Concerning the 33rd distinction, I ask whether moral virtues are in the will as in a subject.

It seems that they are not.

In Bk. I of the *Ethics*, the Philosopher said that that are in the irrational part of the soul, the Commentator, however, explains that they are in that part which is in between the vegetative and rational; such is not the will, but the sensitive appetite.

In addition, in Bk. III of the *Ethics*, the Philosopher posits fortitude and temperance in the sensitive appetite.

In addition, in Bk. VI of the *Ethics* in comment 7: Prudence is etc.

In addition, in Bk. VI of the *Politics* in ch. 3 of the *Politics*, “Reason rules the inferior appetites with a despot rule, but the superior appetite with a political rule, this is civil, such that the appetite can be move against;” therefore to the fact that it is delightfully moved by right reason in that, it will be necessary to posit there some virtue.

In addition, fortitude and temperance are said to be in the irascible and concupiscible parts; these are not distinguished in the will, but only in the sensitive appetite, since conditions in the object which consider—namely the arduous and delectable good—do not always *per se* vary the object of the will, but only the sensible good, which is the object of the sensitive appetite.

On the contrary:

“Virtue is an elective habit,” from its definition, from Bk. II of the *Ethics*, election, however, is an act either of the will or of the reason, according to the Philosopher in Bk. VI of the *Ethics*, “for it is either a counseling appetite or” etc., this pertains to the will, which is operated by cognition of the reason being presupposed. A habit is of that potency of which it is *per se* that operation; therefore a moral habit is *per se* of the will.

In addition, virtue has for its *per se* object the honest good; this is *per se* the object of the will.

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1 *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 19, 1103a 3-5.
2 *Nicomachean Ethics*, III, 12, 1117b 23-49.
3 *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 6.
4 *Politics*, I, 5, 1254b 4-9.
5 *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 5, 1106b 36-1107a 1.
6 *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 3, 1139a 22-23.
9 In addition, virtue is the beginning of a laudable act, from Bk. II of the *Ethics*, but there ought to be no praise unless it was done voluntarily; therefore it is the virtue of it — which performs praiseworthily — of which it is to perform *per se* freely: this is the will.

[I. TO THE QUESTION

A. — THE OPINION OF THOMAS]

10 Here it is said that the Philosopher thinks the negative part, or otherwise he spoke about moral virtues insufficiently: for wherever he spoke about them, he seems to concede that they are in the sensitive part, — however, they are never in the intellectual part, except justice, in Bk. V of the *Ethics*.

11 To this the following reasons are posited:

The first such is: the will is in itself determined to the absolute good (*bonum simpliciter*), since either that is its proper object, which is distinguished in contrast to the good ‘right now’ (*ut nunc*) (which is the object of the sensitive appetite), — or if it can tend to the good ‘right now’, it can sufficiently be determined in tending or not tending from the presentation of reason (for it seems the object apprehended, insofar as it is apprehended, moves the will); and thus it is not necessary to posit a habit in that part, but it suffices that the intellect sufficiently is perfected to the right presentation.

12 In addition, it is argued secondly from the freedom of the will, since the will—which is free—can determine itself freely; therefore it does not need something else determining it. This, also, is argued otherwise, since if it performs freely from itself, it is repugnant to it ‘to will determinately’, inclining it to perform; but virtue inclines through the mode of nature, and thus it is repugnant in the way of performing of the will, -and so it is not in that.

13 Third, it is argued: since “where there are extremes, there is a middle,” therefore where there are passions exceeding, there will be a virtue, which is ‘the moderating passion’; for passions are in the sensitive appetite, and not in the will.

14 Fourth, it is argued thus: since if virtue for right actions can be in the will (which are other than actions of the sensitive appetite), therefore an angel can acquire virtues—from willing moral virtues correctly. The consequent seems unsuitable, and is manifestly against the Philosopher in Bk. X of the *Ethics*, where he denies that the moral virtues are by them.

[B. —THE OPPOSITE OPINION OF HENRY OF GHENT

BY WHICH HE DISPROVES THE OPINION OF THOMAS

1. —THE OPINION OF HENRY IN ITSELF]

15 This opinion is disproved through a way similar to those which are posted in support of the position. The first is through the authority of Aristotle, for he says, in

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7 *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 5, 1105a 15-17.
8 *Nicomachean Ethics*, V, 1, 1229a 6-9.
9 *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 10, 1178b 8-18.
Bk. I of the *Politics*,\(^{10}\) “it is necessary to have the ruling virtue, insofar as it rules rightly, and this in the more principal part than in the subservient part as it is rightly ruled;” and this applies to the superior and inferior part in the soul.

16 In addition, these concede that justice is in the will; therefore common accounts (*rationes*) about the will and moral virtue do not conclude; nor also ought the authority of the Philosopher in Bk. I of the *Ethics*,\(^{11}\) to be understood about ‘obediential reason’ as about only the sensitive appetite, since if he understands that alone through ‘obediential reason’, therefore he insufficiently divides the soul insofar as it is capable of moral virtue, — and thus insofar as he intends to treat about this, he divides it insufficiently: for he treats about it as it is susceptible to moral virtue, as justice, on account of which, at least, it is susceptible, which nevertheless is neither in reason nor in ‘obediential reason’, just as they understand about these two members.

17 In addition, before the definition of virtue, circa the middle of Bk. I, the Philosopher, wishing to inquire about the reason of happiness, says this: “separating the nutritive; following is a certain sensitive: it seems that this is common to all animals. A certain operation is left: of this, therefore, this one is persuadable by reason, that one insofar as it has it and is understanding.”\(^{12}\) From this text it is clear that first he excludes the sensitive part, since in that there is not an operation of man *qua* man, —and such is the operation according to the moral virtues, and through the consequent, these must not be principally placed in that part; therefore that which remains, namely, an operation with respect to having, is *per se* part of the soul, excelling beyond the whole sensitive part, —and that he divides into ‘understanding’ and into ‘being persuaded by reason’; therefore there through ‘being persuadable by reason’ he understands the will, since through ‘understanding’ it remains that he understands the intellect. So, therefore, it seems that expressly it can be held, from the things that have been said, that he sometimes calls the will ‘obedient to reason’, as in end of Bk. I. And just as ‘obedient to reason’ is accepted in two ways, so is ‘rational’ accepted in two ways; in one way strictly and primarily, nevertheless it agrees with only the intellect, —in another way, not strictly nor primarily, nevertheless simply such, and this agrees with the will (the third, namely, the sensitive appetite, does not agree properly but is such metaphorically). This medium, therefore, which is the will, is now called ‘rational’ by one extreme, now ‘obedient to reason’ by another extreme: for by accepting ‘reason’ strictly, this is persuadable by reason; nevertheless by taking it largely (nevertheless, not improperly, but only for that which pertains to the mind), this is rational. — The sensitive appetite is not only persuadable, but also obedient; and these words can well be proved, since ‘free’ is rightly said to be persuadable, but not properly persuadable and able to be obedient. However, the sensitive appetite, which is not free, is not properly persuadable, but only obedient, since it is subjected to the power of the will.

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\(^{10}\) *Politics*, I, 13, 1260a 14-20.

\(^{11}\) *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 18, 1102b 30-31.

\(^{12}\) *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 7, 1098b-1099a 5.
In addition, there are multiple authorities in support of this position. One of Augustine's sayings, in *De moribus Ecclesiae* 15, where he wishes to posit that there are not four moral virtues unless there is ordered love, or ordered loves.

About this, Augustine expands in *On the City of God*, Bk. XIV, chapters 5 & 6.\(^{13}\)

About this, Avicenna explains in Bk. IX, of the *Metaphysics*, in the last chapter.\(^{14}\)

In addition, reasons adduced for this opinion are also adduced to the opposite.

[Contrary to the first reason] — The first is thus: the will is indeterminate to opposites, not only to opposite objects, but to opposite modes of acting, namely to acting rightly or not rightly; therefore it is necessary to act rightly to be determined by something inclining it, and this will be virtue. The consequence is clear: for this is only necessary to posit virtues in potency, as through them the potencies will be ruled, which of themselves can act rightly and not rightly. The proof of the antecedent, since the will can choose whatever is shown to it in which reason is shown to it as its first object, but in choosing such, it can not act rightly.

What if you say “it suffices that reason shows rightly, therefore a virtue of the will is not required, but is required in the reason,” — this is false, since then it is necessary that reason first errs in showing, prior than the will choosing poorly; and thus before the first sin of the will there would be an error in the intellect, — which is irrational: for then the punishment would be prior to the fault!

In addition, by positing that the will would be sufficiently determined through the intellect to choose rightly, — it does not follow that a habit would not be generated in it, since by that the intellect would be determined more to judge rightly, for the intellect, insofar as it has an operation that is previous to the act of the will, merely acts naturally; and nevertheless it is not denied that in the intellect from frequent acts there is generated a habit of judging rightly (think of prudence). Therefore, since the will is not in itself a potency determined more towards one than the intellect, from acts frequently elicited a certain right aptitude can be generated toward similar acts, and this I call ‘virtue’.

Habits are not only posited, so that through them potencies act rightly, but so that it will be more delectable and act promptly; even if, however, the will can be determined by reason to choose rightly, nevertheless it can not do so delectably and promptly without its proper habit.—The proof of this, since if some previous vice begins to be revived *de novo* toward the opposite, and reason rightly directs it to choose something opposite to the vice, although it chooses that, nevertheless it does not do so with delight; no, for it is immediately corrupted in the first act and the whole habit becomes vicious, indeed, either little or nothing is left. This appears from experience, since having turned around *de novo*, it chooses the good with difficulty, and it delightfully chooses the evil according to its previous

\(^{13}\) Augustine, *On the City of God*, XIV, c. 5-6.

\(^{14}\) Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, IX, c. 7 (II 517-518).
custom; therefore to this insofar as the will delightfully acts by the dictate of reason, a habit is required in it to conform the act chosen by that habit.

26 To the first reason, therefore, I respond that it proceeds based on an equivocation of the phrase ‘absolute good’ (bonum simpliciter). For it can be understood either insofar as it is distinguished from the apparent good, or as it is distinguished in contrast to the good taken in the singular instance: if in the first way, ‘the absolute good’ is not an adequate object of the will, since then the will cannot have an act concerning the apparent good, for no potency can have an act concerning that in which the account of its prime object is not preserved,—and so the will of the wayfarer is confirmed by its object, or preserved so that it cannot sin; in the second way, one can concede that the good under the account of good is an appetible object of the will and of its proper cognitive act. The sense, however—according to the common way of speaking—recognizes the singular and the intellect the universal; therefore, the sensitive appetite has for its object ‘the good as now’, so that it is a singular good with individuating conditions,—the will, however, has for its object the good as it is shown to it by the intellect, which is the universal good and that is the good absolutely.

27 This is also added in that account, that it suffices that reason rightly shows,—against this reason: “about the universal and particular, the will can not be in error in the opposite.”

28 [Against the second reason] — The second reason is lead to the opposite: for some disposition is more lacking with respect of which it has an action in its power than with respect to another, since if it does not have it in its power, neither praise nor blame is imputed to it when it acts one way or otherwise. But since it has it in its power, it performs with praise or blame; and for this reason it needs that beginning through which it can act with praise; of such a kind is virtue posited.

29 It seems even marvelous that that on account of which man is praised in his works, is precisely in him insofar as it is common to him and to the brutes.

30 Nor is it valid here to argue that “a natural agent is determined to do things, therefore so is the will, since it is a certain naturally acting potency,” for by pure natural agents all habits are removed, since they are inclined in the highest degree of themselves; nevertheless in the intellect, which is operated more naturally than the will, a habit is not denied, since it is not inclined in the highest degree of itself, nor is that indetermination from an imperfection of the active part, but from its limitation, which is the perfection of the active part; for some are merely naturally limited to one, such that they can not act in ‘opposite ways contrarily’ or so much as ‘contradictorily’,—the will is not thus limited, as it was said in distinction 25 II.

31 Also, that other proof which is added there that ‘virtue inclines through the mode of nature’, is not valid, since against them it would also be concluded that charity and hope are not in the will,—which is against all the theologians.

32 Therefore to these two proofs:
To the first: although the will, from its liberty can determine itself in acting, nevertheless from the action the will is receptive of some aptitude left behind,
inclining it to a similar action; for that one determination of it is not through a natural form (as it is in fire to its operation), but it is from a free action which proceeds from an indeterminate potency, and so it is determinable through a habit.  

33 To the second proof, it is clear from what was said in distinction 17 I and 25 II, how a second natural agent cause can concur with a prior free agent cause, — and how an effect is said to be free on account of the liberty of the principal cause, however a habit, if it is a cause of the act of a substance, is a second cause with respect to the will.  

34 [Against the third reason]— The third reason, about the moderation of passions, is lead to the opposite.  

Then, since there are passions in the will, according to Augustine Bk. XIV of On the City of God, chapters 5 & 6; and on account of this, if on account of action and passion virtue must be posited in that potency in which there is passion and action of the will, it follows that since some passions are in the highest part of the soul, that virtues are posited there.  

35 The since the moderation of passions can be understood in two ways: either of passions present-in or about to be.  

Present-in happens to be moderated in two ways: either by lessening the passion which is naturally carried away from the object in itself, lest it be immoderate, as the object is by nature apt to delight the sensitive potency left to itself; or by referring that delight to an end suitable to right reason, to which it is not referred from the absolute reason of the object of the sensitive appetite.  

A passion ‘to be moderated in the future also’ can be understood either by fleeing the object which it is apt by nature to delight immoderately, or by assuming only the object, which naturally delights moderately; and then a future passion does not moderate in itself, but guards against lest it be immoderate.  

36 In whichever of these ways moderation of the passion is understood, it is more suitable to the will than to the sensitive appetite, if the passion is in or will be in with respect to the sensitive appetite:  

For about a passion present-in—if it is possible to lessen it—the will can lessen it, which it does freely, more than the sensitive appetite, which suffers from the object or co-acts with it insofar as it can. Furthermore the will can refer to the end agreeing with right reason rather than the sensitive appetite, since the will is property of an appetitive reason, and so properly combined to the end which reason shows; ‘use’ of course, which is to refer to the end owed, is not an act of the sensitive appetite, but of the will; for properly it is not conceded to bring together the sensitive potency, as the will, intellect and reason do.  

If it is understood about a passion which ought to guard against immoderate assume moderate, it seems full enough that concerning the future more, the will can have a right act rather than a sensitive appetite, since a cognitive part of the will — which is reason — can counsel about the future, not the sense.  

37 [Conclusion]—From these reasons, therefore, which were adduced for the opposite opinion, it is clear in what way the opposite is concluded: then since the
will is rectifiable with respect to its proper operation, and is not right in itself; then since it is indeterminate, and determinable not less than the intellect, from which a habit is not denied; then since it is apt to delight properly in its own proper operation, and so to have a habit by which it can operate with delight; then since its excellence in operating human operations, since it is free, and praise of human operations require virtue in the principal agent, of which there is praise; then since the will to a greater extent can through a habit moderate the passions suddenly in the way that they ought rather than the sensitive appetite (if it has them).


In addition to these reasons, it is argued against the one opining thus: if, according to him, “in a state of innocence in the sensitive appetite there is not some passion repugnant to right reason,” — it is not necessary to posit a virtue in that sensitive appetite: and nevertheless virtues then existed, since then man was perfect according to them, through the Teacher in the text.

On behalf of this is also the authority of Augustine in Epistle 35 or 36.15 Likewise, the same is in the book of Soliloquies: “Perfect reason is the soul approaching towards its end.”16 Likewise, in On The City of God, Bk. XI, chapter 15.17 Likewise, the Teacher assigns acts which can remain in the fatherland; these are not the sensitive appetite.

[C. — THE PROPER OPINION]

To the question it can be said that although the will without a habit can be in a right act and morally good, neither this alone, but also the intellect can be in a right judgment without every intellectual habit (indeed the first act of the right intellect and the first action of the right will precede the habit, also according to whichever grade, since from them is generated whatever that is first to inhere in the habit), — nevertheless just as in the intellect or through the first act or through many elicited acts a habit of prudence is generated, so also either through the first right ‘to elicit’, is brought together the dictates of right reason, or through many right elections is generated in the will a right virtue, inclining it to choose rightly.

That is proved, since the will naturally chooses prior than that, or reason commands something to the sensitive appetite. For reason does not seem to touch the sensitive appetite unless through the mediating will, which is properly a rational appetite; the will also previously wills something in itself than commands an act against that to an inferior potency: for it is not since it commands an inferior potency, that it wills that, but rather the converse. Therefore, in that prior choice (since it is equally indeterminate and determinable just as the intellect), the will can, from right choices, generate in itself a habit inclining toward a right choice, — and

15 Augustine, Epistle to the Macedonians, c. 3, n. 12.
16 Augustine, Soliloquies, I, c. 6, n. 13.
17 Augustine, On The City of God, Bk. XI, 15.
here the habit most properly will be a virtue, since the most proper elective habit inclines toward doing, as it is generated from right choices.

45 Nevertheless, it can be conceded that if the will, in willing, can command the sensitive appetite or by moderating its passion or by commanding the prosecution or flight, if they are acts, the sensitive appetite can abandon some habit from the right commands in the sensitive appetite, inclining to this as the sensitive appetite is delectably moved to similar things from the command of the will. And this neglected habit, although it is not properly a virtue, since it is not an elective habit nor inclining toward elections, can nevertheless be conceded in some way to be a virtue, since it inclines toward those acts which are consonant with right reason.

[D. —INSTANCES AGAINST THE PROPER SOLUTION]

46 Against the first member, it is objected, since then according to this there can be moral virtues in the angels, —proof: for an angel can have right 'will' concerning those things, concerning which the sensitive appetite is apt to suffer, and so from a multitude of such right 'wills' is generated in it a virtue. This is confirmed, since not only concerning passions existing in the sensitive part it happens to choose rightly, but also concerning passions shown by the intellect, even if they will never be in nor ever were in, as it was touched on in the question "About Practical Knowledge" in the first preface; therefore from such choices, a virtue is generated in the will, and no attending virtue in the sensitive appetite.

47 In addition, if moral virtue were in the will, therefore that would be more noble than prudence, since the perfectible of the more noble is a more noble perfection. The consequence is contrary to the Philosopher, in Bk. VI of the Ethics\textsuperscript{18}, and so is the antecedent.

48 Against the second member it is argued, since if from this alone that the sensitive appetite is moved by a command of the will, a certain quality inclining it to similar acts can be generated in it, and that would be a virtue, therefore with equal reason in that part of the body frequently moved by the command of the will a moral habit can be generated, —and not only here, but in inanimate and irrational animals, in which the will is used.

[E. RESPONSE TO THE INSTANCES]

49 [To the first instant]—To the first, it can be conceded that if an angel were created in pure natures, not having moral virtues in the will, there could be generated in it, from many right choices, not indeed concerning the passions in the sensitive appetite existing in it (neither which were, or will be or can be present in), but only concerning such passions in universal showing through the intellect, by which showing posited and commanded something must be chosen in them—capable to have them—its will consonant with such dictates from many choices can have a right moral habit.

50 And this is proved:

\textsuperscript{18} Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 11, 1143a 8-9.
Then since every will not necessarily lacking a perfection suitable to the will, it is suitable to have whatever perfection of the will; however to will the good concerning the doable (*agilibe?*) not only to itself, but also to another (and this is not only in the order to divine good, but insofar is a certain proper good), is a certain perfection of the will, — and the will of an angel is not necessarily imperfect, therefore a habit can coincide with it by which it to me a good of temperance insofar as such a good is suitable to me. This habit can not be called ‘charity’, since (as it was said) that habit is not only a certain good toward the love of God, but under a proper account of goodness in it; nor another than temperance, since through ‘me’ and ‘you’ the formal account of a habit is not varied; therefore just as in the habit of temperance formally I choose the good for me, so in the habit of the same account whatever other wishes this good to me. And so in an angel there will be temperance, by which he wishes this good to me.

51 In this way also, it can consequently be posited that in God is an account of moral virtue, as in him it is conceded that charity is without its accidentality.

52 And so from this reason about the angels, which is adduced against the opposite proposition, reason can be taken to the proposed: for the will of an angel can will a good to me, which is proper to the habit of temperance insofar as it is ‘such a good’; therefore from the habit of temperance that can will (as it was argued), and so there will be temperance in it, — and not in the sensitive part, therefore in another part.

53 If it is objected that this is contrary to the Philosopher, who denies in Bk. X of the *Ethics* moral virtues from the gods, — I respond: thus perhaps he denies from them every accidental habit, if accordingly, some posit them to be naturally goods.

54 Otherwise, if it does not please him to posit moral virtues in them, the consequence of this account made can be denied against the proposed, —and this in another of those modes:

Either since virtue is not concerning just any good, but concerning the difficult; good, however, is such, that the object of the will is posited, it is not difficult for it unless having a sensitive appetite, which is apt to become in opposite of this good, at least insofar with respect to some circumstance, — and from the fact that a sensitive appetite is so inclined, in the same way it is natural for the will to be pleased with it thus; and from this it is difficult for the will to tend towards the good that is not owed to the circumstances. Therefore an angel, who does not have a sensitive appetite, does not have a will that is apt by nature to delight along with some such habit or appetite; and for this reason without difficulty tends to a moral good, this is circumstanced rightly.

55 In another way it can be said that volition is twofold: one simple, which is a certain complacency in the object, —another capable of fulfilling some object, namely by which the one willing pursues in itself toward having the willed object if it is not impeded. Only the second is properly speaking election, in the way in which the Philosopher speaks of it in Bk. III of the *Ethics*: “wish [voluntas] is for the

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19 *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 10, 1178b 8-18.
20 *Nicomachean Ethics*, III, 5, 1111b 20-23.
impossible, election is not,”—since no one chooses the impossible, this is effectively willed from which volition that thing is pursued, although some one with a simple complacency can will the impossible (in which way, perhaps, the first angel sinned—or can sin—by willing the impossible, that is equality to God).

56 It can be said that in having a sensitive appetite, the will can be the beginning of many choices in respect of moral good, and that an effective will is ‘choice’, which alone is apt by nature to generate a habit, which although it is prior to every habit in the sensitive appetite, nevertheless is apt to be the beginning of commanding such an appetite; in angels, however, it can be a simple choice, but not apt to command.

57 [To the second instance] — To the second, although it can be said that it is not necessary that every perfection of the more noble perfectible is more noble,, if indeed in the more noble there is some perfection less noble than some perfection in the less noble, it is nevertheless necessary that the highest of the more noble exceed the highest of the less noble; moral virtue, however, is not the supreme perfection of the will, but charity is the supreme perfection of the will and faith of the intellect; and charity seems to exceed faith.

58 Nevertheless this response does not seem to suffice, since in respect of the same object of the more noble the potency seems to have a more noble act, when each acts according to its last self, since there is a no excess on the part of the object (since it is the same), but only on the part of the potencies, — and so far the more noble exceeds. Therefore, when concerning the moral good, which is the same object, there is an act of the practical intellect and of the will, if each acts perfectly (this one commanding and that one choosing), absolutely the more noble will be the right choice rather than the right command; and through the consequent, the habit generated from choices will be more perfect absolutely than the habit generated from the acts of the more noble, —that I concede.

59 And to the Philosopher, who gives preference to prudence, I respond: prudence is in a way the rule of all other virtues as far as it or its act precedes the generation of a habit and the act of a moral virtue, — and in that priority the act and moral habit are conformed to it as much as to the prior, and not the converse. This priority seems, with respect to the Philosopher, to conclude the account of the rule and measure, and in this dignity, — but not absolutely.

60 [To the third instance] — To the third, it is conceded that in part of the body there can be virtue and habit, just as it is clear in the hand of the writer and painter: for my hand is untrained and not fitted in that faculty or in its facility, which is playing the lyre; however the exercise, which is fitted, which is not unless from the fittingness inherent in the hand, — which fittingness is posited and conceded to be a certain virtue, since a certain quality fitting to the work of moral virtue. This is also conceded beyond about the irrational soul, as about a horse, which is fitted to a certain act to which it becomes accustomed. But in merely inanimate animals, such a fittingness is not found; for a stone is not easily thrown down from on high out of a habit.
II. — TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS

61 To the principal arguments.

To all the authorities I concede that which they assume, namely that in the sensitive appetite there is some quality which can be said to be a virtue, nevertheless it is less perfectly having the nature of virtue than that quality which is in the will inclining it to election.

62 To the last argument, about the irascible and concupiscible desires, I say that they are not only in the sensitive appetite, but in the will. And when you object about objects difficult and delectable: a distinction can thus be found on the part of the objects, by comparing them to the will, just as on the part of the sensitive appetite.

63 To the other, when it is argued that the will sufficiently is perfected through the theological virtues, I respond: it is true in respect of the divine good, and in respect of no others except in the order towards the ‘love of God’ (so that no act is elicited from charity unless of its object —to which is stopped—is God), although through other intermediate objects. Not only, however, am I capable of willing the good to me ordinately, I will ordinately that ‘I will God’, but also ‘this good’, insofar as it has such goodness suitable to me according to its proper account; and thus I will ‘this good’ suitable to it from another habit.

64 And if you object ‘that habit will not be account referring to God, therefore it will not be right, since its act seems to enjoy a created good’, I respond that an inferior habit does not have of itself an act of a superior habit; charity, however,—which is a superior habit—now has the habit ‘to refer immediately to God’, therefore no other habit properly has in itself thus to refer, but only the habit in itself that is proper to its act of loving this good, which good ought to be referred further through charity. Neither from this does it follow that the inferior is evil, nor that it is the beginning of enjoying a created good, since even if it does not refer negatively by enjoying, nevertheless it does not refer contrarily, namely by opposing the relation; ‘to enjoy’ however, not only includes ‘not to refer negatively’, but its opposite, which is ‘to use contrarily’, as it was said in Distinction II ‘About To Enjoy’.

65 To that argument from the Politics, about the despotic prince, it is said that the Philosopher considers the condition of human nature to be corrupted according to the condition of the nature of the institute.

66 Nevertheless, about this it is said otherwise in Bk. II, just as the inferior appetite was apt by nature to have its delight and as it can be harmoniously moved by the will, so nevertheless some virtue also can be posited in each appetite,—unless perhaps original justice made in the will a more perfect dominion with respect to the sensitive appetite, and it was able immediately to use the sensitive appetite servilely (but besides this they are not preserved, as it seems, because the sensitive appetite is delighted, in whatever way the will is dominated beyond it, unless in that appetite is some habit inclining to such a motion,—how, if I, wishing you to choose rightly concerning some passion, I can generate in me from this some moral virtue).
By holding this way, one can distinguish concerning the will as to its nature, as to how it is free, and as to its deliberative functions.

In the first way, virtue is denied about it, since thus naturally it tends towards its end and in every good shown to it, as the end shines out in it; and on account of such determination virtue is not required in it as it is thus.

Nor also is virtue in it as it is free, since virtue inclines through the mode of nature, and that, as free, is not apt to be moved naturally: for if it can be inclined naturally, therefore as free, it would be necessitated.

In the third way, therefore, namely as there is a deliberative function in it in respect of those things which are to the end, and not in respect of the end, there will be a moral habit in it.

It is added that virtue moves through the mode of nature, since it moves suddenly; whence, according to the phi in the *Ethics*, “in sudden movements, if one is fearless, he greatly appears to be brave.”

Against this:

First, since the will, as a ‘nature’ —elicits no act, as it was said in Distinction 15 of *Ordinatio III*; therefore as a nature, it does not tend toward some object, neither in the end, nor in another (as in the act elicited), but it only tends through a natural inclination just as heaviness is said to tend downward even if it is at rest at some point upwards.

Against these two members: one seems to include the other, for insofar as it is ‘deliberative’, it is ‘free’. For either ‘deliberative’ is said insofar as it anticipates the deliberation, or insofar as it chooses prior to the deliberation: each agrees with it insofar as it is free, since it commands that election freely; and from this it follows that by denying that virtue is in it as it is free, and conceding that virtue is in it as it is deliberative, there is a contradiction.

Also, this proof, that virtue is not in it as free, since then it would be of necessity, does not conclude, since a superior agent —in whose virtue is the action of an inferior agent —can not be of necessity by an inferior agent; virtue, however, if it is an agent in some way to an act, —and there also it was said insofar as it was not repugnant that it acts freely, and nevertheless that habit acts in it through the mode of nature with respect to the same effect.

Similarly, it also can be disproved that virtue is not in the will as deliberative, if that is true that virtue suddenly performs preceding deliberation, for the will, as deliberative, does not seem suddenly to do or to precede deliberation.

Nevertheless, it is not necessary to rest on this, since it is necessary that that word be explained: for absolutely nothing works virtuously unless from deliberation. For just as it does not work humanly unless it works with understanding, so — concerning that which is toward the end —it does not work well in a human manner unless by understanding that on account of which it works; and this ‘to understand’ is ‘to deliberate’. Whence it is not thus that one acts virtuously suddenly and without deliberation as nature works, from Bk. II of the *Physics*.

Therefore the saying of the Philosopher ought thus to be understood, that as the virtuous man, having been shown an object, is inclined to rightly choose from a right habit, so also through prudence he is ordered immediately to the right dictated
concerning that choice, and as it were imperceptibly deliberates on account of its
promptitude in syllogizing practically. Another imperfect one, however, syllogizes
practically with difficulty and delay, since he does not have a habit perfecting the
practice; and if at last he chooses rightly, he is not said to work suddenly, but slowly,
— and another perfect one, as he works suddenly with respect to this, since as it
were he works in an imperceptible time.