Chapter 6

On Suppositions

1. Of things that are said, some are said in combination, some not in combination: in combination, they are like 'a man runs' and 'white man'; not in combination, like 'man,' which is an uncombined term. But each uncombined term signifies either substance, quantity, quality, to-something, doing or being-affected, and so on for the rest. 2. The signification of a term, as used here, is the conventional representation of a thing by an utterance. For this reason, since every thing is either universal or particular, it must be that expressions that do not signify a universal or a particular do not signify anything. Accordingly, they will not be terms as 'term' is used here—as signs that are universal and particular.

One type of signification is of a thing as substance, and it is usually produced by a substantive name, like 'man'; another type is of a thing as modifier, and it is usually produced by a modifying name or by a verb, like 'white' or 'runs.' For this reason, it is not signification that is substantive or modifying in the proper sense; instead, something is signified substantively and something else as modifying because modifying or substantiating are modes of things that are signified, and not of the signifying. Substantive names are said to 'supposit,' while modifying names and also verbs are said to 'couple.'

3. Supposition is taking a substantive term in place of something. Supposition and signification are different, however, because signification happens by imposing an utterance upon a thing in order to signify it, while supposition is taking in place of something the very term that already signifies a thing: when someone says 'a man runs,' for example, that term 'man' supposits for Sortes or for Plato, and so on for

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1 De Rijk (1962–7), II.1, pp. 26, 455, 572–5; II.2, pp. 371, 605–7, 708–12; (1969b), pp. 135–6; LS I.8; 3.2, 5; Spruyt in PCSN, p. 110: Since supposition is the core of the logica modernorum, which is about the properties of terms, why does Peter introduce it here, before his chapter on fallacies, which precedes LS 8–12 on the other properties of terms? For one answer, see Intro., IV. The last sentence of the first paragraph, starting with 'Accordingly,' has puzzled the scribes and the translators. In Peter of Spain (2004), p. 187, Poncio, following R, has sono termini o signi universali e particolari. But DP p. 97, has keine Termini sind z. B. die Universalzeichen und Partikularzeichen, silently accepting a variant rejected (correctly) by R. DP refers to LS 1.8, where signs seem not to be terms when they are quantifiers attached to terms. Here in LS 6.1–2, however, Peter uses 'sign' in a broader sense: a term is a 'sign' just because it 'signifies.' Commenting on LS 6.1–2, De Rijk says that Peter clearly signals a change of terminology whereby terminus "signifies the universal or the singular (individual)" in his introduction to the theory of supposition.
sic de aliis. Quare significatio prior est suppositione. Neque sunt eiusdem quia significare est vocis, supponere vero est termini iam quasi compositi ex voce et significacione. Ergo supposition non est significatio. Copulatio est termini adiectivi acceptio pro aliquo.

4. Suppositionis alia communis, alia discreta. Suppositioni communis est que fit per terminum communem, ut homo. Suppositioni discreta est que fit per terminum discretum, ut Sortes vel iste homo. Item, suppositioni communum alia naturalis, alia accidentalis. Suppositioni naturalis est acceptio termini communis pro omnibus quibus aptus natu est participari, ut homo per se sumptus de natura sua supponit pro omnibus hominibus qui fuerunt et qui sunt et qui erunt. Accidentalis autem suppositioni est acceptio termini communis pro eis pro quibus exigit adiunctum. Ut homo est: iste terminus homo supponit pro presentibus. Cum autem dicitur homo fuit, supponit pro praeteritis, cum vero dicitur homo erit, supponit pro futuris. Et ita habet diversas suppositiones secundum diversitatem eorum que ei adiunguntur.

5. Accidentalium suppositionum alia simplex, alia personalis. Simplex suppositione est acceptio termini communis pro re universali significata per ipsum. Ut cum dicitur homo est species vel animal est genus, iste terminus homo supponit pro homine in communi et non pro aliquo inferiorum, et iste terminus animal pro animali in communi et non pro aliquo inferiorum. Et similiter est de quolibet alio termino communis, ut risibile est proprium, rationale est differentia, album est accidens.

6. Item, suppositionum simplicium alia est termini communis in subiecto positi, ut

Homo est species.

Alia est termini communis positi in predicato affirmativo, ut

Omnis homo est animal:

others. This is why significatio comes before supposition. And they do not involve the same item because it belongs to the utterance to signify, while it is the term, as already composed of an utterance and a significatio, that supposes. Supposition, then, is not significatio. Coupling is taking a modifying term in place of something.2

4. Of supposition, one type is common, another discrete. Common supposition is what is produced by a common term, like ‘human.’ Discrete supposition is what is produced by a discrete term, like ‘Sortes’ or ‘that human.’ Also, of common suppositions, one is natural, another accidental. Natural supposition is taking a common term in place of all those that it is naturally suited to be shared by, as ‘human’ used by itself supposits of its own nature for all the humans who were, who are, and who will be. But accidental supposition is taking a common term in place of those for which something additional is needed. ‘The human is,’ for example: here, the term ‘human’ supposits for present people. But when ‘the human was’ is said, it supposits for past people, and when ‘the human will be’ is said, it supposits for people in the future. And so it has various suppositures with regard to the variation in the items that are added to it.3

5. Of accidental suppositions, one is simple, another personal. Simple supposition is taking a common term in place of the universal thing signified by it. When someone says ‘human is a species’ or ‘animal is a genus,’ for example, the term ‘human’ supposits for the human in general, not for any lower items, and the term ‘animal’ supposits for the animal in general, not for any lower items. And it is the same for any other common term whatever, as in ‘risible is a property,’ ‘rational is a difference,’ and ‘white is an accident.’4

6. Also, of simple suppositions, one is of a common term put in the subject, like

Human is a species.

Another is of a common term put in an affirmative predicate, like

Every human is an animal:

2 De Rijk (1962–7), II.1, pp. 26, 56, 455, 541, 555–6, 572–5; II.2, pp. 371, 408, 446, 606, 712; (1982), pp. 170–1; William of Sherwood (1660), pp. 105–6, 120–2; Iono, VG: In LS 6.3–4, the distinction between (i) supposition and (ii) coupling (copulation) seems to fall between (i) substantive names that supposit and (ii) verbs and adjectival names modifying names and verbs—modifiers that couple but do not supposit. Although Sherwood, who introduces “properties of terms” as including “signification, supposition, copulation and appellation,” has more to say about coupling than Peter, he is no clearer about it.

3 De Rijk (1962–7), II.1, pp. 455, 571, 577, 581–2, 590–1; II.2, pp. 372–3, 409, 607, 716: Note that after LS 6.3, homo is translated as ‘human’ in the chapter on suppositions; the simple proposition ‘human is a species’ has a key role here and in LS 7, especially in the section on the fallacy of accident. LS 7.102–19. Sentences of the form homo est X are favorite premises for sophisms. While preserving its significatio, homo (like many other words) can cover items of several different types; unimpeded by the articles (‘a,’ ‘the’) that Latin lacks, it can stand for (i) a particular man; for the human species, considered (ii) logically, (iii) taxonomically, (iv) ontologically, or (v) biologically; and also for a word, understood either as (vi) an item in one natural language (Latin) or as (vii) an item of language in some broader sense.

iste terminus animal in predicato positus simplicem habet suppositionem quia solum supponit pro natura generis. Alia est termini communis positi post dictionem exceptivam, ut

Omne animal preter hominem est irrationale,
hic enim iste terminus homo, non in predicato positus, simplicem habet suppositionem. Unde non sequitur:

Omne animal preter hominem est irrationale;
ergo omne animal preter hunc hominem. . . .

Sed est ibi figura dictionis, procedendo a simplici ad personalem. Similiter hic:

Homo est species;
ergo aliquis homo est species;
et hic:

Omnis homo est animal;
ergo omnis homo est hoc animal.

In omnibus enim hiis fit processus simplici ad personalem suppositionem. Quod autem terminus communis in predicato positus simpliciter teneatur patet cum dicitur

Omnium contrarium est disciplina.

Nisi enim iste terminus disciplina simplicem habet suppositionem, falsa esset quia nulla particularis disciplina est omnium contrarium: medicina enim non est omnium contrarium sed solum sani et egri; et grammatica congrui et incongrui; et ita de aliis.

that term 'animal,' put in the predicate, has simple supposition because it supposits only for the nature of the genus. Another is of a common term put after an exception expression, like

Every animal besides the human is non-rational,
for here the term 'human,' not put in the predicate, has simple supposition. Hence, this does not follow:

Every animal besides the human is non-rational;
therefore, every animal besides this human . . .

Instead, it is a case of figure of expression, moving from simple to personal. This likewise:

Human is a species;
therefore, some human is a species;

and this:

Every human is an animal;
therefore, every human is this animal.

For in all of these a movement from simple to personal supposition occurs. Clearly, the common term, put in the predicate, is used simply when someone says

Of all contraries, the same is the subject-matter.

For unless that term 'subject-matter' had simple supposition, it would be false since there is no particular subject-matter of all contraries: medicine is not about all contraries, only the healthy and the ill; grammar is about the correct and incorrect; and so on for others.5

1 Arist. Prior 24\!*19–22, 48\!*19–21, 44–9, 50\!*34–5, 69\!*8–9; Top. 104\!*15–17; 105\!*5–6, 23–4, 33–4;
109\!*7–29; 110\!*19–21; 155\!*30–2; 156\!*11–14; 163\!*2–9; SR 171\!*37–b3, 174\!*37–8; Meta. 1046\!*7–12; NE
1129\!*13–14; Boeth. PrAn tran., AL4, pp. 5, 76–7, 83, 136; Top. tran., AL5, pp. 15–16, 19–21, 32, 35, 157, 159,
176; SR tran., AL6, pp. 24, 34; De Rijk (1962–7), II.2, p. 597; Smith (1989), pp. 107, 166–7: For a fallacy
involving an exception (like preter), see Peter's extensive account of figure of expression in LS 7.83–100,
especially 7.99. The wording used here in the last example is the same in the Dialectica monoscopus, reflecting
discussions in the Prior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations as translated by Boethius. The Dialectica uses
the example in describing five modes of begging the question:

The second is when a universal is used for confirming a particular, as if, in order to confirm 'of
contraries the same is the subject matter,' one were to use 'of all contraries the same is the subject
matter.'

The first of these unnatural English sentences mirrors a difficult passage in the Prior Analytics where Aristotle
alludes to a doctrine that he takes to be true: if H/C is a pair of contraries, like hot/cold or wet/dry, a science
that studies H will also study C; this is not to say that for all such pairs—hot/cold, wet/dry, healthy/ill, etc.—
there is a single comprehensive science of contraries. Aristotle affirms or alludes to this doctrine in his
non-logical works, and it is a common example in his logical works, as at PrAn 24\!*19–22, where he uses it to
distinguish universal from indeterminate sentences, as follows (Smith's translation):
7. Personalis suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro suis inferioribus. Ut
cum dicitur homo currit, iste terminus homo supponit pro suis inferioribus. 8. Item,
personalium suppositionum alia determinata, alia confusa. Determinata suppositioni
dicitur quam habet terminus communis indefinito sumptus vel cum signo particulari,
ut homo currit vel alicuius homo currit. Et dicitur utraque iustum determinata quia,
licet in utraque illarum iste terminus homo supponat pro omni homine—tam currente
quam non currente—tamen uno solo homine currente vere sunt. Aliud enim est
supponere et aliud est redde locutionem veram pro aliqua.

In predictis enim, ut dicitur, iste terminus homo supponit pro omni homine—tam
currente quam non currente—sed rettit locutionem veram pro currente. Quod autem
utraque illarum sit determinata patet quia cum dicitur

Animal est Sortes, animal est Plato, animal est Cicerò
et sic de alii;

ergo animal est omnis homo,
hic est figura dictionis a pluribus determinatis ad unam. Et ita terminus communis
indefinite sumptus habet determinatum suppositionem, et similiter cum signo
particulari.

9. Confusa suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro pluribus mediate signo
universalis, ut cum dicitur omnis homo est animal, iste terminus homo mediate
signo universalis tenetur pro pluribus quia pro quolibet suo supposito.

Item, suppositionum confusarum alia est confusa necessitate signi vel modi, alia est
confusa necessitate rei, ut cum dicitur omnis homo est animal, iste terminus homo—
necessitate signi—confunditur sive distribuitur pro quolibet suo supposito. Et cum
unusquisque homo suam habeat essentiam, ideo hoc verbum est tenetur—necessitate
rei—pro tot essentis pro quo hominibus homo. Et cum unicusque homini inst
sua animalitas, ideo tenetur animal—necessitate rei—pro tot animalibus pro quo homi-
inibus homo et pro quo essentis hoc verbum est.

Unde iste terminus homo dicitur supponere confuse, mobiliter et distributivis.
Sed confuse et distributivum supponit quia tenetur pro omni homine; mobiliter vero
quia licet descendam fieri pro quolibet suo supposito, ut

Omnis homo;
ergo Sortes;

vel

Omnis homo;
ergo Plato.

Sed iste terminus animal dicitur confundi immobilem quia non licet fieri descendam
sub eo, ut

Omnis homo est animal;
ergo omnis homo est hoc animal,

sed ibi est processus a simplici ad personalem, sicut hic:

Homo est dignissima creaturarum;
ergo alquis homo . . .

et

in this case there is figure of expression from many determinates to one. And so a
common term used indeterminately has determinate supposition, and likewise when used
with a particular sign.⁶

9. Confused supposition is taking a common term in place of many by means of a
universal sign, so that when someone says 'every human is an animal,' that term
'human' is used for many by means of the universal sign because it is used for anything
whatever that it supposes for.

Also, of confused suppositions, one is confused by necessity of the sign or mode,
another is confused by factual necessity, as when someone says 'every human is an
animal,' that term 'human'—by necessity of the sign—is confused or distributed for
anything whatever that it supposes for. And since each and every human has his own
essence, therefore this verb 'is'—by factual necessity—is used for as many essences as
'human' is used for humans. And since each human has his own animality in him,
therefore 'animal'—by factual necessity—is used for as many animals as 'human' is
used for humans, and for as many essences as the verb 'is.'

Hence, that term 'human' is said to supposit confusedly, movably, and distributively.
It supposit confusedly and distributively, however, because it is used for every human;
but movably because descent is permitted to anything whatever that it supposes for, as
in

Every human;
therefore, Sortes;
or

Every human;
therefore, Plato.

But the term 'animal' is said to be confused immovably because descending under it is
not permitted, as in

Every human is an animal;
therefore, every human is this animal,

though in this case the movement is from the simple to the personal, as it is here:

The human is the noblest of creatures;
therefore, some human . . .,

and

On some problems that arise if every human (necessarily) is an animal, according to Robert Kilwardby—a
Paris and Oxford logician who became a Cardinal just after the papacy of John XXI—see De Libera (2002);
Rosa est pulcherrimus florunm;
ergo aliqua rosa.

Sed in hoc different: quia in his est simplex suppositio a parte subjecti, in illa vero a parte predicati.

10. Nec videatur oppositum quod dictum est: quia in hac omnis homo est animal, iste terminus animal in predicato positum simplicem habet suppositionem, cum prius diceretur quod haberet confusam—quia secundum quod genus ibi predicatur de specie, et ita iste terminus animal tenetur pro ipso communi, quod est genus, sic simplicem habet suppositionem. Secundum autem quod illa natura communis ipsius generis multiplicatur per supposita hominis, sic dicitur habere confusam—non mobiliter sed immobiler. Suppositio enim confusa mobiliter non potest simul esse cum simplici, neque secundum idem neque secundum diversa. Sed suppositio confusa mobiliter potest simul esse cum simplici, non secundum idem sed secundum diversa, ut dictum est. Sic oportet contrarietatem solvere que apparebat sustinentibus quod terminus communis in predicato positus haberet simplicem suppositionem et confunderetur immobiler signo universalis affirmativo existente in subjecto, ut omnis homo est animal.

11. Sed ego credo impossibile esse terminum communem in predicato positum confundiri, mobiliter vel mobiliter, signo universalis affirmativo positio in subjecto, ut omnis homo est animal, et in aliis consimilibus—quia, ut vult Porphirius, omne quod de alio predicatur aut est maius eo aut equale ipsi de quo predicatur, et intendit de predicacione per se. Sed in hac omnis homo est animal, est predicatio per se, et non predicatui equale; ergo predicatur maius. Sed non accidentale; ergo substantiale sive essentiale, ergo genus vel differentia. Sed non differentia; ergo genus. Sed natura generis multiplicata, mobiliter vel immobiler, non est genus. Ergo cum dicitur omnis homo est animal, cum ibi predicatur genus, non est possibile terminum communem multiplicari, mobiliter neque immobiler, qui signifcat naturam generis, quia iam non esset genus, sicut si homo confundituri, mobiliter vel immobiler, iam non erit species.

The rose is the fairest of flowers;
therefore, some rose . . .

But they differ in this: that simple supposition in the latter is on the side of the subject, but on the side of the predicate in the former.⁷

10. And what has been said should not be seen as opposed to this: that in 'every human is an animal,' that term 'animal' put in the predicate has simple supposition, though it was said before to have confused supposition—because, with regard to the genus predicated there of the species, and that term 'animal' thus used for animal in general, which is a genus, in that way it has simple supposition. But with regard to the general nature of that genus itself being multiplied by the supposita of 'human,' in this way it is said to have confused supposition—not movably, but immovably. For there cannot be movably confused supposition together with simple supposition, neither regarding the same nor regarding different items. But immovably confused supposition can exist together with simple supposition, not regarding the same but regarding different items, as has been said. This is how one must resolve the apparent contradiction claimed by those who hold that a common term put in the predicate would have simple supposition and would be immovably confused by the presence of a universal affirmative sign in the subject, as in 'every human is an animal.'

11. But I believe it impossible for a common term put in the predicate to be confused, whether immovably or movably, by a universal affirmative sign put in the subject, as in 'every human is an animal' and other such statements because, as Porphyr believes, everything predicated of something else is either greater than or equal to that of which it is predicated, and what he means is predication in itself. But in 'every human is an animal,' the predication is in itself, and the equal is not predicated; therefore, the predicate is greater. But it is not accidental; therefore, it is substantial or essential, and thus a genus or a difference. It is not a difference, however; therefore, it is a genus. But when the nature of a genus is multiplied, movably or immovably, it is not a genus. Therefore, when 'every human is an animal' is said, although a genus is predicated there, it is not possible for the common term to be multiplied, either movably or immovably, if it signifies the nature of a genus, since then it would not be a genus, just as, if 'human' were confused, movably or immovably, it would not then be a species.⁸


⁸ Porph. Isag. 7; Boet. Isag. trans., AL2, pp. 12–14: For the abrupt shift from exposition to commentary at LS 6.11, see Intro., V.G; De Rijk (1968a), pp. 6–8, notes that "from [here] onwards Peter of Spain is opposing the opinio antiquorum, which he has explained in the foregoing. [LS 6.1–10]. . . Supposition as given in the former part of his tract" is the doctrine presented in London, BM Royal MS 8 A VI, fols. 47–52, which De Rijk calls the Summule antiquorum and edidit (1968a, pp. 9–23). The six properties of terms presented in this manuscript are supposition, relatives, restrictions, ampliations, appellations, and distributions.
Item, hoc idem videtur per Aristotlem in primo Topicos. Dicit enim quod necesse est omne quod de aliquo predicatur aut conversim predicari de eo aut non. Si conversim, diffinitio est vel proprium. Si autem non conversim predicatur de re, aut cadit in diffinitione rei aut non. Si non, tum est accidens. Si cadit in diffinitione, aut est genus aut differentia. Et intendit ibi Aristotles quod sit predicatio recta et species subiectum secundum se vel multiplicata. Sed in hac omnis homo est animal est recta predicatio et subiectur species et non predicatur equale vel accidens; ergo genus vel differentia. Sed non differentia; ergo genus. Et sic redit idem quod prius, quare non est possibile terminum communem in predicato positum confundi immobili er neque mobiliet.

Item, totum universale quod est genus et totum in quantitate ex opposito se habent. Sed totum in quantitate est duplex, quia quoddam totum in quantitate completum, utubicumque confunditur terminus communis mobiliter, et est alius totum in quantitate incompletum sive diminutum, ut ubicumque confunditur terminus communis immobiliet. Quare si multiplicetur terminus communis simpliciter, et simpliciter fit totum in quantitate, et si quodammodo, et quodammodo fit. Ergo si imposibile est totum in quantitate esse genus inquantum huismodi, non est possibile terminum communem in predicato positum confundi, ut diceant.

Item, comparatio illa secundum quam inferiora reducantur in suum superius opposita est illi comparatione secundum quam superius reducitur in inferiora. Sed secundum primum sumitur commune in ratione communis, sic enim ipsum commune in se omnia continet que sub ipso sunt. Secundum alteram sumitur multiplicatum vel confusionem, sive multiplicatur commune pro omnibus sive pro quibusdam. Ergo si genus stat per se in ratione communis, non est possibile ipsum multiplicari inquantum huismodi. Et omnia ista concedimus.

12. Ratio autem propter quam movebantur faciles est ad solvendum. Dicunt enim quod cum dictur omnis homo est animal, cum unicusque hominii sua respondet essentia et sua animalitas, eo quod non est possibile esse hominem quin sit animal; ergo iste terminus animal tenebitur pro tot animalibus pro quos hominum homo. Dicimus enim quod in hoc argumento nulla est apparentia. Cum enim dico omnis homo est albus vel omnis homo est niger, cum impossibile sit esse hominem quin sit animal, necesse est quod tot animalia sive tot animalitates in subiecto quot sunt homines pro quibus tenetur iste terminus homo. Tamen fatuum est dicere quod multitudo illorum animalitatum sit ibi ex multiplicatione predicati cum ibi predicetur album vel nigrum. Unde dico quod quia homo constituitur—logice loquendo, non

Also, one notes this same point from Aristotle in the first book of the Topics. For he says that it is necessary for everything predicated of something else to be predicated convertibly of it or not. If convertibly, it is a definition or a property. But if it is not predicated convertibly of the thing, it either falls under the definition of the thing or not. If not, then it is an accident. If it falls under the definition, it is either a genus or a difference. And here Aristotle means that the predication is direct and the subject is a species in itself, or else it is multiplied. But in 'every human is an animal,' the predication is direct, the subject is a species, and an equal or an accident is not predicated; therefore, it is a genus or a difference. But it is not a difference; therefore, it is a genus. And thus it comes back to the previous point, which is why it is not possible for a common term put in the predicate to be confused, whether immovably or movably.

Also, a universal whole that is a genus and a whole in quantity are opposites. But the whole in quantity is of two types, because one whole in quantity is complete, as wherever a common term is movably confused, and the other whole in quantity is incomplete or reduced, as wherever a common term is immovably confused. For this reason, if a common term is multiplied unqualifiedly, it also becomes a whole in quantity unqualifiedly, and if this happens in a certain manner, it also becomes it in a certain manner. Therefore, if it is impossible for the whole in quantity to be a genus of this kind, it is also not possible for a common term put in the predicate to be confused, as they used to say.

Also, the agreement whereby items below relate to one above them is the opposite of the agreement regarding which an item above relates to those below it. But it is in regard to the first that 'common' is used in the account of the common, for in this way the common includes in itself all the items that are below it. 'Multiplied' or 'confused' is used regarding the second, whether the common is multiplied for all or for some. Therefore, if the genus stands for itself in the account of the common, it is not possible for it to be multiplied as being of this kind. And all these points we grant.9

12. But the reasoning that motivated them is easy to analyze. For they claim that when someone says 'every human is an animal,' since there is a corresponding essence and animality of his own for each and every human, because of this it is not possible for there to be a human unless he is an animal; therefore, that term 'animal' will be used for as many animals as 'human' is used for humans. In fact, we say that there is no clarity in this argument. For when I say 'every human is white' or 'every human is black,' since it is impossible for there to be a human unless there is an animal, it is necessary to understand as many animals or as many animalties in the subject as there are humans for whom this term 'human' is used. Nonetheless, it is foolish to say that the multitude of those animalities is there from multiplication of the predicate when the predicate

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naturaliter—ex animali et rationali, ideo est quod homo de se habet animal. Unde cum homo multiplicatur, in se habet multiplicitatem illarum animalitatuum, ut cum dico omnis homo est albus vel omnis homo est niger, nullo modo habet habas animalitates a predicato.

Similiter est in proposito cum predicatur genus, ut omnis homo est animal. In hac enim propositione subicitur homo, in quo intelligitur multitudo illarum animalitatuum, ut dictum est, et predicatur hoc genus animal, quod nullo modo confunditur, neque nobis neque immobilitatis, sed stat pro ipsa essentia generis communi predicabili de pluribus. Unde animal predicatur et animal intelligitur in subjecto sicut hic: omne animal rationale mortale est animal.

Similiter dico quod non confunditur hoc verbum est, neque nobis neque immobilitatis, quia quod animal esset vel existeret in homine, hoc habet ipsum subjectum de se antequam in propositione subiceretur predicacione actuali vel potentiali. Et propter hoc destruinmus quandam divisionem antecedentem, hanc scilicet: confusurum suppositionum alia est confusa necessitate signi vel modi, alia necessitate rei. Dicimus enim quod omnis confusio est necessitate modi, sicut est hic: omne animal rationale mortale est animal; iste terminus animal tenetur virtute signi pro omni animali quod est homo. Similiter et hic: omnis homo est animal; iste terminus homo tenetur non solum pro omni homine sed pro omni animali quod est homo.

Et ideo est quod tot sunt ibi animalitates quot humanitates (naturaliter loquendo) quia eadem est humanitas (secundum viam logice, non nature) in quolibet individuo hominis, sicut homo in communi idem est. Unde quod sit hic animalitas vel illa, hoc est ratione materie. In via etiam nature, humanitas mea est per se et alia est ab humanitate tua, sicut anima mea—per quam est humanitas mea in me—alia est ab anima tua, per quam causatur humanitas tua in te. Et propter hoc signum sive modus confundendo hominem non confundit animal, sed animal contractum ad hominem per suas differentias. Unde omnis confusio est necessitate signi vel modi.

There is 'white' or 'black.' Hence, I say that it is because 'human' is constituted of 'animal' and 'rational'—speaking in logical, not natural terms—that 'human' of itself includes 'animal.' Hence, when 'human' is multiplied, it has in it the manifold of those animalities, as when I say 'every human is white' or 'every human is black,' it by no means gets those animalities from the predicate. It is like this in the case at hand when a genus is predicated, as in 'every human is an animal.' For in this proposition the subject is 'human,' in which the multitude of those animalities is understood, as has been said, and the predicate is this genus, 'animal,' which is in no way confused, neither movably nor immovably, but stands there for the common essence, predictable of many, of a genus. Hence, 'animal' is predicated and 'animal' is understood in the subject as it is here: 'every mortal rational animal is an animal.'

Likewise, I say that the word 'is' is not confused, either movably or immovably, because the subject itself would have contained, on its own, that animal is or exists in the human, before it became the subject of a proposition by actual or potential predication. And because of this we reject an earlier division: namely, of confused suppositions, one is confused by necessity of the sign or mode, another by factual necessity. For we say that every confusion is by necessity of the mode, as it is here: 'every mortal rational animal is an animal,' where that term 'animal' is used with the effect of a sign for every animal that is a human. Likewise here as well: 'every human is an animal,' where that term 'human' is used not only for every human but for every animal that is a human.

And this is why there are as many animalities there as humanities (speaking in natural terms) since the humanity is the same (with regard to logical, not natural, procedure) in any individual whatever of the human, just as the human in general is the same. Hence, it is by reason of the matter that it is this animality or that one. But when proceeding naturally, my humanity is on its own and is different from your humanity, just as my soul—whereby my humanity is in me—is different from your soul, whereby your humanity is caused in you. And because of this, when the sign or mood confuses 'human,' it does not confuse 'animal,' but 'animal' is limited to 'human' through its differences. Hence, every confusion is by necessity of the sign or the mode.

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10 For nulla est apparentia (‘no clarity’) in the third sentence of LS 6.12, Ponzio in Peter of Spain (2004) has nessuna falsa apparente, but DP has nicht Einleuchtenende.

11 See LS 6.9 for the doctrine rejected here.