tative and relative names, which signify one thing in the nominative case and another thing in an oblique case—for example, ‘white’, ‘hot’, ‘father’, and ‘son’ are names of this sort.

And absolute names, regardless of whether they are the names of composite things or of simple things, do not have nominal definitions. The reason for this /555/ is that, properly speaking, a name that has a nominal definition has only one definition that expresses* its meaning, with the result that for such a name there are not different phrases, having distinct parts, that express what the name means and are such that one part of the one phrase signifies something that is not conveyed in the same way by any part of the other phrase. Absolute names, however, can in some sense be explicated by several phrases that do not signify the same things by their parts, and so no such phrase is properly a nominal definition. An example: The name ‘angel’ is an absolute name, and one person explains what this name signifies in the following way: ‘An angel is a substance separated from matter’; another explains it in this way: ‘An angel is an intellectual and incorruptible substance’; and a third explains it in this way: ‘An angel is a simple substance, not composed of anything’. And the one explains what the name ‘angel’ signifies just as well as the others do. And yet a term posited in the one phrase signifies something that is not signified in the same way by any term in the other phrases, as is manifestly obvious. And so, properly speaking, these are not nominal definitions.

**THIRD ARTICLE**

As for the third article, I claim that these types of definition differ, first, in that real definitions are only of absolute names, whereas nominal definitions are not properly of absolute names but instead are of connotative and relative names.

Second, they differ in that real definitions are of possible things, whereas nominal definitions are also of impossible things. For ‘vacuum’, ‘nonbeing’, ‘impossible thing’, /556/ ‘extensively infinite thing’, ‘chimera’, and ‘goat-stag’ have such definitions. For to these names there correspond certain phrases that signify the same thing that these expressions do.

Third, they differ in that a predication in which a real definition is predicated of that which is defined is a possible proposition when both terms are taken significatively. But a predication in which a nominal definition is predicated of that which is defined is often an impossible proposition when the terms are taken significatively. For example, ‘A chimera is an animal composed of a human being and a cow’ is impossible, and this because of the impossible implication by which it is implied that there is something composed of a human being and a cow.

Fourth, they differ in that real definitions are only of names that are taken significatively, whereas there are nominal definitions of verbs, adverbs, and conjunctions. For someone who wants to define ‘where’ will say that it is an interrogative adverb of place; likewise, he will say that ‘when’ is an interrogative adverb of time, and so on for the rest, where the definition is predicated of what is defined when the latter is supposing materially.

But even though propositions in which a nominal definition is predicated of that which is defined are often impossible when the terms are supposing personally, those who speak correctly nonetheless grant such propositions by understanding them as other, true, propositions, such as ‘“Chimera,” taken materially, and the definition “an animal composed of a human being and a cow” signify the same thing’. Thus, by ‘A chimera is an animal composed of a human being and a cow’ they mean ‘The spoken word “chimera” and the definition “an animal composed of a human being and a cow” signify the same thing’—which is true. Likewise, even though a categorical proposition /557/ in which such a definition is predicated of what is defined is impossible when the terms are taken significatively, still the conditional proposition composed of such a definition and what is defined is true when the terms are taken significatively. For example, this is true: ‘If something is a chimera, then it is composed of a human being and a cow, and conversely’.

**REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT**

To the main argument I reply that, properly speaking, nothing definable by a real definition has a nominal definition.

**Question 20**

*Is it the thing outside the soul that is defined?*

For the negative: According to Porphyry [Isagoge, chap. De differentia], only the species is defined. But the species does not exist outside the soul. Therefore, etc.

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85. This follows from the fact that there are real definitions only of possible things and not of impossible things.
For the opposite: The essential parts of the thing outside the soul are expressed by the parts of the definition. Therefore, etc.

**REPLY TO THE QUESTION**

I reply that ‘that which is defined’ is taken in two ways. In one way ‘that which is defined’ is taken for that whose essential parts are expressed by the parts of the definition, and in this sense I claim that that which is defined is the singular thing itself outside the soul. An example: The definition ‘animate sentient rational substance’ is the definition of each singular human being, /558/ since the essential parts of a human being, viz., the matter and the form, are conveyed and expressed by the parts of this definition, so that the essence of nothing except a singular human being is conveyed by the definition. For there is nothing that is a rational animal or an animate sentient rational substance except this human being or that [human being], and so on for each one. And so in this sense I grant that the singular substance is that which is defined.

‘That which is defined’ is taken in a second way for a term that is interchangeable with the definition, a term of which the definition is adequately predicated.86 And in this sense that which is defined is a concept or a spoken word that signifies exactly the same thing that the definition signifies. And a term that is defined in this way is just a species, since it is the species alone, and no singular thing, that is interchangeable with the definition.

And by means of this distinction regarding that which is defined, we can gloss all the texts of Aristotle and the Commentator, some of which say that definitions are of singular things and some of which say that definitions are only of the species.

And as with ‘that which is defined’, so too I claim, with respect to ‘that which is described’, that it can be taken in two ways: in one way for the term of which the description is primarily predicated, not for itself but for the thing; in a second way for the thing conveyed by that term and by that description.

**REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT**

The reply to the main argument is evident from what has been said. /559/

86. By ‘adequate’ here Ockham means that the definition signifies all and only those things that the defined term signifies.

87. See Quodlibet 4.35.
OBJECTION 1

But against this: A first intention is not superior to a second intention. But ‘quality’ is, according to you, a first intention. Therefore, etc.

OBJECTION 2

Further, a first intention is not predicated of a second intention, or vice versa. Therefore, no second intention is in the category of quality.

OBJECTION 3

Further, no being of reason can be in a real category. But a second intention is a being of reason. Therefore, no second intention is in the genus of quality.

OBJECTION 4

Further, in *Metaphysics* [6.4.1027b17–1028b6] the Philosopher and the Commentator divide being into real being and being of reason and, consequently, no real being is a being of reason, or vice versa, since this is a division according to opposites. But a second intention is a being of reason. Therefore, etc.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 1

To the first of these objections I reply that a first intention may indeed be superior to a second intention. For ‘being in general’ is a first intention, and yet it is superior to a second intention, since every second intention is a being, but not vice versa.

Perhaps you will object that a first intention signifies things that are not signs, whereas a second intention signifies things that are signs; therefore, no first intention signifies second intentions.

I reply by denying the consequence, since in order for a term to be a first intention, it suffices that it signify some things that are not signs, even though it might also signify many things that are signs. A second intention, on the other hand, does not signify anything that is not a sign.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 2

To the second objection I reply that even though a first intention is not predicated of a second intention if both intentions are supposing for themselves—since in that case one would have to grant that the second intention is the first intention, which is false—still, a first intention can be predicated of a second intention, not for itself but for the second intention, in such a way that the first intention is supposing personally and not simply, /561/ while the second intention is supposing for itself or simply. And it is in this sense that ‘Genus’ is a quality is true, though the predicate is truly predicated not for itself but for the second intention, which is genus—just as, in the spoken proposition ‘“Name” is a quality’, a name of first imposition is predicated of a name of second imposition, not for itself but for that name of second imposition, and yet no name of first imposition is a name of second imposition.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 3

To the third objection I reply that the term ‘to be in a category’ is taken in two ways. In one way, it is taken in the sense in which that which is signified by a sign is said to be “in” the sign, so that the first [name] in a given category, taken significationally, is predicated of a pronoun referring to that which is signified. And if ‘to be in a category’ is taken in this way, then there is nothing in the genus of substance except the particular substances that are signified by that category. And in this sense all the universals that convey substances are in the category of quality, since (i) every universal is signified by the category ‘quality’ and (ii) no matter which universal is being referred to, ‘This is a quality’ is true.

In the second way, ‘to be in a category’ is taken for that which is such that,

89. Here the translation follows the alternate reading, which omits the term *substantiae*.

90. The distinction between names of first imposition and names of second imposition is a distinction within spoken language that is similar in many respects to the distinction between first intentions and second intentions within the mental language. See *Quodlibet* 7.10 and *Summa Logicae* 1, chap. 11 (OP 1:38–41).
when it is taken significatively, the first [name] of the category, [also] taken significatively, is predicated of it. And in this sense some universals are in the category of substance, since some universals are such that, when they are taken significatively, the category 'substance', taken significatively, is predicated of them—as when one says, 'Every human being is a substance', 'Every animal is a substance', and so on for the others. On the other hand, in this [same] sense some universals are in the category of quality, and so on. /563/

Given this, my reply to the argument is that the assumed proposition, viz., 'No being of reason can be in a real category', is false, regardless of whether 'to be in a category' is taken in the first way or the second way. For something is called a being of reason not because it is not a true thing existing in reality but because it does not exist except in a concept that the mind uses for another or because of another. And in this sense all propositions and all consequences and all mental terms are beings of reason, and yet they truly exist in reality and are more perfect beings than any corporeal qualities.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 4

To the fourth objection I reply that the Philosopher's division is not according to opposites, in the way that animal is divided into rational animal and irrational animal, but is rather a division of a spoken term into [its] significata*, in the way in which Aristotle, in Prior Analytics 1 [3.25a27–41 and 3.32b4–13], divides contingent into necessary contingent and two-way contingent and possible in general. And so just as one of these three members is predicated of another—since 'The necessary contingent is possible' is true, and so is 'The two-way contingent is possible'—so too, despite the division of being in question, the proposition 'A being of reason is a real being' is true, since a being of reason is a real mental quality. In this way, also, blessed Augustine, in De Trinitate 15 [chap. 17, n. 30] divides the Law into the whole of Sacred Scripture, i.e., into the Pentateuch, the Prophetic Books, and the Psalms, so that 'Law' is sometimes taken in one way and sometimes in another way. So, too, 'real being' is sometimes taken for every true thing existing in reality, and in this sense a being of reason is a real being, whereas sometimes it is taken for a being that exists only outside the soul, and in this sense a being of reason is not a real being. /564/

And in accordance with this latter sense, it follows that the division of

real being into the ten categories is not a division as such of what is common into its inferiors but is instead equivalent to the following division: Some real beings outside the soul are signified by 'substance', others by 'quality', and so on for the rest. Or it is equivalent to this division: Every real being outside the soul is either in such-and-such a category or in such-and-such a category. Yet this is compatible with its being the case that in these categories there are many other things that are not beings outside the soul.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENTS

The reply to the main arguments is sufficiently evident from what has been said.

Question 22

Are there ten categories?

For the negative: It is not the case that there are ten first things signified by the categories. Therefore, it is not the case that there are ten categories.

For the opposite is Aristotle.

Here we must first see in what way a category is predicated of the things contained in it; second, we must see whether ten categories are sufficient.

FIRST ARTICLE

The Opinion of Others

As for the first article, I claim that even though (i) the moderns hold that in every category there are many things ordered with respect to superiority and inferiority /565/ in such a way that, according to them, what is superior is predicated per se in the first mode and in the nominative case of each inferior by predications such as 'Every human being is an animal', and even though (ii), in order to have such predication, they fashion abstract names from adverbs (e.g., from 'when' they fashion 'wherness' and from 'where'
being positioned or having or acting or being acted upon.” And by way of example, he says, “Where, as in a place; when, as at a time, e.g., yesterday; being positioned, e.g., sitting or lying down; having, e.g., having shoes on or being armed; acting, e.g., cutting or cautering; being acted upon, e.g., being cut or being cautered.”

Likewise, in his Logica, chapter 32, Damascene says, “It is important to know that there are ten categories in all, i.e., ten most general genera under which all simple spoken words fall. They are the following: substance, e.g., rock; quantity, e.g., two, three; relation, e.g., father, son; quality, e.g., white, black; where, e.g., in Tyre, in Damascus, and this is indicative of place; when, e.g., yesterday, tomorrow, and this is indicative of time; having, e.g., having clothes on; being positioned, e.g., standing, sitting; acting, e.g., cautering; being acted upon, e.g., being cautered.”

From these passages it is clear that by the categories the authors mean nothing other than certain noncomplex signs that contain under themselves different intentions, intentions of which they are nonetheless not predicated by a proper predication and in the nominative case but in another way. 567/

SECOND ARTICLE

As for the second article, I claim that, according to the Commentator, commenting on Metaphysics 7, the distinctions among the categories are taken from the distinctions among the questions that are asked concerning an individual substance. For different noncomplex [signs] are collected into different categories according as the different questions posed about an individual substance are answered by different noncomplex [signs]. For the noncomplex [signs] by which one responds to the question ‘What is it?’, asked of an individual substance, are in the category of substance, e.g., ‘human being’, ‘animal’, ‘rock’, and, in short, all absolute terms that signify a complete being in the genus of substance.

On the other hand, the noncomplex [signs] by which one responds to the question about a substance posed by ‘How is it qualified?’ are in the genus of quality, e.g., ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘cold’, ‘whiteness’, ‘blackness’. To be sure, the noncomplex [signs] ‘white’ and ‘black’ are more straightforwardly in the genus of quality than are their abstract [counterparts], and this is why in the Categories [4.1b29] the Philosopher, when giving examples of those things that are in the category of quality, says: “Quality, e.g., ‘white’,” and this because ‘white’, but not ‘whiteness’, is predicated in quale.93 And, therefore, it

92. According to Ockham, only the categories of substance and quality contain absolute terms signifying distinct singular entities. All other categorematic terms (including certain terms in the category of quality itself) are connotative and hence do not signify any singular entities distinct from those signified by absolute terms.

93. For an explanation of predication in quale, see Quodlibet 2.4, n. 20.
is by means of ‘white’, and not ‘whiteness’, that one responds to the question posed by ‘How is it qualified?’ Nevertheless, if the category of quality is taken to be something that is denied universally of substance, then in this sense it is not such concrete [names] but rather their abstract [counterparts] that are in the genus of quality. For the concrete [names] are not denied of substance.

Now the noncomplex [signs] by which one responds to the question /568/ ‘How much or many?’, posed of a singular substance, are contained in the genus of quantity, e.g., ‘two cubits [long]’, ‘three cubits [long]’, and so on.

Those noncomplex [signs] by which one responds to the question ‘Whose is it?’ or similar questions—for in this case we are lacking a general interrogative term—are in the genus of relation, since if someone asks with respect to whom Socrates is a father (or with respect to what he is similar), one responds ‘with respect to his son’ (or ‘with respect to another similar thing’).

The noncomplex [signs] by which one responds to the question posed by the adverb ‘where’ are in the genus of ‘where’. And because one never responds to this question appropriately except with an adverb or with a preposition along with an object (since if someone asks where Socrates is, one appropriately responds that he is there or here or in the house or at the villa), all these noncomplex [signs] are said to be in the genus of ‘where’, to the extent that they are neither affirmations nor negations.

Likewise, noncomplex [signs] by which one responds to the question posed by the adverb ‘when’, asked of a substance, are in the genus of ‘when’. And because one does not respond to this question except with adverbs or with prepositions along with their objects (since if someone asks when Socrates existed, one appropriately responds that he existed yesterday or today or on such-and-such a day), it is just noncomplex [signs] of this sort that are in the genus of ‘when’.

Likewise, to the question posed by the expressions ‘What is it doing?’ or ‘What is being done to it?’ one appropriately responds with verbs, e.g., by saying that it is producing heat or walking, that it is being weakened or cooled. So all such noncomplex [signs], viz., active-voice and passive-voice verbs, are in the genus of action or in the genus of being acted upon.

And so it is, too, with the other categories, even though because of a paucity of vocabulary we lack general interrogative terms that are proper to these categories. For every noncomplex [sign] with which one can respond appropriately to a question posed about an individual substance is in some category, and this regardless of whether that [sign] is a name or a verb or an adverb or a preposition with its object. However, there are other noncomplex [signs] that are not in any category, /569/ e.g., conjunctions and syncategorematic terms. For one does not respond appropriately to any question concerning an individual substance by means of such noncomplex [signs] as ‘if’, ‘and’, ‘every’, or ‘no’.

**REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT**

To the main argument I reply that there are ten primary categories, since there are ten first noncomplex [signs] that are predicatable in their own way of the other inferior [signs]. However, it is not the case that corresponding to these ten [signs] there are ten distinct “little things,” in the way that the moderns imagine there to be. This picture is false and impossible, as will be shown elsewhere.94

**Question 23**

Is a category composed of things outside the soul or of concepts of things?

For the position that a category is composed of things: A category is composed not only of universals but also of individuals. But individuals outside the soul are individuals, according to the Philosopher in the Categories [5.211–14], where he says that substance, which is what properly and principally exists, is not said of a subject and is not in a subject. But this cannot be understood to apply to anything except a thing outside the soul, since every concept, be it proper or common, is in a subject (because it is a quality) and is said of a subject.

For the opposite: A category is truly predicated of whatever is contained under it. But it is not predicated of a thing outside the soul, since a thing outside the soul is neither the subject nor the predicate of a proposition. Therefore, etc. /570/

Here the meaning of the question must first be explained; second, we must see what it is to be in a category; third, I will reply to the question.

94. Ockham has already devoted a large section of Quodlibet 4 to defending this claim with respect to the category of quantity. He will deal with the other categories in Quodlibets 6.8–7.8.
FIRST ARTICLE

As for the first article, I claim, as was said above, that ‘category’ is taken in two ways.\textsuperscript{95} In one way, for the first and most common predicable in a categorial ordering; in a second way, for the totality or entire series of predicables that are ordered according to superiority and inferiority in a categorial ordering. The question before us is taken to be a question about ‘category’ taken in the second sense and not in the first sense.

SECOND ARTICLE

As for the second article, I claim, as was said above, that ‘to be in a category’ is taken in two ways.\textsuperscript{96} In one way, it is taken for that which is such that the category is truly predicated of a pronoun referring to it. And in this sense only singular substances outside the soul are in the category of substance, and all universals—genera, species, and even differentiae—are most truly in the category of quality. For ‘This is a quality’ is true, whichever universal is being referred to.

In the second way, ‘to be in a category’ is taken for that which is in a category in such a way that the category, taken significatively, is predicated of it when it is taken significatively. And in this sense some universals are in the category of substance and some are in the category of quality. For in the proposition ‘A human being is an animal’ or ‘A human being is a substance’ [the term] ‘human being’ supposes not for itself but for what it signifies.\textsuperscript{97} For if it were suppositing for itself, then ‘Human being is a substance’ would be false and ‘Human being is a quality’ would be true—just as, if the spoken term ‘human being’ is suppositing for itself, then ‘Human being’ is a substance’ is false and ‘Human being’ is a spoken term and a quality’ is true.\textsuperscript{97}

THIRD ARTICLE

As for the third article, I claim that a category, taken in the second way, is composed properly of concepts and in no way of things outside the soul that are not signs. (I add this [last qualification] because of spoken and written names.)

I prove this in several ways. The first proof is this: According to Aristotle, substance is divided into primary substance and secondary substance as into those things of which the category [of substance] is composed. But this is not a division of what is common into certain things outside the soul or into all the things of which ‘substance’ is predicated when those things are suppositing for themselves. For ‘A secondary substance is a substance’ is false. This is evident from the fact that whatever is denied universally of everything contained directly under a common term is denied universally of that common term itself. But ‘secondary substance’ is denied of all the things contained directly under ‘substance’.\textsuperscript{98} Therefore, ‘secondary substance’ is denied universally of ‘substance’. And, as a result, ‘No secondary substance is a substance’ is true, and so is ‘No substance is a secondary substance’. The assumption is evident from the fact that ‘No corporeal substance is a secondary substance’ is true, and so is ‘No incorporeal substance is a secondary substance’.\textsuperscript{572} That these propositions are true is evident, in turn, by the same rule, viz., ‘Whatever is denied universally, etc.’, since it is by virtue of this rule that ‘No animate body is a secondary substance’ is true, and likewise ‘No inanimate body is a secondary substance’. That these latter propositions are true is evident, again, by the same rule, since ‘No sentient body is a secondary substance’ is true, and so is ‘No nonsentient body is a secondary substance’. And that these propositions are true is proved by the same rule, since ‘No rational animal is a secondary substance’ is true, and so is ‘No irrational animal is a secondary substance’. And that the first of these is true is proved by the fact that ‘No human being is a secondary substance’ is true, since each of its singulars is true. Consequently, ‘No substance is a secondary substance’ is absolutely true and, as a result, ‘No secondary substance is a substance’ is true.

Therefore, it must be the case that the division in question is a division of a certain name into less common names, with the result that this division is equivalent to the following division: Of the names that convey substances outside the soul, some are names proper to one singular substance, e.g., ‘Socrates’, and these names or concepts are called primary substances by the Philosopher; by contrast, some are names common to many substances, and these concepts he calls secondary substances. The Philosopher later divides these secondary substances into genera and species, which are not things

\textsuperscript{95} See Quodlibet 5.21.
\textsuperscript{96} See Quodlibet 5.21, Reply to the Question.
\textsuperscript{97} When a term is suppositing for itself, it has either simple or material supposition.
\textsuperscript{98} This claim is true in the sense that (as Ockham sees it) none of the entities signified by the term ‘substance’ is a secondary substance, that is, a genus or a species.
outside the soul but are instead true qualities or concepts in the soul. Therefore, since the category is composed of primary and secondary substances, which are concepts and names, the category is composed of concepts.

Further, in the Categories the Philosopher says that /573/ every substance seems to signify a this-something and, according to him, it is indubitably true of primary substances that they signify a this-something. But a particular substance existing outside the soul does not signify a this-something, since such a substance is that which is signified. Therefore, it is the name of a singular substance that the Philosopher is calling a primary substance, and a fortiori it is names and concepts themselves that he is calling secondary substances. Therefore, etc.

Further, in the Categories Aristotle claims, as was asserted above, that a category is constituted from noncomplex [signs] and that propositions are composed of these noncomplex [signs]. However, propositions are composed not of things outside the soul but of concepts. Therefore, etc.

Further, in the Categories Aristotle says that everything else either is said of a principal substance [as of] a subject or is in a substance [as in a subject]. But it is not the singular substance that exists outside the soul and that underlies the accidents that he is here calling a subject. For he claims that secondary substances are said of and predicated of primary substances as of subjects; but no proposition is composed of substances outside the soul. Therefore, a primary substance that is the subject of a secondary substance is a name or concept in the soul.

Further, in his Logica [chap. 30] Damascene claims that it is spoken words that are placed in the category of substance.

Therefore, I claim that just as a category written in a book is composed of written expressions, and just as a spoken category is composed of spoken words, so too a category in the mind is composed of concepts and in no way of things outside the soul. /574/ For, like a proposition, a category has only three sorts of existence: in the mind, in writing, and in speech.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that it is sometimes a singular thing outside the soul that Aristotle calls an individual, and sometimes a name proper to that thing. But the individual that is a subject and the lowest [item] in a category is not the first sort of individual, since a proposition is not composed of things outside the soul; rather, it is the second sort of individual.

99. The reference once again is to Quodlibet 5.21.

Question 24

Are the truth and falsity of a complex [sign] distinct from the complex [sign] itself?

For the affirmative: It seems that the answer is yes, since things that are identical with one and the same thing are identical with one another. Therefore, if truth and falsity were identical with the true proposition and the false proposition, it would follow that what is true is false and vice versa, and that truth is falsity and vice versa.

For the opposite: If the truth of a mental proposition were distinct from the mental proposition, then there would be a subject that is not as simple as its accident. For the truth in question would exist subjectively in the whole proposition, which is itself composed of many terms. /575/

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply that we must draw a distinction, in accord with the third mode of equivocation, concerning the meaning of 'The truth of a complex [sign] is distinct from the true complex [sign]' and, likewise, 'The falsity of a complex [sign] is distinct from the false complex [sign].' For in these propositions the terms 'truth' and 'falsity' can be standing either (i) simply or (ii) personally.

If they are taken in the first way, then I claim that they are really distinct, in the way that a term is distinct from a proposition of which it is not a part, even though that term might be predicated of the whole proposition in question. For the concepts 'true' and 'false' are predicated of a whole proposition.

However, if ['truth' and 'falsity'] are taken in the second way, then I claim that [the truth or falsity of a proposition and the proposition itself] are in no way distinct. I prove this as follows: In the Categories [5.4410–13] Aristotle says that it is especially proper to substance, since it is numerically one,

100. As Ockham makes clear, the third mode of equivocation has to do with the modes of supposition of the terms of the proposition. For more on the modes of equivocation, see Summa Logicae 3–4, chaps. 2–4 (OP 1.751–63).

101. For example, 'true' is not part of the proposition 'Socrates is wise', even though the following proposition, in which 'true' has simple supposition, is true: 'The term "true" is truly predicated of the proposition "Socrates is wise."'
that it should receive contraries subjectively in itself, and he proves that this belongs to nothing except substance. But if the truth [and falsity] of a proposition were certain “little things” distinct from the proposition, be they absolute things or relative things, then these things would successively inhere in the proposition as in a subject.\footnote{576} And, as a result, a proposition that is sometimes true and sometimes false would really receive contraries in itself—which is obviously opposed to the Philosopher’s conclusion.

Further, if [they were distinct], then two absurdities would follow. First, it would follow that whichever something moves and is afterward at rest, \footnote{576} a new thing comes to exist and another thing is corrupted in the soul of anyone who has formulated the proposition ‘This thing is moving’. For the proposition ‘This thing is moving’, formulated in the mind, would first be true and later false when the thing is at rest. And so that “little thing” which is truth would be corrupted and that “[little] thing” which is falsity would be produced.

The second absurdity is that a proposition written in a book would be truly changed by virtue of the fact that a housefly is flying. For if the proposition ‘A housefly is flying’ were written in a book, then it would be true when the housefly is flying, and before that it would have been false. And, as a result, the written proposition in question would really receive truth and lose falsity. And so that proposition would at one and the same time be changed by an alteration that is an ‘acquiring’ motion and a ‘losing’ motion.\footnote{577}

Further, as will become evident elsewhere,\footnote{578} the subject of any accident (I mean the first subject) is as simple as the accident itself.\footnote{579} But a proposition is composed of many [things]. Therefore, it cannot formally receive that accident which is truth, since [the latter] would be simple.

Further, if truth existed subjectively in a mental proposition, then either (i) it would exist as a whole in the whole proposition and as a whole in each part or (ii) it would exist as a whole in the whole proposition and as a part in each part. It would not exist in the first way, since if it existed as a whole

\footnote{580}{The assumption here is that the proposition in question is such that it can first be true and afterward false, or vice versa.}

\footnote{581}{That is, the proposition would acquire the absolute quality truth and lose the absolute quality falsity.}

\footnote{582}{See Summa Logicae 1, chap. 44 (OP 1:132–39), and Reportatio 3.3 (OP 6:118–19).}

\footnote{583}{The first subject of an accident is the subject in which the accident inheres immediately. So, for instance, the first subject of the redness of an apple is its skin, and the apple itself is the mediate subject of the redness. More apropos to the present discussion, the first subject of an act of understanding is an intellective soul, which is immaterial and hence lacks integral parts, and the mediate subject of an act of understanding is the human being (a composite being) whose act it is.}
in the subject [of the proposition], then even if the predicate [of the proposition] did not exist, the truth of the complex [sign] would still exist, and so the subject [of that complex sign] would be true by the truth of the complex [sign] in just the way that a human being is white by a whiteness that informs him—which is false. If it existed in the second way, then it would not be a simple accident but would instead be a composite accident, just like the proposition itself. And then either (i) it would be composed of parts of the same type, in which case the subject, and likewise the predicate and the copula, would be true by that truth in the way that each part of a fire is hot through the heat that is in it, or else (ii) it would be composed of parts of different types, in which case one part would be matter and the other form—which is absurd.\footnote{590}{577/}

Likewise, in Soliloquia 2 [chap. 2, n. 2, and chap. 15, n. 15] Augustine proves that truth cannot perish.\footnote{591}{For I take the proposition ‘Truth perishes’ and I ask whether or not it can perish. If it cannot, then I have what I set out to prove.\footnote{592}{If it can, then it is true that truth perishes. And if that is so, then truth does not perish, since there is still a truth.}}

Someone might object that if that were a good argument, then something other than God would be necessary and incorruptible.

I reply that the truth ‘Truth perishes’ is able to perish, but that [the inference] ‘therefore, this truth perishes’ should be denied, since the proposition [‘Truth perishes’] no longer exists and, consequently, is neither true nor false. For the attributes in question are not predicated of a proposition except when it exists. An example: If no propositions exist, a human being is still truly an animal, and yet ‘A human being is an animal’ is not true.

Further, I take the falsity of the proposition ‘God produces something de novo’—let us assume that it is false. According to the position in question, this falsity will be a thing distinct from God and from the proposition. Then I ask whether or not this [falsity] can be produced by God. If it cannot be, then there is something distinct from God that cannot be produced by God—which is contrary to the Evangelist, who says, “All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made” [John 1:3]. If it can be produced

\footnote{594}{That is, given the first alternative, the truth of a proposition would have parts of the same type spread out over the subject, the predicate, and the copula, each of which would itself be true—which is absurd. Given the second alternative, the truth of the proposition would be a composite entity, and on Ockham’s view any entity composed of parts of different types can be properly construed as a form/matter composite. But this seems equally absurd in the case of truth, something akin to a category mistake.}

\footnote{595}{The following three paragraphs are found only in a few of the manuscripts.}

\footnote{596}{If ‘Truth perishes’ cannot perish, then it is true that it cannot perish, and hence truth has not perished.}
de novo by God, then let this be posited as actual. And in that case ‘This falsity is produced de novo by God’ will be true. Therefore, something is produced de novo by God and, as a result, ‘Something is produced de novo’ will be true and, consequently, not false. /578/ And it further follows that the falsity of this proposition does not exist and, consequently, that it is not produced de novo by God.109

Further, I take the truth of the proposition ‘God produces nothing de novo’, and I ask whether or not God can produce this truth. If he cannot, then this will be contrary to an article of the faith, since he is the creator of all things. If he can, then let this be posited as actual, and in that case ‘God produces nothing de novo’ will be true, because its truth has been produced by God. And if this truth is produced by God, then ‘God produces something de novo’ will also be true. And so contradictions will be true at the same time, viz., ‘Something is produced de novo by God’ and ‘Nothing is produced de novo by God’.

Therefore, in agreement with Aristotle I claim that the truth and falsity of a proposition are not things distinct from the true proposition and the false proposition. Hence, unless the abstract [names] ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ include some syncategorematic element, the propositions ‘Truth is a true proposition’ and ‘Falsity is a false proposition’ should be granted without qualification.

O B J E C T I O N 1

But against this: The same proposition is sometimes true and sometimes false and, consequently, it receives contraries. But nothing is identical with two contraries, nor does anything receive itself. Therefore, it is not the case that a proposition is truth and falsity. /579/

109. The argument seems to be this: Suppose that no creature, and hence no proposition, exists. In that case it is false that God produces something de novo. The question is: Can God in that situation produce just the falsity that would inhere in the proposition ‘God produces something de novo’ if that proposition existed and were false? If God cannot produce this falsity, then there is a possible being distinct from God that God cannot produce—which is contrary to Sacred Scripture. If God can produce this falsity, then this very production renders it true, rather than false, that God produces something de novo. But if God has produced something de novo, then he has not, contrary to our assumption, produced the falsity of the proposition ‘God produces something de novo’.

O B J E C T I O N 2

Further, the last [two] arguments above are just as conclusive against you as against the others. For I take the truth and falsity of the propositions in question, and I argue as you argue, and the difficulty will still always remain.

R E P L Y T O O B J E C T I O N 1

To the first of these objections I reply that the name ‘contraries’ is taken in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is truly predicated of certain things outside the soul for the things themselves, as when we say that whiteness and blackness are contraries.

In the second way, [‘contraries’] is taken as truly predicate of terms, as when we say that the terms ‘white’ and ‘black’ are contraries. And it is in this sense that we claim that contraries can be truly predicated of the same thing taken particularly, as when we say ‘A human being is white’ and ‘A human being is black’; and this cannot be truly predicated in a proposition except of terms alone, since a proposition is not composed of things.

And this sense of ‘contrary’ is, [in turn], taken in two ways. To wit, [it may be taken] strictly, in which case terms are called contraries because they signify contrary things, as with ‘white’ and ‘black’. Alternatively, it may be taken broadly, in which case terms are called contraries that cannot be truly predicated of the same thing and for the same thing at the same time but that instead can be predicated of the same thing and for the same thing [only] successively.

Likewise, ‘to be the subject of something’ is taken in two ways: in one way, through inherence; in the second way, through predication.

Given this, my reply to the argument is that if ‘contraries’ is taken in the first way and ‘to be a subject’ is taken in the first way, /580/ then a proposition does not receive contraries, since it does not receive into itself, as into a subject, contrary accidents that mutually expel one another. But if (i) ‘contraries’ is taken in the second way for terms (and this broadly, not strictly), and if (ii) ‘to be a subject’ is taken in the second way, then ‘true’ and ‘false’ are contraries and a proposition receives contraries successively, though not simultaneously, through predication. For of numerically the same proposition at first the term ‘true’ is predicated and afterwards the term ‘false’. But no real thing is thereby received into the proposition at the present time that was not in it beforehand. Rather, it receives successively just the predication of those contraries, since it now signifies things to be otherwise than they in fact are, and previously it signified them to be such as they in fact were. For
example, the proposition ‘You are sitting’—let us assume that it is now false and was previously true—now signifies that you are sitting, and yet you are not sitting. So it is false, but it was true before, since you were sitting before.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 2

To the second objection I reply that if truth is a true proposition and falsity a false proposition, then the arguments in question do not go through against me. For I grant that the falsity of the proposition ‘God produces something de novo’ can be produced de novo by God, even though the proposition ‘This falsity is produced by God’ is impossible—in just the same way that ‘A white thing can be black’ is true, even though ‘A white thing is black’ is impossible. And the reason why [my] position, and not the contrary position, is able to say this is that I claim that the names ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ are connotative names and not absolute names. And thus I claim that the following [assertion] is false: ‘At whatever time this falsity will exist (referring to the false proposition that God will produce de novo), “This falsity exists’ will be true’. /581/ For [this assertion] conveys things to be otherwise than they are in reality, since it conveys that the proposition ‘Something is produced de novo by God’ is a falsity at the time when it is produced by God—and this is false, since at that time it is a truth and not a falsity. But the contrary position is forced to say that at whatever time a given truth or falsity will exist, ‘This truth exists’ will be true, and likewise ‘This falsity exists’—in the same way that, at whatever time some whiteness will exist, ‘This whiteness exists’ will be true. For according to this position, ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ are absolute names that signify things distinct from propositions. Hence, de possibili propositions of the sort in question cannot be posited as actual with [exactly] the same terms, just as ‘A white thing can be black’ cannot be [posited as actual with exactly the same terms].

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that if the proposition [that serves as the major premise of the argument] has truth, then it holds for absolute terms but not, in general, for connotative terms.

Alternatively, one can reply that truth and falsity are identical with one another in the same way that they are identical with the proposition, viz., successively but not simultaneously. For they successively, but not simultaneously, signify the same proposition. And thus I claim that truth can be falsity, in the same way that a true proposition can be false. But the proposition ‘Truth is falsity’ should be denied, in just the way that ‘A true proposition is a false proposition’ should be denied.

And if you say, “Let [‘Truth can be falsity’] be posited as actual,” I reply that it cannot be posited as actual with [exactly] the same terms.

Alternatively, one can reply that the proposition ‘Things that are identical with one and the same thing, etc.’ is universally false as applied to creatures because of a false implication. For it implies that among creatures several of them are one, but this is true only of the divine persons. Rather, if [this proposition] is to be understood correctly, /582/ then it must be taken as follows: ‘Any [two] terms that signify the same thing as [a third] term signify the same thing as one another’. And if it is taken in this way, then the response to the argument is evident: ‘Truth’ and ‘falsity’ signify the same thing as one another successively but not simultaneously, and this because they are connotative terms that signify the same things in contrary ways. But if this is how they signify the same thing, then it does not thereby follow that if a proposition in which the one term is posited is true, then any [corresponding] proposition in which the other term is posited will be true. Just as ‘individual’ and ‘supposistum’ signify exactly the same thing, and yet ‘An individual is assumed by the Son of God’ is true and ‘A human supposistum is assumed’ is false, so it is in the case under discussion. In the posited example, ‘This truth is produced by God’ is true, and so is ‘This truth exists’; but ‘This falsity is produced by God’ is false, and so is ‘This falsity exists’. And in this way it is evident how the proposition [asserted in the main argument] has to be understood.

Question 25

Are absolute, connotative, and relative concepts really distinct from one another?

For the negative: Plurality should not be posited without necessity. But here there is no necessity. Therefore, etc.

For the opposite: The spoken words are distinct from one another; therefore, so are concepts. The consequence is evident from the fact that [spoken words and concepts] are signs that are ordered to one another. /583/
REPLY TO THE QUESTION

I reply that, according to philosophers, the [affirmative answer to this question] is certain. For the concept human being is absolute, the concept white is connotative, and the concept father is relative. And [the three types of concepts] do not overlap except as superior and inferior, since every relative concept is connotative, but not vice versa.

But there is a problem about how they differ from one another.¹¹⁰

And I claim that they differ in that an absolute concept signifies all its significata in an equally primary way and in a single mode of signifying, viz., in the nominative case, as is evident with the name ‘human being’ and similar names. [Human being] signifies all human beings in an equally primary way; it does not signify one of them primarily and another secondarily, nor does it signify one of them in the nominative case and another in an oblique case. And such a name is truly predicated of a thing without the addition of any term in an oblique case. For example, Socrates is a human being, although he is not of any human being. And such a name, properly speaking, does not have a nominal definition.

A connotative name, on the other hand, signifies one thing primarily and another secondarily, and it signifies one thing in the nominative case and another in an oblique case. And such a name properly has a nominal definition. Nor can it be truly predicated of anything unless an oblique case can be added to it. Examples are the concept white and similar concepts. For white signifies the subject [of a whiteness] primarily, and it signifies the whiteness itself secondarily; it signifies the subject in the nominative case and the whiteness in an oblique case. /584/ Nor can Socrates be white unless ‘Socrates is white by a whiteness’ is true. [The same holds for] ‘Socrates is a quantum by a quantity’ and ‘Socrates is long by a longness’.

Now a relative concept, especially a concrete one, meets all the aforementioned conditions that a connotative concept meets. But they differ from one another in that whenever a connotative concept is truly predicated of a thing, only its abstract counterpart can appropriately be added to it in an oblique case, since nothing is white unless it is white by a whiteness or hot unless it is hot by a heat. But when a relative concept is truly predicated of a thing, an oblique case that is not its abstract [counterpart] can always be appropriately added to it. Examples are father, master, and similar [concepts]. For Socrates is not a master unless he is the master of some servant, nor is he a father unless he is the father of some child, nor is he similar except to something that bears a similarity to him or has a similar quality, nor is he equal except to something that has an equal quantity. And so it is with all relative names.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

The reply to the main argument is evident from what has been said. /585/

¹¹⁰. For a more complete discussion of this question, see Summa Logicae 1, chap. 10 (OP 1:35–38).