

# Hume Responds


by David Barnett

Where does Descartes leave us?

# The Cartesian Theatre


## The Private World

Sensations  
Thoughts  
Emotions  
Seemings



## The External World

Chairs  
Food  
Planets  
Other People




# Two Commonsense Claims

1. In normal visual and tactile experience, we are directly aware of physical objects.
2. The existence of physical objects does not depend on, nor consist in, being perceived.

# The Cartesian Theatre


## The Private World

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


## The External World

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# Foundationalism



# Induction

1. Every F examined so far has been G.
  2. Many F's have been examined.
  3. Therefore, it is likely that all F's are G.
- The greater number of F's found to be G, the more likely it is (if no counterinstances have been found) that all F's are G.

# Hume: The Problem of Induction

- What justifies us in thinking that induction is a valid form of reasoning?

- Why do we think the sun will rise tomorrow?
  - Because it has in the past.
- Why think it will continue to rise?
  - Because of the laws of motion.
- Why think the laws of motion will remain in operation?
  - Because they have in the past.
- Why think they will continue to operate?

- Do any number of cases of a regularity in the past afford evidence that the regularity will continue in the future?

# Conditioned Response vs. Justified Belief

- Conditioned response: past regularities cause us to expect them to hold in the future.
- Chicken just conditioned to expect to be fed each morning (not justified).
- Justified belief: past regularities justify us in expecting them to hold in the future
- We are justified in expecting the sun to rise tomorrow (or are we? Hume: NO)

# The Problem of Induction

- Do any number of cases of a regularity in the past afford evidence--i.e., justify us in believing--that the regularity will continue in the future?
- Yes. For all past futures have resembled past pasts.
- But this begs the question: Will future futures resemble past futures?

# The Problem of Induction

- Is there any reason to believe in the Uniformity of Nature?

# Conclusion

- Induction cannot be validated by experience
- Induction cannot be invalidated by experience
- Induction can only be validated or invalidated on a priori grounds

# Foundationalism

