RoMEE Six
Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress

Robert Audi
“The Treatment of Persons: Intuitive Underpinnings of Kant’s Humanity formula”

Thomas Hurka
“Aristotle on Virtue: Wrong, Wrong, and Wrong”

Frances Kamm
“Who Turned the Trolley?”
The RoME Congress is a collective effort. Special thanks go to the following parties:

**Core Organizers**
- Alastair Norcross
- Benjamin Hale

**Assistant Organizers**
- Ryan Jenkins
- Paul Bowman
- Duncan Purves

**Paper Referees**
- Corwin Aragon, Dom Bailey, David Boonin, Paul Bowman, Eric Chwang, Annaleigh Curtis, Ben Hale, Chris Heathwood, Adam Hosein, Michael Huemer, Alison Jaggar, Ryan Jenkins, John Martin Fisher, Matt Kopec, Mitzi Lee, Tom Metcalf, Claudia Mills, Alastair Norcross, Graham Oddie, Duncan Purves, Brian Talbot, Michael Tooley, Mark Van Roojen, Steven Vanderheiden, Jason Wyckoff, Michael Zimmerman

**Young Ethicist Prize Committee**
- David Boonin, Eric Chwang, Benjamin Hale, Chris Heathwood, Alastair Norcross, Mark van Roojen

**Support**
- Maureen Detmer, Philosophy Department
- Kyle Clabaugh, Philosophy Department
- CIRES (Cooperative Institute for Research in the Environmental Sciences)
- Nancy Ollanik, CIRES
Keynote Speakers

**Robert Audi** (Notre Dame)
“The Treatment of Persons: Intuitive Underpinnings of Kant’s Humanity formula”

**Thomas Hurka** (Toronto)
“Fairness, Agreements and Exploitation”

**Frances Kamm** (Harvard)
“Who Turned the Trolley?”

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“Fairness, Agreements and Exploitation”

**Frances Kamm** (Harvard)
“Who Turned the Trolley?”

Author Meets Critics Session on Robert Audi’s *Moral Perception*:

**Critics:**

Daniel Crow (Wisconsin–Beloit)
Justin McBrayer (Ft. Lewis)
David Killoren (Coastal Carolina University)
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   — Comments: Cheryl Abbate (Marquette)

2. **Neera Badhwar** (Oklahoma), ‘Kidneys, Commerce, and Communities’
   — Comments: Tait Szabo (Wisconsin–Washington County)

3. **John Basl** (Bowling Green), ‘Rethinking Biocentrism: What Multi-Level Realism Means for a Central Dogma of Environmental Ethics’
   — Comments: Ben Hale (Colorado)

4. **Saba Bazargan** (UCSD), ‘Agentially Mediated Harms’
   — Comments: Howard Nye (Alberta)

5. **Sara Bernstein** (Duke), ‘Possible Causation and Moral Responsibility’
   — Comments: Emily Crookston (Coastal Carolina)

6. **Mark Boespflug** (Biola), ‘Doxastic Control, Doxastic Practices, and Virtue: Toward an Ethics of Belief’
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7. **Timothy Campbell** (Rutgers), ‘Practical Reasoning without Transitivity’
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8. **Francis Cartieri** (Cincinnati), ‘Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Who Needs Stories?’
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   — Comments: Jason Raibley (California State Long Beach)

10. **Richard Chappell** (Pennsylvania), ‘Satisficing by Effort: From Scalar to Satisficing Consequentialism’
    — Comments: Brian Berkey (Stanford)

11. **Adam Cureton** (UT Knoxville), ‘Unity of Reasons’
    — Comments: Ron Aboodi (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

12. **Eva Dadlez** (Central Oklahoma), ‘Make-Believe Wickedness v. Wicked Making-Believe’
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    — Comments: Dennis Lunt (SIU–Carbondale)

14. **Candice Delmas** (Clemson University), ‘Samaritan Political Obligations’
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15. **Dale Dorsey** (Kansas), ‘Rational Discretion’
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    — Comments: Preston Werner (Nebraska–Lincoln)

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2. **Justin Bernstein** (Pennsylvania), “Kantian Rationalism and the Groundwork Strategy”
3. **Nanhee Byrnes** (UC San Diego), “The Best Results Argument for Democracy”
4. **Emily Crookston** (Coastal Carolina University), “Is Unequal Marriage Morally Objectionable?”
6. **Robyn Gaier** (Viterbo), “Cows, Cats, and a Common Belief: An Examination of the Paradox of Painless Death”
7. **David Killoren** (Coastal Carolina University), “Animal Castes”
8. **Justin Klockseim** (Alabama–Tuscaloosa), “Satisfactionism, Intensity, and Depth”
10. **Dennis Lunt** (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale), “Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience: Is There a Moral Difference?”
11. **Kristin Mickelson** (Minnesota–Morris), “The (Meta-)Manipulation Argument”
12. **Howard Nye** (University of Alberta), “Warren Quinn’s Doctrine of ‘Doing and Allowing’ ”
13. **Cindy Scheopner** (Hawaii), “Why Tolerate Men?”
Saturday Presenters

1. Cheryl Abbate (Marquette University), “Abortion and Animal Rights: They are comparable Issues”
2. Brian Boeninger (Providence College), “Non-Conscious Influences, Reasons Explanations, and Free Will”
3. Zac Cogley (Northern Michigan University), “Blaming the Victim”
5. Wenwen Fan (Misouri), “Fitting Attitude Theories of Wrongness”
10. Justin Moss (South Dakota), “Rule-Consequentialism’s Dilemma: Demandingness or Self-Defeat”
12. Ian Smith (Loyola University–New Orleans), “Why the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing is Immune from Rachels’ Case and Why This Matters to the Euthanasia Debate”
13. Barbara Stock (Gallaudet), “Are you smart enough to vote?”
15. Alex Worsnip (Yale), “Does Deliberation Commit Us To Metanormative Realism?”
1. **Andrew Askland** (Arizona State University), ‘Catholic, Not Parochial: A Values Comprehensive Foundation for a Virtue-based Environmental Ethics’

   The paper argues for the viability of virtue theory as a means to express an environmental ethics. Preliminarily, it points to problems with consequentialist and deontological approaches. The former tends to reduce all values to a common denominator in order to generate comparable alternatives, making ethical decision-making too much like the calculation of mathematical equations. Deontology fails to provide adequate guidance once a threshold level of respect for others is reached and tolerates the rephrasing of interests as rights so that it is less about assuring an appropriate modicum for all than a means of forcefully asserting self-centered concerns.

   Neither consequentialism nor deontology emphasizes the ethical person’s sense that they are living a good life. They share a simplistic view of motivation that presumes that reasons alone persuade the thinker to act consistent with her reasoning. Virtue ethics better accommodates motivation by focusing upon the person’s lived experience.

   — **Comments: Cheryl Abbate (Marquette)**

2. **Neera Badhwar** (Oklahoma), ‘Kidneys, Commerce, and Communities’

   A group of people forms a community to the extent that it is animated by mutual goodwill and trust. A community may include all the residents of a country, or only those who share a common interest. I call the latter “special-interest communities,” and the former simply “community”. It is widely recognized that free markets can create a spirit of community where there was none before by fostering mutual goodwill and trust. I argue that a lack of community spirit can also prevent free, non-exploitative markets in kidneys from arising or flourishing. As can communities that are hostile to markets, such as the special-interest “International
Transplant Community” (ITC). The exploitative nature of kidney markets in India is best explained by these twin facts. The problem in the U.S. is the lack of markets and the consequent deaths of thousands of patients, thanks to the ITC’s hostility to markets and altruism-fetishism.

—  Comments: Tait Szabo (Wisconsin–Washington County)

3. John Basl (Bowling Green), ‘Rethinking Biocentrism: What Multi-Level Realism Means for a Central Dogma of Environmental Ethics’

—  Comments: Ben Hale (Colorado)

4. Saba Bazargan (UCSD), ‘Agentially Meditated Harms’

Suppose P1 at T1 commits a negligent act that enables P2 at T2 to commit φ, a negligent harm. Who is more responsible for φ? It seems that, ceteris paribus, P2 is, since she committed it. Intuitively, P2’s hands are ‘dirtier’ than P1’s. But this is an intuition in need of a foundation, which I hope to provide. I will argue that P2 is more responsible than P1 for φ, because P2 at T2 causes what P1 has done at T1 to contribute to φ against P1’s will. In effect, P2 co-opts P1’s act, by using it as a means to ends which P1 does not want. So what makes P2 more responsible for φ is her relation to P1, rather than the bare fact that P2 is the one who commits φ. An upshot of this account is that in defending a (defeasible) agent-centered constraint against committing harms, we need not simply treat as axiomatic the unsupported intuition that there is something special about being the one who commits a harm. There are, instead, principled reasons for thinking that intervening agency is relevant to responsibility.

—  Comments: Howard Nye (Alberta)

5. Sara Bernstein (Duke), ‘Possible Causation and Moral Responsibility’

Generally, causation is thought to be an on or off affair: either c is a cause of e, or c is not a cause of e. I present several problem cases that throw this assumption into question, and give a framework for understanding them. I hold that these cases support two major lessons about the relationship between causation and moral
responsibility. First: there is little reason to believe in a distinction between actual causation and possible causation for the purposes of moral responsibility. Second: the extent to which c is a cause of e sometimes depends on features extrinsic to the causal process between c and e. This extrinsicness of the causal relation suggests the existence of a new kind of moral luck.

— Comments: Emily Crookston (Coastal Carolina)

6. Mark Boespflug (Biola), ‘Doxastic Control, Doxastic Practices, and Virtue: Toward an Ethics of Belief’

Since we assume that the intellectual life can be carried out either well or poorly, we can say that there are at least some guidelines concerning the process of belief acquisition. However, we must discover what kind of control agents have over that process if we are going to discover those guidelines. Following William Alston, I suggest that the main kind of control agents can exert over the process of belief acquisition is indirect voluntary influence. This implies that doxastic practices—and not beliefs—are the locus of epistemic evaluation. Not only does this call the use of the idiom of justification with respect to beliefs into question, it implies, claims Alston, that doxastic practices are the primary subject of justification. However, I proceed to find that it is doubtful that doxastic practices should be evaluated in terms of justification given the limited control agents have over them. I close by drawing the conclusion that, given the degree of control that agents seem to have over their doxastic practices, intellectual habituation is a primary activity to which moral properties attach. An ethics of belief, therefore, should contain prescriptions about intellectual habituation.

— Comments: Brian Boeninger (Providence College)

7. Timothy Campbell (Rutgers), ‘Practical Reasoning without Transitivity’

An increasing number of philosophers claim that the relation ‘is better than’ can be intransitive i.e. that there can be alternatives A, B, and C, such that A is better than B, B is better than C, and C is better than A. Larry Temkin has argued that the intransitivity of ‘better than’ leads to practical dilemmas and possibly even skepticism
about practical reasoning. Temkin assumes that in the absence of deontological, satisficing, or other standard non-maximizing constraints, if A is better than B, then one’s choice of B over A is irrational. Against this, I argue that if one’s alternatives (states of affairs or prospects) are intransitive with respect to the relation ‘is better than’, one’s possible choices of those alternatives could still be transitive with respect to the relation ‘is more rational than’, and the most rational choice one could make wouldn’t be irrational.

— Comments: Justin Klocksiem (University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa)


— Comments: Brian Talbot (Washington University–St. Louis)

9. C. Ceballos (Yale University), ‘Why we need subjective reasons too’

Parfit believes that reasons for action are objective, or given by facts about objects. Other philosophers hold that reasons for action are subjective, or given by facts about the subject’s desires. In On What Matters, Parfit provides what he believes to be a decisive argument against pure subjective theories: the Agony Argument. In my paper, I provide a similar argument against pure objective theories: the Ice Cream Argument. The Ice Cream Argument follows the same template as Parfit’s Agony Argument, but reverses the thrust of Parfit’s objection to demonstrate that pure objective theories cannot adequately explain matters of mere taste. With the Ice Cream Argument, I hope to establish that subjective reasons exist, and that any theory that excludes subjective reasons will fail when confronted with matters of mere taste.

— Comments: Jason Raibley (California State Long Beach)

10. Richard Chappell (Pennsylvania), ‘Satisficing by Effort: From Scalar to Satisficing Consequentialism’

Traditional forms of Satisficing Consequentialism risk condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as “good enough”. I propose a new, effort-based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the
motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further argue that the resulting view can be motivated even starting from the sparse starting point of Scalar Consequentialism, so long as we’re willing to supplement our consequentialism with independent norms of blameworthiness. Effort-based Satisficing Consequentialism is thus shown to be both extensionally plausible and theoretically well-motivated.

— Comments: Brian Berkey (Stanford)

11. Adam Cureton (UT Knoxville), ‘Unity of Reasons’

Reasons and rationality are basic normative notions. Substantive realism about reasons (SRR) explains rationality in terms of reasons while Kantian constructivism about reasons (KCR) explains reasons in terms of rationality. By supposing that reasons are here, there and everywhere, SRR seems to lack sufficient normative unity and structure, apparently ending normative inquiry too early. But KCR seems to face a dilemma of its own: Either a putative conception of rationality is thick enough to capture the reasons of commonsense, in which case it is not a conception of rationality at all, or a putative conception of rationality is genuine, in which case it is too thin to generate the reasons we recognize in commonsense. My aim is to argue for a version of KCR that is built on an expanded conception of rational agency.

— Comments: Ron Aboodi (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

12. Eva Dadlez (Central Oklahoma), ‘Make-Believe Wickedness v. Wicked Making-Believe’

Much has been said in the philosophical literature about whether fictions make us complicit in perspectives they endorse. Even the most controversial allegations of complicity, however, distinguish between the mere depiction and the outright imaginative adoption of morally problematic perspectives. To depict a person who harbors immoral attitudes is not to endorse them. Even those who claim that merely imagining the rightness of genocide signals complicity still exonerate those who only imagine characters’ approval of genocide. It is possible to imagine people’s problematic attitudes without imagining genocide approvingly. In other words, a distinction can be drawn between the content of one’s imagining and the manner
in which one imagines that content. The glaring potential exception here is that of role playing games (or RPGs). An analysis of role-playing in terms of Kendall Walton’s account of make-believe will be undertaken, in order to determine whether RPGs are especially vulnerable to charges of complicity.

— Comments: Tyler Paytas (Washington University–St. Louis)

13. Helena de Bres (Wellesley College), ‘How Association Matters for Distributive Justice’

Under which conditions does the relation between the levels of benefit and burden held by distinct individuals become a concern of justice? Associativists argue that principles of comparative distributive justice apply only among those persons who share some (special) form of association; humanists argue that some such principles apply among all human persons qua human persons. According to the “weak associativist” account that I defend, humanism is wrong, but so are current versions of associativism. Association is necessary if talk of comparative distributive justice is to be apt, but no special form of it is required. Whether or not principles of comparative distributive justice do in fact apply to an association will depend on whether or not the conditions for legitimate enforcement of the resulting duties are satisfied, and we can expect these conditions to be satisfied by a wide range of associative forms.

— Comments: Dennis Lunt (SIU–Carbondale)

14. Candice Delmas (Clemson University), ‘Samaritan Political Obligations’

— Comments: Sam Huang (Rice)

15. Dale Dorsey (Kansas), ‘Rational Discretion’

This paper is an exploration of one method by which agents shape the practical reasons and rational obligations they face: by exercising a quasi-legal capacity I call “rational discretion”. Similar to the capacity judges maintain to alter the force and content of law by making individual legal decisions, agents exercise this capacity when they make decisions about their lives of—for lack of a better term—
existential consequence. I explore this phenomenon with the help of H.L.A. Hart’s classical analysis of judicial discretion, and answer a number of questions concerning the shape of the resulting view.

— Comments: Errol Lord (Princeton)


Alastair Norcross has criticised satisficing consequentialism on two grounds: that the rightness-threshold it posits is too sharp, and that its location is arbitrary. I defend the view against both objections. Sharpness can be mitigated by the introduction of a vague or indeterminate rightness-threshold. Arbitrariness runs deeper but, depending on the sort of arbitrariness that is meant, satisficing either can reject the charge, or claim other moral theories as companions in guilt.

— Comments: Preston Werner (Nebraska–Lincoln)

17. Mylan Engel Jr. (Northern Illinois University), ‘Fishy Reasoning’

Ethical vegetarians believe that it is morally wrong to eat meat. And yet, many of these so-called ethical “vegetarians” continue to eat fish. The question my paper addresses is this: Can one coherently maintain that it is morally wrong to eat meat, but morally permissible to eat fish? I argue that it is inconsistent for ethical vegetarians to eat fish, not on the obvious yet superficial ground that fish flesh is meat, but on the morally substantive ground that fish deserve moral consideration equal to that owed birds and mammals.

— Comments: Lily Chang (Missouri–Columbia)

18. David Faraci (UNC Chapel Hill), ‘A Hard Look At Moral Perception’

Even if we sometimes perceive moral properties, I argue, this does not guarantee that any moral knowledge is fundamentally perceptual. Following Sarah McGrath, I contend that vindicating fundamentally perceptual moral knowledge (FPMK) requires showing that some moral judgements are based solely on moral evidence. Consider a case of purported FPMK: Sally “sees” wrongness in a cat-burning. Now consider a counterfactual case
where the cat-burning is a convincing fake. If Sally judges the fake to be wrong, I argue, this gives us reason to believe that her judgement in the original case was based on the descriptive features of the cat-burning. I contend that this argument provides powerful evidence against FPMK, at least insofar as moral properties and their supervenience bases are metaphysically distinct. Finally, I discuss the degree to which FPMK would be defensible if they are not distinct—i.e., if a certain kind of moral naturalism is true.

— Comments: Dan Demetriou (Minnesota–Morris)


I argue that Judith Thomson’s “people-seeds” example does not establish her intended conclusion: that under the assumption that the fetus is a person (from the beginning), it is sometimes permissible to have an abortion when contraception has failed in a context of voluntary intercourse.

— Comments: David Boonin (Colorado)

20. Daniel Fogal (NYU), ‘The Non-Fundamentality of Reasons’

Many philosophers (e.g. Scanlon, Parfit) take the notion of a normative reason to be primitive, and take reasons to be the fundamental units or determinants of normativity. I think this is a mistake. Although we can clean up and systematize our thought and talk about reason(s), we shouldn’t take the notion of a normative reason to be primitive, and we shouldn’t think of normative reality as fundamentally consisting of reasons.

To see why, I investigate the relationship between the count noun ‘reason(s)’ (in its normative sense) and the mass noun ‘reason’, and argue that we should take the latter to be conceptually and explanatorily prior to the former. I then present new data concerning the contextual variability of reasons-talk that would be unexpected if reasons were fundamental. After sketching a positive view that accommodates the data, I conclude by exploring some implications of the non-fundamentality of reasons for particular debates.

— Comments: Paul Bloomfield (University of Connecticut)
21. **Kyle Fruh** (Georgetown), ‘Moral Obligations and Moral Heroes’

Acts of moral heroism are often described by heroes as having been in some sense or another required. Here I elaborate two rival strategies for accounting for what I call the requirement claim. The first, originating with J.O. Urmson, attempts to explain away the phenomenon. The second and more popular among moralists is to treat the requirement claim as a moment of moral insight and to make sense of it in terms of moral duty. I argue that both of these strategies are flawed, both failing as an account of the phenomenon in question and being independently problematic. I propose a third, alternative account of the requirement claim based on the concept of practical necessity, which, I argue, avoids the pitfalls of the other views.

— Comments: Lisa Cagle (Washington University–St. Louis)

22. **Molly Gardner** (Wisconsin–Madison), ‘On the Strength of the Reason Against Harming’

According to a counterfactual comparative account of harming, an action harms someone only if it makes her worse off in some respect than she would have been, had the action not been performed. According to a non-comparative account of harming, it is possible for an action to harm an individual even if it does not make her worse off than she would have been in any respect. It might seem that a non-comparative account would be less well-suited to explaining (1) why there is a pro tanto moral reason against harming and (2) why that reason is stronger in some cases than in others. However, I will argue that a non-comparative account I call the Existence Account of Harming is in a better position than a counterfactual comparative account to explain why there is a reason against harming and why that reason is stronger in some cases than in others.

— Comments: Duncan Purves (Colorado)

23. **David Goldman** (Yale), ‘Can Retributive Punishment Change the Past?’

The retributivist idea that punishment can annul wrongdoing is often the target of philosophical ridicule. Surely we cannot change past wrongdoing—after all, it is in the past! Changing the past seems
plainly, metaphysically impossible. I defend annulment against these concerns. First I argue that—in a limited but genuine sense—it is in general possible to alter past events. Next, guided by that argument, I describe one way of altering past wrongdoing through punishment. Such possibilities promise to shed light on punishment’s justification and on the reasons we have to impose particular types and degrees of punishment. The normative significance of annulment requires further exploration, but it should not be dismissed simply because it involves altering the past.

— Comments: Zac Cogley (Northern Michigan University)


Does Kantian moral agency require phenomenal consciousness? Many philosophers have argued that collectives are moral agents but none (to my knowledge) have argued that they are conscious. Can they be moral agents in the absence of consciousness? I present two claims. First, I argue for the positive claim that certain collectives – “corporate agents” – can fulfill the role of the Kantian agent by acting on universalizable principles and treating “humanity” as an end in itself. More importantly, they can give principles to themselves, treat their own “humanity” as an end itself, and act out of respect for the law. Second, I explore the negative claim that there is no necessary part left for phenomenal consciousness left to play, after considering and rejecting the idea that it is necessary for motivation. I close by asking what this implies about moral status: does this have the unfortunate result of recognizing moral standing for corporations?

— Comments: Bradley J. Strawser (Naval Postgraduate School)

25. **Colin Hickey** (Georgetown), ‘Reactive Attitudes, Responsibility, and Structural Injustice’

Structural injustices play havoc with traditional notions of moral responsibility, which address individual intentional acts that are directly causally traced to particular harms. However, some of the most oppressive features of the contemporary world are produced by complex causal processes that depend on the unintentional and individually innocuous ordinary behavior of millions. This demands an overhaul of traditional notions of responsibility, and I suggest
that the only way to succeed is to re-conceive of our best theoretical accounts of what it is to hold someone responsible. So I turn to the reactive attitudes literature for some key conceptual tools. However, the prominent moral emotions employed thereof (resentment, indignation, and guilt) are “unfitting” and insufficient to cope with structural injustice. So I suggest how we might supplement them to adequately account for how we do and should hold people interpersonally accountable for participation in structural injustices.

— Comments: Dave Phillips (Houston)

26. Amelia Hicks (Kansas State), ‘Moral Particularism and Moral Deliberation’

Eliminativist particularists believe that there are no true moral principles. However, those who hold this belief face a difficult puzzle: how can they develop a plausible account of responsible moral deliberation? Eliminativists often respond to this puzzle by adopting abstinence, the view that we shouldn’t use moral principles. Abstinence relies on the claim that we can responsibly abstain from using moral principles, and thus defenses of abstinence usually begin with a defense of this claim. In this paper, I show that such a claim relies on a strong version of moral intuitionism, and that the two most promising elaborations of this kind of intuitionism are incompatible with eliminativism. I conclude that eliminativists should not adopt abstinence when responding to the eliminativist’s puzzle. I also sketch an alternative, eliminativism-compatible account of moral deliberation according to which responsible moral deliberation can, in some cases, involve the consultation of false moral principles.

— Comments: Alain Pé-Curto (Rutgers)

27. Stan Husi (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee), ‘Subjectivism, the Problem of Appraisal, and the Concern for Recognition’

Subjectivism in the theory of value affirms the explanatory priority of valuing over value, of the relevant attitudes such as desire and concern over the desirable and concern-worthy. The big issue, for subjectivists, is valuing. What the subjectivist needs is an understanding of valuing around which to build an account of value suiting commonsense value-folklore. A major problem subjectivists
face is the problem of appraisal: Many of the relevant valuing attitudes seem to incorporate an evaluative perceptive element, a normatively charged form of evaluative receptivity. What I will show is how a particular subjectivist theory, the concern-cluster approach, can elegantly explain how we can judge the appropriateness of one attitude relative to others, in light of some background norms mediating the interconnection, thereby accommodating the element of appraisal without relinquishing the explanatory priority of valuing over value. For illustration, I will use the example of our concern for recognition.

— Comments: Michaela McSweeney (Princeton)

28. Alex Hyun (University of Wisconsin–Madison), ‘How to Use Moral Testimony’

There are some great benefits to using reliable moral testimony as a basis for moral belief. But it has been argued that we have strong moral reasons not to use moral testimony in this way. I take the strongest arguments for this conclusion to come from Alison Hills and Robert Howell. Hills and Howell argue that forming moral beliefs on the basis of moral testimony can damage our moral character. I agree that they have identified a genuine danger of using moral testimony, and that for this reason we ought to be careful in how we use it. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how we can morally defer responsibly. I offer two guiding rules on how to use moral testimony so as to enjoy the great benefits of moral testimony without inadvertently damaging our moral character.

— Comments: Claudia Mills (Colorado)

29. Ramona Ilea (Pacific University), ‘Sympathy and Utilitarianism: Enemies or Allies?’

Some have argued that utilitarian arguments regarding mass suffering—starvation, factory farming, disasters caused by climate change, genocide, for example—are not effective; though philosophically rigorous, they fail to motivate people to take action. Instead, they argued that we should appeal to people’s natural sympathy. In the first half of this paper, I argue against this view; while sympathy is useful in one-on-one relationships, we should not depend on it to motivate people to take action against mass
suffering and death. But this does not mean that utilitarians should completely discount sympathy. As I will show in the second half of the paper, a certain appeal to sympathy can motivate people to take action against mass suffering, making it an appropriate ally to utilitarianism.

— Comments: Adam Lerner (Princeton)

30. Michael Kates (Virginia), ‘Individuals and the Demands of Justice in Nonideal Circumstances’

Ought some individuals be required to do more to combat injustice simply because others have done less? There are two extreme views on this question. On the one hand, some believe that we are always required to do more to combat injustice even if others have failed to do their part. On the other hand, others believe that we are never required to do more combat injustice simply because others have failed to do their part. My thesis in this paper is that not only are both of these views incorrect but that in order to answer this question in an intuitively compelling manner, it is necessary to distinguish the social obligations that citizens have towards one another from the natural duties that all persons share simply in virtue of their status as equal moral agents. For what justice demands of individuals in nonideal circumstances will ultimately depend, I argue, on the comparative scope or range of application of these two different types of moral requirement.

— Comments: Lisa Fuller (SUNY–Albany)

31. Paul Kelleher (Wisconsin–Madison), ‘Prevention and Tiny Risks’

Contrary to popular belief, population-wide preventive measures are rarely cost-reducing. But they can still be cost-effective, and indeed more cost-effective than treatment. This is often true of preventive measures that work by slightly reducing the already low risks of death faced by many people. This raises a difficult moral question: when we must choose between life-saving treatment, on the one hand, and preventive measures that avert even more deaths, on the other, is the case for prevention weakened when it works by reducing many healthy people’s already low risks by a further tiny amount? I argue the answer is no.

— Comments: Rob Hughes (UCLA)
32. **RJ Leland** (Stanford), ‘Political Liberalism’s Justificatory Problem and the Case Against the Respect Answer’

Political liberals advocate a principle of reciprocity in political justification: fundamental political decisions must be justifiable using only considerations that reasonable citizens could expect one another to accept. The justificatory problem is the problem of explaining why the reciprocity principle is important to follow. When political liberals address the problem, they often invoke the respect answer: compliance with reciprocity principle is a requirement of respect for our fellow citizens in the context of political control. I argue there’s no way to connect the reciprocity principle to requirements of respect, focusing on a worry about the constituencies involved in the two requirements: the reciprocity principle is directed at a constituency of reasonable citizens while requirements of respect are owed to persons. There’s no plausible way to bridge this gap, so political liberals should look elsewhere for an answer to the justificatory problem, or revise their understanding of the reciprocity principle.

— Comments: Robyn Gaier (Viterbo)

33. **Hallie Liberto** (University of Connecticut), ‘The Exploitation Solution to the Non-Identity Problem’

We often hear people say things like this, “sweatshop laborers are paid almost nothing, but they are better off with that labor than with no labor.” Similarly, when dealing with Non-Identity Problem cases, Derek Parfit points out: It seems like we do wrong to future generations when we destroy the environment, but we can’t say that the individuals born in future generations are worse off because of these choices because the particular people living in those future generations wouldn’t even exist if it weren’t for these choices. This paper investigates the link between the wrong of exploitation and the Non-Identity Problem and ultimately offers a solution to the latter. Much like the “rights” solution to the non-identity problem, exploitation can be a wrong that is not a harm. However, the exploitation solution is safe from the objections faced by the “rights” solution.

— Comments: Erich Matthes (Wellesley)
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**Friday Poster Session**

**Eaton Living Room**
Friday Poster Presentations

1. John Turri (Waterloo) and Peter Blouw (Waterloo), “Exculpatory Pretense”
4. Emily Crookston (Coastal Carolina University), “Is Unequal Marriage Morally Objectionable?”
6. Robyn Gaier (Viterbo), “Cows, Cats, and a Common Belief: An Examination of the Paradox of Painless Death”
7. David Killoren (Coastal Carolina University), “Animal Castes”
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<td>John Martin Fischer, “Abortion and Voluntary Intercourse: Thomson's People-Seeds Example”</td>
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<td>F: 5:30-7</td>
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<td>Robert Audi</td>
<td>“The Treatment of Persons: Intuitive Underpinnings of Kant's Humanity formula”</td>
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Saturday Poster Presentations

1. Cheryl Abbate (Marquette University), “Abortion and Animal Rights: They are comparable Issues”
2. Brian Boeniger (Providence College), “Non-Conscious Influences, Reasons Explanations, and Free Will”
3. Zac Cogley (Northern Michigan University), “Blaming the Victim”
5. Wenwen Fan (Missouri), “Fitting Attitude Theories of Wrongness”
10. Justin Moss (South Dakota), “Rule-Consequentialism’s Dilemma: Demandingsness or Self-Defeat”
12. Ian Smith (Loyola University–New Orleans), “Why the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing is Immune from Rachels’ Case and Why This Matters to the Euthanasia Debate”
13. Barbara Stock (Gallaudet), “Are you smart enough to vote?”
15. Alex Worsnip (Yale), “Does Deliberation Commit Us To Metanormative Realism?”
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<td><strong>Paper</strong> Amelia Hicks, “Moral Particularism and Moral Deliberation”</td>
<td>Julia Nefsky, “How you can help, without making a difference”</td>
<td>David Morrow, “Climate sins of our fathers? Historical accountability in distributing emissions rights”</td>
<td>Mark Rosner, “Tolerance as a virtue”</td>
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**RoME VI Schedule**

**Sunday 8/11**

**14 SU: 8:45-10**

**Paper**
Alex Madva, “Biased Against De-Biasing: On the Role of (Institutionally Sponsored) Self-Transformation in the Struggle Against Prejudice”

Comments Daniel Silvermint
Chair Klaus Ladstaetter

**15 SU: 10:10-11:25**

**Paper**
Jesse Summers, “Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc: Two Roles for Rationalization”

Kyle Fruh, “Moral Obligations and Moral Heroes”

Hallie Liberto, “The Exploitation Solution to the Non-Identity Problem”

Comments Alex Worsnip
Lisa Cagle
Erich Matthes
Chris Howard
Klaus Ladstaetter

**16 SU: 11:35-12:50**

**Paper**
Adam Cureton, “Unity of Reasons”

Tony Manela, “Gratitude: Duties Of and Rights To”

Kristi Olson, “The Conflation of Choice and Hard Work”

Comments Ron Aboodi
Klaus Ladstaetter
Iskra Fileva
Shane Gronholz
Klaus Ladstaetter

**17 SU: 2:30-3:45**

**Paper**
Amelia Hicks, “Moral Particularism and Moral Deliberation”

Julia Nefsky, “How you can help, without making a difference”

David Morrow, “Climate sins of our fathers? Historical accountability in distributing emissions rights”

Comments Alain Pé-Curto
Henry West
Zac Cogley
Justin Moss
Jeff Watson
Timothy Mosteller

**18 SU: 4-6**

**Frances Kamm**
“Who Turned the Trolley?”

**Eaton 1B50**
34. Matthew Lutz (University of Southern California), ‘What Makes Evolution a Defeater?’

This paper attempts to clarify the nature of the skeptical challenge posed by evolutionary debunking arguments, and in the process rebut a very common and influential objection that has become prevalent in the literature on debunking arguments in recent years. Evolutionary explanations of the sources of our moral beliefs fill the exact same role in skeptical arguments about morality as evil-demon based explanations of our external-world beliefs fill in skeptical arguments about the external world. Any evidence that our external world beliefs were given to us by a demon would count as a defeater for our beliefs about the external world; fortunately, we do not have any such evidence. But we do have evidence that supports Darwinian explanations of our moral beliefs, and this evidence is, therefore, a defeater for our moral beliefs. A number of objections to this master argument are considered.

— Comments: Matthew Braddock (Tennessee–Martin)

35. Alex Madva (University of California–Berkeley), ‘Biased Against De-Biasing: On the Role of (Institutionally Sponsored) Self-Transformation in the Struggle Against Prejudice’

Research suggests that interventions involving extensive training or counterconditioning can reduce implicit prejudice and stereotyping, and even susceptibility to stereotype threat. This research is widely cited as providing an “existence proof” that certain entrenched social attitudes are capable of change, but is summarily dismissed as lacking direct, practical import for the broader struggle against prejudice and discrimination. Criticisms of these “debiasing” procedures fall into three categories: concerns about empirical efficacy, about practical feasibility, and about the failure to appreciate the underlying structural-institutional nature of discrimination. I reply to these criticisms of debiasing and argue that a comprehensive strategy for combating prejudice and discrimination should include a central role for training our biases away.

— Comments: Daniel Silvermint (University of Connecticut)
36. **Tony Manela** (Georgetown), ‘Gratitude: Duties Of and Rights To’

We often talk of “duties” or “obligations” of gratitude that a beneficiary incurs in receiving a favor from a benefactor. About such obligations of gratitude, three propositions are widely accepted: 1) gratitude entails a set of strict obligations—things a beneficiary must do; 2) these obligations are owed to the benefactor; and 3) the benefactor lacks a right to the fulfillment of these obligations. These three platitudes present a tension. A tradition in law and moral philosophy going back to Wesley Hohfeld holds that directed obligations (e.g., promissory obligations) always correlate to rights held by the person to whom the obligation is due. If the three platitudes are true, then gratitude appears to be a glaring exception to Hohfeld’s correlativity thesis. In this paper, I show that all three gratitude platitudes are indeed true, and argue that the correlativity thesis, at least in the moral domain, must be revised.

— Comments: Klaus Ladstaetter (Washburn University)

37. **Adrienne Martin** (University of Pennsylvania), ‘Love and Agency’

We experience love in two, not clearly consistent, ways. On the one hand, love is something that happens to us: we “fall” in love. On the other hand, to love someone is do something: loving is an activity. In this paper, I present what I believe is a compelling way to make sense of the idea that love is both a passivity and an activity. To love is to be subject to certain experiences—feelings, attractions, even compulsions—and also to be an agent, to act. More precisely, to love is to take up the passive experiences of love as practical reasons; it is to incorporate certain feelings and attractions into one’s rational agency. I call this the “incorporation conception” of love.

— Comments: Kristin Mickelson (Minnesota–Morris)

38. **David Morrow** (Alabama–Birmingham), ‘Climate sins of our fathers? Historical accountability in distributing emissions rights’

One major question in climate justice is whether developed countries’ historical emissions are relevant to distributing the burdens of mitigating climate change. To argue that developed countries should bear a greater share of the burdens of mitigation because of their past emissions is to advocate “historical
accountability.” Standard arguments for historical accountability rely on corrective justice. These arguments face important objections. By using the notion of a global emissions budget, however, we can reframe the debate over historical accountability in terms of distributive justice. This papers argues that, given two defensible assumptions, distributive justice requires historical accountability. These assumptions are that the proper claimants on the emissions budgets are societies or states, not individuals, and that the budget is to be allocated retroactively. I show that these assumptions are defensible by offering three arguments for the first assumption and one for the second.

— Comments: Justin Moss (University of South Dakota)

39. Julia Nefsky (Toronto), ‘How you can help, without making a difference’

In many cases, people collectively cause some morally important outcome but no individual seems to make a difference. The problem in these cases is that each person can argue, “it makes no difference whether I do X, so I have no reason to do it.” My approach begins from the observation that underlying the problem is the intuitive assumption that if an act won’t make a difference with respect to an outcome, then it cannot play a significant role in bringing that outcome about. In other words, helping to bring about an outcome requires making a difference. I propose that the key to solving the problem is to reject this assumption. I give an account of what is required for an act to help, and use this to explain our reasons for action in the problem cases. This account also explains why the assumption seems true, even though it’s mistaken.

— Comments: Henry West (Macalaster College)

40. Kristi Olson (Stanford), ‘The Conflation of Choice and Hard Work’

Choice-sensitive egalitarians (also known as luck egalitarians) have traditionally motivated their view that choice justifies inequalities by pointing to situations in which it seems fair for an individual who chooses to work longer hours or in a more burdensome job to receive more resources. The problem with such examples, however, is that they implicate two different justifications: Does the inequality strike
us as fair because of differential choices or because of differential labor burdens? In this essay I show that if we hold how hard individuals work constant, thereby isolating choice, the examples become significantly less compelling. Although this does not disprove choice-sensitive egalitarianism, it does suggest that much of the motivation for the most prominent debate in the egalitarian literature for the last thirty years has been based on a mistake: namely, the conflation of choice and hard work.

— Comments: Iskra Fileva (UNC–Chapel Hill)

41. Matjaž Potrč (University of Ljubljana) and Vojko Strahovnik (European School of Law and Governance), ‘Morphological Pluralism’

Morphological pluralism (MP) is a combination of two main claims, one pertaining to the psychological aspects of moral judgment and the other to its normative aspects. Regarding psychological aspects MP claims that moral judgment follows a dynamical model of reasons, according to which reasons are situated in an agent’s structured morphological background, illuminating the judgment. In this regard it is a version of morphological rationalism, which is positioned between the social intuitionist and between rationalist models of moral judgment. Moral reasons are operating from a rich cognitive background and do not have to be explicitly present in the process of forming a moral judgment in order to be genuinely effective while shaping it. Regarding the normative aspect MP claims that there exists a plurality of mutually irreducible basic moral reasons shaping normative evaluations. MP thus represents an interesting base for an overall account of moral judgment, including its phenomenological aspects.

— Comments: Chris Howard (Arizona)

42. Alex Rajczi (Claremont McKenna), ‘What is the Conservative View About Distributive Justice?’

This paper describes the theory of distributive justice that is held by most American conservatives and Republicans. I show that this viewpoint explains conservative objections to certain social safety net programs, and I argue that the theory is at least plausible. The paper then draws several meta-philosophical lessons. First, the
conservative point of view, which is held by perhaps 50% of the population, is not well-represented in contemporary philosophical discussions. Second, some philosophers may think that the conservative point of view is rebutted by certain contemporary arguments in political philosophy, such as Rawls’s arguments for justice as fairness, but in fact this is not the case. Third, if progressive political philosophers want to make a case for progressive policies, then they will have to explore new philosophical and factual issues that philosophers presently ignore.

— Comments: Steven Hayward (Colorado)

43. Mark Rosner (Queens University), ‘Tolerance as a virtue’

Scepticism regarding the possibility as well as the value of tolerance can stem from a variety of directions. Recently, attention has shifted to a form of phenomenological scepticism that focuses on the fact that tolerance is often felt to be condescending and presumptuous and is seen to embody an unequal power relationship. These criticisms, however, ignore the self-effacing character of the virtue of tolerance. Pursuing an analogy with the virtue of modesty, I argue that the attitude of tolerance displays itself differently in first and third-personal contexts, decreasing the likelihood for condescension and impertinence. In addition, given the value that the attitude of tolerance means to realize, I argue tolerance need not entail an unequal power relationship. Rather, in its best form, the attitude of tolerance pushes us to explore how to realize our common membership in personal, social and political relations.

— Comments: Timothy Mosteller (California Baptist University)

44. Jeff Sebo (NYU), ‘Agency and Moral Status’

According to our traditional conception of agency, most human beings are agents and most, if not all, nonhuman animals are not. However, recent developments in philosophy and psychology have made it clear that we need more than one conception of agency, since human and nonhuman animals are capable of thinking and acting in more than one kind of way. In this paper, I make a distinction among three kinds of agency: first-order agency, second-order agency, and implicit agency. I then argue that (a) many nonhuman animals are implicit and first-order agents and that (b) many human
beings are all three kinds of agent, but we tend to think and act as implicit and first-order agents at least as often as we think and act as second-order agents. Finally, I argue that, if all this is right, then we should collapse the moral boundary between human and nonhuman animals a bit – though not quite in the way that many have thought.

— Comments: Paul Bowman (Colorado)

45. Saul Smilansky (Haifa), ‘The Moral Evaluation of Past Tragedies: A New Puzzle’

The past is full of terrible tragedies, including slavery, World War I, and the Holocaust. Morality would clearly appear to support the preference that the victims of those calamities would have lived free and peaceful lives. And yet, a Zeno-like puzzle or even a paradox appears to be lurking here. Moral evaluation can be either personal or impersonal, yet neither one of these two perspectives nor any other prevalent moral evaluation of events appears to yield the morally expected conclusion. To the best of my knowledge, this puzzle has not been discussed before. If there is no way to escape this surprising conclusion, then morality appears to be much more grim and unsympathetic than we normally think.

— Comments: Steve Sverdlik (SMU)

46. Matthew Smith (Leeds), ‘Reliance and Responsibility’

We, as political actors, aim to shape the world in the image of our ideals and values. But, the relationship between our behavior and more distant, politically substantive events is fraught. For, there are many points between local behavior and political effect at which the world can intervene and affect the course of events. If the world doesn’t play along, the agent’s behavior may lead to the opposite of what she intended. If political effects depend so much upon luck, how is it that any person or any collective can be responsible for outcomes in politics? If people and collectives cannot be responsible for outcomes in politics then in what sense are we political actors? This essay aims to develop an account of political responsibility that sidesteps the problem of moral luck. I argue for a theory of responsibility luck based in what I call reliance-dependent
responsibility that, in future essays, can be employed in a theory of political responsibility.

— Comments: Jeffrey Watson (Arizona State)

47. Doran Smolkin (Kwantlen Polytechnic University), ‘Overall Lifelong Fortune: Sophie, Cognitively Impaired Human Beings, and Superchimp’

Does species membership matter morally? Is it really true that, in themselves, the moral claims of congenitally severely cognitively impaired human beings are no greater than the moral claims of non-human animals of similar cognitive abilities? I will discuss these questions, focusing on some arguments by Jeff McMahan. I will argue that McMahan’s rejection of the moral significance of species membership is mistaken, and that there is at least one sense in which the moral claims of congenitally severely cognitively impaired human beings are, in themselves, stronger than the moral claims of non-human animals of similar cognitive ability.

— Comments: Barbara Stock (Gallaudet)

48. Aaron Smuts (Rhode Island College), ‘Four Theses About Caring’

I defend four theses about caring: Thesis 1: Animals can care. Thesis 2: To care is to value. Thesis 3: Caring cannot be reduced to belief. Thesis 4: Caring cannot be reduced to desire. These four theses do not amount to a full fledge theory of care, but they get us much closer to a workable analysis. They help sketch some of the contours of the concept and close off a few false starts. My argument is principally structured as an argument from elimination. I show what care cannot be, leaving in play a restricted set of options. Caring appears to be a sui generis psychological state, common to both humans and some animals, that cannot be reduced to belief, desire, or emotion.

— Comments: Anthony Cross (Princeton)

49. Kelly Sorensen (Ursinus College) and Stephen E. Henderson (University of Oklahoma College of Law), ‘Search, Seizure, and Immunity: Second-Order Normative Authority and Rights’

A paradigmatic aspect of a paradigmatic kind of right is that the rights holder is the only one who can alienate it. When individuals
waive rights, the normative source of that waiving is normally taken to be the individual herself. This moral feature – immunity – is usually in the background of discussions about rights. We bring it into the foreground here, with specific attention to a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Kentucky v. King (2011), concerning search and seizure rights. An entailment of the Court’s decision is that, at least in some cases, a right can be removed by the intentional actions of the very party against whom the right supposedly protects the rights holder. We argue that the Court’s decision is mistaken. The police officers in the case were not morally permitted, and should not be legally permitted, to intentionally create the very circumstances that result in the removal of an individual’s right against forced, warrantless search and seizure.

— Comments: Justin Bernstein (Pennsylvania)

50. Daniel Star (Boston University), ‘When is it Rationally Appropriate to Treat a Fact as a Practical Reason?’

Recent criticism of the thesis that the norm of practical reasoning is knowledge, according to which it is rational to treat a fact (or true proposition) as a practical reason just in case one knows it, suggest that it is too general in scope. When restricting conditions are placed on this first thesis by a second thesis, reasons as evidence, according to which reasons for action are facts that are evidence that one ought to act, a much more satisfactory account of when reasoning and action are appropriate comes into view. It is rationally appropriate to treat a proposition as a reason just in case it is known and it is evidence that one possesses that one ought to X, and it is rationally appropriate to act on a reason to X just in case the evidence that one possesses concerning what one ought to do makes it most probable that one ought to X, relative to one’s other options (or no less probable that one ought to X than do any other act). The conclusion of the main argument of the paper provides the basis for a new account of what it is to possess a normative reason.

— Comments: Max Barkhausen (NYU)
51. **Jesse Summers** (Duke University), ‘Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc: Two Roles for Rationalization’

Some research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, habits, reactions, and, at best, unexamined principles, then tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. Although the research reaches its conclusions too quickly, I don’t want to dismiss the research, but to ask why it should bother us if it’s true that we rationalize a great deal. One obvious drawback of rationalization is that it interferes with our praise and blame of others, and, similarly, it interferes with correct self-assessments and thus self-improvement. However, there is also a benefit of rationalization. Rationalization allows us to work out, under practical pressure of rational consistency, which are good reasons to act on. Such rationalization further prompts us to turn some meaningless decisions between merely permissible options into meaningful choices.

— **Comments: Alex Worsnip** (Yale)

52. **Matthew Talbert** (West Virginia), ‘Doing What You Think is Right: The Role of Subjectivity in Praise and Blame’

This paper considers the relationship between judgments of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and the subjective perspectives of agents, particularly their views about whether certain actions are right or wrong. Some theorists believe that if a wrongdoer reasonably judges her behavior to be permissible, then she has access to an excuse that insulates her from moral blame. An agent’s belief that she has acted rightly is also commonly cited as a form of moral praise. I argue that what matters for praise and blame is not the subjective moral perspective of the target of these responses, but rather our moral perspective as issuers of praise and blame. On the view I advocate, the fact that an agent does what she thinks is right functions as a plausible excuse, or as plausible grounds for praise, only when her moral views overlap with our own in some significant way.

— **Comments: Shane Gronholz** (Colorado)
53. Justin Weinberg (South Carolina), ‘Wishing Some Things Were Different’

Jamie and Jordan fell in love in college many years ago. For unrelated reasons, Jamie now wishes he had attended a different school, which means he probably wouldn’t have met Jordan. Does Jamie value Jordan less for having this wish? Louis CK says that he loves his daughter, but wishes she never existed. If she had never existed, he certainly couldn’t love her. Does Louis love his daughter less for having this wish? Many people wish that at least some (and usually just some) things about their lives were different. In cases in which the fulfillment of such wishes would undermine their loving of people or their valuing of things, is their actual loving and valuing diminished in some way? Are they, in virtue of these wishes, worse partners or parents, worse people, living worse lives? No. Surprisingly, such wishes may be crucial to a good life.

— Comments: Ryan Preston-Roedder (UNC–Chapel Hill)

54. Eric Wiland (University of Missouri - St. Louis), ‘In the beginning was the doing: The premises of the practical syllogism’

My main goal is to make some progress in characterizing the premises of practical reasoning. But to do that, I discuss problems besetting various proposals about how to characterize the conclusion of practical reasoning. In particular, I closely consider the Aristotelian view that the conclusion of practical reasoning is indeed an action. Then, I look at Hume’s famous ‘is-ought’ argument for help in understanding why it is so difficult to think that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action if we operate with the usual candidates for understanding the premises. I argue that the proposal that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action makes much more sense if at least one premise of practical reasoning is likewise an action – an option that nearly no one even considers.

— Comments: Foad Dizadji-Bahmani (CSULA)
55. **Jennifer Zamzow** (Carnegie Mellon), ‘Rules and principles in moral decision-making: A practical objection to moral particularism’

It is commonly thought that our moral prescriptions should include rules and principles such as ‘Keep your promises’ and ‘Respect autonomy.’ According to the particularist, however, moral thought should be sensitive to the specific combination of features that are present in a particular case and should not center on moral rules and principles. I argue that empirical evidence suggests that principled guidance is beneficial for decision making, which poses a problem for particularist accounts. When people use decision-making rules and principles they have been shown to reason better both on hypothetical problems and in their actual decisions and behaviors. Moreover, studies have found that even experts in their fields rarely outperform rule-based models. I argue that this evidence gives us reason to reject the particularist prescriptive account that we should just be sensitive to the particular features of the case and not rely on rules and principles.

— **Comments: Wenwen Fan (Missouri)**

56. **Peter Zuk** (Rice), ‘Scalar Consequentialism and Pessimism About Moral Responsibility’

Consider two views: first, scalar consequentialism, a position in normative ethics, and second, pessimism about moral responsibility, a position in the debate over free will and moral responsibility. I argue that there is a significant affinity between these two positions despite their arising in quite different domains and their being supported by independent lines of argument. By an “affinity,” I mean that the two positions share several important implications, making them natural allies and providing them with the potential to be mutually supporting. The purpose of this paper is to make a start of unpacking this affinity and, in so doing, to arrive at some more general conclusions about the relationship between the domain of normative ethics and the domain of free will and moral responsibility that will be of interest to those working in either area.

— **Comments: Alastair Norcross (Colorado)**
Almost all restaurants in Boulder offer some vegetarian/vegan options, though some seem to attract more vegetarian customers than others. Here are a few of those. A star (★) indicates that the restaurant comes highly recommended by local vegetarians. For location information, kindly refer to the awesomely instructive Google map we’ve created, accessible through the RoME website.

Quick Bites / Lunch

- Khow Thai
- Colonel Mustard’s
- Snarf’s
- Half Fast Subs
- Hapa Sushi
- Walnut Café
- Dot’s Diner
- Alfalfa’s
- Illegal Pete’s
- Foolish Craig’s
- Dushanbe Tea House
- The Dish
- Falafel King
- The Farmer’s Market 13th and Canyon (on Wed. night and Sat. morning only)

Pricier / Dinners

- Leaf ★
- Happy Noodle House
- The Kitchen
- Himalayas restaurant
- Japango Sushi
- Tandoori Grill
- Chez Thuy
- Black Cat
- Ras Kassa’s
- Rio Grande Mexican
- Casa Alvarez
Also, here’s an online guide to vegetarian restaurants in Boulder. It’s a little out of date, and some places have closed, but otherwise there are good tips there. One vegan contributor to this list has suggested that we caution that Chez Thuy lists many foods as vegetarian, but may in fact use fish sauce in the preparation of these foods. But, I mean, who doesn’t use fish sauce nowadays?

Also, be sure to check out our Google map, at the RoME website, for more suggestions.

**Dushanbe Tea House directions**  
(Friday reception)

Walk west from the Eaton Humanities building until you get to Broadway. Take a right and walk north along Broadway. Take a right at Arapahoe Avenue and walk one block to 13th street. Turn left and walk about one block to the Dushanbe Tea House, which will be on the right.

**Back Country Pizza directions**  
(Thursday night drinks)

Leave the Koenig center and head north to University Avenue. Take a right to head east along University until it bends north (and downhill) to become 17th street. Walk north until Arapahoe Avenue and take a right. Walk for six or seven blocks to 2319 Arapahoe Avenue. Back Country Pizza will be on the left side of the street.

*Note: Back Country Pizza has a selection of over 50 beers on tap, though we regret that, due to the alcohol policy of the University of Colorado Boulder, this will be a cash bar. You’re on your own for drinks. We will be meeting in the back room.*

**More about Back Country Pizza**

**Dushanbe Tea House directions**  
(Friday reception)

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Parking on Campus

The best and cheapest option for parking during RoME V will be to park on University Avenue just west of Broadway, in the area of town known as “The Hill.” Parking is free on the streets west of campus. It’s a short walk to campus from there.

Failing that, you can park at the meters on the street, though that can get pricey. On Saturday and Sunday you can park near Eaton Humanities for $3 for the day. You can access this lot by taking University Drive east or 17th St. south into campus, turning onto Mackie Drive, going through the gate at the back of Eaton Humanities and taking a left. The lot will be on the left.

QR (Quick Response) Codes

Apps are available for iOS and Android that allow you to scan these codes with your phone or tablet to go quickly to a webpage.

Go to our Boulder Sites Google Map

Fill out the anonymous suggestion/complaint form
Important Buildings

1. Eaton Humanities (HUMN)
2. Fleming Law (FLMG)
3. Koenig Alumni Center
4. Back Country Pizza
5. Dushanbe Tea House