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Abstracts from the Plenary Speakers

The Problem of Hiddenness and the Problem of Evil
Presented by
John Schellenberg, Associate Professor, Philosophy, Mount Saint Vincent University

     Everyone knows that the problem of Divine hiddenness and the problem of evil are related, but just how? I will seek to answer this question. My answer identifies many instructive parallels between the two problems, especially at the level of structure or form. But the content of the two problems and of the arguments for atheism they represent, so I shall argue, are importantly different; and 'one size fits all' responses betray confusion. The two problems do not rise or fall together, and atheism is much better served if arguments of both types can be defended than otherwise.

Can God be Hidden and Evident at the Same Time?
Presented by
C. Stephen Evans, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Humanities, Baylor University

    Kierkegaard believes that God's existence is evident in the sense that everyone should be aware of God's reality.  Yet at the same time he holds that it is neither possible nor desirable to prove God's existence.  How can God be evident to everyone and yet hidden from some people?  The answer lies in Kierkegaard's conviction that to become aware of God a person must undergo a process of spiritual development.  I will explicate and defend this Kierkegaardian view, both as a plausible description of the actual epistemic situation human beings face and as an account of the way a good and loving God might want to make his reality known.

What’s Wrong With Skepticism About God’s Purposes?
Presented by
Daniel Howard-Snyder, Associate Professor, Philosophy, Western Washington University

     Many of us find ourselves in the dark about whether, or how likely it is that, God would be justified in permitting bad things to happen, things like horrific suffering and inculpable nonbelief. Consequently, we are disinclined to draw inferences like this one: since we can’t think of a reason that would justify God, there probably is none, and so there probably is no God. In this paper, we assess some objections to skepticism about God’s purposes in permitting bad things to happen, most notably that it leads to objectionable sorts of moral skepticism.