Whether or not it's strictly accurate the often-repeated story is that the Dutch spent 10,000 lives (and 100,000 Acehnese lives) trying (and failing) to conquer this northern tip of Sumatra from 1873 to 1942.

Frequent advisor to the UN, Karen Parker, argued (1997) that the Netherlands' transfer of the Dutch East Indies to the "United States of Indonesia" in 1942 included a territory, the "Kingdom of Aceh" which "had never been incorporated into the Dutch colonial possession. Subsequently,through armed aggression by the Javanese dominated Indonesian government, Acheh was forcibly annexed."   A not uncommon argument that Aceh should be seen as a Javanese colony is found here. Useful political history of Aceh can be found at aceh.org, Portugal's Universidade de Coimbra and the US Refugee Committee.

A Referendum for Aceh? The number of demonstrators on Nov 8, 1999 for a referendum on independence was a half million according to PBS and two million according to acehnet.tripod.com.

"If we do it in East Timor, why not in Aceh?" November 4, 1999 -- Abdurrahman Wahid A reason for the movement to impeach Indonesian President Wahid concerns his all too frequent remarks which later need retraction. By 19nov99, after the Nov 8th rally pictured on the left, his remarks had been reconstructed to mean that a referendum could be held, but only concerning the question of whether the province would like more autonomy. In addition to the independence of East Timor, Wahid's "Why not" remark has helped fuel the Aceh freedom movement, which led to 900 deaths in the first six months of 2001.

Exxon and Mobil merged in 1999 and the $3bn MOI (Mobil of Indonesia) became a wholly owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil. MOI operates three gas fields in the North Aceh districts of Lhoksukon, Arun and Pase. According to Bloomberg 5may01 the three gas fields feed the Arun gas plant (at the northeast corner of Aceh) which, in turn, ships gas primarily to Japan and Korea. PT Arun NGL is 55% owned by the state oil and gas company, Pertamina, 35% by MOI and 15% by Japan-Indonesia LNG. At 2001 prices the export revenue from the Arun plant is approximately $100mil/month.

Due to violence from the separatist movement, ExxonMobil suspended operations on March 9, 2001 -- see CNN 13mar01 and CNN 7apr01. Shortly thereafter, the government responded with the following:

"(Due to) the impact of increased security disturbances on strategic and important facilities such as Exxon Mobil in Arun . . . it is acceptable to use a limited military operation," chief spokesman Wimar Witoelar told reporters. The president has asked the chief political minister (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) and the armed forces chief (Admiral Widodo A.S.) to carry out the measures."   CNN 14mar01

According to the respected London NGO, TAPOL, the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) is about to be obliterated by large scale forces:

Although Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No IV of 11 April did not comply with TNI demands for the armed forces (TNI) to take charge in Aceh and left the police formally in command, KOLAOPS TNI, under Brig.General Zumroni (a former deputy commander of the army's crack troops, KOPASSUS), will be in command of all military operations in Aceh and answerable not to the regional military command or the regional police chief but to TNI headquarters in Jakarta.   23apr01

According to Amnesty International 27jun01

Military operations aimed at defeating GAM began on 2 May 2001. Troops trained in counter-insurgency operations by Special Forces Command (Kopassus), a military unit notorious for violating human rights in Aceh in the early 1990s are among those which have been moved back into Aceh. Human rights monitors and humanitarian workers are prevented from carrying out their legitimate work because of fear for their security.

The history of military actions in Aceh is cause for considerable concern. According to the Asian Human Rights Commission Sept '99

The period of the Military Operational Zone (DOM) from 1989 to 1998, characterized by cases of more than 3,000 killed, 23 mass graves, from 5,000 to 39,000 disappeared persons, 128 women and girls raped, and 597 houses burnt, has left a legacy of trauma amongst the Acehnese people.

Sydney Morning Herald 14may01 suggests atrocities worse than those commited in East Timor. Acehnese Used for Organs

Following intense popular pressure to democratize and lift the 10-year long state of siege, then President Habibie revoked Aceh's DOM status in August [1998], and some troops effectively started leaving the province. Recognizing that they had to make at least nominal amends for their mentor's rule of terror, both Habibie and then chief of the armed forces, General Wiranto, publicly apologized for massive human rights violations under DOM. Yet in December, the TNI was back with a vengeance. Flanked by a newly-created riot control police unit, the PPRM (Petugas Penindak Rusuh Massa), they set about stifling GAM's call for independence.     Al-Ahram Weekly Nov 1999

This Dec 2000 testimony by a human rights worker is an example of the military's effort to intimidate the community of outside observers and get them to leave. The story is also carried in the Atjeh Times 28feb01.

In the words of the murdered human rights activist and former head of the New York International Forum for Aceh (IFA),

'My short experience of living in a democratic country, like the US, reinforced my belief that the repressive political situation in Indonesia is profoundly abnormal, and that propel me to devote my studies, my life and my work, toward social justice and democratic change in Indonesia, along with working to stop human rights violations carry out by the Indonesian military regime in my homeland, Aceh.'   ... Jafar S. Hamzah

The usual view is that Jakarta's political energy is (until Sept 2001 at the earliest) absorbed with impeachment proceedings -- that Jakarta politicians are fiddling while the provinces burn. But another view is that the political vacuum gives the military an opportunity to rid Aceh of GAM while Jakarta's attention is diverted. The 1999 experience in East Timor was seared into military consciousness -- the presence of international observers can force Jakarta politicians to take very strong measures against military leaders obviously responsible for human rights violations. But outside NGO observers are starting to be killed and, according to Tapol 11jul01, Lord Avebury, in a letter to the Foreign Office:

The impression I got was that they [the military] want to get on with their Security Operation without being observed or criticized for the widespread human rights violations accompanying their actions.

This view is also expressed in The Economist 30may01:

The generals are already delighted that Miss Megawati will take power [when the August impeachment vote is cast] -- she is a staunch nationalist and will probably do little to hold them accountable for corruption, or for violent crimes in unsettled provinces where secessionist groups are chafing at rule from Jakarta.

A Christian Science Monitor article entitled "Indonesia's wars over riches" offers the following generalization of the problem:

It's an increasingly familiar pattern across the globe. Gas, oil, and gold are shimmering lures for independence movements, which are then met with violence by the controlling regimes.   9mar01

But the presence of mineral riches is not sufficient to explain the level of violence that Jakarta is willing to allow. As of 2001, approximately 40% of the central government's revenue goes to service their (domestic and foreign) debt. Export revenues constitute 40% of government revenue and the export of natural gas from Aceh is about one-third of that 40%. Jakarta can ill afford to lose over 10% of their revenue from GAM attacks on the gas fields and plants.

Considerable attention in 2001 has been focused on the conditions that the IMF is imposing on the fiscal 2001 budget if Indonesia is to receive the next installment of a $5bn loan that was begun, but interrupted in 2000. The IMF heads the the CGI, or Consultative Group (of donors) on Indonesia. The Press Release of the April 23-24, 2001 meetings indicates that one of the CGI/IMF concerns is whether Jakarta can ensure that the rule of law prevails, especially as it affect foreign investors. That concern is the only reference in the document, no matter how oblique, to the violence between the military and the seccessionist movements in Aceh and West Papua. The CGI is not telling Jakarta whether to use the military or diplomacy to achieve "law and order" -- they are interested in the outcome. But, as Jakarta grovels for yet a new loan to help service the stock of debt outstanding, there's no reason to suspect that a higher death rate in Aceh isn't going to interfere with the loan -- it may, indeed, acquire the loan sooner than otherwise. Current negotiations with donor countries do not appear all that different from the criteria used for making loans to the Suharto regime, in all its brutality. It was, after all, the outside support of the Suharto regime that caused the massive external indebtedness in the first place.

In an otherwise thorough 40 page ICG March 2001 report which calls for greater commitment from the Jakarta authorities to raise revenues to properly service external debt, there is no mention of conflict between the Indonesian military and seccessionist movements in mineral rich provinces. Despite the absence of dialogue between the international financial community and the human rights community, the issues faced by the two groups are not unrelated.

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