prior to that composition. Therefore, the order is as follows: When two white-
nesses are seen, then, first, the specific concept of a whiteness is caused in
the intellect; second, the concept of a similarity is naturally caused through
the mediation of that specific concept, and, I claim, it is caused immediately
by the whitenesses themselves or by the cognitions of them; and after that,
at least in the order of nature, the proposition is formulated.

To the proof I reply that, as was explained earlier, experience teaches that
it is not the case that the intellect judges, through an act of assenting, that
the two whitenesses are similar prior to comparing the one whiteness with the
other by means of composition and division. On the other hand, experience
does not teach that the intellect lacks the relative concept [of a similarity]
prior to composition and division. /387/

Reply to Objection 5
To the fifth objection I reply that we are able to understand a chimera in an
instant by means of a composite concept that involves a contradiction, but
not in any way by means of a simple and proper cognition.

And I claim, further, that the proof assumes something false, viz., that
i.e parts of a composite concept succeed one another in the mind just as
they do in speech. For in the mind, but not in speech, those concepts exist
simultaneously in an indivisible subject.

Reply to Objection 6
To the final objection I reply that the subject of the proposition 'God is dis-
tinct [from each thing that is not himself] is not a simple concept but is
instead a composite concept. In the same way, I claim that when one for-
mulates a proposition such as 'This entity, which is signified by that composite
concept, is distinct from [each thing that is not himself]', the subject of this
second proposition is a concept composed of a concept of God and a demon-
strative pronoun. And, further, when one formulates [the next] proposition
by saying 'This entity, which is signified by that second composite concept, is
distinct from [each thing that is not himself]', the subject is still a composite
concept. And so I grant that there is an infinite regress in formulating pro-
spositions of this sort that are at least numerically distinct from one another, and
the subject in each of the propositions will always be a composite concept
and not a simple concept.

93. See Quodlibet 4.16, Second Article.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that composite concepts such as infinite being
and pure actuality are used to pose questions of, and are demonstrated of, the
concept being taken particularly, as when one asks whether some being in the
universe is infinite and is pure actuality, and as when one proves that some
being is infinite and is pure actuality. 388/ But the subject of this proposition is
a concept composed of the concept of being in general and the syncateg-
orematic term 'some'. And so it is not incongruous that one composite con-
cept should be used to pose questions of, and should be proved of, another
composite concept.

Question 18

On the assumption that quantity is an absolute thing distinct from
substance and quality, is the quantity of Christ's body under the
host able to have the sort of position that is in the genus of quantity
without having the sort of position that is itself a category?

For the affirmative: God is able to separate and conserve a prior absolute thing
in the absence of a posterior thing. But quantity is by hypothesis an absolute
thing, and so is the sort of position that is a differencia of quantity. 94
But the sort of position that is itself a category is a certain relation founded
upon quantity. 95 Therefore, God is able to conserve the quantity of Christ's

94. That is, position in this first sense is a determination of quantity in general, so that
one sort of quantity is positioned quantity, the subject of which is such that its parts are
ordered to one another in a given way. On the other hand, nonpositioned quantity is
characteristic of discrete quantities such as number.

95. In this question, Ockham is accepting for the sake of argument the distinction be-
tween the two sorts of position as explained by Scotus. According to Scotus, position as
a differencia of quantity bespeaks an intrinsic ordering of the parts of a quantum to one
another within the whole. Position as a category, on the other hand, bespeaks an extrinsic
relation of the quantum and its parts to the place that contains it.

In the Tractatus de Corporis Christi, chap. 30 (OT 10:164–65), Ockham gives the following
close paraphrase of Scotus' Opus Oxoniense 4, dist. 10, ques. 1, n. 14: "Some say this: 'The
sort of position that is a differencia of quantity is necessarily in a quantum or inheres nec-
body along with the first sort of position while destroying the second sort of position.

For the opposite: It is impossible for both the foundation and the terminus of a relation to be posited unless the relation itself is posited or unless the thing in question is denominated by the [appropriate] relative concept. But the quantity of Christ's body is the foundation of the second sort of position, and the place of the host to which Christ's body is present is the terminus of this relation. Therefore, it is impossible for that quantity to be present to that place unless it has position with respect to that place. /389/

necessarily in a continuous and permanent quantum. And in the case under discussion it is necessary to preserve this sort of position, which bespeaks the order of the parts within a whole. And it is not at all intelligible to claim that something is a dimensive quantum unless it is possible to assign within the whole an order of one part to another according to a mediating quantity. On the other hand, the sort of position that is posited by some as a category adds something beyond this first sort of position. For presupposing the order of the parts within the whole, it further posits this order of the parts with respect to a place, i.e., with respect to the parts of the place or parts of the thing that locates [the quantum]. This amounts to saying that the parts [of the quantum] are coextensive with the parts [of the place], in the way that a whole is said to be primarily commensurate with the whole place in which it has its 'where', with the result that position as a category presupposes position as a differentia of quantity and specifies the 'where'. And it is possible for God to separate this second sort of position from a quantum while the first sort of position remains. And [it is possible for God to do this] not only by negating the 'where' in the sense that he could create a body outside of the universe, in which case body would not have the second sort of position because it would not have any containing thing with whose parts the parts of the contained thing would be commensurate. Rather, even if one posits a terminus which, as also present, could possibly be commensurate with or coextensive with another body, it would [still] be possible for God to conserve the quantum and its coexistence with the other quantum and yet to conserve it without the coextension of the parts of the one with respect to the parts of the other, a coextension that the second sort of position bespeaks."

96. Suppose that Socrates is similar to Plato in being wise. Then the resulting relation of similarity that inheres in Socrates has Plato as its terminus and the wisdom of Socrates and Plato as its foundation. In the case of position as a category, the terminus is the containing place in which the quantum that has position is located, and the foundation is that quantum's dimensive quantity, i.e., its having parts outside of parts ordered to one another in some configuration or shape.

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply that it is impossible for the quantity of Christ's body, insofar as it is present to a place, to have the sort of position that is a differentia of quantity unless it also has the sort of position that is itself a category.

Proof 1

I prove this in several ways. The first proof is this: The sort of position that is a differentia of quantity is an ordering of the parts within a whole. Now I ask whether (i) this is a positional ordering such that one part is higher and another lower, one part in front and another behind, etc., or whether (ii) it is an ordering of perfection such that one part is more perfect and another more imperfect, or whether (iii) it is an ordering of whole and part in the way that the eye is a part of the head, or whether (iv) it is an ordering of causality such that one part is a cause of another, or whether (v) it is an ordering of origin or nature such that in reality one part is prior in nature to another. I do not see any other way in which it is possible for there to be an ordering of the parts within a whole.

If the ordering of the parts within a whole is understood in the first way, then I have what I set out to prove. For it is obvious that there cannot be a positional ordering in the absence of a local distance between the parts. For in an ordering of this sort, it is possible to assign a first part, a second part, and a third part with respect to the place when the body is immediately present to a place; and, consequently, such an ordering cannot exist without the sort of position that is a category.

If one is talking about an ordering in the other four ways, then one cannot say that the ordering in question is a differentia of quantity. For each of these other sorts of ordering would be able to belong to the parts of the substance of Christ's body if that substance were separated from all quantity in just the same way that it belongs to them now when that substance is conjoined with /390/ quantity. For, as regards the second sort of ordering, one part would be more perfect than another in just the same way in that case as it is now. Again, one thing would be a part of another—e.g., the eye would be a part of the head—in just the same way in that case as it is now. Nor would it be any more true in that case than it is now that one part is a cause of another. Nor would it be any more true in that case than it is now that one part is prior in nature to another, since, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics § [11.1019a1-4], one thing is prior in nature to another when it is able to be separated from the other, but not vice versa. There is no such priority among the parts of a body, since each part is able to be separated from the others, and vice versa. And so it is manifestly obvious that only a posi-
tional ordering, which requires a local distance between the parts, makes a thing a quantum and makes it have the sort of position that is a differentia of quantity.

Proof 2

The second proof is this: Every positioned quantum has length. But nothing has length unless there is a local distance between its parts. Therefore, if the quantity of Christ's body under the host has length, one part must be distant from another, and one part must exist outside another.

Proof 3

The third proof is this: Every quantum is extended. But nothing is extended unless one part is distant from another and exists outside another. For a thing's being present to a quantum is not sufficient for its having extension; otherwise, the intellective soul would be a quantum, since it is present to the whole body and to each of its parts. Therefore, if the quantity in question has the sort of position that is in the genus of quantity, then it is an extended thing that has one part outside another. And, consequently, it has the sort of position that is an ordering* of the parts in a place. /391/

Proof 4

The fourth proof is this: Every continuous quantum that is permanent and positioned is formed by some shape. But an ordering of the parts in a place is required for shape if the shaped body is present to a place. Therefore, an ordering of this sort is required for quantity and for the sort of position that is in the genus of quantity. The assumption is proved from the fact that no other sort of ordering among the parts is sufficient for shape, since a shape is changed when there is a mere local change among the parts without any other sort of change. This is evident in the case of one who gets up, sits, and stands, where there is a difference in shape solely because of local motion. It is also evident from the fact that if God were to create a man along with all his absolute accidents under the appearances of bread, so that he existed in that place definitively and existed nowhere else circumscriptively, then that man would have no shape. For he would have neither a circular shape nor a quadrangular shape nor a triangular shape, and *so* on* for* the* others*. Nor would his body be rare or dense. For the parts of his body would not be close to or remote from one another, since they would all exist together. But the only reason for this is that they would not be ordered in a place. Therefore, etc.

Proof 5

The fifth proof is this: A homogeneous body—e.g., fire or air—truly has the sort of position that is a differentia of quantity, since it is truly a quantum. But among the parts of such a body there can only be a positional ordering that is (i) an ordering of the parts in a place and (ii) the sort of position that is a category. Therefore, the one sort of position cannot exist without the other. The assumption is evident from the fact that in the absence of this sort of ordering, no part can be either prior to or posterior to another, since all of them are of the same nature. /392/

Proof 6

Sixth, this conclusion is evident from the Philosopher in the Categories [6.4b21-24 and 5a15-23], where he divides quantity into having a position and not having a position and gives examples such as a line, a surface, and a body for things that have a position. For each one of these is positioned somewhere. But such positioning cannot exist without an ordering of the parts in a place. Therefore, etc.

Objection 1

But against this: If a nature is related contingently to any given species and individual contained under a genus, then it is related contingently to that genus as a whole, since when something determines a determinate genus for itself, then it determines for itself a determinate species of that genus. But Christ's body is related contingently to any given species of the sort of position that is a category and to any given individual, since it is able to exist without any given species. Therefore, it is able to exist without the genus as a whole, and, consequently, it is able to have the one sort of position without the other.

Objection 2

Further, when there are two relations that come to a thing extrinsically and one of them presupposes the other, then the one that is prior is able to be separated from the one that is posterior. But this is how it is with the relations of presentness and position. Therefore, a quantity is able to be present to a place without having a position. /393/

Objection 3

Further, the category of position presupposes the category of 'where' in the proper sense, viz., the circumscriptive 'where'. But God is able to conserve a quantum without a 'where' in the proper sense. Therefore, etc.
their significata in one mode of signifying but instead signify something in the nominative case and something in an oblique case. And when terms of this sort are subordinated to one another, then the proposition in question is false when it is formulated by using such terms. One example has to do with ‘line’ and ‘form [of line]’. And the reason is that (i) whatever ‘line’ in general signifies, ‘form’ in general also signifies principally (even though the two terms connote certain things affirmatively or negatively in different ways), and that (ii) all the things that ‘line’ connotes negatively, ‘form’ also connotes negatively. And so it is impossible for a line to exist without having any form at all.

As for the case under discussion, I claim that even though a quantified body is related contingently to any given position in the category of position, it nonetheless cannot be present to a place and yet be separated from the genus [of position] as a whole—and this because both ‘position’ as a category and ‘position’ as a differentia of quantity signify the same thing that ‘quantified body’ signifies. Therefore, a quantified body cannot be separated from all positions.

Reply to Objection 2 and Objection 3

To the second and third objections I reply that neither position nor presentness nor ‘where’ are “little relations” of the sort that people imagine. This is evident from the fact that if they were, then a quantity that was present to a place could be separated from them, in which case the quantum in question would not have parts /395/ ordered in a place—which involves a contradiction, as has been proved. Therefore, I claim that the terms ‘position’ and ‘where’ convey only absolute things in different modes of signifying.

Reply to the Main Arguments

As for the main arguments, it is evident from what has been said that there are no relations of the sort that people imagine there to be.
Question 19

Is the extended material substance of Christ’s body composed of substantial parts that are of the same nature and that are distinct from one another in position?

For the negative: This [attribute] belongs only to a quantity. Therefore, it does not belong to a substance. /396/

For the opposite: One part of the matter, and of the corporeity as well, is in the head and another part is in the foot. Therefore, etc.

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply that the extended material substance of Christ’s body, both the matter and the form, is composed of substantial parts that are locally distant from one another. 98

FOUR PROOFS

This can be proved evidently. The first proof is this: A piece of wood is not only composed of matter and form, which are its essential parts and are of different natures, but is also composed of integral parts of the same nature, each of which is a piece of wood. But it is obvious that these parts are not in the same position. Therefore, they are distant from one another in position.

The second proof is this: When a piece of wood is divided into two halves, no substance is generated de novo in itself as a whole. But now that the division has been made, there are two substances that are really distant from one another; otherwise, the accidents in one of the halves would exist without a subject. But these two substances of wood, each of which is a determinate whole after the division, existed beforehand and constituted one whole piece of wood, and they were not at that time in the same place. Therefore, at that time they were distant from one another in position.

This is confirmed by the fact that it is possible for one of the halves of a piece of wood to be corrupted while the other half is not corrupted, and this

98. By a substantial part Ockham means a part that is itself a substance.

corruption is a substantial [change]. Therefore, some substance that previously existed is now corrupted. And it is obvious that some substance that previously existed now remains. Therefore, there were previously /397/ two substantial parts of the wood that were distant from one another in position and that constituted one piece of wood.

The third proof is this: A whiteness that exists in a piece of wood exists as a whole in some whole and as a part in a part. Therefore, either (i) it exists as a whole in some whole substance and as a part in a part [of the substance] or (ii) it exists as a whole in some whole accident and as a part in a part [of the accident]. If the first answer is given, then I have what I set out to prove—viz., that the substance in question is composed of parts that are locally distant from one another—since the parts of the whiteness are distant from one another in position, as is evident to the senses. If the second answer is given, then the accident that is the subject of the whiteness has itself some primary subject, such that the whole [of that accident] is in the whole [of that subject] and a part [of the accident] is in a part [of the subject]. And in that case I ask whether (i) it is the substance that is its primary subject, in which case, as before, I have what I set out to prove, or whether (ii) it is an accident that is its primary subject, in which case one must pose the same question as before about that accident. And either there will be an infinite regress or one will have to stop at some extended accident whose first subject is a substance having parts that are distant from one another in position.

The fourth proof is this: If any material substance did not have parts of the sort in question, then such a substance would not be extended any more than an intellective soul is. For just as an intellective soul exists as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each part of the body, so too any material substance would exist as a whole under the whole quantity and as a whole under each part of the quantity—which is absurd. Therefore, every extended material substance has substantial* parts that are distant from one another in position, one of which can be destroyed while another is not destroyed; and even while those parts remain, they are able to be separated from one another and to be wholes—which I grant. /398/

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that if quantity is, as common opinion holds, an absolute thing distinct from substance and quality, then having such substantial* integral parts does not belong only to the quantity, but instead belongs both to the extended material substance and to the quantity.
Question 20

Is an extended material substance immediately present to a place through its intrinsic parts?

For the negative: An extended material substance is present to a place only through something else, viz., through its quantity, which is in the place primarily. Therefore, it is not itself immediately present to the place through its own parts.

For the opposite: If a substance and its quantity are really distinct from one another, then the presentness of the one to a place differs from the presentness of the other to that place, since relations vary according to the variation of their immediate foundations. Therefore, both [the substance and the quantity] are present to the place immediately.

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply succinctly that the answer is yes. I prove this, first, as follows: Everything that is present to a place is present to that place either (i) through itself or (ii) through something else to which it is present. But it is certain that an extended material substance is present to a place. Therefore, it is present to a place either (i) through its own intrinsic parts or (ii) through something else to which the substance is present—viz., through the quantity to which the substance is present, a quantity that is.

99. It is important to remember that Ockham will argue below that the quantity of a substance is not in fact really distinct from the substance. Here, however, he proceeds for the sake of argument on the assumption that they are distinct from one another.

100. This counterargument is aimed at one who might be tempted to argue that the substance is not immediately present to a place because it is the quantity that is immediately present to the place. This counterargument is meant to show that there is nothing incongruous about the claim that the substance and the quantity are both immediately present to the place. For even though the substance's presentness to the place and the quantity's presentness to that place have the same terminus—viz., the place itself—they do not have the same foundations. For the parts of the substance serve as the foundation in the one case, and the parts of the quantity serve as the foundation in the other case—and by hypothesis the substance is distinct from the quantity. Hence, there are two distinct relations of presentness.

itself present to the place—and I am speaking only about that through which something that is not distant from a place is present to that place. But if a material substance is present to a place through its own intrinsic parts, then I have what I set out to prove. If [you say that] it is present to a place through something else, viz., through its quantity, then against this I argue as follows: When two things are present to one another and are not locally distant from one another, then whatever is immediately present to the one of them is immediately present to the other through the same thing. But a quantity and its place are present to one another and are not locally distant from one another, and the material substance that exists under the quantity is immediately present to the quantity through its own intrinsic parts. Therefore, it is immediately present to the place of that quantity through those same parts.

The second proof is this: A material substance is present to its quantity—a quantity that is immediately present to its place—in such a way that the whole substance is present to the whole quantity and a part to a part, since the whole substance is informed by the whole quantity and a part by a part; otherwise, the substance would not be extended. Therefore, the substance is present to the quantity either (i) immediately or (ii) through some medium. The second answer cannot be given. For regarding this medium to which the substance is present, I ask whether it is present to the material substance immediately or through a medium. And either there will be an infinite regress or else one will stop at the claim that the substance itself is immediately present to the quantity, since one cannot stop at the second step any more easily than at the first. And then I argue as follows: Every substance which, through itself and its intrinsic parts, is immediately present to a quantity in such a way that it is present as a whole to the whole [quantity] and as a part to a part, is, through itself and its intrinsic parts, immediately present to a place in such a way that it is present as a whole to the whole [place] and as a part to a part. For the substance's presentness to the place is different from the quantity's presentness to that place. This is evident from the separability [of the substance and the quantity].

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that by the very fact that a material substance is immediately present to its quantity in such a way that it is present as a whole to the whole [quantity] and as a part to a part, it is immediately present, through its intrinsic parts, to that quantity's place.
Question 21

Is it circumscriptively or definitively that an extended material substance is in a place through its intrinsic parts?

That the answer is not circumscriptively I prove from the fact that everything that is in a place circumscriptively and immediately is a quantity. A material substance is not a quantity. Therefore, etc.

For the opposite: An extended material substance is present to a place through its intrinsic parts in such a way that it is present as a whole to the whole place and as a part to a part. Therefore, it is circumscriptively in a place.

Here we must first see what it is to be in a place circumscriptively and definitively; second, I will reply to the question.

FIRST ARTICLE

As for the first article, I claim that to be in a place circumscriptively is for something to be in the place in such a way that the whole is in the whole place and /401/ a part is in a part of the place. By contrast, to be in a place definitively is to be a whole in the whole place and a whole in each part of the place, in the way that an angel is in a place, and in the way that the body of Christ is in the Eucharist. And it is in this way that an intellective soul is in the whole body and in each part of the body, even though it is not in the body as in a place.

SECOND ARTICLE

As for the second article, I claim that an extended material substance is, through its parts, immediately in a place circumscriptively and not definitively. This is evident from what was said above, since a thing is circumscriptively in a place when the whole is in the whole place and a part is in a part of the place. But an extended material substance is like this. Therefore, etc.

SIX PROOFS

The assumption is proved from the fact that if God destroyed one half of the quantity of this piece of wood and conserved the other half of the quantity in half of the piece of wood, then the two substantial parts of the piece of wood would be locally distant from one another. And if this case is posited, then the one half of the piece of wood is in a place circumscriptively, since its quantity is not destroyed. Therefore, the other half of the piece of wood is likewise in a place circumscriptively. This is evident from the fact that the substance of the piece of wood exists as a whole in the whole place and as a part in a part of the place.

The second proof is this: According to those who posit relations, a piece of wood’s relation of presentness to a place does not depend on its quantity’s relation of inherence with respect to the piece of wood, since even if that inherence is destroyed, the piece of wood can still be present to the place. Given this, I argue as follows: Anything that does not depend on a second thing can by the divine power be conserved without that thing. Therefore, the piece of wood’s relation of presentness as a whole to the whole place and /402/ as a part to a part of the place can be conserved without the quantity’s inherence with respect to the piece of wood. When this happens, it is obvious that the piece of wood will exist immediately as a whole in the whole place and as a part in a part of the place. Therefore, it is in the place circumscriptively.

The third proof is this: Just as the whole substance [of the piece of wood] is prior to the whole quantity, so too the parts of the piece of wood are prior to the parts of the quantity. Then, in keeping with the way that others speak, I ask whether in that prior [instant] the parts are in the same place or in distinct places. They are not in the same place, since they are not more in one place than in another. Therefore, in that prior [instant] they are in distinct places. But a substance that has parts in distinct places is in a place circumscriptively. Therefore, etc.

The fourth proof is this: The passive circumscription of a located thing is, according to those who speak in the common way, a certain relation. But relations vary according to a variation in their foundations as well as accord-

101. Ockham here adopts Scotus’s talk of prior and posterior instants of nature. Given that the substance and its parts are prior to the quantity and its parts, the question then becomes: In that prior instant, before the quantity is posited, are the parts of the substance all in the same place or are they in distinct places?

102. Those who posit relations posit a relation of passive circumscription in a thing that is (passively) located circumscriptively in a place.
ing to a variation in their termini. Therefore, since the substance of a piece of wood is really distinct from its quantity, the passive circumscript of the substance of the piece of wood is really distinct from the passive circumscript of its quantity. And, consequently, the substance of the piece of wood is in a place by means of one passive circumscript and the quantity is in a place by means of another passive circumscript, and the first passive circumscript could by the divine power exist when the second is destroyed.

Fifth, I argue as follows on the basis of the same medium: 103 The local distance of one part of the substance of a piece of wood from another is different from the local distance of one part of the quantity of the piece of wood from another, since relations are distinct from one another when their foundations and termini are distinct. Therefore, the whole substance of a piece of wood that has intrinsic parts locally distant from one another exists in a place circumscriptively.

Sixth, I argue as follows: The foundation and the terminus are, along with the extrinsic causes, sufficient for the existence of a relation. But the local distance /403/ of the parts of the substance of a piece of wood from one another is a relation that has as its foundation and as its terminus the substance's very parts, which are distant from one another. Therefore, once the parts of the substance of a piece of wood are posited along with the extrinsic causes that make them distant from one another, then that [relation of] distance itself will be posited. But since the quantity is neither the foundation nor the terminus of that relation, it will, if it is required, be an extrinsic cause of that relation. And then I argue further: Whatever God can bring about by means of an extrinsic cause, he can bring about immediately without that cause. Therefore, the relation in question is able to exist in the absence of such a quantity, and, consequently, the substance of the piece of wood will, through itself and through its parts, be circumscriptively in a place.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

The reply to the main argument will become evident below. 104

103. The medium of proof is in both cases the premise that relations vary according to variations in their foundations and termini.
104. See Quodlibet 4.24.

Is God able to conserve an extended material substance without local motion while destroying every absolute accident in it?

For the negative: God is not able to make an extended substance in the absence of extension. But if God destroyed every absolute accident in a piece of wood and conserved the long, wide, and deep substance of the piece of wood, then that substance would be extended in the absence of quantity and extension.

For the opposite: This does not involve a contradiction. Therefore, it can be brought about by God. 104/

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply succinctly that the answer is yes.

And in order to prove this I base my argument on the article of the faith 'I believe in God the Father Almighty'. 105 From this article I infer the proposition 'Whatever God produces by means of secondary causes, he is able to produce and to conserve immediately without those causes'. But by means of secondary causes he expels and introduces many absolute accidents in the same patient while it remains unchanged locally. This is evident in cases of alteration and generation where what is generated and what is corrupted are equal in all dimensions, and where not only the quality but also the quantity of the corrupted thing is corrupted, and where a new quantity is introduced, according to those who speak in the common way, without any local motion on the part of the matter. 106 Therefore, God is able by himself to destroy every

105. This is the opening line of the Apostles' Creed.
106. What Ockham apparently has in mind here is the view of those who, following the "common way of speaking," deny that an animal has a form of corporeity distinct from its sentient (or intellective) soul. For such thinkers hold that immediately upon the death of an animal, the corpse of the animal is a substance distinct from the body that the living animal had. And since by common consent what is numerically the same accident cannot migrate from one substance to another, these thinkers must, it seems, claim that the quantity that the corpse has now is an entity distinct from the quantity previously had by the body of the living animal, even though (i) the two substances are exactly the same in all quantitative dimensions and (ii) the matter common to both has not undergone any local motion.
be able to separate itself totally and naturally from that other part. Therefore, if left to its own nature, it would remain unmoved locally.

The fourth proof is this: The substance of a piece of wood, which exists under the natural accidents, is in a place circumscriptively and is present to the place through its intrinsic parts, as was proved earlier. Now I argue as follows: God is able to conserve the substance of the piece of wood, as present to its place, without any local change in it and without the presence of the absolute accidents to that place. For just as the substance of the piece of wood is prior in nature to its accidents, so too the substance is present to its place prior to the accidents' being present to that place. And, consequently, God is able to separate the one presence from the other.

The fifth proof is this: Every relation is able by the divine power to be conserved in the absence of whatever is neither the foundation nor the terminus of that relation. But the distance by which one part of a piece of wood is distant from another part of the substance of the piece of wood is, according to those people, a certain relation whose foundation is the part of the substance that is at a distance and whose terminus is another part of the substance, a part from which that first part is distant. And, consequently, no absolute accident is either the foundation or the terminus of that relation. Therefore, that numerically identical relation of distance can be conserved in the absence of all the absolute accidents. And so it is possible for the substance of the piece of wood to be conserved in the absence of all local motion and for all its absolute accidents to be destroyed or separated.

**REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT**

As for the main argument, I grant that God is able to conserve the long, wide, and deep substance of the piece of wood—and thus the extended substance of the piece of wood—in the absence of any sort of extension that is an absolute thing distinct from the substance.

107. The motion in question would apparently have to be instantaneous. But no natural agent can bring it about that an extended substance now has a place that is totally discontinuous with the place it just occupied.

108. Here the translation follows the alternate reading that omits the word quasi.

109. See Quodlibet 4.21, Second Article and Six Proofs.
Question 23

Is a material substance able to be a quantity or a quantum through its intrinsic parts?

For the negative: An attribute that is adequate to some primary subject can never belong to anything except by the mediation of that primary subject. This is evident in the case ofrisible and human being. But to be a quantum is an attribute that is adequate to a quantity, which is an accident. Therefore, it cannot belong to a substance in the absence of that quantity.

For the opposite: A material substance is able to be long, wide, and deep through its intrinsic parts. Therefore, it is able to be a quantum through those parts.

Here we must first see what it is to be a quantum; second, I will reply to the question.

First Article

As for the first article, I claim that to be a quantum is to have parts outside of parts and to have parts that are distant in position from parts. From this two things follow. The first is that everything that is per se one and truly extended is really and truly a quantum. The second is that everything that is in a place circumscriptively is a quantum, since every such thing exists as a whole in the whole place and as a part in a part of the place. And, conversely, every quantum is in a place circumscriptively if there is a place surrounding it.

Second Article

As for the second article, I claim that a material substance is able to be a quantum through its intrinsic parts.

110. Ockham makes this last qualification because he believes that it is possible for God to make a quantum outside of the world and hence outside of every place. See Quodlibet 4.18, Reply to Objection 1.

Proof 1

I prove this in several ways. The first proof is this: As was made evident earlier, God is able to conserve an extended material substance as locally unmoved and to destroy every absolute accident in it. If this is posited, it is obvious that the whole substance of a piece of wood is conserved in such a way that none of its parts is destroyed, but instead the same parts that previously existed remain. Regarding these parts, I ask whether they are or are not now distant from one another in place in the same way that they previously were, when they were the subjects of accidents. If the first, I have what I set out to prove, since, as is evident from the first article, everything that is per se one and has parts distant from one another in place and position is a quantum. If the second, and if those parts have not been corrupted and it is not the case that one part has been converted into another (since they remain as they were previously), then they will necessarily have been moved locally, since they were previously distant from one another in position and now are not. But this is contrary to the hypothesis.

Proof 2

The second proof is this: I take the whole substance of this piece of wood stripped of all its absolute accidents; and let this be A. And I ask whether or not it is the case that A exists together with its whole place and a part of A exists together with a part of the place. If the answer is yes, then A has parts that are distant from one another in place and position, and, consequently, A is a quantum through its intrinsic parts. If the answer is no and if previously, when A existed under its accidents, A existed together as a whole with the whole place and as a part with a part of the place, then some part of A has been moved locally. For everything that is at first present to a place and afterwards, while it remains in existence, is no longer present to that place, has necessarily been transferred from one place to another, since it does not exist outside of all places. And, consequently, some part of A has been moved locally.

You might object as follows: A is not in a place except through its quantity, which is an accident of the substance. And so when God destroys that quantity, it is not the case either that A is in a place or that it is changed locally.

Against this [I reply that] this does not seem to be well put from a theological point of view. For according to all the Saints, an angel is in a place and changes from one place to another, and yet he is not a quantum through
a distinct quantity of the sort in question. Therefore, in the same way, even if the substance of the piece of wood is separated from every accident, still, unless $A$ is posited outside of the world, the whole of $A$ and each of its parts will be in a place—and thus the argument stands. /409/

You might still object as follows: If every absolute accident is destroyed, $A$ will be in a place definitively, as an angel is, and not circumspectively. Against this: On the assumption that $A$ is in a place definitively, I prove that it is in a place circumspectively. For if $A$ is in a place definitively, then for the same reason its parts, $B$ and $C$, are in a place definitively. And then I ask whether or not $B$ is definitively in the same part of the place that it was in previously. If it is, then for the same reason $C$ will be definitively in the same part of the place that it was in previously. And, consequently, $B$ and $C$ are now distant from one another in place and position just as they were previously before the destruction of the accidents, since they have remained in the same places. But every whole having parts that are distant from one another in place is circumspectively in a place. Therefore, $A$ is circumspectively in a place. On the other hand, if $B$ (and, likewise, $C$) is not definitively in the same part of the place that it was in previously, then this is either (i) because $B$ is somewhere else definitively and is, consequently, locally changed, or (ii) because $B$ is not anywhere definitively—and this cannot be said about $B$, just as it cannot be said about an angel either, since $B$ remains within the world. And, similarly, if this claim were granted, then $B$ would change locally, since by the fact that it remains in existence and is not in the same place that it was in before, it necessarily changes locally.

**Proof 3**

Third, I argue as follows: Taking two [volumes of] water, $A$ and $B$, I argue in this way: It does not take less power to conserve $A$ and $B$ without any absolute accidents when they do not constitute a single [volume of] water than it does to conserve $A$ and $B$ without any absolute accidents when they are parts of a single total [volume of] water. But God is able to conserve $A$ in Rome and $B$ here without any such accidents. For if God were to separate $A$ in Rome from its accidents and to separate $B$ here from its accidents, God would not have to transfer $A$ to this place or to some middle place; and the same holds for $B$. And so $A$ and $B$ are conserved in distinct places when they do not constitute a single thing. Therefore, if $A$ and $B$ were parts of a single [volume of] water, God would be able to conserve $A$ and $B$ in distinct places and destroy all the absolute accidents in them. If this were posited, then that whole substance would be a quantum through $A$ and $B$, which are its parts and are distant from one another in position—which is what I set out to prove.

This is confirmed by the fact that if God were by his absolute power to conserve the whole substance of the great ocean without any absolute accidents, then God would not have to transfer the substance of the water that is in the east to the water of the sea that is in the west, or to transfer it to a middle place, or vice versa. Rather, if this were posited, it is obvious that the substance in question would be a quantum through its own parts, some of which would be in the east and some of which would be in the west.

**Proof 4**

Fourth, when a subject and an accident have parts that correspond to one another in such a way that distinct parts of the substance correspond to distinct parts of the accident, then it takes no less power to conserve the parts of the accident without any local motion in the accident or its parts while destroying the substance than it does to conserve the parts of the substance without any local motion while destroying every absolute accident in the substance. But God does the former in the Eucharist when he destroys the substance of the bread and conserves its accidents. Therefore, God is able to do the latter. When this is done, it is obvious that the substance in question is a quantum through its own parts.

This is confirmed by the fact that it is more reasonable to claim (i) that a substance /411/ that has parts that are locally distant from one another is in a divisible place without any accidents in such a way that the substance exists as a whole in the whole place and as a part in a part than to claim (ii) that a substance that lacks all parts is in a divisible place in such a way that it exists as a whole in the whole place and as a whole in each part. But the latter is true de facto, as is evident from the case of an angel and from the case of a separated soul. Therefore, the former can be true—at least by God's power.

**Proof 5**

Fifth, every absolute entity that exists under an absolute accident that informs it in such a way that the subject exists as a whole under the whole accident and as a part under a part is able by the divine power to exist together with that same accident even when the accident does not inhere in it or inform it. This is proved immediately by the fact that it is possible for a relation that comes to an entity extrinsically to be corrupted while the extremes of the relation remain. But an accident's inherence with respect to a substance is a relation that comes to the substance extrinsically. Therefore, etc. This being so, if God were to conserve the substance of a piece of wood as present to its quantity in the absence of any informing or inhering [and yet] in such a way that the substance of the piece of wood was present as a whole to the whole quantity and as a part to a part, then just as that quantity would have a part
locally distant from a part, so too the substance of the piece of wood would have a part locally distant from a part—and, consequently, the substance of the piece of wood would be a quantum through its intrinsic parts.

You might object as follows: If the quantity’s relation of inherence with respect to the substance is removed, then the substance will not be present to the quantity in the way described above.

Against this I reply that the substance’s relation of presentness with respect to the quantity is prior to the quantity’s relation of inherence with respect to the substance. This is evident from the fact that the relation of inherence cannot be separated from the relation of presentness, whereas the converse is possible, since a substance is able to be present to many things that do not inhere in it. But what is prior in nature is able to be separated from what is posterior—at least by the divine power. Therefore, the whole substance’s relation of presentness with respect to the quantity is able to be separated from the quantity’s inherence with respect to the substance. If this [separation] is posited, then, in the absence of any inherence, the substance of the piece of wood will be present as a whole to the whole quantity and as a part to a part. And, consequently, the substance will through itself have a part distant from a part. Therefore, in this way it is a quantum through its own parts.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

As for the main argument, I deny the assumption. For to be a quantum does not belong to a substance through any accident; nor does it belong to an accident through its substance. Therefore, it does not belong primarily to either of them as an attribute.

Question 24

Is a material substance able to be a quantum through its intrinsic parts without a quantity’s being added to it?

For the negative: A substance is not white in the absence of a whiteness; therefore, a substance is not a quantum in the absence of a quantity. The consequence is evident from the fact that the argument is the same in both cases.

For the opposite: It is possible for a substance to be a quantum through its intrinsic parts. But if what is possible is posited as actual, then nothing impossible follows. Therefore, a substance is in fact a quantum without any quantity’s being added to it.

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply that a substance is in fact a quantum through its intrinsic parts without any absolute thing’s being added to it.

Proof 1

I prove this in several ways. The first proof is this: When a proposition is made true by things, if two things are sufficient for its truth, then it is superfluous to posit a third. But the propositions ‘A material substance is a quantum’, ‘A material substance is in a place circumscriptively’, ‘A material substance has parts outside of parts’, and ‘A material substance has a part distant from a part’, along with exactly similar propositions, are made true by things. And a substance, along with its intrinsic parts and its place, is sufficient to make such propositions true, since it is impossible for a material substance to be in a whole place and for the parts of the substance to be in the parts of that place unless all the above propositions are, if formulated, true. Therefore, it is superfluous to posit a third thing—viz., a quantity—in order to make these propositions true. But a quantity is not posited for any other reason. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is evident from the fact that if one posits the hypothesis that the substance exists as a whole in the whole place and as a part in a part, then one preserves the following claims in just the way he would if he posited a mediating quantity: (i) that the parts of the substance are distant from one another in position, (ii) that the material substance is able to receive qualities whose parts are naturally apt to be distant from one another in place, (iii) that the substance is a quantum, (iv) that the substance has parts outside of parts, and (v) that the substance is in a place circumscriptively. This is evident from what has been said. Therefore, etc.

You might object that this is true as long as the parts of the material substance are in distinct places, but that the latter cannot be brought about in the absence of a quantity that mediates between the substance and its qualities.

Against this I reply that the parts of a material substance are made to exist in distinct places by the same causes and the same power by which the substance is brought into existence.

112. Here the translation follows the alternate reading that omits the word et.
But such a substance is not brought into existence by a quantity of the sort in question, since that quantity, even if it is posited, is an accident and is posterior to the substance. And, consequently, it is not the quantity that makes the parts of the substance exist, but only the efficient cause.

This is confirmed by the fact that an entity has both its existence and its distinctness by virtue of the same thing. But the parts of a substance do not have existence by virtue of a quantity. Therefore, it is not by virtue of a quantity that they are distinct from one another in position.

Proof 2

The second proof is this: Every effect depends sufficiently upon its essential causes. Therefore, if the local distance between the parts of a substance depends upon a mediating quantity of the sort in question, then the quantity is a cause of the distance between those parts. But this is false. For the quantity is neither a final nor an efficient cause of that distance, both because (i) that which is posterior does not cause anything with respect to that which is essentially prior to it, and because (ii) even if one posited [that the quantity is a cause of the distance between the parts], the substance would still be a quantum through its intrinsic parts in the absence of that quantity, since the latter would be only an extrinsic cause of that distance. Otherwise, even though God is an efficient cause of that distance who, when it so pleases him, supplies the causality of every secondary cause, he would not be able to make the substance have a distance between its parts in the absence of a mediating quantity of the sort in question—which is false.

And it is certain that this quantity is not a material cause [of the distance between the parts]; nor is it a formal cause of that distance between the parts in the way that something is white through a whiteness. For if that were so, then just as it is impossible that things should be white without a whiteness (and this whether they are separated from one another or are parts of a [single] whole), so too it would be impossible that those things that are now distant from one another in place through a quantity should be distant from one another in place in the absence of such a quantity (and this whether they are parts of a [single] whole or are separated from one another). But the opposite of this was proved above and is evident from the fact that God could (i) divide a piece of wood into two parts, (ii) put one part in Rome and the other part here, and (iii) separate the parts from all accidents. If this were done, then those parts would be distant from one another in place and yet would be so in the absence of such a quantity. And the same would hold if they were parts of a single piece of wood, as before.

113. See Quodlibet 4.23, Proof 3.

114. See Scotus, Opus Oxoniense 4. dist. 10, ques. 3, nn. 3-5.
from one another. But in rarefaction the substance and the qualities both remain and the quantity does not remain. For since there is a greater quantity in the rare thing than in the dense thing, it is necessary in rarefaction either that (i) the entire previous quantity is corrupted or that (ii) there are two quantities in the same subject. The second answer should not be posited. Therefore, the first answer must be posited, and, consequently, the things in question are necessarily distinct from one another.

For the opposite: This [conclusion] can be proved neither through propositions that are known per se nor through experience. Therefore, it cannot be proved evidently.

THE OPINION HELD BY MANY

Proof 1
There are many who reply that the answer to this question is yes. They prove this in several ways. The first proof is this: No accident is identical with a substance. But every quantity is an accident, since it is in a category of accidents. Therefore, etc. /417/

Proof 2
The second proof is this: Experience teaches that in condensation something is lost. However, according to the Philosopher in Physics 4 [2.217a21–217b16], what is lost is not a substance or a quality. Therefore, some quantity is corrupted, and the substance is not corrupted. Therefore, they are distinct from one another.

Proof 3
The third proof is this: The length and width of [a volume of] air and a fire are of the same species, since every quantity is of the same species as any other quantity. But the fire and the air are not themselves of the same species. Therefore, the quantities in question are distinct from the substances.

Proof 4
Fourth, it is impossible for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time naturally. But a substance and a quality exist in the same place. Therefore, if each of them is a quantity and a body, then two bodies exist in the same place—indeed, as many bodies would naturally exist in the same place as there are material qualities that naturally exist in the same place with a substance—e.g., taste, color, smell, sweetness, heat, and so on for the others.

The fifth proof is this: It is impossible for the same thing to be per se an individual [of the category] of substance and also an individual [of the category] of quality; therefore, it is impossible for the same thing to be per se /418/ an individual [of the category] of substance and also an individual [of the category] of quantity. The antecedent is true. The consequence is evident from the fact that ‘quantity’ is predicated essentially of its individuals in the same way that ‘quality’ or ‘substance’ is predicated [essentially] of its individuals.

And this is confirmed by the fact that an individual [of the category] of substance and an individual [of the category] of quality are related to substance and quality in such a way that it is impossible for that individual to exist unless it is a substance or a quality. Therefore, in the same way, it is impossible for an individual [of the category] of quantity to exist unless it is a quantum.

Reply to Proof 1
To the first of these proofs I reply, with Anselm in Monologion, chapter 25, that ‘accident’ is said in three ways, viz., strictly, broadly, and most broadly. It is taken strictly for an accidental form that informs a substance and does not constitute with its subject a thing that is per se one. Examples are a whiteness, a blackness, and other such things. It is taken broadly for all things that are contingently predicatable of a thing and can be successively affirmed and denied of that thing because of a change either in that thing or in something else. Examples are a similarity, an equality, and other such things. For Socrates can be called similar to Plato [after having been dissimilar to him] either (i) because Socrates changes to being white if Plato is white or (ii) because Plato changes to being white if Socrates is white. ‘Accident’ is taken most broadly for anything that is contingently and successively predicatable of a thing, regardless of whether (i) such a predicatable can belong to a thing [after not having belonged to it] because of either a change in itself or a change in something else, or whether (ii) such a predicatable may belong to it [after not having belonged to it solely] because of a change in something else. And ‘accident’ in this sense is said of God. An example: God is /419/ contingently said to be creating, to be Lord, etc. And he is successively said to be creating and not creating solely because of a change in the creatures.

If ‘accident’ is taken in the first sense, then I claim that not every quantity is an accident, just as not every relation is an accident, since the relations predicated of God in time are not accidents in this sense.

If ‘accident’ is taken in the second sense, then a quantity is an accident, just as a relation is, since ‘quantum’ and ‘quantity’ are predicatable contingently of a substance solely because of a local change in that substance. For ‘The material substance of Christ’s body is a quantity’ is now in fact true,
since ‘The substance of Christ’s body has parts outside of parts’ is now in fact true, viz., in heaven. However, if by God’s power this substance (i) ceased to exist in heaven just by losing its ‘where’ and (ii) had existence only under the host, then ‘This substance is not a quantity’ would be true, since in that case this substance would not have parts outside of parts. And yet Christ’s body would not be corrupted; rather, it would only cease to be present to one place in heaven and would begin to be present to another place under the host. And, consequently, the contradictories ‘being a quantity’ and ‘not being a quantity’ would be truly predicated of that substance successively, solely because of its local motion.

To the form of the argument I reply that ‘A quantity is an accident’ must be distinguished according to the third mode of equivocation, since ‘quantity’ is able to supposit either (i) personally or (ii) simply or (iii) materially. If it is supposing in the first way, then ‘A quantity is an accident’ is true, since some quantity—e.g., a whiteness—is an accident. And, similarly, ‘A quantity is a substance’ is true, since some quantity is a substance insofar as ‘quantity’ is suppositing personally. For an indefinite proposition is made true by one singular thing; hence, this quantity (referring to the substance of the body of Christ in heaven) is a substance. 1420/1

On the other hand, if ‘quantity’ is suppositing either simply or materially, then ‘Every quantity is an accident’ is true, since in that case ‘quantity’ is being taken either for a spoken word or for a concept. 115 And in this sense ‘A substance is a quantity’ is false. However, if ‘quantity’ is being taken personally, then this last proposition is true.

Reply to Proof 2

To the second proof I reply that the experience in question proves just the opposite, since in condensation it is not the case that the entire previous quantity is corrupted. For the taste, the color, and all the accidents of the condensed body would be corrupted continuously if their immediate subject were corrupted. 116 Therefore, that immediate subject remains. Therefore, either (i) the entire quantity remains without any new parts, in which case the substance comes to have less quantity without the corruption of any absolute entity, or (ii) a part of the quantity is corrupted, in which case I ask, concerning the primary subject of that [corrupted] quantity, whether (a) it

115. According to Ockham, concepts are mental qualities and spoken words are physical qualities. Hence, they are both accidents in the category of quality. This is why the proposition ‘Every [token of the term] “quantity” is an accident’ is true.

116. Ockham presupposes here for the sake of argument that the quantity of a substance is the immediate subject of its “material” qualities.
same species in the category of quantity (for ‘length’, which is a species of quantity, is predicated univocally of this length and of that one), and yet they are of different species in the category of substance. However, even though the term ‘is predicated in quid’ of this length and of that one, it is nonetheless not predicated in quid of a pronoun referring to the thing outside the soul. An example: The predication ‘This length is a length’ is univocal and in quid, but not the predication ‘This substance, or this entity, is a length’, where one refers to the substance by means of an absolute term.

Reply to Proof 4

To the fourth proof I reply that ‘body’ is taken two ways. In one way, it is taken for an individual that exists per se in the genus of substance and that is not apt by nature to be a part of anything that exists per se in the genus of substance. In a second way, it is taken for that which is long, wide, and deep through its intrinsic parts. If one takes ‘body’ in the first way, then it is not possible for two bodies to exist in the same place naturally, and it is of such things that the Philosopher is speaking. If one takes ‘body’ in the second way, this is possible when the one thing is apt by nature to be a form [inhering in] the other. And this is how it is with the qualities in the case under discussion.

You might object that it is because of a repugnance between their dimensions that two bodies, taken in the first sense, cannot exist naturally in the same place; and, consequently, no dimensions can exist in the same place.

I reply that it is repugnant to the dimensions of bodies in the first sense to exist in the same place naturally (even though it is not repugnant to them to exist in the same place by the divine power). But this is not repugnant to the dimensions of bodies in the second sense. And no reason for this is to be sought other than that such is the nature of things. And this is clear to us partly through reason and partly through experience. For through reason it is clear that there is no mediating thing between a substance and its qualities; and through experience it is clear to us that matter and a material form and an extended quality all exist in the same place when [the latter two] inform the matter. Similarly, it is clear through experience that when a body that naturally exists per se enters a place, another body leaves that place.

You might object as follows: We see that a body that naturally exists per se gives way to the eucharistic appearances, and yet those appearances are apt by nature to inform a substance.\(^{118}\)

\(^{118}\) The thrust of this objection is that Ockham can give no reason why the eucharistic appearances should not inhere in, rather than expel, a substance S that “attempts to” occupy the same place that they are in. For Ockham has already asserted that sensible qualities can exist in the same place as a substance. The suggestion implicit in the objection is that we must postulate an absolute quantity in which those appearances inhere and which is by nature such that it cannot occupy the same place that S occupies.

Reply to Proof 5

To the fifth proof I reply that the consequence is not valid, since ‘substance’ and ‘quality’ are absolute terms that signify their different significata in one mode of signifying. This is not the case with ‘quantity’.

To the proof I reply that ‘quantity’ is predicated essentially and in quid of its own individual—i.e., of the individual’s connotative term—as, for example, in ‘This line is a quantity’ and ‘This surface is a quantity’. But it is not predicated in quid of its individual’s absolute term—as, for example, in ‘Socrates is a quantity’, ‘This piece of wood is a quantity’, and ‘This whiteness is a quantity’.

To the confirmation I reply that there is no similarity [between the two cases]. For ‘quantity’ signifies a substance while connoting that it has parts outside of parts; and because the substance can exist even if it does not have parts outside of parts, it follows that it can exist even if it is not a quantity.\(^{119}\) On the other hand, ‘substance’ and ‘quality’ do not connote anything in this way. Therefore, [a substance or a quality] cannot exist unless it is a substance or a quality.

**Reply to the Main Argument**

To the main argument I reply that the argument proves just the opposite, since in rarefaction it is not the case that the entire previous quantity is corrupted. For if that were the case, then all the qualities—e.g., the color and the taste—would be continuously corrupted because of the [continuous] corruption of their subject.\(^{120}\) Therefore, [the previous quantity] remains. Therefore,
either (i) the entire [previous quantity remains] without any new parts, in which case the body becomes rare without the acquisition of anything absolute, or (ii) a part of the quantity is acquired de novo, in which case I ask, concerning the primary subject of that [new] part of the quantity, whether (a) it existed beforehand naturally without any quantity, which cannot be claimed; or whether (b) it was the subject of a quantity, in which case, because the previous quantity is not corrupted and the subject receives a new quantity, either the subject now has two quantities or the previous quantity will have naturally migrated from one subject to another. And since the same argument holds for a part of the rare thing and for the whole, it follows that either the entire quantity will be new or no part of it will be new. But it is not the case that the entire quantity is new, since then in the same place there would be two dimensions, one of which is apt by nature to expel the other. Therefore, I claim, as I did before in the case of condensation, that the substance becomes rare without the acquisition of a quantity, because by virtue of an agent cause the parts of the substance are more distant from one another now than they were before. /425/

trary to the faith would follow. The first is that just as the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, so too the quantity of the bread would be converted into the body of Christ. The second is that just as the substance of the bread is converted by the power of the sacrament into the substance of the body of Christ, so too it would be converted into the quantity of the body of Christ, /426/ and so, by virtue of the conversion, the body of Christ would be a quantum and would exist in a place circumscriptively under the host—which is false.

Proof 2

The second proof is this: After the consecration it is impossible for the parts of the appearances [of the bread] to exist together naturally in the same position, since they expel one another and other bodies as well. 121 This natural incomposibility does not belong to them through the qualities, since the whiteness and other qualities [of the bread] can be intensified in the same subject and in the same position; and, according to the faith, the substance of the bread does not exist in that place. 122 Therefore, this natural incomposibility will belong to them through a mediating quantity.

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121. The appearances (species) spoken of here are the qualities of the bread that remain after the consecration and can be seen in the same sensory experiences that the bread itself would cause. These sensory experiences are not illusory, since the qualities that cause them really exist in the place where the body of Christ now is.

The present argument focuses on the fact that these appearances are extended over the place previously occupied by the bread, and they exist in that place circumscriptively. The argument in effect is asking why these appearances do not collapse into one another and come to occupy exactly the same place as one another; its answer is that the quantity of the bread, which is by nature an extended thing having parts outside of parts, remains as their subject and bestows on them the natural incomposibility in question.

Ockham's reply below is that extended qualities are extended by their nature and do not need another entity—viz., a quantity—to account for their being extended.

122. By common consent, the intensification of, say, a whiteness existing in a given place consists in an increase in the number of parts of whiteness that occupy that place. So suppose that place P in the eucharistic appearances is white. Since the whiteness at P does not by nature exclude other parts of whiteness from coming to occupy P, it does not exclude the whiteness of the other parts of the eucharistic appearances from coming to occupy P. So one cannot appeal to the nature of the whiteness at P in order to explain why the whiteness of the other parts does not come to occupy P once the substance of the bread is gone. Nor can one appeal to the substance of the bread, since it is no longer present. Therefore, the objection concludes, the whiteness must inhere in a quantity that keeps the whitenesses in question spread out and prevents them from collapsing into one place.