I. Review
   A. Aristotle is trying to explain the nature of physical things, rejecting Plato's Forms.
   B. He studies change as the way to refute H and P: there are more than 1 principle, but not an infinite number.
   C. He thinks that in any change SOMETHING persists. If we find out what that is in each case, we'll know the thing's nature.
   D. Nature is a sort of source and cause of changing in that to which it belongs -192b20
   E. Two possible candidates for nature: form and matter. Matter is underlying thing, form the shape or pattern of the thing.
      Ex: pen.
   F. Matter as candidate: 193a9: a bed that is buried in the ground sends up a shoot, and it's wood, not a bed. So its nature seems to be found in the underlying matter.
   G. But 193a30: the nature is form, since the form is what a thing is actually, not potentially. Men come to be from men. Beds don't come to be from beds, but from bits of wood. So the nature of a bed is the matter wood, not the shape of a bed. A pile of bricks is not a house. The "matter" of a bed has a nature, i.e., wood has a set of essential properties. These determine how change which is determined by the subject itself (in this case, the wood) will occur. Beds do not contain a principle of their own change, but wood does. So, the nature of a bed is found in the essential properties of wood. But how did we come to realize that this is true?
   H. Ex: brain op, positronic brain w chemical/electrical memories, vs. the hunk of brain tissue on the slab next to the table. Which is the real brain? Thought experiment. Here we can see that it is the function of a brain which determines what we think counts as a brain.
   I. Aristotle's conclusion: there are 2 sorts of things called nature: form and matter (194a12). We should proceed as if we were inquiring what snubness is: it can't be determined without thinking about noses. That is, for substances (subjects) there is a necessary, structured relationship between the matter and the form (the essential properties) which combine to produce the substance. They cannot be separated (in the way that the elements of a definition of mathematical objects can be separated) without losing what makes natural things what they are. To look for the answer to the question "is form or matter the nature of a thing which contains its own principle of change?" you must inquire into it in the same way you would if you were interested in the role of snubness in the formation of noses.
   J. But this role cannot be established until we know the function of noses. Is snubness important to the functioning of a nose? If not, then it would not seem to be necessary in order to give an account of noses. And if that is so, then snubness could not be contributing to the nature of noses. All this shows that if we want to give an account of something, we must know what its function is (because only then can we determine which properties are essential to it, and which are not). As well, we need to have a way to account for things which are natural (i.e., contain within them their own principle of change), and things which are artificial (do not contain their own principle of change). As always for Aristotle, to investigate these things we must look at what stays the same
through a process of change (this tells us which properties are due to the nature of a thing, and which are not). Different kinds of processes of change exist, and they result in a different kinds of explanations. These different kinds of explanations correspond with the different kinds of things which exist in the world. These different explanations require that we understand that there are at least four different kinds of causes of change in anything, and only some of them arise out of the nature of the thing undergoing change. When we understand this, we will be able to account for natural change, as well as for the existence and changes which occur in artificial things like wheelbarrows, houses, and beds.

II. Four causes--- 194b23-195a3, chapter 3
   A. Think of these not as what we think of as causes, but as BECAUSES, or types of explanation.
   B. Material: the matter from which something is made. Bronze of statue.
   C. Formal: the form or essence or structure of a thing. More than mere shape, but not a Form. The shape of the person of statue.
   D. Efficient cause: the maker, what puts form to matter. Could be close (proximal) or far (distal). The sculptor or CU contracting for the statue. What we think of as the cause.
   E. Final cause: the why or purpose (telos). To decorate the fountain area, to honor the person.
   F. Note that A repeats this at 198a22-24, in Chapter 7. Often the formal, efficient, and final causes are the same. Compare 4 causes in a natural entity, for example, a human. The are pried apart in things which are produced by techne, i.e., things which are artificial.

III. Teleology
   A. You may note that A thinks things have final causes, even humans. He believes in a telos or goal or end for things.