CHRIS HEATHWOOD (PhD, UMass, 2005) joined the CU department in 2005 and works mainly in theoretical ethics, but also has interests in metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. Most of his research has been on the topic of welfare, or what makes a life go well for the one living it, and on various topics in metaethics. During the 2012-13 academic year, he will be a Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Fellow at Princeton University's University Center for Human Values.

When he's not thinking about these topics or teaching about others, he hangs out with his two young sons, Henry and Charlie, and wife, Nicki. When he's not doing that, he might go running, do some Bikram yoga, play some golf, watch some baseball, or beat on his guitar.

Current Research: Heathwood has recently finished a paper on whether morality could have a source, as well as a series of survey-type articles on axiology and metaethics. He is currently working on a paper on the nature of irreducibly normative properties, a paper on monism and pluralism about value for The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, and a book on desire theories of welfare, tentatively titled Welfare and Getting What We Want.

For more information, see Chris Heathwood's personal website and CV.

• "Could Morality Have a Source," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2012): 1-19.
• "Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare," Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6 (2011): 79-106.
• "The Relevance of Kant's Objection to Anselm's Ontological Argument," Religious Studies 47 (2011): 345-57.
• "Preferentism and Self-Sacrifice," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011): 18-38.
• "Moral and Epistemic Open-Question Arguments," Philosophical Books 50 (2009): 83-98
• “Fitting Attitudes and Welfare,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3 (2008): 47-73.
• “The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire,” Philosophical Studies 133 (2007): 23-44.
• “Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism,” Philosophical Studies 128 (2006): 539-563.
• “The Problem of Defective Desires,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 487-504.