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Upcoming
Events
Spring 2005
The University of Colorado Theology Forum Presents
"The Son of The Hiddenness of God"
Arnold T Guminski
When: Thursday,
March 17 at 3:30pm
Where: UMC 382
The term "divine hiddenness" refers
either to
a theological or to a philosophical notion. The former standardly
presupposes the existence of the God of traditional monotheism and as
being especially and graciously loving with respect to humans. It
involves efforts to explain (or explain away) why God so often seems to
neglect humans especially when they are especially needful of his help
and support. The sources of explanations are ultimately based upon the
real or supposed deliverances of divine (special) revelation—such as
those contained in the Bible. The second notion of divine hiddenness
does not presuppose the existence of the God of traditional theism and
his being especially and graciously loving. It involves efforts to
disprove or disconfirm the existence of God based upon what is taken to
be the insufficiency of the evidences or grounds for warranted belief
that God exists or because nonbelief is so widespread among ostensibly
decent and reasonable people. The atheological divine hiddenness
arguments are unsatisfactory (for me). First, the most they succeed in
doing (if they succeed at all) is to disprove or disconfirm that God is
especially and graciously loving as to humans. Secondly, the opponents
of the atheological divine hiddenness arguments plausibly rebut them by
relying upon grounds ultimately based upon the real or supposed
deliverances of divine (special) revelation. The son of divine
hiddenness presupposes (for argument's sake at least) the existence of
the God of traditional monotheism prescinding from special revelation.
This paper argues that the property of being especially and graciously
loving to humans is not an attribute—that is an essential property—of
God's nature; although it is an attribute of God that he could be such
in some world created by him. Similarly, that God has made some special
revelation or wills a supernatural life for some or all humans are not
essential divine properties—but rather are contingent properties of the
God of traditional monotheism. This paper considers the hypothesis that
God (as so understod and presupposed to exist) is neither especially
and graciously loving with respect to humans, nor that he has made some
special revelation, to humans nor wills a supernatural life for them.
This paper argues that the foregoing hypothesis provides a better
explanation of notorious facts (including those addressed in the
atheological divine hiddenness arguments) than the hypothesis that God
especially and graciously loves humans, that he has made a special
revelation to them and wills a supernatural life for them—the latter
hypothesis requiring auxillary propositions ultimately based upon real
or supposed special revelation. |
