RoME
Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress

Vicky Spelman
“On Knowing Waste When You See It”

George Sher
“Why We Are Moral Equals”

Alastair Norcross
“Deontology, Using, and Causal Fetishism”
The RoME Congress is a collective effort. Special thanks go to the following parties:

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Benjamin Hale

**Assistant Organizers**
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Paul Bowman

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**Cover Photo**
Left to right: John Nolt (Tennessee), Allen Thompson (Oregon State), Ken Shockley (Buffalo). Photo by Ben Hale.
RoME
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Keynote Speakers

Vicky Spelman (Smith College)
“On Knowing Waste When You See It”

George Sher (Rice)
“Why We Are Moral Equals”

Alastair Norcross (Colorado)
“Deontology, Using, and Causal Fetishism”

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3. **Neera Badhwar** (Oklahoma/George Mason), ‘Reasoning about Wrong Reasons, No Reasons, and Reasons of Virtue’
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   — *Comments: Travis Timmerman (Syracuse)*

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6. **Sara Bernstein** (Duke), ‘Causal Relevance and Moral Luck’
   — *Comments: Geraldine Ng (Reading)*

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51. Nandi Theunissen (Johns Hopkins), ‘On the Value of Human Beings’
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52. Teemu Toppinen (Helsinki), ‘Rule Consequentialism and Kantian Contractualism at Top Rates’
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53. Mike Valdman (Virginia Commonwealth), ‘What’s Wrong with Brainwashing?’
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54. Arthur Ward (Michigan State), ‘Fit, Fitness, and Fittingness’
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55. Justin Weinberg (South Carolina), ‘One True Love’
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56. Rivka Weinberg (Scripps College), ‘You Got Me Into This...’: Procreative Responsibility and its Implications for Suicide and Euthanasia’
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57. Stephen White (Northwestern), ‘Ends Justifying Means’
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58. Eric Wiland (Missouri–St. Louis), ‘Against Advice’
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60. Peter Zuk (Rice), ‘Mill’s Metaethical Noncognitivism’
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Friday Presenters

1. **Corwin Aragon** (Concordia College), ‘Structural Complicity and Responsibility for Injustice’
2. **Samuel Asarnow** (Stanford), ‘Normative Reasons and Non-Monotonic Reasoning’
3. **Amy Berg** (UCSD), ‘Ideal Theory and “Ought Implies Can”’
4. **Yishai Cohen** (Syracuse) and **Travis Timmerman** (Syracuse), ‘Normativity without Metaphysical Vagueness’
5. **Brian Collins** (Iowa), ‘Derivative vs. Non-derivative Moral Principles’
7. **Jonathan Herington** (Kansas State), ‘Consequentialism and Risk’
8. **Matt King** (Alabama-Birmingham), ‘Building Character’
9. **Pamela Lomelino** (Loyola University-Chicago), ‘Are We Communicating?: Rejecting Rethinking Consent as a Communication Process’
10. **Andrew McAninch** (University of Pennsylvania), ‘What is the Value of Deliberation?’
11. **Steven McFarlane** (FSU), ‘Information for Externalists’
12. **Chris Melenovsky** (Pennsylvania), ‘The Basic Structure of Society and Ethical Life’
13. **Geraldine Ng** (Reading), ‘What Moral Luck?’
14. **Patrick Taylor Smith** (Stanford), ‘Two Worries about Indirect Reciprocity Accounts of Intergenerational Cooperation’
15. **Rosa Terlazzo** (Kansas State), ‘Adaptive Preferences, Children, and Ideal Theory’
16. **Aaron Wolf** (Syracuse), ‘Against Rational Exclusion’
17. **Joseph Van Weelden** (McGill), ‘Immoral Deference’

Posters
Saturday Presenters

1. **Caroline Arruda** (Texas-El Paso), ‘Phenomenal Well-Being, Suffering and Full Information Accounts of the Good’

2. **Sameer Bajaj** (Arizona), ‘Why Metanormative Realism Won’t Come from What is Indispensable to Deliberation’

3. **Mark Berger** (Columbia), ‘Pluralism and Practical Reason’

4. **Patrick Clipsham** (Winona State), ‘A Problem for Post-Prior Theories of the Moral/Non-Moral Distinction: Moving Beyond the Logical Autonomy of Ethics’

5. **Daniel Demetriou** (Minnesota-Morris) and **Michael Prideaux** (Minnesota-Morris), ‘The Transgender Normal’

6. **Alexander Dietz** (USC), ‘What We Together Ought to Do’

7. **Aaron Elliott** (Nebraska), ‘Can moral principles explain supervenience?’

8. **Alex Hallam** (Tennessee–Knoxville), ‘A Response to Sharon Street’s ‘Darwinian Dilemma’ For Realist Theories of Value’

9. **Keith Hankins** (Arizona), ‘Responsibility without Culpability’

10. **Jessica Katz** (Bowling Green), ‘Non-Naturalism: Through Thick & Thin’

11. **Amy Massoud** (Syracuse), ‘Moral Worth and Supererogation’

12. **Brennan McDavid** (Princeton), ‘The Epistemology of Phronesis: Connecting Ethical Knowledge with Scientific Knowledge’


14. **Michael Milona** (USC), ‘What Is the Epistemic Role of Emotions in Good Evaluative Inquiry?’

15. **Tyler Paytas** (Washington University-St. Louis), ‘God’s Awful Majesty Before Our Eyes: Kant on Moral Worth and Divine Hiddenness’


17. **Brandon Williams** (Rice), ‘Choose either error theory or objective realism’
1. **Cheryl Abbate** (Marquette), ‘Nonresponsible Threats: the Search for Liability in the Defensive Killing of Nonhuman Animals’

Abstract: While theories of animal rights maintain that nonhuman animals possess prima facie rights, such as the right to life, the dominant philosophies of animal rights permit the killing of nonhuman animals for reasons of self-defense. I argue that the animal rights discourse on defensive killing is problematic because it seems to entail that any nonhuman animal who poses a threat to human beings can be justifiably harmed without question. To avoid this human-privileged conclusion, I suggest that the animal rights position needs to both: (1) deploy a new criterion of liability to defensive harm, and (2) seriously consider whether human beings themselves are liable to defensive harm in human-animal conflicts. By shifting the focus to whether humans are liable to defensive harm, we will find that, in many situations of human-animal conflict, human beings are actually the ones liable to be killed because they are often fully culpable, or at least somewhat responsible, for posing an unjust threat to nonhuman animals.

— Comments: Paul Bowman (Colorado)

2. **Emad Atiq** (Princeton and Yale Law School), ‘On the (obscure) relation between an agent’s blameworthiness and her reasons’

Abstract: It is widely acknowledged that if S is blameworthy for f-ing, then S had a reason not to f. I find in this principle a basis for evaluating competing theories of normative reasons. We might expect that pairing a candidate theory’s account of what it means to have a reason with an independent characterization of blame would explain the truth of the principle. I explore the nature of blame to see whether the expected explanation emerges on neo-Kantian or ‘constitutivist’ theories of normativity, in particular—theories that attempt to ground what it is for an agent to have a reason in what it would take for the agent to avoid irrationality. I find that such
3. **Neera Badhwar** (Oklahoma/George Mason), ‘Reasoning about Wrong Reasons, No Reasons, and Reasons of Virtue’

Abstract: Situationist critics of virtue ethics argue that, in many morally significant situations, most of us unwittingly act for bad reasons - or for no reason. Situational factors trigger automatic cognitive processes that bypass intentional control - but virtue requires such control. Hence, if these claims are true, most of us lack genuine virtue. Too often, however, these claims are made without good reason, because the experimental evidence supports alternative interpretations that are compatible with the agent being in control and acting for the right reason. To the extent that these criticisms are justified, neo-Aristotelian ethics can modify its requirements, because it is committed to basing them on human nature. If some of its requirements are beyond our capacities, then those requirements have no place in the theory, except as part of a regulative ideal.

— **Comments: Andrew McAninch (University of Pennsylvania)**

4. **John Basl** (Northeastern) and **Christian Coons** (Bowling Green), ‘Inferring from Ought to Is: the Puzzle of Moral Science’

Abstract: Consider the following inference:

Ought-To-Is

A. Act utilitarianism is true.

B. It is always morally wrong to kill an innocent child.

Therefore,

C. It never maximizes utility to kill an innocent child.

While C is logically entailed by A and B, it seems clear that one makes some serious mistake in inferring C from A and B. Imagine a sheltered scientist or an isolated hermit who decides to give up direct empirical investigation and instead turns to learning about the empirical world via a study of morality. In this case, though our “moral scientist” may not be fully justified in her belief in A and B,
unless one is willing to simply reject the predominant modes of gathering moral evidence, our scientist appears to have at least some justification for both A and B--but why then doesn’t he have some (defeasible) justification for C? We consider and reject seemingly plausible approaches to solving this puzzle before advocating for our own.

— Comments: Travis Timmerman (Syracuse)

5. Brian Berkey (Stanford), ‘Obligations of Productive Justice: Individual or Institutional?’

Abstract: If it’s a requirement of justice that everyone has access to basic goods and services, then justice requires that the work that’s necessary to produce the relevant goods and provide the relevant services is performed. Two views that are widely accepted, however, together rule out requirements of justice to perform such work. These are, roughly, that the state cannot force people to perform it, and that individuals are not obligated to perform it voluntarily. Lucas Stanczyk argues that we should resolve this inconsistency by endorsing some forms of state coercion, such as compulsory service requirements. I argue that Stanczyk’s proposal fails to fully resolve the inconsistency, and that the further coercive measures that we would have to endorse in order to do so are ones that we have strong reasons to reject. I conclude that we must reject the popular view that principles of justice do not apply directly to individual conduct.

— Comments: Keith Hankins (Arizona)

6. Sara Bernstein (Duke), ‘Causal Relevance and Moral Luck’

Abstract: In a typical case of moral luck, an agent who might have brought about a bad outcome (say, a pedestrian’s death), does not bring about that outcome due to luck. The morally lucky agent is not morally responsible for the bad outcome, since the outcome does not occur. But what do we make of cases in which the bad outcome does occur, but the agent’s causal relationship to the outcome is unclear? This talk develops a new kind of moral luck, proportionality luck, arising from such cases, and gives a causal framework for understanding them.

— Comments: Geraldine Ng (Reading)
7. **Gwen Bradford** (Rice), ‘Uniqueness’

Abstract: What is uniqueness, and how is it valuable? In value theory, uniqueness plays a starring role in transforming the dominant understanding of the nature of intrinsic value. Since G. E. Moore, the orthodox understanding of intrinsic value was the value that something has in virtue of its intrinsic properties. However, this formerly dominant view of intrinsic value was toppled by counterexamples pointing to uniqueness as a value-enhancing property. Uniqueness is an extrinsic property, therefore intrinsic value is not a matter of strictly intrinsic properties. But what is uniqueness, and why is it so special? In this paper, I explore three conceptions of uniqueness, and show that it is not so clear that uniqueness plays the role in value theory with which it has been credited.

— Comments: Aaron Wolf (Syracuse)

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8. **Zac Cogley** (Northern Michigan), ‘Fortifying the Self-Defense Justification of Punishment’

Abstract: David Boonin has recently advanced several challenges to the self-defense justification of punishment. Boonin argues that the self-defense justification of punishment justifies punishing the innocent, justifies disproportionate punishment, and cannot account for mitigating excuses. In this paper, I argue that the self-defense justification, suitably understood, can avoid all of these problems. The self-defense justification is thus more resilient than commonly supposed and deserves to be taken seriously as a justification of punishment.

— Comments: Molly Gardner (North Carolina)

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9. **Daniel Cohen** (Charles Sturt University), ‘An actualist explanation of the procreation asymmetry’

Abstract: Commonsense suggests that procreation is permissible only if it will give rise to the existence of a child with a life worth living. A child, for instance, whose entire life will be filled with pain should not be brought into existence. However, it seems that procreation is never required. For instance, a couple may choose not to have a child even if they are confident that the child would lead a very happy life. Despite the plausibility of these two commonsense claims, it turns out to be very hard to reconcile them. In this paper, I attempt to vindicate this asymmetry -- the claim that we are
obligated not to create miserable children, but have no obligation to create happy children. I do so by appealing to a kind of moral actualism, according to which the value of a world (whether actual or merely possible) is determined only by welfare of its actual denizens - i.e. those who also exist in the actual world.

— Comments: Alexander Dietz (USC)

10. M. Victoria Costa (William and Mary), ‘Cosmopolitanism as a Virtue’

Abstract: In this paper I defend an account of cosmopolitanism as a corrective virtue in the sense introduced by Philippa Foot. In particular, cosmopolitanism corrects a common and dangerous human tendency to form overly strong identifications with political entities such as countries, nations, and cultures. I argue that my account can to some degree unify the current heterogeneous collection of cosmopolitan theories, and I illustrate this claim with a brief discussion of Jeremy Waldron’s and Simon Keller’s views. One central objection is that the value of cosmopolitan attitudes and dispositions is more controversial than the value of traditional virtues: if virtues are beneficial, and if cosmopolitanism is virtue, why is it that many people do not have a positive attitude towards it? Since there is no widespread agreement about the value of cosmopolitan virtue, I offer a number of explanations for this common error.

— Comments: Yena Lee (Princeton)

11. Eva Dadlez (Central Oklahoma), ‘The Robustness of Immoralism: A Reply to Anne Eaton’

Abstract: The starting point of this paper is a recent exchange in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism that pits moderate moralism against robust immoralism and has Humean antecedents. I will proceed by agreeing in part with both, but fully with neither, thereby annoying as many people as possible in one go. I believe, with Anne Eaton, the proponent of robust immoralism, that fictions which valorize what she calls Rough Heroes can arouse both aesthetically compelling and morally troubling reactions. On the other hand, I argue (and this puts me at least partly in Noel Carroll’s moderate moralist camp) that the troubling moral reaction targeted need not be a sufficient ground for attributing a moral flaw to the work itself. The works of Eaton’s robust immoralism do not prescribe unethical
attitudes. Rather, they confront us with heroes who combine positive traits with negative moral ones.

— Comments: Christina van Dyke (Calvin College)

12. Dale Dorsey (Kansas), ‘A Good Death’

Abstract: The standard account of the value or disvalue of death is pretty straightforward. Typically, death is an instrumental bad. It’s bad because of the goods it has the disposition to prevent. Given that I would have obtained additional welfare benefits had I not died when I did, my death causes me to miss out on intrinsic goods I might otherwise have gotten. But this glum picture of death sometimes masks the ways in which death can be good. Most obviously, death can be an instrumental good. If the remainder of your life is of negative welfare, it may be, on balance, good for you to die earlier rather than later. For the purposes of this paper, anyway, I accept everything so far said. But I’d like to go further. The accounts so far canvassed seem to miss an important way that death can be good for the person who dies: death can be not just a good, but an intrinsic good. Indeed, it can be intrinsically good even if to die at that time in that way was not valued by the person in question: death’s intrinsic goodness (at least on my account) is not explained by its being valued, but rather by fitting, or contributing to, the valued projects a person undertakes during their lives.

— Comments: Doran Smolkin (Kwantlen Polytechnic University)

13. Kirsten Egerstrom (Syracuse), ‘Meaning without Fulfillment’

Abstract: In Susan Wolf’s (2010) Meaning in Life and Why it Matters, Wolf defends a compelling conception of meaning in life. For Wolf, one necessary component of a meaningful life is a feeling of fulfillment. The implication of this view is that a meaningful life necessarily feels good. In contrast to Wolf, I argue that some types of painful, difficult or (more generally) negative experiences – ones associated with predominately negative emotions – can also be meaningful. For example, a markedly negative romantic relationship or getting kicked out of graduate school may count as meaningful. Wolf’s insistence that positive affect is a necessary condition of meaning in life would ultimately rule these types of formative life experiences out as unworthy of consideration. I will argue, contra
Wolf, that a person can draw meaning from some life experiences in spite of the fact that they are not fulfilling.

— Comments: Ed Sherline (Wyoming)


Abstract: I begin by consider three examples of animal experiments. Two of these experiments are widely acknowledged to be morally reprehensible. The third experiment is a typical example of biomedical research that is regarded as perfectly permissible (in not obligatory). I argue that by any objective measure the “perfectly permissible” experiment is morally worse than the two reprehensible experiments. Since virtually all animal experiments share the wrong-making features of the two reprehensible experiments, there is a prima facie case for the wrongness of virtually animal experiments. Thus, we have a strong prima facie case against virtually all forms of animal experimentation. The proponent of animal experimentation must find a morally relevant difference between the three examples under consideration, which justifies the one experiment. Absent such a justification, the prima facie case against animal experimentation becomes an ultima facie case against such research. I conclude with a brief look at the so-called “benefits argument” and argue that it fails on both utilitarian and deontological grounds.

— Comments: Sharon Hartline (Radford)

15. Iskra Fileva (Michigan), ‘Context without Contextualism’

Abstract: Our standards of traits, including virtuous traits, depend on context -- an ordinarily vigilant person may be seen as not vigilant enough for a spy, while a not so industrious person may be seen as industrious enough to be a librarian. The problem that interests me in this essay is what follows from the observed context-sensitivity of our traits with regard to virtue? Should we be contextualists about virtuous traits? Edward Slingerland has recently argued “yes,” and in so doing, he has taken a step in the right direction: any viable conception of traits must incorporate contextual constraints, or so I claim. But in endorsing contextualism, I further suggest, Slingerland goes too far. His proposal has a missing element: a normative constraint on motivation. My purpose here is to develop an account of traits, especially virtuous traits, which does justice to the
importance of context without falling prey to the problems plaguing contextualism.

— Comments: Jon Tresan (Rochester)


Abstract: Most defenses of ethical veganism rely on either a welfarist approach (a family of approaches that claim that the welfare of animals deserves equal moral consideration) or an animal rights approach (which tend to rely on the much stronger claim that nonhuman animals have inviolable rights). There are a number of common, intuitively convincing arguments against both of these approaches. After surveying these objections, we argue that a much stronger defense of ethical veganism follows from the claim that there is something especially problematic with actions that inappropriately treat nonhuman animals as commodities (we understand a commodity to be something for which it is appropriate to allow the norms of the market to exclusively regulate its production and exchange). We show that this anti-commodification view gives us all the necessary resources to respond to the strongest objections to ethical veganism.

— Comments: Alastair Norcross (Colorado)

17. Robyn Gaier (Viterbo), ‘Self-love and Moral Agency’

Abstract: Self-love is a largely neglected topic in discussions concerning moral agency. Certainly when self-love is equated with egoism or self-infatuation, it is seen as standing in opposition to what morality demands of an agent – namely, respect for others. But I aim to challenge this common understanding of self-love by suggesting a plausible and promising way of understanding self-love that is deserving of attention in discussions concerning moral agency. Specifically, I will draw upon Eleonore Stump’s relational account of self-love, which maintains that self-love consists of both the desire for one’s well-being and the desire for internal integration. I will proceed to suggest that our basic assumptions about moral agency presuppose such an account of self-love. Hence, I aim to show that self-love is actually a necessary condition for moral agency.

— Comments: Jennifer Baker (College of Charleston)
18. **Joshua Gert** (William and Mary), ‘A Fitting End to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’

Abstract: This paper uses a particular view of the basic emotions in order to develop and defend an account of certain emotion-linked evaluative properties, such as the shameful, the infuriating, and the fearsome. The view of the emotions was developed by Bernard Gert, and it holds that felt emotions are constituted by an awareness that one is about to behave in a certain way. The point of felt emotions is not to cause behavior, but to allow higher cognitive faculties to veto or guide our automatic behavioral impulses. This view of the emotions provides support for a fitting-attitude account of certain evaluative properties. The nature of the account makes these properties analogous to secondary qualities, and therefore sidesteps the need for a solution to the well-known Wrong Kind of Reasons problem. Throughout the paper, a contrast is made with the rational sentimentalism of Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson.

— **Comments: Aaron Elliott (Nebraska)**

19. **Jason Hanna** (Northern Illinois), ‘Enabling Harm and Withdrawing Aid’

Abstract: There has been considerable controversy surrounding the moral status of harm-enabling, or behavior by which an agent removes an obstacle to the completion of a threatening sequence. I argue that enabling harm is equivalent to doing harm, at least when an agent withdraws a resource to which neither she nor the victim has any prior moral claims. I then use this conclusion to revive and refine a challenge to the relevance of the doing/allowing distinction: sometimes, an agent who terminates her own assistance thereby does harm, though her behavior lacks the moral status ordinarily attributed to harm-doing. In developing this challenge, I argue that the existing literature on withdrawal-of-aid cases overlooks a more fundamental problem concerning the moral relevance of an agent’s past behavior.

— **Comments: Cinzia Smothers (Bowling Green)**

20. **Amelia Hicks** (Kansas State), ‘Internalism, Moral Recklessness, and Vegetarianism’

Abstract: One must adopt of a form of internalism about culpability in order to make sense of the view that people who are uncertain of the moral status of animals should provisionally adopt veganism
(or some similar practice). I give a reason for adopting a schematic version of internalism about culpability, and defend that reason from a recent objection. I then show that internalism supports a moral recklessness principle, and defend that principle from another recent objection. This principle tells us that those who (a) are uncertain of the status of animals, (b) have good alternatives to the status quo (with respect to animal consumption), but (c) nevertheless participate in the status quo, are reckless. Finally, I argue that because we have good reason to think that participation in the status quo is reckless, the burden of proof in the animal consumption debate falls on those who endorse the status quo.

— Comments: Patrick Clipsham (Winona State)

21. Dien Ho (MCPHS University), ‘Paid Surrogacy and the Commercialization of Parenthood’

Abstract: A number of philosophers have objected to paid surrogacy on grounds that it commodifies children. In response to this objection, proponents of paid surrogacy such as Heidi Malm and Jo Kornegay have argued that the contracting parties are paying for services rendered by the surrogates and not children. In this paper, I wish to revisit the issue. To wit, I offer a novel argument that shows that paid gestational surrogacy does not differ from moral point of view from baby-selling. Both gestational surrogacy (where the surrogates provide gestation) and full surrogacy (where the surrogates provide gestation and ova) involve the commercialization of parenthood. The real issue confronting paid surrogacy is thus not whether it entails baby-selling per se but whether we wish to permit the trade of money for parenthood.

— Comments: Teresa Blankmeyer-Burke (Gallaudet)

22. Chris Howard (Arizona), ‘In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reasons’

Abstract: In recent work, Jonathan Way defends the skeptical view that reasons of the wrong kind (WKR) are reasons to want and to bring about attitudes, but not reasons for those attitudes (WKR skepticism). His argument turns on the fact that reasons transmit: that there’s often reason to do some action, or to have some attitude, because there’s reason to do some other action, or to have some other attitude. Way argues that WKR transmit in a way that’s distinctive of such reasons, and that only WKR skeptics
can explain why this is so. He claims that this fact lends important support to WKR skepticism. Here, I argue that those who don’t deny the existence of WKRs can explain the way in which such reasons transmit. The upshot is that WKR skepticism can’t gain in plausibility from its purportedly unique ability to explain why WKRs transmit in the way that they do.

— Comments: Samuel Asarnow (Stanford)

23. Stephen Kershnar (SUNY–Fredonia), ‘Reporting Atrocities and Morality’

Abstract: In summary, I argued that if soldiers have a strong duty to report fellow soldiers who commit atrocities, then reporting prevents a catastrophe. The conclusion is based on the notion that if soldiers have a strong duty to so report fellow soldiers, then the duty is either duty is based on its bringing about the best results or based on a moral principle. If it is the former, then reporting prevents a catastrophe. If it is the latter, then the duty correlates with either a human right or another right. There is no such correlative duty.

These arguments do not show that reporting is wrong. They do not show that military law shouldn’t require reporting. They merely establish that in some cases, there is no moral duty to report.

— Comments: Sam Shook (Wyoming)

24. David Killoren (Coastal Carolina), ‘Robust Moral Realism: An Excellent Religion’

Abstract: I argue that robust moral realism—i.e., non-naturalist moral realism—requires faith, and (relatedly) is a religion or is close to being one. However, I also argue that robust moral realism can be an especially good religion, because it lacks some of the worst features of traditional religion. Specifically, robust moral realism, unlike traditional religions such as Christianity, avoids wishful thinking, is profoundly simple, and is guaranteed not to interfere with the progress of natural science. As an added bonus, robust moral realism might even be supported by our total evidence.

— Comments: Yishai Cohen (Syracuse)

25. Victor Kumar (Michigan), ‘Liberal Disgust’

Abstract: Many liberal philosophers are skeptical of moral disgust because of its apparent affiliation with conservative values, and
seek to ground their skepticism in the science of disgust. In fact, empirical research shows that disgust features in liberal moral psychology and suggests that it has laudable moral functions. The basic function of disgust is to motivate avoidance of biological contaminants that cause disease and infection. But this causal role of disgust has been repurposed. Disgust gained a foothold in morality by promoting ingroup norms, but it has since come to play an important role in reciprocity norms and political norms. Disgust motivates an important form of punishment, social exclusion, and acts as a signaling system to coordinate attitudes and behavior. Thus, although disgust has its roots in food and filth, and has acquired a link with outgroup prejudice, it also supports liberal values.

— Comments: Sameer Bajaj (Arizona)


Abstract: The ‘skill model’ takes the performances of artisans and athletes as paradigms of agency: though these individuals perform automatically, without thought or reflection, they can do so only because of the conscious effort involved in learning their skills. Not only is this proposal intuitively appealing, it also seems to block a recent skeptical line that suggests that automatic mechanisms—not conscious deliberation—drive practical decision making.

But the skill model is inadequate. To show this, I focus on Julia Annas’s proposal, arguing that it offers a moral psychology that is both overly intellectualized and implausibly narrow. I then show that by giving greater place to a distinctive form of anxiety, we get better model of the psychology of virtuous agency. Anxiety is an automatic mechanism that prompts conscious deliberation. Thus, while the skeptic may be correct that emotions drive practical judgment, he’s wrong to think there’s no real role for conscious deliberation.

— Comments: Mark Berger (Columbia)


Abstract: Drawing on recent work by Mark Johnston, I argue that four-dimensionalists about persons face a dilemma: reject the permissibility of rational prudence or else accept what I call Unrestricted Aggregation, according to which it is permissible to impose a burden on someone just in case doing so results in a
greater net sum of benefits over burdens. I argue that, because rational prudence is permissible, four-dimensionalists must endorse Unrestricted Aggregation. I consider whether four-dimensionalists can avoid the dilemma by embracing a less radical principle of interpersonal aggregation called R-Related Aggregation. While R-Related Aggregation captures many of our commonsense intuitions, I ultimately argue that Unrestricted Aggregation does a better job of unifying and explaining these intuitions. Relying on recent work in cognitive science, I argue that humans are implicitly committed to Unrestricted Aggregation, but that failures of empathy cause them to systematically misapply it.

— Comments: David Faraci (North Carolina)

28. Hallie Liberto (UConn) and Fred Harrington (Edgewood College), ‘Evil, Wrongdoing, and Concept Distinctness’

Abstract: Philosophers theorizing about ‘evil’ usually distinguish evil actions from ordinary wrongdoing. They either attempt to isolate some quality or set of qualities shared by all evil actions that is not found in other wrongful actions, or they concede that evil is only distinguished by capturing the very worst acts on the scale of moral wrongness. The idea that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing has recently been under contention. We argue that there is a third option, which we call Quality of Emphasis (QE) distinctness, that might be useful for a variety of philosophical accounts of evil. Under QE distinctness, two concepts might share all of the same qualities, but the degree to which an action instantiates one concept as opposed to the other is determined by an emphasis placed on a different particular characteristic. Our broader philosophical point is that conceptual distinctions need not be limited to either purely quantitative or purely qualitative distinctions.

— Comments: Mike Huemer (Colorado)

29. Eden Lin (Rutgers–Newark), ‘Humeanism and Desire Satisfactionism’

Abstract: Humeanism says that there is a reason for you to perform an action if and only if this would promote the satisfaction of one your desires. Desire Satisfactionism says that you are well off in proportion to how well-satisfied your desires are. I raise two puzzles for Humeanism, and I explain how desire satisfactionism can help solve them. The first concerns cases about which Humeanism is
presently silent: the question is how the view should be precisified. Drawing on what desire satisfactionism says about analogous cases, I argue for a particular precisification of Humeanism. The second concerns cases about which the Humeans’ view might, by their own lights, be mistaken: the question is whether the view should be substantially reformulated. I argue that if Humeans want to accommodate a plausible principle connecting an agent’s welfare and her reasons, they must reformulate their view to more closely parallel desire satisfactionism.

— Comments: Caroline Arruda (Texas-El Paso)

30. Theresa Lopez (Hamilton College), ‘On Moral Nativism and Moral Skepticism’

Abstract: Claims about morality’s evolutionary origins have entered into several recent debunking arguments. Compared to other hypotheses about how evolution influences moral judgment, moral nativism – the view that we are endowed with innate cognitive mechanisms specific to the moral domain – figures in an especially compelling case for skepticism. Some have argued that if moral nativism is true, it ultimately follows that our moral beliefs are all unjustified (Joyce, 2006). To evaluate this argument, I examine the details of the relevant moral psychological theses. Based on recent findings in moral psychology, a wide range of nativist positions and critiques of nativist accounts have been developed. Yet the implications of these findings for debates in moral epistemology have remained largely unexplored. I argue that while certain forms of moral nativism may lend support to moral skepticism, forms of moral nativism that are tenable in light of current findings from moral psychology do not.

— Comments: Michael Milona (USC)

31. Errol Lord (UPenn), ‘Bad for Herself and for Others: The Vices of a Consequentialist Character’

Abstract: This paper has three aims. First, I will argue for a new version of the character based objection to impartial consequentialism. Impartial consequentialism, when combined with plausible assumptions, entails that we ought to have an impartial psychology. This psychology is incompatible with, among other things, being a good friend. Second, I will argue that the moral psychology used to motivate this character based objection
reveals the importance of a partial psychology to the welfare of creatures like us. Third, I will use this result to argue that impartial consequentialism is over-demanding insofar as it requires us to have impartial psychologies. Thus, it turns out that by thinking about the best version of the character based objection will lead us to a plausible version of the over-demandingness objection.

— Comments: Tyler Paytas (Washington University-St. Louis)

32. Kris McDaniel (Syracuse), ‘Metaphysical Naturalness and Normativity’

— Comments: Michaela McSweeney (Princeton)

33. Howard Nye (Alberta), ‘The Butterfly Effect Argument Against Constraints on Harming’

Abstract: In this paper I argue that all plausible theories of agent-centered constraints against causing harm are undermined by the likelihood that our actions will make the world drastically different than it would have been. Theories that impose constraints against intended harming but none against foreseen harming have unacceptable implications for choices between more and less harmful ways of securing greater goods. Theories that impose constraints against “proximally” caused harm but none against “distally” caused harm have similarly unacceptable implications. This leaves as plausible only theories that impose constraints against some distally caused harm. I argue that, given the dramatic distal effects our actions are likely to have, these theories entail that any way we could live our lives involves unjustified killing, and that any version of them that is strong enough to be plausible entails that we are morally required either to allow ourselves to waste away or kill ourselves.

— Comments: Amy Massoud (Syracuse)

34. Kate Padgett Walsh (Iowa State), ‘Love as Freedom in Frankfurt and Hegel’

Abstract: Few philosophers have thought that freedom and love might be connected in an important way. Harry Frankfurt is an exception. To be autonomous, Frankfurt contends, is to follow the commands of love. In this paper, I examine Frankfurt’s account of love as freedom. I argue that he oversimplifies their connection because he defines love too narrowly. A richer approach, I suggest,
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Friday Poster Presentations

1. **Corwin Aragon** (Concordia College), ‘Structural Complicity and Responsibility for Injustice’
2. **Samuel Asarnow** (Stanford), ‘Normative Reasons and Non-Monotonic Reasoning’
3. **Amy Berg** (UCSD), ‘Ideal Theory and “Ought Implies Can”’
4. **Yishai Cohen** (Syracuse) and **Travis Timmerman** (Syracuse), ‘Normativity without Metaphysical Vagueness’
5. **Brian Collins** (Iowa), ‘Derivative vs. Non-derivative Moral Principles’
7. **Jonathan Herington** (Kansas State), ‘Consequentialism and Risk’
8. **Matt King** (Alabama-Birmingham), ‘Building Character’
9. **Pamela Lomelino** (Loyola University-Chicago), ‘Are We Communicating?: Rejecting Rethinking Consent as a Communication Process’
10. **Andrew McAninch** (University of Pennsylvania), ‘What is the Value of Deliberation?’
11. **Steven McFarlane** (FSU), ‘Information for Externalists’
12. **Chris Melenovsky** (Pennsylvania), ‘The Basic Structure of Society and Ethical Life’
13. **Geraldine Ng** (Reading), ‘What Moral Luck?’
14. **Patrick Taylor Smith** (Stanford), ‘Two Worries about Indirect Reciprocity Accounts of Intergenerational Cooperation’
15. **Rosa Terlazzo** (Kansas State), ‘Adaptive Preferences, Children, and Ideal Theory’
16. **Aaron Wolf** (Syracuse), ‘Against Rational Exclusion’
17. **Joseph Van Weelden** (McGill), ‘Immoral Deference’
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Saturday Poster Presentations

1. Caroline Arruda (Texas-El Paso), 'Phenomenal Well-Being, Suffering and Full Information Accounts of the Good'
2. Sameer Bajaj (Arizona), 'Why Metanormative Realism Won't Come from What is Indispensable to Deliberation'
3. Mark Berger (Columbia), 'Pluralism and Practical Reason'
4. Patrick Clipsham (Winona State), 'A Problem for Post-Prior Theories of the Moral/Non-Moral Distinction: Moving Beyond the Logical Autonomy of Ethics'
5. Daniel Demetriou (Minnesota-Morris) and Michael Prideaux (Minnesota-Morris), 'The Transgender Normal'
6. Alexander Dietz (USC), 'What We Together Ought to Do'
7. Aaron Elliott (Nebraska), 'Can moral principles explain supervenience?'
8. Alex Hallam (Tennessee-Knoxville), 'A Response to Sharon Street's 'Darwinian Dilemma' For Realist Theories of Value'
9. Keith Hankins (Arizona), 'Responsibility without Culpability'
10. Jessica Katz (Bowling Green), 'Non-Naturalism: Through Thick & Thin'
11. Amy Massoud (Syracuse), 'Moral Worth and Supererogation'
12. Brennan McDavid (Princeton), 'The Epistemology of Phronesis: Connecting Ethical Knowledge with Scientific Knowledge'
14. Michael Milona (USC), 'What Is the Epistemic Role of Emotions in Good Evaluative Inquiry?'
15. Tyler Paytas (Washington University-St. Louis), 'God's Awful Majesty Before Our Eyes: Kant on Moral Worth and Divine Hiddenness'
16. Adam Thompson (Nebraska), 'Beyond Reactive Attitudes: A 'Strawsonian', Anti-Humean Account of Holding Responsible'
17. Brandon Williams (Rice), 'Choose either error theory or objective realism'
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**Keynote Presentation:**
Alastair Norcross, “Deontology, Using, and Causal Fetishism”
University Memorial Center (UMC) Student Union 235
can be found in Hegel’s writings on ethics. Like Frankfurt, Hegel conceives of freedom partly in terms of love. But he also recognizes that love has limits; on its own, love provides only a partial degree of freedom. And love is freeing, Hegel proposes, not just because it allows us to more wholeheartedly be ourselves, but because it also takes us out of ourselves.

— Comments: Adam Thompson (Nebraska-Lincoln)

35. Laura Papish (George Washington), ‘The Empirical Adequacy of Kantian Ethics’

Abstract: For the past decade, Aristotelians have tried to counter John Doris’s criticism that we neither have, nor have the capacity to develop, character traits of the kind envisioned by Aristotelians. My paper considers whether Kantianism likewise depends on a concept of character that appears problematically at odds with empirical findings. To answer this question, I begin by showing that even though Kantian ethics is rightly described as pure, Kant is nonetheless vulnerable to the criticisms outlined by Doris. Responding to work from Patrick Frierson, I then raise several questions about whether Kant’s moral psychology can accommodate the empirical research. I conclude by outlining two possible ways we might attempt to balance Kantianism and situationist recommendations concerning how to facilitate moral progress.

— Comments: Garrett Bredeson (Vanderbilt)


Abstract: I argue that an adequate practical theory must not be exclusively act-orientated but must instead be attitude dependent. For it not to be exclusively act-orientated, it must require more from us than just the performance of certain voluntary acts. And for it to be attitude-dependent, it must hold that what we ought to do depends on what attitudes (e.g., desires, beliefs, and intentions) we ought to have. I argue, then, that we have obligations not only to voluntarily perform certain actions, but also to involuntarily form certain attitudes. Indeed, I argue that whatever obligations we have with respect to actions derive from our obligations with respect to attitudes. The resulting view, which I call attitudism, holds that an agent is obligated to perform an action if and only if it’s the action
that she would perform if she were to have the attitudes that she ought to have.

— Comments: Jonathan Herington (Kansas State)

37. Matjaž Potrc (Ljubljana) and Vojko Strahovnik (Ljubljana), ‘Cognitive Expressivism as Revolutionary Proposal’

Abstract: The paper consists of four parts. Part I briefly introduces Mackie’s error theory with special emphasis upon the cognitivist/descriptivist angle aiming to cast some light on reasons why and how Mackie accepted it. Part II examines consequences following from the famous error conclusion: what we have to do if and when we become convinced in the truth of error theory. The frame of the debate includes both Mackie’s response and a more recent proposal by Köhler and Ridge offering to accept revolutionary expressivism in light of error theory. In part III we argue that the best version of expressivism to accept in the light of error conclusion is cognitive expressivism, which not only preserves function of moral discourse but also captures the phenomenology of moral thought and language. Part IV proposes a more wide-ranging analysis of the longstanding debate between cognitivism and noncognitivism.

— Comments: Alex Hallam (Tennessee-Knoxville)

38. Michael Pressman (USC), ‘A Defense of Average Utilitarianism’

Abstract: Seemingly every theory of population ethics is confronted with unpalatable implications. While various approaches to the subject have been taken, including non-consequentialist approaches, this area has been dominated by utilitarian thought. The two main approaches to population ethics have been total utilitarianism (“TU”) and average utilitarianism (“AU”). According to TU, we should seek to bring about the state of affairs that maximizes the total amount of happiness. According to AU, we should seek to bring about the state of affairs that maximizes average per capita happiness. Both theories have been afflicted by seemingly strong objections, and as a result, numerous variations and hybrids have been introduced. Despite the widespread disagreement in the field, though, a near consensus has developed in rejecting AU as an absurd view. In this paper, however, I will go against the grain and argue that AU is the theory of population ethics that we should endorse.

— Comments: Ramona Ilea (Pacific University)
39. **Ryan Preston-Roedder** (North Carolina) and **Erica Preston-Roedder**, ‘Grief and Recovery’

Abstract: Imagine that someone recovers relatively quickly, say, within two or three months, from grief over the death of her spouse, whom she loved, and who loved her; and suppose that, after some brief interval, she remarries. Does the fact that she feels better and moves on relatively quickly somehow diminish the quality of her relationship? Does it constitute a failure to do well by her spouse? Our aim is to respond to two arguments that give affirmative answers to these questions: the first is developed by Dan Moller in ‘Love and Death’, while the second derives from some classic literary discussions of grief. Responding to these arguments promises to dissolve certain anxieties about whether or not we do well by the people we love when then die. Beyond this, it promises to help us better understand what it means to cultivate good relationships with these people during their lives.

— **Comments: Mark Boespflug (Bowling Green)**

40. **Duncan Purves** (Wyoming), ‘How to Raise the Leveling-Down Objection without Appealing to the Slogan’

Abstract: The Levelling Down Objection is a powerful objection to telic egalitarianism, but its success has been thought to depend on a tacit commitment to a problematic principle known as the Slogan. According to the Slogan, one outcome cannot be better or worse than another unless there is someone for whom it is better or worse. It has been widely assumed that, in order to preserve their position, non-egalitarians must either address the Slogan’s problems or go in search of a new principle to support the Levelling Down Objection. In this article, I argue that this widely held assumption is mistaken. I provide a new version of the Levelling Down Objection, situated in the context of Parfit’s Non-identity Problem, which demonstrates egalitarianism’s implausible implications while avoiding a tacit appeal to the Slogan. I argue that this poses a stronger challenge to egalitarianism than has previously been offered.

— **Comments: Kristina Meshelski (CSU-Northridge)**


Abstract: Recent psychological research indicates that deontological judgments about trolley-style cases are automatic and triggered by
affective responses (some of which have evolutionary explanations), while utilitarian judgments result from controlled cognitive processing. Greene, Singer, and others say these findings support the truth of utilitarianism. This argument fails. Ignoring possible problems with the data, it overlooks the fact that judgments resulting from automatic processing are in many contexts more rather than less reliable. Also, emotions are known to play a supporting role in reliable cognition, more generally, and so they may play a supporting role in moral cognition, especially if moral views besides utilitarianism and Kamm’s version of deontology are considered. Furthermore, all moral intuitions – including the intuitions that pleasure is good and each is to count for one (and none for more than one) – are “the biological residue of our evolutionary history,” so this fact cannot be used to attack deontological intuitions alone. Finally, this argument ignores the spooky ontological commitments of the best versions of utilitarianism.

— Comments: Dan Lowe (Colorado)

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42. **Nick Riggle** (NYU), ‘Ideals as Metaphors’

Abstract: Sometimes our actions are motivated by our identifying with a personal ideal. What are personal ideals, and how do they move us to act? Someone who aspires to be a philosopher might think “I am a philosopher” by way of motivating herself to think hard about a philosophical question. But doing so seems to require her to act on an inaccurate self-description, given that she isn’t yet what she regards herself as being. How should we understand this kind of self-regard? J. David Velleman develops the thought that ideals are a kind of fictional self-conception. In this paper, I discuss Velleman’s view and develop and defend an alternative model, according to which ideal-self-conceptions are metaphors. Thinking of oneself as a philosopher, under the guise of an ideal, is like thinking of Juliet as the sun, under the influence of love.

— Comments: Julia Staffel (Washington University-St. Louis)

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43. **Sarah Roberts-Cady** (Fort Lewis College), ‘Rawls and Justice for Nonhuman Animals’

Abstract: Some people hold that we have duties of justice to nonhuman animals. John Rawls, author of the most influential theory of justice of the 20th century, is often assumed to hold the opposite position. Many philosophers assume that Rawls’ theory only includes duties to rational beings capable of consenting to a
contract. Despite this, other philosophers have tried to modify Rawls’ view to incorporate duties of justice to nonhuman animals. I believe that many of the interlocutors in this discussion have failed to examine adequately the distinction between the subjects and objects of duties of justice. I argue that Rawls’ theory potentially can be extended to include nonhuman animals, but only if a clear distinction is maintained between the subjects and objects of duties of justice. Further, I argue that Mark Coeckelbergh’s attempt to extend Rawls’ theory to include nonhuman animals is flawed because it fails to maintain this distinction.

— Comments: Patrick Taylor Smith (Stanford)

44. Gina Schouten (Illinois State), ‘Does the Gendered Division of Labor Undermine Citizenship?’

Abstract: Despite women’s increased labor force participation, household divisions of labor remain highly unequal. Certain policy initiatives could bring about a more equal sharing of paid work and caring work. But such initiatives face a daunting justificatory burden within the theoretical framework of political liberalism, which imposes demanding criteria for legitimate political interventions into the life of the family. Some theorists have argued that political liberalism can approve gender egalitarian political interventions. One recent such argument concludes that political liberalism—and in particular that framework’s commitment to the realization of citizenship—imposes substantive feminist requirements on the just liberal state. My project is to show that, in its current form, this argument can show only that a hierarchal gendered division of labor (GDL) undermines citizenship. This limitation is problematic for two reasons: First, the GDL is not essentially hierarchal, and morally objectionable harms would persist even if the GDL were non-hierarchal. Second, the policy initiatives licensed by a hierarchal diagnosis of the GDL would actually exacerbate the morally objectionable harms that inhere in the non-hierarchal features of the GDL.

— Comments: Amy Berg (UCSD)

45. Daniel Silvermint (UConn), ‘Resisting for Other Reasons’

Abstract: Does a victim have to intend to resist oppression in order to discharge her obligation to do so, or is it sufficient to resist oppression intentionally in the course of pursuing other life plans and projects of importance to her? This is the difference between,
say, a woman calling attention to sexist double standards in the workplace in order to advance the cause of equality, and a woman calling attention to them because she wants to advance in an otherwise rewarding profession. I argue that resisting intentionally can be sufficient to discharge a victim’s obligation: given that certain valuable plans and projects are systematically complicated or blocked by oppressive burdens, their active pursuit by victims sometimes just is resistance. Requiring that victims count ‘ending oppression’ among their projects misses a wide range of everyday responses to oppressive burdens – responses that are morally worthwhile and that can still cost victims greatly.

— Comments: Amandine Catala (Université du Québec a Montréal)

46. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke), ‘Implicit Moral Attitudes’

Abstract: Most moral philosophers and psychologists focus on explicit moral beliefs that people give as answers to questions. However, much research in social psychology shows that implicit moral attitudes (unconscious beliefs or associations) also affect our thinking and behavior. This talk will report our new psychological and neuroscientific research on implicit moral attitudes (using a process dissociation procedure) and then explore potential implications for scientific moral psychology as well as for philosophical theories of moral epistemology, responsibility, and virtue. If there is time, I will discuss practical uses of these findings in criminal law, especially regarding the treatment of psychopaths and prediction of their recidivism.

— Comments: Steven McFarlane (Florida State)

47. Saul Smilansky (Haifa), ‘Can an egalitarian be very good?’

— Comments: Chris Melenovsky (Penn)


Abstract: Action is more than mere intention. Rather, it is intention engaged with the world. Our actions extend beyond our minds, beyond even our skin. The most relationship between mind and world that is most relevant for understanding action is the reliance-
relation. What we rely upon is a part of our actions. Thus, an action that involves reliance on a morally odious state of affairs is itself partially a manifestation of that state of affairs. Just as, for example, a child catching the wave with the help of her parent is an expression of the child’s intentions and an expression of the parent’s intentions (to say nothing of the wave), more generally, one’s actions can be a concrete manifestation of both, on the one hand, one’s own intentions, and, on the other hand, the morally odious conditions on which one relied in order to act. Consequently, actions have, at least in part, the moral character of their conditions of realization in virtue of the way that the reliance-relation, which bridges the gap between intentions and the alien world, facilitates and extends human agency. This essay explores this phenomenon.

— Comments: Matt King (UAB)

49. **Toby Svoboda** (Fairfield) and **David Morrow** (Alabama-Birmingham), ‘Geo-engineering and non-ideal theory’

Abstract: The strongest arguments for the permissibility of geoengineering rely implicitly on non-ideal theory—roughly, the theory of justice as applied to situations of partial compliance with principles of ideal justice. In an ideally just world, such arguments acknowledge, humanity should not deploy geoengineering; but in our imperfect world, geoengineering may be needed for managing injustices associated with anthropogenic climate change. In examining arguments of this kind, we rely on the branch of non-ideal theory known as “clinical theory,” which aims to identify politically feasible institutions or policies that would address existing (or impending) injustice. We argue that upon closer examination, clinical non-ideal theory provides strong support for some geoengineering techniques that aim to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere but only weak support for geoengineering techniques that aim to manage incoming solar radiation.

— Comments: Ben Hale (Colorado)

50. **Brian Talbot** (Washington University–St. Louis), ‘How unfulfillable obligations can guide’

Abstract: It is widely held that if some agent is obligated to phi, that agent must be able to phi - that there are no unfulfillable obligations. One of the most compelling explanations for why this is true is that it is the nature of obligations to give guidance, and
a putative obligation one cannot fulfill gives one no guidance. I will accept that obligations must guide, but dispute that this means that “obligatory” implies “can.” If obligations generate what I call “extended reasons,” then unfulfillable obligations can still guide. Further, for a range of normative domains (e.g. ethics, epistemology, the law), the existence of unfulfillable obligations which guide via extended reasons can give us a better account of guidance than we get if “obligatory” implies “can.”

— Comments: Colin Hickey (Georgetown)

51. **Nandi Theunissen** (Johns Hopkins), ‘On the Value of Human Beings’

Abstract: I give a positive account of the value of human beings. I take the basis of human value to be that we are capable of having final ends, that is, interests, projects and relationships that are pursued for their own sake. By working through a proposal by Samuel Scheffler, I argue that to have a final end is (i) to believe that the end is valuable, (ii) to be guided by the end in long-range deliberation, (iii) to be engaged with the end in a sustained way over time, and (iv) to be emotionally susceptible to successes and failures in pursuit of the end. The capacity for having final ends confers value on us, I argue, because it makes us capable of leading a good life. And a good life is valuable because it is valuable for the person whose life it is. The most fundamental explanation of the value of having final ends, then, is that it makes us good-for ourselves. The explanation has the air of a paradox. It raises a question about the reasons we have to respond to human beings. If the capacity to have final ends makes us valuable because it makes us good-for ourselves, what reason should others have to respond to us? This is an instance of a more general worry, raised by Donald H. Regan, about the normative force of goodness-for. I argue that the worry rests on a misunderstanding about the theoretical role of goodness-for. That human beings are valuable because we are good-for something or someone explains the value of human beings. That is, it explains how human beings genuinely have value—value which gives everyone reason to interact with human beings in specifiable ways. In particular, I argue that we have reason (i) not to destroy the capacity of human beings to pursue their own ends, and (ii) to help others pursue their ends.

— Comments: Joseph Van Weelden (McGill)
52. **Teemu Toppinen** (Helsinki), ‘Rule Consequentialism and Kantian Contractualism at Top Rates’

Abstract: According to one form of rule consequentialism, (RC), everyone ought to follow the rules whose universal acceptance would make things go best. According to one form of Kantian contractualism, (KC), everyone ought to follow the rules whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will. (RC) and (KC) are widely agreed to be problematic thanks to their appealing to a fixed, universal, 100 percent acceptance rate. I argue that given the inclusion, into our value theory, of what Philip Pettit calls ‘robustly demanding goods’, (RC) and (KC) survive two standard objections. These are the New Ideal World Objection and the Objection from Reprobates and Amoralists. The former is based on the idea that some rules work very nicely given universal acceptance, and yet our actions’ being regulated by these rules in the actual world would have disastrous consequences. The latter is based on the idea that in the ‘ideal’ world of universal acceptance there would be no point in accepting rules for dealing with reprobates and amoralists who would not accept the relevant rules.

— **Comments: Ryan Jenkins (Colorado/Cal Poly–San Luis Obispo)**

53. **Mike Valdman** (Virginia Commonwealth), ‘What’s Wrong with Brainwashing?’

Abstract: Many think that brainwashing and rational persuasion belong in separate moral categories, with only the latter being morally permissible. I argue that there may be nothing about brainwashing per se that makes it morally impermissible and nothing about rational persuasion per se that makes it morally permissible. I argue, however, that the standard view can be defended on broadly consequentialist grounds. There is at least instrumental value in having true beliefs, and, in light of the kinds of creatures we are, persons are more likely to have true beliefs if they’re allowed to be exposed to rational persuasion but not to brainwashing. But if rational persuasion and brainwashing were equally likely to produce true belief, then a presumptive case could be made that neither would be morally superior to the other as a means of changing people’s beliefs.

— **Comments: John Harris (TCU)**
54. **Arthur Ward** (Michigan State), ‘Fit, Fitness, and Fittingness’

Abstract: Recently in ethics there has been a renewed interest in the concept of “fittingness” as a normative primitive. This paper makes a historical point, a conceptual point, and a metaethical point about fittingness. The historical claim is that Samuel Clarke should be given more credit for introducing the concept of fitness as a normative primitive. The conceptual point is that fittingness (akin to Clarke’s fitness) undergirds not only fitting-attitude theories of value, but other normative concepts such as justice, desert, and teleology. The Metaethical point is that in its ubiquity, fittingness is less potent than some might hope. Thus, our moral epistemology should be very cautious, and leading us away from naturalism, and towards either constructivism or non-natural intuitionism.

— Comments: **Brandon Williams** (Rice University)

55. **Justin Weinberg** (South Carolina), ‘One True Love’

Abstract: Whispered to a lover, sung by a pop star, or projected onto the movie screen, the idea that there is one special person out there for you to love—your one true love—has an intoxicating appeal. When looked at in the cold light of day, however, this idea, the “one true love thesis,” seems preposterous. Yet what if it were true? I argue that for at least some people the one true love thesis is indeed true. I further argue that, though the idea of having one true love is popularly thought of as good, whether it is in fact good is ambiguous. These reflections on love are then used to argue that generally, we misunderstand how specialness or uniqueness contributes to value.

— Comments: **Christopher Hudspeth** (Wisconsin-Parkside)

56. **Rivka Weinberg** (Scripps College), ‘You Got Me Into This...’: Procreative Responsibility and its Implications for Suicide and Euthanasia’

Abstract: This paper investigates connections between procreative ethics and the ethics of suicide and euthanasia. Regarding euthanasia/assisted suicide, we might think it too demanding to ask parents to help euthanize their terminally ill, suffering child, but had the parents not procreated, their child wouldn’t need euthanizing. If you need help killing yourself, shouldn’t your parents, who got you into life in the first place – without your consent – help you out of it? Yet knowing that your parents would help you kill yourself may increase your desire to die. A conundrum. Regarding suicide, the
fact that we are forced into life should bolster the right to suicide, even for reasons that others might find wanting. The ways in which we are brought into life have moral implications for the ways in which we are entitled to get out of it.

— Comments: Cory Aragon (Concordia College)

57. Stephen White (Northwestern), ‘Ends Justifying Means’

Abstract: In this talk, I ask whether and how an agent’s intention to realize a certain end bears on the justification for taking the means to that end. On the one hand, theories which allow that intending an end can directly contribute to the justification for pursuing the means are subject to a well-known “bootstrapping” objection. On the other hand, “anti-psychologistic” accounts, which appeal only to the value of realizing a given end, appear to have unacceptable implications in cases where an agent faces multiple rationally permissible options. Recent attempts by John Brunero and Niko Kolodny to deal with the latter problem turn out to invite bootstrapping objections all over again. I propose a relatively simple solution to the problem and suggest that it has been overlooked because it is at odds with the basic conception of practical deliberation that is operating in the background.

— Comments: Mark van Roojen (Nebraska)

58. Eric Wiland (Missouri-St. Louis), ‘Against Advice’

Abstract: Michael Smith, Bernard Williams, and Kate Manne have each defended elements of or versions of:

Simple advice — C is a reason for A to V if and only if (and because) a good adviser would offer C to A as a piece of advice.

Here I argue against Simple advice. Reasons for action cannot be understood in terms of advice of any sort. When an adviser advises an advisee to V, the advisee usually acquires new reasons to V, reasons he lacked before: a reason to avoid a new source of regret, and a second reason to avoid the disapproval or disdain of the adviser and of others who know that he was so advised. So if reasons and advice are indeed related, it is because advice is grounded in terms of reasons, rather than the other way around.

— Comments: Jessica Katz (Bowling Green)

Abstract: In order for patients to make good medical decisions, they need to be able to make accurate affective forecasts—predictions about how various conditions will impact their experiential quality of life. This raises an important question for medical ethics: Do physicians have any ethical obligations to help their patients make more accurate affective forecasts? I argue that assisting patients with their affective forecasting should be among the professional duties of physicians. Physicians have a professional duty of beneficence, which gives them an obligation to try to help their patients engage in good deliberation and make good decisions when they are in a good position qua physicians to help. Whereas physicians are not in a good position to help patients with their finances and other matters, they are in a good position qua physicians to assist their patients with their affective forecasting given their unique knowledge, perspective, and potential resources.

— Comments: Rosa Terlazzo (Kansas State)

60. **Peter Zuk** (Rice), ‘Mill’s Metaethical Noncognitivism’

Abstract: Alan Ryan’s 1970 study of John Stuart Mill’s work provides a compelling case for reading Mill as a metaethical noncognitivist. Ryan’s interpretation has recently been challenged by the realist readings of Christopher Macleod and David Brink. In the present essay, I defend a noncognitivist reading that expands upon Ryan’s treatment. I first lay out key components of Ryan’s case. I next respond to several objections to that reading posed by Macleod. I then respond to Brink’s treatment of the famous “competent judges” passage in Mill’s Utilitarianism. Against both Brink’s favored evidential reading and the rival constitutive reading that he rejects, I opt for a third interpretation that I call the psychological interpretation on which the verdicts of Mill’s competent judges do not themselves have moral content at all, but are instead non-moral phenomenological or psychological judgments of the effect of a given pleasure on its subject. I conclude with a summary of the key claims of my reading.

— Comments: Chris Heathwood (Colorado)
Almost all restaurants in Boulder offer some vegetarian/vegan options, though some seem to attract more vegetarian customers than others. Here are a few of those. A star (★) indicates that the restaurant comes highly recommended by local vegetarians. For location information, kindly refer to the awesomely instructive Google map we’ve created, accessible through the RoME website.

**Quick Bites / Lunch**

- Khow Thai
- Colonel Mustard’s
- Snarf’s
- Half Fast Subs ★
- Hapa Sushi
- Walnut Café
- Dot’s Diner
- Alfalfa’s
- Illegal Pete’s
- Foolish Craig’s
- Dushanbe Tea House
- The Dish
- Falafel King
- The Farmer’s Market 13th and Canyon (on Wed. night and Sat. morning only)

**Pricier / Dinners**

- Leaf ★
- The Kitchen
- Himalayas restaurant
- Japango Sushi
- Tandoori Grill
- Chez Thuy
- Black Cat
- Ras Kassa’s
- Rio Grande Mexican
- Casa Alvarez
Old Main Heritage Room
(Thursday night reception)

Old Main is the building immediately to the west (toward the mountains) of Eaton Humanities. Old Main is the building with a flagpole on top. The Heritage Room is on the top floor of Old Main.

Back Country Pizza directions
(Thursday night drinks)

Leave the Koenig center and head north to University Avenue. Take a right to head east along University until it bends north (and downhill) to become 17th street. Walk north until Arapahoe Avenue and take a right. Walk for six or seven blocks to 2319 Arapahoe Avenue. Back Country Pizza will be on the left side of the street. Note: Back Country Pizza has a selection of over 50 beers on tap, though we regret that, due to the alcohol policy of the University of Colorado Boulder, this will be a cash bar. You’re on your own for drinks. We will be meeting in the back room.

Dushanbe Tea House directions
(Friday reception)

Walk west from the Eaton Humanities building until you get to Broadway. Take a right and walk north along Broadway. Take a right at Arapahoe Avenue and walk one block to 13th street. Turn left and walk about one block to the Dushanbe Tea House, which will be on the right.

Parking on Campus

The best and cheapest option for parking during RoME V will be to park on University Avenue just west of Broadway, in the area of town known as “The Hill.” Parking is free on the streets west of campus. It’s a short walk to campus from there. Failing that, you can park at the meters on the street, though that can get pricey. On Saturday and Sunday you can park near Eaton Humanities for $3 for the day. You can access this lot by taking University Drive east or 17th St. south into campus, turning onto Mackie Drive, going through the gate at the back of Eaton Humanities and taking a left. The lot will be on the left.
Map of Boulder

Important Buildings

1. Eaton Humanities (HUMN)
2. Hellems (HLMS)
3. University Memorial Center (UMC)
4. Old Main
5. Dushanbe Tea House

The mountains are west!