Review
S's remaining problem: how does he know what constitutes the good life, and what constitutes right action? Is true belief enough?

Two Socratic Pictures of Knowledge of Virtue
Craft Analogy: Only a craftsman has the kind of knowledge which permits him to offer an account (to a novice) of how the product of his specialty is generated. This knowledge is procedural...it means he can specify the steps to follow in making the product (and this applies both to crafts which produce artifacts, and crafts, like chess-playing, which do not). What distinguishes the craftsman from the pseudo-craftsman: the craftsman can justify his claim to knowledge by showing a novice how to make the product....thus, he can offer an account of the making of what he claims to have knowledge about. The pseudo craftsman (the poet, for example) lacks this capacity.

Implications: If K of V is like craft knowledge, then virtue can be taught (is implied by the claim that a craftsman can offer an account of what he makes).

Elenchus: this method does not presume that one knows at the start what one is seeking to know, for example, what virtue is. You begin with a generally accepted rule or principle (being moral is making the gods happy), attempt to see either if other accepted beliefs (the gods are not all made happy by the same things) are consistent with that principle, or known facts (Zeus and Hera disagreed about whether X was guilty of disobeying the gods) are consistent with it, and then make modifications to the principle which reflect these other beliefs/facts (being moral has nothing to do with making the gods happy).

Implications: If there are none who know what virtue is, we can still seek to discover what virtue is by using this method.

Meno's problem: how can we know that we have found the right definition of virtue, using the elenchus method, if we are not already able to distinguish that definition from everything else (the paradox of knowledge acquisition)? Plato answers this question with the slave story. This answer, in effect, rejects the Craft Analogy in favor of the elenchus method, and explains how the elenchus method is consistent with the paradox of knowledge. Note: the theory of recollection will not save the Craft Analogy, since the craftsman must know both what the final product is, and how to make it, in order to claim craft knowledge. But we do not know what the end product of virtuous action is (Socrates suspects it is a form of well-being of persons, but he does not know that he is right about this, as he admits in the Phaedo), nor do we know how to make it happen (although we have what may be true beliefs about this). So, if knowledge of
virtue is craft knowledge, the theory of recollection will not save it. Why? Bec it is not enough for craft knowledge that you have knowledge buried somewhere inside your head, inaccessible to your awareness. It must be directly available to you (bec the craftsman is noted for being able to offer an account of what he makes, thereby proving that he has knowledge of it).

Next big problem: if KNV, and the craft analogy fails, is elenchus enough to secure the possibility of virtue?