ROBERT RUPERT’s philosophical interests lie in the philosophy of mind, the philosophical foundations of cognitive science, and in related areas of philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and metaphysics. His research focuses particularly on questions concerning mental representation, concept acquisition, mental causation, and situated cognition. Rob thinks about many of these topics in the context of our scientific understanding of the mind and, in connection with this approach, has written about issues in the metaphysics of science. Rob’s research has twice been funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, in the form of a full-year Fellowship for College Teachers and a summer research stipend. He has won a CU Provost Faculty Achievement Award, is a fellow of the Institute of Cognitive Science at CU-Boulder, and is a member of the CU-Boulder Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science.

• “Ceteris Paribus Laws, Component Forces, and the Nature of Special-Science Properties,” forthcoming in Noûs.
• “The Causal Theory of Properties and the Causal Theory of Reference, or How to Name Properties and Why It Matters,” forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• “Realization, Completers, and Ceteris Paribus Laws in Psychology,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2007): 1-11.
• “Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects,” Noûs 40 (June 2006): 256-83.
• “Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition,” Journal of Philosophy 101 (August 2004): 389-428.
• “Coining Terms in the Language of Thought: Innateness, Emergence, and the Lot of Cummins’s Argument against the Causal Theory of Mental Content,” Journal of Philosophy 98 (October 2001): 499-530.
• “The Best Test Theory of Extension: First Principle(s),” Mind & Language 14 (September 1999): 321-55
• “On the Relationship between Naturalistic Semantics and Individuation Criteria for Terms in a Language of Thought,” Synthese 117 (1998/99): 95-131.