Economic and Political Change in Argentina
last updated -- August 2000


Indebtedness and Budget Projections for de la Rua's Four Year Term


The year 2000 is a time to make an assessment of the changing of the guard -- the change from a decade of Carlos Menem's regime to the new administration of Fernando de la Rua, elected October 24, 1999 and sworn into office December 10. The basic outlines of the course to be charted are now (August 2000) in place and the chances of success can be addressed.

"No" to Dollarization -- the next step after the currency board has probably been terminated

Prior to the October 24, 1999 election, the Interpress Service 8/16/99, reported

"The government says 14.5 percent of the workforce is unemployed and another 13.2 percent is underemployed. Another 4 million people have given up on finding work and left the workforce. Poverty has nearly doubled in the past five years, according to the government, with 12 million of 36 million people living in poverty.

Privatization of state enterprises over the past 13 years has increased the costs of electricity, gas, water, telephone and public transportation for the poor. And ... the capitalized value of the firm, Azurix, that purchased the right to provide water, has plummeted -- that privitization program is not working."

Considerable attention was given to whether the federal government will meet the budget program contained in a $7.2bil standby credit agreement with the IMF in March 2000. The focus of concern was whether the $7.1bil federal deficit during Menem's last term of office, 1999, could be brought down to $4.5bil for Y2000 as requested by the Fund. The possibility that this might happened was given credibility when tax revenues for June 2000 came in much stonger than expected. Never mind that second quarter tax revenues were enhanced by a not-to-be-repeated tax amnesty (and never mind why they had to offer an amnesty to get taxes paid in the first place) -- the government proceeded to proudly place the image above on the web showing the substantial budget improvement compared to Menem's last year in office.

Four Year Projection:
In August 2000, the Finance Ministry put out an interesting projection of the future of the economy and indebtedness for de la Rua's four term in office. For a number of years public indebtedness has been growing relative to GDP, especially in 1999 when GDP dropped 3% for the year following the Jan '99 Brazilian devaluation. There are two public debt numbers, one for the federal government 31dec99 ($122bil gross and $110bil net of holdings of US Treasury strips used as collateral for Brady bonds) and another consolidated number for the national and provincial governments ($136bil for mar00). The official forecast is that the national and provincial budgets, by the end of de la Rua's four year term of office will be in balance! This would be a reversal of most of the decade's rapid growth in government indebtedness. According to the Economics Ministry the ratios of Debt/GDP will peak (in the next year or two depending on assumptions of economic growth) and start a downward trend. This picture of a declining Debt/GDP ratio is a central part of the new administration's economic game plan.

Leaving aside the immediate question of whether the federal budget deficit objective of $4.5bil for Y2000 goal is achieved, the larger issue is whether balanced budgets or even falling Debt/GDP ratios are credible given

De la Rua regards the internet as a new opportunity to market the government's programs. The extensive web sites, such as the 14feb00 Memorandum of Economic Policies, are obviously efforts by the Argentine officials to say all the things that the IMF wants to hear -- to anticipate the Fund's every concern. But the IMF surely does not want to hear projections of balanced budgets unless they are credible.

In a 1999 Business Week interview, the former head of Argentina's SEC, Martin Redrado, argued that external indebtedness will continue to grow unless there is a second wave of economic reforms comparable to the first wave in the early 'nineties. The first wave centered on massive privitizations and now, Y2000, the government, the country's chief debtor, has largely depleted their stock of assets to sell. The high level of second quarter Y2000 tax receipts was generated by a once-and-for-all tax amnesty and $1bil of the Y2000's revenue comes from another of a very limited series of Brady-bond-swaps.
As Redrado points out, recent capital inflows have shifted from the purchase of financial instruments to direct foreign investment (especially for the construction of tourist resorts in Patagonia, following the high-profile purchases of ranches by Ted Turner and Sylvester Stallone). This FDI (foreign direct investment) is doing little to support the government or Argentine corporate debt market. The EUI Jan 2000 (Economics Intelligence Institute) argued

Argentine companies are grappling with an estimated $6.39bn in debt coming due this year, including payments on principal and interest. Rolling over this debt will be complicated, considering that the government is seeking to raise $17.5bn in both the international and local financial markets in 2000. On top of that, most of the 23 Argentine provinces are running fiscal deficits and will need additional funds, placing more pressure on demand for the country's debt issues.
...
All of this public-sector fundraising narrows the space for companies in the international markets. At the local level, the only big investors are pension funds that have more than $16.5bn in assets under management. But local institutional investors have not been friendly to corporate bonds so far. Such instruments represent only 2% of their total portfolio, while government securities make up nearly 50%.
In the presence of (July 2000) 15+% unemployment, the largest labor demonstration since the Dirty War, rising economic stoppages by labor, a shortage of finance for Argentine corporations, junk bond rating for $136bil of public debt, a government and corporate sector that lives in continuous fear of a hike the US Fed Funds rate, and a government (unlike the Menem administration) committed to social programs, the projection of a balanced budget by 2004 is just not credible, unless, of course, they think that the net revenue from cleaning up the corruption surrounding Menem -- as exemplary as that might be -- is going to be, year after year, comparable to interest on public indebtedness. Proximity to the drugs and arms trade has hopefully been removed from the halls of power by the new administration, but Menem's ten years of accumulated deficits linger on in the form of debt which, in during the 1999 presidential campaign, both candidates, Eduardo Duhalde and Fernando de la Rua, expressed some misgivings until they were admonished by the financial community. Duhalde went so far as to seek an audience with the Pope concerning the Church's debt foregiveness program which led the head of IMF research, Michael Mussa, to suggest that the IMF could most easily work with de la Rua as President. Worries from the financial community increased Argentina's borrowing rates from 600 to nearly 900 basis points above US Treasuries in the summer of 1999. The market's evaluation of country risk continues to put pressure on the government's budget.