, quia solae ultimae superficies corporis sunt in actu, aliae autem non sunt nisi tantum in potentia.

Contra sic ponentes; aut partes corporis copulantur ad superficiem quae est in rerum natura et existens, aut ad superficiem quae non est in rerum natura sed potest esse. Si detur primum, igitur illa superficies est in actu, et per consequens sunt infinitae superficies in actu. Si detur secundum, igitur illae partes corporis non sunt actualiter continuae sed tantum in potentia, quia nullae partes actualiter continuantur per id quod non est in rerum natura.

Et tunc quae o, quomodo illa potentia reducetur ad actu; an quando illae partes continuantur, an quando non continuantur. Non primo modo quia tune secundum illos semper superficies continuans est in potentia non in actu; nec secundo modo, quia tune non continuantur. Sed dicatur quod illa superficies non dicitur

Similarly, God might not be able to divide one continuum unless He could create more absolute things, and could destroy some absolute things; nor would He be able to unite, unless He could very similarly corrupt and produce new things. Similarly, then it does not seem contradictory that there could be a surface without a line, and consequently there could be a surface not terminated, and yet it would be of finite length.

But that a surface could be distinct from a body can be proved through the first theological reason; for another primary and adequate subject can not be assigned to itself, as is evidently clear. Similarly, this can be proved through the third reason, for there would be surfaces infinite actually but potentially only finite; for the extreme surfaces alone of a body are actually; but the others are not except only potentially.

In opposition to those positing thus; either the parts of the body are joined to a surface, which is in the nature of things and is existent, or to a surface which is not in the nature of things but can be. If the first be granted; then that surface is actually, and consequently there are surfaces infinite actually. If the second be conceded, then those parts of a body are not actually continuous but only potentially; for no parts are actually continuous through that which is not in the nature of things.

And then I ask, how that potentiality may be reduced to actuality; whether when those parts are continuous or when they are not continuous. Not in the first mode, for then according to those writers a continuant surface always is potentially, not actually; nor in the second mode, for then they are not continuous. But it may be said that that surface is not indeed said to
ideo esse in potentia quia non est in rerum natura, sed quia non est separata a corpore; sicut partes dicuntur in potentia non quia non sunt in rerum natura, sed quia non sunt separatae a toto.

Contra hoc non sufficit. Primo, quia ad hoc inconveniens sequitur tale, quod, scilicet, infinita sunt in rerum natura eiusdem quantitatis. Secundo, quia omne, quod est in rerum natura et non est pars alterius, est simpliciter in actu sibi competenti, sed illa superficies est in rerum natura et non est pars alterius; igitur est simpliciter in actu.

Tertio, sic; quia sicut illa superficies media non est separata a corpore ita nec ultima est separata a corpore; igitur sicut ultima est in actu, ita illa est in actu. Sic igitur patet quod, si superficies sit alia res a corpore, sequitur illud inconveniens quod infinita eiusdem quantitatis, quorum nullum est pars alterius, sunt in actu.

Conclusio etiam principalis potest probari per quattuor et quinque rationes, et per alias sequentes. Si enim superficies sit res secundum se totam distincta a corpore, non videtur aliqua contradictio quod Deus faciat eam sine corpore, vel e converso; et per consequens potest esse corpus sine omnibus tali et tamen erit finitum et continuum; ergo omnino frustra ponitur superficies.

Similiter quaero quomodo superficies et corpus faciunt unum in sacramento altaris; aut faciunt unum per se aut unum per accidens aut unum aggregacione so-

be potentially; for it is not in the nature of things; but because it is not separate from a body; as parts are said to be potentially, not because they are not in the nature of things, but because they are not separate from a whole.

On the contrary, this does not suffice. First, because according to this such an inconsistency follows; namely, that infinites are in the nature of things of the same quantity. In the second place, because everything, which is in the nature of things and is not part of another, is simply actually suitable to itself, but that surface is in the nature of things and is not a part of another; therefore, it simply is actually. Which is absurd.

In the third place thus; for, as that intermediate surface is not separate from a body, so neither is the extreme separate from a body; therefore, as the extreme is actually, so that is actually. Thus, therefore, it is obvious that, if a surface be a thing other than a body; this inconsistency follows, that infinites of the same quantity, of which none is part of another, are actually.

However, the principal conclusion can be proved through four and five reasons and through other reasons which follow. For if a surface be a thing as regards itself as a whole distinct from a body, there does not appear any contradiction that God may make it without a body, or conversely; and consequently a body can be without any such surface, and yet it will be finite and continuous; therefore, a surface is needlessly posited.

Similarly, I ask how a surface and a body make one in the sacrament of the altar; whether they make one per se or one through accident or one only by aggre-
lum. Primum non potest dari, quia tunc superficies esset pars corporis vel ambo essent partes essentiales alterius, quod non potest dari. Et si dicatur quod superficies, quamvis non sit pars quantitativa corporis, est tamen pars coessentialis corporis, nec improbabur a philosopho, quamvis improbetur, quod superficies sit pars quidditativa corporis.

Contra quandocunque aliquod est pars alterius, vel est eiusdem rationis cum alia parte vel alterius rationis. Igitur si superficies sit pars corporis quod est per se unum, vel est eiusdem rationis cum alia parte corporis vel alterius rationis, quod etiam non potest dari; quia, quandocunque aliquae partes diversarum rationum faciunt per se unum, una illarum est materia vel potentia, et alia est actus vel forma, sed potentia et actus facientes per se unum numquam distinguuntur loco et sita, sicut manifeste patet; ergo nullo modo sunt (corpus et superficies) potentia et actus, et per consequens non faciunt per se unum.

Secundum etiam non potest dari, videlicet, quod superficies et corpus faciunt unum per accidentem, quia tunc unum esset actus alterius, et per consequens superficies esset subjective in corpore, vel e contrario; quorum utrumque est falsum ex argumentis factis in praecedenti quaestione.

Nec potest dari tertium; scilicet, quod faciunt aggregationem unum, quia tunc non posset assignari quod superficies alter esset terminus corporis quam vas est terminus aquae. Tunc etiam nulla apparet contradictio quin Deus posset facere corpus in eodem loco et situ

gation. The first can not be granted; for then a surface would be part of a body or both would be essential parts of another, which can not be conceded. And if it be said that a surface, although it may not be a quantitative part of a body, is however an essential part of a body; it is not refuted by the philosopher, although it may be refuted, that a surface may be a quidditative part of a body.

On the contrary, whenever something is part of another, either it is of the same ground as another part or it is of another ground. Therefore, if a surface be a part of a body which is per se one, either it is of the same ground as another part of a body or it is of another ground, which also can not be conceded; for, whenever some parts of diverse grounds make one per se, one of them is matter or potentiality, and the other is actuality or form; but potentiality and actuality making one per se are never distinguished in place or situation, as is manifestly obvious; therefore, in no mode are body and surface potentiality and actuality, and consequently they do not make one per se.

The second also can not be granted; namely, that a surface and a body make one by accident; for then one would be the actuality of another, and consequently a surface would be subjectively in a body, or conversely; each of which is false according to the arguments set forth in the preceding question.

Nor can the third be conceded; namely, that they make one by aggregation, since it could not then be affirmed that a surface would otherwise be a terminus of a body than that a vase is a terminus of water. Then also no contradiction appears in the statement that God might be able to make a body in the same
sine superficie, sicut potest facere aquam in eodem loco et sita sine vase; et tamen tunc corpus esset continuum infinitum sine omni superficie; quo concessum patet quod omnino frustra ponitur talis superficies.

Similiter tunc ante transsubstantiationem superficies vel esset sine substantia vel esset in alia substantia, tamquam in suicto primo et adaequato, et non in eadem substantia in qua est primo et adaequato corpus, sicut potest probari per argumenta facta in quaestione praecedenti, et per consequens esset alia substantia ibi praeter materiam et formam in quibus ponitur corpus quod est quantitas subjective.

Ex praedictis patet quod linea et superficies non distinguuntur realiter inter se; et quia probatun est quod superficies non distinguuitur a corpore, ergo nec linea, et per consequens nec inter se nec a corpore realiter distinguuntur.

Ad argumentum principale dico, quod isti conceptus 'linea' et 'superficies' sunt distincti, et hoc sufficit ad distinctionem specierum; hoc tamen non obstante illa, quae significatur, non sunt distincta; sic enim 'locus' et 'superficies' sunt species distinctae, et tamen non sunt distincta realiter; sed sufficit quod significat diversi-mode idem, sicut dicit commentator, IV. Metaphysica de 'ente' et 'uno,' ubi vult quod 'ens' et 'unum' significat idem, sed modis diversis.

Unde sicut talis diversitas modorum significandi eandem rem falsificat praedicationem unius de alio, quamvis tales modi significant non sint nisi duo, sci-

place and situation without a surface, as he can make water in the same place and situation without a vase; and yet a body would then be an infinite continuum without any surface; if this is conceded, it is obvious that such a surface is posited entirely in vain.

Similarly, then before transsubstantiation a surface either would be without a substance or would be in another substance, as if in a primary and adequate subject, and not in the same substance in which a body is in a primary and adequate subject; as can be proved through the arguments set forth in the preceding question, and consequently there would be another substance there besides matter and form in which a body is posited, which is a quantity subjectively.

From the preceding statements it is obvious, that a line and a surface are not really distinguished from each other; and because it was proved that a surface is not distinguished from a body; therefore, neither is a line, and consequently they are not really distinguished from each other or from a body.

As regards the principal argument, I say that these concepts 'line' and 'surface' are distinct, and this suffices for a distinction of species; yet notwithstanding this, those, which are signified, are not distinct; for 'place' and 'surface' are thus distinct species, and yet they are not really distinct; but it suffices that they signify the same in diverse modes, as the commentator says in Book IV. of the Metaphysics concerning 'entity' and 'one,' where he states that 'entity' and 'one' signify the same, but in diverse modes.

Whence, as such diversity of modes of signifying the same thing, vitiates the predication of one of another, although there may be only two such modes of
licet, 'casus' et 'numerus'; ita diversitas modorum significandi sufficit ad distinctionem specierum, quantum-cumque frequenter una vere praedicetur de alia.

Contra ista sunt multa quae ad praescens pertranseo, quia alias in diversis locis dixi de eis.

**TERTIO QAERITUR**

Utrum corpus, quod est quantitas, sit res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia. Quod sic probatur; quia secundum philosophum Primo Posteriorem negativa est immediata in qua negatur unum praedicamentum ab alio, sicut haec est immediata, 'nulla substantia est quantitas,' et per consequens substantia est alia res a quantitate.

Ad oppositum; substantia de se habet partes, igitur de se est quanta; igitur non est per aliam rem quanta, et per consequens non est alia res.

Circa istam quaestionem; primo declarabo unam opinionem per viam narrationis; secundo per viam probationis; tertiio ponam objectiones contra istam opinionem et solvam.

Circa primum, dico quod quantitas non est alia res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia et a qualitate. Sed si hoc nomen 'quantitas' supponat pro aliqua re et habeat praecise vim nominis 'categorenumatici' in significando, debet concedi quod aliqua quantitas non est substantia sed qualitas, ita quod quantitas praedicatur

signification, namely, 'case' and 'number'; so a diversity of modes of signification suffices for the distinction of species, no matter how frequently one be truly predicated of another.

There are many arguments contrary to these which I pass over for the present; for I have spoken of them elsewhere in diverse places.

**QUESTION III**

It is asked in the third place whether a body, which is a quantity, may be an absolute thing really distinct from substance. Which is thus proved; for according to the philosopher in the first book of the Postieriores, a negative is immediate in which one category is denied of another, as this is immediate, 'no substance is a quantity,' and consequently a substance is a thing other than a quantity.

As regards the opposite; a substance has of itself parts; therefore, it is of itself a quantum; therefore, it is not a quantum through another thing; and consequently it is not another thing.

Regarding this question; in the first place, I shall declare one opinion through the mode of narration; in the second place, through the mode of demonstration; in the third place, I shall posit the objections against this opinion and I shall refute them.

Regarding the first, I say that quantity is not another absolute thing really distinct from substance and quality. But if this name 'quantity' be substituted for another thing and have precisely the force of the name 'categorenumatici' in signification, it ought to be conceded that any quantity is not substance but quality, so that
particulariter tam de substantia quam de qualitate; quia aliqua substantia est quantitas, et aliqua qualitas est quantitas.

Modus autem ponendi est ille, aliqua substantia est simpliciter indivisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis, quae substantia est angelus et anima intellectiva; omnis autem alia substantia componitur ex aliquibus partibus eiusdem rationis inter se, quamvis non onnres partes sint eiusdem rationis cum toto inter se; sicut etiam in homine aliquae partes sunt eiusdem rationis inter se, quamvis non onnres partes sunt eiusdem rationis cum homine; tales autem sicut ex naturis suis sine omni re addita habent quod sunt plures, quamvis non sunt plures causaliter ex se sed per suas causas essentiales, puta, efficientem et finalem, ita ex suis naturis habent quod naturaliter et per agens creatum, quicquid sit de potentia divina absoluta, non sunt in codem loco et situ. Et ideo ex hoc quod producuntur a quoquumque agente creato producuntur, sunt in distincto situ ita quod una pars distat ab alia situ et est extra aliam, quantumcumque nulla alia res secum producatur; et si sit alius locus ambiens ipsum productum, illud productum, quantumcumque nulla alia res sibi inhaeret, esset circumscriptive in illo loco, ita quod totum esset in toto loco et pars in parte; et per consequens eo ipso esset quantum, quia nihil aliud esset quantitas, de qua est quæstio, quam corpus continuum per se unum vel res habens partes vel partem extra partem circumscriptus

quantity is predicated particularly of substance as well as of quality; for any substance is a quantity, and any quality is a quantity.

But the mode of positing is this: some substance is simply not divisible into parts of the same ground, which substance is an angel and a rational soul; but every other substance is composed of some parts of the same ground among themselves, although not all parts may be of the same ground with the whole among themselves; as also in man some parts are of the same ground among themselves, although not all the parts are of the same ground with man; but such as are so constituted out of their own natures without any thing added, that they are more, although they are not more causally out of themselves but through their essential causes, say, efficient and final; so out of their natures are they constituted that they are not in the same place and situation naturally and through created agency, whatever may be of the absolute divine power. And indeed from this, that they are produced by whatever created agency they are produced, they are in a distinct situation so that one part is separate from another in situation and is outside another, no matter how much no other thing may be produced with it; and if there be another place surrounding the same product, that product, no matter how much no other thing might inhere in it, would be circumscriptively in that place, so that the whole would be in a whole place and a part in a part; and consequently by this itself it would be a quantum; since nothing other could be quantity, concerning which there is a question, than a continuous body per se one or a thing having parts or a part outside of a part existing circumscriptively in a place,
tive existens in loco, si locus sit ambiens ipsum. Et ita ipsumet substantia per hoc solum, quod habet partem extra partem sine omni re adventiente sibi, est quanta; et per consequens ad hoc, quod sit quanta, non requiritur talis alia res. Et sic est de substantia quod aliqua habet tales partes, ita est de aliqua qualitate, quae sine omni re addita sibi, immo si ab omni alia re esset separata et haberet partem extra partem, esset quanta, et per consequens ista qualitas non differret realiter ab ista quantitate. Sic igitur aliqua quantitas est substantia, et aliqua quantitas est qualitas, sicut aliqua substantia habet partem extra partem, et aliqua qualitas habet partem extra partem.

Secundo, probo istam conclusionem; scilicet, quod aliqua substantia est quantitas, et eodem modo potest probari quod aliqua qualitas est quantitas; ita, scilicet, quod non sit alia res distincta.

Primo, sic: omne rem absolutam priorem alia re absoluta, potest Deus de potentia sua absoluta conservare et posteriori destruere non mutando illam rem priorem localiter vel situaliter. Si igitur haec substantia sit quanta, puta, ille lapis, potest Deus de potentia sua absoluta conservare illam substantiam et destruere illam rem posteriori, quae ponitur quantitas, non mutando substantiam illius lapidis localiter vel situaliter, sed cum quiescere illius substantiae; quia non videtur necessarium, ita quod eius oppositum includat contradictioem, si Deus velit illam rem absolutam priorem conservare, quod cogatur eam mutare loco ad locum.

Ponatur igitur quod sine mutatione locali illa res prior conservetur et posterior destruatur. Tunc quero
aut illa substantia est circumscriptive in loco aut non est circumscriptive in loco. Si detur primum, igitur illa substantia est quanta; igitur haec est aliqua quantitas et haec non est alia res posterior; igitur haec, 'aliqua quantitas est sine quantitate,' quod est falsum; si non sit circumscriptive in loco.

Contra, accipio unam partem illius substantiae et quaero, aut est in eodem loco sive definitiva sive circumscriptive in quo est alia pars aut non. Si sic, igitur est mutata localiter, quia prius non erat in eodem loco. Si non sit in eodem loco, igitur est in alicio et per consequens totum est in toto loco et pars in parte; et per consequens totum est circumscriptive in loco, et per consequens totum est quantum sine omni alia re addita sibi.

Unde multo magis derogatur divinae potentiae dicendo quod Deus non potest conservare rem priorem sine mutatione locali ipsius et destruere rem posteriori, quod tamen sequitur ad contrarium opinionem, quam ponere quod aliqua quantitas est substantia; si dicatur quod substantia illa non habet partes nisi per quantitatem, et ideo destructa quantitate non habet partem et per consequens non erit in loco circumscriptive sed tantum diffinitive.

Contra ista positio non vitiat responsionem quia semper sequitur illud incommensurans quod Deus de potentia sua absoluta non potest conservare rem priorem sine mutatione locali destruendo rem posteriori. Praeterea responsio falsum accipit, scilicet, quod substantia non habet partes nisi per quantitatem si quantitas sit alia res.

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may be destroyed. Then I ask whether that substance is circumscriptively in a place or is not circumscriptively in a place. If the first is granted, then that substance is quantum; therefore, this is some quantity and this is not another posterior thing; therefore, this, 'some quantity is without quantity,' which is false; if it be not circumscriptively in a place.

On the contrary, I take one part of that substance and I ask, whether or not it is either definitively or circumscriptively in the same place in which there is another part. If so, then it has been changed locally, because it was not before in the same place. If it be not in the same place, then it is in another and consequently a whole is in a whole place and a part in a part; and consequently the whole is circumscriptively in a place, and consequently the whole is a quantum without any other thing added to it.

Whence, it much more restrains the divine power by saying that God can not preserve a thing prior without local change of it and destroy a thing posterior, which however follows according to the contrary opinion, than to posit that some quantity is substance if it be said that that substance does not have parts except through quantity; and, therefore, when quantity is destroyed, it does not have part and consequently will not be in a place circumscriptively but only definitively.

On the contrary, this proposition does not vitiate a response; for there always follows that inconsistency, that God of His absolute power can not preserve a thing prior without local change by destroying the thing posterior. Moreover, the response embraces a falsehood; namely, that substance does not have parts except through quantity, if quantity be another thing.
Primo, quia si tota substantia est prior tota quantitate et subiectum eius, ita pars substantiae est prior parte quantitatis et subiectum eius; igitur partes substantiae sunt priores partibus quantitatis, si quantitas est res existens subjectiva in substantia; igitur substantia non habet partes praecise per aliam rem advenientem sibi. Praeterea id, quod manet sine alio, est prius isto, sed pars ista substantiae est sine illa quantitate; igitur prior est ea, et eadem ratione est prior alia quantitate.

Si dicatur quod substantia non habet alias partes nisi partes quae sunt partes quantitatis, ita quod partes istae non sunt substantiae sed sunt quantitates, (contra illa pars quantitatis est in aliquo subiecto primo; aut igitur in eodem subiecto primo in quo est alia pars quantitatis, aut in alia; si in eodem igitur illud subiectum non plus est extensum per quantitatem quam anima intellectiva, quae est tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte; si sit in alio subiecto, igitur sunt ibi distinctae partes quantitatis; puta, dividatur lignum in duas partes) manifestum est, quod utraque quantitas est in aliquo subiecto, et non in eodem; igitur in distinctis, et per consequens vel per divisionem causatur nova substantia vel istae substantiae, quae sunt istorum quantitatum, erant ante divisionem, et habet propositum.

Secundo, arguo sic: non est magis impossibile Deo facere 'rem habentem partes distinctas realiter' coexistere aliqui toti non informanti igitur totum coexistit toti et pars parti quam facere istam eandem rem

First; because, if a whole substance is prior to a whole quantity and the subject of it, so a part of a substance is prior to a part of a quantity and the subject of it; therefore, parts of a substance are prior to parts of a quantity, if quantity is a thing existing subjectively in substance; therefore, substance does not have parts precisely through another thing advening to it. Moreover, that, which remains without another, is before this, but this part of substance is without that quantity; therefore, it is prior to it, and for the same reason is prior to another quantity.

If it be said that substance does not have other parts except parts which are parts of a quantity, so that these are not substances but are quantities, (on the contrary that part of a quantity is in some primary subject; therefore, either in the same primary subject in which there is another part of quantity, or in another; therefore, if in the same, that subject is not extended through quantity more than the rational soul, which is a whole in a whole body and a whole in each part; if it be in another subject, then there are distinct parts of quantity there say, wood may be divided into two parts) it is manifest; that each quantity is in some subject, and not in the same; therefore in distinct, and consequently either a new substance is caused through division or these substances, which are of these quantities, were before division; and the proposition is maintained.

In the second place, I argue thus: it is not more impossible for God to make 'a thing having parts really distinct' to coexist with some whole not informing so that a whole coexists with a whole and a part with a part, than to make this same thing to coexist with
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coexistere toti tali informanti. Sed secundum communiter opinantes 'substantia habens partes distinctas realiter coexistit toti quantitati informanti ita quod tota substantia est sub tota quantitate,' et 'pars substantiae sub parte quantitatis'; igitur possibile est Deo facere quod substantia tota sit coexistens eidem quantitati non informanti et pars toti. Hoc posito, ista substantia vere est quanta, quia vere habet partem distinctam situ a parte, et non est substantia quanta per altiquid quantitatem aliam informamentem, quia ponitur quod nulla quantitas substantiae informet eam, sed tantum faceret sibi; igitur est quanta per seipsam; igitur ipsa substantia est quaedam quantitas, quod est propositionem. Confirmationem istius rationis pono per dicta aliorum opiniantium contraria, quia secundum eos quicquid sit de respectu intrinsecus adveniente, dicitur de respectu extrinsecus adveniente, tamen est verum; sed Deus potest facere extrema sine tali respectu, quia respectus inhaerentiae, quo quantitas inhaeret subiecto, est respectus extrinsecus adveniens secundum eos; igitur potest Deus facere ista extrema sine tali respectu. Conservet igitur Deus istam substantiam lapidis et illam quantitatem destruendo praecise illum respectum inhaerentiae. Hoc posito, adiue ista substantia habebit respectum praesentialitatis ad istam quantitatem, ita quod tota erit praens toti et pars partii; igitur illa substantia habet partem extra partem, et per consequens esset quanta et tamen sine omni quantitate in-

such a whole informing. But according to those holding this opinion in common, 'a substance having parts really distinct coexists with a whole quantity informing so that a whole substance is under a whole quantity,' and 'a part of a substance is under part of a quantity'; therefore, it is possible for God to bring it to pass that a whole substance may be coexisting with the same quantity not informing and part with the whole. This having been posited, this substance is truly a quantum; for it truly has part distinct in situation from part, and a substance is not a quantum through some other quantity informing; for it is posited that no quantity of a substance may inform it, but it may only coexist with it; therefore, it is a quantum through itself; therefore, the substance itself is a certain quantity, which is the thesis.

I posit the confirmation of this ground through the statements of those holding opposite views; for according to them, whatever may be of a respect intrinsically adventing, is said of a respect extrinsically adventing, yet it is true; but God can make extremes without such a respect; for the respect of inherence, by which quantity inheres in a subject, is a respect extrinsically adventing according to those writers; therefore, God can make these extremes without such a respect. Therefore, God may preserve this substance of stone and that quantity by destroying precisely that respect of inherence. This having been posited, still this substance will have the respect of presentiality as regards this quantity, so that a whole will be present with a whole and a part with a part; therefore, that substance has part outside of part, and consequently would be a quantum and yet without any quantity informing;
formante; igitur ipsamet substantia est tunc quantitas. Istae duae rationes probant quod substantia vere est quanta per suas partes substantiales sine omni alia re adveniente sihi et per consequens quod ipsa est quantitas.

Ex quo arguo ulterior quod non est aliquam alia quantitas nisi substantia vel qualitas; quia frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora; sed omnia, quae possunt salvari per talem quantitatem distinctam a substantia et qualitate, possunt salvari sine ea, sicut inductive patet; igitur talis quantitas distincta a substantia et qualitate non est ponenda. Per istas etiam duas rationes potest probari quod qualitas est quantitas; assumpta ista maiore quod qua ratione potest Deus facere qualitatem sine quantitate, si sit alia res, cum non magis dependeat a quantitate quam a substantia. Similiter si Deus potest facere talem quantitatem, quam ponunt, sine substantia, eadem ratione poterit facere qualitatem sine quantitate, cum non plus dependet qualitas a quantitate quam qualitas a substantia. Confirmo rationes praedictas.

Non magis repugnat substantiae habenti partes per seipsam sine omni alia re informante eam esse in loco divisibili, ita quod tota res sit in toto loco et partes in partibus loci, quam repugnet rei indivisibili sine omni re informante eam esse in toto loco et in qualibet parte; sed res indivisibilis, sicut angelus et anima intellectiva, est tota in toto loco et in qualibet parte; igitur non repugnat rei habenti partes realiter distinctas, therefore, the substance itself is then quantity. Those two reasons prove that substance is truly quantum through its substantial parts without any other thing advenient to itself, and consequently that it itself is quantity.

From which I argue farther that there is not any other quantity except substance or quality; for that is needlessly accomplished through more which can be accomplished through fewer; but all, which can be saved through such a quantity distinct from substance and quality, can be saved without it, as is obvious inductively; therefore, such a quantity distinct from substance and quality must not be posited. It can also be proved through these two reasons, that quality is quantity; since this major premise is assumed, that God for this reason can make quality without quantity, if it be another thing, since it may no more depend on quantity than on substance. Similarly, if God can make such quantity, which they posit, without substance; for the same reason he could make quality without quantity, since quality no more depends on quantity than quality on substance. I confirm the previous arguments.

It is not more inconsistent for a substance having parts through its own self without every other thing informing it to be in a divisible place so that a whole thing may be in a whole place and parts in parts of a place, than it may be inconsistent for an indivisible thing without every thing informing it to be in a whole place and in each part; but an indivisible thing, as an angel and a rational soul, is a whole in a whole place and in each part; therefore, it is not inconsistent for a thing having parts really distinct, of such a kind is
cuiusmodi est substantia materialis et etiam multae qualitates, esse totam in toto loco et partem in parte sine omni alia re adveniente. Sed hoc posito talis res vere habebit partem extra partem et per consequens erit quanta sine omni alia re adveniente sibi; unde multum videntur derogare divinae potentiae illi qui dicunt quod Deus de potentia sua absoluta non potest facere quod una res distet sita ab alia, nisi faciat unam aliam rem facientem illas res distare; et magis videntur negare divinam omnipotentiam quam illi qui dicunt quod substantia habens partes est sine omni alia re sibi adveniente quanta et circumscriptive in loco.

Item confirmatur praedictae rationes. Non plus repugnat substantiae compositae ex aliquibus distinctis realiter et natis distare situ esse per seipsam sine re addita sibi in loco modo sibi convenienti, quam repugnat substantiae indivisibili non habenti partes esse in loco modo sibi convenienti sine re addita sibi. Sed angelus sine omni re addita sibi est in loco diffinitive; igitur non repugnat substantiae habenti partes distinctas realiter esse in loco circumscriptive sine omni re addita sibi. Sed nihil est in loco circumscriptive nisi quantum; igitur substantia potest esse quanta sine omni re distincta, realiter addita sibi; igitur frustra ponitur talis alia quantitas.

Item confirmatur; quia omnis res, quae est praesens alteri rei localiter, per seipsam vel per aliu intrinsecum est sibi praesens, nihil enim aliu est dictum material substance and also many qualities, to be a whole in a whole place and a part in a part without every other thing advening. But if this is posited, such a thing will truly have part outside of part, and consequently will be quantum without any other thing advening to it; whence they seem to detract much from the divine power who say that God of His own absolute power can not bring it to pass that one thing may be separate from another in situation, unless He create one other thing making those things to be separate; and they seem to reject the divine omnipotence more than those who say that a substance having parts is a quantum without any other thing advening to itself and is circumscriptively in a place.

Again, the preceding reasons are confirmed. It is not more inconsistent for a substance composed of some things really distinct and created to be separate in situation to be through itself without a thing added to itself in a place in a mode suitable to itself, than it is inconsistent for an indivisible substance not having parts to be in a place in a mode suitable to itself without a thing added to itself. But an angel without any thing added to itself is in a place definitively; therefore, it is no: inconsistent for a substance having parts really distinct to be in a place circumscriptively without any thing added to itself. But nothing is in a place circumscriptively except a quantum; therefore, a substance can be a quantum without any thing really distinct added to it; therefore, such another quantity is needlessly posited.

Again, it is confirmed; for every thing, which is present to another thing locally, is present to itself through itself or through another intrinsic; for it has
quod una res est praesens localiter alteri nisi quia finis suus est ibi praesens localiter. Si igitur substantia lapidis sit praesens loco, per seipsam est praesens loco, et per consequens eadem ratione partes substantiae per seipsas sunt praesentes loco, et per consequens tota substantia est per seipsam fundamentaliter circumscriptive in loco; sed omne, quod seipso est circumscriptive in loco, seipso est quantum, igitur substantia seipsa est quanta et per consequens est quantitas.

Eadem ratio fieri potest de qualitate.

Item confirmantur praedictae rationes; quia quando aliqua sunt nata facere unum quae tamen possunt non facere unum, cujusmodi sunt partes aquae et aëris et aliorum multorum, quia aliquando eadem partes faciunt per se unum aliquando non. Si Deus potest facere ea esse in loco et situ distincta, quando non faciunt per se unum sine omni re addita eis, ista eadem potest Deus facere esse in loco et situ distincta sine omni re addita eis, quamvis faciunt per se unum, nulla enim ratio apparet quare unum plus debet negari ab omnipotentia divina quam reliquum. Sed Deus potest facere istum aërem, qui est hic, et illum aërem, qui est Romae, esse loco et situ distinctos destruendo omnia accidentia absoluta in eis et sine omni quantitate inhaerente eis; igitur Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest facere quod isti duo aëres uniantur et faciant unum aërem, et tamen quod sint distincti loco et situ sine omni tali re adveniente eis; igitur ille aër habebit partem extra partem sine re tamen addita, et per con-

not been said that one thing is locally present to another, unless because its end is present there locally. If, therefore, the substance of a stone be present in a place, it is present in a place through itself, and consequently for the same reason parts of a substance are present in a place through themselves, and consequently the whole substance is circumscriptively in a place; but every thing, which in itself is circumscriptively in a place, is in itself a quantum; therefore, substance in itself is quantum and consequently is quantity. The same reason can be applied concerning quality.

Again, the previous reasons are confirmed; for when some are created to make one which however can not make one, of such kind are parts of water and of air and of many others; for sometimes the same parts make one per se, sometimes not. If God can make these to be distinct in place and in situation, when they do not make one per se without any thing added to them, God can make these same to be distinct in place and in situation without any thing added to them, although they make one per se; for no reason appears why one more than the rest ought to be denied of the divine omnipotence. But God can make this air, which is here, and that aër which is at Rome, to be distinct in place and in situation by destroying all the absolute accidents in them and without any quantity inhering in them; therefore, God of His absolute power can bring it to pass that those two bodies of air may be united and make one body of air, and yet that they may be distinct in place and situation without any such thing advening to them; therefore, that air will have part outside of part without a thing however added,
and consequently will be a quantum without such a thing added; therefore, such an added thing is needlessly posited for this, that air may be a quantum.

The previous reasons can be confirmed in many other ways, which I pass by for the sake of brevity.

In the third place, it is principally argued thus according to the Master of the Sentences in Book IV., Distinction XII. Accidents of such a kind, taste, color, weight, and any other of the kind, are without a subject in the sacrament of the altar. But if quantity were another thing bearing those qualities, those qualities would not be without a subject, but would be in a subject; on the contrary the common dictum of the Doctors could in no mode be able to be verified, and very incorrectly, as it seems, the determination of the church that the accidents remain in the sacrament of the altar without a subject; for thus only one accident could remain without a subject, and all others would be in a subject; therefore, a quantity would not be such a distinct thing; et cetera. And so in carefully considering the Master and the text with the gloss on the De Consecratione and the statements of the Saints, there is not found a passage so apparent that by virtue of the sacrament of the altar it may be necessary to posit such another thing intermediate between substance and qualities, as this against such an intermediate thing bearing qualities. No mention is made in all those places of an intermediate quantity nor is this term even once mentioned, nor does any passage speak of quantity, whether or not it be, except that many seem to posit that all the qualities in the sacrament of the altar are not in any subject; whence, the Master says thus in Book IV., Distinction XII., A:
"Remanet ergo illa accidentia," quae supra enumeraavit; scilicet, sapor, pondus, et huiusmodi, "per se subsistentia ad mysterii ritum," et cetera. Nec tamen intendo dicere quod ponentes tales rem defereant talia accidentia, de quibus loquentur sancti et quae isti videntur ponere sine omni subjecto, sint haeretici vel errantes in fide seu circa sacramentum Eucharisticae, quia tales auctoritates licuit est eis exponere; nec omnes dicentes falsum sunt erronei acentiandi. Et sicut licuit est eis exponere tales auctoritates doctorum approbarum ab ecclesia, ita licuit erit mihi non solum exponere sed etiam negare dicta sanctorum qui se mutuo reprobant, et in nullo tamquam authentici ab ecclesia approbantur.

Quarto, arguo sic: nullum accidentes absolutum est simplicius suo subjecto primo et aequiput; sed, si quantitas esset aliqua res a substantia et qualitate, esset accidentes. Quaero igitur de suo subjecto primo et aequiput, aut est materia aut est forma aut compositum. Non compositum, quia subjectum esset compositiues suo accidente absoluto, quod videtur falsum; nec materia est suum subjectum, quia tune aliquod accidenis absolutum praecedet formam in materia; nec forma est suum subjectum primum, quia tune materia si esset separata, non posset esse quanta, quod videtur esse falsum.

Similiter secundum commentatoriem dimensiones formam praecedunt in materia; igitur etiam ratione dimensiones terminatae sunt primo in materia.illa ratio est efficax, sicut aestimo, si teneatur

"Those accidents, therefore, remain," which he enumerated before; namely, taste, weight, and any other of the kind, "subsisting per se at the celebration of the mystery," et cetera. However, I do not intend to say that those who posit such a thing bearing such accidents, of which the Saints speak and which they seem to posit without any subject, may be heretical or erring in the faith or about the sacrament of the Eucharist; for they were permitted to explain such passages; nor are all who have uttered a falsehood to be considered in error. And as they were permitted to explain such passages of the Doctors approved by the church, so I shall be permitted not only to explain but even to refute the statements of the Saints who mutually condemn one another, and in no way were approved as if authorized by the church.

In the fourth place, I argue thus: no absolute accident is more simple than its primary and adequate subject; but, if a quantity were any thing other than substance and quality, it would be an accident. Therefore, I ask about its primary and adequate subject, whether it is matter or form or a composite. It is not a composite; for a subject would be more composite than its absolute accident, which seems false; nor is matter its own subject, because then some absolute accident would precede form in matter; nor is form its own primary subject, because then matter, if it were separated, could not be a quantum, which seems to be false.

Similarly, dimensions precede form without limits in matter according to the commentator; therefore, for the same reason dimensions are limited at first in matter. That reason is valid, as I think, if this opinion
ista opinio quae negat istam entitatem distinctam a materia et forma, quam ponunt aliqui.

Quinto, arguo sic: secundum philosophiwm in Praedicamentis, sola substantia est susceptiva contrarioerum; quantitas vero secundum illos non est substantia et tamen est susceptiva contrariorum, quod est contra Aristotelem.

Sexto, arguitur sic: quando ex denso fit rarem; quare aut est ibi nova alia quantitas aut non; sed praecise est eadem quantitas numero; si est ibi nova, igitur quaelibet quantitas praecedens est corrupta, quod videtur falsum. Si pars sit nova; quareo de subcieto illius quantitatis, oportet enim quod sit tota substantia rarefacta vel pars eius; non tota quia tunc duae quantitates essent simul, quod negant sic opinantes. Si pars, sequitur idem, vel quod accidentis migraret a subiecto in subiectum, sicut posset evidenter ostendi, sed omittitur propter brevitatem. Si sit eadem quantitas, tunc sine variatione absoluti coexistit maiori loco nunc quam prius; sed hoc inconveniens ponitur de substantia; igitur frustra ponitur talis quantitas distincta a qualitate et a substanti.

Ideo dico propter illas rationes et multas alias tam physicam quam theologicas, quod quantitas non est res distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate, sed aliqua quantitas est realiter eadem cum substantia, et aliqua quantitas est realiter eadem cum qualitate; unde quantitas non est nisi 'res habens partem extra partem et habens partem distantem situ ab alia,' sive 'res existens hold which rejects this entity distinct from matter and form, which some posit.

In the fifth place, I argue thus: according to the philosopher in the Categories, substance alone is susceptible of contraries; but quantity is not a substance: according to these writers, and yet it is susceptible of contraries, which is contrary to Aristotle.

In the sixth place, it is argued thus: when a thing becomes rare from dense, I ask whether or not there is there another new quantity; but it is precisely the same quantity numerically; if it is new there, then any preceding quantity is corrupted, which seems false. If a part be new; I ask about the subject of that quantity, for it is necessary that there be a whole rarefied substance or a part of it; not the whole because then the two quantities would be at the same time, which they deny who think thus. If a part, the same argument follows, or that an accident might travel from subject into subject, as would be able to be clearly shown; but it is omitted for the sake of brevity. If it be the same quantity, then it coexists in a larger place now than before without the variation of an absolute; but this inconsistency is posited of substance; therefore, such a quantity distinct from quality and substance is needlessly posited.

Therefore, I say by virtue of those reasons and many other reasons, physical as well as theological, that quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance and quality, but any quantity is really the same as substance, and any quantity is really the same as quality; whence, quantity is not, unless 'a thing having part outside of part and having part separate from another in situation,' or 'a thing existing circumscril-
circumscriptive in loco, si sit aliquis ambiens ipsam. Et quia aliqua substantia scipsa fundamentaliter, quamvis causali a Deo vel aliis causis extrinsecis habet partem extra partem, nec oportet ponere aliam rem trahentem unam partem extra aliam. Sed causae extrinsecae rei, puta, efficiens et finalis, sufficient ad producendum res diversas, unam in uno situ et aliam in alio, sine omni re media inter eas; ideo ipsamet substantia est quanta sine omi alia re applicata sibi vel facta simul cum ea.

Et sicut dico de substantia, ita dico proportionabiliiter de qualibet re corporali. Nec illa opinio in aliquo derogat sacramento altaris, sed multas difficultates circa sacramentum altaris evitat, sicut in respondendo ac obiciendo patebit.

Et ideo licet aliqui moderni forte stimulante invidia illam opinionem tamquam erroneam non argumentis sed detractionebus lacerarent; antiqui tamen doctores, quamvis eam non intelligerent, non tamen haereticam circa fidem vel mores reputaverunt, quorum rationes intendo recitare et solvere. Unde quidam doctor arguens contra eam dicit sic. Haece opinio est contra philosophum qui in Praedicamentis distinguit quantitatem a substantia et qualitate. Est etiam contra communem opinionem doctorum. Est etiam contra experimentium, et cum substantia corporea densatur absque conversione alciuius rei in ipsam, efficitur minoris quantitatis absque alicuius partis amissive. Est etiam contra rationem, quia in diversis subjectis differentibus tively in a place, if it be something surrounding itself. And because some substance in itself fundamentally, although causally by God or other extrinsic causes, has part outside of part; it is not necessary to posit another thing bearing one part outside of another part. But the extrinsic causes of a thing, say, efficient and final, are sufficient to produce things diverse, one in one situation and another in another, without any intermediate thing between them; therefore, the substance itself is a quantum without any other thing connected with itself or made at the same time with it.

And as I say of substance, so I say proportionately of any corporeal thing. Nor does that opinion in any way detract from the sacrament of the altar; but it avoids many difficulties respecting the sacrament of the altar, as will be obvious in replying and in objecting.

And, therefore, although some modern writers, stimulated perhaps by envy, would censure that opinion as if erroneous not by arguments but by detractions; yet the ancient Doctors, although they could not understand it, did not, however, repudiate it as heretical respecting faith or character, whose reasons I intend to cite and to explain. Whence, a certain Doctor arguing against this opinion says thus. This opinion is contrary to the philosopher, who in the Categories distinguishes quantity from substance and quality. It is also contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors. It is also contrary to experience; and when a corporeal substance is condensed without conversion of anything into itself, it is effected of a less quantity without the loss of any part. It is also contrary to reason, for in diverse subjects differing in species a
specie videtur posse esse eadem quantitas specie; non enim est alia longitudo seu latitudo vel profunditas in pugillo aëris quam in pugillo aquae. Quod etiam dicunt quantitatem qualitatis realiter differre a quantitate substantiæ et ipsam realiter esse idem cum qualitate, est contra auctoritatem et rationem. Dicit enim philosophus VI. Physicorum, quod "qualitas non est quantitas nisi per accidentem," quod non esset verum si quantitas diceretur proprie. Per rationes arguitur sic: impossibile est naturaliter corpus, quod est quantitas, simul esse cum aliis corpore quod est quantitas; sed qualitas simul est cum substantia; igitur ex praedicta opinione sequitur hoc impossibile, quod naturaliter simul sunt soliditates duae et etiam multo plures; quia qua ratione albedo haberet suam propriam quantitatem, eadem ratione sapor haberet suam, et caliditas vel frigiditas suam, et humiditas et siccitas et sic de aliis; et sic non erunt tantum simul quantitas substantiæ et quantitas qualitatis, sed etiam essent simul soliditates plurium qualitatum; patet igitur quod supradicta opinio multa implicat inconvenientia. Istae sunt rationes illius doctoris quae apparentiores sunt aliis. Sed praeter illas addo alias; primo, quia substantia panis non transsubstantiatur in quantitatem corporis Christi sed tantum in substantiam corporis Christi. Sed si substantia esset quantitas, vere esset transsubstantiata in quantitatem. Confirmatur, quia quantitas corporis Christi non est in quantity the same in species seems to be able to be; for the length, or breadth, or depth in a handful of air is not other than that in a handful of water. That they, however, say that the quantity of a quality really differs from the quantity of a substance and that it itself is really the same as quality, is contrary to authority and reason. For the philosopher in the sixth book of the Physics says that "quality is not quantity except through accident," which would not be true if it were properly called quantity. It is argued through the reasons thus: it is naturally impossible for a body, which is a quantity, to be at the same time with another body which is a quantity; but quality is at the same time with substance; therefore, from the previous opinion it follows that this is impossible, that two thicknesses or even many more are naturally at the same time; because for whatever reason whiteness would have its proper quantity, for the same reason taste would have its own, and coldness or frigidity its own, and humidity and dryness, and so of others; and so not only will the quantity of substance and the quantity of quality be at the same time, but there would also be at the same time the thicknesses of several qualities; therefore, it is obvious that the opinion cited above implies many inconsistencies. These are the reasons of that Doctor, which are more apparent than others. But besides these I add others; first, because the substance of the bread is not transsubstantiated into the quantity of the body of Christ but only into the substance of the body of Christ. But if substance could be quantity, it would have been truly transsubstantiated into quantity. It is confirmed; for the quantity of the body of Christ is not in the sacrament of
sacramento altaris ex vi conversionis sed tantum concomitantiter. Sed si substantia corporis Christi esset quantitas, vere esset ibi quantitas corporis Christi ex vi conversionis. Praeterea argumenta aliqui si substantia est quantitas, igitur cum in sacramento altaris non maneat substantia panis, igitur non est ibi quantitas, quod est contra sensum et contra veritatem sacramenti. Aliae rationes possunt adducere; sed, quia solutio earum poterit patere ex solutionibus iam factarum, ideo perpetranseo.

Ad primum argumentum illius doctoris dico quod illa opinio in nullo est contra philosophum nec in Praedican mentis nec alibi. Et quando dicit quod in Praedican mentis distinguit quantitatem a substantia et qualitate; respondeo quod philosophus non intenedit distinguere inter substantiam, quantitatem et qualitatem, quasi illa sint res absolutae distinctae realiter inter se. Sed intenedit distinguere inter illa praedica menta quae important res, non quidem distinctas res sed easdem quamvis modis diversis, qui modi non sunt nisi modi grammaticales vel logicales; et ideo quomvis hoc praedican tum ‘quantitas’ sit distinctum realiter, si sit res in anima ab aliis praedicamentis, de qua distinctione dictum est alias; non tamen importat aliam rem per se unam, nisi illa res sit substantia vel qualitas; et ita distinctio praedicamentorum, de qua loquitur philosophus, stat simul cum hoc, quod quantitas non sit alia res a substantia et qualitate; sicut secundum cum ‘locus’ et ‘superficies’ non distinguuntur realiter et

the altar by the power of conversion but only concomitantly. But if the substance of the body of Christ were a quantity, the quantity of the body of Christ would truly be there by the power of conversion. Moreover, some argue: if substance is quantity, then since the substance of the bread may not remain in the sacrament of the altar; therefore, a quantity is not there, which is contrary to sense and contrary to the reality of the sacrament. Other reasons can be adduced; but, because the solution of these could be made clear from the explanations of those already offered, I, therefore, pass them by.

As regards the first argument of that Doctor, I say that that opinion is in no mode contrary to the philosopher either in the Categories or elsewhere. And when he says that in the Categories he distinguishes quantity from substance and quality, I reply that the philosopher does not intend to distinguish between substance, quantity and quality; as if they be absolute things really distinct from one another. But he intends to distinguish between those categories which signify things, not indeed distinct things but the same things although in diverse modes, which are not modes, unless grammatical or logical modes; and indeed although this category ‘quantity’ may be really distinct, if it be a thing in mind different from other categories, of which distinction a statement was made elsewhere; yet it does not signify another thing one per se, unless that thing be a substance or a quality; and so the distinction of categories, of which the philosopher speaks, obtains at the same time with this, that quantity may not be a thing other than substance and quality; as according to him ‘place’ and ‘surface’ are not really
tamen sunt distinctae species quantitatis. Quod enim
sint distinctae species quantitatis patet per philoso-
phum in Praedicamentis. Quod istae species non im-
portant distinctas quantitates a parte rei, patet, quia

tune essent duae quantitates continuae simul sita et
loco, quarum neutra esset nata informare aliam.

Similiter secundum philosophum in Praedicamentis,
Capitulo de ‘qualitate,’ idem est in diversis praedicam-
entis; igitur praedicamenta aliquando important ean-
derem; igitur non obstante quod quantitas et sub-
stantia et qualitas sint distincta praedicamenta; pote-
runt tamen aliqua eorum importare eandem rem, et ita
potest stare cum philosopho quod quantitas non est
alia res absoluta a substantia et a qualitate, sicut simile
et album sunt in diversis praedicamentis, sive per se
sive per reductionem; ad praesens non curro, et tamen
important aliquam eandem rem.

Consimiliter dico de ‘numero’ qui nullam rem per se
unam importat, nisi qui est sub aliqua alia specie quam
sub hoc communi ‘numero,’ sicut probatum est alias; et
tamen sunt diversae species. Similiter ‘ternarius’ et
‘quaternarius’ sunt distinctae species, et tamen nulla
res una per se importatur per ‘ternarium,’ quin est vel
esse post eiusdem speciei cum alia re importata per
‘quaternarium’ nec e converso. Et ideo, sicut dictum est
prius, ad negandum unum conceptum ab ali o sufficit
sola diversitas modorum significandi, non absolute
quod nulla res significetur per unum, quin significetur
distinguished, and yet they are distinct species of
quantity. For that there may be distinct species of
quantity is obvious through the philosopher in the Cat-
gories. That these species do not imply quantities
distinct from a part of a thing, is obvious; since there
would then be two continuous quantities at the same
time in situation and in place, neither of which would
be created to inform another.

Similarly, according to the philosopher in the Cat-
gories in the chapter on ‘quality’, the same is in di-
verse categories; therefore, categories sometimes sig-
nify the same thing; therefore, notwithstanding that
quantity and substance and quality may be distinct
categories, yet some of them have been able to signify
the same thing, and so it is possible to agree with the
philosopher that quantity is not an absolute thing other
than substance and quality, as resemblance and white
are in diverse categories, whether per se or through
reduction; for the present I do not care, and yet they
signify some thing the same.

Quite similarly I speak of ‘number’ which signifies
no thing one per se, unless that which is under some
species other than that under this common (species)
‘number’; as was proved elsewhere; and yet they are
different species. Similarly, ‘ternary’ and ‘quater-
ary’ are distinct species, and yet no thing one per se
is signified through ‘ternary,’ but that it is or can be
of the same species with another thing signified through
‘quaternary,’ or conversely. And, indeed, as was stated
before, only a diversity of modes of signification suf-
fices to distinguish one concept from another; not that
no thing may be signified absolutely through one, but
that it may be signified by another. So also it is ob-
per alium. Sic etiam patet de istis duobus ‘homo’ et ‘hominis,’ impossibilis est enim dare aliquam rem importatam per unum quin importetur per reliquam; tamen haec est falsa, ‘homo est species.’ Ita idemptitas significatorum per aliam species vel genera stat cum distinctione specierum et generum; et, si sic frequenters probatum est, genera vel species non sunt nisi conceptus vel nomina.

Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod illa opinio est contra communem opinionem doctorum, respondeo quod, si intelligat per doctores approbatos ab Ecclesia Romana, non est verum. Immo per nullam auctoritatem aliquius doctoris approbatis ab Ecclesia Romana potest hoc probari. Et si inventatur aliqua auctoritas talis doctoris sonans, haec sufficieret exponenda est. Nec est inconvenientis exponere dicta eorum, cum multa dicta etiam sacrae paginae indigente etiam expositione; quia multa non sunt vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, sed secundum sensum, quem debeamus habere, sunt verissima.

Unde tales propositiones quas dixit Salvator: “Ego sum vitis vera et Pater meus agricola est,” “doctrina mea non est mea,” et huissusmodi multae non sunt vera secundum proprietatem sermonis; sic et dicit beatus Augustinus in quodam Homilia super Iohannem: “Quamquam in sensu, quo dicebantur et quo debent accipi, sint verissimae.” Et sic multae auctoritates scripturae sacrae sunt exponendae, ita auctoritates doctorum approbatorum ab Ecclesia Romana sonantes quod quantitas sit alia res a substantia et qualitate

vionis from these two ‘homo’ and ‘hominis’; for it is impossible to grant anything signified through one that may not be signified through the rest; yet this is false, ‘man is species.’ So the identity of significators through some species or genera obtains with the distinction of species and of genera; and, as was frequently proved, genera or species are not, unless concepts or names.

As regards the second point; since it is said that that opinion is contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors, I reply that, if it be understood through the Doctors approved by the Roman Church, it is not true. On the contrary, this can be proved through no passage of any Doctor approved by the Roman Church. And if there be found any high-sounding passage of such a Doctor, this must be sufficiently explained. Nor is it inconsistent to explain their statements, since many statements even of the Sacred Page may also be in need of exposition; for many are not true according to a property of common speech, but are most true according to the sense which we ought to have.

Whence, such propositions which the Saviour uttered: “I am the true vine and my Father is the husbandman,” “My doctrine is not mine,” and many of a like kind, are not true according to the propriety of common speech; as the blessed Augustine says in a certain Homily on John: “Although in the sense in which they were spoken and in which they ought to be accepted, they may be most true.” And as many passages of Sacred Scripture must be explained, so the passages of the Doctors approved by the Roman Church declaring that quantity may be a thing other than substance and quality must also be explained. But
etiam sunt exponendae. Si autem per doctores intelligant doctores modernos mutuo se repromtesse publice
et occulce et etiam in scriptis, concedo; sed negare eos non est inveniendum; nihil enim, quod dicunt, est reci-
piendum, nisi quod possunt probare per rationem evidentem vel per auctoritatem sacrae scripturae vel per
determinationem ecclesiae vel per doctores approbatos ab ecclesia.

Et ideo quia nullo praedictorum modorum possunt probar e quod quantitas est alia res a substantia et
qualitate, quamvis aliquae sophisticationes possint adduci ad hoc; ideo non havo pro inveniendia negare
eos in hac parte, qua enim ratione ipsi se mutuo repreh-
stant, et posteriores reprehent priores, eos possun
negare, ubi non habent pro se nisi sophismata vel au-
toritates male intellected; nec reputo me debere artari
ad eos contra rationis dictamen.

Immo periculolum et temerarium aestimo velle
artare quemcumque ad captivandum ingenium suum
et ad credendum aliquod quod ratio dictat sibi esse falsum, nisi possit elici ex scriptura sacra vel ex de-
terminatione Ecclesiae Romanae vel ex dictis doctorum,
approbatorium. Quale non est illud, 'quantitas est alia
res absoluta a substantia et qualitate,' unde hoc assero,
quod nulla cuiuscumque philosophi auctoritates nec
aliqua ratio naturalis, quam unquam audivi vel legi,
movet me plus ad credendum quantitatem esse aliam
rem absolutam a substantia et qualitate quam ad cre-
dendum quod caro est alia res a Deo et creatura. Si

if through the Doctors they may understand the mod-
er Doctors who mutually censure each other publicly
and privately and even in their writings, I concede;
but it is not inconsistent to contradict them; for noth-
ing, which they say, must be accepted, except that
which they can prove through clear reason or through
the authority of Sacred Scripture or through a decree
of the church or through the Doctors approved by the
church.

And, therefore, since they can prove in none of the
preceding modes that quantity is a thing other than
substance and quality, although some simplifications
may be able to be adduced for this; I, therefore, do
not hold it as an inconsistency to refute them in this
part; for by what reason the Church themselves mutually
censure one another, and the latter reprove the former,
I can refute them, when they have for their support
nothing but sophisms or passages wrongly understood;
nor do I think that I ought to be limited to those con-
trary to the dictate of reason.

On the contrary, I consider it dangerous and rash
to wish to limit any one to the holding captive of his
ability and to the believing of something which reason
dictates to him to be false, unless it may be able to be
drawn from Sacred Scripture or from a decree of the
Roman Church or from the statements of the approved
Doctors. Such is not this, 'quantity is an absolute
thing other than substance and quality'; whence, I
assert this, that no passage of any philosopher, nor
any natural reason, which I have ever heard or read,
moves me to believe that quantity is an absolute
thing other than substance and quality more than to believe
that flesh is a thing other than God and creature. Yet
tamen possit probari, quod sit de mente aliquius sancti vel doctoris approbati ab ecclesia, quem negare non est licitum, propter eum volo ingenium captivare et concedere quod sit alia res a substantia et qualitate.

Ad tertium dico quod non est contra experienciam, sed magis consonum experienciae; unde si aliam rationem non haberet nisi illam experienciam quam adducit, concederem quod quantitas non est talis res sicut ipsi imaginantur.

Unde, quando substantia corporea condensatur, quaero aut amittitur aliqua pars quantitatis aut nulla. Si nulla, et tunc potest salvari condensatio, igitur eadem ratione, quamvis substantia sit quantitas et nulla pars substantiae anittatur, poterit salvare condensatio.

Si autem aliqua pars amittitur quantitatis, quaero de primo subjecto et adaequato ipsius quantitatis, aut remanet sine omni quantitate quod est contra experienciam, aut habet aliquam quantitatem, et tunc vel novam vel praexistentem. Non novam, quia eadem ratione alia pars haberet novam quantitatem, cum non sit maior ratio de una quam de alia, et per consequens tota substantia perderet totam quantitatem praexistentem et acquireret novam, quod est contra experienciam. Nec habet praexistentem, quia tunc accidens migraret a subjecto in subjectum, quod non est consonum experienciae.

Et ita patet quod in nullo est contra experienciam dicer, quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate.

if it may be able to be proved that it may be from the mind of some Saint or Doctor approved by the church, whom it is not permitted to refute; for his sake I wish to hold in check my ability and to concede that there may be a thing other than substance and quality.

As regards the third, I say that it is not contrary to experience, but rather consonant with experience; whence, if he should not have another reason, except that experience which he adduces, I would concede that quantity is not such a thing as they themselves imagine.

Whence, when a corporeal substance is condensed, I ask whether any part or no part of a quantity is lost. If no part, now then condensation can be saved; then for the same reason, although substance may be quantity and no part of substance may be lost, condensation will have been saved. But if some part of quantity is lost, I ask about the primary and adequate subject of the quantity itself, whether it remains without any quantity, which is contrary to experience, or whether it has any quantity, and then whether new or pre-existing. It does not have a new quantity, because for the same reason another part would have a new quantity, since there may be no greater reason for one than for another; and consequently the whole substance would utterly lose the whole pre-existing quantity and would acquire a new quantity, which is contrary to experience. Nor does it have a pre-existing (quantity), since then an accident would change from subject into subject, which is not consonant with experience.

And so it is obvious that in no way is it contrary to experience to say, that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality.
Respondetur igitur ad illam experientiam et concedendo quod, quando substantia corporea condensatur, ipsa efficitur minoris quantitatis absque alieius partis suae amissione, sed non sine suarum partium omnium motu locali.

Unde per hoc solum, quod omnes partes sic moventur localiter ut occupent minorem locum nunc quam prius et una pars minus distet ab alia nunc quam prius, condensatur tota substantia, nec aliquid est substantiam condensari. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in Praedicamentis, quod “densum est cuius partes propinquius iacent,” quod non est intelligendum de partibus inter quas non est medium; quia illae non possunt secundum se totas propinquius iacere; sed est intelligendum de partibus inter quas sunt partes mediae, quia illae propinquius iacent in corpore denso quam fecerunt in eodem corpore quando erat rarerum. Et ex hoc ipso quod omnes tales partes propinquius iacent, sive sint sub alia re sive non; seipsis propinquius iacent et est illud corpus magis densum nunc quam prius.

Unde non video quod conveniender possit salvari condensatio et rarefactio, nisi ponendo quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, et per illum modum salvatur faciliter. Et si dicatur tota substantia manet post condensationem, (sed tota quantitas non manet; quia, si tota maneret, sequitur quod est tantae quantitatis quantae prius fuit); igitur illa quantitas praecedens non fuit substantia ipsa. Dicendum quod perfecte scientes logicum evidenter vident omnia tali

Therefore, a reply is made to that experience and by conceding that, when corporeal substance is condensed, it itself is effected of a smaller quantity without the loss of any of its part; but not without local motion of all of its parts.

Whence, through this alone, that all the parts are so moved locally that they may occupy a smaller place now than before and one part may be less separate from another now than before, the whole substance is condensed, and otherwise a substance is not to be condensed. And this is that which the philosopher says in the Categories, that “that is dense whose parts lie closer together,” which is not to be understood of the parts between which there is not an intermediate; for these can not as regards themselves as wholes lie closer together; but it must be understood of the parts between which there are intermediate parts, for those parts lie closer together in a dense body than they did in the same body when it was rare. And from this itself, that all such parts lie closer together whether they may be under another thing or not; they in themselves lie closer together, and that body is more dense now than before.

Whence, I do not see that condensation and rarefaction may be able conveniently to be saved, except by positing that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality, and through that mode is easily saved. And if it be said that the whole substance remains after condensation (but the whole quantity does not remain; for, if the whole could remain, it follows that it has as much quantity as there was before); then, that preceding quantity was not itself substance. It must be said that those who perfectly understand
esse sophistica, quia tales consequentiae inferentes unam de praeterito ex dubius de praesenti non valent; sicut frequenter duae de praeterito vel futuro non inferunt unam de praesenti et frequenter etiam una de praeterito, et una de praesenti non inferunt unam de praesenti. Sed quomodo ex talibus sit argumentum, longum foret enarrare; ideo de hoc pertranseo. Et dico quod illa consequentia non valet: tota substantia manet et non manet tanta quantitas; igitur tanta quantitas non fuit in tota illa substantia. Et consimiliter tales consequentiae non valent: 'illa pedalis quantitas non manet' et 'ista substantia manet'; igitur 'illa substantia non erit pedalis quantitatis,' nec infernt ultra; ergo illa substantia fuit aliud a pedali quantitate. Et sicut dictur de istis, ita proportionabiliter dicendum est de omnibus consimilibus, quae reputantur demonstrationes a multis.

Unde sicut non sequitur, 'beatificans non est.' Ponatur quod Deus nullum beatificet, 'Deus est,' igitur 'Deus non fuit beatificans.' Similiter non sequitur: 'mortuus non est,' 'Christus est,' igitur 'Christus non est mortuus.' Ita non sequitur: 'tanta quantitas non est,' 'substantia est'; igitur 'substantia non fuit tanta quantitas.' Et ita evidenter patet quod, quamvis tales praemissae inferant illam de praesenti, non tamen inferunt illam de praeterito. Nec refert quantum ad modum, utrum recipiantur termini 'abstracti' vel 'concreti.'

Et sicut de istis dicitur, ita proportionabiliter de illis de 'possibili'; quia frequenter duae de 'possibili,' et logic clearly see that all such are sophistic, for such consequences inferring one of the past from two of the present are not valid; as frequently two of the past or of the future do not infer one of the present, and frequently even one of the past and one of the present do not infer one of the present. But it would take too long to tell how it must be argued from such; therefore, I pass on from this. And I say that this consequence is not valid: 'the whole substance remains' and 'so much quantity does not remain'; therefore, 'so much quantity was not in that whole substance.' And quite similarly such consequences are not valid: 'that foot of quantity does not remain' and 'this substance remains'; therefore, 'that substance will not be of the quantity of a foot'; nor does it infer more; therefore, that substance was other than a quantity of a foot. And as it is said of these, so proportionately must it be said of all of like kind, which are considered demonstrations by many.

Whence, as it does not follow: 'making happy is not.' It may be posited that 'God may make no one happy,' 'God is'; therefore, 'God was not making happy.' Similarly, it does not follow: 'the dead is not,' 'Christ is'; therefore, 'Christ is not dead.' So it does not follow: 'so much quantity is not,' 'substance is'; therefore, 'substance was not so much quantity.' And so it evidently is obvious that, although such premises may not infer that of the present, yet they do not infer that of the past. Nor does it refer quantum to a mode, whether the terms 'abstracts' or 'concretes' be accepted.

And as it is said of these, so proportionately of those of a 'possible'; for frequently two of a 'possible,' and
etiam de 'in esse' una et alia de 'possibili,' non inferunt unam negativam de 'in esse,' quamvis inferant unam de 'possibili'; et ideo tales modi arguendi non valent. Haec est possibilis, 'haec similitudo non est,' haec existente vera, 'haec albedo' est, ergo 'haec albedo non est haec similitudo,' quamvis sequitur illa 'de possibilis,' ergo possibile est 'haec albedinem non esse hanc similitudinem.' Nec sequitur; possibile est 'haec albedinem non esse hanc similitudinem'; ergo 'haec albedo' et 'haec similitudo' non sunt eadem res. Sic non sequitur: 'possibile est Deum non esse creantem,' ergo 'Deus' et 'creans' non sunt eadem res. Sed certe bene sequitur quod haec est possibilis, 'Deus et creans non sunt eadem'; et hoc est verum.

Consimiliter est in proposito, quod quia illa substantia potest manere, quamvis haec non sit vera, 'tota quantitas est'; tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod haec sit vera, 'haec substantia' et 'tanta quantitas' non sunt eadem res, sed sequitur quod sit possibile; et hoc est verum.

Et si dicatur, haec est possibilis, 'haec substantia' et 'haec quantitas' non sunt eadem res manente substantia; propter eadem rationem dico quod haec est bene possible, 'haec substantia' et 'haec quantitas' non sunt eadem res, ita quod potest esse vera, haec existente vera, 'haec substantia est'; sed non potest esse vera, haec existente vera, 'haec quantitas est.' Unde tunc erit haec vera propter illam causam veritatis, 'haec quantitas non est,' quae sequitur ex illa, 'haec substantia non est quanta,' quae est possibilis.

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even one of an 'actual' and another of a 'possible,' do not infer one negative of an 'actual,' although they may infer one of a 'possible'; and, therefore, such modes of arguing are not valid. This is possible, 'this likeness is not,' while this appears true, 'this whiteness is'; therefore, 'this whiteness is not this likeness'; although that follows from a 'possible'; therefore, it is possible for 'this whiteness not to be this likeness.' It does not follow: it is possible for 'this whiteness not to be this likeness'; therefore, 'this whiteness' and 'this likeness' are not the same thing. So it does not follow: 'it is possible for God not to be creating'; therefore, 'God' and 'creating' are not the same thing; but it certainly correctly follows that this is possible, 'God and creating are not the same'; and this is true.

Quite similarly is it in the proposition, that because that substance can remain, although this may not be true, 'the whole quantity is'; yet from this it does not follow that this may be true, 'this substance' and 'so much quantity' are not the same thing; but it follows that it may be possible; and this is true.

And if it be said that this is possible, 'this substance' and 'this quantity' are not the same thing, if the substance remains; by virtue of the same reason I say that this is fully possible, 'this substance' and 'this quantity' are not the same thing, so that it can be true, while this appears true, 'this substance is'; but it can not be true, while this appears true, 'this quantity is.' Whence, this will then be true by virtue of that cause of reality, 'this quantity is not,' which follows from this, 'this substance is not quantum,' which is possible.
Aliud inferius declarabitur. Et si dicatur adhuc quod impossibile est transire de contradictorio ad contradictorium sine omni novitate, (si igitur haec sit primo vera, 'illa substantia est tantae quantitatis' et postea sit falsa;) oportet quod sit aliquam novitas vel saltam destructio aliquius antiqui. Dicendum est quod non est verum, sed aliquando sufficit solus motus localis, per quem non est necesse aliquid acquiri vel perdi nec tamen aliquod antiquum; puta, locum semper manen-

tem.

Inmo sicut etiam ostendetur alibi, locus ambiens corpus mobile manere potest et hoc vel toti vel parti. Et ideo in proposito ad hoc quod ipsa substantia sit maioris quantitatis vel maior quantitas nunc quam prius sicut in rarefactione, vel minor quantitas nunc quam prius sicut in condensatione, sufficit solus motus localis omnium partium istius substantiae sine omni novitate cuiuscumque rei imaginabilis et sine omni destructione cuiuscumque rei antiquae.

Ad quatum, cum dicitur quod illa opinio est contra rationem, dicendum est quod non, sed est consonam rationi, sicut ostensum est prius. Et quando dicitur quod in diversis substantiis differentibus specie videtur esse eadem quantitas in specie, dicendum est quod omnis quantitas, quae non est qualitas quae est in diversis substantiis specie, differit specie; unde omnis quantitas ignis quae non est qualitas, differit specie ab omni quantitate aëris quae non est qualitas; et ideo concedo quod longitudo ignis et similiter profunditas et latitudo, differunt specie. Et tamen hoc non obstante

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Another argument will be set forth later. And if it be said further that it is impossible to pass from a contradictory to a contradictory without entire newness, (if, therefore, this be at first true, 'that substance is of so much quantity' and afterwards it be false;) there is need that there be some newness or at least a destruction of something old. It must be said that it is not true; but sometimes local motion alone suffices, through which it is not necessary for something to be acquired or destroyed nor yet something old, say, a place always remaining.

On the contrary; as is shown elsewhere, a place surrounding a movable body can remain and this either in a whole or in a part. And, therefore, in the proposition regarding this, that the substance itself may be of a larger quantity or a larger quantity now than before as in rarefaction, or a smaller quantity now than before as in condensation, only local motion of all the parts of this substance suffices without entire newness of any imaginable thing whatever and without entire destruction of any thing old whatever.

As regards the fourth point; when it is said that that opinion is contrary to reason, it must be said that it is not, but is consonant with reason, as was shown before. And when it is said that in diverse substances differing in species it seems to be a quantity the same in species, it must be said that any quantity, which is not quality which is in substances diverse in species, differs in species; whence every quantity of fire, which is not a quality, differs in species from every quantity of air which is not a quality; and indeed I concede that the length of fire, and similarly the depth and the width, differ in species.
cadem species specialissima poterit praedicari de eis, quamvis non 'in quid' et 'per se' primo modo. Unde duo homines et duo equi differunt specie et tamen 'biniarius,' qui est species specialissima, probatur de eis.

Unde sicut non est inconveniens quod idem sit in diversis praedicamentis, ita non est inconveniens quod eadem sint in diversis speciebus unius praedicamenti, et tamen in una specie specialissima alterius praedicamenti; et ideo non est inconveniens quod eadem simpliciter sint in diversis speciebus substantiae, et tamen quod sint in eadem specie specialissima quantitatis. Et quandocumque ita est, tunc illa species specialissima non praedicatur de illis 'in quid' et 'per se' primo modo, et multae auctoritates tam de 'generibus' quam de 'speciebus' loquentur de illis respectu illorum de quibus praedicantur 'in quid' et 'per se' primo modo; quae tamen multa de nullo nomine proprio aliquius rei nec de pronomine demonstrante aliquam rem praedicantur 'in quid' et 'per se' primo modo. Immo secundum intentionem philosophi secundum id quod diversimode respondetur ad quaestionem factam de individuo substantiae, secundum hoc accipiuntur diversa praedicamenta, sicut alibi dictum est, et ideo falsum est quod dicunt aliqui, quod quodlibet praedicamentum habet rem proprium de qua praedicatur 'in quid.'

Ad quintum dico quod quantitas, quae est qualitas, distinguitur realiter a quantitate, quae est substantia saltem aliqua, puta, omnis talis: color, calor, frigus, et huiusmodi, quamvis hoc non sit verum de figura et aliquibus talibus. Et quando dicitur quod qualitas se-

that the same most particular species could be predicated of them, although not 'in quid' and 'per se' in the first mode. Whence, two men and two horses differ in species, and yet 'biniarius,' which is a most particular species, is applied to them. Whence, as it is not inconsistent that the same may be in diverse categories, so it is not inconsistent that the same may be in diverse species of one category, and yet they are in one most particular species of another category; and, therefore, it is not inconsistent that the same may be simply in diverse species of substance, and yet that they may be in the same most particular species of quantity. And whenever it is so, then that most particular species is not predicated of them 'in quid' and 'per se' in the first mode, and many passages concerning 'genera' as well as concerning 'species' speak of them with respect to those of which they are predicated 'in quid' and 'per se' in the first mode; yet there are many of no proper noun of any kind nor of a pronoun signifying some thing which are predicated 'in quid' and 'per se' in the first mode. Indeed, according to the intention of the philosopher relative to that which is replied in diverse modes to the question raised concerning an individual of a substance, as regards this diverse categories are accepted, as was said elsewhere; and indeed that is false which some say, that each category has a proper thing of which it is predicated 'in quid.'

As regards the fifth point; I say that quantity, which is quality, is really 'distinguished from quantity, which is at least some substance; say, any such, as color, heat, cold, and any other of the kind; although this may not be true of figure and of any such. And when it is
cundum philosophum non est quanta nisi per accidens; dico quod per omnes tales propositiones in Praedicamentis et in Libro Physicorum et aliis, "substantia non est quanta nisi per accidens," et sic de qualitate. Finitim et infinitum non conveniunt substantiae vel qualitati vel per accidens, et huicmodi. Non intelligit nisi quod illud praedicabile 'quantum' non praedicatur de substantia et qualitate nisi per accidens et non per se primo modo. Unde talis non est per se primo modo nec stricte nec large accipiendo per se primo modo: 'substantia est quanta,' 'qualitas est quanta,' 'homo est quantum,' 'homo est longus,' 'albedo est lata,' et huicmodi; cum hoc tamen stat quod quantitas non sit alia res a qualitate et substantia. Sic 'Deus' et 'creans' non sunt res distinctae, et tamen haec non est per se, 'creans' est immortalis,' sicut illa, 'Deus est immortalis.' Similiter finitum vel infinitum per se secundo modo vel primo probatur de quanta et non de substantia vel qualitate. Et ita apparet, quoniam illa substantialia et praedicalia, 'quantitas,' 'substantia,' 'qualitas,' sunt distinctae; cum hoc tamen stat quod non important res distinctas, et per illum modum respondendum est ad multas auctoritates.

Ad ultimum illius doctoris, dico quod loquendo de corporibus diversarum rationum quorum unum natum est esse forma alterius, vel quorum utrumque natum est esse forma tertii, non est inconveniens duo corpora naturaliter esse in eodem loco, et sic se habent accidens et subjectum; sic etiam se habent diversa accidentia

said that quality according to the philosopher is not a quantum except through accident, I say that through all such propositions in the Categories and in the book of the Physics and elsewhere, "substance is not a quantum except through accident," and so of quality. Finite and infinite do not combine with a substance or a quality through accident and anything else of the kind. It means nothing other than that that predicatable 'quantum' is not predicated of substance and quality except through accident and not per se in the first mode. Whence, such is not per se in the first mode; neither by strictly nor freely accepting per se in the first mode: 'substance is quantum,' 'quality is quantum,' 'man is quantum,' 'man is long,' 'whiteness is wide,' and any other of the kind; since this however holds that quantity may not be a thing different from quality and substance. So 'God' and 'creating' are not distinct things, and yet this is not per se, 'creating is immortal'; as this, 'God is immortal.' Similarly, finite or infinite per se in the second or the first mode is applied to quantum and not to substance or quality. And so it appears, since those substantives and predicables, 'quantity,' 'substance,' 'quality,' are distinct; since this however holds that they do not signify distinct things, and through that mode the reply must be made to many passages.

As regards the last point of that Doctor, I say that in speaking of both... of diverse grounds of which one was created to be in the form of another, or of which each was created to be in the form of a third, it is not inconsistent for two bodies to exist naturally in the same place; and accident and subject are so constituted; so also are constituted diverse acci-
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quae nata sunt informare idem subiectum; sic etiam se
habent albedo et dulcedo in lacte; et ideo de virtute
sermonis debebit concedi quod plura corpora possint esse
simul, hoc est, quod plures res circumscriptive existen-
tentes in hoc loco, et quorum quaelibet habet partem
extra partem, sunt simil; tamen quod duo corpora
eiusdem rationis, (quorum utrumque sit complete in
genere aut in aliqua specie substantiae, vel duo corpora
diversarum rationum, quorum neutrum natum est esse
forma alterius nec utrumque tertii,) sint simul, est in-
conveniens; et de talibus corporibus loquitur Aristo-
teles et alii auctores qui dicunt quod duo corpora non
possunt esse simul.

Ad alias rationes. Ad primam, quando dicitur quod
substantia panis non transsubstantiatur in quantitatem
corporis Christi sed tantum in substantiam corporis
Christi, dicendum quod de virtute sermonis haec est
concedenda, 'substantia panis transsubstantiatur in
quantitatem corporis Christi'; nec oppositum illius in-
venitur in Biblia nec in dictis sanctorum nec in iure
canonico nec in aliquo libro authentico, quamvis in-
veniatur in scripturis aliquorum qui a multis Catholicis
et solemnibus reprobatur. Non dico eos reprobare
tamquam haereticos sed tamquam tenentes falsas opi-
niones; unde Doctor subtilis communem et solemnem et
omnes, in quorum scripturis inventur oppositum illius,
reprobat quantum ad multas opiniones. Multi etiam
catholicci doctores doctorem subtilem in multis conclu-

dents which are created to inform the same subject;
so also whiteness and sweetness in milk are consti-
tuted; and, therefore, it ought to be conceded accord-
ing to the virtue of common speech that several bodies
can be at the same time, that is, that several things
existing circumscriptively in this place, and each one of
which has part outside of part, are at the same time;
yet it is inconsistent that two bodies of the same
ground (each of which may be completely in a genus
or in some species of a substance, or that two bodies of
diverse grounds, neither of which was created to be
in the form of another nor both (in the form) of a
third), may be at the same time; and of such bodies
Aristotle speaks and other authors who say that two
bodies can not be at the same time.

As regards other arguments. As regards the first;
when it is said that the substance of the bread is not
transubstantiated into the quantity of the body of
Christ but only into the substance of the body of
Christ, it must be said that according to the virtue of
common speech this must be conceded, 'the substance
of the bread is transubstantiated into the quantity of
the body of Christ' nor is the opposite of that found
in the Bible nor in the statements of the Saints nor
in the canonical law, nor in any authorized book; al-
though it may be found in the writings of some who
are censured by many Catholics and religious writers.
I do not say that they censure them as heretics, but
as those holding false opinions, whence, the subtle
Doctor censures very much the profane and sacred
writer and all, in whose writings is found the opposite
of that, as regards many opinions. Many Catholic
Doctors also censure the subtle Doctor in many con-
sionibus reprobant; et ideo, quamvis eorum oppositum conclutere inveniatur, non est multum curandum, quia nullus tenetur eorum auctoritatem recipere, quamvis sint eis gratiae referendae, eo quod quando falsa dixerunt, ingenia nostra exercitaverunt, et nobis magis occasiones inveniendi veritatem dederunt. Dico ergo quod de facto haec est concedenda, 'substantia panis transsubstantiatur in corpus Christi quod est in caelo.' Similiter illa de virtute sermonis est concedenda, 'substantia panis transsubstantiatur in corpus Christi quod est in caelo localiter.' Eodem modo ad confirmationem dico quod de virtute sermonis haec est concedenda, 'quantitas corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est in sacramento altaris,' sicut haec de virtute sermonis est concedenda, 'corpus Christi in caelo existens ex vi conversionis est in sacramento altaris'; nec praecise oppositum in aliquo authentico inveniatur. Verum tamenquantumcumque de virtute sermonis et de facto utraque illorum sit vera, tamen de virtute sermonis potest utraque esse falsa, haec existente vera, 'substantia corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est in sacramento altaris'; sed non nisi in uno casu, puta, si substantia corporis Christi nullibi esset circumscrip. Unde non videtur includere contradictionem, quod facta transsubstantiatione in corpus Christi et remanente ibi corpore Christi sub specieibus panis, Deus faceret corpus Christi

conclusions; and, indeed, although a conclusion the opposite of these may be found, it need not make much difference; for no one is bound to accept their authority, although thanks must be rendered to them, for this reason that, when they have made false statements, they have stimulated our abilities, and they have rather given to as occasions for finding the truth. I say, therefore, that this must really be conceded, 'the substance of the bread is transsubstantiated into the body of Christ which is in heaven.' Similarly, this must be conceded according to the virtue of common speech, 'the substance of the bread is transsubstantiated into the body of Christ which is in heaven locally.' In the same mode I say in confirmation that this must be conceded according to the virtue of common speech, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion'; as according to the virtue of common speech this must be conceded, 'the body of Christ existing in heaven is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion'; and precisely the opposite is not found in any authorized writer. But yet no matter how much each of those may be true according to the virtue of common speech and according to fact, yet according to the virtue of common speech both can be false; while this appears true, 'the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion'; but not except in one case, say, if the substance of the body of Christ should exist nowhere circumscripibly. Whence, it does not seem to involve a contradiction, that, when the transsubstantiation into the body of Christ has been accomplished and the body of Christ remains there under the species of bread, God could
nullibi esse localiter seu circumscripive. Quo facto posset sacerdos celebrare, et tunc haec esset vera de virtute sermonis, 'substantia corporis Christi est sub illis speciebus panis ex vi transubstantiationis'; et haec tunc esset falsa, 'quantitas corporis Christi est sub speciebus illius panis,' et haec propter falsam implicacionem; implicaretur enim quod substantia corporis Christi esset quanta, quod non esset verum; quia nihil est quantum nisi cuius pars est extra partem et cuius pars distat a parte. Sed isto modo, cum corpus Christi nullibi esset localiter, nusquam posset assignari quod una pars esset distans ab alia parte; sed ubicumque esset, una pars in codem situ esset alia; et tunc haec esset vera, 'corpus Christi nullibi est circumscripive,' et eadem ratione esset haec vera, 'corpus Christi nullibi est quantum,' et per consequens haec esset falsa, 'corpus Christi est quantitas,' et ita propter falsam implicacionem haec esset falsa, 'quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris.' Et ita qui vellet exponere dicentes, quod quantitas corporis Christi non est ex vi conversionis in sacramento altaris, posset dicere, quod hoc dicunt, quia illa consequentia non valet, scilicet, 'substantia corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est in sacramento altaris'; igitur quantitas corporis Christi ex vi conversionis est in sacramento altaris, quia antecedens

make the body of Christ to be nowhere locally or circumscripive. When this has been done, the priest might be able to celebrate, and then this would be true according to the virtue of common speech, 'the substance of the body of Christ is under the species of bread by the power of transubstantiation'; and then this would be false, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is under the species of that bread,' and this by virtue of a false implication; for it would be implied that the substance of the body of Christ would be a quantum, which would not be true; for nothing is a quantum except that whose part is outside of part and whose part is separate from part. But, since the body of Christ could be nowhere locally, never could it be able in that mode to be assigned that one part could be separate from another part; but wherever it would be, one part would be in the same situation as another; and then this would be true, 'the body of Christ is nowhere circumscripive'; and for the same reason this would be true, 'the body of Christ is nowhere a quantum'; and consequently this would be false, 'the body of Christ is a quantity'; and so by virtue of a false implication this would be false, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar.' And so he who would desire to excuse those who say that the quantity of the body of Christ is not in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion, could say that they say this, because that consequence is not valid; namely, 'the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion'; therefore, the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament, if the altar by the power of conversion; for the antecedent can be true, while the con-
potest esse verum, consequente existente falso. Sed hoc non potest contingere nisi substantia corporis Christi nullibi habeat partem distantem a parte.

Et si dicatur contra hoc quod, ubicumque ex vi conversionis est quantitas corporis Christi, ibi ex vi conversionis corpus Christi est quantitas vel quantum. Si igitur quantitas corporis Christi ex vi conversionis sit in sacramento altaris, corpus Christi in sacramento altaris est quantum vel quantitas. Sed omne quantum est circumscriptive in loco; igitur corpus Christi est in sacramento altaris circumscriptive in loco, quod est haereticum;quia tunc non esset in tota hostia et in qualibet parte hostiae. Dicendum quod illud solum argumentum posset movere catholicum ad tenendum quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, et posset sic formari; ubicumque aliqua res habet aliam rem natam denominare eam, verum est dicere quod res est ibi talis; sicut ubi corpus habet albedinem, verum est dicere quod corpus est ibi album, et sic est de omnibus. Si igitur quantitas corporis Christi sit alia res a substantia corporis Christi, non est separata ab illa quantitate; quia tunc dicunt sic opinantes, quod quantitas corporis Christi ibi est quanvis concomitante; sed ubicumque est aliquod quantum ibi, vere habet partem extra partem et partem distantem a parte; quia ubicumque aliquid competit diffinitio, eidem competit ibi diffinitum. Cum haec ergo sit diffinitio quantitatis vel quanti, ‘habere partem extra partem’; si corpus Christi sequent appears false. But this can not happen unless the substance of the body of Christ nowhere have part separate from part.

And if it be said contrary to this that, wherever the quantity of the body of Christ is by the power of conversion, there the body of Christ is a quantity or a quantum by the power of conversion. If, therefore, the quantity of the body of Christ be in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion, the body of Christ is a quantum or quantity in the sacrament of the altar. But every quantum is circumscriptively in a place; therefore, the body of Christ is circumscriptively in a place in the sacrament of the altar, which is heretical; for it could not then be in the whole host and in each part of the host. It must be said that that argument alone would be able to move a Catholic to hold that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality, and would be able to be formulated thus: wherever any thing has another thing created to designate it, it is true to say that the thing there is such; as when a body has whiteness, it is true to say that the body there is white; and so is it of all. If, therefore, the quantity of the body of Christ be a thing other than the substance of the body of Christ, it is not separate from that quantity; for then those holding this opinion thus say, that the quantity of the body of Christ is there, although concomitantly; but whenever there is some quantum there, it truly has part outside of part and part separate from part; for whenever a definition corresponds to something, the defined corresponds there to the same. Therefore, since this may be a definition of quantity or of quantum, ’to have part outside of part’; if ’the body of Christ in the sac-
in sacramento altaris sive concomitantur sive alio modo, oportet quod ibi corpus Christi sit 'habens partem extra partem distantem a parte,' quod est manifeste falsum et periculosum, et omnino non videtur tutum concedere quod corpus Christi sit ibi quantum. Et ideo dico quod de virtute sermonis concedendum est quod corpus Christi non est quantum in sacramento altaris. Sicut de virtute sermonis est concedendum, quod corpus Christi in sacramento non habet partem extra partem, quamvis corpus Christi habeat in caelo partem extra partem, et per consequens in caelo sit quantum. Et si dicatur quod hoc repugnat priori dicto, (dictum est enim quod haec est vera, 'quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris'; ex qua sequitur quod corpus Christi est quantum vel quantitas in sacramento altaris, quod est modo negatum;) dicendum quod haec simpliciter est vera, 'quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris.' Sed illa non inferit illam; ergo corpus Christi est quantum in sacramento altaris; sicut illa est vera de virtute sermonis, 'corpus Christi existens localiter in caelo est in sacramento altaris,' et tamen illa est falsa, 'corpus Christi est localiter existens in sacramento altaris.'

Similiter illa est vera, 'corpus Christi existens in loco est in sacramento altaris'; quia per illam non denotatur nisi illud pro quo supponit hoc, 'totum corpus Christi circumscriptive existens in loco,' quod non est nisi corpus Christi est in sacramento altaris, quod rament of the altar be a quantum either concomitantly or in another mode, it is necessary that the body of Christ there be 'having part outside of part, separate from part,' which is manifestly false and perilous, and it does not seem at all safe to concede that the body of Christ may be a quantum here. And indeed I say that it must be conceded according to the virtue of common speech that the body of Christ is not a quantum in the sacrament of the altar. As according to the virtue of common speech it must be conceded that the body of Christ in the sacrament does not have part outside of part, although the body of Christ may have part outside of part in heaven, and consequently may be a quantum in heaven. And if it be said that this is contradictory to a prior statement, (for it was said that this is true, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar'; from which it follows that the body of Christ is a quantum or a quantity in the sacrament of the altar, which was just denied;) it must be stated that this is simply true, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar.' But the former does not infer that; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar; as this is true according to the virtue of speech, 'the body of Christ existing locally in heaven is in the sacrament of the altar'; and yet this is false, 'the body of Christ is locally existent in the sacrament of the altar.'

Similarly, this is true, 'the body of Christ existing in a place is in the sacrament of the altar'; for nothing else is designated through that except that for which it substitutes this, 'the whole body of Christ existing circumscriptively in a place,' which is not unless the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar,
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verum est; et haec tamen est falsa, 'corpus Christi est circumscrip 
tive existens in loco in sacramento altaris.'

Similiter illa est vera, 'corpus Christi habens partem extra partem est in sacramento altaris.' Eodem modo non obstante quod ista sit vera, 'quantitas corporis Christi est in sacramento altaris'; tamen haec est falsa secundum proprietatem sermonis, 'corpus Christi est quantum in altaris sacramento'; et ita, quamvis quantitas corporis Christi sit ibi vere, tamen corpus Christi non est ibi quantitas; sic et, quamvis corpus Christi habens partem sita distantem a parte sit ibi, tamen ibi non habet partem distantem a parte.

Et confirmatur illa responsio; quia, quandocunque aliqua sunt convertibili, de quocumque praedicatur unum et reliquum significative sumptum, et similiter de quocumque praedicatur unum et reliquum. Sed illa sunt convertibili; 'quantum continuum permanens' et habens partem distantem sita a parte,' et e contrario; igitur de quocumque dicitur unum et reliquum. Si igitur haec sit vera, 'corpus Christi est in sacramento altaris habens partem distantem sita a parte'; quod est manifeste falsum, quia nulla pars distat sita ab alia in sacramento altaris; igitur haec est falsa secundum proprietatem sermonis, 'substantia corporis Christi est quantum continuum permanens in sacramento altaris.'

Dico igitur quod corpus Christi non est ibi quantum, quia non habet ibi partem distantem a parte; sed sicut which is true; and yet this is false, 'the body of Christ is circumspectively existent in a place in the sacrament of the altar.'

Similarly, this is true, 'the body of Christ having part outside of part is in the sacrament of the altar.' In the same way, notwithstanding that this may be true, 'the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar'; yet this is false according to a property of common speech, 'the body of Christ is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar'; and so, although the quantity of the body of Christ be truly there, yet the body of Christ is not a quantity there; as, although the body of Christ having part separate in situation from part may be there, yet it does not there have part separate from part.

And that reply is confirmed; for, whenever some are convertibles, of whatever one term is predicated the rest is also assumed significatively; and similarly of whatever one term is predicated, the rest also. But those are convertibles: 'a continuous and permanent quantum' and 'having part separate in situation from part,' and conversely; therefore, of whatever one is said, the rest also. If therefore, this be true, 'the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar having part separate in situation from part,' which is manifestly false; for no part is separate in situation from another in the sacrament of the altar; therefore, this is false according to a property of common speech, 'the substance of the body of Christ is a continuous and permanent quantum in the sacrament of the altar.'

Therefore, I say that the body of Christ is not a quantum there; for it does not have there part separate
alibi in caelo habet partem distantem situ a parte, ita 
in caelo est quantum. Si tantum quantitas corporis 
Christi esset alia res, vere esset ibi quantitas, scilicet, 
in sacramento altaris; et per consequens vere corpus 
Christi esset ibi quantum, et per consequens vere ha-
beret ibi partem distantem a parte, et per consequens 
non esset totum sub tota hostia et totum sub qualibet 
parte.

Ad aliud, quando dicitur quod, si substantia corpo-
ris Christi esset quantitas, tune non remaneret quantitas 
in sacramento altaris; sic non remanet ibi substantia 
panis.

Dicendum est quod illud argumentum hic non 
deberet fieri, nisi quia aliqui maliceose provocant ali-
quos simplices contra opinionem; quasi illa opinio po-
neret, quod omnis quantitas esset substantia, et ideo 
maliceose proponunt illam propositionem, 'substantia est 
quantitas,' et subtrahunt illam, 'qualitas est quantitas,' 
Ut per hoc dant intelligere apud simplices non adver-
tentes ad prae dictam opinionem ponere illam, 'omnis 
quantitas est substantia'; et propter defectum argu-
mentorum nituntur cautelose aliquos simplices contra 
opinionem provocare.

Dico igitur ad argumentum quod nimirum est stolidum;
quia non sequitur, 'substantia est quantitas,' et sub-
stantia desinit esse ibi; ergo non remanet ibi aliqua 
quantitas, sicut non remanet ibi substantia; sicut non 
sequitur, 'substantia est ens,' igitur nullum ens remanet 
ibi; sicut non remanet ibi substantia prae-existens.
Unde dico quod una quantitas prae-existens remanet in sacramento altaris; sed non remanet ibi quantitas, quae est substantia vel quae fuit substantia; sed remanet ibi una quantitas quae est qualitas; quia remanet ibi quantitas quae non est alia res ab albedine.

Similiter remanet ibi quantitas quae non est alia res a sapore et sic de alris quantitatis. Et dico cum doctoribus approbatis ab ecclesia quod remanet ibi color, sapor, pondus, hoc est, gravitas, et huiusmodi qualitates; quorum nulla est alia res a quantitate extra omne subiectum situ per se subsistentia divina potentiæ; quorum nulla est in alia subjective; sed quaelibet per divinam potentiam existit extra subiectum, et simul in eodem loco et situ per divinam potentiam conservatur; et ideo remanet ibi quantitas una habens partem distantem a parte, quae nunquam fuit nec unquam erit substantia, sed est simpliciter alia res a substantia. Et istora de illa materia ad praeans sufficient, quia alias diffuse de ea tractabo.

Whence, I say that one pre-existing quantity remains in the sacrament of the altar; but quantity does not remain there, which is substance or which was substance; but one quantity remains there, which is quality; for quantity remains there, which is not a thing other than whiteness.

Similarly, a quantity remains there which is not a thing other than taste, and so of other quantities. And I say with the Doctors approved by the church, that color, taste, weight, that is, gravity, and some qualities of a like kind, remain there; none of which is a thing other than a quantity subsisting per se in situation outside of every subject by divine power; none of which is subjectively in another; but each one exists outside of a subject through the divine power, and they are preserved at the same time in the same place and situation through the divine power; and indeed there remains there one quantity having part separate from part, which never was nor ever will be substance, but is simply a thing other than substance. And these arguments concerning that matter may suffice for the present, for I shall elsewhere treat at length of it.