John of Mirecourt

Question 6

1  Can any truth be cognized evidently by a created nature?

2  First, it is argued that it cannot be cognized: No falsity can be cognized by a created nature, therefore neither can any truth

2.1 The antecedent is clear, since the false is not known (*scitur*), as is clear in Bk. 1 of *Posterior Analytics*; therefore, neither is it evidently known;

2.2 The inference is proved, since if the false is more evident than the truth, this would be on account of its appearing. But I prove that this appearing cannot yield certainty, since the latter can stand with falsity even more than with truth, but so it is with any appearing, since according to the Philosopher in Bk. 8 of the *Topics*, nothing prohibits various false claims from being more probable than various true claims. Therefore.

3  On the contrary: some truth can be known by a created nature, therefore it can be cognized evidently.

3.1 The inference is clear, since knowledge (*scientia*) is an evident cognition of the truth.

3.2 And the antecedent is clear, since the conclusions of a demonstration can be known by a most certain knowledge, similarly, many propositions are *per se* known, therefore.

4  Concerning the question, I will first put forth a characterization of evidentness, and it is this: that evidentness is twofold; one is the special evidentness of first principles, the other is the natural evidentness of our ingenuity (*ingenii*).
4.1 Special evidentness is that by which somehow someone assents that something is without any fear, by an assent caused naturally in him from causes necessitating him to that assent, and it is not possible that he so assents and that things are not as he assents that they are.

In this description, four parts are posited;

4.1.1 The first is: special evidentness is that by which someone assents that somehow something is, since evidentness is a kind of assent or is not without an assent.

4.1.2 The second is: without any fear, which excludes opinion as well as suspicion or conjecture, which are not without fear about a fact or a possibility.

4.1.3 The third is: by an assent caused naturally, an account through which faith is excluded, since it is an assent believed (*creditoris*) and is not without a command of the will.

4.1.4 The fourth is: and it is not possible [etc.], which excludes the other, natural evidentness, which I will now address.

4.2 Natural evidentness is that by which somehow someone assents that something is without any fear, and this is by an assent caused naturally in him from causes necessitating him to that assent, and it is not possible – while holding in place God’s general influence, without any miraculous deed having occurred – that he so assents and that things are not as he assents that they are.

All parts of this description were clarified except the last, which is posited to differentiate it from the first evidentness.
[Conclusion One]

5 With this premised, I posit some conclusions:

The first is this: a created intellectual nature can know, with an evidentness reduced to the certainty of first principles, that *if a man is, an animal is*, that *if God exists, God exists*, and other propositions of this kind that are evident from the terms or that can be deduced as a formal inference from first principles, or from principles *per se* known.

6 This is proved thus: knowing evidently the antecedent of some inference with the evidentness of the first principle, and knowing evidently the inference with the same evidentness, he knows or he can know the consequent with the same evidentness.

6.1 This is clear, since it is known evidently, with an evidentness reduced to the certainty of the first principle, that if the antecedent of some formal and evident inference is evident, then the consequent is evident; but it is evidently known that such propositions follow from the first principle either medially or immediately, and the first principle is evident with that evidentness. Therefore both those propositions [are known with such evidentness].

7 The second is argued thus: one assents that if man is, an animal is, without any fear, by an assent created in it naturally from causes necessitating it to that assent, and since whether he wills it or not, it is not possible that he so assents and that it is not so, since otherwise it would not be necessary that it is so. Therefore it is evidently known that *if a man is, an animal is*, and others of this kind,

7.1 The inference is clear through the characterization given about evidentness and the antecedent is known well enough.
Against this conclusion it is argued thus: it is not evident with such evidentness that the first principle exists, that the antecedent exists, that the consequent exists, that the proposition exists, or that the inference exists. Therefore it is not evident in this way that if a man is, an animal is.

8.1 The inference is clear, since if a man is, an animal is is one proposition and one inference.

8.2 And the antecedent is proved, since it is not evident with such evidentness that many things exist; therefore it is not evident that the first exists, or that the principle exists, or that the antecedent exists, etc.

Second, it is argued [against the first conclusion] thus: one cannot be certain of the first principle; therefore neither can he be certain with that certainty that if a man is, an animal is.

9.1 The inference is clear through the aforesaid and the antecedent is proved: about the first (de primo), the intellect cannot be certain concerning that which it can be in error; but so it is for any principle; therefore.

9.2 The minor is proved, since with respect to anything God can cause a dissension in some soul, therefore he can cause it to err. This is confirmed, since some deny first principles, therefore they dissent, therefore it is not evident by such an evidentness, since such evidentness is without any fear.

To solve these [two contrary] arguments, I put forth the following propositions.

10.1 The first is that someone can evidently know, with the evidentness of the first principle, some proposition or some inference, and not know evidently that a proposition or inference is known by him; this is clear of a simple man who knows
evidently that either he is or that he is not, and nevertheless does not know evidently with such evidentness that some proposition exists or that some inference exists.

10.2 The second is that someone can evidently know the antecedent of some inference (for now I speak always of evidentness in the first way mentioned above), and someone can evidently know the consequent of the same inference and evidently know the inference and not know evidently that something is the antecedent or that something is the consequent, nor know that the consequent follows from the antecedent. This is clear just as the first proposition is.

10.3 The third is that someone can evidently know the first principle and not know what a first principle is, nor know whether the first principle exists. This is clear, since the first principle is immediately evident to anyone who forms it, and nevertheless many have doubted about what a first principle is – whether, for instance, it is a categorical or a hypothetical proposition and from which terms it is composed.

10.4 The fourth is that someone can evidently know some proposition and not know with such evidentness whether the proposition is true or false, and similarly can know some inference and not know evidently whether that inference is valid; this is clear from the premises.

10.5 The fifth is that someone can evidently know some proposition and not evidently know whether things are as that proposition signifies; this is clear, since it cannot be known whether a proposition exists and whether the proposition signifies, therefore nor can it be known whether things are as the proposition signifies.
10.6 This sixth is that no one can evidently know some proposition and yet, insofar as the proposition signifies that things are, he would in no way know that they are. This is clear, since it implies a contradiction.

11 From these it is clear how to respond to the argument: by conceding the antecedent and denying the inference, the reason for which denial is clear through the premises.

11.1 To the proof I concede the assumption, but I say that it is not evident, which would be required before the inference would be valid.

12 For the solution of the second argument, it must be known that according to diverse ways there are diverse modes of speaking, for those who hold the first two opinions which I recited in the second conclusion of this lecture would have to concede the following propositions:

12.1 The first is that God cannot, by himself alone, cause any evidentness in the mind. This is clear, since according to that opinion, God by himself alone cannot cause any intellection in the soul; therefore neither can he cause evidentness.

12.2 Second: God cannot cause, by himself alone, any error in the soul.

12.3 Third: By mediating secondary causes, God can cause in the soul some evidentness; this is clear, since with sufficient movements in the soul he causes that, as is clear.

12.4 Fourth: By mediating secondary causes, God can cause some error; this is clear just as the previous.

12.5 Fifth: By mediating secondary causes, God cannot cause an error in which some dissent from the first principle, since this would be principally (potissimo) from the cognition of some thing, but this cannot be, since every cognition is suited to cause an assent of the first principle. Likewise, since God can cognize by a
mediating whiteness no more than God can cause by a mediating secondary cause an error or dissent with respect to the first principle.

12.6 Sixth: by mediating secondary causes, God can cause an error with respect to the first principle; this is clear, since one can doubt about its being and such things.

According to this, the response to the argument is to deny the antecedent.

13.1 To the proof, the minor and its proof is denied, as is clear through what was said.

13.2 As for the confirmation, it is said that although philosophers deny with their mouth, nevertheless they do not deny with their heart, as is clear through the Philosopher in Bk. 4 of the *Metaphysics*.

13.3 However, those who hold the third, more common opinion (of those recited above in the aforementioned question) say that God can, by himself alone, make it so that someone errs even concerning a first principle, and therefore they deny the major, as it is expressed, since they say that through God’s power someone can dissent from the first principle (or from the opposite of the first principle), but not reasonably, since from the fact that he dissents, the truth of the first principle follows. This is not so for many dissents by which one dissents to something true. If it is said: God causes an error with respect to the first principle in this person’s soul, therefore he can rationally doubt, I say that he can rationally if that means meritoriously and not demeritoriously, but he cannot do so without there being a reason for the opposite, since the opposite implies a contradiction.

[Second Conclusion]
The second conclusion is this: with the aforesaid first kind of evidentness, reduced to
the certainty of the first principle, a created soul evidently knows or can know that
something exists and that it exists.

This is proved with respect to the first part and similarly with respect to the second
thus: that is evident to someone which cannot be rationally doubted by him, in whatever
possible way the case is posited, and admitting that it implies a contradiction that it appears
to him thus and it not thus, and he assents with an assent caused by causes necessitating him
to that assent.

15.1 This is clear through the aforesaid description, and so it is in these cases,
since if someone doubts that something exists or that he exists, he has to concede
that it follows evidently: he doubts that something exists, therefore he exists, since in
granting that he does not exist, he would not doubt; and it follows: if he exists,
therefore something exists; and in the same way it follows: he believes that
something exists, therefore something exists. Similarly, it appears to him that
something exists, therefore something exists, through the same line [of argument].

15.2 With respect to the first part it is argued thus: something exists, therefore it
is either dependent or independent; the inference is evident and the antecedent is
evident, therefore so also is the consequent. Then it is thus: something is and this is
dependent or independent, but whether it is dependent or independent, it evidently
follows from each that God exists, since it follows evidently: an independent thing
exists, therefore God exists, since by ‘God’ I understand nothing other. And from
the other half it follows: a dependent thing exists, therefore it depends on something
else, and it is evidently known that this process cannot go on to infinity, therefore it
is evidently concluded from this that it is dependent on that which is independent, therefore God exists, therefore etc.

15.2.1 Without doubt, I doubt [sic!] whether it is evident that there is no process to infinity, which, nevertheless, if it is not evident, the conclusion is not true with respect to this half, and therefore I do not assert it.

16 On the contrary: no intellect is certain about any truth, therefore.

16.1 The inference is clear; the antecedent is proved, since, if it is certain, it follows that the intellect can be certain about some falsehood that it is true, but this is impossible, as will become evident, therefore.

16.2 The inference is proved, since, if one were certain about some truth, this would be since it appears to the intellect to be true and *per se* known, but some false proposition can appear to the intellect to be true and *per se* known, since otherwise he could not be deceived, and then it is asked whether that false proposition appears true from the terms, and thus the proposed would hold; or it appears to be true from some other true proposition, and this not, since from something true what is false does not follow, or it appears true from some false proposition, and then I ask about that whether it is known from the terms or from something else, and thus will the process proceed to infinity, or there is some false proposition which will appear to be true from the terms.

17 Second, it is argued that it is not evident that “God exists,” since it evidently follows: God exists, therefore infinite and most perfect being exists.

17.1 The inference is good, and the antecedent is evident to you, therefore the consequent is evident to you, and by the same reason, it will be evident that the first cause exists. And this consequent is false, since it is not evident that any cause exists.
17.2 Confirmation. This inference is good: no infinite being exists, therefore God
does not exist. The antecedent is doubtful to you, therefore the consequent is not
denied by you, therefore the opposite of the consequent is not evident.

18 For the solution of these arguments, I posit the following propositions:

18.1 First, it is not possible that what is false is *per se* known or evident, since it
implies a contradiction.

18.2 Second, it is not possible that what is false follows evidently from some true
proposition; this is also clear, since it implies a contradiction.

18.3 Third, a person’s indisposition makes him frequently assent to something
false, as is clear from the sick.

18.4 Fourth, the indisposition of the medium makes someone frequently assent to
something false; this is clear from the broken stick.

18.5 Fifth, a true assent can on occasion (*in casu*) give rise to one’s assenting to
something false; this is clear, since according to the Philosopher, Bk. 2 of *Sophistical
Refutations*, some think that honey (*mel*) is poison (*fel*), on account of the agreement
between the words.

18.6 Sixth, although nothing is evident unless it so appears to be, nevertheless it is
not mainly because it appears so to be that it is thus evident; rather, many others
causes concur [in making it be evident].

19 On the basis of these propositions, in reply to the argument: the antecedent is denied
and the inference is denied by which the antecedent is proved. In response to the proof the
major is denied, as is clear through the sixth conclusion, and the minor, as is clear through
the first. And when the minor is proved, it is clear what the reason is why it appears true,
and I say that it is clear, since occasionally whenever from some true proposition, although it does not follow from it.

20 To the second, whatever is the case concerning the conclusion, nevertheless the argument does not conclude, since, although the inference is good, nevertheless it is not evident, which is required for the argument to conclude.

20.1 In the same way for the confirmation, I say that the antecedent is not doubtful to me. So I assert this proposition: that, however much the antecedent of some inference is not evident, nevertheless it can be that the consequent is evident, since from something believed or doubted there can follow something evident, although not vice versa.

[Third Conclusion]

21 The third conclusion is this: no proposition is demonstrable from per se known and necessary propositions by a created intellect, but that, as things are signified through that proposition, so it can be evident to the same intellect.

22 This is proved thus: every such proposition follows from an evident inference from things that are evident, therefore it itself is evident or can be evident.

22.1 The inference is clear, since from an evident antecedent and an evident inference an evident consequent follows.

22.2 And the antecedent is proved, because it follows through a demonstration, as is said in the conclusion, which is an evident inference.

23 Second, the same conclusion is clear through the aforesaid description of the evidentness of the first principle.
24 Nevertheless, against that conclusion, there stands a double response. In one way it is thus, since an appearance was caused for the philosopher about this false principle, “from nothing, nothing comes,” and thus it seemed to him that it follows from per se known, as with any demonstrated conclusion, but he was not certain about this nor was it evident to him, therefore neither was anything else.

25 Second, the intellect can be equally certain about that about which there can be an equal appearance within the intellect. But there can, within the intellect, be an appearance about anything that has been made, as there can be for any demonstrated conclusion, and yet something false is not known evidently. Therefore neither is a demonstrated conclusion.

The minor is proved, since the appearance of the true does not exceed the appearance of the false in an infinite [measure], therefore through a finite [measure] alone, as [for instance] by double, Then the appearance of the false can be intended and the appearance of the true can be remitted until they arrive at equality, and then the intended result is had.

26 For the solution of these arguments, I posit the following propositions:

26.1 The first is this: it is possible that, for some created intellect, it is not now be evident that it is thus, or that it now doubts that it is thus as it will be evident to it later, and conversely, since perhaps until he knew evidently it was not reduced to what is per se. ??

26.2 Second, it is possible for any two people, that one of them doubts that it is so and the other knows that it is so; this is clear, because of the case where it is a demonstration for one and not for the other.

26.3 Third, one who holds that God cannot be by himself the sole cause of some evidentness has to say consequently that it is not possible for someone to know a
first principle and to know evidently some inference from which some conclusion follows from them and to doubt that conclusion.

26.4 Fourth, it is possible for someone to believe firmly that he knows something and [yet] not to know it.

26.5 Fifth, it is not possible that someone so assents to something false, but that he could rationally doubt the opposite in such a way that it will not be evident to him that the opposite contains a contradiction.

26.6 Sixth, with an equally intense assent, someone can assent to something false as to something true.

27 From these the response to the arguments is clear. To the first I concede the antecedent, as is clear through the sixth proposition, and deny the inference, and the reason for my denial is that the Philosopher was able rationally to doubt it, as is clear through the fifth proposition.

28 To the second, I say that the major is not universally true since, as it was said, evidentness is not posited through the magnitude of the appearance or the judgment, but on account of the fact that it evidently follows from the first principle, or on account of the fact that it is evidently known \( (scitur) \) that the opposite contains a contradiction.

[Fourth Conclusion]

29 The fourth conclusion is this, that the aforesaid evidentness is evident or can be to a created soul that understands [or] that cognizes, and, if I were to say that God cannot by himself alone make that soul assent and dissent without a secondary cause, I would also say that it could be evident to a soul that it knows, that it evidently cognizes, that it wants to be happy, and that I senses, that it lives, and others of this kind.
30. This is proved as follows: for the soul can assent that it cognizes [or] that it understands, and it cannot dissent or erroneously assent to this through the command of the will or through any reason, true or possibly sophistical, that is possible for it. This is because that assent could not be an error on account of the apprehensive clarity of the complex and non-complex cognitions necessitating such an assent. But every such assent is evident, therefore etc.

31. Second, it is argued here by the authority of the Blessed Augustine, in Bk. 15 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 12: we know, he says, that we live, and further we do not fear that we are deceived by some likeness, since it is certain also that he who is deceived lives.

32. Against this conclusion it is argued as follows. Whatever God can do with a mediating second cause, he can do immediately through himself. But God can cause that judgment by which someone judges himself to love or to will something or to know, and he can cause it by the means of such love, and so therefore he can cause that judgment without that love, and indeed can do so while that act of loving is entirely non-existent, since he depends on no other kind of cause but himself, unless effectively. But if God were to do this, then the one judging would would be deceived, and therefore he would not judge evidently, which is the intent of the objection.

33. Second, it is argued thus: it is not necessary for a soul to cognize, therefore it is not evident to a soul, the evidentness having been reduced to the certainty of the first principle, that cognizes or understands.

33.1 The antecedent is clear, since it can be otherwise, and the inference is proved, since the first principle is so evident that it is impossible to be otherwise through any sort of power.

34. To solve these arguments, I put forth various propositions:
34.1 The first is this: for no supposition that does not attain evidentness is it possible for some judgment to be evident that was and was not evident (speaking always about the aforesaid evidentness).

34.1.1 This is clear, since by no such supposition does something become necessary that was and was not necessary, nor impossible that was and was not impossible, therefore.

34.1.2 The inference is clear, since there is no evident judgment that is possible, and is otherwise through any power than (quam?) it is judged to be through that [judgment]. Thus this is necessary: if it evidently is judged so to be as it is, that it not be made [false?] through the positing of any event (casus) not attaining to evidentness.

34.2 Second: if some supposition has been granted or plausibly deduced, it must be granted that something is evident, something that, if this had not been posited or granted or proved, nor would this be granted, and conversely.

34.2.1 This is clear, because posited that it were evident that God cannot cause by himself alone any evidentness, then it would be granted that it is evident, since something would be known evidently, just as evidently something is known, otherwise it would not be granted.

34.3 The third proposition, which follows from these, is that none of the aforesaid conclusions is evident with this evidentness, and for this reason I posit them not on account of their evidentness, but on account of their plausibility (probabilitatem).

34.4 Fourth, on behalf of the solution of the other, there is this: it is not only what is necessary that is evident by the evidentness of the first principle.
34.4.1 This is clear, since it is not only what is necessary that is such that its opposite, along with a naturally created assent, implies a contradiction. Instead, sometimes this is so of something contingent, as is evident through the aforesaid.

35 From these, the response to the arguments is clear. To the first it is clear that the conclusion must be granted, as I have said that it is evident to someone that something is evident to him, but I said that this must be granted on the supposition of what is supposed there, and thus I grant that conclusion, that it is not evident to someone with the aforesaid evidentness whether he knows anything.

36 To the second the inference is denied, as is clear through the fourth proposition.

36.1 And to the proof, I say that it rightly concludes that such evidentness is not in every way that of the first principle, but it stands with this that it is evident once its evidentness has been caused, because of the aforesaid evidentness.

[Fifth Conclusion]

37 The fifth, negative conclusion is this, that no one knows evidently, with the aforesaid evidentness, that something other than himself exists – for instance, not that whiteness exists, nor also thus that a man exists, nor also that two things are or that many are and so on for such cases, nor that man is other than a donkey and the like.

38 This is proved thus: that is not known evidently with such evidentness about which someone can rationally doubt in such a way that it is not evident that it implies a contradiction for things to appear thus and not to be thus. But so it is for things of this sort. Therefore.
38.1 The major is clear through the aforesaid. The minor is proved, for I ask from where this would be evident to him. It would be either through sense or through the intellect. But it is not through the intellect, since it does not follow: the intellect understands some other thing than itself, therefore some thing is other than it. This is clear enough, though it does indeed follow that if it understands something to be, then something is. So by so much or by such evidentness by which you know that something exists you do not know that something other than yourself exists, because then this would follow from the one just as from the other. Neither can it be said that through some sense you know this, since this would be the case most of all through sight, but this is not so. Proof: that the power of sight is confused and the medium disordered and the object not in a proportionate distance; therefore it does not judge with certainty about its object.

38.1.1 This inference is good and the antecedent is doubtful with respect to such evidentness and will always remain doubtful; therefore the consequent should not be denied by you.

39 Second, because many times you judge that you see a donkey when you do not with just as much strength as when you really do see a donkey. Still, despite such a judgment and despite the most firm adhesion, you are deceived and you do not see that which you believe. Therefore, on account of no matter how strong a judgment and firm adhesion, you do not have to grant that things are as they appear to you, and this especially where it does not follow: it appears to you that things are so, therefore they are so. Neither do you have to judge that this is, therefore this is. Therefore from no evident antecedent could you infer that something other than yourself exists.
39.1 This is confirmed: God indisposes the medium and thing seen; therefore sight does not judge with certainty about its object.

39.1.1 The inference is good and the antecedent is doubtful to you, therefore you do not have to deny the consequent.

40 It is argued against this conclusion, since based on this conclusion (cognitione?) someone knows evidently that he exists and that God exists, if this could be reached from per se known propositions, then it is argued thus: you know evidently that you are and that God is, but God is a thing other than you, therefore you know evidently that there is a thing other than you.

41 Second, since the reason that is given for why no one has evidentness that a thing that appears externally exists – that it is not known (sequitur?) whether God might make this to appear without its being so – this cannot be.

41.1 Proof: God deceives no one nor can he deceive; but, if he were to do this, then God would deceive human beings; therefore he does not do this nor can he.

42 For the solutions of these, I posit the following propositions.

42.1 Let the first be this: something is known evidently that nevertheless is not known evidently to be something. This is clear, since someone knows evidently that something exists, and nevertheless does not know whether this thing that is known is something.

42.2 Second: many things are known evidently, although it is not known evidently that many exist. This is clear, since many conclusions can be known and nevertheless it is not known evidently whether they are many.
42.3 Third: where some of the premises are non-evident, it need not [omit ??] be
the case that the conclusion is non-evident; this is clear from Bk. I of the Prior
Analytics.

42.4 Fourth, God can, by himself alone or with mediating secondary causes,
dispose or indispose [a thing] in such a way that the soul, in judging about its object,
will judge otherwise than as it is. This is clear, since God can cause there to be some
humor in the eye, and it is also clear in the case of deceptions.

42.5 Fifth: God cannot deceive someone, since whoever deceives does something
other than he ought.

42.6 Sixth: it can be that the soul is deceived and that no one deceives it.

43 From these I reply to the arguments: to the first, it is clear that the inference is not
valid, as is clear through the third proposition.

44 To the second, it is clear that the minor should be denied, since given that God so
indisposes a thing either by himself alone or by means of a secondary cause, nevertheless he
does not deceive, since he does not do otherwise than he ought.

[Sixth Conclusion]

45 The sixth conclusion is this, that no created nature can evidently know with such
evidentness any future contingent.

46 I argue thus: no judgment is evident with which it is consistent (stat) that things are
not as they are judged to be, but so it is for any judgment that a created nature has or can
have about a future contingent; therefore.

46.1 The major is clear through the aforesaid description of evidentness, and the
minor is proved, since let a created nature judge or have judged that the Antichrist
will be, and let that judgment be *a*. Then it cannot be but that *a* will be, and
nevertheless it can be that the Antichrist will not be. Then it is argued: he judged that
the Antichrist will be and the Antichrist will not be, therefore he judged erroneously.
The antecedent is possible, therefore so is the consequent, and this can be argued in
the same way for any future contingent.

47 Second, it is confirmed through Anselm, who shows, in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter
2, that an evil angel did not foreknow nor was able to foreknow its fall, and here this is the
knowledge (*scientia*) that exists only inasmuch as a thing is understood through certain
reason; about such knowledge, he said, one altogether cannot know what could have not
been so; for what is able not to be so can by no means be gathered by certain reason,
wherefore by no means does it stand that he could foreknow his fall, which was not
necessarily something that was to be. For let us posit that his fall was not to be. Then do you
think that he was able to foreknow it, if it was not something that was to come?

48 Against the conclusion, it is argued first, since then the blessed do not have
evidentness about the eternity of their beatitude, therefore it would not be secure, therefore
it would not be blessed.

48.1 The first inference is clear through the conclusion, since that is a future
contingent; and the second is clear, since one could rationally doubt about this; and
the third is clear, since security is the greatest part of beatitude according to the
Blessed Augustine.

49 The second is argued thus: God evidently knows future contingent, and nevertheless
with this it holds that they could not be; therefore it holds at the same time that future
contingents are known by God and nevertheless can fail to be; therefore similarly for a
created intellect.
50 For the solution of these, I posit the following propositions:

50.1 The first is: no one who is blessed knows evidently that his beatitude will last forever, although he believes this firmly without any hesitation. This is clear through the conclusion.

50.2 Second: everyone who is blessed knows or can know what does not imply a contradiction: that he believes his beatitude will be forever and yet it will not be forever. This is clear, since otherwise the principle (?) could be evident to him.

50.3 Third: these do not hold at the same time: that someone is blessed and that he considers whether his beatitude will be forever and he doubts whether his beatitude will be forever. This is clear, since error is incompatible with the state of beatification.

50.4 Fourth: about any future contingent, this is possible: “a creature firmly assents to this future contingent and it will not be thus.”

50.5 Fifth, about no future contingent is this possible: “God assents to this and it will not be thus,” since God could [then] err.

50.6 Sixth: about any future contingent it is possible that it does not come about.

51 From these, I grant the first inference of the first argument, and the consequent is clear through the first proposition, and I deny the second inference and consequent, since he believes firmly, as is clear through the second argument, and also I deny the third inference and its proof, as is clear through the third proposition.

52 To the second I grant the antecedent, as is clear through the sixth proposition, and I deny the inference, as is clear through the fifth proposition, and I deny also the second inference, the cause of this denial being clear though the fourth conclusion, since it is not similar since God cannot err and a creature can.
[Seventh Conclusion]

53 The seventh conclusion, that with natural evidentness in the second aforesaid mode it can be evident to a created soul that whiteness exists, that blackness exists, that a human being exists, and that a donkey exists, and that two things exist, and that many exist, and others of this kind.

54 This is proved thus: no experience is but that it causes in the one experience (inexperimentate ??) or can cause an apprehension (notitiam) that he does not doubt, nor could it happen through a natural power, while the common influence of God remains, that he experiences things thusly and they are not so. But through such an experiment we can cognize that whiteness exists, that a human being exists, and others of this kind. Therefore such an apprehension can be caused, therefore it can be caused with the aforesaid evidentness.

55 Second, since, unless we were to have some evidentness about such things, it would follow that we would have no evidentness about anything other than ourselves, which does not seem as if it ought to be granted. The inference is clear enough.

56 Against this conclusion it is argued first thus: there is no such judgment but that through a natural power it could be that that judgment exists and that things are not so as they are denoted to be. Therefore it is not evident with a natural evidentness.

56.1 The inference is clear, and the antecedent is proved, since such a judgment can be caused, given that things are not so, either in sleep or on account of an indisposition of the medium or the organ, or on account of illusions, as is clear through experience.
Second, since, if so it would follow that it is possible yet that the Philosopher had evidentness that the world will remain for eternity. This is false, therefore.

57.1 The falsity of the consequent is clear, since that is false and it is not possible that he knew something false.

57.2 The inference is proved, since the Philosopher assents to that without any hesitation, without fear, and with an assent caused in him from causes and reasons necessitating his intellect to the assent. Nor was it naturally possible that he so assented and that it was not so, and yet it is possible that things were as he assented them to be, since God can make the world be forever. Therefore etc.

For the solution of these I posit these propositions:

58.1 The first is this: any two assents can be of the same character, one of which will be evident and the other will not be evident. This is clear, if someone sees the host consecrated and assents that he sees bread, and the other does not see it consecrated and assents that he sees bread.

58.2 Second: some assent is now evident in me and that can become not evident while I do not know it, and likewise conversely.

58.3 Third: there are no plausible (probabiles) reasons necessitating the assent without the fear of the proposition that they prove, since they necessitate only opinionative assent.

58.4 Fourth: only experience or demonstration mediately or immediately necessitates the assent of some proposition which remains doubtful without them.

59 From these to the first argument the inference is denied, as is clear through the two first propositions, and because it is not evident unless it is so, as is clear from the description of the former evidentness.
60. To the second also the inference is denied, and to the proof the antecedent is denied, as is clear through the two last propositions, hence the Philosopher had only an opinion, nor could he have had certitude naturally.

[Eighth Conclusion]

61 The eighth conclusion and last is this: there is some truth about which it is evidently known that it is true, and nevertheless that is in no way an evident apprehension (notitia).

62 This is clear as follows: I take an angel who knows evidently that God is three and one, and let some wayfarer form a proposition, such that he assents to it from faith, that God is three and one. Then let the angel see the proposition formed by that wayfarer. Then I argue thus: the angel indeed knows that the proposition that the wayfarer formed is true, since he knows it evidently that it is indeed as the proposition signifies, and he knows that the proposition signifies that God is three and one, therefore he knows evidently that this is true; but that apprehension is not evident; therefore.

62.1 The minor is proved, because if this apprehension that the wayfarer has is an evident apprehension then he would evidently assent without the command of the will. This, however, is not true, and consequently the proven conclusion follows, namely, that there is some truth that is evidently known to be true and nevertheless it is not an evident apprehension.

63 To the argument to the opposite of the conclusion the first inference is denied; to the proof the minor is denied; to the authority of the Philosopher: this is not against me,

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1 Apparently the text does not contain any such argument to the opposite.
since, although the Philosopher here spoke about certain false statements in respect of some true statements, nevertheless not in respect of all true statements. So much for this question.