Don Roper
(January 2001) The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (CI)
The Beacon of Stability in Volatile West Africa Comes Apart
Non-Sustainable Economics and Politics from the IMF

Entering the Debt Trap:
For the Cote d'Ivoire (CI), the second most indebted (mid 'nineties) country in Sub-Saharan Africa, the chart on the left shows two waves of accelerated borrowing -- from the early 'seventies until 1980 and from 1985 until '93. The cause of the first wave reflects the explosion in world commodity prices (including CI's exports of cocoa, coffee and timber) which fueled an approximate 20% nominal GNP growth measured in USD (chart below). Contrary to the recycled-petro-dollar theory of the international build-up of external debt in the 'seventies, CI observers do not explain the initial wave of borrowing by a need to either finance petroleum imports or to develop petroleum resources. Heavy external borrowing was used to finance infrastructure, especially roads for timber removal and for cocoa and coffee plantations which (in 1993) constituted just over 50% of exports.

CI GNP and the rate of growth of debt both peaked in 1980. A shift from world inflation to deflationary conditions caused severe economic contraction in the early 'eighties especially in economies relying on primary commodity exports. The "bear market for commodity prices" which "greatly damaged" (CI's Finance Minister (1999)) the economy, should include, not just the sharp 1996-99 drop in export prices, but the longer bear market since 1980.

The jump in the Debt-to-GNP ratio in the early 'eighties was more about the fall in GNP than an increase in Debt. In 1981 the Debt/GNP ratio crossed the 100% mark which would, by the late 'nineties, be understood as a critical indicator of an unsustainable debt load. By this standard the CI had, by the early 'eighties, already overborrowed (creditors had already overlent) during the lure of new wealth from the explosion of commodity export prices in the 'seventies.

The sharp drop in the USD value of GNP in 1994 was the result of a 50% devaluation of the CFA franc combined with a sufficiently tight monetary policy to keep domestic CI inflation to 32% for the year. The IMF required this two pronged program prior to a new 1995 ESAF loan in order to enhance CI's international competitiveness. To accomplish the GNP growth objectives of the new 1995 ESAF loan, the CI authorities agreed to a program of "limiting the increase in the wage bill," reducing "the number of civil service employees by 2.4 percent" and accelerated privatizations.

Falling export prices and depression in the early 'eighties lead to increasingly widespread demonstrations against structural adjustment and a moratorium on interest payments in '87. The moratorium resulted in arrears and is part of the 1985-93 acceleration of indebtedness. The drop in CI debt from it's 1996 high of $20bil occurred when the Paris Club granted CI debt relief following the 1994 50% devaluation of the CFA franc.

Cast of Characters

IMF Deputy Managing Director -- Primary Threat to Political Establishment since '94	Alassane Ouattara:   "epicenter of [Ivorian] politics" US (Wharton) trained economist, Governor (1980s) of the West African Central Bank, Prime Minister 1990-93 and IMF Deputy Manager 1994-99. Head of the Rally of Republicans (RDR) party that broke from PDCI after Boigny's death. Ouattara is repeatedly surprised at being repeatedly barred from elections for his Burkinabe background.
Political Legend Who Left Country with Single Dominant Political Party	Felix Houphouet Boigny:   post independence ruler from 1960 to 1993 Loyal friend of Washington, the IMF and France. Founder of the PDCI (Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire) party in 1946. External debt to GDP went over 200% by the end of Boigny's rule.
Corrupt Political Sycophant Deposed Dec99	Henri Konan Bedie:   (terrific personality :-) Handpicked by Boigny as his successor over protests by Ouattara. Bedie assumed power in 1993 and then won a 1995 election marred with violence and boycotts. Following the example of his mentor Boigny, Bedie was a friend of Washington, the IMF and Paris. Bedie followed the autocratic rule of Boigny with government control of the press and primary trade union. His rule was tarnished with a reputation for mismanagement and corruption, xenophobia, and even neo-Fascism. Easily deposed in the bloodless (Christmas Eve) Dec99 military coup.
President 24dec99-24oct00 Toppled like Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia.	General Guei:   Finally (dec99) topples indebted/cash-strapped Ivorian government. As Bedie had long proclaimed, Guei had been waiting to snatch presidential power for years. Ten months after the dec99 coup Guei is driven from the capital in the violence of Oct 24-25, 2000 in a popular revolt when Guei tampers with the election process.
Socialist University history lecturer involved with student demonstrations against the IMF	Laurent Gbagbo:   President of CI as of 24Oct00 Imprisoned in 1969 and 1971-73 for "subversive teaching." Went into exile in France in 1982 when government closed the universities. Formed the Front Populaire Ivorian (FPI) while exiled in France. Served another 6-month jail sentence in the early 'nineties at the hands of Prime Minister Ouattara. The only serious candidate against Boigny in CI's first multi-party election in 1990. Like Bedie and Guei, Gbagbo also incurred the wrath of the US and France by disallowing Ouattara to run for parliament in the dec00 elections.

Politics and Economics Prior to the Y2000 Upheaval

Following Boigny's death in '93, Bedie becomes (over Ouattara's objections) Boigny's successor and Ouattara leaves the country to accept the position of IMF Deputy Managing Director. CI enters into IMF program in '89 and by '95 the number of Ivorians earning less than $1/day doubles to 37%. Economic problems in late 'nineties led Bedie to "blame the foreigners" (xenophobism). IMF blames sluggish economy on overvalued currency and requires a 50% devaluation of the CFA franc Jan94 leading to brief economic growth, 1995-96. Bedie changes election code to keep Ouattara from running as president prior to '95 election. IMF/WB agree on new 3yr ESAF loan program in early '98, but they continue to postpone disbursements because of new evidence of corruption and government's slowness to liberalize the export sector. Election code still in place for Y2000 elections as Ouattara leaves IMF position in aug99 to return to CI and stand in presidential election. Bedie responds by arresting Ouattara supporters and issuing a warrant for Ouattara's arrest. In sep/oct00 President Guei goes into arrears on debt payments in order to pay public sector employees. Guei frees 12 leaders of Ouattara's party that Bedie had imprisoned. The 1998 all-is-not-well report by the Jesuits for Debt Relief is in sharp contrast to the 1998 exaltations of economic tranquility by Tradeport following the mar98 HIPC debt relief plan and a new ESAF loan. On a date, Christmas Eve, 1999, which is uncomfortably similar to the same date, ten years earlier when civil war started in Liberia, General Guei overthrows Bedie in a bloodless coup.

Final Act: Y2000 --

How the West Lost the Post-Colonial Struggle for Control of the Crown Jewel of France's Former Colonies

Curiously enough, socialist candidate Laurent Gbagbo, in his June 23, 1997 remarks to the National Press Club, Washington D.C., summarized the political problem that eventually led to his takeover of power three years later:

As surprising as it may sound, multiparty politics was authorized in Cote d'lvoire only on April 30, 1990 after thirty years of national sovereignty. ... for most Ivorians it is clear that democracy to this moment still remains held up to ridicule in our country.

Phony elections bred not only ridicule but cynicism towards "democratic" institutions that led to the sort of political violence in Oct00 that put Gbagbo into the presidency. Not only did the West not "export democracy," as claimed, but the West, using the IMF loan programs as its agent, supported non-democracy. Without Western loan programs that were used to suppress democracy the CI and other Sub-Saharan African nations might have achieved democracy on their own. The loan programs instead set up the contempt for the Western supported political process that has led to violence in country after country.

Genuine democratic institutions were woefully inadequate to ensure non-fraudulent elections in Y2000. From the time that Boigny assumed power in 1960 until his death in 1993, there was an "election" every five years. It was not until 1990 that he was forced to allow an opposition candidate to run and even then, the election was hampered by "official obstruction" and regarded as a "fraud" and a "masquerade." So why have outside creditors, especially official institutions like the IMF and WB, provided funding to countries with fraudulent election practices? In the case of the CI the answer is that Boigny convinced the West that he was strong proponent of free enterprise and one of the most steadfast anti-Communists among African leaders. According to the Washington Post 12jan00 "In the dichotomy of the Cold War, a single-party state was seen as stable, and Houphouet-Boigny kept Ivory Coast allied with the West." According to Pan African News 8aug00 "Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany in 1989, Houphouet-Boigny was obliged to open the country to multiparty politics." The French even stationed hundreds of French troops in the CI for the purpose of continued assurance that Boigny would remain in power. The West wanted to take no chances on losing CI to any anti-West doctrine like populism or socialism or even nationalism.

But fraudulent elections continued after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union. The CI's '95 election entailed sufficient arrests, detentions and deaths to get the attention of Amnesty International. As Tom Kamara (nov2000) argued, the electoral procedures continue to produce

"individuals violently desirous of the democratic regalia for legitimacy and respectability, but contemptuous of democratic values and institutions seen as inherent bottlenecks against tyranny."

Since the West failed to make official loans conditional on genuine multi-party presidential elections in the past, the exclusion of "the Western countries' choice candidate" in the Y2000 elections should have come as no surprise. In late '99 the US State Department expressed its concern over the arrests and convictions of Ouattara's supporters and warned that the elections scheduled in Y2000 must be "fair and democratic". In Oct00 the US State Dept condemned Ouattara's exclusion from the presidential election. But such warnings were many years late -- they should have been attached to earlier IMF loan agreements, at least the '94 ESAF program which might have altered the outcome of the 1995 election of Bedie.

In a public address to the nation two days before being overthrown in the 24dec99 military coup, President Bedie

added a denunciation of foreign interference in the country's internal affairs and took a sideswipe at the IMF and its draconian economic prescription. That this was to offer too little too late, became only too evident in the next two days ..."       from ISS African Early Warning Programme (2000)

This new found political awareness is in sharp contrast to Bedie having fired his military chief, Guei, when Guei criticized Bedie's suppression of the '95 anti-IMF student riots.

The West has far too long told itself a story of "democratization that was progressing steadily" and it is now harvesting the result of having falsified this important piece of reality. Judged by their behavior the IMF and Washington were more concerned about (promises of and commitments to) privatizations than genuine democracy when the long term consequences of election charades (such as 1995) were not so immediately apparent. Judged by the differential reactions of the CI populace and the US populace to their respective Dec00 Supreme Court interferences with election procedures, Africians in the CI are awake to the problem while the US is still asleep at the wheel.

Phony elections are one thing but why, one might ask, were the Y2000 elections rigged in a particular direction -- against someone close to the international investment community like Ouattara. The answer is that the financial stress of servicing the debt was a critical part of bringing someone to power willing to put internal concerns over the demands of international finance. In order to service external debt, Bedie had to go into arrears, first on teachers' pay and subsequently on military pay. The coup against Bedie was bloodless because he no longer had support of the military. If, as many observers argue, the "coup" was a mutiny over pay and "poor living conditions", the military would not put someone in power who was going to continue servicing external debt rather than address the grievances of the military. Since export prices had declined sharply over the preceding year, the tightness of the budget demanded someone to stand up to foreign creditors and Guei -- who was fired from Chief of Staff by Bedie for criticizing government policy for suppressing anti-IMF student demonstrations in '95 -- met that qualification.

When Guei took power in Dec99, he surprised the international investment community but not CI's military -- they got what they were demanding. According to African Business Feb 2000

One of Guei's first steps upon proclaiming himself the new head of state was to suspend payment of the country's external debt (estimated in 1997 at $15.6bn). This allowed him to find the 3.5bn CFA Francs ($60 million) to pay the salaries of the country's military and civil service employees.

When the IMF stressed the severity of the consequences of this unilateral moratorium, he resumed payments on Jan 8. But his administration nevertheless had to go into technical default on CI Brady bonds in April 2000 and into arrears, yet again, on debt in Sept/Oct00.

A yet stronger whiff of anti-IMF (and therefore anti Ouattara) sentiment occurred when Guei abandoned the government's commitment to the IMF to privatize the remainder of the state's 37% holding in the oil refinery (SIR).

It was obvious that Bedie and Ouattara had been political enemies since the transition of power from Boigny to Bedie in 1993-94. From the perspective of Western investors, both would honor CI's external debt commitments -- their differences merely reflected a personal struggle for power. Bedie had proved to be corrupt and Western powers were happy to see him deposed since, they (incorrectly) thought, it would leave the door open for Ouattara's presidential candidacy. They failed to realize that the conditions which gave rise to the military uprising demanded a new head of state who would stand up to external creditors. It was the level of indebtedness that led the military to support someone, Guei, who was on an entirely different political tract than the loyal IMF supporter, Ouattara. With 40 years of phony elections it's hardly a surprise that Guei would move to keep someone off the ballot whose policy towards external debt was opposite the policy required by the military that put Guei in power. And even with Guei out of the way after 25oct00, it's not surprising that the military supported Gbagbo over Ouattara in the struggle over the fraudulent parliamentary election in dec00. When Ouattara's supporters shouted "fraud" and demanded new elections, it's not surprising that their demands were not supported by the larger Ivorian public. Where had the IMF/Washington/France been during the preceding 40 years of phony elections?

A glance at a little history from Africana.com

In the late 1980s the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank pushed Houphouet-Boigny to implement austerity measures that would further tax the already impoverished nation and inevitably bring new protest.   ...   the government remained a target of widespread protests, organized by teacher and student unions and opposition groups such as the Ivorian Popular Front, led by the exiled Laurent Gbagbo.

suggests that IMF policy is in for difficult times at the CI.

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Annotated Bibliography -- The Most Interesting First:

Tom Kamara   Journalist -- Exiled from Liberia and founder of the New Democrat:

UNHCR sponsored report "Implications of the December 1999 Coup d'Etat" 4/2000 Excellent treatment of the coup that gives substantial attention to CI's relation to surrounding countries. It is supplemented by the following shorter and more controversial/outspoken writings by Kamara: "Gen. Guei's Lost Chance" 8/22/2000 As a crusader for democracy, Kamara believes that the courage shown, especially by CI students standing up to General Guei, is "closing the curtain" on coup d'etats as a ticket to obtain power in Africa. But his only other example is that Nigeria reclaimed "$3 billion looted by Abacha"; consequently, he may be confusing his hopes with predictions. Immediately upon obtaining power, Guei went public with statistics (reported in this article by Kamara) to show how Bedie had looted the state controlled oil refinery. Kamara argues that had Guei listened to his own statistics and realized that the popularity of his coup was due to the hatred of Bedie's corruption rather than any endorsement of Guei that the General might not have squandered his "last chance" to be known as a great Ivorian by having toppled Bedie but not running for President. Writing in Aug00, Kamara shows incredible intuitive foresight of the tragedy that was to come two months later as a result of Guei's quest to use the election to legitimate the Presidency that he had grabbed with a coup. "The Abidjan 'Harvest'" 1/16/2001 Civil war started in Liberia in dec89 when Charles Taylor's NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) began its insurgent warfare against the Liberian regime of Samuel Doe (1980-1990). Although Taylor's rebel group was trained in Libya and has received arms (in exchange for diamonds) from Eastern Europe and Russia, Kamara argues that Taylor's insurgency would have been impossible had they not been allowed to mount their campaign against Doe from the CI in the town of Danane, next to the Liberian county of Namibia. Hence, the jan01 finding that a Liberian backed coup attempt on the new Gbagbo government in which Russian weapons were used must be blamed, in Kamara's view, not on Liberia and Russia, but on the CI's backing of Taylor in dec89. Kamara ignores the fact that the West would have never had allowed Taylor to bring arms through CI and use CI as a military springboard had the West in general and the US in particular not been favorably disposed to an overthrow of Samuel Doe, the person who ended decades of Liberian rule by American-Liberians. The CI government is now, according to Kamara, reaping the harvest of the seeds of destruction planted a decade ago. This article, which is basically saying that CI has no one to blame but itself for this downward spiral into violence ignores the obvious fact that Gbagbo was a long-standing political enemy of Boigny, CI's ruler at the time that CI supported Taylor's rebel group. The reason Kamara decides to treat CI-1989 and CI-2000 as an unchanged decision-making unit is surely due to Kamara's blinding hatred of whoever and whatever put Taylor in power because it was Taylor who drove Kamara and his newspaper from his native country, Liberia. "Liberia's Mercenary Virus and Ivory Coast" 10/30/2000 In Oct00 rumors circulated that Taylor's Liberia had provided armed support to Ouattara's supporters. Kamara persuasively argues that this rumor was used to cover up Taylor's real support, viz., arms and personnel for Guei. The connections that Kamara documents between Guei and Taylor serve as the conduit in Kamara's argument that the seeds of outside destabilization that CI laid on Liberia 1989 are coming back to haunt CI in 2000. "Elections and Erosion of Stability in Africa" 11/16/2000 argues that the Cold War led the West as well as the USSR to support phony elections as well as military power to reinforce their client states. "Now, with the protective layers of super power godfathers removed, armed conflicts and coups, in the absence of genuine democratic institutions for settling the leadership struggle, have become the norms..."

Abdel-Fatau Musah Centre for Democracy and Development
"The Politics of People's Power" (probably Nov 2000)
Musah argues that the way the population stood up against Guei in the phony Oct 2000 election supports a paradigm shift in which

"For the first time, ordinary people in West Africa are refusing to be fooled by the rhetoric of military adventurers."

Given the way the population swallowed Guei's rhetoric in the early days of the coup, it seems that Musah, like Kamara, may be reading his hopes into this Oct 2000 event.

Richard Cornwell, Institute for Security Studies   "Côte d'Ivoire: Asking for It"
This lengthy article can be read as an answer to the question of why France allowed General Guei's coup to go unchallenged since according to Cornwell

"the former colonial power was unlikely to tolerate the military overthrow of incumbent regimes deemed important to the maintenance of France's regional influence."

Most interesting is Cornwell's statement that, in a 22dec99 address to the nation, Bedie

added a denunciation of foreign interference in the country's internal affairs and took a sideswipe at the IMF and its draconian economic prescription. That this was to offer too little too late, became only too evident in the next two days ..."

Buckmaster Report : Advisory service for foreign investors: April 1995
This is an upbeat report, the primary reasons being

the jan94 50% devaluation of the CFA franc was followed by only a 10% increase in urban wages. "new [as of 1994] government has made reform of the mining and hydrocarbons codes a high priority." the government since 1990 has "promised to sell off two-thirds of the 140 public companies."

The last item contrasts sharply with the DOE's July 2000 statement that "Since 1990 the government ... has privatized 44 of 61 entities it had schedule for privatization."
The only possible political variable on which Buckmaster offers any caution concerns what they regard as the "main opposition party," viz., Gbagbo's FPI. This is nothing to fear since the FPI is "moderate socialist party more concerned with political issues than radical economic change." Perhaps they were reading rosy statements such as "General elections in 1995 should further consolidate the legitimacy and authority of government institutions" from the US State Department in March '95 rather than noticing that Bedie had changed the election code in Dec '94 thereby excluding his chief political rival, Ouattara from participating in the Oct 95 election which proved to be a fraudulent and violent.

IMF Documents:

8sep00   The IMF "directors strongly regretted the build up of external arrears, and emphasized the need to normalize relations with creditors as soon as possible." There has been "a significant slowdown in disbursements of external assistance [scheduled in the Mar98 agreement], which began prior to the coup d'etat." This is on top of a 50% drop in world cocoa prices 1998-2000. 15apr00   According to the CI Finance Minister, "a major reason for the change [coup] has to do with the fact that the policies in the past did not take into account a large part of the population." If that's a reason for the coup then it's got to be an equally valid reason that the head of the coup, Guei, was toppled in Oct00. 16jul99   This is an interim assessment of CI's implementation of agreements under the 3yr Mar98 ESAF. The IMF chastises CI for "delays" in privatizations, collecting taxes, etc. 19mar98   HIPC agreement for NPV US$ one-third billion over three year period. 17mar98   New ESAF 3yr loan of roughly the same magnitude as the HIPC debt relief which means that CI's obligations remain about the same but they expect a new infusion of cash. 6mar98   35pp HIPC supporting document which makes it clear that debt relief disbursements depend upon "continued strong policy implementation." 14jun96   3rd loan under '94 ESAF -- "The authorities have slated 31 enterprises for privatization in 1996-97." 22may95   2nd disbursement under 1994 ESAF -- evaluation of results of jan94 devaluation

News Reports -- Gbagbo Ousts Guei: The Oct00 Presidential Election

According to CNN 19oct00 "The National Islamic Council (CNI) did not specifically ask Muslims not to vote, but it condemned the exclusion from the ballot of major candidates, including Ouattara, who draws most of his support from the Muslim north."

26oct00 CNN reports has at least a dozen links plus 3 video clips which give an excellent sense of the upheaval in the streets of Abidjan. Links to some of the Oct CNN stories follow:

Laurent Gbagbo took power Thursday, 26oct00, "after military ruler Robert Guei disbanded the electoral commission in charge of Sunday's presidential election and proclaimed himself the winner. At least 60 people have been killed." US embassy pulls personnel since 85 people have been killed in demonstrations in two days. "Gbagbo said foreign countries such as South Africa had no place calling for the presidential election to be repeated because his rival Alassane Ouattara was barred from running." "Guei called a halt to the vote counting on Monday when early results showed Gbagbo with the lead."

04oct So. African Mail and Guardian reported before the election
'If they [Ouattara and supporters] want to burn it (Ivory Coast), we will burn it together and we'll all look at the ashes together," the junta official said. - Reuters'

The Dec00 Election -- Ouattara is barred from Parliament

21dec00 africa.com
This is largely a short news report indicating the importance that africa.com gives to a systematic account of political violence by Human Rights Watch.

20dec00 Human Rights Watch
"In the days following the October 22, 2000 presidential elections ... state security forces gunned down political protestors in the streets and rounded up civilians, later executing them in ditches, fields and within a gendarme base. ... Several mosques [supporters of Ouattara] and churches [supporters of the Gbagbo] were also attacked." On Tue, two days after the Sunday (10/22) Presidential election, Gbagbo supporters and Ouattara supporters took to the streets driving Robert Guei from office and perhaps from the country. Once Guei had fled most of the violence was from paramilitary gendarmes (holdovers from French colonial days) in support of the Gbagbo's FPI against the predominately Muslim supporters of Ouattara. Ouattara himself took refuge in the German embassy as Gbagbo declared himself president.

5dec00 Financial Times
After the National Electoral Commission approved Ouattara as a candidate for parliament on Nov 22, two weeks later protestors "clashed with police in Abidjan following the Ivory Coast supreme court's decision to exclude Alassane Ouattara, the opposition leader and former prime minister, from the country's parliamentary elections taking place next Sunday."

Miscellaneous Items:

DOE 7/00
The Ivory Coast (CI) has sufficient oil (mostly offshore) and gas production that "Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad receive a significant portion of their refined products from Cote d'Ivoire." Significant oil findings have led numerous outside oil interests to invest in CI. The government's plans to privatize the remainder of the state's 37% holding in the Societe Ivoirienne Raffinage (SIR) was canceled following the Christmas Eve '99 military coup that put Robert Guei into power. Some relief from the Paris Club lowered it's public sector external debt to $14bil, almost 130% of its GDP. With a population of 15mil, external public debt is almost $1000/person (Y2000). Bilateral aid from several countries was suspended after the coup and not resumed until debt arrears were cleared and plans were announced for a Oct 2000 election. CI technically defaulted on its Brady bonds in April 2000.

The conditions that the Ivory Coast accepted in a new 3-year IMF program enabled a reduction in external debt from $16.2bn (year end '97) to $12bn by the end of 1998. Tradeport (20% down the page) reports that much of that reduction was commercial so I can only conclude that the conditions increased the likelihood of payment to be worth billions to foreign creditors.

1997 Jubilee 2000
CI external debt peaked in 1996 at almost $20bn. France got the CI into the HIPC group but only by expanding the criteria to include the magnitude of debt relative to the size of a government's budget -- the fiscal indicator. France could have obviously given the CI sufficient foreign aid to help CI service its debt. But they instead got other wealthy countries to share the burden of debt relief by getting the CI into the HIPC category. CI has qualified for HIPC relief which is suppose to start in 2001. Oxfam 4/98 laments the lateness of the relief which, as of 4/98, they were expecting to occur in '98.

Centre for Economic and Policy Research
According to the Centre's 1999 " Survey of the Impacts of IMF Structural Adjustment in Africa: Growth, Social Spending, and Debt Relief" in the graph at the right, the CI's per capita spending on health and education fell 35% between 1990 and 1995. But their use of constant 1995 CFA francs understates the decline since the CFA franc was devalued by 50% in 1994 as shown on the left. With the devaluation the CI was able to restrain inflation to 26% in 1994 and 10% in 1995. The dollar value of expenditures should, therefore, be 24% (50%-26%) lower than shown in 1994 and 14% (24%-10%) lower than shown for 1995. A more rigorous measure of the drop would be in constant dollars but I haven't found easy access to the original CI data.


Reference:

Debt/Data Table from Jubilee2000


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