

On board:

- Forms: 74b-d
- mechanism for knowing the Forms: Recollection (RA and *Meno*)
- mechanism for occurrence of recollection: immortality (AA)
- summary of *Phaedo*:
 - portrayal of S as phil on death day
 - introduction of Th of Forms to uninitiated
 - args for imm (both for Forms and Pythag)

I. Review 74b-d

II. Recollection Argument

- A. Look at 72e-73a; reconstruct in class
- B. (1) Learning is only recollection. (Demo in *Meno*)
 - (2) We must have learned at some previous time what we now recollect.
 - (3) This is possible only if our soul pre-existed our body.
 - (4) Therefore, the soul is immortal.
- C. Note prob with premises (1) and (4): doesn't follow.
- D. But only half of arg- later argues that soul post-exists death.
 - (1) Recollection is recalling knowledge of a thing one had forgotten because of contact with a similar thing.
 - (2) Learning is recollection.
 - (3) Therefore, one must have had knowledge of the thing one recollects.
 - (4) We recollect the Forms.
 - (5) Therefore we had K of them at one time.
 - (6) But we do not gain K of them by our senses during our lives.
 - (7) Therefore we must gain K of them before we are born.
 - (8) Therefore our souls exist before we are born (embodied).
 - (9) Therefore our souls are immortal.

Note objection: only pre-existence is proven, not post-existence. Half of proof.

Fallacy: to have recollection, one must have prior K. But this is precisely what is to be proven.

III. Affinity Argument

- (1) The soul is like the Forms.
 - (2) The Forms are eternal.
 - (3) Therefore, the soul must be eternal.
- A. Soul must be immutable, non-spatio-temporal, simple.
 - B. Claims
 1. 78: things likely to be scattered and split up must be composites.
 2. 79e: which of composites/incomposites is most like divine? Incomposites.
 3. Which is soul like?
 - C. Plato never says soul IS a Form, but is like one. There is no Form of Soul, but individual souls. Forms are universals.
 - D. If not, we'd all share one soul.

- (1) What is incomp. cannot be destroyed.
- (2) What is unvarying is incomp.
- (3) Soul is unvarying.
- (4) Therefore soul is incomp. and cannot be destroyed.

How is it that soul can't vary? If we grant this, then still: why is it that incomp. things can't be destroyed? No parts to lose. Nec. condition of a thing going out of existence that it dissolve into its parts. Only way to attack arg. is to attack claim that things go out of existence nec. this way.

Problems with (2): soul is not constant: 79c, 81b, 83d. How do we fix this? Soul is essentially constant in its nature. See also (6).

IV. Summary of dialogue

- A. S dies at end, quietly.
- B. Plato offers a theory that should correct the problem he sees with S: no sure K. Th of Forms seems to depend upon Th of Rec. But does it? Not nec: brain structure, not content recalled.
- C. Args for imm provide way to get recollection to work. But also are part of Plato's Pyth belief in purification of soul, though for him it's REASON being purified.