The Morris Colloquium -- an annual conference in memory of Bertram Morris (Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder) -- is organized by the Philosophy Department of the University of Colorado at Boulder and supported by the generous contributions of the Bertram Morris Fund.

Topic: Immigration
Speakers: Michael Blake, Kit Wellman, Adam Hosein
March 15-16, 2012
Contact: Adam Hosein

-  P r o g r a m  -

Thursday, March 15

Kit Wellman (Washington University in St. Louis)
"Political Legitimacy and Territorial Rights"

6:30-8:00pm, HUMN 135

a joint THINK!/Morris talk

ABSTRACT: Few deny that states should be delineated territorially, but questions abound as to what moral rights states can claim to which parcels of territory. In other words, even if one assumes that states can be legitimate and must be territorially districted (and not everyone does, of course), why think that Norway is entitled to exclusive jurisdiction over the particular piece of territory it currently occupies? And even if Norway does have a special claim to this land, what rights does this give it against which parties? More specifically, does Norway have exclusive rights of jurisdiction (the right to make and enforce law on its territory), resources (the right to control and consume the natural resources available in its territory), and/or border control (the right to design and enforce its own immigration policy as it sees fit)?

It is tempting to suppose that legitimate states enjoy these three rights to jurisdiction, resources, and border control. It is far from clear, however, how the dominant approach to political legitimacy -- functional accounts -- can ground these rights. Thus, prominent authors like David Miller have recently suggested that functional theories of political legitimacy must be replaced or at least supplemented with nationalist elements. I am not convinced that invoking a nation's claim to territory can do the desired work, but I shall not press this critique here. In this paper, I shall merely explore how a functional theorist might try to ground a legitimate state's claims to jurisdiction, border control and resources. In my view, functional theorists can provide plausible accounts of the first two territorial rights, but it remains unclear how they can justify the third. Assuming that this is correct, the plausibility of non-nationalist functional theories of political legitimacy will depend upon whether natural resources should be understood as belonging exclusively to the citizens of the country in which they lie.

Friday, March 16

Kit Wellman (Washington University in St. Louis)
"The Rights to Enter and Exit"
10:00–11:30am, EDUC 220

ABSTRACT: In my earlier work on the morality of migration, I have defended an asymmetric view on the rights to enter and exit countries. In particular, I have alleged that legitimate states are morally entitled to limit immigration with a great deal more discretion than they may prohibit emigration. This general orientation has been challenged by Phillip Cole and Lea Ypi who, despite their differences, are united in defending much more symmetric approaches to the twin rights to enter and exit. In the first section of this paper I critically examine Cole's view that states may not restrict immigration in the manner that I allege, and in the second I address Ypi's arguments that states may permissibly limit emigration much more than one might initially suspect.

Adam Hosein (CU Boulder)
"What Do We Owe Undocumented Migrants?"

1:00–2:30pm, HALE 270

ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that, subject to some mild caveats, undocumented migrants can gain rights against the state in the same way that other migrants can, namely through extended residence. This is true, I argue, even if we suppose that they have done wrong by entering the territory unauthorized.

Michael Blake (University of Washington)

"Immigration and Obligation: How to Justify the Right to Exclude"
3:30–5:00pm, HALE 270

ABSTRACT: Most contemporary justifications of the right to exclude foreign nationals begin with the idea that such restrictions help protect some good: a culture, a society, or some associative project. I believe these justifications fail to account for what is unique about immigration—namely, that it involves the crossing into a new legal jurisdiction, in which distinct legal rights are acquired simply through jurisdictional presence. In this, the immigrant creates obligations on other persons, who are now obligated to support and maintain a system within which these new legal rights are defended. I believe this is the source of the pro tanto right to exclude would-be immigrants. We are permitted, I argue, to prevent others from acquiring new rights over us, unless some new story can be told about why those rights are in fact morally demanded. I believe this account of immigration lends itself nicely both to an account of why border controls are sometimes morally legitimate—and an account of when those controls are morally repugnant, and we are obligated to provide rights to would-be immigrants by admitting them to residence.

Bertram Morris (1908-1981) was born in Denver.  Educated at Princeton and Cornell, he taught at the University of Colorado from 1947 until his retirement in 1977.  He published books including The Aesthetic Process, Philosophical Aspects of Culture, and Institutions of Intelligence.

Bertram Morris is remembered as much for his committed involvement in the social issues of his community as for his scholarly work.  In 1953, he began an outreach program at Manual High School in Denver that still continues.  In 1975, he was given a special award by the American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado for his efforts on behalf of academic freedom and his work to improve conditions at the Boulder County Jail.

As an expression of admiration and gratitude, the Philosophy Department established this Colloquium when Bertram Morris retired in 1977.