Roksana Alavi (South Texas College): “Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Moral Agency”

Abstract: Personal identity is necessary for an agent to continue to participate in the moral community. We, as people (even Philosophers), define ourselves within a particular context. If our context, which includes our personal commitments, is constantly ignored or morally destroyed, a part of what we depend on for personal identity and hence our sense of self is gone. A systematic attack on integrity can destroy one’s sense of identity in a way that destroys the agent’s trust and connection to humanity. I argue without sufficient trust and connection one cannot operate as a moral agent. Utilitarian demands could pressure even a utilitarian agent to the point where a person’s self-identity is shattered. Williams’s integrity objection understood this way introduces a different consideration on the topic of integrity’s importance.

Commentator: Nate Olson (Georgetown University)


Abstract: Does a happy life require moral virtue, as Aristotelians claim? A relevant – and interesting – questioning of this claim must do one of two things: (i) show that it is false even on the Aristotelian conception of happiness (eudaimonia) as the individual’s highest prudential hood (HHPG) and the Aristotelian conception of virtue as an integrated intellectual and emotional disposition to characteristically think, feel, and act “at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way,” and with pleasure; or (ii) reject one or both of these conceptions as implausible. Most criticisms miss their mark by failing to do either.

I explicate HHPG as a life that meets the formal criteria of the highest good as the most complete, self-sufficient, and most choiceworthy good. Then I address Hooker’s Argument from Sympathy: (i) we feel sorry for people who lack important prudential goods (autonomy, knowledge, friends, etc.). (ii) Unscrupulous has
everything that Upright has other than virtue. (iii) Most of us wouldn’t feel sorry for Unscrupulous. So, (iv) virtue is not a prudential good. I show why, if Unscrupulous had the same prudential goods as Upright, he would have to have virtue.

Commentator: Jennifer Baker (College of Charleston)

Nick Beckstead (Rutgers): “The Case for Focusing on Catastrophic Risk”

Abstract: How could governments, foundations, and wealthy philanthropists do the most good with their resources? Economists at the 2008 Copenhagen Consensus recommended funneling money to the most efficient aid programs in the developing world. Many philosophers accept similar conclusions. I argue that decreasing existential risk—that is, decreasing the risk of catastrophes that would completely destroy human civilization or dramatically curtail its future potential—is even more important. Potential examples of such risks include catastrophic climate change, global bioterrorism, nuclear war, and some hypothetical scenarios involving dangerous future technologies.

The essence of my argument is that civilization could continue for a long time and that, if it does, that would be very good. As a result, decreasing existential risk even by a small amount has tremendous expected value. I offer some empirical background and assumptions from population ethics that support this view, and then I reply to objections.

Commentator: Benjamin Hale (University of Colorado Boulder)

Sara Bernstein (Duke): “A Metaphysical Puzzle About Moral Difference”

Commentator: Peter Nichols (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Gwen Bradford (Rice): “Evil Achievements and the Principle of Recursion”

Abstract: This paper looks at the value of achievements by examining the implications of a highly plausible axiological principle, the principle of Recursion, as developed by Thomas Hurka. According to Recursion, the pursuit of a good is itself good, and the pursuit of a bad is bad. I consider three possible ways of understanding how Recursion works, and the implications of these construals for the value
of achievements. Doing so reveals not only a good way to account for the value of achievements, but also the best way to understand the principle of Recursion as an axiological principle. Ultimately, I conclude that Recursion is best construed as an instance of genuine organic unity.

Commentator: Tanya Rodriguez (John Jay College, CUNY)

Keynote Presentation:

Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State): “...But What About the Animals?”

Abstract: Immanuel Kant famously claimed that we have no direct duties to animals and that animals are things that we may dispose of as we will. Even Kantian moral philosophers have sometimes called this a repugnant moral doctrine. Utilitarian ethics, but contrast, gives us a much more animal-friendly account of our moral obligations: we are obligated to take into account the interests of all sentient animals, both human and nonhuman. However, there is much that is attractive in Kant’s moral thinking—especially his emphasis on the importance of not using persons for one’s own ends and of avoiding contempt and arrogance. So it is worth taking a second look at Kant’s relatively brief and scattered remarks about animals before concluding that utilitarianism provides a superior account of our duties to animals. In this lecture, I imagine asking Kant, “But what about the animals?” And I come to the surprising conclusion that Kant offers us helpful ways of thinking not just about animal welfare but also about the attitudes a well-formed moral agent should have toward nonhuman animals and about the morally appropriate responses to the service animals and pets with whom we share a social world.

Mary Coleman (Illinois Wesleyan): “Exploring Metanormative Constitutivism”

Abstract: Constitutivism, as I conceive of it, is characterized by three theses.

- Normative expressions about which actions we ought to perform have truth-values.
- Some of these normative expressions are true.
- True normative expressions about which actions we ought to perform are true (at least in part) in virtue of the nature of action itself.

Constitutivism faces two kinds of challenges. First, the
constitutivist strategy of deriving normative truths about actions from truths about the nature of action may seem incoherent. Second, even if the constitutivist strategy is coherent, it may not look very promising; it may seem as if there is no way to derive normative truths about action from whatever minimal premises we can squeeze out of the nature of action.

I begin by addressing two objections to the coherence of the constitutivist strategy. I argue that both depend on implausible views about what it is for a principle to be constitutive of action, and I offer a more plausible view about this. I then turn to the second kind of challenge. I make a proposal about the nature of action, and I use this proposal (in combination with my view about what it is for a principle to be constitutive of action) to argue that anyone who acts ought to comply with both an instrumental principle and a prudential principle. I conclude by briefly considering whether we might be able to give an analogous argument for the claim that anyone who acts ought to comply with a moral principle. Spoiler alert: the prospects are not good.

My aim in this paper is to show that some of the most pressing objections to constitutivism can be answered. To give a full defense of constitutivism, I would have to do much more than I can manage here. For one thing, I would need to answer other objections to the coherence of the constitutivist strategy. For another, the proposal I make about the nature of action is controversial, and I would need to argue that it compares favorably with the wide range of competing views about action in the literature. Nonetheless, I hope that what I say here will help to promote the idea that constitutivism deserves serious consideration.

Commentator: Matthew Silverstein (New York University Abu Dhabi)

William Crouch (Oxford): “How to Act Appropriately”

Abstract: Recently, some philosophers have applied decision-theoretic reasoning to moral matters, arguing that decision-makers ought to maximise expected value, where the expected value of an option is relative to both empirical and moral uncertainty. This approach is salutary, but there is a problem. Sometimes, at least, value differences are not comparable across different theories, and so the expected value of an option is not defined. Jacob Ross has suggested that this results in the ‘near impotence of practical reason’.
I suggest that reason is not impotent in such circumstances. Drawing on an analogy with voting, I argue that the most plausible criterion for appropriate action in circumstances of moral uncertainty and intertheoretic incomparability is the *Borda Rule*.

*Commentator: Graham Oddie (University of Colorado Boulder)*

**Eva Dadlez and William Andrews (Central Oklahoma):** “Not Separate but not Equal: How Fetal Rights Deprive Women of Civil Rights”

*Commentator: Kelly Heuer (Georgetown University)*

**Keynote Presentation:**

**Stephen Darwall (Yale):** “Morality’s Distinctiveness”

*Abstract:* Beginning with Anscombe’s and Sidgwick’s characterization of the difference between ancient ethics and “modern moral philosophy,” I argue that what is distinctive about *morality* as conceived in early modern to contemporary ethical thought is the conceptual centrality of irreducibly second-personal ideas, like obligation and accountability. The argument proceeds through considering David Hume’s famous claim that the distinction between “moral virtues” and estimable nonmoral “natural abilities,” is purely verbal. Hume makes this claim because he fails to appreciate the conceptual difference between third-personal evaluative attitudes, like disesteem and contempt, and moral blame, which is a fundamentally “addressing” or second-personal attitude. Hume’s failure to see more than a verbal difference between the moral and the nonmoral is thus evidence that what is distinctive about morality is its second-personal aspect—that it concerns forms of evaluation and judgment that are essentially interpersonal.

**Dale Dorsey (Kansas):** “Desire-satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal”

*Commentator: Alex Sarch (University of Michigan Law School)*

**Tom Dougherty (Stanford):** “Sex, Lies, and Veiled Rape”

*Abstract:* Lying to get laid: how bad is it really? Suppose weapons scientist Jones says she is a peace activist in order to bed hippie Smith. Behavior like this is common and typically seen as merely sleazy. But I argue that it is in fact seriously wrong. If Smith decides to have sex because she has been deceived about Jones’s occupation, then she
does not consent to the sexual encounter. What Smith consented to was sex with a peace activist, and the sexual encounter was sex with a weapons scientist. And culpably having non-consensual sex with someone is seriously wrong.

*Commentator: Grant Rozeboom (Stanford University)*

**Billy Dunaway (Michigan): “Practical Reasoning for Theorists about Vagueness”**

*Commentator: Julia Staffel (University of Southern California)*

**Mylan Engel, Jr. (Northern Illinois): “Rethinking Free Will”**

*Abstract:* Waxing Orwellian, Dennett and Kapitan essentially argue that “ignorance is freedom,” for they maintain that the epistemic possibility of alternative courses of action is the only kind of “possibility” of doing otherwise required for free will. I argue that this sort of epistemic standpoint compatibilism fails on the grounds that (i) genuine freedom requires both the epistemic openness and the metaphysical openness of alternative courses of action and (ii) the epistemic possibility of performing alternative actions only gets us the epistemic openness of those alternative courses of action, not their metaphysical openness. I also examine two libertarian accounts of free will – sans-causation accounts and agent-causation accounts – and argue that both these accounts are unsatisfactory. Finally, I argue that guidance control is not the kind of control needed for freedom. I conclude that if we wish to retain our conception of ourselves as morally responsible beings, we should seriously explore the possibility of responsibility without freedom.

*Commentator: Mark Heller (Syracuse University)*

**Benjamin Ferguson (LSE): “Kant on Duty in the *Groundwork:* Causality and Motives”**

*Commentator: Sven Nyholm (University of Michigan)*

**Guy Fletcher (Oxford): “A New Objective-List Theory of Well-Being”**

*Abstract:* Objective-list theories are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this paper to redress this. First (§S1-2), I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that exposes and undermines some of the bad reasons for rejecting objective-list theories. Second (§S3), I undermine some
other misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold such theories. Third (§4), I briefly explain two different routes we could take to determine the truth about well-being and undermine the main alternative to objective-list theories. Fourth (§§5-6), I provide a new objective list theory and explain how it’s able to capture what attracts people to desire-fulfilment theories whilst avoiding the problems those theories face.

Commentator: Chris Heathwood (University of Colorado Boulder)

Peter Fristedt (Towson): “Normativity and the Problem of Interpretation”

Abstract: In this paper, I ask whether Korsgaard’s ethics can be reconciled with a “hermeneutic” understanding of the human subject as an interpreter of moral principles. Much of recent European philosophy, inspired by Nietzsche, has been skeptical about the notion that moral principles have authority over us. But Korsgaard’s account of normativity as grounded in self-consciousness and its reflective distance from beliefs and desires is strikingly similar to hermeneutic philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer’s description of human beings as distant and ‘free’ from their environment. The hermeneutic challenge to Kantian ethics is whether it is possible for a subject to be bound unconditionally by principles, when our understanding of them is always historically mediated and partial. I argue that Gadamer’s notion of the subject matter of understanding allows us to see that we understand our principles as true interpretations of fully determined and binding principles.

Commentator: Toby Svoboda (Penn State University)

Robyn Gaier (Viterbo): “Psychopaths and the Refutation of Internalism”

Commentator: Danielle Wylie (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Richard Galvin (Texas Christian): “The Practical Contradiction Interpretation Reconsidered”

Commentator: Michael Cholbi (Cal Poly Pomona)

David Goldman (UCLA): “Modification of the Reactive Attitudes”

Abstract: In the twentieth century, prominent leaders including Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr, rejected antagonistic response to
wrongdoing categorically. By contrast, P. F. Strawson, in his seminal essay “Freedom and Resentment,” forcefully defends resentment, indignation, and other antagonistic responses to wrongdoing. He argues that relating to someone as an adult member of the moral community and being susceptible to antagonistic reactive attitudes like resentment if she should do wrong are deeply interconnected—so deeply interconnected that eliminating the antagonistic reactive attitudes, as King and Gandhi aspire to, would require exiting interpersonal relationships altogether. I describe an alternative to the reactive attitudes Strawson defends: a form of sadness that is not antagonistic. This sadness, I argue, keeps engaged interpersonal relationships intact. Thus the antagonism-free ideal that King and Gandhi advocate is compatible with relating to somebody as an adult member of the moral community.  

Commentator: Andrew Khoury (Arizona State)

Moti Gorin (Rice): “Interpersonal Manipulation and the Rational Capacities”

Abstract: Despite its ubiquity, its conceptual richness, and the subtlety of the ethical problems it raises, interpersonal manipulation has received relatively little attention from philosophers. In this paper I take one modest step toward developing a full account of interpersonal manipulation by examining a claim I have encountered occasionally both in the literature and in conversation. This is the plausible claim that manipulation is, or at least always involves, the bypassing or subversion of the manipulated agent’s rational capacities. If this were true, it likely would be an ethically salient fact about manipulation. I explore various interpretations of what it means to bypass or subvert an agent’s rational capacities and I argue that none of them captures a phenomenon that is always inconsistent with manipulation. Manipulation is sometimes consistent with treating others as rational beings.  

Commentator: Ekaterina Vavova (Amherst)

Jason Hanna (Northern Illinois): “The Moral Status of Innocent Threats”

Commentator: Kai Draper (University of Delaware)

Abstract: Philosophers usually assume that more matters (for well-being) than simply mental states. This could mean that certain mind-independent events count when it comes to assessing how good my life is, whether or not I know about these. Call this the “desire satisfaction is good thesis” or DSG. Alternatively, it could mean that it is important to have a connection with reality. On this view, it matters that a person be in touch with reality at least insofar as her own life is concerned. Call this the “positive value of knowledge thesis” or PVK. Knowledge (or ignorance) requires the obtaining (or not) of a certain relation between mind and world. Thus one who subscribes to PVK can also insist that more matters than just mental states. Here I consider what we should say about DSG and PVK, and consider what theory of well-being is best equipped to let us say that.

Commentator: Stephen Campbell (University of Michigan)

Brian Hedden (MIT): “Options and the Subjective Ought”

Abstract: There are two stages to determining what you ought to do. The first involves determining what your options are, and the second involves ranking those options. While the second stage has been widely explored, the first has gone largely unaddressed. I argue that the fact that what you ought to do depends on your uncertainty about the world forces us to conceive of your options as consisting of all and only the decisions you are presently able to make. In this way, oughts apply only to decisions, and not to ordinary non-mental acts. This conception of options is not of mere bookkeeping interest. It has substantive implications for first-order normative theorizing. Here, I show that it provides a principled solution to Chisholm’s Paradox, in which your doubts about your own self-control seem to give rise to conflicting claims about what you ought to do.

Commentator: Tyler Paytas (Washington University in St. Louis)

Avram Hiller (Portland State): “A ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ for Climate Change?”

Abstract: This paper provides an argument regarding climate change parallel to that in Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (FAM), including a greenhouse gas analogue to Singer’s famous “drowning child” example. Since humans are causing
(expected) climate harms (and not merely allowing suffering, as in FAM), this argument should have a significant influence on those who accept a highly plausible “do no easily-avoidable harm” principle. Thus deontological views may be extremely demanding in an era of climate change. However, I show that this new argument is in an important way trumped by the original FAM, so consequentialists who reject a doing/allowing distinction and who deny species-level/ecocentric goods should not be moved very much by it. Consequentialists should not be unduly influenced by the different causal mechanisms involved in global poverty and climate change into prioritizing less beneficial actions over ones that do more good.

Commentator: David Killoren (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Robert Howell (SMU): “What’s Wrong with Google Morals?”
Commentator: Brian Talbot (University of Colorado Boulder)

Stan Husi (North Carolina, Chapel Hill): “Against Fictionalism (Again, but Different)”
Commentator: Andrew Sepielli (University of Toronto)

Keynote Presentation:
Dale Jamieson (NYU): “Constructing Practical Ethics”

Abstract: In this talk my aim is to shed light on contemporary practices by exposing some of their origins. I proceed by presenting a broad history of practical ethics that is somewhat speculative and impressionistic. My most general conclusion is that the diversity of activities collected under the rubric of “practical ethics” is fed by a wide range of intellectual and cultural sources. Seeing contemporary practices in the light of their historical background will, I hope, contribute to greater methodological self-consciousness and sophistication, and help to clarify the relationship of practical ethics to the discipline of philosophy.

Avery Kolers (Louisville): “Social Ontology and Territorial Rights”

Abstract: How does anyone get a right to territory? An adequate answer must explain attachment or particularity: something must link group G in particular to place P in particular. Moreover, such attachments are achievements – something G must do, like cultivate or settle. Thus territorial claimants must be persisting groups that act and
intend. Territorial rights theory needs social ontology.

Current work in social ontology cannot support the required
attachments and achievements. Social ontology also needs territorial
rights.

I first lay out these claims and the desiderata of an adequate
account. I then argue that David Miller’s conception of a nation cannot
meet the demands of social ontology. Finally, I build on David Copp’s
conception of a society to propose a kind of group that can ground
territorial rights claims while meeting the demands of social ontology. I
call this group an ethnogeographic community.

Commentator: Troy Kozma (University of Wisconsin–Barron County)

Uri Leibowitz (Nottingham): “Particularism and Moral Knowledge”

Abstract: In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist
explanation of practical wisdom (understood as the ability to acquire
moral knowledge in a wide range of situation). First, I consider
McKeever and Ridge’s recent arguments in favour of a generalist
account of practical wisdom and I explain why I find these arguments
unconvincing. I then go on to propose a particularist-friendly
explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that a
particularist-friendly explanation of the fact that (e.g.,) Jane knows
that A is morally right might not be so difficult to come by. Moreover, I
suggest that the particularist approach I put forward may go some way
towards responding to the moral sceptic.

Commentator: Jeff Wisdom (Joliet Junior College)

Matthew Liao (NYU): “The Prospect of a Causal Structure Theory of
Nonconsequentialism”

Abstract: Frances Kamm has a novel theory of
nonconsequentialism, according to which one can use just the causal
structures of an act to determine the permissibility of an act. I first
argue that Kamm’s Causal Structure Theory (CST) is more plausible
than other causal structure theories because it has a Modal Condition,
according to which the permissibility of an act depends not on its
actual causal structures but on its possible causal structures. Next I
argue that for the Modal Condition to be defensible, it needs to address
what might be called the Unpredictability Problem. I then argue that
some of the more plausible ways of addressing this problem all seem to
fail. If I am right, not only does this cast doubt on Kamm’s CST, it also
calls into question the prospect of an adequate causal structure theory of nonconsequentialism.

Commentator: Brian Berkey (UC, Berkeley)

Alida Liberman (USC): “Linking Principles and Narrow Scope”

Abstract: I argue against an objection by John Brunero to a narrow-scope understanding of conditional requirements. First, I consider a reply to this objection on behalf of the narrow-scoper offered by Errol Lord. I argue that this reply is unsuccessful, and put forward my own account of why the objection fails, in which I highlight the need for a clear and correct understanding of the “linking principle” governing the way local, pro tanto requirements combine to form global, all-things-considered requirements. I claim that Brunero’s objection works only if we assume a simple maximizing linking principle, and I suggest that we instead adopt a more nuanced linking principle, under which the objection to narrow-scoping does not go through.

Commentator: John Brunero (University of Missouri, St. Louis)


Abstract: In her 2010 book, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, Debra Satz introduces four dimensions by which we should scrutinize markets in order to determine if those markets are ethically permissible: vulnerability of the providers, which she links to exploitation; weak agency of the providers; harm done to individuals; and harm done to society. If a particular market scores high marks on each of these dimensions, then Satz describes that market as “noxious.” She argues that particularly noxious markets should not be tolerated or legitimized. I argue that certain “gift relationships” as both Satz and Richard Titmuss describe them, can be noxious in a variety of the same ways that markets can be noxious, particularly when it comes to vulnerability and exploitation. I will argue that, in these cases, a market can serve as an egalitarian alternative to gift relationships. In this paper I will demonstrate how this is true in the case of live-donor kidney distribution schemes.

Commentator: Tait Szabo (University of Wisconsin–Washington County)
Clayton Littlejohn (King’s College, London): “In Defense of the Doctrine of Double Effect”
   Commentator: Steve Sverdlik (Southern Methodist University)

Julia Markovits (MIT): “Saints, Heroes, Sages, and Villains”
   Abstract: This talk explores the question of how to be good. My starting point is a thesis about moral worth that I’ve defended in the past: roughly, that an action is morally worthy if and only it’s performed for the reasons why it is right. While I think that account gets at one important sense of moral goodness, I argue here that it fails to capture several ways of being worthy of admiration on moral grounds. Moral goodness is more multi-faceted.
   My title is intended to capture that multi-facetedness: the paper examines saintliness, heroism, and sagacity. The variety of our common-sense moral ideals underscores the inadequacy of any one account of moral admirableness, and the paper aims to illuminate the distinct roles these ideals play in our everyday understanding of goodness.
   I hope to say something at the end of this talk about the flip side of these ideals: about villainy.
   Commentator: Vanessa Carbonell (University of Cincinnati)

David McNaughton and Piers Rawling (Florida State):
   “Consequentialism, Benefits, and the Good”
   Abstract: We’ll explore the relationships among consequentialism, practical reasons, benefits and the good. On our usage, a practical reason is a fact rather than a psychological state – the fact that it’s cold outside, say, is a reason for you to wear a coat. Under what conditions do you have a reason to act in this sense? Only if benefit or good would ensue, we think. The consequentialist can agree with this, and we argue that consequentialism fares better than many of its opponents suppose – Ross, for example, fails to distinguish adequately between benefits and the good in his critique of Moore. But, in the end, we reject consequentialism on the grounds that you can have more reason to benefit yourself or those with whom you have “special” relationships than value alone would warrant. We also, however, reject constraints -- thus we attempt to tread a middle way between consequentialism and deontology.
   Commentator: Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado Boulder)

Abstract: Traditional accounts of human agency claim that it is necessarily connected to the good. These accounts seem to entail that akratic and perverse actions are exercises of agency to a lesser extent (if at all) than actions that express the agent’s conception of the good. I consider an argument from Michael Bratman for the claim that one such account, Gary Watson’s Platonic Model, has these entailments. I show that Bratman’s argument fails to adequately attend to some important distinctions. Then I argue that the Platonic Model can capture our intuition that the agent is fully behind his perverse action and propose an amendment to the original account, such that it can capture our intuition that the akratic agent is fully behind his weak action.

Commentator: Carl Hammer (Baruch College)

David Morrow (Alabama, Birmingham): “Adaptive Preferences and a Theory of Desirability”

Commentator: Leonard Kahn (Air Force Academy)

Howard Nye (Alberta): “Implicit Psychology and the Badness of Death”

Abstract: Michael Tooley has claimed that, to persist over time, a welfare subject must possess the concept of a continuing self. Since infants and animals lack this concept, death cannot deprive them of a future they would have had. More recently, Jeff McMahan has argued that infants and animals have interests in survival, but because they lack the most important connections to their futures these interests are relatively weak. In this paper I contend that Tooley and McMahan are mistaken about which psychological relations matter for an individual’s persistence. I argue that continuities among affective and implicit psychological states are more important than abstract beliefs and intentions. Psychological research makes this directly plausible, and it explains important intuitions. Since infants and animals have substantial implicit continuities with their futures, I conclude that the harm they suffer in death is comparable to that suffered by human adults with similar goods in prospect.

Commentator: Zac Cogley (Northern Michigan University)
Trisha Phillips (Mississippi State): “Them’s Fighting Words: Provocation and Retaliatory Violence”

Abstract: “Fighting words” are insults that tend to incite retaliatory violence and carry no instrumental cognitive value. Many people have written about the moral status of “fighting words,” specifically whether we have a moral right to engage in such speech. In fact, for better or for worse, it is currently illegal in many places to utter “fighting words.” Not much has been written about the moral force of “fighting words,” specifically whether “them’s fighting words” constitutes a justification or excuse for retaliatory violence. This paper considers three different ways in which “them’s fighting words” might constitute a justification or excuse. It shows that all three approaches fail to justify or excuse the responder from wrongdoing, but one approach provides good reason to mitigate the moral weight of the wrong.

Commentator: Jacob Blair (California State University, Northridge)

Matjaz Potrc and Vojko Strahovnik (Ljubljana): “Moral Reasons and Generalities”

Abstract: One of the important shifting points in the debate on moral particularism was the recognition that holism of reasons does not necessarily imply impossibility of general moral principles and that the two questions, namely the structure and functioning of reasons and the possibility of general moral principles must be separated. Thus, a number of intermediate positions combining reasons variability with some kind of moral generalities were put forward. We discuss four such holism-friendly models of moral principles, namely the model of (a) that’s it moral principles, (b) default moral principles, (c) hedged moral principles and (d) defeasible moral principles. We diagnose that one of the open questions in the debate is how to understand the notion of a reason. We opt for a Rossian model of moral pluralism and investigate the resources it has to accommodate reasons’ variability via a distinction between basic and derived reasons and a conception of prima facie duties as tendencies.

Commentator: Hille Paakkunainen (Syracuse University)

Eamon Quinn (Queen’s University, Kingston): “Values in Partiality”

Abstract: On most conceptions of morality, agents must assume an impartial view of the value of acts. “Partialists”, however, press that in adopting an impartial perspective, an individual commits herself
to an evaluation of her close relationships that is in conflict with the evaluation she has of them from her perspective – in which they have what Joseph Raz terms “relational” value. Adopting the moral point of view, therefore, impairs these relationships.

I argue, however, that one cannot understand a relational value without a corresponding non-relational value. In consequence, if an agent is to believe that there is a personal goodness of her personal relationships, it is because she views these relationships as good tout court. Moreover, I contend that meaningful friendships call for people to see close relations as valuable just insofar as they are persons. Hence, the impartial perspective is presupposed by those who engage in such relationships.

Commentator: Nandi Theunissen (Columbia University)

Erick Ramirez (UCSD): “Receptivity, Reactivity and the Successful Psychopath”

Abstract: I argue that research on psychopathy undermines three important claims in support of moderate reasons responsive (MRR) theories of responsibility. I characterize psychopathic agents as having difficulty with feeling empathic distress, as having problems with consequence salience, and as not susceptible to ‘aversive conditioning.’ First I argue that psychopathic agents show that the systems that underlie receptiveness to moral and pragmatic reasons bifurcate. This raises a unique form of mechanism individuation problem. Second, these bifurcations newly challenge the claim that ‘reactivity is all of a piece.’ If moral and pragmatic receptivity and reactivity are distinct then we lack a reason to believe that pragmatic reactivity implies moral reactivity. Thirdly, I argue that attempts to incorporate bifurcation into MRR relies on a notion of ‘appropriate’ receptiveness that implies motivational internalism, a claim Fischer and Ravizza have previously rejected.

Commentator: Rob Eason (Emerson College)

Christopher Rice (Fordham): “An Objectivist Critique of Nature-fulfillment Theories of Well-Being”

Abstract: Nature-fulfillment theories identify human well-being with human flourishing, or with the exercise of the basic powers and capabilities of human nature. In this paper, I develop an objectivist critique of these theories, focusing especially on the views of Mark
Murphy and Richard Kraut. To do this, I assume the truth of objectivism about well-being, but argue that objective list theories better reflect our central objectivist intuitions than nature-fulfillment views. Here, I focus especially on our intuitions about the value of health, knowledge, and friendship and argue that these diverge from the implications of nature-fulfillment views. I conclude that objective list theories of the kind discussed by Derek Parfit, James Griffin, and Thomas Scanlon best capture our objectivist intuitions and should be given increased attention as objective theories of well-being. To support this contention, I discuss some advantages of objective list theories and defend their pluralistic structure.

Commentator: Jason Raibley (California State University, Long Beach)

Melinda Roberts (TCNJ): “Variabilism and the Asymmetry”

Abstract: Two claims in procreative ethics—together, the Asymmetry—seem highly intuitive. The first is that agents are morally obligated not to bring a miserable child into existence. And the second is that agents are perfectly free to leave a child whose life would be worth living—a happy child—out of existence. The most promising accounts of the Asymmetry suggest that the reason obligations arise in the case of the one child but not the other has something to do with the fact that the one child is among “the people who ever live.” They link the child’s moral status to his or her modal status. But there is a problem. It will not do to say that some people matter morally and others not at all. As the cases suggest, we should instead say that all people—existing, future and merely possible—matter morally. And we should say as well that leaving a person out of existence is (often) a way of making things worse for that person. I argue that we can nonetheless account for the Asymmetry in a cogent and plausible way.

Commentator: Molly Gardner (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Amanda Roth (Michigan): “Queering Reproductive Ethics”

Abstract: In this paper, I apply the insights of feminist epistemology to the case of reproductive ethics and the perspective of GLBQ people given that sexual orientation—like gender and race—is a major axis of social difference and stigmatization and that anti-GLBQ oppression tends to take the form of exclusion (both conceptually and practically) from marriage, parenthood, and family. I argue that centering a GLBQ perspective in doing reproductive ethics might produce unique
epistemic insights. As an example, I offer a case study of two issues in reproductive ethics in which little attention has been paid to GLBQ issues: AID and surrogacy. I attempt to show how much of the dominant philosophical work on these topics fails to consider GLBQ families in any way and so, unsurprisingly, both the policy recommendations and the underlying value judgments in some of this literature ignores GLBQ interests and lives.

Commentator: Edgar Dahl (University of Muenster)

Benjamin Sachs (NYU): “The Hopelessness of Carving Out a Threatening Speech Exception to Freedom of Speech”

Abstract: Over the last 40 years the Supreme Court has been trying to carve out an exception to the First Amendment that would allow the states to regulate some threatening speech. This project has become increasingly urgent and has drawn ever-more attention in the literature due to recent concerns about school bullying and terrorism—two practices that often involve the use of threats. I will argue here that there is nothing the court could do that would be satisfactory. A sensible threatening speech exception is a pipe dream. It is not possible to delineate an exception that excludes the right kinds of threat from protection and meets these two criteria: 1) enforceability; 2) being narrow enough so as not to exclude from free speech protection certain kinds of speech that deserve it.

Commentator: Robert Jones (California State University, Chico)

Alex Silk (Michigan): “Why ‘Ought’ Detaches: Or, Why You Ought to Get With My Friends (If You Want to Be My Lover)”

Abstract: This paper argues that a (suitably revised) standard analysis of modals from formal semantics suggests a solution to the detaching problem — that is, the problem of whether (certain objectionable) unembedded ‘ought’-claims can “detach” (be derived) from hypothetical imperatives and their antecedent conditions. On this analysis, modals have a skeletal conventional meaning and only receive a particular reading (e.g., deontic, epistemic, teleological) relative to certain forms of contextual supplementation. Accordingly, ‘ought’-claims can detach, but only as long as the ‘oughts’ in the conditional premise and conclusion are interpreted relative to the same ordering sources. Detached ‘ought’-claims play a crucial role in practical reasoning: they serve as lemmas, which, in conjunction
with additional normative assumptions, can figure in larger practical arguments. Rival wide-scoping accounts are shown to be deficient on the grounds that they are without a response to certain quantificational variants of the detaching problem.

Commentator: Mark van Roojen (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)

Paulina Sliwa (MIT): “If You Have to Ask... A Defense of Moral Testimony”

Abstract: Moral testimony has been getting a bad name in the recent literature. It has been argued that while testimony is a perfectly fine source for nonmoral belief, there’s something wrong with basing one’s moral beliefs on it. This paper argues that the bad name is undeserved: Moral testimony isn’t any more problematic than nonmoral testimony.

Commentator: Michael Patton (University of Montevallo)

Saul Smilansky (Haifa): “A Hostage Situation”

Commentator: Darren Domsky (Texas A&M University at Galveston)

Marion Smiley (Brandeis): “Re-thinking Paternalism for a Democratic Welfare State”

Abstract: I set out in this paper to re-think ‘paternalism’ so that we are able to grasp it as a threat to democracy and to sketch the contours of a non-paternalistic, democratic welfare state. I argue in Part One that the prevailing concept of paternalism is not, as we now assume it to be, a general description of paternalism per se. Nor does it present paternalism in a socially and politically neutral fashion. Instead, it is a very peculiar – and particular -- construction of its subjective matter that grows out of a distinctly libertarian project. I re-formulate the concept of paternalism in Part Two by focusing attention on the relationships of domination and subordination in which paternalistic choices are made and then use this reformulated concept to sketch the contours of a non-paternalistic, democratic, welfare state that also values individual rights to free choice.

Commentator: Roger Pielke, Jr. (University of Colorado Boulder)

Matt Smith (Yale): “Political Obligation and the Self”

Commentator: Rob Hughes (NIH)
Nicole Ann Smith (Bowling Green): “Situationism: In with a Bang, out with a Whimper”

Abstract: A plausible adequacy condition on accounts of character traits is that they should generate successful predictions of a subject’s overt behavior. A central plank in the so-called “situationist critique” of “traditional” or “common sense” accounts of character traits is that these accounts fail to meet this condition. Situationists support their critique with data from a plethora of experiments in social psychology. These data, they claim, in addition to undermining traditional notions of character, constitute evidence in favor of their own (less “robust”) conception of character traits. Situationism, they conclude, succeeds where the traditional account fails. In this paper, I argue that—to the contrary—when the rival accounts of character traits are properly understood, it is situationism rather than the traditional account that turns out to be empirically inadequate.

Commentator: Joshua Hollowell (UC, Riverside)

Aaron Smuts (Rhode Island College): “In Defense of the No-Reasons View of Love”

Abstract: I argue that although we can try to explain why we love, we can never justify our love. Love is neither based on reasons, nor responsive to reasons, nor can it be assessed for normative reasons. Love can be odd, unfortunate, fortuitous, or even sadly lacking, but it can never be fitting or unfitting. We may have reasons to act on our love, but we cannot justify our loving feelings. Shakespeare’s Bottom is right: “Reason and love keep little company together now-a-days.” Indeed, they keep none and they never kept any: there are no justifying reasons for love.

Commentator: Claudia Mills (University of Colorado Boulder)

Justin Snedegar and Stephen Finlay (USC): “One Ought Too Many”

Abstract: A popular view in moral philosophy is that ‘ought’ is ambiguous between a sense in which it expresses a propositional operator (‘it ought to be the case that…’) and a relation between an agent and an action (‘S ought to A’). This ambiguity thesis goes against a tradition in linguistics and philosophy that holds that ‘ought’ uniformly expresses a propositional operator. Mark Schroeder (2011) has recently argued against uniformity, claiming that it overgenerates ambiguities in ‘ought’ sentences, predicting readings that aren’t there.
We show how Schroeder’s arguments can be resisted by adopting an independently well-motivated contrastive semantics for ‘ought’, on which ‘ought’ sentences are always relativized to sets of alternatives (‘it ought to be that $p$ rather than $a$, $b$, or $c$’). This theory explains the ambiguities that motivate Schroeder’s own view, and diffuse his arguments against uniformity.

Commentator: Robert Shanklin (Santa Clara University)

Daniel Star (Boston U): “Practical Reasons as Evidence, Consequentialism, and Virtue”

Abstract: Consequentialists sometimes seek to explain what virtues are by reference to promotion of the good. Julia Driver, for example, argues that virtues are character traits that generally bring about good outcomes. It is unclear why one should accept this account of virtue, even if one were to accept consequentialism. Driver argues that it is necessary to accept this account of virtue if we are to understand so-called “virtues of ignorance”, especially modesty. I doubt that there are virtues that it is right to categorize in this way, and argue, in particular, that the consequentializing move is unnecessary for understanding modesty. I also argue that normative ethicists, whether consequentialists or not, can accept a more theoretically neutral reason-responding account of virtue, based on the reasons as evidence thesis. The discussion is helped along by consideration of a couple of thought experiments involving virtue-responsive evil demons, which suggest that virtue sometimes comes apart from right action.

Commentator: Caroline Arruda (University of Texas at El Paso)

Jim Swindler (Illinois State): “Reactive Attitudes and Collective Action”

Abstract: Against common naturalistic readings of Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment,” I suggest a more Kantian constructivist approach, pointing to the duality in us between our empirical and moral selves, both of which are expressed in reactive attitudes. I ask whether the same range of attitudes may not also be attributable to groups as to individuals and argue that praising and blaming groups raises questions about group freedom corresponding to those for individuals. Like individuals, groups give norms to themselves, so we can think of them as autonomous. I suggest that Strawson’s “participant” perspective reflects the Kantian moral requirement of
respecting autonomy, both individual and collective, I provide examples of group manifestation of reactive attitudes: (pride, regret, resentment, etc.), and, despite a certain residual dualism, I try to show how understanding group reactive attitudes enhances our grasp of human freedom.

Commentator: Marcus Hedahl (Georgetown University)

Ruth Tallman (Barry U): “Keeping Up Appearances: Moral Exemplarism and the Importance of Looking Good”

Abstract: In this paper, I will suggest that according to a particular subset of virtue theory, moral exemplarism, we ought to be very concerned, not just with reality, but with appearances. I will explain the basic components of the theory and consider who our moral exemplars actually are. Then, I will argue that, if moral exemplarism actually works the way it’s described, exemplars ought not always strive for honesty and transparency, but instead should focus on presenting their best features while concealing their morally ugly ones.

Commentator: James Digiovanna (John Jay College of Criminal Justice)

Christina van Dyke (Calvin College): “Adaptive Antirealism and Adequate Explanations: Defusing the Darwinian Dilemma”

Commentator: Justin Horn (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Arthur Ward (Bowling Green): “Norms of Nature and Goodness-fixing Kinds”

Abstract: In her recent book Normativity, Judith Jarvis Thomson builds a naturalistic neo-Aristotelian moral theory by evaluating members of the kind “human” which is in her terminology a goodness-fixing kind. In this paper I deny that naturalism is consistent with any biological kind, let alone humans, counting as goodness-fixing. I point out that good-of-a-kind analysis entails that there exist norms for the phenotype of an organism. A phenotype, however, is the combination of a genotype and the environment in which it is placed. Even holding fixed some genotype, having a norm for phenotypic outcome requires some norm for environment. The trouble for biological norms, I claim, is that naturalism does not support a mind-independent notion of “proper environment® for an organism. Thus proper phenotypes for organisms, along with goodness-fixing kinds, are ruled out and Thomson,s theory cannot get off the ground. This is a special problem
limited to neo-Aristotelian “norms of nature,” and I do not take it necessarily to undermine more traditional normative concepts of “good” and “right.”

Commentator: Jay Quigley (Florida State University)

**Justin Weinberg (South Carolina): “When Non-Identity Matters”**

Abstract: Some of our choices will affect not only the quality of future people’s lives, but who will exist. Does the identity-shifting effect of such choices itself make a moral difference to how we should choose? Some, like Thomas Schwartz, argue that it makes all the difference. Derek Parfit argues that it makes no difference. In this paper, I defend a middle position. While Parfit shows that there are some cases in which the “non-identity” of the parties in alternative futures does not make a moral difference, I provide some cases that show it does. My explanation for when and why non-identity sometimes matters comes in the form of a pluralist theory of value. One counterintuitive implication of my view, which I defend, is that it is good to create different kinds of people, including people who are typically thought of as defective or badly-off.

Commentator: Doran Smolkin (Kwantlen Polytechnic University)

**Jennifer Welchman (Alberta): “The Mystery of Passenger to Frankfurt, or What’s Wrong with Involuntary Benevolence?”**

Abstract: Agatha Christie’s Passenger to Frankfurt concludes with a moral dilemma: should the protagonists, fighting a conspiracy against the Western world, restrict themselves to conventional means or expose the conspirators to Benvo, a benevolence inducing gas. Prima facie, it seems neither Kantianism nor consequentialism should ground moral objections to using Benvo, since Benvo does not impair one’s rational autonomy (it only intensifies ‘inclinations’) and should promote net happiness. However (i), a Kantian might argue that Benvo could impair personal autonomy if it induced the formation of non-autonomous, ‘sour-grapes,’ adaptive preferences and (ii) a consequentialist might argue that exposed individuals might miss opportunities for important personal goods, resulting in a net loss of utility. I argue that neither sort of objection is compelling and conclude that employing Benvo to defeat the threat posed should not be considered morally problematic. In the circumstances there is nothing wrong with inducing involuntary benevolence.

Commentator: Will Beals (Stanford University)
Fiona Woollard (Southampton, UK): “Have we solved the non-Identity Problem?”

Abstract: It is natural to think that we are required to stop polluting because polluting harms future individuals. This natural thought faces Derek Parfit’s famous Non-Identity Problem. The people who live on the polluted earth would not have existed if we had not polluted. We do not make these individuals worse off. I argue that Parfit’s own proposed solution cannot give an adequate account of our duties to refrain from polluting. I consider attempts to solve the Non-Identity Problem by denying that to harm someone an agent must make them worse off. Such responses provide a partial solution to the Non-Identity Problem. They show that we harm future individuals in a morally relevant sense by polluting. However, harm-based reasons against polluting are less strong than we intuitively believe. Thus an appeal to the claim that we harm future individuals cannot give a fully satisfactory account of constraints against polluting.

Commentator: David Boonin (University of Colorado Boulder)