REPLY TO THE QUESTION

Thesis 1
To the first question I reply succinctly that the answer is yes. However, this cannot be proved either by reason or by the authority of the Bible; instead, it is proved through the writings of the Saints and the determination of the Church. Thus in /447/ Extravagantes: De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, [chap.] Firmiter, 136 [Pope] Innocent III says in general council, "There is one universal church of the faithful, outside of which no one at all is saved, in which both the priest and the sacrifice are the same Jesus Christ himself, whose body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the appearances of bread and wine, with the bread having been transubstantiated by the divine power under into his body and the wine into his blood."

Thesis 2
As for the second question, I claim that 'conversion' or 'transubstantiation' is understood in two ways: properly, i.e., strictly, and improperly, i.e., broadly.

In the first way it is understood as follows: It is not the case that one thing is converted into another by virtue of the fact that the latter is joined to some third thing into which the conversion is made; instead, one thing is converted into another in the sense that even if the latter were separated from other things, it would begin to exist by the divine power under the appearances of the bread when a priest uttered the sacramental words over suitable matter and with the appropriate intention. And taking 'conversion' in this sense, I claim that the substance of the bread is by virtue of the conversion transubstantiated into the body of Christ and into nothing else, viz., not into his divinity or into his soul or into his blood or into any accident. For if (i) the soul, the blood, and the accidents were separated from the body, as was the case with respect to [the soul and the blood] during the triduum of Christ's death, and if (ii) the sacramental words had at that time been uttered with the proper intention, then the bread would have been converted neither (a) into the soul and the blood, and this because the soul was not then united to the body of Christ and the blood had been poured out [on the cross], nor (b) into the divinity, since it was not the divinity, but only the body, that by virtue of the conversion began to exist /448/ in a place where it previously did not exist—which is required for a conversion in this sense. 137

136. See Quodlibet 3.4, n. 12.
137. Ockham's point here is that since the divine nature is necessarily omnipresent and hence present to every place in the created world, Christ's divinity does not begin to be present to the place of the host during the celebration of the Mass.

If one understands 'conversion' in the second way, then in this sense the bread is converted into each thing that (i) is joined to another thing into which the conversion is made in the proper sense and that (ii) now in fact begins to exist under the appearances of the bread when the sacramental words are uttered. In this sense I grant that by virtue of the conversion the bread is converted into the soul and into the accidents, but I do not grant that it is converted into the divinity. For the soul and the accidents begin to exist in that place when the words are uttered, but it is not the case that the divinity thus begins to exist there. Exactly the same thing should be said about the conversion of the wine into the blood of Christ.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that even though the things in question are in fact such that (i) they constitute the same thing and hence (ii) the one is not in fact acquired without the others, God could nonetheless bring about a separation, and in that case there would be a conversion only into the body. And so by virtue of a conversion, properly speaking, there is only a transubstantiation of the bread into the body of Christ and of the wine into the blood of Christ.

Question 30

Does the substance of the bread remain after the consecration?

For the affirmative: A plurality of miracles should not be posited without necessity. But it is not necessary to claim that the substance of the bread does not remain, since the body of Christ is just as able to be present there /449/ sacramentally if the substance of the bread remains as it is if the substance of the bread does not remain. Therefore, etc.

For the opposite is the determination of the Church.
THREE OPINIONS

On this question there have from of old been three opinions, a fact recorded by the Master of the Sentences in book 4 dist. 11, [chaps. 1–2]; by Hostiensis in the Summa [3.17] (Extraogantes: De Consecratione); by the gloss on De Consecratione, dist. 2, [chap.] In sacramentum; and by the gloss on Extraogantes: De Celebratione Missarum, [chap.] Cum Marthae. The first opinion is that the substance of the bread that existed beforehand is afterwards [identical with] the flesh of Christ. The second opinion is that (i) the substance of the bread and the substance of the wine cease to exist there, and only their accidents remain, and that (ii) the body of Christ begins to exist under those accidents. The third opinion is that (i) the substance of the bread and the substance of the wine remain there and that (ii) the substance of the body of Christ remains in the same place, together with the substance of the bread and the substance of the wine.

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

The first opinion is irrational, since every proposition in which the body of Christ is predicated of the bread is impossible.

The second opinion is the common opinion of all theologians, /450/ an opinion that I hold because of the determination of the Church and not because of any argument. Hence, as was asserted in the preceding question, in Extraogantes: De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, [chap.] Firmifer, Innocent III says that the body of Christ is contained under those appearances, with the bread having been transubstantiated by the divine power into the body and the wine into the blood.

The third opinion would be quite reasonable if the determination of the Church were not opposed to it. For this opinion avoids, and saves one from, all the difficulties that follow upon the separation of the accidents from their subject; nor is the contrary of this opinion found in the canon of the Bible. And it is no more of a contradiction for Christ’s body to exist together with the substance of the bread than it is for it to exist together with the accidents of the bread. Nor is this repugnant to reason. For a quantity is repugnant to another quantity [in the same place] to the same extent that a substance is repugnant to another substance [in the same place]; but two quantities can exist simultaneously in the same place, as is evident in a case where two bodies exist in the same place. Furthermore, the substance [of the body] of Christ is able to exist in the same place as the quantity of the host; therefore, it is able for the same reason to exist in the same place as the substance of the host.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that in some cases many miracles have to be posited with respect to a given thing, where that thing could be brought about with fewer miracles, and this is what pleases God. And this, I assume, is clear to the Church through some sort of revelation, and this is why the Church has determined the issue the way it has. /451/

Question 31

Does the body of Christ exist circumscriptionally in a place under the consecrated host?

For the affirmative: The body of Christ is a quantum there, since its quantity exists there. Therefore, it exists circumscriptionally in a place.

For the opposite: The body of Christ exists as a whole under the whole host and as a whole under each part of the host. Therefore, it exists there only definitively.

Here we must first see how it is in fact; second, we must see how this is possible.

139. Ockham undoubtedly has in mind here the three examples that he cites below in Quodlibet 4.31, Reply to Difficulty 2. The first is that of Christ’s glorified body, which according to Sacred Scripture was able to pass through the walls of the room in which the Apostles were gathered after the Resurrection. The second is the birth of Christ, in which, according to tradition, Christ passed through the womb of the Blessed Virgin without violating her bodily integrity, i.e., without breaking her hymen. The third is the ascension of Christ, wherein he ascended bodily to heaven without (on a medieval cosmology) dividing any celestial sphere.

FIRST ARTICLE

As for the first article, I claim that the body of Christ exists in the place of the host only definitively and not circumspectively.

This is proved from Saint Jerome in De Consecratione, dist. 2: “Each individual receives Christ the Lord; he exists as a whole in each portion, and he is not diminished by the individuals but instead offers himself as a whole to each individual.”

This reply also accords with reason. For it is not repugnant to an indivisible thing that it should exist together with things that are distinct in place. This is evident in the cases of an angel and an intellective soul, each of which exists as a whole in a whole body and as a whole in each part. Therefore, it is not repugnant to a divisible thing that it should exist as a whole together with a whole and as a whole together with each part.

Further, two parts of a body that are such that they previously existed in two places are able naturally to exist in a single place. This is evident in the case of a body that is at first rare and afterwards dense. Therefore, it is not repugnant to a body that it should have all its parts in a single place at the same time—at least by the divine power.

Further, it is possible by God’s power for two bodies to exist in the same place at the same time. Therefore, it is possible by that same power for two parts of the same body to exist in a single place. And if two parts can do this, then all the parts can.

Further, it is not repugnant to the body of Christ that it should exist naturally without any particular greater or lesser extension; this is evident if it is rarefied or condensed. Therefore, it is not repugnant to it that it should exist without any extension at all, and, consequently, the body of Christ is able to exist in a place definitively without any repugnance.

SECOND ARTICLE

Two Difficulties

As for the second article, there are two difficulties. The first is this: How is it possible for the same part of the body of Christ to exist in more than one place at the same time? The second is this: How is it possible for more than one part of the body of Christ to exist in the same place? Once these points have been understood, the conclusion I intend to prove will be evident.

Reply to Difficulty 1

We can understand that the first point does not involve a contradiction from the fact that we hold that the intellective soul exists as a whole in a whole and as a whole in each part, and, similarly, we hold the same thing in the case of an angel; nor can the opposite be proved by a demonstrative argument. Therefore, in the same way it is not a contradiction that the same part of the body of Christ, or the whole body, should exist together with the whole host and with each part of the host; and consequently, the same part will exist in more than one place. /453/

Reply to Difficulty 2

We can understand that the second point does not involve a contradiction from the fact that we hold by faith that bodies—both bodies of the same species and bodies of diverse species—are able to exist in the same place at the same time. This is evident from [the following cases]: (i) when Christ came inside to the disciples even though the doors were closed; (ii) when he came forth into the world even though the womb of the Virgin was closed; (iii) when he ascended into heaven without dividing any celestial body. Therefore, in the same way it is not a contradiction that two parts of the same body should be in the same place, and for the same reason it is possible for all the parts of Christ’s body to be in the same place without a contradiction.

Conclusion

From these two points I argue to the conclusion I intended to prove. For if (i) it is possible by the divine power for all the parts of Christ’s body to be in the same place, in the way that it is possible for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time, and if (ii) it is possible for each part of Christ’s body to exist in its entirety in different places, in the way that a soul or an angel exists as a whole in different places at one and the same time, then it follows that it is possible for Christ’s body to exist as a whole together with the whole place of the host and as a whole together with each part. This is what I principally intended to prove, viz., how it is that Christ’s body exists definitively in a place under the consecrated host.

A PROBLEM

But there is a problem here. For the body of Christ has organic parts that are really distinct from one another and are such that one of them is not the other, e.g., the foot is not the eye. /454/
Similarly, even though one part may be in some other part as in a whole, it is nonetheless not in every other part. For instance, even though the eye is in the head as in a whole, it is nonetheless not in the foot, or vice versa. But now if these parts are not distant from one another in place, then it seems that the foot is the eye, or at least that it is in the eye.

REPLY TO THE PROBLEM

I reply that what is required for the distinction among the organic parts is not local distance, but is instead a real distinction among the material dispositions. (Now I have discussed elsewhere whether this diversity among the organs is substantial or accidental.)\textsuperscript{140} And so given that they retain their natural dispositions, even if the foot and the eye are in the same place, it is still the case that the eye is the eye and not the foot, and that the foot is the foot and not the eye, and that the man in question sees with his eye and not with his foot, and that he walks with his feet and not with his eyes. And so even though they are not distant in place from one another, the organs remain really distinct and remain apt by nature to have distinct operations.

Similarly, even though the foot and the eye are not distant from one another in place, it nonetheless does not follow either that (i) the foot is in the eye, or vice versa, or that (ii) the vision is thereby impeded; instead, it follows only that the foot and the eye are in the same place. Similarly, it is compatible with this sort of lack of local distance that one part should be in some other part as in a whole, in the way that the eye is in the head, just as the intellectual soul exists definitively in exactly the same place in which the human being exists, even though the soul is a part of the human being.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that the body of Christ under the host is not a quantum. And if a quantity were a ‘skin’ mediating between a substance and its accidents, as is /455/ commonly claimed, then in that case I would maintain either that (i) the quantity [of the body of Christ] does not exist under the host but exists [only] in heaven or that (ii) if it does exist under the host, then

\textsuperscript{140} See Ockham, \textit{Reportatio} 4, ques. 9 (OT 7:160). There Ockham discusses the question of whether the distinction among the organs derives from (i) substantial forms that are of the essence of a human being or from (ii) accidental forms that a human being can exist without having.

it exists there only definitively, in the way that the substance exists there, with the result that the quantity is not a quantum [there].

Question 32

\begin{quote}
Is God able to make every prior absolute thing without a posterior thing that is really distinct from it?
\end{quote}

\textit{For the negative:} God is not able to make a line without a point, since if he were able to do this, then the line in question would be infinite. Therefore, etc.

\textit{For the opposite:} A prior absolute thing does not depend upon a posterior thing. Therefore, it is not impossible for the former to be separated from the latter, and, consequently, God is able to do this.

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply succinctly that the answer is yes. I show this in several ways. The first is this: An absolute thing that is prior in nature depends less upon a posterior thing than an effect depends upon its essential cause. But God is able to produce an effect in the absence of its natural and essential cause. Therefore, he is able to produce and conserve a prior thing without a posterior thing.

Further, a posterior thing is not a cause of a prior thing; therefore, if a prior absolute thing is not able by God’s power to exist without a posterior thing, this is only because the posterior thing is a natural effect that follows upon the prior thing. But God is able to suspend the action of a created cause and to conserve the cause /456/ without its effect, as is evident from the case of the fire in the fiery furnace, which did not consume the servants of God thrown into its midst but did kill the Chaldeans.\textsuperscript{141} Therefore, etc.

Further, an accident depends upon its subject more than a prior thing naturally depends upon a posterior thing. But God is able to conserve an accident without a subject, as is evident in the Eucharist.

Further, it is not a contradiction for an absolute thing to exist without that

\textsuperscript{141} See Daniel 3.
which is neither a part of it nor an essential cause of it. But that which is posterior in nature is not a part of what is prior or an essential cause of it. Therefore, etc.

Further, everything other than God is such that if it exists, then it is produced by God, and, consequently, if the prior thing is produced, then the posterior thing will not exist unless it is produced by God. But the divine power does not obey any creature. Therefore, it is not a contradiction for the prior thing to be produced without the posterior thing, if it so pleases God.

Further, if the answer to the question were no, then it seems that this would be the case only because of one of three things: either because (i) the posterior thing is naturally a part of the prior thing, and a whole cannot exist without its parts; or because (ii) the prior absolute thing is an effect of the posterior thing, and an effect presupposes its cause; or because (iii) the prior thing is a natural cause of the posterior, and when a natural cause is posited, the effect necessarily follows. The first answer cannot be given, since the [present] question presupposes that they are totally distinct from one another. Nor can the second answer be given, since in that case the thing in question would not be a prior absolute thing; instead, the posterior thing would be prior in the way that a cause is prior to its effect. And, similarly, if this answer were given, then I would have what I set out to prove, since God is able to suspend the action of a natural cause and to conserve the effect in the absence of its cause; and, consequently, if this answer were given, then he would be able to conserve the prior thing without the posterior thing. Nor does the third answer constitute an impediment, since God is able to conserve a natural cause in existence and to suspend its action. Therefore, etc. /457/

Further, a created power is able to conserve an absolute prior thing in the absence of a determinate individual of a given species—e.g., it is able to conserve this substance without that designated accident; therefore, an infinite power is able to conserve that same prior thing in the absence of the whole species in question. Similarly, a finite power is able to conserve a prior absolute thing in the absence of every individual of a given species—e.g., the sun is able to conserve a piece of wood in the absence of every whiteness; therefore, an infinite power is able to conserve the same prior thing in the absence of every individual of the genus of the posterior thing in question—e.g., God is able to conserve a piece of wood in the absence of every color. Similarly, a fire is able to conserve [a volume of] water in the absence of every individual coldness; therefore, God is able to conserve [a volume of] water in the absence of every quality.

Problem 1
But there are some problems here. For if this position were true in general, then God would be able to separate an attribute from its subject, and, consequently, it would be possible for a human being to exist even if he were not risible, and the conclusion of a demonstration in which an attribute is predicated of its subject would be contingent.

Further, if this position were true, then God would be able to separate a human being from his quantity, and so the human being in question would not be long or wide or deep, and he would not have distinct organic parts. There are infinitely many other counterexamples to these claims, counterexamples that will be made clear in another place. 142

Problem 2
The second problem is that if this position were true, then God would be able to make a nose without snubness and curvedness. /458/

Reply to Problem 1
To the first of these problems I reply that 'attribute' is sometimes taken for that which is predicable of another per se in the second mode, in the way that 'risible' is predicated of 'human being'; 143 in a second sense it is taken for that which is conveyed in an oblique case by such a predicate, in the way that 'risible' conveys the act of laughing and 'creative' conveys a creature; in a third sense it is taken for that for which such a predicabale supposita.

In the first and second senses of 'attribute', it is possible for a subject to be separated from its attribute, and sometimes it is possible for an attribute to exist in reality without its subject's existing. For example, it is possible for an angel to conceive of the term risible even if no human being exists.

In the third sense of 'attribute' this is not possible, since that for which such a predicable supposita and that for which its subject supposita are one and the same thing. For instance, 'risible' supposita for a human being and 'creative' supposita for God in the propositions 'A human being is risible' and 'God is creative'.

But even if an attribute can be separated from its subject in the way described above, it is nonetheless the case that a negative proposition (i) that is either formally a de possibili proposition or equivalent to a de possibili proposition and (ii) in which an attribute taken in the first sense is denied of its subject is impossible, especially if actual existence is truly predicated of the

142. It is not clear which "other place" Ockham is referring to here.
143. On the modes of per se predication, see Quodlibet 1.2, n. 14.
subject—e.g., the proposition ‘A human being is not risible’ is impossible if a human being exists—and I say “equivalent to a de possibili proposition” because if the proposition is both formally a nonmodal proposition and equivalent to a nonmodal proposition, /459/ then it is contingent—e.g., ‘A human being is laughing’ and ‘God is creating’ are contingent. And my reply to the first proof [in the first part of the first problem] is thereby evident.

To the second proof I reply that the conclusion of a demonstration is either formally a de possibili proposition or equivalent to a de possibili proposition, and it is not simply a nonmodal proposition. And such a de possibili proposition is necessary regardless of whether or not the attribute actually exists. (I am not claiming that the proposition is necessary in such a way that it must always be true, since if it does not exist, then it is not true. Instead, I am claiming that if it exists, then it is true, since it is impossible for it to be false.) And the whole reason for this is that such a proposition is a de possibili proposition and not simply a nonmodal proposition.

As for the second [part of the first] problem, I grant that God is able to separate a human being from the sort of mediating quantity that is commonly posited. However, this separated human being would still be long, wide, and deep, as was proved earlier.\footnote{144} Now as far as the distinction among the organs is concerned, I claim that if the organs are distinct because of substantial forms, then God is not able to make a perfect human being without those organs. If they are distinct because of accidental forms, then he is able to do this, since he is able to make a man without feet and hands and, similarly, a man once lived miraculously without a head.\footnote{145} And so God is able to conserve a substantial form in one part of the matter and not in another part. And perhaps this in fact happens frequently.

\textit{Reply to Problem 2}

To the next problem, the one that has to do with snubness, curvedness, straightness, shape, etc., I reply that if these things conveyed “little things” distinct from \footnote{146} substances and qualities, then they would be able to be separated from [substances and qualities] by God’s power. However, because they convey just substances and qualities and connote that the parts of the substance and the quality are distant from one another in place (e.g., that some parts are high and some are low and some are at the same height), it follows that these things cannot be separated from [substances and qualities] that exist in a place circumspectively. For it is evident that they are not quali-

\footnote{144} See Quodlibet 4.23.

\footnote{145} Ockham is here referring to the legend according to which St. Dionysius went on living after having been decapitated.

\footnote{146} See Ockham, Expositio in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis 3, chap. 9 (OP 4:513–15); 4, chap. 23 (OP 5:243–48); and 5, chap. 5 (OP 5:381–83). Note that on the standard view of medieval Aristotelians a point is not a part of a line, but is instead that which terminates a line. That is why the main argument could plausibly contend that if God made a line without a point, then the line would be infinite.
the subject or none of them will be. But not each of them. Therefore, none of them.

**REPLY TO THE QUESTION**

*Thesis 1*

In reply to this question I will set forth three theses. The first thesis is that the quantity that remains after the consecration does not exist subjectively in just one of the qualities. For that which (i) is not really identical with a quantity and (ii) does not exist subjectively in a quantity and (iii) is not the subject of a quantity is not itself a quantum. But if one posits the hypothesis [that the quantity that remains after the consecration exists subjectively in just one of the qualities], then the rest of the qualities—i.e., those other than the quality that by hypothesis is the subject of the quantity—are such that (i) they are not really identical with the quantity, given that a quantity is a thing distinct from substance and quality, 462 as this case presupposes, and (ii) they do not exist subjectively in the quantity, as will become evident below, and (iii) by hypothesis they are not subjects of that quantity. Therefore, they are not quanta. But this is false, since when the host is broken [in half], each of the qualities that is found in the one part is such that an exactly similar quality is found in the other part.

Perhaps you will claim that just one of the qualities is an immediate subject of this quantity and that the other qualities are mediate subjects of it—and this is why they are called quanta.

Against this [I reply that] this could be the case only if the quality that is the immediate subject of the quantity existed subjectively in the qualities that are the mediate subjects of the quantity. But this is impossible. For if one corporeal quality were the subject of another corporeal quality, then, since a subject is truly denominated by an accident that informs it, it would follow that heat is either white or black, etc.

Similarly, the destruction of every accident in an immediate subject follows upon the destruction of the subject. So if, as one proceeded in order through all the qualities in the substance, one quality were the subject of the next, then it would have to be the case that if the quality—say, the heat—that existed immediately in the substance as in a subject were destroyed, then all the other qualities would be destroyed. For each accident would be such that its immediate subject is destroyed.

*Thesis 2*

The second thesis is that the quantity that remains does not exist subjectively in each quality taken one by one, in the sense that a distinct quality would be the immediate subject of a distinct quantity.

I prove this by the fact that [if the quantity that remains existed subjectively in each quality taken one by one], then for the same reason the substance of the bread [before the consecration] would be the distinct and immediate subject of a quantity that is distinct from those other quantities. And in that case the substance of the bread would be a quantum by virtue of distinct quantities, since it would be a quantum by virtue of the one quantity of which it is the immediate subject, 463 and it would be a quantum by virtue of the other quantities of which it is the mediate subject—i.e., of which it is the subject through the mediation of the other qualities that exist in the substance of the bread.

The second proof is this: Those who posit a quantity as a thing mediating between a substance and its qualities regard it as absurd that two dimensions should exist in the same place. But if a substance were the immediate subject of one quantity and its qualities were the immediate subjects of other quantities, then it would follow that two dimensions, and perhaps more, would exist in the same place, since the dimension of the substance and the dimensions of all the other qualities would exist in the same place at the same time. Therefore, etc.

The third proof is this: Even though, according to those who reject this sort of mediating quantity, it is not absurd to posit distinct quantities of different species that together constitute one thing, it is nonetheless absurd according to everyone that diverse quantities of the same lowest-level species that do not constitute numerically one quantity should naturally exist in the same place. But if each quality were the immediate subject of a distinct quantity, then those quantities would not constitute one quantity and would not be distinct from one another in species. Therefore, etc.

147. See Quodlibet 4.34 below.

148. For example, the apple is a mediate subject of redness only because the immediate subject of the redness—viz., the skin—exists subjectively in the apple, i.e., has the apple as its own subject.
Thesis 3
The third thesis is that it is not the case that what is numerically one quantity exists subjectively in all the qualities taken together. I prove this, first, by the fact that no accident that is numerically one can exist in any subject that is one thing only through [an] aggregation of [subjects] unless one part [of the accident] exists in one of those subjects and another part exists in another of the subjects. But the qualities that remain after the consecration are all one thing only through aggregation, and it is certainly not the case that one part of the quantity in question exists subjectively in one quality /464/ and another part in another quality. For all those qualities exist in the same place, and, consequently, it is not the case that a part of the quantity in question informs one of the qualities more than it informs another. Therefore, etc.

You might object as follows: If one part of a piece of wood is placed in the water and another part in the air, then the part that is in the water is changed into stone and the other part remains wood. And in that case a quantity that is numerically one exists in this composite whole, which is one thing only through aggregation. Therefore, the major premise is not true.

Against this [I reply that] this cavil is ruled out by the stipulation ‘unless one part of the quantity exists in one of those subjects and another part exists in another of the subjects’, as is the case with the quantity in the example, since one part of the quantity exists in the stone and another part in the wood. But it cannot be this way in the case under discussion. Therefore, etc.

The second proof is this: No accident that is numerically one is able to exist successively in different primary subjects through a natural action or through the action of a natural cause. And what I am calling a primary subject is not that which is the subject of an accident through a part of itself, in the way that a human being is said to be the subject of whiteness because his hand is the subject of it; rather, the primary subject of an accident is such that no part of it is naturally a primary and adequate subject of that accident. Given this, let us assume that one of the qualities that remains after the consecration is taken away—this can be done, as is evident to the senses. Then I ask whether or not numerically the same quantity that previously existed remains. If it does remain, then numerically the same quantity (i) at first exists subjectively in the whole aggregate that is made up of all the prior qualities and (ii) after-

150. The objector bases this claim on a common medieval theory of petrification. The argument is that if, as everyone should agree, there is just one quantity in the piece of wood before a part of it is submerged in the water, then there is just one quantity in it after one part has turned to stone. But a thing composed of both stone and wood can be one thing only through aggregation and not per se.

151. See Quodlibet 4.19–24. Ockham is claiming that a [material] quality, like a material substance, is extended by virtue of its own intrinsic parts and not by virtue of an absolute entity distinct from itself. Hence, each such quality is a quantum and literally (so Ockham holds) a quantity in its own right.
Question 34

Do the qualities of the host exist subjectively in the quantity after the consecration?

For the affirmative: The qualities in question are extended and they are quanta, just as before [the consecration], and they are not subjects of the quantity, as was proved above; therefore, they exist subjectively in the quantity.

For the opposite: A quantity is not a skin that mediates between a substance and its qualities, and the quantity of the bread does not remain after the consecration. Therefore, only the quantity that is identical with a quality remains. And this quantity does not exist subjectively in a quantity, since it is not the case that the same thing exists subjectively in itself. Therefore, etc. 466/1

Reply to the Question

To this question one can reply—without temerity, since it does not accord with the common opinion—that the qualities that remain after the consecration do not exist subjectively in the quantity. And since, I believe, it was sufficiently proved above that a quantity is not an entity (i) that is distinct from the substance and its qualities and (ii) in which the qualities exist subjectively, I will prove this further by quoting doctors who have the approval of the Church. First, the Master of the Sentences says in book 4, dist. 12: 464/1

"If someone asks, concerning the accidents that remain, viz., concerning the appearances of taste and weight—what subject they are based in, it seems to me that one should maintain that they exist without a subject rather than that they exist in a subject." Therefore, according to him, the qualities do not exist in the quantity as in a subject.

You might object as follows: He means only that they exist without a substance. This is evident from what he says in giving a reason for the above claim. "For there is no substance there," he says, "except the substance of the Lord's body and blood, which is not affected by those accidents."

Against this [I reply that] this seems false, both because (i) an accident is never said to exist without a subject as long as it exists in its primary and immediate subject; and also because (ii) an accident is never said to subsist per se as long as it exists in its immediate subject, whereas, according to him, the accidents in question not only exist without a subject, as has been said, but also subsist per se. For the Master, in speaking about those accidents, goes on to say, "Those accidents remain and subsist per se." Therefore, they do not exist subjectively in the quantity, since, in the place cited, the same Doctor 467/ says, "Do not be astonished or scoff if the accidents seem to be broken there, since they exist there without a subject." 455/ For it is more astonishing that the accidents should exist without a subject than that they should be broken.

Further, the weight of the bread is a certain quality that exists without a subject [after the consecration]; therefore, every other quality exists without a subject. The consequence is evident from the fact that the same argument that holds for one of the qualities holds for all of them. The antecedent is proved through one of the glosses on dist. 2, chapter Si per negligentiam, 456/ which says, "The accidents do not have weight, since only a body has weight. How, then, are the accidents said to fall, given that they do not have weight? Assert that the weight still exists with those accidents, and yet that nothing is heavy." From this it follows that the weight does not exist in any subject, since if it did, then that subject, whatever it might be, would be heavy; and, in the same way, the whiteness exists there and [yet] nothing is white, and so on for the other qualities. For if the quantity were the subject there, then the quantity would be heavy, warm, cold, sweet, bitter—which is clearly contrary to the above gloss, which says that there is no body there that has weight; therefore, there is no heavy quantity there. This is evident from the fact that neither a line nor a surface has weight. For the gloss says that only a body has weight.

Further, in the readings approved by the Church for the feast of Corpus Christi it says, "The accidents in that same thing, viz., in the sacrament, exist without a subject in order that there might be room for faith when the invisible is taken up visibly and hidden under the appearances of something else, and in order that the senses, which judge concerning the accidents that are known to them, might be rendered immune from deception." 457/ From all this it follows that it is not only the one accident—viz., the quantity—that remains without a subject, but [all] the accidents—which would not be true if all those qualities existed subjectively in the quantity. 468/
THREE OBJECTIONS

Against this, *De Consecratione*, dist. 2, chap. *Quia corpus*: “While remaining in a visible measure, you are made invisibly greater than yourself without an increase in quantity, since you yourself are one and the same.”

Notice here that he posits a quantity and denies that it is increased.

Further, the gloss on *De Consecratione*, dist. 2, chap. *Dupliciter*, says, “This can be understood either with respect to that form and quantity which he had on the cross or with respect to the quantity of Christ’s glorified body, which appears as spiritual because it does not fall under any of the senses.”

Further, the gloss on the chapter *Ubi pars* says, “The quantity should not be thought to be such that there is less of the body of Christ under a smaller quantity and more in a larger quantity, since wherever a part of the appearances or of the body (i.e., a foot or a hand) exists, there the whole body exists.”

REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS

To the objections I reply that from these authorities one is able to conclude only that a quantity exists there. But they do not say, either directly or indirectly, that the qualities exist subjectively in the quantity. On the other hand, the gloss on *De Consecratione*, dist. 2, chap. *Ego Berengarius* expressly claims that the qualities remain after the consecration and that they are broken and chewed up: “Not only do I maintain that the weight and other qualities of the sacrament are perceived by the bodily senses, but I also confess that under these broken appearances and completely chewed up parts the whole and entire body of Christ exists, the whole body is eaten, and the whole body is consumed.” Therefore, it is not necessary to posit another quantity because of such passages.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

As for the main argument, I deny the consequence, since the qualities in question are truly quantities, and yet it is not the case either that they are the subjects of a quantity or that they exist subjectively in a quantity.


Here the translation follows the alternate reading that omits the words *loquens recipienti corpus Christi dicit sic*, since it seems that what follows must apply directly to Christ (rather than to one who is receiving the body of Christ) if it is to be relevant to the question under discussion.

QUESTION 35

Are first intentions and second intentions really distinct from one another?

For the negative: Beings of reason are not really distinct from one another. But both first intentions and second intentions are only beings of reason. Therefore, etc.

For the opposite: First and second intentions are entities. And they are not the same entity. Therefore, they are distinct entities, and, consequently, they are really distinct from one another.

Here we must first see what a first intention is and what a second intention is; second, I will reply to the question.

FIRST ARTICLE

A First Intention

As for the first article, I claim that both ‘first intention’ and ‘second intention’ can be taken in two ways, viz. broadly and strictly. What is called a first intention in the broad sense is any intentional sign that exists in the soul and that does not signify just intentions or concepts in the soul or other signs. And I make this claim regardless of whether (i) ‘sign’ is being taken for that which is able to supposit for something in a proposition and to be a part of a proposition, as is the case with categoric signs, or whether (ii) ‘sign’ is being taken for that which, when it is taken significatively, is neither able to supposit for anything nor to be an extreme of a proposition, as is the case with align catechumenic signs.

And in this sense not only mental categoric signs that signify things that are not signs, but also mental anecdotic signs, verbs, conjunctions, etc., are called first intentions. An example: What are called first intentions in this sense include not only (i) the concept *human being*, which signifies each singular human being (human beings [themselves]) do not signify anything) and which is able to supposit for them and to be a part of a proposition, (ii) the concept *whiteness*, and (iii) the concept *color*, etc., but also (iv) anecdotic concepts such as *if*, *now*, *not*, *while*, and also (v) *is*, *is running*, *is reading*, etc. And this is so because even though the latter do not, when taken by themselves, supposit for things, they are nonetheless such