Acknowledgements

We are quite thankful to be holding the 2013 Society of Christian Philosophers’ Mountain-Pacific Region Conference at the University of Colorado at Boulder. As many of you know, hosting an event of this magnitude is a tremendous undertaking, and we would therefore like to thank all of those who helped make it happen.

First and foremost, we would like to thank The Society of Christian Philosophers, the University of Colorado at Boulder’s President’s Fund for the Humanities, and the University of Colorado at Boulder’s Philosophy Department for their generous financial contributions.

Second, we would like to thank the University of Colorado at Boulder faculty, particularly Graeme Forbes, Brad Monton, Wes Morriston, and Michael Tooley, for supporting this event as well as Robert Pasnau for helping us with its planning and preparation.

Third, we would like to thank our keynote speakers, Lara Buchak, Trent Dougherty, and Jeffrey Jordan, for their willingness to participate in the proceedings.

Fourth, we would like to thank all the graduate students from the University of Colorado at Boulder who willingly served as referees for the conference as well as all of you who are serving as commentators or session chairs.

Finally, we would like to thank all the conference presenters and participants for visiting Boulder to discuss your philosophical and religious beliefs with us.

Thanks for making this conference an excellent one!
Jonathan Spelman and Ashley Taylor

Faith and Reason
University of Colorado at Boulder
March 8-9, 2013

Keynote Speakers
Lara Buchak
Trent Dougherty
Jeffrey Jordan
Faith and Reason
University of Colorado at Boulder
March 8-9, 2013

Jeffrey Jordan (Delaware)
“Bridging the Gap: Theistic pragmatic arguments and justification”
March 8, 2013 at 5:30 p.m.
University Memorial Center
Room 384

Trent Dougherty (Baylor)
“The Common Sense Problem of Evil”
March 9, 2013 at 12:15 p.m.
University Memorial Center
The Gallery

Lara Buchak (UC, Berkeley)
“Rational Faith”
March 9, 2013 at 5:30 p.m.
University Memorial Center
The Gallery

Table of Contents
Schedule of Events
Paper Abstracts
Important Addresses
Directions
Acknowledgements
Friday, March 8

10:00-11:00  Registration

11:00-12:05  Session 1
UMC 382  Ian Church
UMC 384  Chad McIntosh
UMC 386  Brandon Rickabaugh

12:15-01:20  Session 2
UMC 382  Allison Thornton
UMC 384  Wade Munroe
UMC 386  Travis Dumsday

01:30-02:35  Session 3
UMC 382  Anthony Bolos
UMC 384  Noël Saenz
UMC 386  Leigh Vicens

02:35-04:00  Break

04:00-05:05  Session 4
UMC 382  Blake McAllister
UMC 384  Andrew Jaeger
UMC 386  Mike Austin

05:30-07:00  Keynote 1
UMC 384  Jeffrey Jordan
  *Bridging the Gap: Theistic pragmatic arguments and justification*

07:30-09:00  Banquet Dinner
Cantina Laredo

Saturday, March 9

09:45-10:50  Session 5
UMC 382  Max Baker-Hytch
UMC 384  Timothy O'Connor
UMC 386  Robert Fischer

11:00-12:05  Session 6
UMC 382  Thomas Metcalf
UMC 384  Kenneth Boyce
UMC 386  Andrew Bailey

12:15-01:45  Keynote 2
The Gallery  Trent Dougherty
  *The Common Sense Problem of Evil*

01:45-03:00  Break

03:00-04:05  Session 7
UMC 382  Paul Macdonald
UMC 384  Jonathan Reibsamen
UMC 386  Beth Seacord

04:15-05:20  Session 8
UMC 382  Laura Goins
UMC 384  Philip Swenson
UMC 386  Caleb Cohoe

05:30-07:00  Keynote 3
The Gallery  Lara Buchak
  *Rational Faith*
Ian Church (Fuller Theological Seminary)  
“Should CSR Give Atheists Epistemic Assurance?”  
Room: UMC 382  
Chair: Max Baker-Hytch (University of Oxford)  
Commentator: Nick Byrd (University of Colorado at Boulder)  

Recent work in cognitive science of religion (CSR) is beginning to converge on a very interesting thesis— that, given the ordinary features of human minds operating in typical human environments, we are naturally disposed to believe in the existence of gods, among other religious ideas (e.g., see Atran 2002; Barrett 2004; Barrett 2012; Bering 2011; Boyer 2001; Guthrie 1993; McCauley 2011; Pyysiäinen 2004; Pyysiäinen 2009). In this paper, we explore whether such a discovery ultimately helps or hurts the atheist position— whether, for example, it lends credence to atheism by explaining away religious belief or whether it actually strengthens some already powerful arguments against atheism in the relevant philosophical literature. We argue that the recent discoveries of CSR hurt, not help, the atheist position— that CSR, if anything, should not give atheists epistemic assurance.

Chad McIntosh (Cornell University)  
“Towards a Natural Trinitarian Theology: On the Possibility of a Single Perfect Being”  
Room: UMC 384  
Chair: Steven Duncan (Bellevue College)  
Commentator: Alex Zambrano (University of Colorado at Boulder)  

There is a long tradition that sees the doctrine of the Trinity as belonging to the realm of faith, not reason; in the domain of revealed theology, not natural theology. In contrast to this tradition, that I want to explore what there is by way of a “natural Trinitarian theology.” Specifically, I want to explore an argument that concerns itself only with propositions available to all by the natural light of reason, but nonetheless pushes in the direction of a Trinitarian conception of God. I will do so by engaging Dale Tuggy’s recent attempt to argue that “we know of no such cogent argument.” I will argue, contra Tuggy and the tradition, that a certain metaphysics of value—together with the assumption that God is a being of great value—provides the resources for at least one cogent argument in the domain of natural Trinitarian theology.

Brandon Rickabaugh (Biola University)  
“Consciousness, Maximality and the Ontology of Human Persons”  
Room: UMC 386  
Chair: Ben Rohrs (University of Colorado at Boulder)  
Commentator: Jonathan Spelman (University of Colorado at Boulder)  

It is recalcitrant that I am a conscious being, and there is a unity and exclusivity to my consciousness— I am the only self that has all and only my conscious life. I am not composed of a “great host” of conscious selves. I experience my self as an individual not composed of any separable parts. According to a dominant thesis, however, the brain is the locus of consciousness which has separable parts, such as the brain or a human animal including my brain. Thus, we have two disparate views: (a) I am a conscious being composed of separable parts, and (b) I am a conscious being not composed of separable parts. This paper analyzes an argument for (b) advanced by David Barnett, and an objection from Andrew Bailey which relies on Ted Sider’s work on maximality and consciousness. Finally, I offer responses in defense of Barnett. The central argument is made that Sider’s argument is in fact motivated by an intuition that favors (b).
Richard Swinburne (2004) gives an account of perceiving God that goes roughly like this: we perceive something if and only if what we apparently perceive causes it to seem to us that it is present. In apparent perceptions of God, it seems to us that God is present, and, since God causes everything, God causes it to seem to us that he is present. Thus Swinburne makes the bold claim that any apparent perception of God is veridical. In this paper, I’ll pay attention to the details of this account to show that Swinburne’s claim is false: some apparent perceptions of God are not veridical. I’ll first consider Swinburne’s account of the causal theory of perception and the defense of religious experience he bases on it. I will then suggest a revision to the causal theory of perception as Swinburne formulates it, a qualification almost universally accepted in the literature on the theory, which is meant to exclude deviant causation. I’ll then show that once the causal theory of perception is thus revised, plausibly some perceptions of God are not veridical, because, plausibly, God is a deviant cause of apparent perceptions of him.

Molinism relies on what I will term Molinist counterfactuals to do its philosophical work. These Molinist counterfactuals are brute, contingent modal facts, which indicate what contingent effects would be produced either directly or indirectly by indeterministic processes or causes in any given circumstance. The philosophical literature on Molinism has traditionally focused on counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs). But CCFs do not exhaust the Molinist counterfactuals that Molinism must posit. Molinism is also committed to what I will term counterfactuals of material indeterminism (CMIs), which are counterfactual conditionals that satisfy the following schema: \( \text{CMI: If hunk of matter, } M, \text{ where in circumstances, } C, \text{ then } M \text{ would indeterministically act in manner, } B. \) In this paper I argue that CCFs will supervene on CMIs. This supervenience relation will threaten the possibility of libertarian free will, which is a central tenant of Molinism.
Friday, March 8
Session 3 (1:30-2:35)

Anthony Bolos (University of Edinburgh)
“Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement?”
Room: UMC 382
Chair: Nick Byrd (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Commentator: Laura Goins

Recent literature in religious epistemology has overlooked a significant debate in mainstream epistemology. In short, theories in religious epistemology have failed to consider the value problem. This paper, then, hopes to rectify this omission by arguing that one of the most influential accounts of religious epistemology—reformed epistemology—fails to adequately account for the value of knowledge. Reformed epistemology fails to account for the final value of knowledge in that is it susceptible to the same problems that all reliabilist accounts of knowledge face; namely, the swamping problem. However, there is a reasonable way out for the reformed epistemologist. This comes by way of endorsing the achievement thesis whereby knowledge is seen as a cognitive achievement. In the essay, I highlight two different ways one can understand the achievement thesis. First, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is always primarily creditable to the agent. Or, second, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is at least partially creditable to the agent. In the end, whichever version of the achievement thesis is correct, it is possible to provide an account of reformed epistemology where the value of knowledge is adequately demonstrated.

Leigh Vicens (Augustana College)
“Common-Sense Freedom and the Soul Hypothesis”
Room: UMC 386
Chair: Paul Herrick (Shoreline Community College)
Commentator: Garrett Pendergraft (Pepperdine University)

Stewart Goetz has recently argued that the existence of the soul is necessary to makes sense of what he calls the “common-sense” view of human freedom. An implicit assumption in Goetz’s argument is that our reasons for acting can only figure in irreducible explanations of our free actions if we have souls that cause those actions in light of our reasons. I contend, however, that such an assumption is false, for on some rival views to substance dualism—in particular, non-reductive physicalism and property dualism—our reasons may likewise play an irreducible role in the explanation of our actions. In explicating the irreducible explanatory role that reasons may play in a non-reductive physicalist account of human persons, I also argue, contra Goetz, that gaps in the causal processes of our brains are not necessary for teleological explanations of our actions to be non-redundant. And while I grant that the common-sense view of human freedom may require causal gaps for another reason, I maintain that a soul is not necessary to secure them. Thus I conclude that the view of human freedom which Goetz considers commonsensical does not give us reason to favor substance dualism over non-reductive physicalism.

Noël Saenz (University of Colorado at Boulder)
“Against Browerian Simplicity”
Room: UMC 384
Chair: Rebecca Chan (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Commentator: Travis Dumsday (Concordia University College of Alberta)

According to divine simplicity, God is absolutely simple. That is, God is both mereologically and metaphysically simple, where x is metaphysically simple just in case x instantiates no intrinsic properties (and so nominalism, at least with respect to intrinsic properties, is true of x) or x instantiates one intrinsic property and is identical to that property. Browerian Simplicity is a version of divine simplicity that appeals to the notion of truthmakers in order to avoid having to identify God with a property. In this paper, I present three criticisms of Browerian Simplicity. I argue that Browerian Simplicity rests on a false principle, cannot explain the dependency that exists between intrinsic divine predications, and has some costs in saying that God does not exemplify any intrinsic properties.
Blake McAllister (Baylor University)
“A Reductive Account of the Sensus Divinitatis”
Room: UMC 382
Chair: Anthony Bolos (University of Edinburgh)
Commentator: Max Baker-Hytch (University of Oxford)

The *sensus divinitatis* is the faculty that produces non-inferentially justified theistic beliefs in the widely reported flowers, sunsets, and starry skies cases. I develop an account on which the *sensus divinitatis* is a standard rational faculty with both religious and non-religious applications. There is no need to postulate a special religious faculty. I discuss some of the advantages of this reductive model and argue for a restriction on what experiences trigger the *sensus divinitatis*. The acceptance of this restriction moves one much closer to accepting my reductive model.

Andrew Jaeger (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)
“A Tale of Two Parts”
Room: UMC 384
Chair: Alex Zambrano (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Commentator: Allison Thornton (Baylor University)

Extended (heterogeneous) simple substances have played key roles throughout the history of metaphysics and philosophical theology, and recently have begun to make a comeback in analytic metaphysics. Joshua Spencer (2010) has raised an interesting version of the problem of spatial intrinsics against the possibility of extended heterogeneous simples which relies on the possibility of worlds with mixed spatial regions: worlds that have *both* spatial regions that are extended and yet atomic (extended regions without subregions) and spatial regions that are continuous. In this paper, I will argue that Spencer’s argument (if sound) is not just a problem for simple heterogeneous substances. If one regards Spencer’s argument against the possibility of heterogeneous simples as sound, then one is committed to a parallel argument against the possibility of composite objects (objects with proper parts). This, I suggest, gives the believer in heterogeneous material objects (be they simple or composite) *prima facie* reason to regard Spencer’s argument as suspect in some way. I then conclude by suggesting that an argument can be given for the *actuality* of extended heterogeneous simples.

Mike Austin (Eastern Kentucky University)
“The Virtue of Humility”
Room: UMC 386
Chair: Jonathan Reibsamen (Saint Louis University)
Commentator: Ian Church (Fuller Theological Seminary)

Humility is a complex and often misunderstood virtue. It is also a relatively neglected one, though this has not always been the case. However, there is a renewed interest among some contemporary analytic philosophers regarding the nature and value of humility. While some of their treatments are explicitly theological, in general this is not the case. In this paper, I discuss an explicitly Christian account of humility. I apply the methods of contemporary analytic philosophy to the field of moral theology in order to partially articulate and defend a Christian account of humility. This paper, then, is best characterized as a work of analytic moral theology, focused on the virtue of humility.

Mike Austin (Eastern Kentucky University)
“The Virtue of Humility”
Room: UMC 386
Chair: Jonathan Reibsamen (Saint Louis University)
Commentator: Ian Church (Fuller Theological Seminary)
Saturday, March 9
Session 5 (9:45-10:50)

Max Baker-Hytch (University of Oxford)
“Species-Wide Proper Function and the Sensus Divinitatis”
Room: UMC 382
Chair: Ashley Taylor (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Commentator: Paul Macdonald (Bucknell University)

Alvin Plantinga has argued that if God exists then it is very likely that among humans’ native cognitive abilities is a faculty designed by God to produce true monotheistic beliefs, a sensus divinitatis. In this paper I argue, however, that given the truth of Plantinga’s proper-functionalism theory of warrant and given that human beings and their cognitive faculties are indeed designed by God, it is in fact unreasonable to suppose that the proper function of one of our native cognitive capacities is the production of specifically monotheistic beliefs. I make this case by attempting to show that if a significant proportion of a species fails to exhibit a certain cognitive ability, then it is unreasonable to think the designer of the species meant for them to have such an ability unless there is either a reason for thinking the designer meant only some members of the species to have it, or a reason for thinking only some members of the species are subject to cognitive malfunction of the relevant sort. I go on to argue that neither sort of reason is available to account for the partial and uneven distribution of monotheistic beliefs throughout the human population.

Timothy O’Connor (Indiana University)
“Could There Be a Theory of Everything?”
Room: UMC 384
Chair: Robert Pasnau (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Commentator: Caleb Murray Cohoe (Metropolitan State University of Denver)

A little reflection shows that a satisfactory answer to the question ‘Why is there this—why, indeed, is there anything at all?’ would require an altogether different kind of explanation from familiar sorts in science and in everyday life. Would any sort manage to do? If so, would more than one? Here I aim only to get us started on thinking about the questions and to address one central argument that, if successful, would bring the whole discussion to a screeching halt. It is an argument that purports to show that it is impossible that these questions could have a constructive answer, or at least an answer other than one that is too crazy to take seriously. I will try to show that the argument is mistaken and that we can learn something important about the nature of explanation by seeing that this is so. As a result, we’ll see how to ask, and how not to ask, the central question concerning contingent existence, and we’ll begin to see as well what sorts of answers might be possible.

Robert Fischer (Texas State University-San Marcos)
“Rawlsian Christianity”
Room: UMC 386
Chair: Joseph Stenberg (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Commentator: Beth Seacord (University of Colorado at Boulder)

In the interest of aiding a rapprochement between Christian theological realists and anti-realists, I develop a Rawlsian understanding of Christianity. The centerpiece of the view is an analogy between a central Christian commitment—the Gospel—and a society’s political values as understood in Rawls’ Political Liberalism. If the analogy works, then realists and antirealists should have available to them a principled account of (a) the sense in which they are coreligionists, (b) those matters concerning which they should attend to one another’s views, and (c) those matters concerning which each may properly ignore the other’s views.
Anselmian theists believe that God is maximally great. Here I examine whether God’s maximal greatness entails that God have a certain kind of power that I call an ethical power: briefly, the power to bring about a state of affairs such that the state of affairs has a certain axiological value. The first section of this paper introduces necessary terminology. In the second section, I show that the most prominent analyses of omnipotence (historical and contemporary) entail that God has a set of ethical powers. In the third section, I argue that we should require of a maximally great or an omnipotent being that it possess these ethical powers, since there are intuitive reasons to think that a being deficient in ethical powers would be less than maximally great. The last section of this paper examines one potentially extremely important implication of the thesis that maximal greatness entails having this set of ethical powers.

Kenneth Boyce (University of Notre Dame)
“The Multiverse and the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy:
A Response to Nick Bostrom on Behalf of Roger White”
Room: UMC 384
Chair: Philip Swenson (University of California, Riverside)
Commentator: Timothy O’Connor (Indiana University)

Many have claimed that the fine-tuning of the universe is evidence that our universe is but one of numerous (perhaps infinitely many) other universes. This claim, however, has been forcefully challenged by Roger White. White, developing an objection originally put forward by Ian Hacking, compellingly argues that those who claim that the fine tuning of our universe provides evidence for there being a large number of universes commit what Hacking dubbed “the inverse gambler’s fallacy.” In this paper, I defend White’s thesis from an objection to it that has been raised by Nick Bostrom.
Paul Macdonald (Bucknell University)
“Faith, Reason, and the Beatific Vision”
Room: UMC 382
Chair: Van Tu (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Commentator: Ashley Taylor (University of Colorado at Boulder)

Belief in and hope for the beatific vision, or the immediate knowledge of God enjoyed by the blessed in heaven, has been essential to traditional, orthodox Christian faith, particularly in the Catholic tradition. My main claim in this paper is that embracing the beatific vision as normative for Christian faith has definitive, positive consequences for philosophical and religious (or theological) epistemology. Once we properly view the beatific vision as the paradigm case and height of normal human cognitive functioning, rather than as a drastic departure from normal human cognitive functioning, then we are able to affirm—against sceptical and subjectivist epistemologies—that the human mind is capable of and even oriented towards enjoying genuine, objective knowledge of the world as well as God (to some degree) in this life. This, in turn, opens up positive epistemic room for viewing faith and reason as distinctly intellective capacities for generating knowledge of God—on the level of true belief, rather than direct, intellective vision. Thus, even in this life, by way of faith and reason, we can direct our minds towards God, and thereby enjoy genuine transcendent knowledge, even if such knowledge falls radically short of the knowledge or vision of God we hope to enjoy in heaven.

Jonathan Reibsamen (Saint Louis University)
“A New Augustinian Response to the Problem of Petitionary Prayer”
Room: UMC 384
Chair: Alex Zambrano (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Commentator: Mike Austin (Eastern Kentucky University)

Typical theistic religious practices include petitioning God for the satisfaction of needs and desires, both for oneself and for others. The problem of petitionary prayer arises when one sees an apparent conflict between the traditional concept of God as omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good, and the efficacy of requesting goods from God. In this paper I will develop a new “Augustinian” response to the problem of petitionary prayer. To do this, I will first explain the problem identified by Augustine, which focuses on an apparent conflict between divine omniscience and petitionary prayer. Augustine’s response, which appeals to relational benefits gained through prayer, is promising but limited. I will then consider a version of the problem that focuses on an apparent conflict between divine goodness and the efficacy of petitionary prayer, and Eleonore Stump’s proposed solution. Her solution—Augustinian in spirit though broader in its philosophical reach—faces significant objections. I will then develop a new response—also Augustinian in spirit—that utilizes a “shared attention” model of petitionary prayer. This solution avoids the objections to Stump’s argument, and has greater explanatory scope.

Beth Seacord (University of Colorado at Boulder)
“The Problem of Predation and the Objections from Modal and Moral Skepticism”
Room: UMC 386
Chair: Rebecca Chan (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Commentator: Paul Bowman (University of Colorado at Boulder)

According to Peter van Inwagen, for all we know, our world with its physical laws including evolution driven by predation and its attendant suffering is the only metaphysically possible, non-irregular mechanism for the creation of valuable, higher-level sentient creatures like ourselves. And, for all we know, massively irregularity could be a much greater defect than the defect of the suffering of sentient creatures. If this is the case, then God can’t be faulted for choosing regularity over irregularity in the design of the world and He can’t be faulted for using the only metaphysically possible means to create human beings and other higher-level sentient creatures. Thus, if van Inwagen’s story is true then God would have a morally sufficient reason for permitting animal suffering. However, I will argue that Van Inwagen’s story is highly implausible. I challenge van Inwagen’s claims that 1) for all we know being massively irregular is a defect in a world as great as the defect of massive suffering and 2) for all we know it was not metaphysically possible for God to have created a world that has higher-level sentient creatures that also has less suffering than the actual world.
Laura Goins
“Virtue in Trust: Implications for Theistic Religious Faith”
Room: UMC 382
Chair: Van Tu (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Commentator: Jonathan Reibsamen (Saint Louis University)

Virtue epistemology offers a promising new way of framing an old question about the epistemic defensibility of faith: can a person of faith be intellectually virtuous with respect to his/her religious beliefs? Some of the central worries one might have regarding the intellectual virtue of faith – worries about tensions between faith and intellectual caution, intellectual autonomy, or respect for evidence in forming / revising beliefs – also pertain to the intellectual virtue in interpersonal trust. In this paper, I attempt to clarify these worries and argue that trust – meaning a well-tuned willingness to trust others, which is neither gullible naïveté nor suspicious cynicism – is nevertheless an intellectual virtue. The observations I make on trust’s behalf are suggestive for an analysis of the intellectual virtue or vice in faith, given the significant parallels between the cases of faith and trust. However, specific implications for the case of faith will turn upon empirical questions regarding the specific epistemic demands of a particular faith tradition on a believer. I conclude that faith’s being intellectually virtuous is compatible with its requiring one to make decisive, resilient commitments in the same vein as commitments required by appropriate interpersonal trust.

Philip Swenson (University of California, Riverside)
“Ability, Foreknowledge and Explanatory Dependence”
Room: UMC 384
Chair: James Cook (Academic Connections International)
Commentator: Chris Tweedt (Baylor University)

Many philosophers wish to maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. One problem with this view is that the Fixity of the Past principle, which underlies the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise, and determinism appears to generate an argument for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge as well. By developing an account of ability which appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the Fixity of the Past with a new principle which does not generate this difficulty.

Caleb Cohoe (Metropolitan State University of Denver)
“Theological Realism and the Pessimistic Induction”
Room: UMC 386
Chair: Caleb Ontiveros (Fort Lewis College)
Commentator: Chris Conn (Sewanee: The University of the South)

I argue that there is at least one important respect in which the scientific realist is worse off than the theological realist. The progressive character of scientific theories leave scientific realism worse off with respect to the skeptical challenge posed by the pessimistic induction problem. The stability of theological views, by contrast, allows the theological realist to avoid this problem. The theological realist can offer an account of theology that is in no danger of generating a pessimistic induction and, in particular, the theological realist can give an account that specifies what the ordinary person is entitled to believe. The scientific realist may be able to respond to the challenge of the pessimistic induction, but even the strongest responses face difficulties in giving any detailed prescription for what the ordinary person should believe.
Important Addresses

Best Western Plus Boulder Inn
770 28th Street Frontage Road
Boulder, CO 80303
(303) 449-3800

Cantina Laredo
1680 29th Street
Boulder, CO 80301
(303) 444-2260

Quality Inn and Suites Boulder Creek
2020 Arapahoe Avenue
Boulder, CO 80302
(303) 449-7550

University Memorial Center (UMC)
1669 Euclid Avenue
Boulder, CO 80302
(303) 492-6161

University Memorial Center to Cantina Laredo

Drive
http://goo.gl/maps/44jY4

If you are driving to Cantina Laredo:

1. Drive north on Broadway, and turn right on Canyon Boulevard.
2. Travel east on Canyon Boulevard.
3. Cantina Laredo is on your right, just past the four way stop at Canyon and 29th Street.

Bus
http://goo.gl/maps/bgc6r

We will provide you with a bus ticket to pay for your trip.

If you are riding the bus to Cantina Laredo:

1. Walk under Broadway via the pedestrian underpass, and walk up the stairs in front of you.
2. Turn right, and walk 25 feet north.
3. Board the “Hop: Counterclockwise.”
4. Tell the bus driver that you need to get off at Canyon and 28th Street. He or she will help you exit at the correct stop. (The map indicates that you should stay on the bus a bit longer, but that’s unnecessary.)
5. Walk east one and a half blocks.
6. Cantina Laredo is in front of you, just past the four way stop at Canyon and 29th Street.
Cantina Laredo to Best Western Boulder Plus Inn

Drive
http://goo.gl/maps/a961Q

If you are driving to the Best Western Plus Boulder Inn:
1. Drive east on Canyon Boulevard, and turn right on 30th Street.
2. Travel south on 30th Street, and turn right on Aurora Avenue.
3. Travel west on Aurora Avenue, and turn left on 28th Street Frontage Road.
4. Travel south on 28th Street Frontage Road.
5. The Best Western Plus Boulder Inn is on your left.

Bus
http://goo.gl/maps/A37Eh
We will provide you with a bus ticket to pay for your trip.

If you would like to walk to the Best Western Plus Boulder Inn:
1. Walk west on Canyon Boulevard, and turn left at 30th Street. (Do not cross 30th Street.)
2. Walk south for approximately 25 feet on the west side of 30th Street.
3. Board the “Bound.” (The “Bound” stops at this stop on the 20th minute and the 50th minute of every hour.)
4. Tell the bus driver that you need to get off at Baseline and 30th Street. He or she should help you exit at the correct stop.
5. Walk west to 29th Street, and turn right.
6. Walk north to 28th Street Frontage Road, and turn left.
7. Continue walking along 28th Street Frontage Road.
8. The Best Western Plus Boulder Inn will be on your right.
Cantina Laredo to Quality Inn and Suites

Drive

http://goo.gl/maps/dR3Ch

If you would like to drive to the Quality Inn and Suites Boulder Creek:

1. Drive south on 29th Street.
2. Turn right at Arapahoe Avenue.
3. The Quality Inn and Suites Boulder Creek will be on your left, just past 21st Street.

Bus

http://goo.gl/maps/I30Wf

We will provide you with a bus ticket to pay for your trip.

If you would like to take the bus to the Quality Inn and Suites Boulder Creek:

1. Walk south on 29th Street.
2. Turn right at Arapahoe Avenue. (*Do not cross Arapahoe Avenue.*)
3. Walk approximately 50 to 100 feet west on the north side of Arapahoe Avenue.
4. Board the “Jump.”
5. Tell the bus driver that you need to get off at Arapahoe and 21st Street. He or she will help you exit at the correct stop.
6. Walk west one block west.
7. The Quality Inn and Suites Boulder Creek will be across the street on your left.

Walk

http://goo.gl/maps/kAJSm

If you would like to walk to the Quality Inn and Suites Boulder Creek:

1. Walk south on 29th Street.
2. Turn right at Arapahoe Avenue.
3. The Quality Inn and Suites Boulder Creek will be on your left, just past 21st Street.